[Federal Register Volume 85, Number 7 (Friday, January 10, 2020)]
[Notices]
[Pages 1329-1338]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2020-00213]



[[Page 1329]]

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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Antitrust Division


United States v. National Association for College Admission 
Counseling; Proposed Final Judgment and Competitive Impact Statement

    Notice is hereby given pursuant to the Antitrust Procedures and 
Penalties Act, 15 U.S.C. 16(b)-(h), that a proposed Final Judgment, 
Stipulation, and Competitive Impact Statement have been filed with the 
United States District Court for the District of Columbia in United 
States of America v. National Association for College Admission 
Counseling, Civil Action No. 1:19-cv-03706. On December 12, 2019, the 
United States filed a Complaint alleging that the National Association 
for College Admission Counseling (``NACAC'') enacted certain mandatory 
rules (collectively referred to as the ``Recruiting Rules'') that 
unlawfully limited competition between its members in violation of 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1. The proposed Final Judgment, 
filed at the same time as the Complaint, prevents NACAC from re-
imposing those or any similar rules. The proposed Final Judgment also 
requires NACAC to take specific compliance measures and to cooperate in 
any investigation or litigation examining whether or alleging that 
NACAC enacted a Recruiting Rule or any similar rule in violation of 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1.
    Copies of the Complaint, proposed Final Judgment, and Competitive 
Impact Statement are available for inspection on the Antitrust 
Division's website at http://www.justice.gov/atr and at the Office of 
the Clerk of the United States District Court for the District of 
Columbia. Copies of these materials may be obtained from the Antitrust 
Division upon request and payment of the copying fee set by Department 
of Justice regulations.
    Public comment is invited within 60 days of the date of this 
notice. Such comments, including the name of the submitter, and 
responses thereto, will be posted on the Antitrust Division's website, 
filed with the Court, and, under certain circumstances, published in 
the Federal Register. Comments should be directed to Aaron Hoag, Chief, 
Technology and Financial Services Section, Antitrust Division, 
Department of Justice, 450 Fifth Street NW, Suite 7100, Washington, DC 
20530 (telephone: 202-514-4890).

Amy Fitzpatrick,
Counsel to the Senior, Director of Investigations and Litigation.

United States District Court for the District of Columbia

    United States of America, Department of Justice, Antitrust 
Division, 450 5th Street NW, Suite 7100, Washington, DC 20530, 
Plaintiff, v. National Association for College Admission Counseling, 
1050 North Highland St., Suite 400, Arlington, VA 22201, Defendant.

Complaint

    The United States of America, acting under the direction of the 
Attorney General of the United States, brings this civil antitrust 
action to obtain equitable relief against Defendant National 
Association for College Admission Counseling. The United States alleges 
as follows.

I. Introduction

    1. This action challenges under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 
U.S.C. 1, a number of rules that restrained competition between 
colleges and universities (``colleges'') for the recruitment of first-
year and transfer students.
    2. Defendant National Association for College Admission Counseling 
(``NACAC'') is the leading national trade association for college 
admissions. Defendant's members are divided roughly into two groups: 
Non-profit colleges and their admissions personnel, and high schools 
and their guidance counselors. NACAC's college members compete 
vigorously with each other for college students, both incoming freshmen 
and transfer students. These colleges compete in a variety of college 
services, including tuition cost, majors offered, ease and cost of 
application, campus amenities, quality of education, reputation of the 
institution, and prospects for employment following graduation.
    3. One condition of membership in NACAC is adherence to NACAC's 
Code of Ethics and Professional Practices (``CEPP'' or ``Ethics 
Rules''), which sets forth mandatory rules for how member organizations 
engage in college admissions. These rules are drafted, voted on, and 
enforced by NACAC members.
    4. As part of its CEPP, NACAC includes certain rules regarding the 
recruitment of students by colleges. Prior to September 2019, among 
these rules were ones that prevented, or severely limited, colleges 
from (1) directly recruiting transfer students from another college, 
(2) offering incentives of any kind to college applicants who applied 
via a process known as Early Decision, and (3) recruiting incoming 
college freshmen after May 1 (together, ``Recruiting Rules'').
    5. The Recruiting Rules were not reasonably necessary to any 
separate, legitimate procompetitive collaboration between NACAC 
members. As part of its CEPP, NACAC establishes many rules and 
regulations for its members' conduct throughout the college admissions 
process, including, among others, when applications may open and close, 
the definitions of Early Decision and Early Access, and the use of paid 
agents in recruiting students. Many of these rules appear to strengthen 
the market for college admissions. The Recruiting Rules, however, were 
not reasonably necessary to achieve the otherwise market-enhancing 
rules contained in the CEPP, and furthermore had the effect of 
unlawfully restraining competition among NACAC's college members, 
resulting in harm to college applicants and potential transfer 
students.
    6. By establishing and enforcing the Recruiting Rules, NACAC 
substantially reduced competition among colleges for college applicants 
and potential transfer students and deprived these consumers of the 
benefits that result from colleges vigorously competing for students. 
These Recruiting Rules, which were horizontal agreements among the 
schools participating in NACAC, denied American college applicants and 
potential transfer students access to competitive financial aid 
packages and benefits and restricted their opportunities to move 
between colleges.
    7. In September 2019, NACAC members voted to remove the Recruiting 
Rules from the CEPP. Removal of the Recruiting Rules became effective 
as of the time of the vote.
    8. NACAC's Recruiting Rules were unlawful restraints of trade that 
violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1. The United States 
seeks an order prohibiting such agreements and other relief.

II. Jurisdiction and Venue

    9. Defendant NACAC is located in, and represents members that do 
business in, the United States. The rules at issue affected primarily 
the provision of college services in the United States. The colleges 
that provide these college services charge significant prices to 
students, many of whom legally reside outside the state. The sale of 
college services, and the NACAC rules that affect the sale, are 
therefore in the flow

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of and substantially affect interstate commerce. The Court has subject 
matter jurisdiction under Section 4 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 4, 
and under 28 U.S.C. 1331 and 1337, to prevent and restrain Defendant 
and its members from violating Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 
1.
    10. Defendants have consented to venue and personal jurisdiction in 
this district. Venue is proper in this district under Section 12 of the 
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 22, and 28 U.S.C. 1391.

III. Defendant

    11. Defendant NACAC is a trade association comprised of college 
admissions personnel and high school guidance counselors and their 
respective institutions. Although NACAC does have members around the 
world, its principal focus is on college admissions in the United 
States. NACAC currently has in excess of 15,000 members, representing 
several thousand colleges and high schools. In addition to maintaining 
and enforcing the CEPP, NACAC provides educational training to members, 
engages in lobbying and other public outreach, and holds dozens of 
popular college fairs that allow colleges to meet and recruit 
prospective students.

IV. Trade and Commerce

    12. NACAC is the largest trade association focused on college 
admissions in the United States.
    13. There is significant competition among colleges for college 
students, especially incoming freshmen. Colleges compete on a number of 
different dimensions of college services, including tuition cost, 
majors offered, ease and cost of application, campus amenities, quality 
of education, reputation of the institution, and prospects for 
employment following graduation. The focal point for that competition 
is the college admissions process.
    14. Colleges employ a number of competitive tactics to encourage 
students to apply for admission to, and ultimately attend, their 
institutions. Colleges typically heavily advertise to prospective 
applicants, including by sending physical and electronic mailings, by 
participating in college fairs, and by direct solicitation on high 
school campuses. Competition, however, does not end there. If a 
prospective student is accepted by more than one college, there is 
typically a competitive negotiation between the student and each 
college over the financial aid package offered to the student. 
Additionally, if a college has not met its enrollment goals by the 
summer before school begins, it often will reach back out to 
prospective students to make a competitive pitch to entice the student 
to commit to enrolling at the college in the fall. Finally, even after 
classes begin, many colleges advertise college transfer programs that 
allow students to move from one college to another between semesters.
    15. In competitive circumstances, colleges would compete vigorously 
for students to purchase their college services. This competition 
benefits students because it lowers the cost of attendance and 
increases the incentive that the colleges have to provide high quality 
or innovative services. Competition also improves an applicant's 
ability to negotiate for a better financial aid package with the 
college. Defendant's Recruiting Rules, however, blunted several avenues 
of competition for students and disrupted the normal competitive 
mechanisms that would otherwise apply.

V. The Unlawful Rules

    16. For decades, NACAC has had a set of rules governing the college 
admissions process for its members. Historically, some of the rules 
were mandatory for all members, and others were voluntary ``best 
practices.'' In 2017, NACAC members voted to reformulate the mandatory 
rules into the 2017 CEPP. The CEPP rules are mandatory for all NACAC 
members, which includes most non-profit colleges and universities in 
the United States, and also for any non-member institutions that 
participate in NACAC's college fairs. Accordingly, agreeing to NACAC 
membership, or agreeing to participate in a NACAC college fair, is 
equivalent to agreeing with other members or college fair participants 
to execute on the restrictions in the CEPP. The 2017 CEPP governs many 
aspects of the college admissions process for its members, including, 
most relevant to this action, the recruitment of students.
    17. The 2017 CEPP included several rules that unreasonably 
restricted some of the ways in which colleges recruited incoming 
freshmen and transfer students. The three Recruiting Rules at issue in 
this case are (1) the Transfer Student Recruiting Rule, (2) the Early 
Decision Incentives Rule, and (3) the First-Year Undergraduate 
Recruiting Rule. While the CEPP certainly included rules and 
regulations that were aimed at, and actually do, increase 
competitiveness between schools and ease the burden of students 
applying to college, these Recruiting Rules were not reasonably 
necessary to those procompetitive rules or any other separate, 
legitimate business transaction or collaboration between NACAC's 
members. Prior to the 2017 CEPP, virtually identical rules were voted 
on and included in earlier NACAC rules and have been in place for 
years.

A. Transfer Student Recruiting Rule

    18. The Transfer Student Recruiting Rule was codified at paragraph 
II.D.5 of the 2017 CEPP and instructed that, ``[c]olleges must not 
solicit transfer applications from a previous year's applicant or 
prospect pool unless the students have themselves initiated a transfer 
inquiry or the college has verified prior to contacting the students 
that they are either enrolled at a college that allows transfer 
recruitment from other colleges or are not currently enrolled in a 
college.''
    19. The Transfer Student Recruiting Rule acted as a ban on 
affirmatively recruiting transfer students, unduly restraining 
competition for transfer students amongst colleges.
    20. Without this opportunity for colleges to compete, potential 
transfer students may be unaware of transfer opportunities that may 
provide them lower priced or higher quality college services.
    21. Absent the Transfer Student Recruiting Rule, colleges can 
engage in significantly more recruitment of transfer students through 
direct solicitation or otherwise. Furthermore, colleges will likely 
seek to provide better experiences to their existing student base in 
order to retain them in the face of increased competition for 
transfers.

B. Early Decision Incentives Rule

    22. The Early Decision Incentives Rule was codified at paragraph 
II.A.3.a.vi of the 2017 CEPP and provided that ``[c]olleges must not 
offer incentives exclusive to students applying or admitted under an 
Early Decision application plan. Examples of incentives include the 
promise of special housing, enhanced financial aid packages, and 
special scholarships for Early Decision admits.''
    23. NACAC defined Early Decision in the 2017 CEPP as an application 
plan where ``[s]tudents commit to a first-choice college and, if 
admitted, agree to enroll and withdraw their other college 
applications.'' The Early Decision application plan is akin to an 
exclusive contract in any other industry. In this case, the student 
foregoes the opportunity to consider the competitive offers of other 
institutions in exchange for an early decision on acceptance. Colleges 
thus stand as direct competitors for Early Decision

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applicants, because those applicants are far more likely, if accepted, 
to attend the college. This results in an increased yield, which is the 
percentage of accepted applicants that choose to attend the college. 
Yield is critically important to colleges--overestimating expected 
yield can lead to less students attending than anticipated (thus 
lowering total tuition received), which could force the college to cut 
classes or layoff staff. The increased yield from Early Decision 
applicants is financially significant to colleges.
    24. The Early Decision Incentives Rule explicitly limited the scope 
of competition for Early Decision students by removing the ability of 
colleges to incent students financially or otherwise. At base, the only 
form of payment an institution may provide in exchange for the 
exclusive contract with an applicant is the early decision itself. The 
rule prohibited all other forms of competition specifically targeted at 
particular Early Decision applicants.
    25. Absent the Early Decision Incentives Rule, colleges are free to 
use any number of competitive levers to more aggressively recruit 
students. Some institutions may prefer to offer only the early 
decision, while others might compete more aggressively, such as by 
offering scholarships, preferential housing, or early course 
registration for those admitted under Early Decision.

C. First-Year Undergraduate Recruiting Rule

    26. The First-Year Undergraduate Recruiting Rule was codified at 
paragraph II.B.5 of the 2017 CEPP and required that, among other 
things, ``[c]olleges will not knowingly recruit or offer enrollment 
incentives to students who are already enrolled, registered, have 
declared their intent, or submitted contractual deposits to other 
institutions.'' Furthermore, while the rule allowed colleges to 
``contact students who have neither deposited nor withdrawn their 
applications to let them know that they have not received a response 
from them,'' it also commanded that schools could ``neither offer nor 
imply additional financial aid or other incentives'' were available 
unless the student had ``affirmed that they [had] not deposited 
elsewhere and [were] still interested in discussing fall enrollment.''
    27. The First-Year Undergraduate Recruiting Rule imposed 
significant restraints on a college's ability to recruit students. The 
rule created an arbitrary deadline of May 1 for all colleges to cease 
improving their recruitment offers to students, even though many 
students do not decide on a college until well after May 1 and many 
colleges therefore can reallocate resources to make better offers after 
May 1. Furthermore, the rule imposed significant hurdles before a 
college could improve its offer to a prospective student, requiring 
that the student first affirm both that they ``[had] not deposited 
elsewhere'' and were ``still interested in discussing fall 
enrollment.'' By directly limiting the ability of colleges to improve 
their offers to students, the First-Year Undergraduate Recruiting Rule 
operated as a significant restraint on competition.
    28. The arbitrariness of the May 1 deadline was fully highlighted 
by the recognized exception to the rule ``when students are admitted 
from a wait list.'' Section II.C of the CEPP regulates institutions' 
use of wait lists and explicitly authorizes schools to accept students 
off of a wait list as late as August 1, even when those students have 
already committed to attend another school. NACAC thus allows for 
vigorous competition over a student already committed to another school 
when a change in circumstances frees up a spot for a student on the 
wait list. The change in circumstances that free up additional 
resources to make a better offer is not conceptually distinct, but the 
rules explicitly allowed the former and prohibited the latter, 
restricting an opportunity for students to benefit from the sorting 
process.
    29. Absent the First-Year Undergraduate Recruiting Rule, 
institutions are free to continue to improve their offers to students 
after May 1, to the benefit of those students. If students have made up 
their minds about their school of choice, or are otherwise insensitive 
to the change in circumstances, they can simply reject any further 
offers received from other schools. For students who may change their 
minds due to a more beneficial offer, continued recruitment can only 
work to their benefit.

VI. Violation Alleged

    30. Defendant's college members are direct competitors in college 
services and compete vigorously for students. Defendant coordinated and 
enforced an anticompetitive agreement that restrained colleges from 
improving their offers or otherwise competing vigorously to be selected 
by students in the college admissions process.
    31. Defendant's Recruiting Rules eliminated significant forms of 
competition to attract students. These rules, which were horizontal 
agreements between NACAC's college members, denied college applicants 
and potential transfer students access to potentially better financial 
aid packages and benefits and restricted their opportunities to move 
between colleges that offered superior services.
    32. Accordingly, Defendant's Recruiting Rules constituted 
unreasonable restraints of trade in violation of Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1.

VII. Request for Relief

    33. The United States requests that this Court:
    (a) Adjudge and decree that Defendant's Recruiting Rules are 
unreasonable restraints of trade and interstate commerce in violation 
of Section 1 of the Sherman Act;
    (b) enjoin and restrain Defendant from enforcing or adhering to any 
Recruiting Rules that unreasonably restrict competition for students;
    (c) permanently enjoin and restrain Defendant from establishing 
similar rules in the future, except as prescribed by the Court;
    (d) award the United States such other relief as the Court may deem 
just and proper to redress and prevent recurrence of the alleged 
violations and to dissipate the anticompetitive effects of the illegal 
agreements entered into by Defendant; and
    (e) award the United States the costs of this action.
Dated: December 12, 2019.

Respectfully submitted,

FOR PLAINTIFF UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

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Makan Delrahim,

Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust.
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Aaron D. Hoag,

Chief, Technology and Financial Services Section.
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Bernard A. Nigro, Jr. (D.C. Bar #412357),

Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General.
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Danielle Hauck,
Adam Severt,

Assistant Chiefs, Technology and Financial Services Section.
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Kathleen O'Neill,

Senior Director of Investigations and Litigation.
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Ryan S. Struve (D.C. Bar #495406),
Travis Chapman,
Aaron Comenetz (D.C. Bar #479572),
Erin Craig,
Adrienne Hahn,
Trial Attorneys.

United States Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, Technology 
and Financial Services Section, 450 Fifth Street NW, Suite 7100, 
Washington, DC 20530, Telephone: (202) 514-4890, Email: 
[email protected].

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United States District Court for the District of Columbia

    United States of America, Plaintiff, v.
    National Association for College Admission Counseling, 
Defendant.

[Proposed] Final Judgment

    Whereas, Plaintiff, United States of America, filed its Complaint 
on [DATE], alleging that Defendant National Association for College 
Admission Counseling violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 
Sec.  1, the United States and the Defendant, by its attorneys, have 
consented to the entry of this Final Judgment without trial or 
adjudication of any issue of fact or law;
    And whereas, this Final Judgment does not constitute any evidence 
against or admission by any party regarding any issue of fact or law;
    And whereas, the Defendant agrees to be bound by the provisions of 
this Final Judgment pending its approval by this Court;
    And whereas, the Defendant agrees to undertake certain actions and 
refrain from certain conduct for the purpose of remedying the 
anticompetitive effects alleged in the Complaint;
    Now therefore, before any testimony is taken, without trial or 
adjudication of any issue of fact or law, and upon consent of the 
parties, it is ordered, adjudged, and decreed:

I. Jurisdiction

    This Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and each of the 
parties to this action. The Complaint states a claim upon which relief 
may be granted against the Defendant under Section 1 of the Sherman 
Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 1.

II. Definitions

    As used in this Final Judgment:
    A. ``NACAC'' and ``Defendant'' mean the National Association for 
College Admission Counseling, a non-profit trade association with its 
headquarters in Arlington, Virginia, its successors and assigns, and 
its subsidiaries, divisions, groups, affiliates, partnerships, and 
joint ventures, and their directors, officers, managers, agents, and 
employees.
    B. ``Agreement'' means any agreement, understanding, pact, 
contract, or arrangement, formal or informal, oral or written, between 
two or more persons.
    C. ``Early Decision'' means the college application plan as defined 
and used by the Ethics Rules.
    D. ``Early Decision Incentives Rule'' means any Rule or Agreement, 
or part of a Rule or Agreement, including, but not limited to, Section 
II.A.3.a.vi of the Ethics Rules, that restrains any person from 
offering incentives to students applying under an Early Decision 
application plan that are not available to students applying under a 
different application plan.
    E. ``First-Year Undergraduate Recruiting Rule'' means any Rule or 
Agreement, or part of a Rule or Agreement, including, but not limited 
to, Section II.B.5 of the Ethics Rules, that restrains any college or 
university from recruiting or offering enrollment incentives to first-
year college applicants on the basis that (a) a particular date has 
passed; (b) the applicants have either declined admission or not 
affirmatively indicated that they are still interested in attending 
that institution; or (c) the applicants have already enrolled in, 
registered at, declared their intent to enroll in or register at, or 
submitted contractual deposits to other institutions.
    F. ``Transfer Student Recruiting Rule'' means any Rule or 
Agreement, or part of a Rule or Agreement, including, but not limited 
to, Section II.D.5 of the Ethics Rules, that restrains any person from 
recruiting or offering enrollment incentives to transfer students.
    G. ``Ethics Rules'' means NACAC's Code of Ethics and Professional 
Practices.
    H. ``Rule'' means an enforceable regulation governing particular 
conduct or activities.
    I. ``Person'' means any natural person, college or university, 
corporation, company, partnership, joint venture, firm, association, 
proprietorship, agency, board, authority, commission, office, or other 
business or legal entity, whether private or governmental.
    J. ``Management'' means all officers, directors, committee chairs, 
and board members of NACAC, or any other person with management or 
supervisory responsibilities for NACAC's operations.

III. Applicability

    This Final Judgment applies to NACAC, and to all other persons in 
active concert or participation with NACAC who receive actual notice of 
this Final Judgment by personal service or otherwise.

IV. Prohibited Conduct

    Defendant shall not establish, attempt to establish, maintain, or 
enforce any Early Decision Incentives Rule, Transfer Student Recruiting 
Rule, or First-Year Undergraduate Recruiting Rule. To the extent such 
prohibited rules currently exist in the Ethics Rules, Defendant must 
promptly abolish them.

V. Conduct Not Prohibited

    Nothing in Section IV shall prohibit Defendant from maintaining or 
enforcing any current provisions in the Ethics Rules other than those 
specifically enumerated in Paragraphs II.D, E, and F.

VI. Required Conduct

    A. Within ten (10) days of entry of this Final Judgment, Defendant 
shall appoint an Antitrust Compliance Officer and identify to United 
States the Antitrust Compliance Officer's name, business address, and 
telephone number. Within forty-give (45) days of a vacancy in the 
Defendant's Antitrust Compliance Officer position, the Defendant shall 
appoint a replacement, and shall identify to the United States the 
replacement Antitrust Compliance Officer's name, business address, 
telephone number, and email address. The Defendant's initial or 
replacement appointment of an Antitrust Compliance Officer is subject 
to the approval of the United States in its sole discretion.
    B. The Antitrust Compliance Officer shall:
    1. Within sixty (60) days of entry of the Final Judgment, furnish 
to all of the Defendant's Management a copy of this Final Judgment, the 
Competitive Impact Statement, and a cover letter in a form attached as 
Exhibit 1;
    2. within sixty (60) days of entry of the Final Judgment, in a 
manner to be devised by Defendant and approved by the United States, 
provide the Defendant's Management and employees reasonable notice of 
the meaning and requirements of this Final Judgment;
    3. annually brief the Defendant's Management on the meaning and 
requirements of this Final Judgment and the antitrust laws;
    4. brief any person who succeeds a person in any position 
identified in Paragraph II(J), within sixty (60) days of such 
succession;
    5. obtain from each member of Management, within sixty (60) days of 
that person's receipt of the Final Judgment, a certification that he or 
she (i) has read and, to the best of his or her ability, understands 
and agrees to abide by the terms of this Final Judgment; (ii) is not 
aware of any violation of the Final Judgment that has not been reported 
to the Defendant; and (iii) understands that any person's failure to 
comply with this Final Judgment may result in an enforcement action for 
civil or criminal contempt of court against the Defendant and/or any 
person who violates this Final Judgment;
    6. maintain a record of certifications received pursuant to this 
Section; and

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    7. annually communicate to the Defendant's Management and employees 
that they may disclose to the Antitrust Compliance Officer, without 
reprisal, information concerning any potential violation of this Final 
Judgment or the antitrust laws.
    C. Within sixty (60) days of entry of the Final Judgment, Defendant 
shall furnish notice of this action to its members through (1) direct 
communication, in a form approved by the United States prior to 
communication and containing the text of Exhibit 2 and (2) the creation 
of website pages linked to the Defendant website, to be posted for no 
less than one (1) year after the date of entry of the Final Judgment, 
containing the text of Exhibit 2 and links to the Final Judgment, 
Competitive Impact Statement, and Complaint on the Antitrust Division's 
website.
    D. Defendant shall:
    1. Upon Management's or the Antitrust Compliance Officer's learning 
of any violation or potential violation of any of the terms and 
conditions contained in this Final Judgment, promptly take appropriate 
action to investigate, and in the event of a violation, terminate or 
modify the activity so as to comply with this Final Judgment and 
maintain all documents related to any violation or potential violation 
of this Final Judgment;
    2. within sixty (60) days of Management's or the Antitrust 
Compliance Officer's learning of any violation or potential violation 
of any of the terms and conditions contained in this Final Judgment, 
file with the United States a statement describing any violation or 
potential violation, which shall include a description of any 
communications constituting the violation or potential violation, 
including the date and place of the communication, the persons 
involved, and the subject matter of the communication, and steps taken 
to remedy any violation; and
    3. have its CEO or CFO, and its General Counsel, certify in writing 
to the United States annually on the anniversary date of the entry of 
this Final Judgment that the Defendant has complied with the provisions 
of this Final Judgment.

VII. Compliance Inspection

    A. For the purposes of determining or securing compliance with this 
Final Judgment, or of determining whether the Final Judgment should be 
modified or vacated, and subject to any legally recognized privilege, 
from time to time authorized representatives of the United States, 
including agents retained by the United States, shall, upon the written 
request of an authorized representative of the Assistant Attorney 
General in charge of the Antitrust Division, and on reasonable notice 
to Defendant be permitted:
    1. Access during Defendant's office hours to inspect and copy, or 
at the option of the United States, to require Defendant to provide 
electronic or hard copies of, all books, ledgers, accounts, records, 
data, and documents in the possession, custody, or control of NACAC, 
relating to any matters contained in this Final Judgment; and
    2. to interview, either informally or on the record, Defendant's 
Management, officers, employees, or agents, who may have their 
individual counsel present, regarding such matters. The interviews 
shall be subject to the reasonable convenience of the interviewee and 
without restraint or interference by Defendant.
    B. Upon the written request of an authorized representative of the 
Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division, 
Defendant shall submit written reports or responses to written 
interrogatories, under oath if requested, relating to any of the 
matters contained in this Final Judgment as may be requested.
    C. No information or documents obtained by the means provided in 
this Section VII shall be divulged by the United States to any person 
other than an authorized representative of the executive branch of the 
United States, except in the course of legal proceedings to which the 
United States is a party (including grand jury proceedings), or for the 
purpose of securing compliance with this Final Judgment, or for law 
enforcement purposes, or as otherwise required by law.
    D. If at the time information or documents are furnished by 
Defendant to the United States, Defendant represents and identifies in 
writing the material in any such information or documents to which a 
claim of protection may be asserted under Rule 26(c)(1)(G) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and Defendant marks each pertinent 
page of such material, ``Subject to claim of protection under Rule 
26(c)(1)(G) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,'' then the United 
States shall give Defendant ten (10) calendar days' notice prior to 
divulging such material in any legal proceeding (other than a grand 
jury proceeding).

VIII. Retention of Jurisdiction

    This Court retains jurisdiction to enable any party to this Final 
Judgment to apply to this Court at any time for further orders and 
directions as may be necessary or appropriate to carry out or construe 
this Final Judgment, to modify any of its provisions, to enforce 
compliance, and to punish violations of its provisions.

IX. Enforcement of Final Judgment

    A. The United States retains and reserves all rights to enforce the 
provisions of this Final Judgment, including the right to seek an order 
of contempt from the Court. Defendant agrees that in any civil contempt 
action, any motion to show cause, or any similar action brought by the 
United States regarding an alleged violation of this Final Judgment, 
the United States may establish a violation of the Final Judgment and 
the appropriateness of any remedy therefor by a preponderance of the 
evidence, and Defendant waives any argument that a different standard 
of proof should apply.
    B. This Final Judgment should be interpreted to give full effect to 
the procompetitive purposes of the antitrust laws and to restore all 
competition the United States alleged was harmed by the challenged 
conduct. Defendant agrees that it may be held in contempt of, and that 
the Court may enforce, any provision of this Final Judgment that, as 
interpreted by the Court in light of these procompetitive principles 
and applying ordinary tools of interpretation, is stated specifically 
and in reasonable detail, whether or not it is clear and unambiguous on 
its face. In any such interpretation, the terms of this Final Judgment 
should not be construed against either party as the drafter.
    C. In any enforcement proceeding in which the Court finds that 
Defendant has violated this Final Judgment, the United States may apply 
to the Court for a one-time extension of this Final Judgment, together 
with other relief as may be appropriate. In connection with any 
successful effort by the United States to enforce this Final Judgment 
against Defendant, whether litigated or resolved before litigation, 
Defendant agrees to reimburse the United States for the fees and 
expenses of its attorneys, as well as any other costs, including 
experts' fees, incurred in connection with that enforcement effort, 
including in the investigation of the potential violation.
    D. For a period of four (4) years following the expiration of the 
Final Judgment, if the United States has evidence that Defendant 
violated this Final Judgment before it expired, the United States may 
file an action against Defendant in this Court requesting that the 
Court order (1) Defendant to comply with the terms of this Final 
Judgment for an additional term of at least four

[[Page 1334]]

years following the filing of the enforcement action under this 
Section, (2) any appropriate contempt remedies, (3) any additional 
relief needed to ensure the Defendant complies with the terms of the 
Final Judgment, and (4) fees or expenses as called for in Paragraph 
IX(C).

X. Expiration of Final Judgment

    Unless this Court grants an extension, this Final Judgment shall 
expire seven (7) years from the date of its entry, except that after 
five (5) years from the date of its entry, this Final Judgment may be 
terminated upon notice by the United States to the Court and Defendant 
that the continuation of the Final Judgment no longer is necessary or 
in the public interest.

XI. Notice

    For purposes of this Final Judgment, any notice or other 
communication required to be provided to the United States shall be 
sent to the person at the address set forth below (or such other 
addresses as the United States may specify in writing to Defendant): 
Chief, Technology and Financial Services Section, U.S. Department of 
Justice, Antitrust Division, 450 Fifth Street NW, Suite 7100, 
Washington, DC 20530.

XII. Public Interest Determination

    Entry of this Final Judgment is in the public interest. The parties 
have complied with the requirements of the Antitrust Procedures and 
Penalties Act, 15 U.S.C. 16, including making copies available to the 
public of this Final Judgment, the Competitive Impact Statement, and 
any comments thereon and the United States' responses to comments. 
Based upon the record before the Court, which includes the Competitive 
Impact Statement and any comments and response to comments filed with 
the Court, entry of this Final Judgment is in the public interest.

Date:------------------------------------------------------------------
Court approval subject to procedures of Antitrust Procedures and 
Penalties Act, 15 U.S.C. 16
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
United States District Judge
Exhibit 1
[Company Letterhead]
[Name and Address of Antitrust Compliance Officer]

Re: Early Decision Incentives Rule, Transfer Student Recruiting Rule, 
or First-Year Undergraduate Recruiting Rule

Dear [XX]:
    I am providing you this notice regarding a judgment recently 
entered by a federal judge in Washington, DC affecting rulemaking 
practices. The judgment applies to our association and all of its 
employees, including you, so it is important that you understand the 
obligations it imposes on us. [CEO Name] has asked me to let each of 
you know that [s/he] expects you to take these obligations seriously 
and abide by them.
    The judgment prohibits us from establishing rules that restrict the 
ability of colleges to recruit early decision applicants, incoming 
freshmen, and transfer students. There are limited exceptions to this 
restriction. You must consult me before determining whether a 
particular recruiting rule is subject to an exception under the 
judgment.
    A copy of the court order is attached. Please read it carefully and 
familiarize yourself with its terms. The judgment, rather than the 
above description, is controlling. If you have any questions about the 
judgment or how it affects your activities, please contact me as soon 
as possible.
    Thank you for your cooperation.

Sincerely,

[Defendant's Antitrust Compliance Officer]
Exhibit 2
    Please take notice that National Association for College Admission 
Counseling (``NACAC'') has entered into a settlement with the United 
States Department of Justice relating to its rulemaking practices.
    On December 12th, 2019, the United States filed a federal civil 
antitrust Complaint alleging that NACAC established rules that 
restricted its members' ability to recruit college applicants and 
transfer students in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 
U.S.C. 1. At the same time, the United States filed a proposed 
settlement that prohibits NACAC from entering into, maintaining, or 
enforcing such rules.
    As part of its settlement with the United States, NACAC confirmed 
that it has withdrawn any offending rule already in place.
    The Final Judgment, which was recently entered by a federal 
district court, is effective for seven years. Copies of the Complaint, 
Final Judgment, and Competitive Impact Statement are available at:

[Link to Complaint]

[Link to Final Judgment]

[Link to Competitive Impact Statement]

United States District Court for the District of Columbia

    United States of America, Plaintiff, v. National Association for 
College Admission Counseling, Defendant.

Competitive Impact Statement

    Plaintiff United States of America (``United States''), pursuant to 
Section 2(b) of the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act (``APPA'' or 
``Tunney Act''), 15 U.S.C. 16(b)-(h), files this Competitive Impact 
Statement relating to the proposed Final Judgment submitted for entry 
in this civil antitrust proceeding.

I. Nature and Purpose of the Proceeding

    On December 12, 2019, the United States filed a civil antitrust 
Complaint alleging that Defendant National Association for College 
Admission Counseling (``NACAC'') enacted certain mandatory rules 
(collectively referred to as the ``Recruiting Rules'') that unlawfully 
limited competition between its members in violation of Section 1 of 
the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. Sec.  1.
    NACAC members include colleges and their admissions personnel and 
high schools and their guidance counselors. NACAC's college members 
compete with each other for college students, both college applicants 
and potential transfer students. Colleges compete on a number of 
different dimensions, including tuition cost, majors offered, ease and 
cost of application, campus amenities, quality of education, reputation 
of the institution, and prospects for employment following graduation. 
The Complaint, however, alleges that NACAC, through its rulemaking 
authority, established three mandatory rules that limited the manner in 
which its college members could compete for college applicants and 
potential transfer students.
    The first rule, the Transfer Student Recruiting Rule, expressly 
prevented colleges from affirmatively recruiting potential transfer 
students from other schools. The second rule, the Early Decision 
Incentives Rule, forbade colleges from offering incentives, financial 
or otherwise, to Early Decision applicants. The third rule, the First-
Year Undergraduate Recruiting Rule, limited the ability of colleges to 
recruit incoming first-year students after May 1. These three rules--
collectively ``the Recruiting Rules''--were not reasonably necessary to 
any separate, legitimate business transaction or collaboration among 
NACAC and its members. According to the Complaint, the Defendant's 
Recruiting Rules unlawfully restricted competition between NACAC's 
members and were unreasonable restraints of trade that violated Section 
1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. Sec.  1.

[[Page 1335]]

    At the same time the Complaint was filed, the United States filed a 
Stipulation and Order and proposed Final Judgment, which would remedy 
the violation by enjoining the Defendant from enacting, maintaining, or 
enforcing the Recruiting Rules, subject to limited exceptions.
    NACAC members voted in September of 2019 to repeal the Recruiting 
Rules, effective as of that time, and the Final Judgment seeks to 
prevent NACAC from re-imposing those or any similar rules. The proposed 
Final Judgment also requires NACAC to take specific compliance measures 
and to cooperate in any investigation or litigation examining whether 
or alleging that NACAC enacted a Recruiting Rule or any similar rule in 
violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. Sec.  1.
    The United States and NACAC have stipulated that the proposed Final 
Judgment may be entered after compliance with the APPA. Entry of the 
proposed Final Judgment would terminate this action, except that the 
Court would retain jurisdiction to construe, modify, or enforce the 
provisions of the proposed Final Judgment and to punish violations 
thereof.

II. Description of the Events Giving Rise to the Alleged Violation

A. The Defendant

    NACAC is a nonstock corporation organized in the State of Delaware 
and headquartered in Arlington, Virginia. Beyond establishing ethics 
rules that govern its members, NACAC holds dozens of college fairs that 
allow prospective students to interact with a number of regional and 
national colleges.

B. Defendant-Established Anticompetitive Recruiting Rules

    The Complaint alleges that NACAC, through the version of its Code 
of Ethics and Professional Practices (``CEPP'' or ``Ethics Rules'') 
that was effective during and prior to 2018, established three rules 
that unreasonably restrained competition between its member colleges 
for college applicants and potential transfer students. These rules, 
described in more detail below, were voted on by NACAC's members and 
were mandatory not only for NACAC's members but also for any non-
members that participated in NACAC's college fairs. Failure to abide by 
the rules embodied in the CEPP could have resulted in disciplinary 
actions by NACAC, including but not limited to exclusion from its 
college fairs or expulsion from NACAC.
1. Transfer Student Recruiting Rule
    The first rule at issue is the Transfer Student Recruiting Rule, 
originally embodied at Section II.D.5 of the CEPP. That rule provided 
that:

    Colleges must not solicit transfer applications from a previous 
year's applicant or prospect pool unless the students have 
themselves initiated a transfer inquiry or the college has verified 
prior to contacting the students that they are either enrolled at a 
college that allows transfer recruitment from other colleges or are 
not currently enrolled in a college.

    As described in the Complaint, this rule acted as a substantial 
impediment to competition between colleges for potential transfer 
students, and provided only limited exceptions that allowed for 
transfer recruitment. Absent this restriction, colleges will be free to 
recruit potential transfer students more aggressively, which will lead 
to colleges to making more attractive offers, like lower tuition costs 
or higher quality admissions packages.
2. Early Decision Incentives Rule
    The second rule at issue is the Early Decision Incentives Rule, 
which was at Section II.A.3.a.vi of the CEPP. This rule stated that:

    Colleges must not offer incentives exclusive to students 
applying or admitted under an Early Decision application plan. 
Examples of incentives include the promise of special housing, 
enhanced financial aid packages, and special scholarships for Early 
Decision admits. Colleges may, however, disclose how admission rates 
for Early Decision differ from those for other admission plans.

    This rule, as alleged in the Complaint, unreasonably limited the 
competition for Early Decision applicants. In the current admissions 
ecosystem, some colleges allow students to apply via Early Decision, 
which provides students with an accelerated decision on admission to 
that school but also requires from the student a binding commitment to 
attend if admitted. The Early Decision Incentives Rule forbade colleges 
from offering incentives (beyond the accelerated decision) to those 
students. This was an unreasonable restraint on competition. Absent 
this restriction, colleges will be free to offer a set of incentives 
for Early Decision applicants that best serves the college and its 
applicant base, including special scholarships, preferred housing, or 
other discounts on tuition. Over time, this will lead to more 
aggressive recruitment of students through more attractive offers of 
admission.
3. First-Year Undergraduate Recruiting Rule
    The final rule at issue is the First-Year Undergraduate Recruiting 
Rule, which was at Section II.B.5 of the CEPP. This rule required that:

    Colleges will not knowingly recruit or offer enrollment 
incentives to students who are already enrolled, registered, have 
declared their intent, or submitted contractual deposits to other 
institutions. May 1 is the point at which commitments to enroll 
become final, and colleges must respect that. The recognized 
exceptions are when students are admitted from a wait list, students 
initiate inquiries themselves, or cooperation is sought by 
institutions that provide transfer programs. These statements 
capture the spirit and intent of this requirement:
    a. Whether before or after May 1, colleges may at any time 
respond to a student- initiated request to reconsider an offer or 
reinstate an application.
    b. Once students have declined an offer of admission, colleges 
may no longer offer them incentives to change or revisit their 
college decision. Before May 1, however, colleges may ask whether 
candidates would like a review of their financial aid package or 
other incentives before their admission is canceled, so long as the 
question is asked at the time that the admitted students first 
notify them of their intent to cancel their admission.
    c. After May 1, colleges may contact students who have neither 
deposited nor withdrawn their applications to let them know that 
they have not received a response from them. Colleges may neither 
offer nor imply additional financial aid or other incentives unless 
students have affirmed that they have not deposited elsewhere and 
are still interested in discussing fall enrollment.

    This rule imposed several limits on the ability of colleges to 
recruit incoming first-year students. First, it prevented colleges from 
recruiting students who the colleges knew had declared their intent, 
through making a deposit or otherwise, to attend another institution. 
Second, it prevented colleges from offering incentives to students who 
had declined an offer of admission (with the limited exception set 
forth in II.B.5.b. of the CEPP). Third, it limited the ability of 
colleges, after May 1, to recruit students who had neither made a 
deposit nor withdrawn their application.
    The First-Year Undergraduate Recruiting Rule imposed significant 
restrictions on competition between colleges for first-year students. 
It limited the ability of colleges to continue to compete for students 
who had declined an offer of admission and significantly restricted the 
ability of colleges to compete for students after May 1. Absent these 
restrictions, colleges will be free to offer more aggressive financial 
aid packages or other inducements to students to entice them to enroll. 
Due to

[[Page 1336]]

this enhanced competition, students will receive more attractive offers 
of admission.

C. NACAC's Recruiting Rules Were Unlawful Agreements Under Section 1 of 
the Sherman Act

    Horizontal restraints that are not reasonably necessary to any 
separate, legitimate business transaction or collaboration are unlawful 
under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. Section 1 outlaws any ``contract, 
combination . . . , or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce.'' 
15 U.S.C. 1. Courts have long interpreted this language to prohibit 
only ``unreasonable'' restraints of trade. Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp 
Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 723 (1988). Courts have consistently found 
that trade association rules are no different than horizontal 
agreements entered into between the association's members. For example, 
in National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 
U.S. 679 (1978), the Supreme Court upheld a challenge to a trade 
association's ban on competitive bidding as a horizontal agreement 
between its members. Other Supreme Court precedent is consistent with 
this outcome.\1\ Additionally, when a trade association works to 
enforce a stated policy, it faces ``more rigorous antitrust scrutiny.'' 
Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 501 n.6 
(1988) (citing Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 
364 U.S. 656 (1961); Fashion Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v. 
FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941)).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ See, generally, Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Indiana Fed'n of 
Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986); California Dental Ass'n v. Fed. Trade 
Comm'n, 526 U.S. 756 (1999).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The United States has historically challenged the actions of trade 
associations or other membership organizations where they advance 
unreasonable restraints among their memberships. In addition to the 
Professional Engineers case cited above, on June 27, 1995, the United 
States challenged several accreditation practices of the American Bar 
Association as violative of Section 1.\2\ The United States has also 
challenged association rules in the chiropractic,\3\ nursing,\4\ and 
realty \5\ industries, among others.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \2\ Complaint, United States v. American Bar Association, No. 
95-cv-1211 (D.D.C. June 27, 1995).
    \3\ Complaint, United States v. Oklahoma State Chiropractic 
Independent Physicians Association, No 13-CV-21-TCK-TLW (N.D. Okla. 
January 10, 2013).
    \4\ Complaint, United States v. Arizona Hospital and Healthcare 
Association, No. CV07-1030-PHX (D.Ariz. May 22, 2007).
    \5\ Complaint, United States v. National Association of 
Realtors, No. 05C-5140 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 8, 2005).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As described in the Complaint, NACAC's Recruiting Rules were 
horizontal agreements restricting competition between colleges for 
college applicants and potential transfer students. The Recruiting 
Rules suppressed and eliminated competition to the detriment of college 
applicants and potential transfer students by restraining the ability 
of NACAC's college members to recruit them. They were not reasonably 
necessary to achieve the otherwise market-enhancing rules contained in 
the CEPP. Accordingly, they were unlawful agreements under Section 1 of 
the Sherman Act.

III. Explanation of the Proposed Final Judgment

    The proposed Final Judgment sets forth (1) conduct in which the 
Defendant may not engage; (2) certain actions the Defendant is required 
to take to ensure compliance with the terms of the proposed Final 
Judgment; (3) the Defendant's obligations to cooperate with the United 
States in its investigations of the promulgation of any future rules 
similar to the Recruiting Rules; and (4) oversight procedures the 
United States may use to ensure compliance with the proposed Final 
Judgment.

A. Prohibited Conduct

    Section IV of the proposed Final Judgment prevents the Defendant 
from establishing, maintaining, or enforcing any ``Transfer Student 
Recruiting Rule,'' ``Early Decision Incentives Rule,'' or ``First-Year 
Undergraduate Recruiting Rule'' or any similar rules. The proposed 
Final Judgment defines each of those terms in Section II, and the 
definitions are intended to correspond with the rules described in 
Section II.B of this Competitive Impact Statement.
    Furthermore, Section IV of the proposed Final Judgment requires 
that the Defendant abolish any ``Transfer Student Recruiting Rule,'' 
``Early Decision Incentives Rule,'' or ``First-Year Undergraduate 
Recruiting Rule'' currently within its ethics rules.

B. Required Conduct

    Section VI of the proposed Final Judgment sets forth various 
mandatory procedures to ensure the Defendant's compliance with the 
proposed Final Judgment, including a requirement to provide officers, 
directors, and management with copies of the proposed Final Judgment 
and annual briefings about its terms. Additionally, Section VI requires 
the Defendant to provide notice to its members about this action that 
includes a description of the terms of the proposed Final Judgment, the 
Competitive Impact Statement, and the Complaint. Finally, Section VI 
requires the Defendant's Antitrust Compliance Officer to promptly 
notify the United States upon receipt of any complaint that the terms 
of the proposed Final Judgment have been violated.

C. Compliance

    To facilitate monitoring of the Defendant's compliance with the 
proposed Final Judgment, Section VII permits the United States, upon 
reasonable notice and a written request:
    (1) Access during the Defendant's office hours to inspect and copy, 
or at the option of the United States, to require the Defendant to 
provide electronic or hard copies of, all books, ledgers, accounts, 
records, data, and documents in the possession, custody, or control of 
the Defendant, relating to any matters contained in the proposed Final 
Judgment; and (2) to interview, either informally or on the record, the 
Defendant's officers, employees, or agents.
    Additionally, Section VII requires the Defendant, upon written 
request of the United States, to submit written reports or responses to 
interrogatories relating to any of the matters contained in the 
proposed Final Judgment.

D. Enforcement and Expiration of the Final Judgment

    The proposed Final Judgment contains provisions designed to promote 
compliance and make the enforcement of the Final Judgment as effective 
as possible. Paragraph IX(A) provides that the United States retains 
and reserves all rights to enforce the provisions of the proposed Final 
Judgment, including its rights to seek an order of contempt from the 
Court. Under the terms of this paragraph, the Defendant has agreed that 
in any civil contempt action, any motion to show cause, or any similar 
action brought by the United States regarding an alleged violation of 
the Final Judgment, the United States may establish the violation and 
the appropriateness of any remedy by a preponderance of the evidence 
and that the Defendant has waived any argument that a different 
standard of proof should apply. This provision aligns the standard for 
compliance obligations

[[Page 1337]]

with the standard of proof that applies to the underlying offense that 
the compliance commitments address.
    Paragraph IX(B) provides additional clarification regarding the 
interpretation of the provisions of the proposed Final Judgment. The 
proposed Final Judgment was drafted to restore the competition the 
United States alleged was harmed by the Defendant's challenged conduct. 
The Defendant agrees that it will abide by the proposed Final Judgment, 
and that it may be held in contempt of this Court for failing to comply 
with any provision of the proposed Final Judgment that is stated 
specifically and in reasonable detail, as interpreted in light of this 
procompetitive purpose.
    Paragraph IX(C) of the proposed Final Judgment provides that if the 
Court finds in an enforcement proceeding that the Defendant has 
violated the Final Judgment, the United States may apply to the Court 
for a one-time extension of the Final Judgment, together with such 
other relief as may be appropriate. In addition, to compensate American 
taxpayers for any costs associated with investigating and enforcing 
violations of the proposed Final Judgment, Paragraph IX(C) provides 
that, in any successful effort by the United States to enforce the 
Final Judgment against the Defendant, whether litigated or resolved 
before litigation, that the Defendant will reimburse the United States 
for attorneys' fees, experts' fees, and other costs incurred in 
connection with any enforcement effort, including the investigation of 
the potential violation.
    Paragraph IX(D) states that the United States may file an action 
against the Defendant for violating the Final Judgment for up to four 
years after the Final Judgment has expired or been terminated. This 
provision is meant to address circumstances such as when evidence that 
a violation of the Final Judgment occurred during the term of the Final 
Judgment is not discovered until after the Final Judgment has expired 
or been terminated or when there is not sufficient time for the United 
States to complete an investigation of an alleged violation until after 
the Final Judgment has expired or been terminated. This provision, 
therefore, makes clear that, for four years after the Final Judgment 
has expired or been terminated, the United States may still challenge a 
violation that occurred during the term of the Final Judgment.
    Finally, Section X of the proposed Final Judgment provides that the 
Final Judgment will expire seven years from the date of its entry, 
except that after five years from the date of its entry, the Final 
Judgment may be terminated upon notice by the United States to the 
Court and the Defendant that the continuation of the Final Judgment is 
no longer necessary or in the public interest.

IV. Remedies Available to Potential Private Litigants

    Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 15, provides that any 
person who has been injured as a result of conduct prohibited by the 
antitrust laws may bring suit in federal court to recover three times 
the damages the person has suffered, as well as costs and reasonable 
attorneys' fees. Entry of the proposed Final Judgment neither impairs 
nor assists the bringing of any private antitrust damage action. Under 
the provisions of Section 5(a) of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 16(a), the 
proposed Final Judgment has no prima facie effect in any subsequent 
private lawsuit that may be brought against the Defendant.

V. Procedures Available for Modification of the Proposed Final Judgment

    The United States and the Defendant have stipulated that the 
proposed Final Judgment may be entered by the Court after compliance 
with the provisions of the APPA, provided that the United States has 
not withdrawn its consent. The APPA conditions entry upon the Court's 
determination that the proposed Final Judgment is in the public 
interest.
    The APPA provides a period of at least 60 days preceding the 
effective date of the proposed Final Judgment within which any person 
may submit to the United States written comments regarding the proposed 
Final Judgment. Any person who wishes to comment should do so within 60 
days of the date of publication of this Competitive Impact Statement in 
the Federal Register, or the last date of publication in a newspaper of 
the summary of this Competitive Impact Statement, whichever is later. 
All comments received during this period will be considered by the U.S. 
Department of Justice, which remains free to withdraw its consent to 
the proposed Final Judgment at any time before the Court's entry of the 
Final Judgment. The comments and the response of the United States will 
be filed with the Court. In addition, comments will be posted on the 
U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division's internet website and, 
under certain circumstances, published in the Federal Register.
    Written comments should be submitted to: Chief, Technology and 
Financial Services Section Antitrust Division, United States Department 
of Justice, 450 Fifth Street NW, Suite 7100, Washington, DC 20530.
    The proposed Final Judgment provides that the Court retains 
jurisdiction over this action, and the parties may apply to the Court 
for any order necessary or appropriate for the modification, 
interpretation, or enforcement of the Final Judgment.

VI. Alternatives to the Proposed Final Judgment

    The United States considered, as an alternative to the proposed 
Final Judgment, a full trial on the merits against NACAC. The United 
States could have continued the litigation and sought preliminary and 
permanent injunctions against NACAC. The United States is satisfied, 
however, that the requirements of the proposed Final Judgment will 
preserve competition among colleges for the provision of college 
services to college applicants and potential transfer students in the 
United States. Thus, the proposed Final Judgment achieves all or 
substantially all of the relief the United States would have obtained 
through litigation, but avoids the time, expense, and uncertainty of a 
full trial on the merits of the Complaint.

VII. Standard of Review Under the APPA for the Proposed Final Judgment

    The Clayton Act, as amended by the APPA, requires that proposed 
consent judgments in antitrust cases brought by the United States be 
subject to a 60-day comment period, after which the Court shall 
determine whether entry of the proposed Final Judgment ``is in the 
public interest.'' 15 U.S.C. 16(e)(1). In making that determination, 
the Court, in accordance with the statute as amended in 2004, is 
required to consider:

    (A) the competitive impact of such judgment, including 
termination of alleged violations, provisions for enforcement and 
modification, duration of relief sought, anticipated effects of 
alternative remedies actually considered, whether its terms are 
ambiguous, and any other competitive considerations bearing upon the 
adequacy of such judgment that the court deems necessary to a 
determination of whether the consent judgment is in the public 
interest; and
    (B) the impact of entry of such judgment upon competition in the 
relevant market or markets, upon the public generally and 
individuals alleging specific injury from the violations set forth 
in the complaint including consideration of the public benefit, if 
any, to be derived from a determination of the issues at trial.

    15 U.S.C. 16(e)(1)(A) & (B). In considering these statutory 
factors, the Court's inquiry is necessarily a limited one as the 
government is entitled to

[[Page 1338]]

``broad discretion to settle with the defendant within the reaches of 
the public interest.'' United States v. Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 1448, 
1461 (D.C. Cir. 1995); United States v. U.S. Airways Grp., Inc., 38 F. 
Supp. 3d 69, 75 (D.D.C. 2014) (explaining that the ``court's inquiry is 
limited'' in Tunney Act settlements); United States v. InBev N.V./S.A., 
No. 08-1965 (JR), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84787, at *3 (D.D.C. Aug. 11, 
2009) (noting that a court's review of a consent judgment is limited 
and only inquires ``into whether the government's determination that 
the proposed remedies will cure the antitrust violations alleged in the 
complaint was reasonable, and whether the mechanism to enforce the 
final judgment are clear and manageable'').
    As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 
has held, under the APPA a court considers, among other things, the 
relationship between the remedy secured and the specific allegations in 
the government's complaint, whether the proposed Final Judgment is 
sufficiently clear, whether its enforcement mechanisms are sufficient, 
and whether it may positively harm third parties. See Microsoft, 56 
F.3d at 1458-62. With respect to the adequacy of the relief secured by 
the proposed Final Judgment, a court may ``not to make de novo 
determination of facts and issues.'' United States v. W. Elec. Co., 993 
F.2d 1572, 1577 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (quotation marks omitted); see also 
Microsoft, 56 F.3d at 1460-62; United States v. Alcoa, Inc., 152 F. 
Supp. 2d 37, 40 (D.D.C. 2001); United States v. Enova Corp., 107 F. 
Supp. 2d 10, 16 (D.D.C. 2000); InBev, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84787, at 
*3. Instead, ``[t]he balancing of competing social and political 
interests affected by a proposed antitrust consent decree must be left, 
in the first instance, to the discretion of the Attorney General.'' W. 
Elec. Co., 993 F.2d at 1577 (quotation marks omitted). ``The court 
should bear in mind the flexibility of the public interest inquiry: the 
court's function is not to determine whether the resulting array of 
rights and liabilities is one that will best serve society, but only to 
confirm that the resulting settlement is within the reaches of the 
public interest.'' Microsoft, 56 F.3d at 1460 (quotation marks 
omitted). More demanding requirements would ``have enormous practical 
consequences for the government's ability to negotiate future 
settlements,'' contrary to congressional intent. Id. at 1456. ``The 
Tunney Act was not intended to create a disincentive to the use of the 
consent decree.'' Id.
    The United States' predictions about the efficacy of the remedy are 
to be afforded deference by the Court. See, e.g., Microsoft, 56 F.3d at 
1461 (recognizing courts should give ``due respect to the Justice 
Department's . . . view of the nature of its case''); United States v. 
Iron Mountain, Inc., 217 F. Supp. 3d 146, 152-53 (D.D.C. 2016) (``In 
evaluating objections to settlement agreements under the Tunney Act, a 
court must be mindful that [t]he government need not prove that the 
settlements will perfectly remedy the alleged antitrust harms[;] it 
need only provide a factual basis for concluding that the settlements 
are reasonably adequate remedies for the alleged harms.'') (internal 
citations omitted); United States v. Republic Servs., Inc., 723 F. 
Supp. 2d 157, 160 (D.D.C. 2010) (noting ``the deferential review to 
which the government's proposed remedy is accorded''); United States v. 
Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 272 F. Supp. 2d 1, 6 (D.D.C. 2003) (``A 
district court must accord due respect to the government's prediction 
as to the effect of proposed remedies, its perception of the market 
structure, and its view of the nature of the case''). The ultimate 
question is whether ``the remedies [obtained by the Final Judgment are] 
so inconsonant with the allegations charged as to fall outside of the 
`reaches of the public interest.' '' Microsoft, 56 F.3d at 1461 
(quoting W. Elec. Co., 900 F.2d at 309).
    Moreover, the Court's role under the APPA is limited to reviewing 
the remedy in relationship to the violations that the United States has 
alleged in its complaint, and does not authorize the Court to 
``construct [its] own hypothetical case and then evaluate the decree 
against that case.'' Microsoft, 56 F.3d at 1459; see also U.S. Airways, 
38 F. Supp. 3d at 75 (noting that the court must simply determine 
whether there is a factual foundation for the government's decisions 
such that its conclusions regarding the proposed settlements are 
reasonable); InBev, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84787, at *20 (``the `public 
interest' is not to be measured by comparing the violations alleged in 
the complaint against those the court believes could have, or even 
should have, been alleged''). Because the ``court's authority to review 
the decree depends entirely on the government's exercising its 
prosecutorial discretion by bringing a case in the first place,'' it 
follows that ``the court is only authorized to review the decree 
itself,'' and not to ``effectively redraft the complaint'' to inquire 
into other matters that the United States did not pursue. Microsoft, 56 
F.3d at 1459-60.
    In its 2004 amendments to the APPA, Congress made clear its intent 
to preserve the practical benefits of using consent judgments proposed 
by the United States in antitrust enforcement, Public Law 108-237 Sec.  
221, and added the unambiguous instruction that ``[n]othing in this 
section shall be construed to require the court to conduct an 
evidentiary hearing or to require the court to permit anyone to 
intervene.'' 15 U.S.C. 16(e)(2); see also U.S. Airways, 38 F. Supp. 3d 
at 76 (indicating that a court is not required to hold an evidentiary 
hearing or to permit intervenors as part of its review under the Tunney 
Act). This language explicitly wrote into the statute what Congress 
intended when it first enacted the Tunney Act in 1974. As Senator 
Tunney explained: ``[t]he court is nowhere compelled to go to trial or 
to engage in extended proceedings which might have the effect of 
vitiating the benefits of prompt and less costly settlement through the 
consent decree process.'' 119 Cong. Rec. 24,598 (1973) (statement of 
Sen. Tunney). ``A court can make its public interest determination 
based on the competitive impact statement and response to public 
comments alone.'' U.S. Airways, 38 F. Supp. 3d at 76 (citing Enova 
Corp., 107 F. Supp. 2d at 1

VIII. Determinative Documents

    There are no determinative materials or documents within the 
meaning of the APPA that were considered by the United States in 
formulating the proposed Final Judgment.

Dated: December 20, 2019

Respectfully submitted,
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Ryan Struve,
United States Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, Technology and 
Financial Services Section, 450 Fifth Street NW, Suite 7100, 
Washington, DC 20530, Telephone: (202) 514-4890, Email: 
[email protected].

[FR Doc. 2020-00213 Filed 1-9-20; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 4410-11-P