[Federal Register Volume 84, Number 246 (Monday, December 23, 2019)]
[Notices]
[Pages 70574-70578]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2019-27658]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket No. 50-293; NRC-2019-0247]
Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC; Pilgrim Nuclear Power
Station
AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
ACTION: Exemption; issuance.
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SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has issued
exemptions in response to a request from the licensee regarding certain
emergency planning (EP) requirements. The exemptions eliminate the
requirements to maintain an offsite radiological emergency preparedness
plan and reduce the scope of onsite EP activities at the Pilgrim
Nuclear Power Station, based on the reduced risks of accidents that
could result in an offsite radiological release at a decommissioning
nuclear power reactor.
DATES: The exemption was issued on December 18, 2019.
ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID NRC-2019-0247 when contacting the
NRC about the availability of information regarding this document. You
may obtain publicly-available information related to this document
using any of the following methods:
Federal Rulemaking website: Go to https://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2019-0247. Address
questions about NRC docket IDs in Regulations.gov to Jennifer Borges;
telephone: 301-287-9127; email: [email protected]. For technical
questions, contact the individual listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION
CONTACT section of this document.
NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System
(ADAMS): You may obtain publicly-available documents online in the
ADAMS Public Documents collection at
[[Page 70575]]
https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To begin the search, select
``Begin Web-based ADAMS Search.'' For problems with ADAMS, please
contact the NRC's Public Document Room (PDR) reference staff at 1-800-
397-4209, 301-415-4737, or by email to [email protected]. The ADAMS
accession number for each document referenced (if it is available in
ADAMS) is provided the first time that it is mentioned in this
document.
NRC's PDR: You may examine and purchase copies of public
documents at the NRC's PDR, Room O1-F21, One White Flint North, 11555
Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Scott P. Wall, Office of Nuclear
Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington DC
20555-0001; telephone: 301-415-2855, email: [email protected].
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The text of the exemption is attached.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 18th day of December, 2019.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Scott P. Wall,
Senior Project Manager, Plant Licensing Branch III, Division of
Operating Reactor Licensing, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
Attachment--Exemption
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Docket No. 50-293
Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC
Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station
Exemption
I. Background
By letter dated November 10, 2015 (Agencywide Documents Access and
Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML15328A053), Entergy Nuclear
Operations, Inc. (ENOI) certified to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) that it planned to permanently cease power operations
at Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (Pilgrim) no later than June 1, 2019.
On May 31, 2019, ENOI permanently ceased power operations at Pilgrim.
By letter dated June 10, 2019 (ADAMS Accession No. ML19161A033), ENOI
certified to the NRC that the fuel was permanently removed from the
Pilgrim reactor vessel and placed in the spent fuel pool (SFP) on June
9, 2019. Based on the docketing of these certifications for permanent
cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor
vessel, as specified in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10
CFR) Section 50.82(a)(2), the 10 CFR part 50 license for Pilgrim no
longer authorizes operation of the reactor or emplacement or retention
of fuel into the reactor vessel. The facility is still authorized to
possess and store irradiated (i.e., spent) nuclear fuel. Spent fuel is
currently stored onsite at the Pilgrim facility in the SFP and in a dry
cask independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI).
Many of the accident scenarios postulated in the updated safety
analysis reports (USARs) for operating power reactors involve failures
or malfunctions of systems, which could affect the fuel in the reactor
core and, in the most severe postulated accidents, would involve the
release of large quantities of fission products. With the permanent
cessation of power operations at Pilgrim and the permanent removal of
the fuel from the reactor vessel, many accidents are no longer
possible. The reactor, reactor coolant system, and supporting systems
are no longer in operation and have no function related to the storage
of the spent fuel. Therefore, emergency planning (EP) provisions for
postulated accidents involving failure or malfunction of the reactor,
reactor coolant system, or supporting systems are no longer applicable.
The EP requirements of 10 CFR 50.47, ``Emergency plans,'' and
Appendix E to 10 CFR part 50, ``Emergency Planning and Preparedness for
Production and Utilization Facilities,'' continue to apply to nuclear
power reactors that have permanently ceased operation and have
permanently removed all fuel from the reactor vessel. There are no
explicit regulatory provisions distinguishing EP requirements for a
power reactor that is permanently shut down and defueled from those for
a reactor that is authorized to operate. To reduce or eliminate EP
requirements that are no longer necessary due to the decommissioning
status of the facility, the Pilgrim licensee must obtain exemptions
from those EP regulations. Only then can the Pilgrim licensee modify
the facility emergency plan to reflect the reduced risk associated with
the permanently shutdown and defueled condition of Pilgrim.
II. Request/Action
By letter dated July 3, 2018 (ADAMS Accession No. ML18186A635), as
supplemented by letters dated November 30 and December 4, 2018, and
February 14 and February 18, 2019 (ADAMS Accession Nos. ML18338A205,
ML18341A219, ML19050A298, and ML19056A260, respectively), ENOI
requested exemptions from certain EP requirements in 10 CFR part 50 for
Pilgrim. Specifically, ENOI requested exemptions from certain planning
standards in 10 CFR 50.47(b) regarding onsite and offsite radiological
emergency preparedness plans for nuclear power reactors; from certain
requirements in 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2) that require establishment of plume
exposure and ingestion pathway EP zones for nuclear power reactors; and
from certain requirements in 10 CFR part 50, Appendix E, Section IV,
which establish the elements that comprise the content of emergency
plans. In the letters dated November 30 and December 4, 2018, and
February 14 and February 18, 2019, ENOI provided supplemental
information and responses to the NRC staff's requests for additional
information concerning the proposed exemptions.
By letter dated November 16, 2018 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML18320A031), ENOI, on behalf of itself and Entergy Nuclear Generation
Company (ENGC) (to be known as Holtec Pilgrim, LLC), Holtec
International (Holtec), and Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC
(HDI, the licensee) (together, Applicants), requested that the NRC
consent to: (1) The indirect transfer of control of Renewed Facility
Operating License No. DPR-35 for Pilgrim, as well as the general
license for the Pilgrim ISFSI (together, the Licenses), to Holtec; and
(2) the direct transfer of ENOI's operating authority (i.e., its
authority to conduct licensed activities at Pilgrim) to HDI. In
addition, the Applicants requested that the NRC approve a conforming
administrative amendment to the Licenses to reflect the proposed direct
transfer of the Licenses from ENOI to HDI; a planned name change for
ENGC from ENGC to Holtec Pilgrim, LLC; and deletion of certain license
conditions to reflect satisfaction and termination of all ENGC
obligations after the license transfer and equity sale.
By Order dated August 22, 2019 (ADAMS Accession No. ML19170A265),
the NRC staff approved the direct and indirect transfers requested in
the November 16, 2018, application. Additionally, on August 22, 2019,
HDI informed the NRC (ADAMS Accession No. ML19234A357) that:
HDI will assume responsibility for all ongoing NRC regulatory
actions and reviews currently underway for Pilgrim Nuclear Power
Station. HDI respectfully requests NRC continuation of these regulatory
actions and reviews.
On August 26, 2019, ENOI informed the NRC that the license transfer
transaction closed on August 26, 2019 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML19239A037). On August 27, 2019 (ADAMS Accession
[[Page 70576]]
No. ML19235A050), the NRC staff issued Amendment No. 249 to reflect the
license transfer. Accordingly, HDI is now the licensee for
decommissioning operations at Pilgrim.
The information provided by the licensee included justifications
for each exemption requested. The exemptions requested would eliminate
the requirements to maintain formal offsite radiological emergency
preparedness plans reviewed by the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) under the requirements of 44 CFR, ``Emergency Management and
Assistance,'' part 350, ``Review and Approval of State and Local
Radiological Emergency Plans and Preparedness,'' and would reduce the
scope of onsite EP activities at Pilgrim. The licensee stated that the
application of all the standards and requirements in 10 CFR 50.47(b),
10 CFR 50.47(c), and 10 CFR part 50, Appendix E is not needed for
adequate emergency response capability, based on the substantially
lower onsite and offsite radiological consequences of accidents still
possible at the permanently shutdown and defueled facility, as compared
to an operating facility. If offsite protective actions were needed for
a highly unlikely beyond-design-basis accident that could challenge the
safe storage of spent fuel at Pilgrim, provisions exist for offsite
agencies to take protective actions using a comprehensive emergency
management plan (CEMP) under the National Preparedness System to
protect the health and safety of the public. A CEMP in this context,
also referred to as an emergency operations plan, is addressed in
FEMA's Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 101, ``Developing and
Maintaining Emergency Operations Plans,'' which is publicly available
at http://www.fema.gov/pdf/about/divisions/npd/CPG_101_V2.pdf.
Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 101 is the foundation for State,
territorial, Tribal, and local EP in the United States. It promotes a
common understanding of the fundamentals of risk-informed planning and
decision-making and helps planners at all levels of government in their
efforts to develop and maintain viable, all-hazards, all-threats
emergency plans. An emergency operations plan is flexible enough for
use in all emergencies. It describes how people and property will be
protected; details who is responsible for carrying out specific
actions; identifies the personnel, equipment, facilities, supplies and
other resources available; and outlines how all actions will be
coordinated. A CEMP is often referred to as a synonym for ``all-hazards
planning.''
III. Discussion
In accordance with 10 CFR 50.12, ``Specific exemptions,'' the
Commission may, upon application by any interested person or upon its
own initiative, grant exemptions from the requirements of 10 CFR part
50 when: (1) The exemptions are authorized by law, will not present an
undue risk to public health and safety, and are consistent with the
common defense and security; and (2) any of the special circumstances
listed in 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2) are present. These special circumstances
include, among other things, that the application of the regulation in
the particular circumstances would not serve the underlying purpose of
the rule or is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the
rule.
As noted previously, the EP regulations contained in 10 CFR
50.47(b) and Appendix E to 10 CFR part 50 apply to both operating and
shutdown power reactors. The NRC has consistently acknowledged that the
risk of an offsite radiological release at a power reactor that has
permanently ceased operations and permanently removed fuel from the
reactor vessel is significantly lower, and the types of possible
accidents are significantly fewer, than at an operating power reactor.
However, the EP regulations do not recognize that once a power reactor
permanently ceases operation, the risk of a large radiological release
from credible emergency accident scenarios is significantly reduced.
The reduced risk for any significant offsite radiological release is
based on two factors. One factor is the elimination of accidents
applicable only to an operating power reactor, resulting in fewer
credible accident scenarios. The second factor is the reduced short-
lived radionuclide inventory and decay heat production due to
radioactive decay. Due to the permanently defueled status of the
reactor, no new spent fuel will be added to the SFP and the
radionuclides in the current spent fuel will continue to decay as the
spent fuel ages. The irradiated fuel will produce less heat due to
radioactive decay, increasing the available time to mitigate a loss of
water inventory from the SFP. The NRC's NUREG/CR-6451, ``A Safety and
Regulatory Assessment of Generic BWR [Boiling Water Reactor] and PWR
[Pressurized Water Reactor] Permanently Shutdown Nuclear Power
Plants,'' dated August 1997 (ADAMS Accession No. ML082260098), and the
NRC's NUREG-1738, ``Technical Study of Spent Fuel Pool Accident Risk at
Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants,'' dated February 2001 (ADAMS
Accession No. ML010430066), confirmed that for permanently shutdown and
defueled power reactors that are bounded by the assumptions and
conditions in the report, the risk of offsite radiological release is
significantly less than for an operating power reactor.
In the past, EP exemptions similar to those requested for Pilgrim,
have been granted to permanently shutdown and defueled power reactor
licensees. However, the exemptions did not relieve the licensees of all
EP requirements. Rather, the exemptions allowed the licensees to modify
their emergency plans commensurate with the credible site-specific
risks that were consistent with a permanently shutdown and defueled
status. Specifically, the NRC's approval of these prior exemptions was
based on the licensee's demonstration that: (1) The radiological
consequences of design-basis accidents would not exceed the limits of
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) early phase Protective
Action Guides (PAGs) of one roentgen equivalent man (rem) at the
exclusion area boundary; and (2) in the highly unlikely event of a
beyond-design-basis accident resulting in a loss of all modes of heat
transfer from the fuel stored in the SFP, there is sufficient time to
initiate appropriate mitigating actions, and if needed, for offsite
authorities to implement offsite protective actions using a CEMP
approach to protect the health and safety of the public.
With respect to design-basis accidents at Pilgrim, the licensee
provided analysis demonstrating that 10 months following permanent
cessation of power operations, the radiological consequences of the
only remaining design-basis accident with potential for offsite
radiological release (the fuel handling accident in the Auxiliary
Building, where the SFP is located) will not exceed the limits of the
EPA PAGs at the exclusion area boundary.
With respect to beyond-design-basis accidents at Pilgrim, the
licensee analyzed a drain down of the SFP water that would effectively
impede any decay heat removal. The analysis demonstrates that at 10
months after permanent cessation of power operations, there would be at
least 10 hours after the assemblies have been uncovered until the
limiting fuel assembly (for decay heat and adiabatic heatup analysis)
reaches 900 degrees Celsius ([deg]C), the temperature used to assess
the potential onset of fission product release. The analysis
conservatively assumed that
[[Page 70577]]
the heat up time starts when the SFP has been completely drained,
although it is likely that site personnel will start to respond to an
incident when drain down starts. The analysis also does not consider
the period of time from the initiating event causing loss of SFP water
inventory until cooling is lost.
The NRC staff reviewed the licensee's justification for the
requested exemptions against the criteria in 10 CFR 50.12(a) and
determined, as described below, that the criteria in 10 CFR 50.12(a)
will be met, and that the exemptions should be granted 10 months after
Pilgrim has permanently ceased power operations. An assessment of the
licensee's EP exemptions is described in SECY-19-0078, ``Request by the
Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. for Exemptions from Certain Emergency
Planning Requirements for the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station,'' dated
August 9, 2019 (ADAMS Accession No. ML18347A717). The Commission
approved the NRC staff's recommendation to grant the exemptions in the
staff requirements memorandum to SECY-19-0078, dated November 4, 2019
(ADAMS Accession No. ML19308A034). Descriptions of the specific
exemptions requested by the licensee and the NRC staff's basis for
granting each exemption are provided in SECY-19-0078. The NRC staff's
detailed review and technical basis for the approval of the specific EP
exemptions requested by the licensee are provided in the NRC staff's
safety evaluation dated December 18, 2019 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML19142A043).
A. The Exemption Is Authorized by Law
The licensee has proposed exemptions from certain EP requirements
in 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR part 50, Appendix E,
Section IV, that would allow the licensee to revise the Pilgrim
Emergency Plan to reflect the permanently shutdown and defueled
condition of the facility. As stated above, in accordance with 10 CFR
50.12, the Commission may, upon application by any interested person or
upon its own initiative, grant exemptions from the requirements of 10
CFR part 50. The NRC staff has determined that granting of the
licensee's proposed exemptions will not result in a violation of the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, or the NRC's regulations.
Therefore, the exemptions are authorized by law.
B. The Exemption Presents No Undue Risk to Public Health and Safety
As stated previously, the licensee provided analyses that show that
the radiological consequences of design-basis accidents will not exceed
the limits of the EPA early phase PAGs at the exclusion area boundary.
Therefore, formal offsite radiological emergency preparedness plans
required under 10 CFR part 50 will no longer be needed for protection
of the public beyond the exclusion area boundary, based on the
radiological consequences of design-basis accidents still possible at
Pilgrim 10 months after the plant has permanently ceased power
operations.
Although highly unlikely, there is one postulated beyond-design-
basis accident that might result in significant offsite radiological
releases. However, NUREG-1738 confirms that the risk of beyond-design-
basis accidents is greatly reduced at permanently shutdown and defueled
reactors. The NRC staff's analyses in NUREG-1738 conclude that the
event sequences important to risk at permanently shutdown and defueled
power reactors are limited to large earthquakes and cask drop events.
For EP assessments, this is an important difference relative to
operating power reactors, where typically a large number of different
sequences make significant contributions to risk. As described in
NUREG-1738, relaxation of offsite EP requirements in 10 CFR part 50 a
few months after shutdown resulted in only a small change in risk. The
report further concludes that the change in risk due to relaxation of
offsite EP requirements is small because the overall risk is low, and
because even under current EP requirements for operating power
reactors, EP was judged to have marginal impact on evacuation
effectiveness in the severe earthquakes that dominate SFP risk. All
other sequences including cask drops (for which offsite radiological
emergency preparedness plans are expected to be more effective) are too
low in likelihood to have a significant impact on risk.
Therefore, granting exemptions to eliminate the requirements of 10
CFR part 50 to maintain offsite radiological emergency preparedness
plans and to reduce the scope of onsite EP activities will not present
an undue risk to the public health and safety.
C. The Exemption Is Consistent With the Common Defense and Security
The requested exemptions by the licensee only involve EP
requirements under 10 CFR part 50 and will allow the licensee to revise
the Pilgrim Emergency Plan to reflect the permanently shutdown and
defueled condition of the facility. Physical security measures at
Pilgrim are not affected by the requested EP exemptions. The
discontinuation of formal offsite radiological emergency preparedness
plans and the reduction in scope of the onsite EP activities at Pilgrim
will not adversely affect the licensee's ability to physically secure
the site or protect special nuclear material. Therefore, the proposed
exemptions are consistent with common defense and security.
D. Special Circumstances
Special circumstances, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii),
are present whenever application of the regulation in the particular
circumstances is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the
rule. The underlying purpose of 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2),
and 10 CFR part 50, Appendix E, Section IV, is to provide reasonable
assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in
the event of a radiological emergency, to establish plume exposure and
ingestion pathway emergency planning zones for nuclear power plants,
and to ensure that licensees maintain effective offsite and onsite
radiological emergency preparedness plans. The standards and
requirements in these regulations were developed by considering the
risks associated with operation of a power reactor at its licensed
full-power level. These risks include the potential for a reactor
accident with offsite radiological dose consequences.
As discussed previously in Section III, because Pilgrim is
permanently shut down and defueled, there will no longer be a risk of a
significant offsite radiological release from a design-basis accident
exceeding EPA early phase PAGs at the exclusion area boundary and the
risk of a significant offsite radiological release from a beyond-
design-basis accident is greatly reduced when compared to an operating
power reactor. The NRC staff has confirmed the reduced risks at Pilgrim
by comparing the generic risk assumptions in the analyses in NUREG-1738
to site-specific conditions at Pilgrim and determined that the risk
values in NUREG-1738 bound the risks presented at Pilgrim. As indicated
by the results of the research conducted for NUREG-1738, and more
recently for NUREG-2161, ``Consequence Study of a Beyond-Design-Basis
Earthquake Affecting the Spent Fuel Pool for a U.S. Mark I Boiling
Water Reactor,'' dated September 2014 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML14255A365), while other consequences can be extensive, accidents from
SFPs with significant decay time have little potential to cause offsite
early fatalities, even if the formal offsite radiological EP
requirements were relaxed. The licensee's analysis of a beyond-design-
basis accident
[[Page 70578]]
involving a complete loss of SFP water inventory, based on an adiabatic
heatup analysis of the limiting fuel assembly for decay heat, shows
that within 10 months after permanent cessation of power operations,
the time for the limiting fuel assembly to reach 900 [deg]C is 10 hours
after the assemblies have been uncovered assuming a loss of all cooling
means.
The only analyzed beyond-design-basis accident scenario that
progresses to a condition where a significant offsite release might
occur, involves the highly unlikely event where the SFP drains in such
a way that all modes of cooling or heat transfer are assumed to be
unavailable, which is referred to as an adiabatic heatup of the spent
fuel. The licensee's analysis of this beyond-design-basis accident
shows that within 10 months after permanent cessation of power
operations, more than 10 hours would be available between the time the
fuel is initially uncovered (at which time adiabatic heatup is
conservatively assumed to begin), until the fuel cladding reaches a
temperature of 900 [deg]C, which is the temperature associated with
rapid cladding oxidation and the potential for a significant
radiological release. This analysis conservatively does not include the
period of time from the initiating event causing a loss of SFP water
inventory until all cooling means are lost.
The NRC staff has verified the licensee's analyses and its
calculations. The analyses provide reasonable assurance that in
granting the requested exemptions to the licensee, there is no design-
basis accident that will result in an offsite radiological release
exceeding the EPA early phase PAGs at the exclusion area boundary. In
the highly unlikely event of a beyond-design-basis accident affecting
the SFP that results in a complete loss of heat removal via all modes
of heat transfer, there will be over 10 hours available before an
offsite release might occur and, therefore, at least 10 hours to
initiate appropriate mitigating actions to restore a means of heat
removal to the spent fuel. If a radiological release were projected to
occur under this highly unlikely scenario, a minimum of 10 hours is
considered sufficient time for offsite authorities to implement
protective actions using a CEMP approach to protect the health and
safety of the public.
Exemptions from the offsite EP requirements in 10 CFR part 50 have
previously been approved by the NRC when the site-specific analyses
show that at least 10 hours is available following a loss of SFP
coolant inventory with no air cooling (or other methods of removing
decay heat) until cladding of the hottest fuel assembly reaches the
rapid oxidation temperature. The NRC staff concluded in its previously
granted exemptions, as it does with the licensee's requested EP
exemptions, that if a minimum of 10 hours is available to initiate
mitigative actions consistent with plant conditions, or if needed, for
offsite authorities to implement protective actions using a CEMP
approach, then formal offsite radiological emergency preparedness
plans, required under 10 CFR part 50, are not necessary at permanently
shutdown and defueled facilities.
Additionally, Pilgrim committed to maintaining SFP makeup
strategies in its letters to the NRC dated November 30 and December 4,
2018, and February 14 and February 18, 2019. The multiple strategies
for providing makeup to the SFP include: Using existing plant systems
for inventory makeup; an internal strategy that relies on the fire
protection system with redundant pumps (one diesel-driven and electric
motor-driven); and onsite diesel fire truck that can take suction from
the Cape Cod Bay. These strategies will continue to be required as
License Condition 3.K, ``Mitigation Strategy License Condition,'' of
Renewed Facility License No. DPR-35 for Pilgrim. Considering the very
low probability of beyond-design-basis accidents affecting the SFP,
these diverse strategies provide multiple methods to obtain additional
makeup or spray to the SFP before the onset of any postulated offsite
radiological release.
For all of the reasons stated above, the NRC staff finds that the
licensee's requested exemptions meet the underlying purpose of all of
the standards in 10 CFR 50.47(b), and requirements in 10 CFR
50.47(c)(2) and 10 CFR part 50, Appendix E, and satisfy the special
circumstances provision in 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii) in view of the
greatly reduced risk of offsite radiological consequences associated
with the permanently shutdown and defueled state of the Pilgrim
facility 10 months after the facility permanently ceases operation.
The NRC staff has concluded that the exemptions being granted by
this action will maintain an acceptable level of emergency preparedness
at Pilgrim and, if needed, that there is reasonable assurance that
adequate offsite protective measures can and will be taken by State and
local government agencies using a CEMP approach in the highly unlikely
event of a radiological emergency at Pilgrim. Since the underlying
purpose of the rules, as exempted, would continue to be achieved, even
with the elimination of the requirements under 10 CFR part 50 to
maintain formal offsite radiological emergency preparedness plans and
the reduction in the scope of the onsite EP activities at Pilgrim, the
special circumstances required by 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii) exist.
E. Environmental Considerations
In accordance with 10 CFR 51.31(a), the Commission has determined
that the granting of this exemption will not have a significant effect
on the quality of the human environment as discussed in the NRC staff's
Finding of No Significant Impact and associated Environmental
Assessment published in the Federal Register on December 18, 2019 (84
FR 69396).
IV. Conclusions
Accordingly, the Commission has determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR
50.12, the licensee's request for exemptions from certain EP
requirements in 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR part
50, Appendix E, Section IV, and as summarized in Enclosure 2 to SECY-
19-0078, are authorized by law, will not present an undue risk to the
public health and safety, and are consistent with the common defense
and security. Also, special circumstances are present. Therefore, the
Commission hereby grants the licensee's exemptions from certain EP
requirements in 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR part
50, Appendix E, Section IV, as discussed and evaluated in detail in the
NRC staff's safety evaluation dated December 18, 2019. The exemptions
are effective as of 10 months after permanent cessation of power
operations.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 18th day of December, 2019.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Craig G. Erlanger,
Director, Division of Operating Reactor Licensing, Office of Nuclear
Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 2019-27658 Filed 12-20-19; 8:45 am]
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