

notice published on May 29, 2019, at 84 FR 24827. All comments have been considered in the development of the proposed version. Please see <http://www.nsf.gov/bfa/dias/policy/>. A summary of the significant changes and clarifications to the PAPPG has been incorporated into the document.

*Title of Collection:* “National Science Foundation Proposal & Award Policies & Procedures Guide.”

*OMB Approval Number:* 3145–0058.

*Type of Request:* Intent to seek approval to extend with revision an information collection for three years.

*Proposed Project:* The National Science Foundation Act of 1950 (Pub. L. 81–507) sets forth NSF’s mission and purpose:

“To promote the progress of science; to advance the national health, prosperity, and welfare; to secure the national defense. . . .”

The Act authorized and directed NSF to initiate and support:

- Basic scientific research and research fundamental to the engineering process;
- Programs to strengthen scientific and engineering research potential;
- Science and engineering education programs at all levels and in all the various fields of science and engineering;
- Programs that provide a source of information for policy formulation; and
- Other activities to promote these ends.

NSF’s core purpose resonates clearly in everything it does: Promoting achievement and progress in science and engineering and enhancing the potential for research and education to contribute to the Nation. While NSF’s vision of the future and the mechanisms it uses to carry out its charges have evolved significantly over the last six decades, its ultimate mission remains the same.

*Use of the Information:* The regular submission of proposals to the Foundation is part of the collection of information and is used to help NSF fulfill this responsibility by initiating and supporting merit-selected research and education projects in all the scientific and engineering disciplines. NSF receives more than 50,000 proposals annually for new projects and makes approximately 11,000 new awards.

Support is made primarily through grants, contracts, and other agreements awarded to approximately 2,000 colleges, universities, academic consortia, nonprofit institutions, and small businesses. The awards are based mainly on merit evaluations of proposals submitted to the Foundation.

The Foundation has a continuing commitment to monitor the operations of its information collection to identify and address excessive reporting burdens as well as to identify any real or apparent inequities based on gender, race, ethnicity, or disability of the proposed principal investigator(s)/ project director(s) or the co-principal investigator(s)/co-project director(s).

#### **Burden on the Public**

It has been estimated that the public expends an average of approximately 120 burden hours for each proposal submitted. Since the Foundation expects to receive approximately 50,600 proposals in FY 2019, an estimated 6,072,000 burden hours will be placed on the public.

The Foundation has based its reporting burden on the review of approximately 50,600 new proposals expected during FY 2019. It has been estimated that anywhere from one hour to 20 hours may be required to review a proposal. We have estimated that approximately 5 hours are required to review an average proposal. Each proposal receives an average of 3 reviews, resulting in approximately 759,000 hours per year.

The information collected on the reviewer background questionnaire (NSF 428A) is used by managers to maintain an automated database of reviewers for the many disciplines represented by the proposals submitted to the Foundation. Information collected on gender, race, and ethnicity is used in meeting NSF needs for data to permit response to Congressional and other queries into equity issues. These data also are used in the design, implementation, and monitoring of NSF efforts to increase the participation of various groups in science, engineering, and education. The estimated burden for the Reviewer Background Information (NSF 428A) is estimated at 5 minutes per respondent with up to 10,000 potential new reviewers for a total of 833 hours.

The aggregate number of burden hours is estimated to be 6,831,000. The actual burden on respondents has not changed.

Dated: November 13, 2019.

**Suzanne H. Plimpton,**

*Reports Clearance Officer, National Science Foundation.*

[FR Doc. 2019–24906 Filed 11–15–19; 8:45 am]

**BILLING CODE 7555–01–P**

## **NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION**

[Docket No. 50–331; NRC–2019–0194]

### **NextEra Energy Duane Arnold, LLC; Duane Arnold Energy Center**

**AGENCY:** Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

**ACTION:** Exemption; issuance.

**SUMMARY:** The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing an exemption in response to a February 28, 2019, request from NextEra Energy Duane Arnold, LLC. The exemption allows a certified fuel handler, in addition to a licensed senior operator, to suspend security measures in an emergency or during severe weather at the Duane Arnold Energy Center (DAEC) after both the “Certification of Permanent Cessation of Operations” and the “Certification of Permanent Fuel Removal” have been docketed for the facility.

**DATES:** The exemption was issued on November 7, 2019.

**ADDRESSES:** Please refer to Docket ID NRC–2019–0194 when contacting the NRC about the availability of information regarding this document. You may obtain publicly available information related to this document using any of the following methods:

- *Federal Rulemaking Website:* Go to <https://www.regulations.gov> and search for Docket ID NRC–2019–0194. Address questions about NRC docket IDs in [Regulations.gov](https://www.regulations.gov) to Jennifer Borges; telephone: 301–287–9127; email: [Jennifer.Borges@nrc.gov](mailto:Jennifer.Borges@nrc.gov). For technical questions, contact the individual listed in the **FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT** section of this document.

- *NRC’s Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS):* You may obtain publicly available documents online in the ADAMS Public Documents collection at <https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html>. To begin the search, select “Begin Web-based ADAMS Search.” For problems with ADAMS, contact the NRC’s Public Document Room (PDR) reference staff at 1–800–397–4209, 301–415–4737, or by email to [pdr.resource@nrc.gov](mailto:pdr.resource@nrc.gov). For the convenience of the reader, the ADAMS accession numbers are provided in a table in the “Availability of Documents” section of this document.

- *NRC’s PDR:* You may examine and purchase copies of public documents at the NRC’s PDR, Room O1–F21, One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852.

**FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:**  
Mahesh Chawla, Office of Nuclear  
Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear  
Regulatory Commission, Washington,

DC 20555–0001; telephone: 301–415–  
8371; email: [Mahesh.Chawla@nrc.gov](mailto:Mahesh.Chawla@nrc.gov).  
**SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:**  
The NRC is making the documents  
identified below available to interested

persons through one or more of the  
following methods, as indicated. To  
access documents related to this action,  
see the **ADDRESSES** section of this  
document.

Document	ADAMS accession No.
NextEra Energy Duane Arnold, LLC; “Certification of Permanent Cessation of Power Operations”; Dated January 18, 2019 ....	ML19023A196
NextEra Energy Duane Arnold, LLC; “Request for Approval of Certified Fuel Handler Training Program”; Dated January 29, 2019.	ML19037A016
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission; “Duane Arnold Energy Center—Approval of a Certified Fuel Handler Training and Continuing Training Program”; Dated August 28, 2019.	ML19204A287
NextEra Energy Duane Arnold, LLC; “Request for Exemption from 10 CFR 73.55(p)(1)(i) and (ii) Related to the Suspension of Security Measures in an Emergency or During Severe Weather”; Dated February 28, 2019.	ML19059A099

The text of the exemption is attached.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 12th day  
of November, 2019.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

**Mahesh L. Chawla,**

*Project Manager, Plant Licensing Branch III,  
Division of Operating Reactor Licensing,  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.*

**Attachment: Exemption Related to the  
Approval Authority for Suspension of  
Security Measures in an Emergency or  
During Severe Weather**

**Nuclear Regulatory Commission**

**Docket No. 50–331**

**NextEra Energy Duane Arnold, LLC;  
Duane Arnold Energy Center**

**Exemption Related to the Approval  
Authority for Suspension of Security  
Measures in an Emergency or During  
Severe Weather**

**I. Background**

NextEra Energy Duane Arnold, LLC  
(NEDA) is the holder of Renewed  
Facility Operating License No. DPR–49  
for the Duane Arnold Energy Center  
(DAEC). The license provides, among  
other things, that the facility is subject  
to all applicable rules, regulations, and  
orders of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory  
Commission (NRC, the Commission),  
now or hereafter in effect. The DAEC  
facility consists of a boiling-water  
reactor located in Linn County, Iowa.

By letter dated January 18, 2019  
(Agencywide Documents Access and  
Management System (ADAMS)  
Accession No. ML19023A196), NEDA  
provided formal notification to the NRC  
pursuant to Title 10 of the *Code of  
Federal Regulations* (10 CFR) Sections  
50.82(a)(1)(i) and 50.4(b)(8) of the  
intention to permanently cease power  
operations at the DAEC in the fourth  
quarter of 2020.

In accordance with 10 CFR  
50.82(a)(1)(i)–(ii) and 50.82(a)(2), the 10  
CFR part 50 license for the facility no  
longer authorizes reactor operation or

emplacement or retention of fuel in the  
reactor vessel, after certifications of  
permanent cessation of operations and  
permanent removal of fuel from the  
reactor vessel are docketed for the  
DAEC. As a result, licensed senior  
operators (*i.e.*, individuals licensed  
under 10 CFR part 55 to manipulate the  
controls of a facility and to direct the  
licensed activities of licensed operators)  
will no longer be required to support  
plant operating activities. Instead,  
certified fuel handlers (CFHs) (*i.e.*, non-  
licensed operators who have qualified  
in accordance with a fuel handler  
training program approved by the  
Commission) will perform activities  
associated with decommissioning,  
irradiated fuel handling, and  
management. Commission approval of a  
fuel handler training program is needed  
to facilitate these activities.

By letter dated January 29, 2019  
(ADAMS Accession No. ML19037A016),  
NEDA submitted a request for  
Commission approval of the CFH  
Training and Retraining Program for the  
DAEC. By letter dated August 28, 2019  
(ADAMS Accession No. ML19204A287),  
the Commission approved the CFH  
Training and Retraining Program for the  
DAEC. The CFH Training and  
Retraining Program is to be used to  
satisfy training requirements for the  
plant personnel responsible for  
supervising and directing the  
monitoring, storage, handling, and  
cooling of irradiated fuel in a manner  
consistent with ensuring the health and  
safety of the public. As stated in 10 CFR  
50.2, “Definitions,” CFHs are qualified  
in accordance with a Commission-  
approved training program.

**II. Request/Action**

The Commission’s regulation at 10  
CFR 73.55(p)(1) addresses the  
suspension of security measures in an  
emergency (10 CFR 73.55(p)(1)(i)) or  
during severe weather (10 CFR  
73.55(p)(1)(ii)) by stating:

The licensee may suspend implementation  
of affected requirements of this section under  
the following conditions:

(i) In accordance with §§ 50.54(x) and  
50.54(y) of this chapter, the licensee may  
suspend any security measures under this  
section in an emergency when this action is  
immediately needed to protect the public  
health and safety and no action consistent  
with license conditions and technical  
specifications that can provide adequate or  
equivalent protection is immediately  
apparent. This suspension of security  
measures must be approved as a minimum by  
a licensed senior operator before taking this  
action.

(ii) During severe weather when the  
suspension of affected security measures is  
immediately needed to protect the personal  
health and safety of security force personnel  
and no other immediately apparent action  
consistent with the license conditions and  
technical specifications can provide adequate  
or equivalent protection. This suspension of  
security measures must be approved, as a  
minimum, by a licensed senior operator, with  
input from the security supervisor or  
manager, before taking this action.

By letter dated February 28, 2019  
(ADAMS Accession No. ML19059A099),  
NEDA requested an exemption from 10  
CFR 73.55(p)(1)(i) and (ii), pursuant to  
10 CFR 73.5, “Specific exemptions.”  
Consistent with 10 CFR 50.54(y), the  
proposed exemption would authorize a  
CFH, in addition to a licensed senior  
operator, to approve the suspension of  
security measures in an emergency or  
during severe weather at the DAEC.

**III. Discussion**

The NRC’s security rules have long  
recognized the potential need to  
suspend security or safeguards measures  
under certain conditions. Accordingly,  
10 CFR 50.54(x) and (y), first published  
in 1983, allow a licensee to take  
reasonable actions in an emergency that  
depart from license conditions or  
technical specifications when those  
actions are immediately “needed to  
protect the public health and safety”  
and no actions consistent with license  
conditions and technical specifications

that can provide adequate or equivalent protection are immediately apparent (48 FR 13970; April 1, 1983). This departure from license conditions or technical specifications must be approved, as a minimum, by a licensed senior operator. In 1986, in its final rule, "Miscellaneous Amendments Concerning the Physical Protection of Nuclear Power Plants" (51 FR 27817; August 4, 1986), the Commission issued 10 CFR 73.55(a), stating, in part:

In accordance with § 50.54(x) and (y) of Part 50, the licensee may suspend any safeguards measures pursuant to § 73.55 in an emergency when this action is immediately needed to protect the public health and safety and no action consistent with license conditions and technical specification that can provide adequate or equivalent protection is immediately apparent. This suspension must be approved as a minimum by a licensed senior operator prior to taking the action.

In 1996, the NRC made a number of regulatory changes to address decommissioning. One of the changes was to amend 10 CFR 50.54(x) and (y) to authorize a non-licensed operator called a "certified fuel handler," in addition to a licensed senior operator, to approve such protective actions in an emergency situation at a permanently shutdown facility. Specifically, in addressing the role of the CFH during emergencies, the Commission stated in the proposed rule, "Decommissioning of Nuclear Power Reactors" (60 FR 37379; July 20, 1995):

The Commission is proposing to amend 10 CFR 50.54(y) to permit a certified fuel handler at nuclear power reactors that have permanently ceased operations and permanently removed fuel from the reactor vessel, subject to the requirements of § 50.82(a) and consistent with the proposed definition of "Certified Fuel Handler" specified in § 50.2, to make these evaluations and judgments. A nuclear power reactor that has permanently ceased operations and no longer has fuel in the reactor vessel does not require a licensed individual to monitor core conditions. A certified fuel handler at a permanently shutdown and defueled nuclear power reactor undergoing decommissioning is an individual who has the requisite knowledge and experience to evaluate plant conditions and make these judgments.

In the final rule (61 FR 39298; July 29, 1996), the NRC added the following definition to 10 CFR 50.2, "[c]ertified fuel handler means, for a nuclear power reactor facility, a non-licensed operator who has qualified in accordance with a fuel handler training program approved by the Commission." However, the decommissioning rule did not propose or make parallel changes to 10 CFR 73.55(a) regarding the role of a non-

licensed CFH at a permanently shutdown facility.

In the final rule, "Power Reactor Security Requirements" (74 FR 13926; March 27, 2009), the NRC relocated the security suspension requirements from 10 CFR 73.55(a) to 10 CFR 73.55(p)(1)(i) and (ii). The role of a CFH was not discussed in the rulemaking; therefore, the suspension of security measures in accordance with 10 CFR 73.55(p) continues to require approval, as a minimum, by a licensed senior operator, even for a permanently shutdown facility.

Under 10 CFR 73.5, the Commission may, upon application of any interested person or upon its own initiative, grant exemptions from the requirements of 10 CFR part 73, as it determines are authorized by law, will not endanger life or property or the common defense and security, and are otherwise in the public interest. As explained below, the proposed exemption is authorized by law, will not endanger life or property or the common defense and security, and is otherwise in the public interest.

#### A. The Exemption Is Authorized by Law

The proposed exemption from 10 CFR 73.55(p)(1)(i) and (ii) would permit, as a minimum, a CFH, in addition to a licensed senior operator, to approve the suspension of security measures in an emergency or during severe weather at the DAEC when it is permanently shutdown. Although the exemption is effective upon receipt, the actions permitted by the exemption may not be implemented at the DAEC until the 10 CFR part 50 license no longer authorizes operation of the reactor or emplacement or retention of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). The intent of the proposed exemption is to align these regulations with 10 CFR 50.54(y).

Per 10 CFR 73.5, the NRC may grant specific exemptions from the requirements of 10 CFR part 73, as are authorized by law. Granting the proposed exemption is consistent with the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and not otherwise inconsistent with NRC regulations or other applicable laws. Therefore, the exemption is authorized by law.

#### B. The Exemption Will Not Endanger Life or Property or the Common Defense and Security

Permitting, as a minimum, a CFH, in addition to a licensed senior operator, to approve the suspension of security measures in an emergency or during severe weather at the DAEC when it is permanently shutdown will not endanger life or property or the common

defense and security for the reasons discussed below.

First, 10 CFR 73.55(p)(2) will continue to require that "[s]uspended security measures must be reinstated as soon as conditions permit."

Second, the suspension of security measures for emergencies under 10 CFR 73.55(p)(1)(i) will continue to be invoked only "when this action is immediately needed to protect the public health and safety and no action consistent with license conditions and technical specifications that can provide adequate or equivalent protection is immediately apparent." Thus, the exemption would not prevent the licensee from meeting the underlying purpose of 10 CFR 73.55(p)(1)(i) to protect the public health and safety.

Third, the suspension of security measures for severe weather under 10 CFR 73.55(p)(1)(ii) will continue to be used only when "the suspension of affected security measures is immediately needed to protect the personal health and safety of security force personnel and no other immediately apparent action consistent with the license conditions and technical specifications can provide adequate or equivalent protection." The requirement in 10 CFR 73.55(p)(1)(ii) to receive input from the security supervisor or manager will remain. Therefore, the exemption would not prevent the licensee from meeting the underlying purpose of 10 CFR 73.55(p)(1)(ii) to protect the health and safety of the security force.

Additionally, by letter dated August 28, 2019, the NRC approved the DAEC CFH Training and Retraining Program. The NRC staff found that, among other things, the program addresses the safe conduct of decommissioning activities, the safe handling and storage of spent fuel, and the appropriate response to plant emergencies. Because a CFH at the DAEC will be sufficiently trained and qualified under an NRC-approved program, the NRC staff considers the CFH to have sufficient knowledge of operational and safety concerns, such that allowing the CFH to suspend security measures in emergencies or during severe weather will not result in undue risk to the public health and safety.

In addition, since the exemption allows a CFH the same authority currently given to the licensed senior operator under 10 CFR 73.55(p)(1)(i) and (ii), no change is required to physical security. Since no change is required to physical security, the exemption would not reduce the overall effectiveness of the DAEC physical security plan and would not adversely

impact the licensee's ability to physically secure the site or protect special nuclear material at the DAEC, and thus, would not have an effect on the common defense and security. The NRC staff has determined that the exemption would not reduce security measures currently in place to protect against radiological sabotage. Instead, the exemption would align the requirements of 10 CFR 73.55(p)(1)(i) and (ii) with the existing requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(y).

For these reasons, permitting, as a minimum, a CFH, in addition to a licensed senior operator, to approve the suspension of security measures in an emergency or during severe weather at the DAEC when it is permanently shutdown will not endanger life or property or the common defense and security.

### C. The Exemption Is Otherwise in the Public Interest

The proposed exemption would allow a CFH, in addition to a licensed senior operator, to approve the suspension of security measures in an emergency when "immediately needed to protect the public health and safety" or during severe weather when "immediately needed to protect the personal health and safety of security force personnel" at the DAEC when it is permanently shutdown. If the exemption is not granted, the DAEC will be required to have a licensed senior operator available to approve the suspension of security measures in an emergency or during severe weather for a permanently shutdown plant, even though there would no longer be a requirement for a licensed senior operator after the certifications required by 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) are submitted.

This exemption is in the public interest for the following reasons. Without the exemption, there would be uncertainty regarding how the licensee will invoke the temporary suspension of security measures that may be needed for protecting the public health and safety or the personal health and safety of the security force personnel in emergencies or during severe weather given the differences between the requirements in 10 CFR 73.55(p)(1)(i) and (ii) and 10 CFR 50.54(y). The exemption would allow the licensee to make decisions pursuant to 10 CFR 73.55(p)(1)(i) and (ii) without having to maintain a staff of licensed senior operators at a nuclear power reactor that has permanently ceased operations and permanently removed fuel from the reactor vessel. The exemption would also allow the licensee to have an established procedure in place to allow

a CFH to suspend security measures in an emergency or during severe weather after the certifications required by 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) have been submitted. Finally, the consistent and efficient regulation of nuclear power plants serves the public interest and this exemption would assure consistency between the regulations in 10 CFR part 73 and 10 CFR 50.54(y) and the requirements concerning licensed operators in 10 CFR part 55.

The NRC staff has determined that granting the proposed exemption would allow the licensee to designate a CFH with qualifications appropriate for a permanently shutdown and defueled reactor to approve the suspension of security measures in an emergency to protect the public health and safety and during severe weather to protect the personal health and safety of the security force personnel at the DAEC when it is permanently shutdown, which is consistent with the similar authority provided by 10 CFR 50.54(y). Therefore, the exemption is in the public interest.

### D. Environmental Consideration

The NRC's approval of the proposed exemption belongs to a category of actions that the Commission, by rule or regulation, has declared to be a categorical exclusion, after first finding that the category of actions does not individually or cumulatively have a significant effect on the human environment. Specifically, the NRC's approval of the exemption is categorically excluded from further environmental analysis under 10 CFR 51.22(c)(25).

Under 10 CFR 51.22(c)(25), the granting of an exemption from the requirements of any regulation of Chapter I to 10 CFR is a categorical exclusion provided that: (i) There is no significant hazards consideration; (ii) there is no significant change in the types or significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be released offsite; (iii) there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative public or occupational radiation exposure; (iv) there is no significant construction impact; (v) there is no significant increase in the potential for or consequences from radiological accidents; and (vi) the requirements from which an exemption is sought involve: Recordkeeping requirements; reporting requirements; inspection or surveillance requirements; equipment servicing or maintenance scheduling requirements; education, training, experience, qualification, requalification or other employment suitability requirements; safeguard

plans, and materials control and accounting inventory scheduling requirements; scheduling requirements; surety, insurance or indemnity requirements; or other requirements of an administrative, managerial, or organizational nature.

The NRC staff has determined that granting the proposed exemption involves no significant hazards consideration because allowing a CFH, in addition to a licensed senior operator, to approve the security suspension at a permanently shutdown and defueled power plant does not (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The proposed exemption is unrelated to any operational restriction. Accordingly, there is no significant change in the types or significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be released offsite and no significant increase in individual or cumulative public or occupational radiation exposure. The proposed exemption is not associated with construction, so there is no significant construction impact. The proposed exemption does not concern the source term (*i.e.*, potential amount of radiation in an accident) or mitigation. Thus, there is no significant increase in the potential for or consequences from radiological accidents. Finally, the requirement regarding suspensions of security measures involves either safeguards, materials control, or managerial/organizational matters.

Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) and (c)(25), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the approval of the proposed exemption.

### IV. Conclusion

Accordingly, the Commission has determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR 73.5, the proposed exemption is authorized by law, will not endanger life or property or the common defense and security, and is otherwise in the public interest. Therefore, the Commission hereby grants the licensee's request for an exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR 73.55(p)(1)(i) and (ii) to permit, as a minimum, a CFH, in addition to a licensed senior operator, to approve the suspension of security measures in an emergency or during severe weather at the DAEC once the certifications required under 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1) have been submitted.

The exemption is effective upon receipt.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 7th, day of November 2019.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.  
/RA/

Craig G. Erlanger, Director,  
Division of Operating Reactor Licensing,  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

[FR Doc. 2019-24855 Filed 11-15-19; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590-01-P

## NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[NRC-2019-0073]

### Stakeholder Input on Best Practices for Establishment and Operation of Local Community Advisory Boards in Response to a Portion of the Nuclear Energy Innovation and Modernization Act

**AGENCY:** Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

**ACTION:** Public meetings and webinar; reopening of comment period.

**SUMMARY:** On September 27, 2019, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) solicited comments on best practices for establishment and operation of local community advisory boards (CABs) associated with decommissioning activities, including lessons learned from existing boards, as required by the Nuclear Energy Innovation and Modernization Act (NEIMA). The public comment period was originally scheduled to close on November 15, 2019. The NRC has elected to reopen the public comment period to allow more time for members of the public to develop and submit their comments. Consistent with the consultation requirements in NEIMA Section 108, the NRC has hosted 11 public meetings and a public webinar to consult with host States, communities within the emergency planning zone of an applicable nuclear power reactor, and existing local CABs. The NRC is planning to host a second public webinar on November 19, 2019. In addition to these public meetings and public webinars, the NRC has developed a questionnaire to collect information regarding the areas identified in NEIMA with respect to the creation and operation of CABs from CABs in the vicinity of power reactors undergoing decommissioning, similar established stakeholder groups, or local government organizations. The results of the meetings, along with any other data received as a result of the NRC's information collection activities

associated with the NEIMA Section 108, will be captured in a best practices report that will be submitted to Congress.

**DATES:** The due date of comments requested in the notice published on September 27, 2019 (84 FR 51189) is reopened. Comments should be filed no later than December 6, 2019. Comments received after this date will be considered, if it is practical to do so, but the Commission is able to ensure consideration only for comments received on or before this date. The NRC hosted 11 Category 3 public meetings and a public webinar from August through October of 2019. A second public webinar will take place on November 19, 2019. Specific details regarding the webinar can be found on the NRC's public website at <https://www.nrc.gov/waste/decommissioning/neima-section-108.html>.

**ADDRESSES:** You may submit comments by any of the following methods:

- *Federal Rulemaking Website:* Go to <https://www.regulations.gov> and search for Docket ID NRC-2019-0073. Address questions about NRC docket IDs in *Regulations.gov* to Jennifer Borges; telephone: 301-287-9127; email: [Jennifer.Borges@nrc.gov](mailto:Jennifer.Borges@nrc.gov). For technical questions, contact the individual listed in the **FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT** section of this document.

- *Mail comments to:* Office of Administration, Mail Stop: TWFN-7-A60M, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, ATTN: Program Management, Announcements and Editing Staff.

For additional direction on obtaining information and submitting comments, see "Obtaining Information and Submitting Comments" in the **SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION** section of this document.

**FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:** Kim Conway, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; telephone: 301-415-1335; email: [NEIMA108.Resource@nrc.gov](mailto:NEIMA108.Resource@nrc.gov).

#### SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

##### I. Obtaining Information and Submitting Comments

###### A. Obtaining Information

Please refer to Docket ID NRC-2019-0073 when contacting the NRC about the availability of information for this action. You may obtain publicly-available information related to this action by any of the following methods:

- *Federal Rulemaking Website:* Go to <https://www.regulations.gov> and search for Docket ID NRC-2019-0073.

- *NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS):* You may obtain publicly-available documents online in the ADAMS Public Documents collection at <https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html>. To begin the search, select "Begin Web-based ADAMS Search." For problems with ADAMS, please contact the NRC's Public Document Room (PDR) reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737, or by email to [pdr.resource@nrc.gov](mailto:pdr.resource@nrc.gov). The ADAMS accession number for each document referenced (if it is available in ADAMS) is provided the first time that it is mentioned in this document.

- *NRC's PDR:* You may examine and purchase copies of public documents at the NRC's PDR, Room O1-F21, One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852.

###### B. Submitting Comments

Please include Docket ID NRC-2019-0073 in your comment submission. The NRC cautions you not to include identifying or contact information that you do not want to be publicly disclosed in your comment submission. The NRC will post all comment submissions at <https://www.regulations.gov> as well as enter the comment submissions into ADAMS. The NRC does not routinely edit comment submissions to remove identifying or contact information.

If you are requesting or aggregating comments from other persons for submission to the NRC, then you should inform those persons not to include identifying or contact information that they do not want to be publicly disclosed in their comment submission. Your request should state that the NRC does not routinely edit comment submissions to remove such information before making the comment submissions available to the public or entering the comment into ADAMS.

## II. Introduction

On September 27, 2019 (84 FR 51189), as part of the ongoing efforts to obtain feedback from members of the public and other stakeholders, the NRC solicited comments on best practices for establishment and operation of local CABs associated with decommissioning activities, including lessons learned from existing boards, as required by Section 108 of NEIMA. The NRC is coordinating activities in accordance with Section 108 of NEIMA to develop a report identifying best practices for establishment and operation of CABs.