[Federal Register Volume 84, Number 189 (Monday, September 30, 2019)]
[Notices]
[Pages 51657-51667]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2019-21096]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

[Release No. 34-87096; File No. SR-CboeEDGA-2019-012]


Self-Regulatory Organizations; Cboe EDGA Exchange, Inc.; Order 
Instituting Proceedings To Determine Whether To Approve or Disapprove a 
Proposed Rule Change To Introduce a Liquidity Provider Protection Delay 
Mechanism on EDGA

September 24, 2019.

I. Introduction

    On June 7, 2019, Cboe EDGA Exchange, Inc. (``EDGA'' or 
``Exchange'') filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(``Commission''), pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 (``Exchange Act'') \1\ and Rule 19b-4 
thereunder,\2\ a proposed rule change to introduce a delay mechanism on 
EDGA. The proposed rule change was published for comment in the Federal 
Register on June 26, 2019.\3\ On August 5, 2019, the Commission 
designated a longer period within which to approve the proposed rule 
change, disapprove the proposed rule change, or institute proceedings 
to determine whether the proposed rule change should be disapproved.\4\ 
The Commission received twenty-one comment letters from eighteen 
commenters on the proposed rule change, including a response from the 
Exchange.\5\ This order institutes proceedings under Section 
19(b)(2)(B) of the Exchange Act \6\ to determine whether to approve or 
disapprove the proposed rule change.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1).
    \2\ 17 CFR 240.19b-4.
    \3\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 86168 (June 20, 
2019), 84 FR 30282 (``Notice'').
    \4\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 86567, 84 FR 39385 
(August 9, 2019).
    \5\ See Letters from: R.T. Leuchtkafer, dated July 12, 2019 
(``Leuchtkafer Letter I''); Steve Crutchfield, Head of Market 
Structure, CTC Trading Group, LLC, dated July 15, 2019 (``CTC 
Letter''); Tyler Gellasch, Executive Director, Healthy Markets, 
dated July 16, 2019 (``Healthy Markets Letter''); Larry Tabb, 
Founder and Research Chairman, TABB Group, dated July 16, 2019 
(``Tabb Group Letter''); Stephen John Berger, Managing Director, 
Global Head of Government and Regulatory Policy, Citadel Securities, 
dated July 16, 2019 (``Citadel Letter''); Mehmet Kinak, Vice 
President & Global Head of Systematic Trading & Market Structure, 
and Jonathan D. Siegel, Vice President & Senior Legal Counsel 
(Legislative & Regulatory Affairs), T. Rowe Price, dated July 16, 
2019 (``T. Rowe Price Letter''); Adam Nunes, Head of Business 
Development, Hudson River Trading LLC, dated July 16, 2019 (``Hudson 
River Trading Letter''); Joanna Mallers, Secretary, FIA Principal 
Traders Group, dated July 16, 2019 (``FIA Letter''); Ray Ross, Chief 
Technology Officer, Clearpool, dated July 16, 2019 (``Clearpool 
Letter''); Eric Swanson, CEO, XTX Markets LLC (Americas), dated July 
16, 2019 (``XTX Letter I''); John Thornton, Co-Chair, Hal S. Scott, 
President, and R. Glenn Hubbard, Co-Chair, Committee on Capital 
Markets Regulation, dated July 16, 2019 (``CMR Committee Letter''); 
Kirsten Wegner, Chief Executive Officer, Modern Markets Initiative, 
dated July 17, 2019 (``MMI Letter''); Theodore R. Lazo, Managing 
Director and Associate General Counsel, SIFMA, dated July 18, 2019 
(``SIFMA Letter''); Eric Swanson, CEO, XTX Markets LLC (Americas), 
dated July 31, 2019 (``XTX Letter II''); Mark D. Epley, Executive 
Vice President & Managing Director, General Counsel, and Jennifer W. 
Han, Associate General Counsel, Managed Funds Association, dated 
August 2, 2019 (``MFA Letter''); Hubert De Jesus, Managing Director, 
Global Head of Market Structure and Electronic Trading, and Joanne 
Medero, Managing Director, Global Public Policy, Black Rock, dated 
August 2, 2019 (``Black Rock Letter''); Rich Steiner, Head of Client 
Advocacy and Market Innovation, RBC Capital Markets, dated August 
15, 2019 (``RBC Letter''); Adrian Griffiths, Assistant General 
Counsel, Cboe Global Markets, dated August 22, 2019 (``Exchange 
Response Letter''); R.T. Leuchtkafer, dated August 23, 2019 
(``Leuchtkafer Letter II''), R.T. Leuchtkafer, dated September 9, 
2019 (``Leuchtkafer Letter III''), Joshua Mollner, Assistant 
Professor, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, 
and Markus Baldauf, Assistant Professor, Sauder School of Business, 
University of British Columbia, dated September 12, 2019 (``Mollner 
& Baldauf Letter'') available at https://www.sec.gov/comments/sr-cboeedga-2019-012/srcboeedga2019012.htm.
    \6\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(2)(B).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

II. Summary of the Proposal

    EDGA proposes to adopt the Liquidity Provider Protection (``LP2'') 
delay mechanism, which would delay all incoming executable orders for 
up to four milliseconds.\7\ If an incoming executable order subject to 
the delay is no longer executable against orders resting on the EDGA 
Book (e.g., resting orders on the book are cancelled or modified such 
that they are no longer marketable against the delayed incoming order), 
such incoming order will be immediately released from the queue.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \7\ See Notice, 84 FR at 30284.
    \8\ See Notice, 84 FR at 30284.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The LP\2\ delay mechanism also would apply to the cancel, cancel/
replace, or modification messages that are associated with liquidity 
taking orders.\9\ The Exchange would apply such messages after the 
liquidity taking order is released from the delay mechanism.\10\ At the 
end of the delay period, incoming orders, cancel, and cancel/replace 
messages subjected to the delay mechanism would be processed after the 
System has processed, if applicable, all messages in the security 
received by the Exchange during such delay period which could result in 
a message being delayed for longer than four milliseconds depending on 
the volume of messages being processed by the Exchange.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \9\ See id.
    \10\ See id.
    \11\ See Notice 84 FR at 30284, n. 11.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Certain order types, or orders with instructions, that are not 
eligible for execution upon entry would become subject to the LP2 delay 
mechanism when a potential execution is triggered by a subsequent 
incoming order. For example, orders entered with either a Stop Price or 
Stop Limit Price instruction would not be executed until elected, and 
would only be subject to the delay mechanism after the order is 
converted to either a Market Order or Limit Order. Similarly, orders 
entered with a time-in-force instruction of Regular Hours Only would be 
subjected to the delay mechanism when entered into the EDGA Book after 
an opening or re-opening process.\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \12\ See EDGA Rule 11.7 relating to the opening and re-opening 
process.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    An incoming order that is not executable upon entry would not be 
subject to the delay mechanism. For example, orders with instructions 
that

[[Page 51658]]

are not executable when entered due to its order instructions (e.g., 
Minimum Quantity and Post Only) would not be subject to the LP2 Delay 
Mechanism. The one exception to this would be incoming orders with the 
EdgeRisk Self Trade Protection modifier.\13\ These modifiers would be 
applied to the order after it is delayed. In addition, incoming 
routable orders that bypass the EDGA book would not be subject to the 
LP2 delay mechanism, but any returning, executable remainder of such a 
routed order would be subject to the delay mechanism.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \13\ See Notice, 84 FR at 30283.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Market Data

    The Exchange proposes that the LP2 delay mechanism would not apply 
to inbound or outbound market data. Current, un-delayed data, would be 
used for all purposes including regulatory compliance and the pricing 
of pegged orders and the quotation and trade data would continue to be 
disseminated, without delay, to the applicable securities information 
processor (``SIP'') and direct market data feeds.\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \14\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Regulation NMS

    In conjunction with the proposed LP2 delay mechanism, the Exchange 
proposes to disseminate a manual, unprotected quotation.\15\ In 
addition, because certain Regulation NMS rules related to locked and 
crossed markets would apply differently to EDGA's manual, unprotected 
quotation, compared to its current automated, protected quotation, the 
Exchange proposed to make the two rule changes described below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \15\ Rule 600(a)(37) defines a ``manual quotation'' as any 
quotation other than an automated quotation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    First, the Exchange proposes to add new EDGA Rule 11.10(a)(6) to 
provide that a bid (offer) on the EDGA Book is eligible to remain 
posted to the EDGA Book for one second after such bid (offer) is 
crossed by a Protected Offer (Protected Bid). The bid (offer) on the 
EDGA Book will be cancelled if it continues to be higher (lower) than a 
Protected Offer (Protected Bid) after this one second period. Because 
the delayed cancellation behavior set forth by proposed EDGA Rule 
11.10(a)(6) would allow bids and offers on EDGA to remain posted and 
executable for up to one second if crossed by a Protected Bid or 
Protected Offer of another market, the Exchange also proposes to amend 
EDGA Rule 11.10(a)(2) to provide that the Exchange will not execute any 
portion of a bid or offer at a price that is more than the greater of 
five cents or 0.5 percent through the lowest Protected Offer or highest 
Protected Bid, as applicable.
    Second, the Exchange proposes to amend EDGA Rule 11.10(f) related 
to the dissemination and display of ``Locking Quotations or Crossing 
Quotations''.\16\ Because the Exchanges' quotations would be marked 
manual, Rule 610(d)(1)(ii) of Regulation NMS requires that the Exchange 
avoid locking or crossing any quotation in an NMS stock disseminated 
pursuant to an effective national market system plan. The Exchange 
proposes to amend EDGA Rule 11.10(f)(3) to provide that an EDGA 
quotation would not be considered a Locking or Crossing Quotation if 
the quotation being locked or crossed is a manual quotation that is 
allowed to be locked or crossed pursuant to an exemption request 
submitted by the Exchange.\17\ In the Notice, the Exchange notes that 
it submitted an exemption request to the Commission pursuant to Rule 
610(e) of Regulation NMS that, if granted by the Commission, would 
permit the Exchange to lock or cross manual quotations disseminated by 
the New York Stock Exchange LLC (``NYSE'').\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \16\ A ``Locking Quotation'' is the display of a bid for an NMS 
stock at a price that equals the price of an offer for such NMS 
stock previously disseminated pursuant to an effective national 
market system plan, or the display of an offer for an NMS stock at a 
price that equals the price of a bid for such NMS stock previously 
disseminated pursuant to an effective national market system plan in 
violation of Rule 610(d) of Regulation NMS. See EDGA Rule 11.6(g). A 
``Crossing Quotation'' is the display of a bid (offer) for an NMS 
stock at a price that is higher (lower) than the price of an offer 
(bid) for such NMS stock previously disseminated pursuant to an 
effective national market system plan in violation of Rule 610(d) of 
Regulation NMS. See EDGA Rule 11.6(c).
    \17\ See Notice, 84 FR at 30285.
    \18\ See Notice, 84 FR at 30285; see also Letter from Adrian 
Griffiths, Assistant General Counsel, Cboe, to Vanessa Countryman, 
Acting Secretary, dated June 7, 2019 (requesting exemptive relief 
from certain requirements related to locked and crossed markets 
pursuant to Rule 610(e) of Regulation NMS).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Eliminate or Modify Certain Order Types and Instructions
    The Exchange proposes to eliminate or modify certain order types 
and instructions to reduce System complexity in light of the operation 
of the proposed LP\2\ delay mechanism. Specifically, the Exchange 
proposes to eliminate the:
     Discretionary Range instruction \19\ and the MidPoint 
Discretionary Order (``MDO''); \20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \19\ Discretionary Range is an optional instruction that a User 
may attach to an order to buy (sell) a stated amount of a security 
at a specified, displayed or non-displayed ranked price with 
discretion to execute up (down) to another specified, non-displayed 
price. See EDGA Rule 11.6(d).
    \20\ A Midpoint Discretionary Order is a limit order to buy that 
is pegged to the NBB, with discretion to execute at prices up to and 
including the midpoint of the NBBO, or a limit order to sell that is 
pegged to the NBO, with discretion to execute at prices down to and 
including the midpoint of the NBBO. See EDGA Rule 11.8(e).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     Pegged instruction,\21\ including the Market Peg \22\ and 
Primary Peg instruction;
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \21\ Pegged is an instruction to automatically re-price an order 
in response to changes in the NBBO, and can be entered as either a 
Market Peg or Primary Peg. See EDGA Rule 11.8(b)(9).
    \22\ A Market Peg is an order entered with an instruction to peg 
to the NBB, for a sell order, or the NBO, for a buy order. See EDGA 
Rule 11.6(j)(1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     Supplemental Peg Orders; \23\ and
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \23\ Supplemental Peg Orders are non-displayed Limit Orders that 
are eligible for execution at the NBB for a buy order and NBO for a 
sell order against an order that is in the process of being routed 
to an away Trading Center if such order that is in the process of 
being routed away is equal to or less than the aggregate size of the 
Supplemental Peg Order interest available at that price. See EDGA 
Rule 11.8(g).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     Non-Displayed Swap and Super Aggressive instructions.\24\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \24\ Currently, when an order entered with an NDS or Super 
Aggressive instruction is locked by an incoming order with a Post 
Only instruction that would not remove liquidity based on the 
economic impact of removing liquidity on entry compared to resting 
on the order book and subsequently providing liquidity, the order 
with the NDS or Super Aggressive instruction is converted to an 
executable order and will remove liquidity against such incoming 
order. If an order that does not contain a Super Aggressive 
instruction maintains higher priority than one or more Super 
Aggressive eligible orders, the Super Aggressive eligible order(s) 
with lower priority will not be converted and the incoming order 
with a Post Only instruction will be posted or cancelled in 
accordance with Rule 11.6(n)(4). This does not apply to orders 
entered with an NDS instruction. See EDGA Rule 11.6(n)(2), (n)(7).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition, the Exchange proposes to modify the:
     MidPoint Peg Order (``MPO'') \25\ by eliminating the 
optional functionality that allows a User to: (1) Peg the order to the 
less aggressive midpoint or one minimum price variation inside the same 
side of the NBBO, and (2) opt for executions during a locked market;
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \25\ MPOs are non-displayed, market or limit orders with an 
instruction to execute at the midpoint of the NBBO, or, 
alternatively, pegged to the less aggressive of the midpoint of the 
NBBO or one minimum price variation inside the same side of the NBBO 
as the order. See EDGA Rule 11.9(c)(9).

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 51659]]

     Price Adjust \26\ and Display-Price Sliding \27\ 
instructions to eliminate the functionality to allow orders with these 
instructions to adjust multiple times to a more aggressive price in 
response to changes to the prevailing NBBO; \28\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \26\ Price Adjust is an order instruction requiring that where 
an order would be a locking quotation or crossing quotation of an 
external market if displayed by the System on the EDGA Book at the 
time of entry, the order will be displayed and ranked at a price 
that is one minimum price variation lower (higher) than the locking 
price for orders to buy (sell). See EDGA Rule 11.6(l)(1)(A).
    \27\ Display-Price Sliding is an order instruction requiring 
that where an order would be a locking quotation or crossing 
quotation of an external market if displayed by the System on the 
EDGA Book at the time of entry, will be ranked at the locking price 
in the EDGA Book and displayed by the System at one minimum price 
variation lower (higher) than the locking price for orders to buy 
(sell). See EDGA Rule 11.6(l)(1)(B).
    \28\ See EDGA Rule 11.6(l)(1)(A)(i),(B)(iii).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     Post Only instruction to (1) limit the use of the 
instruction to displayed orders and MPOs and (2) eliminate the ability 
of such orders to execute on an incoming basis; and
     Market Maker Peg Orders to require the use of a Post Only 
instruction with such orders.\29\ Finally, the Exchange proposes 
related, conforming changes to rules referencing the current Post Only 
functionality that would permit an incoming order to be executed.\30\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \29\ A Market Maker Peg Order is designed to assist market 
makers maintain compliance with their continuous quoting 
obligations. Specifically, it is a limit order that is automatically 
priced by the System at the Designated Percentage away from the then 
current NBB (in the case of an order to buy) or NBO (in the case of 
an order to sell), or if there is no NBB or NBO at such time, at the 
Designated Percentage away from the last reported sale from the 
responsible single plan processor.
    \30\ See e.g., EDGA Rule 11.6(l)(A)(4),(B)(4) and EDGA Rule 
11.8(c)(5).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

III. Summary of Comments

    The Commission received twenty-one comments from eighteen 
commenters on the proposed rule change, including a response letter 
from the Exchange.\31\ Three commenters supported the proposal \32\ and 
twelve commenters opposed the proposal.\33\ One commenter conditioned 
support for the proposal on the Exchange's quote not being included in 
the SIP.\34\ One commenter did not explicitly express support for, or, 
opposition to, the proposed rule change.\35\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \31\ See supra note 5.
    \32\ See CTC Letter; Mollner & Baldauf Letter; XTX Letter I; XTX 
Letter II.
    \33\ See Black Rock Letter; Citadel Letter; CMR Committee 
Letter; FIA Letter; Healthy Markets Letter; Hudson River Trading 
Letter; R.T. Leuchtkafer Letters I, II, and III; MFA Letter; MMI 
Letter; RBC Letter; SIFMA Letter; T. Rowe Price Letter.
    \34\ See Clearpool Letter at 4.
    \35\ See Tabb Group Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

A. Impact on Market Participants/Impact on Orders

    Two commenters believed that the proposal was consistent with the 
Exchange Act.\36\ One commenter believed the proposal was not unfairly 
discriminatory under the Exchange Act because it targets a behavior, 
latency arbitrage, and not specific market participants.\37\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \36\ See CTC Letter at 3-4; XTX Letter I at 2-4; XTX Letter II 
at 3.
    \37\ See XTX Letter I at 3. A subsequent comment by the same 
commenter also characterized the proposal as ``not discriminatory'' 
but ``rather a rational response to address behavior that imposes 
explicit and implicit costs on investors and the wider market in the 
form of spread and market impact.'' See XTX Letter II at 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Two commenters noted the proposal would protect all orders that add 
liquidity.\38\ One commenter suggested that, by protecting the resting 
orders of both liquidity providers and end users, the proposal would 
afford ``the best service and pricing to investors while still 
preserving the opportunity for those who wish to pursue higher speeds 
to benefit from doing so.'' \39\ One commenter suggested that the delay 
mechanism would protect the passive orders routed by commercially 
available order placement algorithms, including the orders of 
institutional investors.\40\ The commenter explained that an end users' 
passive orders would only miss fills if they cancelled their orders, 
and if this were the case, they would only miss adverse fills.\41\ One 
commenter noted the proposal would allow market participants to 
interact with their resting orders, e.g., by canceling the order or 
modifying the order's size, without being subject to the delay.\42\ 
This commenter believed the ability for liquidity providers to ``fade 
away'' was important in light of today's fragmented, fast moving 
markets.\43\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \38\ See XTX Letter I at 3; CTC Letter at 3.
    \39\ See CTC Letter at 3.
    \40\ See XTX Letter II at 5.
    \41\ See id.
    \42\ See Clearpool Letter at 2.
    \43\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Two commenters believed that the asymmetric delay is not akin to 
the ``last look'' practice in foreign exchange markets.\44\ One 
commenter explained that the information leakage and pre-hedging 
activity associated with ``last look'' would not be possible under the 
current proposal because the liquidity provider would have no knowledge 
of any order attempting to access the liquidity provider's quote until 
an execution occurs against that quote.\45\ One commenter indicated 
that the asymmetric speedbump is not a last look because it ``does not 
enjoy the ability to fade against a specific order.'' \46\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \44\ See Tabb Group Letter at 4; XTX Letter I at 6.
    \45\ See XTX Letter I at 6.
    \46\ See Tabb Group Letter at 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Eleven comments raised concerns about the proposal being unfairly 
discriminatory among market participants.\47\ One commenter stated that 
intentional delays associated with speed bumps should be equally 
applied, not asymmetrically applied, to all market participants.\48\ 
Two commenters stated the proposal would discriminate unfairly against 
liquidity takers.\49\ Another commenter did not believe that the 
Exchange justified why investors accessing EDGA quotations should be 
``systematically disadvantaged over those who provide quotations.'' 
\50\ One commenter suggested the proposal would impede the ability of 
ETF market makers to reliably access displayed quotations in underlying 
securities for hedging purposes, potentially increasing the risks 
associated with providing ETF liquidity and resulting in wider spreads, 
the costs of which would be ``disproportionately borne by retail 
investors.'' \51\ Two commenters were concerned that EDGA liquidity 
providers could be disadvantaged compared to faster EDGA liquidity 
providers, and an inability to respond quickly enough to market signals 
would create a riskless arbitrage opportunity for faster liquidity 
providers.\52\ One commenter believed that market makers with superior 
resources would be able to avoid price volatility and the effects of 
latency arbitrage would be shifted to market participants without fast 
and expensive technology.\53\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \47\ See Black Rock Letter at 1-2; Citadel Letter at 3; CMR 
Committee Letter at 1-2; Leuchtkafer Letter I at 1, 8, 11 and 15; 
FIA Letter at 1; Healthy Markets Letter at 9-10; Hudson River 
Trading Letter at 1 and 5; MFA Letter at 1-2; MMI Letter at 2; RBC 
Letter at 1; T. Rowe Price Letter at 1.
    \48\ See CMR Committee Letter at 2.
    \49\ See Black Rock Letter at 2; Healthy Markets Letter at 2.
    \50\ See Healthy Markets Letter at 2.
    \51\ See Citadel Letter at 2.
    \52\ See Leuchtkafer Letter I at 8; RBC Letter at 2.
    \53\ See Leuchtkafer Letter I at 8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Exchange responded that liquidity providers are subject to 
asymmetric risks because liquidity takers determine the time of a trade 
and are able to remove liquidity before a liquidity provider can 
reprice its resting orders.\54\ The Exchange explained that 
sophisticated liquidity takers can use information about impending 
price changes to purchase or sell shares.\55\ The Exchange stated that 
limit orders can essentially serve as a ``free option'' for liquidity 
takers that use marketable

[[Page 51660]]

orders to access posted liquidity, and that the liquidity takers 
essentially can lock in a risk-free profit if the liquidity provider is 
not able to react and reprice its posted liquidity.\56\ The Exchange 
indicated that liquidity providers are mindful of this ``free option'' 
when they price their quotes, and reasoned that it is important to 
protect liquidity providers ``given the service that they provide to 
the market'' and because ``quotations posted by liquidity providers 
determine the quality of executions received by investors that submit 
marketable order flow.'' \57\ The Exchange suggested different types of 
market participants that provide liquidity would benefit from the delay 
mechanism since it would attract a wider range of participants that 
could compete on factors other than speed, such as quality of 
execution, and noted a ``significant amount'' of institutional order 
flow is managed through broker-dealer algorithms that could response to 
market information in less than the 4 millisecond timeframe.\58\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \54\ See Exchange Response Letter at 2, 3, and 7.
    \55\ See id. at 3.
    \56\ See id.
    \57\ See Exchange Response Letter at 4, 7.
    \58\ See id. at 9-10.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Five commenters expressed concern about unfair discrimination among 
orders because the delay mechanism would apply asymmetrically to only 
liquidity-taking orders.\59\ One commenter noted that the speedbumps 
previously approved by the Commission are applicable to all inbound and 
outbound communications, whereas the EDGA speedbump is asymmetric and 
only applies to incoming executable orders.\60\ Another commenter 
stated that each time a liquidity provider utilizes the asymmetric 
speed bump to cancel or reprice a displayed quote, any incoming order 
that would have otherwise immediately executed would be negatively 
impacted.\61\ The commenter explained that in the event that a large 
institutional order is routed to multiple exchanges simultaneously, the 
EDGA portion of the order would likely be filled at a worse price since 
EDGA liquidity providers would be able to cancel or reprice their 
displayed quotes based on the most recent market data showing liquidity 
being taken from other venues.\62\ Another commenter suggested that 
enabling market makers to obtain superior order book queue position 
could discourage the use of limit orders by retail and institutional 
investors over time by increasing these investors' transaction 
costs.\63\ One commenter noted that under the proposal non-marketable 
orders could be canceled at any time, while marketable orders could not 
be cancelled while the order queues because of the delay mechanism.\64\ 
This commenter suggested that marketable orders would be harmed because 
they would not be allowed to be updated during the delay to adjust 
market information that is revealed during the delay.\65\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \59\ See Citadel Letter at 2-3; Leuchtkafer Letter I at 10; 
Hudson River Trading Letter at 3; MFA Letter at 1-2; SIFMA Letter at 
2.
    \60\ See MFA Letter at 2.
    \61\ See Citadel Letter at 2.
    \62\ See id.
    \63\ See Leuchtkafer Letter I at 9.
    \64\ See Hudson River Trading Letter at 3.
    \65\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Exchange responded to the comment suggesting that the proposed 
asymmetric delay that would only be applicable to incoming executable 
orders is unfairly discriminatory by stating the previously approved 
delay mechanisms may delay all incoming and outgoing orders, but treat 
orders resting on the book differently.\66\ Specifically, the Exchange 
noted that the repricing instructions for non-displayed pegged orders 
on IEX and NYSE American are not subject to a delay and suggested that 
the proposed delay mechanism would similarly protect resting orders 
while allowing liquidity providers to improve displayed prices as 
opposed to relying on exchange-driven algorithms ``designed solely to 
match prices quoted on other markets.'' \67\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \66\ See Exchange Response Letter at 6.
    \67\ See id. at 6-7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Three commenters asserted that the benefit liquidity providers 
receive as a result of the proposed rule change would be material or 
significant.\68\ Five commenters expressed concern that liquidity 
providers with a speed advantage could use the asymmetric delay to 
engage in price discovery on other venues in order to gain an 
informational advantage at the expense of other market 
participants.\69\ These commenters were concerned that liquidity 
providers would observe trading on other venues during the delay and 
cancel resting orders (i.e., back away or quote fade) on EDGA to avoid 
executions against delayed incoming orders.\70\ Two commenters believed 
the proposal bore some similarities to the ``last look'' practice in 
foreign exchange markets, wherein a market participant disseminates 
non-firm quotes to clients, and upon receiving a request to trade 
against its quoted price, has a final opportunity to accept or reject 
the trade request.\71\ One commenter expressed that approving the 
proposal would be ``akin to institutionalizing the practice of `last 
look''' but without the ``mitigating controls and prudential 
supervision'' associated with that practice.\72\ One commenter believed 
that liquidity providers would cancel or reprice displayed quotes to 
selectively avoid incoming orders.\73\ This commenter expressed that 
EDGA liquidity providers would be advantaged over EDGA liquidity takers 
because access to the Exchange's displayed quotations would be 
negatively impacted if the market moved in favor of the liquidity 
taker, while liquidity takers would have no equivalent mechanism to 
avoid executions if the market moves against them.\74\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \68\ See Black Rock Letter at 2; Citadel Letter at 2; FIA Letter 
at 2.
    \69\ See Citadel Letter at 2; Hudson River Trading Letter at 3; 
Leuchtkafer Letter I at 10-11; MFA Letter at 2; RBC Letter at 1.
    \70\ See Citadel Letter at 2-3; Hudson River Trading Letter at 
3; Leuchtkafer Letter I at 7; MFA Letter at 2; RBC Letter at 2.
    \71\ See Black Rock Letter at 3; Citadel Letter at 3.
    \72\ See Black Rock Letter at 3.
    \73\ See Citadel Letter at 2.
    \74\ See id. at 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    One commenter stated that the proposal would discriminate unfairly 
against liquidity takers since they would be exposed to an increase in 
adverse selection and stale executions after the delay.\75\ Another 
commenter suggested that the advantages liquidity providers would 
receive raise concerns that the proposal ``is inconsistent with the 
objectives of Section 11A of the Act to assure fair competition among 
brokers and dealers, and among exchange markets.'' \76\ Another 
commenter, a long-term institutional trader, indicated that their 
exposure to adverse selection and unfavorable fills would increase if 
highly sophisticated market makers could adjust their displayed quotes 
based on market signals.\77\ This commenter elaborated that the 
proposal could lead to an artificial increase in passive bids and 
offers by EDGA Market Makers, which could result in EDGA being 
``similar to other venues where buy-side participants and other 
institutions struggle'' to receive quality executions.\78\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \75\ See Black Rock Letter at 2.
    \76\ See MFA Letter at 3.
    \77\ See T. Rowe Price Letter at 2.
    \78\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    One commenter suggested that it may be a violation of the Quote 
Rule to permit some market participants to modify or cancel their 
quotations while incoming orders seeking to access those quotations are 
delayed.\79\ Another commenter suggested that the proposal could create 
problems for brokers or dealers with respect to complying with

[[Page 51661]]

Rule 602(b) of Regulation NMS, which requires a broker or dealer to 
honor its quotes when an order is presented to trade with those 
prices.\80\ This commenter noted that the speedbump is designed to 
delay the incoming order from being presented to a broker or dealer in 
order to provide the broker or dealer with additional time to update 
its prices, which would effectively allow the broker or dealer to not 
honor its quotation when the incoming order was presented (i.e., 
received and processed by the Exchange).\81\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \79\ See Healthy Markets Letter at 11.
    \80\ See Hudson River Trading Letter at 4.
    \81\ See Hudson River Trading Letter at 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Exchange responded that commenter concerns related to quote 
fading were unwarranted because post execution prices are relatively 
stable for most investors and such liquidity should continue to be 
available despite the four millisecond delay.\82\ The Exchange 
responded that the proposal is consistent with the Quote Rule. 
According to the Exchange, the Quote Rule only requires quotations to 
be firm when presented to a broker-dealer for execution.\83\ Under the 
proposed rule change, the liquidity provider has no knowledge of the 
incoming order and thus the incoming order is not presented to the 
liquidity provider for execution until the incoming order exits the 
delay mechanism.\84\ The Exchange opined that since the liquidity 
provider would be unable to refuse the trade at this point, the 
liquidity provider's quotation would be firm ``consistent with both the 
letter and the spirit of the Quote Rule.'' \85\ The Exchange also 
asserted that the proposal is distinguishable from ``last look'' 
functionality on the foreign exchange markets because EDGA liquidity 
providers would not have the opportunity to avoid executions with an 
incoming marketable order after it has been presented for 
execution.\86\ Rather, the Exchange suggested that liquidity providers 
would continue to quote prices based on available market information, 
and the liquidity taking order would only become known when the order 
is presented for execution after exiting the delay mechanism.\87\ The 
Exchange believed that the proposal could reduce the risk of adverse 
selection for liquidity providers by giving them an opportunity to 
update their posted quotations before trading at a potentially stale 
price.\88\ The Exchange indicated that reduced adverse selection risks 
for liquidity providers, as opposed to reduced liquidity for investors, 
was the more likely outcome, which could benefit investors by 
facilitating more aggressive quoting and effective price discovery on 
EDGA.\89\ The Exchange was not persuaded by the argument that liquidity 
providers would free ride price discovery because the Exchange believed 
such a strategy would be unsuccessful and result in EDGA having 
inferior intermarket priority for liquidity taking orders.\90\ The 
Exchange noted that liquidity providers on EDGA would still need to 
compete with each other to establish the Exchange BBO in order to trade 
with incoming marketable order flow, which should improve market 
quality on EDGA.\91\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \82\ See Exchange Response Letter at 5. The Exchange believes 
that statistics provided in the response letter related to markouts 
for liquidity providers on EDGA in July 2019 demonstrate that 
published quotations accessed by the majority of investors tend to 
be relatively stable in the 20 milliseconds following an investor 
removing liquidity posted on the EDGA order book. See id.
    \83\ See Exchange Response Letter at 15-16.
    \84\ See id. at 16.
    \85\ See id.
    \86\ See id. at 15.
    \87\ See Exchange Response Letter at 15-16.
    \88\ See id. at 2, 5.
    \89\ See id. at 5.
    \90\ See id. at 8.
    \91\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

B. Competition

    Two commenters asserted that the proposal would reduce barriers to 
entry for new liquidity providers,\92\ and three commenters believed 
the proposal would encourage competition among existing liquidity 
providers.\93\ One commenter expected that the proposal would result in 
greater competition between EDGA market makers on the basis of price 
and order size.\94\ One commenter characterized the proposal as 
``explicitly pro-competitive'' and suggested it would help foster 
competition by ensuring all market participants have at least some 
minimum amount of time to react to price changes in related markets, 
which would likely reduce the advantage that would otherwise be held by 
the small number market participants that use ``extreme'' low-latency 
technology to ``pick off'' participants who take slightly longer to 
reprice resting orders in response to new information.\95\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \92\ See CTC Letter at 3-4; XTX Letter I at 5; XTX Letter II at 
1, 8.
    \93\ See CTC Letter at 3-4; Mollner & Baldauf Letter at 2; XTX 
Letter I at 5; XTX Letter II at 1, 8.
    \94\ See XTX Letter II at 2.
    \95\ See CTC Letter at 1, 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Four commenters were concerned that proposal would impose a burden 
on competition.\96\ Three commenters suggested that EDGA liquidity 
providers would be advantaged over liquidity providers on other markets 
because non-EDGA liquidity providers would not have a mechanism to 
avoid unfavorable executions.\97\ One commenter suggested that the 
proposal did not address the burden on competition that could be caused 
by allowing EDGA liquidity providers to ``free-ride'' on price 
discovery on other markets that do not employ an asymmetric delay, and 
how such free-riding could discourage the order display of liquidity 
providers on competing exchanges and potentially diminish liquidity and 
price discovery on those other markets.\98\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \96\ See Citadel Letter at 5; FIA Letter at 2; Hudson River 
Trading Letter at 1; MFA Letter at 1.
    \97\ See Citadel Letter at 5; Hudson River Trading Letter at 2; 
MFA Letter at 3.
    \98\ See Hudson River Trading Letter at 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Exchange responded that the proposal would serve to increase 
competition among liquidity providers by attracting a wider range of 
participants that could compete on factors other than speed.\99\ The 
Exchange suggested that market participants that routinely enter two 
sided quotations and traded actively would benefit from the proposal 
relative to the amount of liquidity provided, but the benefits of the 
proposal would not be restricted to liquidity providers.\100\ The 
Exchange indicated that, for instance, institutional order flow that is 
managed by a broker-dealer algorithm would also benefit from the 
ability to react to market signals during the four millisecond 
delay.\101\ The Exchange stated that different kinds of market 
participants would directly benefit from the LP2 delay mechanism as 
liquidity providers and liquidity takers because of improved market 
quality.\102\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \99\ See Exchange Response Letter at 9.
    \100\ See id. at 8.
    \101\ See id. at 10.
    \102\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

C. Impact on Market Quality

    Four commenters expected that the proposal would result in improved 
market quality.\103\ One commenter believed that the proposal would aid 
in attracting liquidity and positively impact order routing behavior, 
execution quality, and general market quality.\104\ One commenter 
theorized that liquidity and informative prices were desirable market 
attributes but that such objectives sometimes conflicted and thus a 
tradeoff was necessary; the commenter suggested an asymmetric speedbump 
may be a means to achieve these dual goals because it would help to 
eliminate latency arbitrage.\105\ Two commenters believed that the 
proposal would allow liquidity providers to

[[Page 51662]]

narrow spreads and display larger size.\106\ One commenter indicated 
that although high-frequency liquidity providers were likely to be the 
immediate beneficiaries of the asymmetric speedbump, competition among 
them would likely result in tighter and deeper markets that would 
benefit other traders, and these traders may be the ultimate 
beneficiaries of the asymmetric speedbump.\107\ This commenter 
explained that even though quotes may fade during episodes of latency 
arbitrage, these quotes are likely to remain accessible during other 
times, to the benefit of most investors.\108\ Another commenter 
believed that the proposal would make the market more fair, encourage 
displayed liquidity and promote efficient price discovery.\109\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \103\ See Clearpool Letter at 1; CTC Letter at 1-2; Mollner & 
Baldauf Letter at 2; XTX Letter I at 3; XTX Letter II at 9.
    \104\ See Clearpool Letter at 1.
    \105\ See Mollner and Baldauf Letter at 1.
    \106\ See XTX letter I at 1; Mollner & Baldauf Letter at 2.
    \107\ See Mollner & Baldauf Letter at 2.
    \108\ See id.
    \109\ See CTC Letter at 1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Two commenters believed that a positive outcome of the proposal 
would be a reduced reliance on the speed of market connectivity, which 
would decrease the need for market participants to invest in technology 
in order to attain small, incremental speed advantages (i.e., 
microseconds).\110\ One of these commenters suggested that some latency 
sensitive firms engage in illegal or untoward activity to attain speed 
advantages in order to trade at stale prices, which impose an 
operational tax on liquidity providers that is passed on to 
investors.\111\ This commenter believed that providing liquidity 
providers with the ability to identify and react to latency arbitrage 
strategies should result in tighter pricing and deeper books for 
investors.\112\ This commenter indicated that even if the LP2 delay 
mechanism slowed down price discovery on EDGA, it would not materially 
affect investors because investors tend to have long-run economic 
exposures (e.g., days, weeks, or months) and their trading or hedging 
activity is not motivated by market developments at the millisecond 
timescale.\113\ This commenter noted that other commenters referenced 
an Australian study suggesting that an asymmetric speedbump had a 
negative impact on market liquidity on the TSX Alpha Exchange in 
Canada, however this commenter believed a subsequent academic study 
lacked evidence that the asymmetric speedbump had a negative impact on 
liquidity, trading costs or execution quality.\114\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \110\ See XTX Letter I at 2; CTC Letter at 3.
    \111\ See XTX Letter I at 1-2.
    \112\ See id.
    \113\ See XTX Letter I at 8.
    \114\ See XTX Letter II at 8-9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Nine commenters were concerned that the proposal could negatively 
impact market quality.\115\ Three commenters noted that an asymmetric 
speedbump could give a misleading impression of the availability of 
firm quotes and therefore result in illusory quotes or liquidity.\116\ 
One commenter stated that although the proposal may enhance displayed 
liquidity on EDGA, such displayed liquidity would be ``conditional and 
less accessible'' since liquidity providers would be likely to quote 
larger sizes and tighter spreads only because of their ability to back 
away from these quotes during the delay.\117\ One commenter expressed 
concern about the potential for an increase in quote fading at other 
exchanges resulting in adverse change to the NBBO, which could 
ultimately reduce the incentive for liquidity providers to post a 
larger size on EDGA.\118\ One commenter stated that the proposal does 
not explain how it would incentivize ``tighter quotes or other 
benefits.'' \119\Another commenter suggested that the proposal 
functions as an ``opaque rebate'' to liquidity providers because it 
affords them an advantage by allowing them to avoid adverse executions, 
and the economic value of this advantage is not quantifiable in 
advance.\120\ This commenter suggested that the use of structural 
incentives such as LP2 raises concern that transparent pricing will be 
replaced by advantages that are difficult to quantify, and such 
advantages could impact the efficacy of Rule 610T, the Transaction Fee 
Pilot.\121\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \115\ See Black Rock Letter at 1; Citadel Letter at 10; FIA 
Letter at 1; Healthy Markets Letter at 7; Hudson River Trading 
Letter at 3-4; MMI Letter at 2; RBC Letter at 1-2; Tabb Group Letter 
at 2; T. Rowe Price Letter at 2.
    \116\ See Black Rock Letter at 3; FIA Letter at 2; RBC Letter at 
2.
    \117\ See Hudson River Trading Letter at 3.
    \118\ See T. Rowe Price Letter at 2.
    \119\ See SIFMA Letter at 2.
    \120\ See Hudson River Trading Letter at 4.
    \121\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Two commenters were concerned about the potential for the proposal 
to have a negative impact on Intermarket Sweep Orders (``ISOs'').\122\ 
One commenter suggested that it would be likely that the EDGA portion 
of an ISO order would be filled at a worse price than other portions of 
the order since EDGA liquidity providers would be able to reprice 
displayed quotes based on recent market data.\123\ The other commenter 
believed that by the time the investor's order would exit the delay, 
the order it would have executed against on EDGA would almost certainly 
be gone.\124\ Thus, the commenter queried how the market center would 
interact with ISOs that are effectively 4 milliseconds old in a 
scenario in which a customer seeks to access liquidity across multiple 
venues by sweeping the market at a given price level.\125\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \122\ See Citadel Letter at 9; Healthy Markets Letter at 14.
    \123\ See Citadel Letter at 4.
    \124\ See Healthy Markets Letter at 14.
    \125\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    One commenter suggested that marketable orders would likely be 
diverted to competing venues, which would result in increased adverse 
executions for liquidity providers on those venues since marketable 
orders on EDGA would be less likely to contribute to price 
discovery.\126\ Two commenters suggested that because liquidity 
providers at exchanges without asymmetric delays would be likely to 
bear the costs of this increased adverse selection, spreads would 
likely widen at those venues.\127\ One commenter suggested that such 
adverse selection would serve to reduce liquidity, degrade price 
discovery, and widen spreads market-wide.\128\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \126\ See Hudson River Trading Letter at 3.
    \127\ See Black Rock Letter at 2; Hudson River Trading Letter at 
3.
    \128\ See Hudson River Trading Letter at 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    One commenter suggested that because similar proposals could be 
adopted by all or a substantial portion of the U.S. equities market, 
the potential impact on market quality and investor protection in such 
a scenario should be considered.\129\ One commenter suggested approval 
should only be given on a pilot basis in order to limit the proposed 
rule change's ``deleterious effects and enable collection of empirical 
data for assessing its impact on market quality.'' \130\ One commenter 
noted that the proposal may encourage other exchanges to implement 
additional and longer delays, which could result in exchanges competing 
to execute orders more slowly.\131\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \129\ See id. at 4.
    \130\ See Black Rock Letter at 3.
    \131\ See SIFMA Letter at 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    One commenter expressed that the proposed 4 millisecond delay would 
create ``significant uncertainty of execution (``fill rates'') and 
severely impede the ability of long-term investors to access displayed 
quotations simultaneously.'' \132\ This commenter noted that MIDAS data 
indicated that 15.59% of quotes in large stocks are canceled within one 
millisecond, and because that timeframe is only one quarter of EDGA's 
proposed delay, it

[[Page 51663]]

could be expected that arbitrary cancellation rates would rise 
considerably if the proposal were implemented.\133\ One commenter did 
not believe that the proposal sufficiently addressed the potential 
impact on financial products and asset classes traded on other 
venues.\134\ Two commenters were concerned that the proposal would 
increase locked and crossed markets.\135\ One commenter did not believe 
that the proposal addressed how trades would be conducted during locked 
and crossed markets which could frustrate investors receiving best 
execution.\136\ The commenter also suggested that by ``enabling those 
who submit orders to modify or cancel those orders before execution, 
but after'' orders that could potentially match have been presented, 
the Exchange ``opens the door'' to potentially ``significant 
manipulative or abusive practices, including spoofing'', which should 
be addressed.'' \137\ This commenter also questioned whether it was 
prudent to link a major market structure rule or delay mechanism to 
existing technology such as the high speed microwave connection, since 
technology is ``prone to frequent changes.'' \138\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \132\ See T. Rowe Price Letter at 2.
    \133\ See T. Rowe Price Letter at 2 (referencing SEC's Quote 
Life Data Series on the MIDAS website).
    \134\ See Healthy Markets Letter at 7.
    \135\ See Healthy Markets Letter at 12; RBC Letter at 2.
    \136\ See Healthy Markets Letter at 12.
    \137\ See id. at 13.
    \138\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Seven commenters referenced studies on the impact of an asymmetric 
speedbump on TSX Alpha, an unprotected exchange in Canada that delayed 
liquidity-taking orders, as a means to evaluate and critique the 
instant proposal.\139\ One commenter noted that an Australian study on 
TSX Alpha suggested that even a millisecond of advance knowledge of 
institutional investors' trading intentions is valuable and could lead 
to substantial information leakage across venues resulting in an 
increase in total transaction costs and a reduction in order book 
resiliency.\140\ Another commenter indicated that the Australian study 
found that liquidity, in the aggregate, was negatively impacted with 
increased market-wide costs for liquidity-takers.\141\ One commenter 
noted that after the introduction of the speedbump, TSX Alpha's quoting 
at the NBBO fell immediately from 60% to 36%.\142\ This commenter, 
while noting the structural differences between the Canadian and US 
markets, believed that TSX Alpha is analytically relevant to the 
current proposal.\143\ One commenter suggested that the data related to 
the impact on speedbumps was unsettled because Australian and Canadian 
studies had yielded different conclusions, and noted that the Canadian 
study did not examine quote fading.\144\ One commenter indicated the 
Canadian study found that TSX Alpha did not impact market-wide 
liquidity and further found negative effects for certain participants, 
such as buy-side investors.\145\ The commenter also referenced an 
Ontario Securities Commission (``OSC'') staff notice that reported the 
OSC's own market quality measures did not materially change as a result 
of the TSX Alpha speedbump, as well as a survey of market participants 
by the OSC that found TSX Alpha added complexity into routing decisions 
and that fill rates on Alpha had decreased in certain situations, such 
as for orders that are expected to go through multiple price levels or 
need to be split and sent to multiple marketplaces simultaneously--
e.g., institutional orders.\146\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \139\ See Black Rock Letter at 2; Healthy Markets Letter at 10; 
Leuchtkafer Letter I at 13-14; Leuchtkafer Letter II at 5-6; 
Leuchtkafer Letter III at 7; MFA Letter at 2; SIFMA Letter at 2.
    \140\ See MFA Letter at 2.
    \141\ See SIFMA Letter at 2.
    \142\ See Black Rock Letter at 2.
    \143\ See id.
    \144\ See Leuchtkafer Letter II at 5-6.
    \145\ See Leuchtkafer Letter III at 7.
    \146\ See Leuchtkafer Letter III at 7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Exchange responded that the proposal is designed to improve 
market quality by reducing the adverse selection risk for liquidity 
providers in order to encourage the provision of liquidity that is more 
aggressively priced with greater depth.\147\ The Exchange indicated 
that liquidity takers could choose not to route to EDGA if liquidity 
providers did not step up and provide the expected market quality 
benefits in terms of increased depth or more aggressive prices.\148\ 
The Exchange believed that the potential for liquidity takers to route 
to alternative venues would incent liquidity providers to improve 
market quality since their ability to trade is ``wholly contingent on 
attracting liquidity taking orders willing to access their 
quotations.'' \149\ The Exchange stated that this is consistent with 
the current operation of EDGA liquidity providers.\150\ The Exchange 
responded to comments related to the Australian TSX Alpha study and 
suggested that the results of the study had been contradicted by a 
subsequent study and review performed by Canadian regulators which 
concluded that the TSX Alpha speedbump did not have an adverse effect 
on the market quality of the Canadian equity markets.\151\ The Exchange 
also noted the significant differences between the U.S. and Canadian 
equities markets in terms of regulation and market structure, as well 
as material differences between the current proposal and the TSX Alpha 
speedbump.\152\ The Exchange offered that to the extent that the 
Canadian perspective is instructive, the analysis done by Canadian 
regulators demonstrates the value of offering innovations similar to 
the instant proposal.\153\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \147\ See Exchange Response Letter at 1-2.
    \148\ See id. at 8.
    \149\ See id.
    \150\ See id. at 15-16.
    \151\ See id. at 10. The Exchange referenced a joint study on 
the impact of the TSX Alpha redesign conducted by the Investment 
Industry Regulatory Organization of Canada and the Bank of Canada, 
as well as a review conducted by the Ontario Securities Commission. 
See id.
    \152\ See Exchange Response Letter at 11.
    \153\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

D. Data and Support

    Five commenters expressed concern that the Exchange did not provide 
data to support key assertions within the proposal.\154\ One commenter 
stated that the proposal was ``inadequate in light of Susquehanna'' and 
noted that the proposal lacked ``quantitative detail'' related to 
EDGA's current marketplace, and how EDGA would achieve its stated goals 
if the proposal were implemented.\155\ Four commenters indicated that 
EDGA did not provide the data necessary to demonstrate that cross-asset 
latency arbitrage negatively impacts liquidity on EDGA or that the 
proposed asymmetric speed bump would improve market quality.\156\ One 
commenter noted that EDGA did not provide ``any data or analysis 
regarding how many members could be expected to increase quoting as a 
result'' of the proposal.\157\ One commenter stated that EDGA did not 
provide data to evaluate the impact of the proposal on winners and 
losers--for example, the frequency with which liquidity providers are 
expected to use the delay, the impact on retail and institutional 
orders, and the impact on ETF market makers.\158\ This commenter 
compared EDGA and EDGX market quality and postulated that the ``lower 
market quality of quotes on EDGA'' could be a function of the

[[Page 51664]]

different fee and rebate structures of the exchanges.\159\ This 
commenter believed that its comparison of market quality on these 
exchanges provided insight into the potential impact of the inverted 
fee structure on EDGA, and stated that EDGA did not explain how its 
inverted fee structure would interact with the proposal to deliver the 
benefits claimed.\160\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \154\ See Citadel Letter at 6 and 10; Leuchtkafer Letter I at 2-
5; FIA Letter at 2; Healthy Markets Letter at 5-6; SIFMA Letter at 
2.
    \155\ See Leuchtkafer Letter I at 3, 15 (citing Susquehanna 
Int'l Grp., LLP v. SEC, 866 F.3d 442 (D.C. Cir. 2017)).
    \156\ See Citadel Letter at 6-7; FIA Letter at 2; Healthy 
Markets Letter at 6; SIFMA Letter at 2.
    \157\ See Healthy Markets Letter at 7.
    \158\ See Citadel Letter at 7.
    \159\ See id. at 7 and 10.
    \160\ See id. at 7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    One commenter believed that the MIDAS data referenced by another 
commenter, i.e., that 15.59% of orders in large stocks are cancelled 
within one millisecond, were irrelevant to whether the delay mechanism 
impacted the fill rates for institutional investors because it is 
unlikely that latency arbitrage would occur immediately after order 
placement.\161\ Another commenter suggested that ``the proposal [has] 
some merits'' and suggested that quote and execution traffic should be 
examined in order to estimate how much quote fading would occur via 
market makers within 4 milliseconds of a price movement.\162\ The 
commenter also suggested that it would be beneficial to analyze how the 
proposed Transaction Fee Pilot's reduced and no-rebate pricing tiers 
might impact liquidity, and how this could be countered by the 
introduction of an asymmetric speedbump.\163\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \161\ See XTX Letter II at 4 (referencing T. Rowe Price Letter, 
which provided data from the SEC's Quote Life Data Series on the 
MIDAS website).
    \162\ See Tabb Group Letter at 5.
    \163\ See Tabb Group Letter at 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Exchange responded by providing data and analysis that it 
believes illustrates the latency arbitrage problem. The Exchange 
presented a chart displaying markouts for liquidity providers on EDGA 
in SPY for July 2019 that was based on whether a transaction involved a 
missed cancel--i.e., instances in which a liquidity provider attempted 
and failed to cancel or replace their quotation within 4 milliseconds 
after an execution.\164\ The Exchange indicated that ``these statistics 
illustrate the difference between the execution price and the midpoint 
price at the time of the trade and in the milliseconds following an 
execution.'' \165\ The Exchange believed the data demonstrated that the 
midpoint price moves dramatically in the milliseconds immediately 
following transactions involving missed cancels, and that transactions 
in this category often involve a handful of faster firms that are 
routinely able to predict and profit from prices that are about to 
change.\166\ The Exchange expressed that when prices immediately move 
against the resting order in the milliseconds following the trade, the 
trade was likely to have been executed at a stale price.\167\ The 
Exchange further explained its belief that by offering a four 
millisecond period for liquidity providers to update their posted 
quotations before trading at a stale price, the LP2 delay mechanism 
would reduce the effectiveness of latency arbitrage strategies.\168\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \164\ See Exchange Response Letter at 3-4, Appendix A.
    \165\ See id. at 3.
    \166\ See id.
    \167\ See id.
    \168\ See id. at 2, 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In response to the information provided by the Exchange, one 
commenter suggested that the sample selection in the chart does not 
necessarily show stale quotes being picked off by latency arbitrageurs 
in Chicago, but rather may demonstrate that the SPY signal to cancel is 
coming from somewhere closer than Chicago, or perhaps that some or all 
of the EDGA market makers use something faster than fiber.\169\ This 
commenter also suggested that based on the graphs provided by the 
Exchange, the proposal could result in providing an ``investor-funded 
subsidy'' of $900 a day or more in SPY to EDGA market makers.\170\ This 
commenter also suggested that the data likely shows the effect of 
investor equities market sweeps as opposed to latency arbitrage 
activity based on the futures markets in Chicago.\171\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \169\ See Leuchtkafer Letter III at 3.
    \170\ See id. at 5.
    \171\ See id. at 6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

E. Impact of the SIP Disseminating Manual, Unprotected Quotes

    One commenter expressed support for the inclusion of EDGA's 
unprotected quote in the SIP, and ultimately emphasized that there 
should be an appropriate modifier denoting the unprotected status.\172\ 
In its second letter, the commenter noted that no market participant 
would be required to access EDGA's unprotected quote and thus the 
Exchange would stand or fall on its own merits.\173\ The commenter also 
stated that it would be reasonable for pegged orders to only peg off 
the protected BBO and exclude unprotected quotes, which the Exchange 
explained is how the Canadian markets handle the pricing of pegged 
orders today in a market with both protected and unprotected 
quotes.\174\ The commenter also expressed it would be reasonable to 
exclude unprotected quotes from consideration for regulatory references 
such as Regulation SHO's price test.\175\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \172\ See XTX Letter I at 5; XTX Letter II at 7.
    \173\ See XTX Letter II at 3.
    \174\ See id. at 6.
    \175\ See XTX Letter II at 6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Eight commenters expressed concern about the inclusion of EDGA's 
quotations to the SIP as manual, unprotected quotes.\176\ Two of these 
commenters argued that EDGA quotations should be removed from the 
SIP.\177\ One commenter suggested that the inclusion of EDGA's 
quotations in the SIP would allow EDGA to free ride the SIP.\178\ Three 
commenters were concerned about the potential impact of EDGA quotes on 
the pricing of pegged orders, including midpoint orders.\179\ As one 
commenter explained, many trading venues use the SIP NBBO for pegged 
orders, and to the extent EDGA sets the NBBO, the proposal could impact 
mid-point pegging prices on other venues with an inaccessible quotes 
that is artificially narrower than those on other venues.\180\ One 
commenter suggested considering whether the SIPs should disseminate a 
new Protected Best Bid and Offer (``PBBO'') that would not include 
EDGA's non-protected quote and how EDGA's non-protected quote should be 
used in calculating midpoint values.\181\ One commenter questioned how 
the NBBO would be determined when the SIP contains both protected and 
unprotected quotes, and whether it would be appropriate for a venue 
with only unprotected quotes to publish to the SIP--as well as what the 
implications would be for the different SIP Plans and for revenue 
sharing.\182\ This commenter also queried how the routing of certain 
orders, such as ISOs, would be affected, and whether market 
participants would be required to make technological changes as a 
result.\183\ Another commenter indicated the dissemination of 
unprotected, manual quotes to the SIP would add complexity and 
confusion to the national market system that could be harmful to long-
term investors.\184\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \176\ See Black Rock Letter at 3; Citadel Letter at 8; Clearpool 
Letter at 3-4; Healthy Markets Letter at 10; Hudson River Trading 
Letter at 3; RBC Letter at 3; SIFMA Letter at 3; T. Rowe Price 
Letter at 2.
    \177\ See Clearpool Letter at 3-4; Healthy Markets Letter at 13.
    \178\ See Healthy Markets Letter at 12.
    \179\ See Citadel Letter at 9; Healthy Markets Letter at 14; 
SIFMA Letter at 3.
    \180\ See Healthy Markets Letter at 14.
    \181\ See SIFMA at 3.
    \182\ See Citadel Letter at 8-9.
    \183\ See id. at 8.
    \184\ See T. Rowe Price Letter at 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Exchange responded to comments suggesting that EDGA's quotation 
should be excluded from the NBBO disseminated by the SIP. The Exchange 
contended that eliminating EDGA's quotation from the SIP would

[[Page 51665]]

only serve to reduce transparency into the best prices available for 
securities, which would likely result in investor orders being executed 
at worse prices.\185\ The Exchange noted that broker-dealers would 
remain free to determine how to use EDGA's manual quotation 
information, such as for setting midpoint prices or using it as a 
reference price for the execution of customer orders on ATSs or other 
off exchange markets.\186\ The Exchange noted the EDGA manual quote 
would be identified in SIP feeds in the same manner as manual 
quotations disseminated from the NYSE floor, and that firms choosing to 
ignore EDGA's quotations could continue to identify the PBBO for order 
routing and trade-through compliance purposes, among others.\187\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \185\ See Exchange Response Letter at 13-14.
    \186\ See id. at 14.
    \187\ See id. at 14-15.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

F. Impact on the National Market System

    Four commenters expressed concern about how the proposal could 
impact the National Market System, particularly as it relates to the 
publication of manual, unprotected quotations and functions related to 
the NBBO.\188\ One commenter questioned whether EDGA would continue to 
meet Rule 604 standards for displaying customer limit orders without 
protected quote status.\189\ Five commenters were concerned about how 
the proposal would impact the calculation of Rule 605 metrics and 
execution quality disclosures.\190\ One commenter suggested that the 
inclusion of EDGA's quotation in the benchmark used for calculating 
execution quality statistics under Rule 605 would allow EDGA to free 
ride such metrics.\191\ This commenter explained that because only the 
best orders on the exchange would be executed, and statistical measures 
of execution quality do not currently account for how many quotations 
are ``subject to backing away,'' execution quality metrics would likely 
show that EDGA's execution quality is better than execution quality on 
other exchanges, even if this is not the case.\192\ Another commenter 
suggested that in addition to Rule 605 reporting, EDGA's best bid 
should not be used as a reference price for Regulation SHO, best 
execution, mid-point executions, or OTC transactions, since it would 
not be immediately accessible.\193\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \188\ See Citadel Letter at 8; Healthy Markets Letter at 10-12; 
Hudson River Trading Letter at 3; RBC Letter at 3.
    \189\ See Citadel Letter at 8.
    \190\ See Black Rock Letter at 3; Citadel Letter at 8-9; Healthy 
Markets Letter at 11-12 and 14-15; Hudson River Trading Letter at 3; 
SIFMA Letter at 3.
    \191\ See Healthy Markets Letter at 12 and 14-15.
    \192\ See id. at 12.
    \193\ See Hudson River Trading Letter at 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    One commenter opined that market data would not be impacted by the 
proposal because liquidity providing and quote generating orders would 
not be subject to the delay mechanism, and execution information for 
those orders would not be delayed once they pass over the 
speedbump.\194\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \194\ See Tabb Group Letter at 1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Three commenters were concerned that the proposal could result in 
an increase in locked and crossed markets.\195\ One commenter 
questioned whether the proposal is consistent with Rule 610 of 
Regulation NMS and was concerned that the proposal did not address 
trading during locked and crossed markets, which could increase the 
risk of investors not receiving best execution.\196\ One commenter 
noted that EDGA would be able to lock and cross automated markets 
despite being defined as a manual market, and cautioned that crossed 
markets may be more frequent and last longer than expressed in the 
proposal.\197\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \195\ See Healthy Markets Letter at 12; Hudson River Trading 
Letter at 4 n.7; RBC Letter at 2.
    \196\ See Healthy Markets at 12,14.
    \197\ See RBC Letter at 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Nine commenters were concerned that this proposed rule change could 
result in increased market complexity if implemented as proposed.\198\ 
Five commenters were concerned about the potential for this proposal to 
establish precedent that could result in substantially similar 
proposals from competing exchanges, which could serve to increase 
market complexity.\199\ One commenter indicated that the proposal may 
actually create an incentive not to trade on EDGA, and suggested that 
it would be beneficial to ascertain ``what types of liquidity 
incentives are valuable to the market and to the economy.'' \200\ The 
commenter explained that because EDGA's inverted pricing model charges 
liquidity providers a fee when an order executes, the proposal would 
effectively allow liquidity providers to pull their quotes on EDGA as 
other markets move and incentivize quote fading to avoid the fee that 
would be incurred in the event of an execution.\201\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \198\ See Black Rock Letter at 1; Clearpool Letter at 4; FIA 
Letter at 2; Hudson River Trading Letter at 4; Leuchtkafer Letter II 
at 5; MMI Letter at 1-2; RBC Letter at 3; SIFMA Letter at 2; T. Rowe 
Price Letter at 2 and 3.
    \199\ See Black Rock Letter at 2; Hudson River Trading Letter at 
4; RBC Letter at 2; SIFMA Letter at 2; T. Rowe Price Letter at 2.
    \200\ See Tabb Group Letter at 4.
    \201\ See Tabb Group Letter at 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    One commenter believed that because the proposal would eliminate or 
adjust the operation of certain rarely used order types and 
instructions, the Exchange was taking steps to reduce the complexity of 
its market.\202\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \202\ See XTX Letter I at 6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

G. Impact on Best Execution and Broker-Dealer Obligations

    Eight commenters expressed concern about the impact of the proposed 
rule change on broker-dealers' regulatory obligations, particularly 
with respect to a broker-dealer's obligation to obtain best 
execution.\203\ One commenter believed that Commission and FINRA 
guidance and the adopting release for Regulation NMS adequately 
addressees best execution obligations.\204\ This commenter noted that 
the decision to access a manual quotation rests with the broker-
dealer's review of execution quality.\205\ Four commenters conveyed it 
would be important to issue new guidance or modernize existing guidance 
to address the application of best execution principles to routing 
quotes to an unprotected exchange as compared to protected exchanges if 
the proposal is approved.\206\ One commenter requested clarification 
that broker-dealers do not necessarily have to access or route to an 
unprotected venue that displays the best quote.\207\ One commenter 
questioned whether EDGA's request to extend the ``Flickering Quote 
Exception'' to unprotected quotes would be appropriate, given that this 
may result in situations where a quote published on the SIP is locked 
or crossed with a protected quote, leading to potential confusion 
regarding best execution obligations and executions occurring outside 
of the protected NBBO.\208\ One commenter suggested that the proposal 
would disincentivize improving the best bid or offer displayed on away 
markets.\209\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \203\ See Black Rock Letter at 3; Citadel Letter at 9; Clearpool 
Letter at 3-4; Healthy Markets Letter at 11-12; Hudson River Trading 
Letter at 4; MFA Letter at 3; RBC Letter at 3; SIFMA Letter at 2.
    \204\ See XTX Markets Letter II at 6-7.
    \205\ See id. at 7.
    \206\ See Black Rock Letter at 3; Healthy Markets Letter at 13-
14; MFA Letter at 3; SIFMA Letter at 3.
    \207\ See SIFMA Letter at 3.
    \208\ See Citadel Letter at 9.
    \209\ See Black Rock Letter at 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Exchange responded to comments related to best execution 
concerns. The Exchange posited that the Commission's guidance related 
to best execution provided in conjunction with

[[Page 51666]]

the adoption of Regulation NMS remained relevant, and broker-dealers 
should continue to be able to determine how to best to route their 
clients' orders.\210\ The Exchange noted that broker-dealers already 
account for different types of execution venues in making best 
execution decisions, and the majority of these venues are not national 
securities exchanges and do not publicly disseminate a protected 
quotation, or display any quotation at all.\211\ The Exchange agreed 
with reasoning set forth in the Regulation NMS adopting release 
suggesting that that exclusion of manual quotations from the NBBO could 
result in broker-dealers ignoring the best available quotations when 
executing customer orders.\212\ The Exchange therefore contended that a 
similar best execution analysis would apply when determining whether to 
route an order to an unprotected exchange disseminating a manual 
quotation.\213\ The Exchange further noted that if the proposal does 
not yield the intended market quality benefits on EDGA, broker-dealers 
would be free to route their clients' orders elsewhere according to 
their analysis of the best market for the security under prevailing 
market conditions.\214\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \210\ See Exchange Response Letter at 12.
    \211\ See id. at 12-13.
    \212\ See Exchange Response Letter at 14.
    \213\ See Exchange Response Letter at 13.
    \214\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

H. Operation of the Delay

    Two commenters noted that there is no precedent for an asymmetric 
speedbump in the U.S. equities market.\215\ One commenter noted that 
the instant proposal differed from the intentional delays implemented 
by NYSE American and IEX in that the 4 millisecond delay is 
approximately ten times longer than the 350 microsecond delays on IEX 
and NYSE American, and that EDGA proposes to waive order protection for 
its quotes, whereas the quotes on IEX and NYSE American would continue 
to be protected.\216\ One commenter believed that a delay somewhat 
shorter in length than 4 milliseconds would suffice, although the 
proposal was a ``step in the right direction.'' \217\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \215\ See Black Rock Letter at 1-2; Citadel Letter at 1.
    \216\ See Tabb Group at 1.
    \217\ See Mollner & Baldauf Letter at 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    One commenter believed that while the proposed delay is longer in 
duration than those of the symmetric speedbumps implemented by IEX and 
NYSE American, the four-millisecond speed bump ``appropriately 
recognizes the realities of U.S. market structure, where highly 
correlated instruments including equities, futures, and ETFs are 
variously traded in data centers across the New York-New Jersey metro 
area as well as in and around Chicago.'' \218\ This commenter believed 
the duration of the proposed delay reasonably reflected the 
technological realities of cross-market securities and derivatives 
trading and hedging strategies.\219\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \218\ See CTC Letter at 3.
    \219\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    One commenter expressed concern that the proposal was not 
sufficiently clear in regard to how the proposed delay mechanism would 
operate, particularly in circumstances where intervening actions 
occur.\220\ This commenter noted the examples provided by the Exchange 
did not address orders of different types or sizes, or orders from 
additional market participants.\221\ This commenter posed the following 
questions about how a 200 share order that is submitted might interact 
with a 100 share order that is resting on the Exchange: (1) Whether the 
full 200 share order would be delayed; (2) if 100 shares were delayed, 
whether the other 100 shares would be permitted to post; (3) whether 
the non-delayed 100 shares would be sent to other market centers; (4) 
whether the firm who submitted the resting order that triggered the 
delay would be able to modify its order to increase its size in the 
interim, perhaps to 200 shares, and the impact of this change; (5) 
whether the answers to these questions are dependent upon order types 
used or other factors, and if so, what those factors are and how would 
they be determinative; (6) whether a new order that is submitted while 
a delayed order is waiting would be able to immediately execute against 
the now-delayed order once it waits out the four milliseconds, or if it 
would also be subject to a delay.\222\ The commenter also requested an 
explanation related to why the first cancel or cancel/replace message 
entered would be queued and all subsequent messages would be ignored if 
a user enters multiple cancel or cancel/replace messages for a 
liquidity taking order during the delay period.\223\ The commenter also 
inquired about the outcome in a scenario in which a quote is not 
canceled for one second in order to comply with the flickering quote 
rule.\224\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \220\ See Healthy Markets Letter at 6-7.
    \221\ See id.
    \222\ See id. at 7.
    \223\ See Healthy Markets Letter at 7.
    \224\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

IV. Proceedings To Determine Whether To Approve or Disapprove SR-
CboeEDGA-2019-012 and Grounds for Disapproval Under Consideration

    The Commission is instituting proceedings pursuant to Section 
19(b)(2)(B) of the Exchange Act \225\ to determine whether the proposed 
rule change should be approved or disapproved. Institution of such 
proceedings is appropriate at this time in view of the legal and policy 
issues raised by the proposed rule change. Institution of proceedings 
does not indicate that the Commission has reached any conclusions with 
respect to any of the issues involved. Rather, as stated below, the 
Commission seeks and encourages interested persons to provide comments 
on the proposed rule change.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \225\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(2)(B).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Pursuant to Section 19(b)(2)(B) of the Exchange Act,\226\ the 
Commission is providing notice of the grounds for disapproval under 
consideration. The Commission is instituting proceedings to allow for 
additional analysis of the proposed rule change's consistency with: (1) 
Section 6(b)(5) of the Exchange Act, which requires, among other 
things, that the rules of a national securities exchange not be 
designed to permit unfair discrimination between customers, issuers, 
brokers, or dealers;\227\ (2) Section 6(b)(8) of the Exchange Act, 
which requires that the rules of a national securities exchange not 
impose any burden on competition not necessary or appropriate in 
furtherance of the purposes of the Exchange Act;\228\ and (3) Section 
11A of the Exchange Act.\229\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \226\ Id.
    \227\ 15 U.S.C. 78f(b)(5).
    \228\ 15 U.S.C. 78f(b)(8).
    \229\ 15 U.S.C. 78k-1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

V. Procedure: Request for Written Comments

    The Commission requests that interested persons provide written 
submissions of their views, data, and arguments with respect to the 
issues identified above, as well as any other concerns they may have 
with the proposal. In particular, the Commission invites the written 
views of interested persons concerning whether the proposal is 
consistent with Sections 6(b)(5), 6(b)(8), and 11A of the Exchange Act, 
any other provision of the Exchange Act, or any other rule or 
regulation under the Exchange Act. Although there do not appear to be 
any issues relevant to approval or disapproval that would be 
facilitated by an oral presentation of views, data, and

[[Page 51667]]

arguments, the Commission will consider, pursuant to Rule 19b-4, any 
request for an opportunity to make an oral presentation.\230\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \230\ Section 19(b)(2) of the Exchange Act, as amended by the 
Securities Act Amendments of 1975, Public Law 94-29 (June 4, 1975), 
grants the Commission flexibility to determine what type of 
proceeding--either oral or notice and opportunity for written 
comments--is appropriate for consideration of a particular proposal 
by a self-regulatory organization. See Securities Act Amendments of 
1975, Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs, S. Rep. No. 
75, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 30 (1975).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Interested persons are invited to submit written data, views, and 
arguments regarding whether the proposal should be approved or 
disapproved by October 21, 2019. Any person who wishes to file a 
rebuttal to any other person's submission must file that rebuttal by 
November 4, 2019. The Commission asks that commenters address the 
sufficiency of the Exchange's statements in support of the proposal, in 
addition to any other comments they may wish to submit about the 
proposed rule change. In particular, the Commission seeks comment on 
the following:
    1. Do commenters agree with the Exchange's assertion that the 
proposal would reduce cross-market latency arbitrage and improve market 
quality by enabling liquidity providers to maintain tighter spreads for 
longer durations and with greater size? Why or why not? How should 
enhancements to market quality be measured?
    2. According to several commenters, EDGA liquidity would be 
``illusory'' because the Exchange's liquidity providers could update 
their quotations while incoming orders are delayed. Do commenters 
believe that the proposed rule change would lead to quote fading? Why 
or why not? Do commenters believe that the proposed rule change would 
impact fill rates? Would the ``illusory'' liquidity be a significant 
portion of the Exchange's overall liquidity?
    3. Some commenters assert that the proposal is not unfairly 
discriminatory under the Exchange Act because the proposal addresses a 
particular behavior as opposed to specific class or type of market 
participants. Is this assertion accurate? Why or why not?
    4. Will the proposal increase the risk of adverse selection for 
liquidity takers and market participants that are unable to react to 
market signals in order to adjust their quotes within four 
milliseconds?
    5. Is an intentional delay of four milliseconds necessary to 
minimize the effectiveness of latency arbitrage strategies? Will the 
delay negate the advantages that trading firms using the latest 
microwave connections have over liquidity providers using traditional 
fiber connections? Should the delay be shorter or longer to accomplish 
this goal? Is four milliseconds an appropriate duration for a delay? Is 
such delay consistent with the Act? Why or why not?
    6. Is the proposal tailored in a manner such that its potential 
benefits outweigh the potential or likelihood of harm or unintended 
consequences to the national market system?
    7. Should the Exchange's unprotected, manual quote be allowed to 
lock or cross manual quotations disseminated by another manual market? 
Why or why not?
    8. What impact, if any, would the dissemination of an unprotected, 
manual quote have on the national market system? Should EDGA's 
unprotected, manual quote be disseminated by the SIP? If so, should the 
SIP disseminate a modifier to indicate that EDGA's quote is manual? 
Should the EDGA quote be used to calculate the NBBO? Should the EDGA 
quote be used to calculate midpoint values?
    9. How will the dissemination of EDGA's unprotected, manual quote 
impact a broker-dealer's obligation to obtain best execution?
    10. What would be the impact, if any, on the national market system 
if other national securities exchanges, with a larger percentage of 
overall trading volume, adopted a similar proposal? In particular, how 
would the proposal affect market quality?
    11. What are commenters' views on how the proposal would affect 
trading activity, in general, and liquidity providers, in particular, 
on other markets? Would the LP2 delay mechanism impose systemic risks 
and create informational disparities across the national market system? 
Would the proposal provide EDGA liquidity providers with the option to 
leverage or free ride price discovery that occurs at other trading 
venues?
    Comments may be submitted by any of the following methods:

Electronic Comments

     Use the Commission's internet comment form (http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml); or
     Send an email to [email protected]. Please include 
File Number SR-CboeEDGA-2019-012 on the subject line.

Paper Comments

     Send paper comments in triplicate to Secretary, Securities 
and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street NE, Washington, DC 20549-1090.

All submissions should refer to File Number SR-CboeEDGA-2019-012. This 
file number should be included on the subject line if email is used. To 
help the Commission process and review your comments more efficiently, 
please use only one method. The Commission will post all comments on 
the Commission's internet website (http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml). 
Copies of the submission, all subsequent amendments, all written 
statements with respect to the proposed rule change that are filed with 
the Commission, and all written communications relating to the proposed 
rule change between the Commission and any person, other than those 
that may be withheld from the public in accordance with the provisions 
of 5 U.S.C. 552, will be available for website viewing and printing in 
the Commission's Public Reference Room, 100 F Street NE, Washington, DC 
20549, on official business days between the hours of 10:00 a.m. and 
3:00 p.m. Copies of these filings also will be available for inspection 
and copying at the principal office of the Exchange. All comments 
received will be posted without change. Persons submitting comments are 
cautioned that we do not redact or edit personal identifying 
information from comment submissions. You should submit only 
information that you wish to make available publicly. All submissions 
should refer to File Number SR-CboeEDGA-2019-012 and should be 
submitted on or before October 21, 2019. Rebuttal comments should be 
submitted by November 4, 2019.

    For the Commission, by the Division of Trading and Markets, 
pursuant to delegated authority.\231\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \231\ 17 CFR 200.30-3(a)(57).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Jill M. Peterson,
Assistant Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2019-21096 Filed 9-27-19; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8011-01-P