[Federal Register Volume 84, Number 168 (Thursday, August 29, 2019)]
[Notices]
[Pages 45575-45601]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2019-18636]
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SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
[Release No. 34-86742; File No. SR-CboeBYX-2019-014]
Self-Regulatory Organizations; Cboe BYX Exchange, Inc.; Notice of
Filing of a Proposed Rule Change To Make Permanent Rule 11.24, Which
Sets Forth the Exchange's Pilot Retail Price Improvement Program
August 23, 2019.
Pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(the ``Act''),\1\ and Rule 19b-4 thereunder,\2\ notice is hereby given
that on August 22, 2019, Cboe BYX Exchange, Inc. (the ``Exchange'' or
``BYX'') filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the
``Commission'' or ``SEC'') the proposed rule change as described in
Items I, II, and III below, which Items have been prepared by the
Exchange. The Commission is publishing this notice to solicit comments
on the proposed rule change from interested persons.
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\1\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1).
\2\ 17 CFR 240.19b-4.
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I. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Terms of Substance
of the Proposed Rule Change
Cboe BYX Exchange, Inc. (``BYX'' or the ``Exchange'') is filing
with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the ``Commission'') a
proposed rule change to make permanent Rule 11.24, which sets forth the
Exchange's pilot Retail Price Improvement Program. The text of the
proposed rule change is provided in Exhibit 5.
The text of the proposed rule change is also available on the
Exchange's website (http://markets.cboe.com/us/equities/regulation/rule_filings/byx/), at the Exchange's Office of the Secretary, and at
the Commission's Public Reference Room.
II. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Purpose of, and
Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule Change
In its filing with the Commission, the Exchange included statements
concerning the purpose of and basis for the proposed rule change and
discussed any comments it received on the proposed rule change. The
text of these statements may be examined at the places specified in
Item IV below. The Exchange has prepared summaries, set forth in
sections A, B, and C below, of the most significant aspects of such
statements.
A. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Purpose of, and
Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule Change
1. Purpose
The purpose of the proposed rule change is to amend Rule 11.24 to
make permanent the Retail Price Improvement Program (the ``Program''),
which is currently offered on a pilot basis. The Exchange has operated
the pilot for a six year period and believes that it has been
successful in its stated goal of providing price improvement
opportunities to retail investors. The analysis conducted by the
Exchange shows that retail investors have been provided a total of $4.5
million of price improvement during the 2.5 year period reviewed from
January 2016 through June 2018. In addition, the Exchange's analysis
shows that the Program has provided these benefits to retail investors
without having an adverse impact on the broader market. The proposal
provides an analysis of the economic benefits to retail investors and
the marketplace flowing from operation of the Program, which the
Exchange believes supports making the Program permanent.
Background
In November 2012, the Commission approved the Program on a pilot
basis.\3\ The Program is designed to attract retail order flow to the
Exchange, and allow such order flow to receive potential price
improvement. The Program is currently limited to trades occurring at
prices equal to or greater than $1.00 per share.\4\ Under the Program,
a class of market participant called a Retail Member Organization
(``RMO'') is eligible to submit certain retail order flow (``Retail
Orders'') to the Exchange. Users \5\ are permitted to provide potential
price improvement for Retail Orders \6\ in the form of non-displayed
interest that is better than the national best bid that is a Protected
Quotation (``Protected NBB'') or the national best offer that is a
Protected Quotation (``Protected NBO'', and together with the Protected
NBB, the ``Protected NBBO'').\7\ The Program was approved by the
Commission on a pilot basis running
[[Page 45576]]
one-year from the date of implementation.\8\ The Commission approved
the Program on November 27, 2012.\9\ The Exchange implemented the
Program on January 11, 2013, and has extended the pilot period seven
times.\10\ The pilot period for the Program is scheduled to expire on
September 30, 2019. The Exchange believes that the Program has been
successful in its goal of providing price improvement to Retail Orders,
and is therefore proposing to amend Rule 11.24 to make this pilot
permanent so that retail investors can continue to reap the benefits of
the Program.\11\
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\3\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 68303 (November 27,
2012), 77 FR 71652 (December 3, 2012) (``RPI Approval Order'') (SR-
BYX-2012-019).
\4\ The Exchange will periodically notify the membership
regarding the securities included in the Program through an
information circular.
\5\ A ``User'' is defined in Rule 1.5(cc) as any member or
sponsored participant of the Exchange who is authorized to obtain
access to the System.
\6\ A ``Retail Order'' is defined in Rule 11.24(a)(2) as an
agency order that originates from a natural person and is submitted
to the Exchange by a RMO, provided that no change is made to the
terms of the order with respect to price or side of market and the
order does not originate from a trading algorithm or any
computerized methodology. See Rule 11.24(a)(2).
\7\ The term Protected Quotation is defined in BYX Rule 1.5(t)
and has the same meaning as is set forth in Regulation NMS Rule
600(b)(58). The terms Protected NBB and Protected NBO are defined in
BYX Rule 1.5(s). The Protected NBB is the best-priced protected bid
and the Protected NBO is the best-priced protected offer. Generally,
the Protected NBB and Protected NBO and the national best bid
(``NBB'') and national best offer (``NBO'', together with the NBB,
the ``NBBO'') will be the same. However, a market center is not
required to route to the NBB or NBO if that market center is subject
to an exception under Regulation NMS Rule 611(b)(1) or if such NBB
or NBO is otherwise not available for an automatic execution. In
such case, the Protected NBB or Protected NBO would be the best-
priced protected bid or offer to which a market center must route
interest pursuant to Regulation NMS Rule 611.
\8\ See RPI Approval Order, supra note 3 at 71652.
\9\ Id.
\10\ See Securities Exchange Act Release Nos. 71249 (January 7,
2014), 79 FR 2229 (January 13, 2014) (SR-BYX-2014-001); 74111
(January 22, 2015), 80 FR 4598 (January 28, 2015) (SR-BYX-2015-05);
76965 (January 22, 2016), 81 FR 4682 (January 27, 2016) (SR-BYX-
2016-01); 78180 (June 28, 2016), 81 FR 43306 (July 1, 2016) (SR-
BatsBYX-2016-15); 81368 (August 10, 2017), 82 FR 38960 (August 16,
2017) (SR-BatsBYX-2017-18); 84830 (December 17, 2018), 83 FR 65769
(December 21, 2018) (SR-CboeBYX-2018-025); 86206 (June 26, 2019), 84
FR 31650 (July 2, 2019) (SR-CboeBYX-2019-010).
\11\ The Program will continue to only apply to trades occurring
at prices equal to or greater than $1.00 per share.
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The SEC approved the Program on a pilot basis, in part, because it
concluded, ``the Program is reasonably designed to benefit retail
investors by providing price improvement to retail order flow.'' \12\
The Commission also found that ``while the Program would treat retail
order flow differently from order flow submitted by other market
participants, such segmentation would not be inconsistent with Section
6(b)(5) of the Act, which requires that the rules of an exchange are
not designed to permit unfair discrimination.'' \13\ As the SEC
acknowledged, the retail order segmentation was designed to create
greater retail order flow competition and thereby increase the amount
of this flow to transparent and well-regulated exchanges. This would
help to ensure that retail investors benefit from competitive price
improvement that exchange-based liquidity providers provide. As
discussed below, the Exchange believes that the Program data supports
the conclusion that it provides valuable price improvement to retail
investors that they may not otherwise have received, and that it is
therefore appropriate to make the Program permanent.
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\12\ See RPI Approval Order, supra note 3 at 71655.
\13\ Id.
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Definitions
The Exchange adopted the following definitions under Rule 11.24(a):
First, the term ``Retail Member Organization'' is defined as a
Member (or a division thereof) that has been approved by the Exchange
to submit Retail Orders.
Second, the term ``Retail Order'' is defined as an agency order or
riskless principal that meets the criteria of FINRA Rule 5320.03 \14\
that originates from a natural person and is submitted to the Exchange
by a Retail Member Organization, provided that no change is made to the
terms of the order with respect to price or side of market and the
order does not originate from a trading algorithm or any other
computerized methodology. A Retail Order is an Immediate or Cancel
(``IOC'') Order and shall operate in accordance with Rule 11.24(f). A
Retail Order may be an odd lot, round lot, or mixed lot.
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\14\ FINRA Rule 5320.03 clarifies that an RMO may enter Retail
Orders on a riskless principal basis, provided that (i) the entry of
such riskless principal orders meet the requirements of FINRA Rule
5320.03, including that the RMO maintains supervisory systems to
reconstruct, in a time[hyphen]sequenced manner, all Retail Orders
that are entered on a riskless principal basis; and (ii) the RMO
submits a report, contemporaneously with the execution of the
facilitated order, that identifies the trade as riskless principal.
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Finally, the term ``Retail Price Improvement Order'' or ``RPI
Order'' consists of non-displayed interest on the Exchange that is
priced better than the Protected NBB or Protected NBO by at least
$0.001 and that is identified as such (``RPI interest'').\15\ The
System \16\ will monitor whether RPI buy or sell interest, adjusted by
any offset and subject to the ceiling or floor price, is eligible to
interact with incoming Retail Orders. An RPI Order remains non-
displayed in its entirety (the buy or sell interest, the offset, and
the ceiling or floor). An RPI Order may also be entered in a sub-penny
increment with an explicit limit price. Any User is permitted, but not
required, to submit RPI Orders. An RPI Order may be an odd lot, round
lot or mixed lot.
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\15\ Exchange systems prevent Retail Orders from interacting
with RPI Orders if the RPI Order is not priced at least $0.001
better than the Protected NBBO. The Exchange notes, however, that
price improvement of $0.001 would be a minimum requirement and Users
could enter RPI Orders that better the Protected NBBO by more than
$0.001. Exchange systems will accept RPI Orders without a minimum
price improvement value; however, such interest will execute at its
floor or ceiling price only if such floor or ceiling price is better
than the Protected NBBO by $0.001 or more.
\16\ The ``System'' is defined in BYX Rule 1.5(aa) as ``the
electronic communications and trading facility designated by the
Board through which securities orders of Users are consolidated for
ranking, execution and, when applicable, routing away.''
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The price of an RPI Order is determined by a User's entry of the
following into the Exchange: (1) RPI buy or sell interest; (2) an
offset, if any; and (3) a ceiling or floor price. RPI Orders submitted
with an offset are similar to other peg orders available to Users in
that the order is tied or ``pegged'' to a certain price, and would have
its price automatically set and adjusted upon changes in the Protected
NBBO, both upon entry and any time thereafter. RPI buy or sell interest
is typically entered to track the Protected NBBO, that is, RPI Orders
are typically submitted with an offset. The offset is a predetermined
amount by which the User is willing to improve the Protected NBBO,
subject to a ceiling or floor price. The ceiling or floor price is the
amount above or below which the User does not wish to trade. RPI Orders
in their entirety (the buy or sell interest, the offset, and the
ceiling or floor) will remain non-displayed. The Exchange also allows
Users to enter RPI Orders that establish the exact limit price, which
is similar to a non-displayed limit order currently accepted by the
Exchange except the Exchange accepts sub-penny limit prices on RPI
Orders in increments of $0.001. The Exchange monitors whether RPI buy
or sell interest, adjusted by any offset and subject to the ceiling or
floor price, is eligible to interact with incoming Retail Orders.
Users and RMOs may enter odd lots, round lots or mixed lots as RPI
Orders and as Retail Orders respectively. As discussed below, RPI
Orders are ranked and allocated according to price and time of entry
into the System consistent with Rule 11.12 and therefore without regard
to whether the size entered is an odd lot, round lot or mixed lot
amount. Similarly, Retail Orders interact with RPI Orders according to
the Priority and Allocation rules of the Program and without regard to
whether they are odd lots, round lots or mixed lots. Finally, Retail
Orders are designated as Type 1 or Type 2 without regard to the size of
the order.
RPI Orders interact with Retail Orders as follows. Assume a User
enters RPI sell interest with an offset of $0.001 and a floor of $10.10
while the Protected NBO is $10.11. The RPI Order could interact with an
incoming buy Retail Order at $10.109. If, however, the Protected NBO
was $10.10, the RPI Order could not interact with the Retail Order
because the price required to deliver the minimum $0.001 price
improvement ($10.099) would violate the User's floor of $10.10. If a
User otherwise enters an offset greater than the minimum required price
improvement and the offset would produce a price that would violate the
User's floor, the offset would be applied
[[Page 45577]]
only to the extent that it respects the User's floor. By way of
illustration, assume RPI buy interest is entered with an offset of
$0.005 and a ceiling of $10.112 while the Protected NBB is at $10.11.
The RPI Order could interact with an incoming sell Retail Order at
$10.112, because it would produce the required price improvement
without violating the User's ceiling, but it could not interact above
the $10.112 ceiling. Finally, if a User enters an RPI Order without an
offset (i.e., an explicitly priced limit order), the RPI Order will
interact with Retail Orders at the level of the User's limit price as
long as the minimum required price improvement is produced.
Accordingly, if RPI sell interest is entered with a limit price of
$10.098 and no offset while the Protected NBO is $10.11, the RPI Order
could interact with the Retail Order at $10.098, producing $0.012 of
price improvement. The System will not cancel RPI interest when it is
not eligible to interact with incoming Retail Orders; such RPI interest
will remain in the System and may become eligible again to interact
with Retail Orders depending on the Protected NBBO.
RMO Qualifications and Application Process
Under Rule 11.24(b), any Member may qualify as an RMO if it
conducts a retail business or routes retail orders on behalf of another
broker-dealer. For purposes of Rule 11.24(b), conducting a retail
business shall include carrying retail customer accounts on a fully
disclosed basis. Any Member that wishes to obtain RMO status is
required to submit: (1) An application form; (2) supporting
documentation sufficient to demonstrate the retail nature and
characteristics of the applicant's order flow; and (3) an attestation,
in a form prescribed by the Exchange, that substantially all orders
submitted as Retail Orders will qualify as such under Rule 11.24.\17\
The Exchange shall notify the applicant of its decision in writing.
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\17\ For example, a prospective RMO could be required to provide
sample marketing literature, website screenshots, other publicly
disclosed materials describing the retail nature of their order
flow, and such other documentation and information as the Exchange
may require to obtain reasonable assurance that the applicant's
order flow would meet the requirements of the Retail Order
definition.
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An RMO is required to have written policies and procedures
reasonably designed to assure that it will only designate orders as
Retail Orders if all requirements of a Retail Order are met. Such
written policies and procedures must require the Member to (i) exercise
due diligence before entering a Retail Order to assure that entry as a
Retail Order is in compliance with the requirements of this rule, and
(ii) monitor whether orders entered as Retail Orders meet the
applicable requirements. If the RMO represents Retail Orders from
another broker-dealer customer, the RMO's supervisory procedures must
be reasonably designed to assure that the orders it receives from such
broker-dealer customer that it designates as Retail Orders meet the
definition of a Retail Order. The RMO must (i) obtain an annual written
representation, in a form acceptable to the Exchange, from each broker-
dealer customer that sends it orders to be designated as Retail Orders
that entry of such orders as Retail Orders will be in compliance with
the requirements of this rule, and (ii) monitor whether its broker-
dealer customers' Retail Order flow continues to meet the applicable
requirements.\18\
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\18\ The Exchange or another self-regulatory organization on
behalf of the Exchange will review an RMO's compliance with these
requirements through an exam-based review of the RMO's internal
controls.
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If the Exchange disapproves the application, the Exchange provides
a written notice to the Member. The disapproved applicant could appeal
the disapproval by the Exchange as provided in Rule 11.24(d), and/or
reapply for RMO status 90 days after the disapproval notice is issued
by the Exchange. An RMO also could voluntarily withdraw from such
status at any time by giving written notice to the Exchange.
Failure of RMO To Abide by Retail Order Requirements
Rule 11.24(c) addresses an RMO's failure to abide by Retail Order
requirements. If an RMO designates orders submitted to the Exchange as
Retail Orders and the Exchange determines, in its sole discretion, that
those orders fail to meet any of the requirements of Retail Orders, the
Exchange may disqualify a Member from its status as an RMO. When
disqualification determinations are made, the Exchange provides a
written disqualification notice to the Member. A disqualified RMO may
appeal the disqualification as provided in Rule 11.24(d) and/or reapply
for RMO status 90 days after the disqualification notice is issued by
the Exchange.
Appeal of Disapproval or Disqualification
Rule 11.24(d) provides appeal rights to Members. If a Member
disputes the Exchange's decision to disapprove it as an RMO under Rule
11.24(b) or disqualify it under Rule 11.24(c), such Member
(``appellant'') may request, within five business days after notice of
the decision is issued by the Exchange, that the Retail Price
Improvement Program Panel (``RPI Panel'') review the decision to
determine if it was correct.
The RPI Panel consists of the Exchange's Chief Regulatory Officer
(``CRO''), or a designee of the CRO, and two officers of the Exchange
designated by the Chief Operating Officer (``COO''). The RPI Panel
reviews the facts and render a decision within the time frame
prescribed by the Exchange. The RPI Panel may overturn or modify an
action taken by the Exchange and all determinations by the RPI Panel
constitute final action by the Exchange on the matter at issue.
Retail Liquidity Identifier
Under Rule 11.24(e), the Exchange disseminates an identifier when
RPI interest priced at least $0.001 better than the Exchange's
Protected Bid or Protected Offer for a particular security is available
in the System (``Retail Liquidity Identifier''). The Retail Liquidity
Identifier is disseminated through consolidated data streams (i.e.,
pursuant to the Consolidated Tape Association Plan/Consolidated
Quotation Plan, or CTA/CQ, for Tape A and Tape B securities, and the
Nasdaq UTP Plan for Tape C securities) as well as through proprietary
Exchange data feeds.\19\ The Retail Liquidity Identifier reflects the
symbol and the side (buy or sell) of the RPI interest, but does not
include the price or size of the RPI interest. In particular, CQ and
UTP quoting outputs include a field for codes related to the Retail
Liquidity Identifier. The codes indicate RPI interest that is priced
better than the Exchange's Protected Bid or Protected Offer by at least
the minimum level of price improvement as required by the Program.
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\19\ The Exchange notes that the Retail Liquidity Identifier for
Tape A and Tape B securities are disseminated pursuant to the CTA/CQ
Plan. The identifier is also available through the consolidated
public market data stream for Tape C securities. The processor for
the Nasdaq UTP quotation stream disseminates the Retail Liquidity
Identifier and analogous identifiers from other market centers that
operate programs similar to the RPI Program.
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Retail Order Designations
Under Rule 11.24(f), an RMO can designate how a Retail Order would
interact with available contra-side interest as follows:
A Type 1-designated Retail Order will interact with available
contra-side RPI Orders and other price improving contra-side interest
but will not interact with other available contra-side interest
[[Page 45578]]
in the System that is not offering price improvement or route to other
markets. The portion of a Type 1-designated Retail Order that does not
execute against contra-side RPI Orders or other price improving
liquidity will be immediately and automatically cancelled.
A Type 2-designated Retail Order will interact first with available
contra-side RPI Orders and other price improving liquidity and then any
remaining portion of the Retail Order will be executed as an Immediate-
or-Cancel (``IOC'') Order pursuant to Rule 11.9(b)(1). A Type 2-
designated Retail Order can either be submitted as a BYX Only Order
\20\ or as an order eligible for routing pursuant to Rule 11.13(a)(2).
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\20\ A BYX Only Order is defined in BYX Rule 11.9(c)(4) and
includes orders that are not eligible for routing to other trading
centers.
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Priority and Order Allocation
Under Rule 11.24(g), competing RPI Orders in the same security are
ranked and allocated according to price then time of entry into the
System. Executions occur in price/time priority in accordance with Rule
11.12. Any remaining unexecuted RPI interest remains available to
interact with other incoming Retail Orders if such interest is at an
eligible price. Any remaining unexecuted portion of the Retail Order
will cancel or execute in accordance with Rule 11.24(f). The following
example illustrates this method:
Protected NBBO for security ABC is $10.00-$10.05
User 1 enters an RPI Order to buy ABC at $10.015 for 500
User 2 then enters an RPI Order to buy ABC at $10.02 for
500
User 3 then enters an RPI Order to buy ABC at $10.035 for
500
An incoming Retail Order to sell ABC for 1,000 executes first
against User 3's bid for 500 at $10.035, because it is the best priced
bid, then against User 2's bid for 500 at $10.02, because it is the
next best priced bid. User 1 is not filled because the entire size of
the Retail Order to sell 1,000 is depleted. The Retail Order executes
against RPI Orders in price/time priority.
However, assume the same facts above, except that User 2's RPI
Order to buy ABC at $10.02 is for 100. The incoming Retail Order to
sell 1,000 executes first against User 3's bid for 500 at $10.035,
because it is the best priced bid, then against User 2's bid for 100 at
$10.02, because it is the next best priced bid. User 1 then receives an
execution for 400 of its bid for 500 at $10.015, at which point the
entire size of the Retail Order to sell 1,000 is depleted.
As a final example, assume the same facts as above, except that
User 3's order was not an RPI Order to buy ABC at $10.035, but rather,
a non-displayed order to buy ABC at $10.03. The result would be similar
to the result immediately above, in that the incoming Retail Order to
sell 1,000 executes first against User 3's bid for 500 at $10.03,
because it is the best priced bid, then against User 2's bid for 100 at
$10.02, because it is the next best priced bid. User 1 then receives an
execution for 400 of its bid for 500 at $10.015, at which point the
entire size of the Retail Order to sell 1,000 is depleted.
Eligible Securities
All Regulation NMS securities traded on the Exchange are eligible
for inclusion in the RPI Program. The Exchange limits the Program to
trades occurring at prices equal to or greater than $1.00 per share.
Toward that end, Exchange trade validation systems prevent the
interaction of RPI buy or sell interest (adjusted by any offset) and
Retail Orders at a price below $1.00 per share.\21\ For example, if
there is RPI buy interest tracking the Protected NBB at $0.99 with an
offset of $0.001 and a ceiling of $1.02, Exchange trade validation
systems would prevent the execution of the RPI Order at $0.991 with a
sell Retail Order with a limit of $0.99. However, if the Retail Order
was Type 2 as defined the Program,\22\ it would be able to interact at
$0.99 with liquidity outside the Program in the Exchange's order book.
In addition to facilitating an orderly \23\ and operationally intuitive
program, the Exchange believes that limiting the Program to trades
equal to or greater than $1.00 per share enabled it better to focus its
efforts to monitor price competition and to assess any indications that
data disseminated under the Program is potentially disadvantaging
retail orders. As part of that review, the Exchange produced data
throughout the pilot, which included statistics about participation,
the frequency and level of price improvement provided by the Program,
and any effects on the broader market structure.
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\21\ As discussed above, the price of an RPI is determined by a
User's entry of buy or sell interest, an offset (if any) and a
ceiling or floor price. RPI sell or buy interest typically tracks
the Protected NBBO.
\22\ Type 2 Retail Orders are treated as IOC orders that execute
against displayed and non-displayed liquidity in the Exchange's
order book where there is no available liquidity in the Program.
Type 2 Retail Orders can either be designated as eligible for
routing or as BYX Only Orders, and thus non-routable, as described
above.
\23\ Given the limitation, the Program would have no impact on
the minimum pricing increment for orders priced less than $1.00 and
therefore no effect on the potential of markets executing those
orders to lock or cross. In addition, the non-displayed nature of
the liquidity in the Program simply has no potential to disrupt
displayed, protected quotes. In any event, the Program would do
nothing to change the obligation of exchanges to avoid and reconcile
locked and crossed markets under NMS Rule 610(d).
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Rationale for Making the Program Pilot Permanent
The Exchange established the Program in an attempt to attract
retail order flow to the Exchange by providing an opportunity for price
improvement to such order flow. The Exchange believes that the Program
promotes transparent competition for retail order flow by allowing
Exchange members to submit RPI Orders to interact with Retail Orders.
As the Commission stated in the RPI Approval Order, such competition
``promote[s] efficiency by facilitating the price discovery process''
and ``may generate additional investor interest in trading securities,
thereby promoting capital formation.'' The Program will continue to be
limited to trades occurring at prices equal to or greater than $1.00
per share.
In accordance with its filing establishing the pilot, the Exchange
did ``produce data throughout the pilot, which will include statistics
about participation, the frequency and level of price improvement
provided by the Program, and any effects on the broader market
structure.'' \24\ The Exchange has fulfilled this obligation through
the reports and assessments it has submitted to the Commission since
the implementation of the pilot Program. The Exchange believes that its
analysis of data provided to the Commission to date, as well as the
data being provided in this proposed rule change, support the continued
operation of the Program on a permanent basis.
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\24\ RPI Approval Order, 77 FR at 71655.
\25\ Id. See also Concept Release on Equity Market Structure,
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 61358 (January 14, 2010), 75 FR
3593, 3600 (January 21, 2010) (File No. S7-02-10) (``A review of the
order routing disclosures required by Rule 606 of Regulation NMS of
eight broker-dealers with significant retail customer accounts
reveals that nearly 100% of their customer market orders are routed
to OTC market makers.'').
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The SEC stated in the RPI Approval Order that the Program could
promote competition for retail order flow among execution venues, and
that this could benefit retail investors by creating additional well-
regulated and transparent price improvement opportunities for
marketable retail order flow, most of which is currently executed in
the Over-the-Counter
[[Page 45579]]
(``OTC'') markets without ever reaching a public exchange.\25\ The
Exchange believes that it has achieved its goal of attracting retail
order flow to the Exchange. As the Exchange's analysis of the Program
data below demonstrates, there has been consistent retail investor
interest in the Program, which has provided tangible price improvement
to those retail investors through a competitive pricing process over
the course of the pilot. The data also demonstrates that the Program
had an overall negligible impact on broader market quality outside of
the Program. The Exchange has not received any complaints or negative
feedback concerning the Program.
I. Overall Analysis of the Program
Brokers route retail orders to a wide range of different trading
systems. The Program offers a transparent and well-regulated option,
providing meaningful competition and price improvement. As explained
above, the purpose of the Program is to attract retail order flow to
the Exchange by providing an opportunity for retail investors to
receive price improvement. The Exchange believes that the Program has
satisfied this goal, having provided a total of $4.5 million of price
improvement, or approximately $153,000 per month, in the 2.5 year
period analyzed. Furthermore, to ensure that the price improvement
opportunities for Retail Orders under the Program are meaningful, the
Exchange compared the volume weighted average price improvement in
basis points received in the Program to the same metric for marketable
orders executed on the BYX Book. As Shown in Table A, retail investors
have benefited from significantly higher price improvement by
participating in the Program, including when assessed across different
liquidity groupings.\26\
Table A--Retail Price Improvement Compared to BYX Book
[May 2018--Oct. 2018]
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CADV 500,000 or more CADV between 50,000 and 500,000
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Volume Weighted Avg. Price Retail................ 2.947 Retail................ 4.502
Improvement (bps). BYX Book.............. 0.649 BYX Book.............. 3.574
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Furthermore, while the amount of price improvement provided in the
Program varies month to month, the amount of price improvement provided
in recent months has generally increased relative to prior months due
to additional participation in the Program by market participants with
retail order flow. The Exchange believes that this supports permanent
approval of the pilot as retail investors continue to reap the benefits
afforded by the Program. The amount of monthly and cumulative price
improvement provided in the Program is illustrated in Chart 1 below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\ The two liquidity categories used for this analysis
correspond to the liquidity profiles described in the Exchange's
analysis of the market structure impact of the Program.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
[[Page 45580]]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TN29AU19.000
Furthermore, Retail Order volume executed in the Program accounted
for between 0.86% and 2.32% of total BYX volume from January 2017 to
June 2018, as shown in Chart 2 below, and between 0.05% and 0.11% of
total consolidated volume, as shown in Chart 3 below. Despite its size
relative to total volume executed on the Exchange or the broader
market, the Program has continued to provide considerable price
improvement each month to retail investors that participated in the
Program. In addition, the Exchange believes that the relatively modest
volume executed in the Program relative to total BYX volume and total
consolidated volume limits the potential impact of the Program on
broader market quality on the Exchange.\27\ The Exchange therefore
believes that the Program has demonstrated the effectiveness of a
transparent, on-exchange retail order price improvement functionality,
notwithstanding that the majority of retail volume is still traded off-
exchange.\28\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\27\ The Exchange has also performed an analysis of the impact
of the Program on other market quality indicators, which found that
the Program did not have a significant impact on market quality in
the broader market. See Section III below.
\28\ See supra note 25.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
BILLING CODE 8011-01-P
[[Page 45581]]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TN29AU19.001
[[Page 45582]]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TN29AU19.002
BILLING CODE 8011-01-C
Retail Orders are routed by sophisticated brokers using systems
that seek the highest fill rates and amounts of price improvement.
These brokers have many choices of execution venues for this order
flow. When they choose to route to the Program, they have determined
that it is the best opportunity for fill rate and price improvement at
that time. As shown in Table 1 below, Retail Order average daily volume
(``ADV'') executed in the Program averaged between 2 and 7 million
shares from January 2016 to June 2018. Increased volatility in February
2018 likely contributed to the increased Retail Order shares executed
in the Program that month. Fill rates for the majority of the period
studied ranged from 11%-19% with fill rates declining below 10%
starting in December 2017, likely due to additional participation in
the Program that resulted in a significant increase in the Retail Order
volume entered on the Exchange. Retail Orders also continue to receive
more than the minimum $0.001 price improvement required of a liquidity
providing RPI Order, with the monthly average price improvement
provided to Retail Orders ranging from $0.0011-$0.0014 per share, and
the monthly effective/quoted spread ratio ranging from 0.77-0.90. The
Exchange believes that this data supports permanent approval of the
Program as this would allow retail investors to continue to execute
their orders with price improvement in the Program.
Table 1--Summary Statistics on the Program
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Effective/
Date Retail shares Retail orders Effective Quoted spread quoted spread Price Fill rate
executed ADV placed ADV spread BPS BPS ratio improvement (percent)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Jan-16.................................. 4,666,052 20,560 19 22 0.89 $0.0011 16.09
Feb-16.................................. 4,083,670 18,025 19 22 0.87 0.0011 16.10
Mar-16.................................. 3,474,997 15,103 21 24 0.90 0.0011 17.50
Apr-16.................................. 3,216,923 14,126 18 21 0.88 0.0011 19.23
[[Page 45583]]
May-16.................................. 2,912,160 12,980 18 21 0.87 0.0011 19.73
Jun-16.................................. 3,144,024 13,924 16 18 0.89 0.0011 19.65
Jul-16.................................. 4,009,916 17,257 18 20 0.90 0.0011 19.97
Aug-16.................................. 3,906,624 17,135 19 21 0.90 0.0011 17.66
Sep-16.................................. 4,887,221 20,708 17 19 0.88 0.0011 17.28
Oct-16.................................. 3,595,900 15,922 24 27 0.90 0.0012 17.19
Nov-16.................................. 2,273,885 8,972 29 33 0.88 0.0013 12.71
Dec-16.................................. 3,192,065 12,768 36 41 0.88 0.0013 14.82
Jan-17.................................. 3,122,721 16,951 31 36 0.88 0.0013 16.09
Feb-17.................................. 3,262,046 21,151 31 35 0.88 0.0013 14.71
Mar-17.................................. 3,068,930 20,921 33 38 0.88 0.0014 13.85
Apr-17.................................. 2,680,646 18,518 34 38 0.88 0.0013 13.97
May-17.................................. 3,407,603 23,437 29 33 0.87 0.0013 16.88
Jun-17.................................. 7,896,833 46,398 28 32 0.88 0.0013 17.07
Jul-17.................................. 5,966,961 36,717 27 31 0.88 0.0012 16.43
Aug-17.................................. 6,467,615 38,608 23 26 0.88 0.0013 16.24
Sep-17.................................. 5,237,243 33,314 27 31 0.87 0.0013 15.76
Oct-17.................................. 5,702,759 33,578 34 40 0.84 0.0012 16.77
Nov-17.................................. 4,427,779 62,352 33 40 0.83 0.0012 11.61
Dec-17.................................. 5,131,502 142,810 34 41 0.84 0.0012 8.30
Jan-18.................................. 6,359,122 167,730 29 36 0.82 0.0013 7.98
Feb-18.................................. 7,230,230 227,980 21 27 0.79 0.0012 8.29
Mar-18.................................. 5,967,844 202,050 23 31 0.73 0.0011 7.69
Apr-18.................................. 4,976,642 178,009 20 27 0.75 0.0011 7.90
May-18.................................. 4,367,743 169,085 23 28 0.83 0.0011 7.02
Jun-18.................................. 5,211,044 202,601 23 31 0.77 0.0011 7.19
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
II. Analysis of Retail Orders by Order Size
Tables 2, 3, and 4 show the distribution of Retail Orders entered
and executed in the Program for the period from January 2017 to June
2018. As shown in Table 2, a majority of all Retail Orders entered to
participate in the Program from January 2016 to June 2018 were for a
round lot or fewer shares. Specifically, Retail Orders of one round lot
or fewer shares accounted for an average of approximately 56% of the
total number of Retail Orders entered. More than 73% of Retail Orders
entered were for 300 shares or less. Very large orders of more than
7,500 shares accounted for only 1.9% of Retail Orders submitted to the
Program but accounted for a significant portion (approximately 40%) of
the shares entered, as shown in Table 3. In addition, despite lower
fill rates, large orders account for a reasonable portion
(approximately 9%) of the shares executed in the Program, as shown in
Table 4. The Program also receives a significantly large number of odd
lot and single lot sized shares, which could be representative of
retail marketable orders from retail customers. By providing price
improvement to these orders, retail customers would continue to benefit
from the Program.
Table 2--Distribution of Retail Orders Entered by Order Size
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
<= 100 101-300 301-500 501-1,000 1,001-2,000 2,001-4,000 4,001-7,500 7,500-15,000 >15000
Date (percent) (percent) (percent) (percent) (percent) (percent) (percent) (percent) (percent)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Jan-17.......................................... 44.90 18.45 8.60 10.12 6.84 4.90 3.10 1.93 1.16
Feb-17.......................................... 47.80 18.04 8.21 9.61 6.27 4.41 2.82 1.75 1.09
Mar-17.......................................... 47.60 17.76 8.16 9.67 6.36 4.60 3.01 1.78 1.05
Apr-17.......................................... 48.82 17.30 7.88 9.48 6.19 4.61 2.88 1.82 1.02
May-17.......................................... 52.39 18.69 7.13 8.13 5.21 3.81 2.40 1.41 0.83
Jun-17.......................................... 55.32 13.89 6.67 8.08 5.35 4.47 3.24 2.03 0.95
Jul-17.......................................... 53.18 15.12 7.32 8.85 5.86 4.12 2.71 1.79 1.05
Aug-17.......................................... 49.41 16.53 8.00 9.65 6.33 4.49 2.75 1.76 1.08
Sep-17.......................................... 49.88 16.51 7.94 9.50 6.27 4.49 2.71 1.71 1.00
Oct-17.......................................... 49.92 16.17 7.73 9.45 6.49 4.67 2.76 1.79 1.02
Nov-17.......................................... 61.01 17.66 5.65 6.33 3.86 2.54 1.39 0.98 0.59
Dec-17.......................................... 61.48 18.49 6.31 6.65 3.40 1.97 0.93 0.49 0.28
Jan-18.......................................... 61.20 17.06 6.54 7.14 3.84 2.25 1.06 0.58 0.33
Feb-18.......................................... 66.63 15.79 5.61 5.80 2.98 1.70 0.80 0.43 0.25
Mar-18.......................................... 66.11 15.39 5.82 6.22 3.25 1.76 0.78 0.41 0.24
Apr-18.......................................... 67.41 15.45 5.40 6.06 3.10 1.43 0.59 0.34 0.22
May-18.......................................... 66.09 16.12 5.43 6.30 3.41 1.47 0.59 0.35 0.24
Jun-18.......................................... 66.29 16.17 5.59 6.14 3.20 1.46 0.59 0.35 0.22
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[[Page 45584]]
Table 3--Distribution of Shares Entered by Order Size
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
<= 100 101-300 301-500 501-1,000 1,001-2,000 2,001-4,000 4,001-7,500 7,500-15,000 >15000
Date (percent) (percent) (percent) (percent) (percent) (percent) (percent) (percent) (percent)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Jan-17.......................................... 2.15 3.45 3.27 7.03 9.15 12.48 14.61 17.00 30.87
Feb-17.......................................... 2.36 3.64 3.40 7.30 9.16 12.29 14.52 16.80 30.53
Mar-17.......................................... 2.25 3.55 3.36 7.32 9.21 12.68 15.38 16.92 29.33
Apr-17.......................................... 2.36 3.54 3.32 7.32 9.17 13.00 14.92 17.45 28.91
May-17.......................................... 3.44 4.59 3.60 7.51 9.25 12.92 15.02 16.32 27.35
Jun-17.......................................... 1.89 2.89 2.92 6.64 8.44 13.27 17.56 20.05 26.34
Jul-17.......................................... 1.98 3.18 3.22 7.24 9.17 12.23 14.73 18.29 29.96
Aug-17.......................................... 1.92 3.36 3.39 7.59 9.57 12.76 14.33 17.21 29.87
Sep-17.......................................... 2.15 3.49 3.43 7.55 9.70 13.15 14.55 17.27 28.70
Oct-17.......................................... 1.97 3.34 3.30 7.41 9.91 13.48 14.54 17.90 28.16
Nov-17.......................................... 6.28 5.19 3.86 7.92 9.53 12.10 12.18 16.22 26.72
Dec-17.......................................... 9.96 7.34 5.96 11.51 11.24 12.70 11.15 11.31 18.83
Jan-18.......................................... 8.56 6.29 5.64 11.27 11.49 13.17 11.61 12.18 19.79
Feb-18.......................................... 11.33 7.16 6.01 11.31 11.12 12.42 10.99 11.30 18.37
Mar-18.......................................... 11.06 6.96 6.10 12.00 11.88 12.69 10.62 10.82 17.88
Apr-18.......................................... 12.30 7.46 5.95 12.51 12.19 11.17 8.89 9.73 19.80
May-18.......................................... 12.14 7.50 5.74 12.40 12.76 11.08 8.53 9.67 20.17
Jun-18.......................................... 12.39 7.77 6.12 12.60 12.60 11.42 8.76 9.89 18.45
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 4--Distribution of Shares Executed by Order Size
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
<= 100 101--300 301--500 501--1,000 1,001--2,000 2,001--4,000 4,001--7,500 7,500--15,000 >15000
Date (percent) (percent) (percent) (percent) (percent) (percent) (percent) (percent) (percent)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Jan-17.......................................... 11.39 14.06 10.40 18.41 15.88 12.34 8.41 5.26 3.86
Feb-17.......................................... 13.96 15.27 10.48 17.77 14.54 11.44 7.82 5.15 3.60
Mar-17.......................................... 14.14 14.99 10.15 17.53 14.74 11.80 8.15 5.02 3.48
Apr-17.......................................... 14.69 14.83 10.01 17.80 14.84 11.55 7.85 5.00 3.42
May-17.......................................... 17.86 18.10 9.98 16.46 13.17 10.48 6.94 4.23 2.78
Jun-17.......................................... 9.74 11.25 8.91 16.71 14.58 14.86 12.03 7.97 3.95
Jul-17.......................................... 10.37 12.33 9.91 18.84 16.17 12.75 8.96 6.56 4.11
Aug-17.......................................... 9.39 12.34 10.01 18.97 16.70 13.36 8.77 6.15 4.31
Sep-17.......................................... 10.60 12.93 10.22 18.87 16.28 13.00 8.56 5.74 3.79
Oct-17.......................................... 9.40 12.40 10.16 19.36 17.12 13.45 8.58 5.86 3.66
Nov-17.......................................... 12.42 13.48 9.27 16.56 15.84 13.24 7.98 6.63 4.56
Dec-17.......................................... 14.98 15.80 10.29 16.77 14.92 11.67 6.98 5.04 3.55
Jan-18.......................................... 14.27 14.96 10.28 17.53 15.27 11.90 7.12 5.16 3.50
Feb-18.......................................... 16.74 15.75 10.78 17.05 14.27 11.08 6.48 4.57 3.30
Mar-18.......................................... 17.27 15.97 10.58 16.87 13.81 10.51 6.66 4.63 3.70
Apr-18.......................................... 17.12 15.58 10.24 16.30 13.60 10.04 6.71 5.37 5.03
May-18.......................................... 18.24 16.29 10.18 15.89 12.80 9.80 6.25 5.25 5.31
Jun-18.......................................... 18.93 17.28 10.59 16.16 12.96 9.64 5.66 4.95 3.84
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Exchange also analyzed fill rates across the different order
size buckets and found that while fill rates are higher for smaller
orders as expected, large size orders are still able to access
liquidity and therefore receive price improvement in the Program.
Moreover, overall fill rates indicate that market participants that
provide liquidity are responding with quote depth when the contra side
order is looking for a fill. While fill rates decreased starting in
November 2017, the Exchange believes that this is due to new Retail
Order flow being routed to the Program, rather than a decrease in the
available liquidity. Monthly volume executed in the Program, as shown
in Table 1, has therefore remained constant or increased since November
2017 despite the lower overall fill rates for those months. The
Exchange therefore believes that the Program is an attractive option
for market participants looking to fill Retail Orders with price
improvement.
Table 5--Fill Rates
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
<= 100 101--300 301--500 501--1,000 1,001--2,000 2,001--4,000 4,001--7,500 7,500--15,000 >15000
Date (percent) (percent) (percent) (percent) (percent) (percent) (percent) (percent) (percent)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Jan-17.......................................... 85.19 65.62 51.13 42.16 27.93 15.91 9.26 4.98 2.01
Feb-17.......................................... 87.21 61.69 45.31 35.83 23.36 13.69 7.92 4.51 1.73
Mar-17.......................................... 87.04 58.53 41.87 33.20 22.18 12.89 7.34 4.11 1.65
Apr-17.......................................... 86.90 58.46 42.12 33.97 22.59 12.40 7.35 4.00 1.65
May-17.......................................... 87.53 66.54 46.75 36.99 24.03 13.69 7.80 4.38 1.71
Jun-17.......................................... 87.78 66.50 52.07 42.98 29.48 19.12 11.70 6.78 2.56
Jul-17.......................................... 85.99 63.63 50.52 42.77 28.96 17.12 9.99 5.89 2.25
Aug-17.......................................... 79.61 59.74 48.02 40.59 28.33 17.00 9.94 5.81 2.34
Sep-17.......................................... 77.55 58.32 46.98 39.39 26.44 15.58 9.27 5.24 2.08
Oct-17.......................................... 80.19 62.29 51.71 43.82 28.97 16.73 9.90 5.49 2.18
Nov-17.......................................... 22.78 29.93 27.66 24.11 19.16 12.61 7.55 4.71 1.97
Dec-17.......................................... 12.14 17.37 13.96 11.77 10.72 7.42 5.05 3.60 1.52
Jan-18.......................................... 12.84 18.31 14.06 11.98 10.24 6.96 4.72 3.26 1.36
Feb-18.......................................... 11.79 17.56 14.32 12.03 10.24 7.12 4.70 3.23 1.43
[[Page 45585]]
Mar-18.......................................... 11.56 17.00 12.85 10.42 8.60 6.13 4.64 3.17 1.53
Apr-18.......................................... 10.61 15.91 13.11 9.93 8.50 6.85 5.76 4.21 1.94
May-18.......................................... 10.11 14.61 11.93 8.62 6.75 5.95 4.93 3.65 1.77
Jun-18.......................................... 10.57 15.39 11.98 8.88 7.12 5.84 4.47 3.46 1.44
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
III. Impact of the Program on Broader Market Quality
As shown in Charts 2 and 3 above, Retail Order volume executed in
the Program is a small percentage of both total volume executed on the
Exchange and total consolidated volume. While the Program has better
depth available for Retail Orders, it does not significantly affect the
market volume of BYX. The average volume within the 95th percentile is
between 1.3% and 1.7%. With the Program volume mostly below 2.5% of BYX
volume, the Exchange does not believe that it is able to significantly
impact BYX market quality. Nevertheless, to test the impact of the
Program on broader market quality, the Exchange: (1) Reviewed the
correlation between metrics that are tied to overall market quality
with relevant Program metrics over both 2017 and 2018, and (2)
performed a difference-in-difference analysis to analyze the potential
impact of the Program on a number of important market quality
indicators. Based on the results of this analysis, the Exchange does
not believe that the Program has had any significant impact on broader
market quality. The Exchange therefore believes that the Program can
continue on a permanent basis--and thereby provide increased price
improvement opportunities to retail investors on a transparent well-
regulated exchange--without degrading market quality outside of the
Program.
Correlation Analysis
As shown in Table 6 below, the Exchange's correlation analysis
shows that: (1) Inside size in the broader market is not correlated
with either RPI effective spreads or the percentage of volume executed
in the Program, which suggests that market participants are not moving
volume from the regular market to the Program as effective spreads
narrow or volume executed in the Program increases; (2) effective
spreads in the broader market are not correlated with the percentage of
volume executed in the Program, which suggests that spreads are not
widening as a result of more Retail Order flow being executed in the
Program; (3) midpoint volume executed is not correlated with effective
spreads in the Program, which suggests that market participants are not
moving midpoint liquidity from the regular market to instead receive
price improvement in the Program; and (4) displayed volume executed is
not correlated with quoted spreads in the Program, which suggest that
market participants are not entering non-displayed retail price
improving interest in the Program as an alternative to displaying
interest on an order book.
Table 6--BYX Market Quality Correlation Analysis
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Date
-------------------------------
2017 2018
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Correlation of RPI Effective Spread to -0.0145 -0.0096
Average Inside Size across all Equities
Exchanges \29\.........................
Correlation of RPI Volume as a Percent -0.0217 -0.0056
of Total Volume to Average Inside Size
across all Equities Exchanges..........
Correlation of RPI Volume as a Percent 0.1175 0.0134
of Total Volume to Average Effective
Spread across all Venues...............
Correlation of RPI Effective Spread to -0.1438 -0.1366
Total Midpoint Volume across all Venues
Correlation of RPI Quoted Spread to -0.1221 -0.0999
Total Protected Lit Volume across all
Equities Exchanges.....................
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Difference in Difference Analysis
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\29\ Inside size is the average bid or ask size when the venue
is at the NBB or NBO.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The aim of this analysis was to compare the values of a set of
general market metrics prior to the introduction of the Program to
those prevailing after. The Exchange follows what is commonly termed
the `difference-in-difference' approach (``DnD''). A DnD analysis
involves identifying a group of subjects (stocks in this case) that
receive a given `treatment.' In this case, the `treatment' is the
introduction of the Program. The Exchange would then observe the change
(difference) in a set of empirical indicia of market quality, before
and after Program introduction. The analysis is enhanced by observing
the intertemporal change in the same indicia for a set of stocks that
did not receive the treatment. The non-treated stocks would serve as
`controls.' The impact of the Program could therefore be assessed by
comparing the pre/post changes in the treated stocks with those from
the control stocks, hence the difference in differences. Observed
changes in the control stocks would account for environmental effects,
such as changes in general market volatility, that are unrelated to the
introduction of the Program.
The introduction of the Program applied to all stocks traded on the
Exchange. Thus, control stocks in the strict sense are not available.
The Exchange applies therefore a fallback approach, in which it
identifies stocks with relatively high levels of participation in the
Program and use these as the `treatment' stocks. Those for which
Program participation was light serve as the `control' stocks. The
approach suffers from the limitation that Program participation is a
determined by endogenous choice. It is possible that stocks with high
levels of participation are systematically different from those with
low participation. That is, the controls may be different from the
treated stocks in important ways. With this caveat in mind, it is
nevertheless of interest to see differences in outcomes between the two
groups of stocks.
While the treatment and control stocks differ substantially in
terms of participation in the Program, the validity of the DnD analysis
is enhanced to the extent that the two groups are otherwise as similar
to each other as possible. To achieve this objective, the Exchange
first breaks its analysis into two parts: One dealing with active
securities, the other with less active
[[Page 45586]]
securities. The Exchange's set of active securities are those with
consolidated average daily volume (``CADV'') of 500,000 shares or more
after Program introduction. The less active group have CADV between
50,000 and 500,000 shares after Program introduction. Then, within each
volume grouping, the Exchange conducts a `matched pairs' process to
identify a smaller set of treatment and control groups that are as
close to each other as possible across three dimensions: Consolidated
average daily share volume, average price, and average BBO spread
across exchanges. The values of these variables prior to Program
introduction were used.
Data from the pre-treatment period was obtained from trading during
the three months of October through December 2012. The Exchange looks
at two post-treatment periods. The first is based on trading from
January through December 2013. The second is based on trading from the
two years from January 2017 through December 2018.
The overall set of four DnD analyses can be represented and
hereafter labeled as follows:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Post-period dates
CADV -----------------------------------------
2013 2017-2018
------------------------------------------------------------------------
500,000 or more............... I.................. III
2012 pair.......... 2012 pair
2013 pair.......... 2017-18 pair
Between 50,000 and 500,000.... II................. IV
2012 pair.......... 2012 pair
2013 pair.......... 2017-18 pair
------------------------------------------------------------------------
For each of the four DnD analyses, the specific matched-pairs
process employed the following steps:
1. Daily averages for a set of variables are computed for each
stock for the appropriate pre/post time frames.
2. The initial universe of stocks are identified as having, in the
post period, the appropriate CADV, an average share price greater than
$2, and positive average daily BYX share volume.
3. These stocks are ranked on the percentage of consolidated volume
that was done in the Program (in the post period). Selection of the
treatment stocks starts with the top 100 stocks in terms of post-
introduction RPI Program volume for analysis I, II and III, and top 200
stocks are selected for analysis IV in order to generate sufficient
number of pairs in the sample set.
4. Pre-period data for the provisional treatment stocks is
obtained. During the pre-period, the treatment stocks must also have
the appropriate CADV level, an average price greater than $2, positive
BYX share volume, and listed during the entire pre-period. This process
will generally result in fewer than 1000 remaining treatment
candidates.
5. The candidate control stocks are selected from those with low
RPI Program volume, where the control stocks were selected from stocks
whose RPI volume was less than one-tenth that of the lowest RPI volume
from the treatment stocks.
6. The control stocks must also have similar restrictions to the
treatment stocks in both pre- and post-periods: CADV in the appropriate
range, price greater than $2, and positive BYX volume.
7. Each treatment stock was compared with each candidate control
stock. Using pre-period data, a discrepancy score was computed as:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TN29AU19.003
In words, the score is the sum of the absolute value of the
percentage differences in the indicated values. The lower the score,
the closer the match.
8. Each treatment stock was paired with the best possible match,
subject to the constraint that a given control stock could be used only
once (often termed `sampling without replacement').
9. Finally, only stock pairs with reasonable discrepancy scores,
which were 2.0 and lower, were retained.
Once a set of matched pairs was determined for a given analysis,
the Exchange computed the DnD result using a standard linear regression
framework. A DnD regression model can be expressed as:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TN29AU19.004
[[Page 45587]]
The Exchange considered ten metrics of interest, all of which were
computed during standard 9:30 a.m.-4:00 p.m. (Eastern time) trading
hours: (1) Average BBO spread across exchanges in dollars; (2) average
BBO spread across exchanges in basis points; (3) average BYX spread in
dollars; (4) average BYX spread in basis points; (5) average inside ask
size across exchanges in round lots; (6) average inside bid size across
exchanges in round lots; (7) average inside ask size on BYX in round
lots; (8) average inside bid size on BYX in round lots; (9) BYX volume
compared to total consolidated volume (``TCV'') in basis points; (10)
trade reporting facility (``TRF'') volume as a percentage of Symbol
Total Volume.
In assessing the results of the DnD analysis, certain caveats are
worth bearing in mind. As shown above, BYX RPI volume represents a very
small fraction of consolidated volume. Further, the Program was
introduced at a time when similar exchange-based retail price
improvement programs were introduced by other exchanges. It is also
important to recognize that much, if not most, marketable retail order
flow is routed to off-exchange market makers. For example, the Exchange
examined Rule 606 disclosures for the second quarter of 2019 from four
prominent retail brokerages: E-Trade, TD Ameritrade, Charles Schwab,
and Fidelity. Only Fidelity reported routing any market orders to
national securities exchanges, and its total exchange percentage was
less than 2.5% for each of Tape A, B, and C securities. This practice
of routing retail marketable orders to off-exchange venues has been in
place for a long time, both before and after the introduction of the
Program. Considering the smallness of the Program, the existence of
similar programs on other national securities exchanges, and the
continuing prevalence of off-exchange trading of retail orders, the
incremental impact of the Program on market quality generally would not
be expected to be large.
Furthermore, BYX RPI activity is itself somewhat anomalous in the
first place since the majority of retail market orders are routed off-
exchange for execution. Why some retail flow reaches exchanges via the
Program (or that of similar exchange programs), and why it varies
across stocks is not clear. Since treatment and control stocks are
determined on the basis of observed RPI usage--resulting from
participant choice--they may be different in important ways. The DnD
study attempts to take into account differences in average share
volume, price, and spread in the pre-period. If, however, the two
groups of stocks are nevertheless still not properly fully matched, it
is possible that results drawn from the DnD may be spurious. `Spurious'
in this context means a result that is robust statistically, but
nevertheless does not indicate the impact of the intended factor. In
other words, a spurious result is caused by some extraneous factor.
Matching Summary
The full set of matched pairs data for each of the four analyses
will be provided below, but the following table provides summary
information. Shown are the number of matched pairs, and sample averages
for the three matching variables. Also shown is the average of the
discrepancy score used in the matching process.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Treatment Control
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Post Post
Analysis Score Number of Price Period CADV Spread Price Period CADV Spread
pairs RPI Pct RPI Pct
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
I......................................... 1.01 58 $ 44.93 0.034 8,216,026 38 $ 37.76 0.004 3,608,540 40
II........................................ 0.5 78 17.70 0.184 186,708 262 17.35 0.011 191,422 233
III....................................... 0.87 51 40.29 0.154 4,820,112 50 34.46 0.020 3,048,311 45
IV........................................ 0.58 34 12.80 0.328 216,895 530 13.42 0.029 191,580 382
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The table again illustrates the low level of Program participation,
even for the treatment stocks. The RPI percentages are especially low
for the higher volume samples (I and III). As intended, the RPI
percentages for the control stocks are much lower still, averaging at
least an order of magnitude lower than the treatment stocks.
Other than these differences, the pairs exhibit strong average
similarity in terms of the values of the pre-period matching variables.
Regression Results
The following table provides the estimated coefficients for the DnD
regressions for the indicated market indicator and sample. In addition
to the estimated coefficient, the p-value is provided. This value can
be used to gauge the statistical significance of the coefficient--the
confidence that the true value of the coefficient is different than
zero. The results are accompanied, as appropriate, with a set of
asterisks indicating the associated level of significance: * = 10%, **
= 5%, and *** = 1%.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Spreads
---------------------------------------------------------------
Avg. BBO Avg. BBO
spread for all Avg. BYX spread for all Avg. BYX
exchanges spread (bps) exchanges spread
(bps) (dollars) (dollars)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
I
coef........................................ -2.77 -9.63 -0.01 0.03
p value..................................... 0.823 0.722 0.887 0.819
II
coef........................................ -50.87 -54.69 -0.10 -0.04
p value..................................... 0.287 0.531 0.212 0.835
III
coef........................................ 40.95 -11.06 -0.03 * -0.27
p value..................................... 0.148 0.781 0.797 0.098
IV
[[Page 45588]]
coef........................................ 166.71 211.50 -2.18 ** -0.42
p value..................................... 0.219 0.316 0.207 0.018
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Four measures were analyzed to assess the potential impact that the
Program had on spreads: Average BBO spreads across all exchanges and
BYX quoted spreads were both measured in both basis points and dollar
terms. The table above shows limited impact of the Program on spreads
on BYX and the broader market. The only statistically significant
changes identified were to BYX spreads measured in dollar terms when
using a post-period treatment group from 2017-2018. Specifically, the
Exchange observed a relative narrowing of average BYX spreads in
treatment securities that is equivalent to: $0.27 for the more liquid
symbols in Sample III, and $0.42 for the less liquid symbols contained
in Sample IV, indicating an improvement in market quality on BYX in
securities with more volume traded in the Program. While the Exchange's
analysis does not prove that the observed improvements in BYX spreads
could necessarily be attributed to the Program rather than other
factors, this result supports the overall conclusion that the Program
did not result in spreads widening.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Depth in Round Lots
---------------------------------------------------------------
Avg. inside Avg. inside
bid size for Avg. BYX bid ask size for Avg. BYX ask
all exchanges size all exchanges size
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
I
coef........................................ 1.30 -4.85 4.66 1.03
p value..................................... 0.926 0.538 0.840 0.948
II
coef........................................ -2.79 -2.10 0.11 -1.40
p value..................................... 0.505 0.170 0.984 0.331
III
coef........................................ 4.75 -3.76 3.23 -7.03
p value..................................... 0.699 0.556 0.813 0.406
IV
coef........................................ -15.18 * -16.54 -6.19 * -13.22
p value..................................... 0.105 0.052 0.277 0.065
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Similar to the analysis of spreads, four size measures are
analyzed, including inside bid and ask sizes both on BYX and across all
exchanges. Here, the Exchange found only two statistically significant
changes in the available size. Specifically, the Exchange found a
relative decrease in the average bid and ask size on BYX in treatment
securities when looking at the results for Sample IV, which includes
less liquid securities with a post-period treatment group of 2017-2018.
For the bid side of the market, the Exchange found that the average
size on BYX for treatment securities decreased by 16.54 round lots
(i.e., 1654 shares) relative to the control group. Similarly, for the
offer side of the market, the Exchange found that the average size on
BYX for treatment securities decreased by 13.22 round lots (i.e., 1322
shares) relative to the control group. While available bid and offer
sizes on BYX in the treatment group decreased relative to the control
group, the Exchange believes that this change may have been caused by
factors unrelated to the Program. In fact, the average BYX bid and ask
sizes materially increased during the duration of the Program for
securities included in both the treatment and control groups. For
example, the average BYX bid size for Sample IV increased from 3.49
round lots in the pre-period to 4.91 round lots in the post-period, an
approximately 40% improvement. Similarly, the average BYX ask size for
Sample IV increased from 3.74 round lots in the pre-period to 5.16
round lots in the post-period, an approximately 38% improvement. The
Program results simply indicate a larger increase in size for the
control groups was observed. The same statistics for the control group
indicate 791% increase in BYX bid size and a 1014% increase in BYX ask
size. The Exchange therefore believes the results are largely due to
outlier stocks in the control group that experienced a significant
increase in depth that was most likely related to outside factors
rather than the lack of Program participation. Given the significant
increase in depth across stocks in both the control and treatment
groups, the Exchange believes that the results are consistent with a
finding that the Program did not materially harm depth on BYX.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Volume
-------------------------------
TRF volume as
BYX volume as % of symbol
% of TCV (bps) total volume
------------------------------------------------------------------------
I
coef................................ * 0.43 1.10%
p value............................. 0.051 0.522
II
coef................................ 0.38 1.09%
p value............................. 0.112 0.641
III
coef................................ * -1.11 *** 7.43%
p value............................. 0.051 0.002
IV
coef................................ * -1.72 ** 7.95%
p value............................. 0.068 0.033
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Market Share
To assess the impact of the Program on market share the Exchange
explored measures related to both BYX volume as a percentage of TCV and
TRF volume as a percentage of Symbol Total Volume. The BYX market share
coefficients shown in the table are expressed in
[[Page 45589]]
market share basis point. For example, a value of 100 means that market
share increased by one point (e.g., 30% to 31%). Many of the results
related to market share are statically significant, suggesting shifts
in both BYX and TRF market share in the years following the
introduction of the Program. Sample I, for example, suggests a
statistically significant relative increase in BYX volume in more
liquid treatment securities immediately following the introduction of
the Program, but Samples III and IV suggest that any such increases
were temporary with BYX volume as a percentage of TCV decreasing
relative to the control group in both of the later samples. In
addition, Samples III and IV also reflect a large and statistically
significant relative increase in TRF share for securities with more
volume executed in the Program. Collectively, it can be safely stated
that the introduction of the Program did not work towards decreasing
TRF share. More likely what the results tell us is that the treatment
stocks with relatively high volume executed in the Program also had
high levels of retail interest generally. Such retail interest is
executed largely off-exchange, hence the increase in TRF share.
I. Active Stocks (CADV >500,000) and Post-Period = 2013
For this sample, there were 58 matched pairs that emerged from this
process. The pairs, along with values of selected variables, pre- and
post-Program introduction, are shown as follows:
BILLING CODE 8011-01-P
[[Page 45590]]
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[[Page 45591]]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TN29AU19.006
[[Page 45592]]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TN29AU19.007
[[Page 45593]]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TN29AU19.008
[[Page 45594]]
II. Less Active Stocks (CADV Between 50,000 and 500,000) and Post-
Period = 2013
For this sample, there were 78 matched pairs that emerged from this
process. The pairs, along with values of selected variables, pre- and
post-Program introduction, are shown as follows:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TN29AU19.009
[[Page 45595]]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TN29AU19.010
[[Page 45596]]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TN29AU19.011
[[Page 45597]]
III. Active Stocks (CADV >500,000) and Post-Period = 2017-208
For this sample, there were 51 matched pairs that emerged from this
process. The pairs, along with values of selected variables, pre- and
post-Program introduction, are shown as follows:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TN29AU19.012
[[Page 45598]]
IV. Less Active Stocks (CADV Between 50,000 and 500,000) and Post-
Period = 2017-2018
For this sample, there were 34 matched pairs that emerged from this
process. The pairs, along with values of selected variables, pre- and
post-Program introduction, are shown as follows:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TN29AU19.013
[[Page 45599]]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TN29AU19.014
BILLING CODE 8011-01-C
IV. Conclusion
When the Commission approved the initial retail price improvement
pilot on the New York Stock Exchange LLC (``NYSE'') and NYSE Amex LLC
(``Amex'') it stated that it was not concerned that such a program
would ``cause a major shift in market structure.'' \30\ Instead, the
Commission explained that the program ``should closely replicate the
trading dynamics that exist in the OTC markets'' and would ``simply
present another competitive venue for retail order flow execution''
that is ``not likely to alter the incentives for market participants to
post limit orders in a material way.'' \31\ At the same time, the
Commission saw fit to approve such programs on a pilot basis so that it
would have the opportunity to monitor the operation of the Program and
confirm its expectations about the impact on broader market structure
before permanent approval. The Exchange believes that the Commission's
expectations that the Program would not have any significant impact on
broader market structure is both correct and confirmed by the data.
Specifically, based on the Exchange's experience in operating the
Program, and the data provided here and during the duration of the
pilot, the Exchange believes that the Program has been a positive
experiment in attracting retail order flow to a public exchange, and
should thus be approved on a permanent basis so that retail investors
can continue to reap its benefits.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\30\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 67347 (July 3,
2012), 77 FR 40673 (July 10, 2012) (SR-NYSE-2011-55; SR-NYSEAmex-
2011-84).
\31\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The data provided by the Exchange describes a valuable service that
delivers considerable price improvement to retail investors in a
transparent and well-regulated environment. The Program represents just
a fraction of retail orders, most of which are executed off-exchange by
a wide range of order handling services that have considerably more
market share, and which operate pursuant to different rules and
regulatory requirements. Specifically, the majority of retail order
flow is currently executed off-exchange by various wholesale market
makers that are able to offer sub-penny price improvement to retail
orders without running afoul of the Sub-Penny Rule under Regulation
NMS.\32\ Given that retail orders already trade off-exchange in
increments of less than one penny, the Exchange believes that the
primary impact of the Program is to provide an opportunity for retail
investors to receive price improvement on a transparent, well-
regulated, exchange venue.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\32\ The Commission has itself has opined that OTC market makers
appear to handle the vast majority of marketable retail order flow,
with the eight retail broker-dealers with significant retail
accounts whose Rule 606 order routing disclosures the Commission
reviewed routing ``nearly 100%'' of their customer market orders to
OTC market makers. See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 61358
(January 14, 2010), 75 FR 3593, 3600 (January 21, 2010) (Concept
Release on Equity Market Structure).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Exchange believes that this understanding is also supported by
the data, which shows that the Program was not likely to have caused
any significant harm to broader market quality. The order flow the
Program attracted and continues to attract to the Exchange provides
tangible price improvement to retail investors through a competitive
and transparent pricing process unavailable in non-exchange venues. As
such, despite relatively modest volumes, the Exchange believes that the
Program has satisfied the twin goals of attracting retail order flow to
the
[[Page 45600]]
Exchange and allowing such order flow to receive potential price
improvement. Moreover, the Exchange believes that the data collected
supports the conclusion that the Program did not have a negative impact
on broader market quality. Although the results of the Program
highlight the substantial advantages that broker-dealers retain when
managing the benefits of retail order flow, the Exchange believes that
the level of price improvement provided by the Program and the scant
evidence that the Program negatively impacted the marketplace justifies
making the Program permanent.
2. Statutory Basis
The Exchange believes the proposed rule change is consistent with
the requirements of Section 6(b) of the Act,\33\ in general, and
Section 6(b)(5) of the Act,\34\ in particular, in that it is designed
to remove impediments to and perfect the mechanism of a free and open
market and a national market system, to promote just and equitable
principles of trade, and, in general, to protect investors and the
public interest and not to permit unfair discrimination between
customers, issuers, brokers, or dealers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\33\ 15 U.S.C. 78f(b).
\34\ 15 U.S.C. 78f(b)(5).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Exchange believes that making the pilot permanent is consistent
with these principles because the Program is reasonably designed to
attract retail order flow to the exchange environment, while helping to
ensure that retail investors benefit from the better price that
liquidity providers are willing to give their orders. During the pilot
period, the Exchange has provided data and analysis to the Commission.
The Exchange believes that this data and analysis, as well as the
further analysis provided in this filing, show that the Program has
provided the intended benefits to the market, and retail investors in
particular, and is therefore consistent with the Act. Furthermore, the
Exchange notes that similar programs instituted by NYSE and Nasdaq BX
have recently been approved by the Commission to operate on a permanent
basis.\35\ The Exchange believes that its analysis, as well as the
analysis conducted by NYSE and Nasdaq BX in their proposals for
permanent approval, show that retail price improvement programs do not
negatively impact market structure, and can therefore provide benefits
to retail investors without negatively impacting the broader market.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\35\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 85160 (February 15,
2019), 84 FR 5754 (February 22, 2019) (SR-NYSE-2018-28); 86194 (June
25, 2019), 84 FR 31385 (July 1, 2019) (SR-BX-2019-011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The proposed rule change is designed to facilitate transactions in
securities and to remove impediments to, and perfect the mechanisms of,
a free and open market and a national market system because making the
Program permanent would allow the Exchange to continue to attract
retail order flow to a public exchange and allow such order flow to
receive potential price improvement. The data provided by the Exchange
to the Commission staff demonstrates that the Program provided tangible
price improvement to retail investors through a competitive pricing
process unavailable in non-exchange venues, and otherwise had an
insignificant impact on the broader market. The Exchange believes that
making the Program permanent would encourage the additional utilization
of, and interaction with, the Exchange and provide retail customers
with an additional venue for price discovery, liquidity, competitive
quotes, and price improvement. For the same reasons, the Exchange
believes that making the Program permanent would promote just and
equitable principles of trade and remove impediments to and perfect the
mechanism of a free and open market.
Finally, the Exchange also believes that it is subject to
significant competitive forces, as described below in the Exchange's
statement regarding the burden on competition. For all of these
reasons, the Exchange believes that the proposed rule change is
consistent with the Act.
B. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement on Burden on Competition
The Exchange does not believe that the proposed rule change will
result in any burden on competition that is not necessary or
appropriate in furtherance of the purposes of the Act. The Exchange
believes that making the Program permanent would continue to promote
competition for retail order flow among execution venues and contribute
to the public price discovery process. The Exchange believes that the
data supplied to the Commission, and experience gained over the life of
the pilot, have demonstrated that the Program creates price improvement
opportunities for retail orders that are similar to what would be
provided under OTC internalization arrangements, thereby benefiting
retail investors and increasing competition between execution venues.
The Exchange also believes that making the Program permanent will
promote competition between execution venues operating their own retail
liquidity programs, including competition between the Program and a
similar programs currently operated by NYSE and Nasdaq BX on a
permanent basis pursuant to a recently approved rule changes.\36\ Such
competition will lead to innovation within the market, thereby
increasing the quality of the national market system and allowing
national securities exchanges to compete both with each other and with
off-exchange venues for order flow. Such competition ultimately
benefits investors, and in this case specifically retail investors by
providing multiple potential trading venues for the execution of their
order flow, consistent with the principles of Regulation NMS, which was
premised on promoting fair competition among markets. Finally, the
Exchange notes that it operates in a highly competitive market in which
market participants can easily direct their orders to competing venues,
including off-exchange venues. In such an environment, the Exchange
must continually review, and consider adjusting the services it offers
and the requirements it imposes to remain competitive with other U.S.
equity exchanges. For the reasons described above, the Exchange
believes that the proposed rule change reflects this competitive
environment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\36\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
C. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement on Comments on the Proposed
Rule Change Received From Members, Participants, or Others
The Exchange has neither solicited nor received written comments on
the proposed rule change.
III. Date of Effectiveness of the Proposed Rule Change and Timing for
Commission Action
Within 45 days of the date of publication of this notice in the
Federal Register or within such longer period up to 90 days (i) as the
Commission may designate if it finds such longer period to be
appropriate and publishes its reasons for so finding or (ii) as to
which the Exchange consents, the Commission will:
A. By order approve or disapprove such proposed rule change, or
B. institute proceedings to determine whether the proposed rule
change should be disapproved.
IV. Solicitation of Comments
Interested persons are invited to submit written data, views, and
arguments concerning the foregoing, including whether the proposed rule
change is consistent with the Act.
[[Page 45601]]
Comments may be submitted by any of the following methods:
Electronic Comments
Use the Commission's internet comment form (http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml); or
Send an email to [email protected]. Please include
File Number SR-CboeBYX-2019-014 on the subject line.
Paper Comments:
Send paper comments in triplicate to Secretary, Securities
and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street NE, Washington, DC 20549-1090.
All submissions should refer to File Number SR-CboeBYX-2019-014. This
file number should be included on the subject line if email is used. To
help the Commission process and review your comments more efficiently,
please use only one method. The Commission will post all comments on
the Commission's internet website (http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml).
Copies of the submission, all subsequent amendments, all written
statements with respect to the proposed rule change that are filed with
the Commission, and all written communications relating to the proposed
rule change between the Commission and any person, other than those
that may be withheld from the public in accordance with the provisions
of 5 U.S.C. 552, will be available for website viewing and printing in
the Commission's Public Reference Room, 100 F Street NE, Washington, DC
20549 on official business days between the hours of 10 a.m. and 3 p.m.
Copies of the filing also will be available for inspection and copying
at the principal office of the Exchange. All comments received will be
posted without change. Persons submitting comments are cautioned that
we do not redact or edit personal identifying information from comment
submissions. You should submit only information that you wish to make
available publicly. All submissions should refer to File Number SR-
CboeBYX-2019-014, and should be submitted on or before September 19,
2019.
For the Commission, by the Division of Trading and Markets,
pursuant to delegated authority.\37\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\37\ 17 CFR 200.30-3(a)(12).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Jill M. Peterson,
Assistant Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2019-18636 Filed 8-28-19; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8011-01-P