[Federal Register Volume 84, Number 166 (Tuesday, August 27, 2019)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 45020-45053]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2019-17518]



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Vol. 84

Tuesday,

No. 166

August 27, 2019

Part III





Department of the Interior





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Fish and Wildlife Service





Department of Commerce





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National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration





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50 CFR Part 424





Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Regulations for Listing 
Species and Designating Critical Habitat; Final Rule

  Federal Register / Vol. 84 , No. 166 / Tuesday, August 27, 2019 / 
Rules and Regulations  

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DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR

Fish and Wildlife Service

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

50 CFR Part 424

[Docket No. FWS-HQ-ES-2018-0006; Docket No. 180202112-8112-01; 
4500030113]
RIN 1018-BC88; 0648-BH42


Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Regulations for 
Listing Species and Designating Critical Habitat

AGENCY: U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Interior; National Marine 
Fisheries Service, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 
Commerce.

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: We, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) and the National 
Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) (collectively referred to as the 
``Services'' or ``we''), revise portions of our regulations that 
implement section 4 of the Endangered Species Act of 1973, as amended 
(Act). The revisions to the regulations clarify, interpret, and 
implement portions of the Act concerning the procedures and criteria 
used for listing or removing species from the Lists of Endangered and 
Threatened Wildlife and Plants and designating critical habitat.

DATES: 
    Effective date: This final regulation is effective on September 26, 
2019.
    Applicability date: These revised regulations apply to 
classification and critical habitat rules for which a proposed rule was 
published after September 26, 2019.

ADDRESSES: Public comments and materials received, as well as 
supporting documentation used in the preparation of this final 
regulation, are available on the internet at http://www.regulations.gov 
in Docket No. FWS-HQ-ES-2018-0006.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Gary Frazer, U.S. Fish and Wildlife 
Service, Department of the Interior, Washington, DC 20240, telephone 
202/208-4646; or Samuel D. Rauch, III, National Marine Fisheries 
Service, Department of Commerce, 1315 East-West Highway, Silver Spring, 
MD 20910, telephone 301/427-8000. If you use a telecommunications 
device for the deaf (TDD), call the Federal Relay Service at 800/877-
8339.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

    On July 25, 2018, the Services published a proposed rule in the 
Federal Register (83 FR 35193) regarding section 4 of the Act and its 
implementing regulations in title 50 of the Code of Federal Regulations 
(CFR), part 424, which sets forth the procedures for the addition, 
removal, or reclassification of species on the Federal Lists of 
Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants (lists) and designating 
critical habitat. In the July 25, 2018, Federal Register document, we 
provided the background for our proposed revisions to these regulations 
in terms of the statute, legislative history, and case law.
    In this final rule, we focus our discussion on changes from the 
proposed revisions based on comments we received during the comment 
period and our further consideration of the issues raised. For 
background on the statutory and legislative history and case law 
relevant to these regulations, we refer the reader to the proposed rule 
(83 FR 35193, July 25, 2018).
    In finalizing the specific changes to the regulations in this 
document, and setting out the accompanying clarifying discussion in 
this preamble, the Services are establishing prospective standards 
only. Although these regulations are effective 30 days from the date of 
publication as indicated in DATES above, they will apply only to 
relevant rulemakings for which the proposed rule is published after 
that date. Thus, the prior version of the regulations at 50 CFR part 
424 will continue to apply to any rulemakings for which a proposed rule 
was published before the effective date of this rule. Nothing in these 
final revised regulations is intended to require that any previously 
completed classification decision or critical habitat designation must 
be reevaluated on the basis of these final regulations.
    This final rule is one of three related final rules that are 
publishing in this issue of the Federal Register. All of these 
documents finalize revisions to various regulations that implement the 
Act.

Discussion of Changes From the Proposed Rule

    In this section we discuss changes between the proposed regulatory 
text and regulatory text that we are finalizing in this document 
regarding the foreseeable future, factors for delisting, and 
designation of unoccupied critical habitat. We also explain a revision 
to the regulatory definition of ``physical or biological features.'' We 
are not modifying the proposed regulatory text for the section on 
prudent determinations of critical habitat or the proposed revision to 
50 CFR 424.11(b). We are finalizing those sections as proposed.

Foreseeable Future

    We proposed that the framework for the foreseeable future in 50 CFR 
424.11(d) provide that the term foreseeable future extends only so far 
into the future as the Services can reasonably determine that the 
conditions potentially posing a danger of extinction in the foreseeable 
future are probable. The Services will describe the foreseeable future 
on a case-by-case basis, using the best available data and taking into 
account considerations such as the species' life-history 
characteristics, threat-projection timeframes, and environmental 
variability. The Services need not identify the foreseeable future in 
terms of a specific period of time, but may instead explain the extent 
to which they can reasonably determine that both the future threats and 
the species' responses to those threats are probable.
    The Services received numerous comments stating that many of the 
terms and phrases in the proposed framework are vague and unclear, and 
that the proposed framework impermissibly raises the bar for listing 
species as threatened species. Some commenters suggested in particular 
that ``likely'' should be used instead of ``probable,'' to avoid 
confusion and to ensure that the provision is consistent with the 
statutory definition of ``threatened species.'' In response to these 
comments and upon further consideration, we have revised the framework 
to provide that the term foreseeable future extends only so far into 
the future as the Services can reasonably determine that both the 
future threats and the species' responses to those threats are likely. 
The Services will describe the foreseeable future on a case-by-case 
basis, using the best available data and taking into account 
considerations such as the species' life-history characteristics, 
threat-projection timeframes, and environmental variability. The 
Services need not identify the foreseeable future in terms of a 
specific period of time.
    We have removed the phrase ``conditions potentially posing a danger 
of extinction in the foreseeable future,'' and are replacing it with 
``both the future threats and the species' responses to those 
threats.'' In light of the public comments received, we determined that

[[Page 45021]]

this particular phrase, as originally proposed, could be read 
incorrectly to imply that ``conditions'' could include something other 
than ``threats,'' and that ``conditions'' affecting the species need 
only be ``potential conditions'' and not actual or operative threats. 
In addition, we concluded that the phrase ``posing a danger of 
extinction'' could conflate the concept of the foreseeable future with 
the status of the species, instead of indicating that the foreseeable 
future is the period of time in which the Services can make reliable 
predictions about the threats and the species' responses to those 
threats.
    We have also replaced the word ``probable'' with the word 
``likely.'' While we had intended ``probable'' to have its common 
meaning, which is synonymous with the term ``likely,'' we have 
determined that it is most consistent with the statutory definition of 
``threatened species'' to instead use the term ``likely.'' We have 
deleted the term ``probable'' and replaced it with the term ``likely'' 
to avoid any confusion on this point and to address public comments. We 
clarify that by ``likely'' the Services mean ``more likely than not.'' 
This is consistent with the Services' long-standing interpretation and 
previous judicial opinions.

Factors Considered in Delisting Species

    We are making one minor change to the proposed regulatory text for 
50 CFR 424.11(e). We have replaced ``will'' with ``shall'' in the first 
sentence of this provision to make it consistent with the language in 
other sections of 50 CFR 424.11. While we have not made any other 
changes, we note that when we use the term ``status review'' in the 
context of evaluating extinction or not meeting the definition of a 
``species,'' this review may not necessarily involve an evaluation of 
the species' status relative to the five listing factors in section 
4(a)(1) of the Act. As is our common practice, if the Services 
determine the entity does not meet the statutory definition of a 
``species,'' the status review would conclude at that point. Likewise, 
if the Services determine an entity is extinct, there would be no need 
for the Services to evaluate the factors affecting the species as part 
of a status review.
    We received many comments expressing concern over removing the 
terms ``recovery'' and ``error'' from the regulatory text because of a 
perception that the basis of the Services' actions would not be clear. 
As is the Services' current practice, we will continue to explain in 
proposed and final delisting rules why the species is being removed 
from the lists--whether due to recovery, extinction, error, or other 
reasons. These revisions do not alter, in any way, the Services' 
continued goal of recovery for all listed species.

Not Prudent Determinations

    We proposed that 50 CFR 424.12(a)(1)(v) provide that after 
analyzing the best scientific data available, the Secretary otherwise 
determines that designation of critical habitat would not be prudent.
    We note that this formulation could be misconstrued to suggest that 
the Secretary may make a determination irrespective of the data, 
provided the Secretary first analyzes the data. This interpretation, 
although grammatically possible, was not our intent and is not 
permissible under the Act. However, given that numerous comments 
expressed concern about expanding circumstances when the Services may 
find critical habitat designation to be not prudent, we decided to 
reorder 50 CFR 424.12(a)(1)(v) to provide that the Secretary otherwise 
determines that designation of critical habitat would not be prudent 
based on the best scientific data available.

Designating Unoccupied Areas

    We proposed that 50 CFR 424.12(b)(2) provide that the Secretary 
will only consider unoccupied areas to be essential where a critical 
habitat designation limited to geographical areas occupied would be 
inadequate to ensure the conservation of the species or would result in 
less efficient conservation for the species. Efficient conservation for 
the species refers to situations where the conservation is effective, 
societal conflicts are minimized, and resources expended are 
commensurate with the benefit to the species. In addition, for an 
unoccupied area to be considered essential, the Secretary must 
determine that there is a reasonable likelihood that the area will 
contribute to the conservation of the species.
    The Services received numerous comments that the term ``efficient 
conservation'' is vague and would introduce a requirement not contained 
in the statute. We also received numerous comments that the reasonable 
likelihood standard was not defined and is unclear. In response to 
these comments and upon further consideration, we revised 50 CFR 
424.12(b)(2) to provide that the Secretary will designate as critical 
habitat, at a scale determined by the Secretary to be appropriate, 
specific areas outside the geographical area occupied by the species 
only upon a determination that such areas are essential for the 
conservation of the species. When designating critical habitat, the 
Secretary will first evaluate areas occupied by the species. The 
Secretary will only consider unoccupied areas to be essential where a 
critical habitat designation limited to geographical areas occupied 
would be inadequate to ensure the conservation of the species. In 
addition, for an unoccupied area to be considered essential, the 
Secretary must determine that there is a reasonable certainty both that 
the area will contribute to the conservation of the species and that 
the area contains one or more of those physical or biological features 
essential to the conservation of the species.
    We have removed the proposed language regarding ``efficient 
conservation.'' Therefore, we will only designate unoccupied critical 
habitat if we determine that occupied critical habitat is inadequate 
for the conservation of the species. Public comments indicated that the 
``efficient conservation'' concept was confusing and that 
implementation of this provision would be inordinately complex and 
difficult.
    We have also revised the proposed language by replacing 
``reasonable likelihood'' with ``reasonable certainty.'' Although 
``reasonable likelihood'' and ``reasonable certainty'' both convey the 
need for information beyond speculation but short of absolute 
certainty, we find that the latter requires a higher level of certainty 
than the former. We intend the phrase ``reasonable certainty'' as 
applied to designation of unoccupied critical habitat in this final 
regulation to preclude designations of unoccupied critical habitat 
based upon mere potential or speculation--either as to the contribution 
of the area of unoccupied critical habitat to the species' conservation 
or as to the existence of one or more of the physical or biological 
features essential to the conservation of the species. At the same 
time, we do not intend to require that designations of unoccupied 
critical habitat be based upon guarantees or absolute certainty about 
the future conservation contributions of, or features present within, 
unoccupied critical habitat. In light of the public comments that the 
``reasonable likelihood'' language was undefined and unclear, and could 
allow too much discretion to designate areas that would not ultimately 
contribute to species conservation, we concluded that the language of 
this final rule better reflects the need for high confidence that an 
area designated as unoccupied critical habitat will actually contribute 
to the

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conservation of the species. We consider the phrase ``reasonable 
certainty'' to confer a higher level of certainty than ``reasonable 
likelihood,'' meaning a high degree of certainty, but not to require 
absolute certainty.
    The Supreme Court recently held that an area must be habitat before 
that area could meet the narrower category of ``critical habitat,'' 
regardless of whether that area is occupied or unoccupied. See 
Weyerhaeuser Co. v. U.S. FWS, 139 S Ct. 361 (2018). We have addressed 
the Supreme Court's holding in this rule by adding a requirement that, 
at a minimum, an unoccupied area must have one or more of the physical 
or biological features essential to the conservation of the species in 
order to be considered as potential critical habitat. We note that we 
do not in the rule attempt to definitively resolve the full meaning of 
the term ``habitat.''
    First, the language and structure of the statute support this 
interpretation. By its very terms the Act requires that areas 
designated as critical habitat be habitat for the species: ``The 
Secretary . . . shall . . . designate any habitat of [a listed] species 
which is then considered to be critical habitat'' (section 
4(a)(3)(A)(i) of the Act (emphasis added)). Moreover, paragraph (C) of 
the statutory definition of ``critical habitat'' at section 3(5) makes 
clear that ``critical habitat shall not include the entire geographical 
area which can be occupied by the [listed] species.'' The phrase ``can 
be occupied'' in the definition demonstrates that all critical 
habitat--both occupied and unoccupied alike (the use of ``can be'' 
instead of ``is'' demonstrates that the provision is not limited to 
occupied habitat)--must be habitat because the only way that an area 
``can be occupied'' is if it is habitat. Further, the use of the 
present tense--``are essential''--in section 3(5)(A)(ii) indicates that 
for an unoccupied area to qualify as ``critical habitat,'' it must 
currently be essential for the conservation of the species. The 
Services interpret this requirement to mean that there is a reasonable 
certainty both that the area currently contains one or more of the 
physical or biological features essential to the conservation of the 
species and that the area will contribute to the species' conservation. 
A reasonable reading of the statutory definition of ``unoccupied'' 
critical habitat would find that areas that do not contain at least one 
of the features essential to life processes of the species or will not 
contribute to the conservation of the species cannot be essential for 
conservation.
    Second, the legislative history supports the conclusion that 
unoccupied habitat must contain one or more of those physical or 
biological features essential to the conservation of the species. While 
the 1973 Act did not define ``critical habitat,'' the Services' 1978 
regulations did define ``critical habitat'' as ``any air, land, or 
water area . . . and constituent elements thereof, the loss of which 
would appreciably decrease the likelihood of survival and recovery of a 
listed species . . . . The constituent elements of critical habitat 
include, but are not limited to: physical structures and topography, 
biota, climate, human activity, and the quality and chemical content of 
land, water, and air. Critical habitat may represent any portion of the 
present habitat of a listed species and may include additional areas 
for reasonable population expansion.'' 43 FR 870, 874-875 (Jan. 4, 
1978).
    In response to the Tellico Dam decision by the Supreme Court, 
Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978), Congress 
amended the Act in a number of ways, including by providing a statutory 
definition of ``critical habitat.'' Notably, Congress did not adopt the 
Services' regulatory definition. Congress was concerned that the 
agencies' ``regulatory definition could conceivably lead to the 
designation of virtually all of the habitat of a listed species as its 
critical habitat.'' H.R. Rep. No. 95-1625, at 25 (1978). The House 
``narrow[ed]'' the definition and told the agencies to be ``exceedingly 
circumspect in the designation of critical habitat outside of the 
presently occupied areas of the species.'' Id. at 18, 25. Additionally, 
the Senate Report noted there is ``little or no reason to give exactly 
the same status to lands needed for population expansion as is given to 
those lands which are critical to a species' continued survival.'' S. 
Rep. No. 95-874, at 10 (1978).
    The Senate Report recognized the potential value of designating 
unoccupied habitat to expand populations, but questioned how broadly it 
could be used. Id. at 9-10 (``The goal of expanding existing 
populations of endangered species in order that they might be delisted 
is understandable''; ``This process does, however, substantially 
increase the amount of area involved in critical habitat designation 
and therefore increases proportionately the area that is subject to the 
regulations and prohibitions which apply to critical habitats''). The 
Senate specifically criticized designations of critical habitat that 
include land ``that is not habitat necessary for the continued 
survival'' of the species, but is instead ``designated so that the 
present population within the true critical habitat can expand.'' Id. 
at 10.
    Thus, we conclude that Congress intended that the test be more 
demanding for designating unoccupied critical habitat than for occupied 
habitat. All the courts to address this issue have agreed with this 
general principle. E.g., Home Builders Ass'n v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife 
Service, 616 F.3d 983, 990 (9th Cir. 2010) (``Essential conservation is 
the standard for unoccupied habitat . . . and is a more demanding 
standard than that of occupied critical habitat.''); Cape Hatteras 
Access Pres. All. v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 344 F. Supp. 2d 108, 119 
(D.D.C. 2004) (``it is not enough that the area's features be essential 
to conservation, the area itself must be essential''). As the Act and 
its legislative history makes clear, Congress intended that unoccupied 
critical habitat be defined more narrowly than as areas contemplated 
for species expansion. H.R. Rep. No. 95-1625 pp. 18, 25 (1978); S. Rep. 
No. 95-874, at 9-10 (1978). We have concluded that requiring that areas 
contain one or more features that the species needs furthers this 
congressional intent.
    Note that, although the Conference Committee changed the definition 
of ``critical habitat'' so that it was no longer modeled after the 1978 
regulatory definition as closely, Congress did not call into question 
the rest of that definition, which focused uniformly on aspects of 
habitat that were analogous to the concept of ``essential features'': 
```Critical habitat' means any air, land, or water area . . . and 
constituent elements thereof . . . . The constituent elements of 
critical habitat include, but are not limited to: Physical structures 
and topography, biota, climate, human activity, and the quality and 
chemical content of land, water, and air.'' 43 FR 870, 874-875 (Jan. 4, 
1978). Moreover, areas outside the occupied geographical range are not 
likely to be ``essential for the conservation of the species'' unless 
they contain at least one of the features that are essential for 
survival and recovery of the species.
    We acknowledge that the reference to ``physical or biological 
features'' in the definition of ``critical habitat'' only occurs in the 
portion addressing occupied habitat. Nevertheless, given that Congress 
intended that a higher standard apply to the designation of unoccupied 
critical habitat than to the designation of occupied critical habitat, 
the Services conclude that it furthers congressional intent to require 
that those areas contain one or more of the physical or biological 
features that are essential to the conservation of the

[[Page 45023]]

species. This interpretation retains the 1978 regulation's focus on 
physical or biological features and furthers the objective Congress 
referenced when it adopted the definition of ``critical habitat'' that 
included both occupied and unoccupied habitat: Allowing for the 
possibility of protecting areas that are reasonably certain to 
contribute to the conservation of the species while limiting the 
designation to areas where the species can survive.
    We note that the Services have not previously taken the position 
that unoccupied habitat must contain physical or biological features 
that are essential to the conservation of the species. In fact, in 
litigation FWS has sometimes argued the contrary. E.g., Weyerhaeuser 
Co. v. U.S. FWS, No. 17-71 (S. Ct.); Bear Valley Mutual Water Co. v. 
Jewell, 790 F.3d 977 (9th Cir. 2015). Although our previous 
interpretation was reasonable, we have revisited our interpretation in 
light of the recent Weyerhaeuser decision, which held that critical 
habitat must be ``habitat.'' Given the ambiguity of the language at 
issue, we may interpret it in any manner that is a reasonable 
construction of the Act and consistent with controlling court 
decisions.

Physical or Biological Features

    We received a number of comments in response to our invitation for 
recommendations on whether the Services should consider modifying the 
definition of ``physical or biological features'' at 50 CFR 424.02. We 
adopted this regulatory definition in 2016 to provide an interpretation 
of this term, which appears in the Act's definition of ``critical 
habitat,'' that was simpler and closer to the statutory text than the 
prior approach we had followed since 1984. The prior approach had 
involved identification of ``primary constituent elements,'' which is a 
term not used in the statute and which we found led to significant 
confusion.
    We defined the term ``physical or biological features'' at a 
general level in 2016, with the expectation that the Services would 
first identify the physical or biological features that support the 
species' life-history needs, and then narrow that group of features 
down to a subset of those features that meet all the requirements the 
statute imposes for features that could lead to a designation of 
occupied critical habitat. Thus, once physical or biological features 
had been identified, the Services would apply the language from section 
3(5)(A) of the Act. That language layers on additional qualifiers, 
including that the features ``are essential to the conservation of the 
species'' and ``may require special management considerations or 
protection.'' Further, the statute limits designation of occupied 
habitat to ``specific areas'' on which one or more of those features 
are found.
    Many commenters expressed concern that the definition should be 
more clearly limited only to those features that could, in the context 
of the statutory requirements, actually lead to designation of a 
specific area as critical habitat.
    We have decided in the interests of clarity to make minor 
modifications to the existing definition to provide that physical or 
biological features essential to the conservation of the species are 
the features that occur in specific areas and that are essential to 
support the life-history needs of the species, including but not 
limited to, water characteristics, soil type, geological features, 
sites, prey, vegetation, symbiotic species, or other features. A 
feature may be a single habitat characteristic, or a more complex 
combination of habitat characteristics. Features may include habitat 
characteristics that support ephemeral or dynamic habitat conditions. 
Features may also be expressed in terms relating to principles of 
conservation biology, such as patch size, distribution distances, and 
connectivity.
    We find that the changes we are making, which we detail below, are 
helpful to emphasize the key statutory language and make clear that 
only those features that are essential to the conservation of the 
species can lead to a designation of occupied critical habitat 
(assuming the requirement that the features may require special 
management considerations or protection is also met). First, in order 
to bring such clarity directly into the regulatory text, we have found 
that we should identify the term more specifically. The full term used 
in the statutory definition of occupied critical habitat is ``physical 
or biological features . . . essential to the conservation of the 
species,'' and therefore we are modifying the defined term to read 
``physical or biological features essential to the conservation of the 
species.''
    Second, we incorporate the statutory requirement that essential 
features be found on specific areas by qualifying ``features'' with the 
new phrase ``that occur in specific areas.'' We note that the use of 
the word `on' in the statute has been interpreted by the Services to 
mean `in' when used in conjunction with specific areas. Therefore, 
``features found on specific areas'' is synonymous with ``features 
found in specific areas.'' Finally, instead of referring to the broader 
group of features that ``support the life-history needs'' of the 
species, and in keeping with further focusing the scope of the defined 
term, we have added language specifying that these are the features 
which are ``essential to support the life-history needs'' of the 
species. We retain the rest of the language of the current definition, 
which makes clear that, in identifying the essential physical or 
biological features, the Services are to articulate those features with 
the level of specificity previously associated with ``primary 
constituent elements'' (an issue we discuss further in response to 
comments, below).

Summary of Comments and Responses

    In our proposed rule published on July 25, 2018 (83 FR 35193), we 
requested public comments on our specific proposed changes to 50 CFR 
part 424. We also sought public comments recommending, opposing, or 
providing feedback on specific changes to any provisions in part 424 of 
the regulations, including but not limited to revising or adopting as 
regulations existing practices or policies, or interpreting terms or 
phrases from the Act. In particular, we sought public comment on 
whether we should consider modifying the definitions of ``geographical 
area occupied by the species'' or ``physical or biological features'' 
in 50 CFR 424.02. We received several requests for public hearings and 
requests for extensions to the public comment period. Public hearings 
are not required for regulation revisions of this type, and we elected 
not to hold public hearings or extend the public comment period beyond 
the original 60-day public comment period. We received more than 65,000 
submissions representing hundreds of thousands of individual 
commenters. Many comments were nonsubstantive in nature, expressing 
either general support for or opposition to provisions of the proposed 
rule with no supporting information or analysis. We also received many 
detailed substantive comments with specific rationale for support of or 
opposition to specific portions of the proposed rule. Below, we 
summarize and respond to the significant, substantive public comments 
sent by the September 24, 2018, deadline and provide responses to those 
comments.

Comments on Presentation of Economic or Other Impacts

    Comment: Most commenters disagreed with removing the phrase 
``without reference to possible economic

[[Page 45024]]

or other impacts of such determination'' and our proposal to present 
the economic impacts of listing determinations. Many stated that this 
change violates the intent of the Act and cited the Act and its 
legislative history in support of their statements. Furthermore, a 
commenter also stated that the Services are prohibited by the Act from 
compiling and presenting economic data on the listing of a species as a 
threatened or an endangered species, citing the conference report 
language from the 1982 amendments to the Act: ``economic considerations 
have no relevance to determinations regarding the status of species and 
the economic analysis requirements of Executive Order 12291, and such 
statutes as the Regulatory Flexibility Act and the Paperwork Reduction 
Act, will not apply to any phase of the listing process.'' Many 
commenters also questioned how the Services could compile such economic 
information and not have it influence their decision whether to list a 
species as a threatened or an endangered species, noting that the 
statute and legislative history are clear that listing decisions are to 
be based solely on the best scientific and commercial data available. 
In contrast, several commenters stated that providing the economic 
impacts of listing species shows transparency to the public and local, 
State, and tribal governments, and could be useful for planning 
purposes. Commenters noted that making this information available does 
not mean that it will be used in the decisionmaking process, but it 
would provide important information about the impacts of implementing 
the Act.
    Response: In this final rule, the Services remove the phrase 
``without reference to possible economic or other impacts of such 
determination.'' As discussed in the preamble to the proposed rule, we 
acknowledge that the statute and its legislative history are clear that 
listing determinations must be made solely on the basis of the best 
scientific and commercial data available. Moreover, the listing 
determination must be based on whether a species is an endangered 
species or a threatened species because of any of the five statutory 
factors. However, the Act does not prohibit the Services from compiling 
economic information or presenting that information to the public, as 
long as such information does not influence the listing determination. 
Similarly, the statements Congress included in the legislative history 
focus on ensuring that economic information would not affect or delay 
listing determinations, but do not demonstrate an intention to prohibit 
the Services from compiling information about economic impacts. For 
example, the legislative history for the 1982 amendments to the Act 
describes the purposes of the amendments using the following language 
(emphases added): ``to prevent non-biological considerations from 
affecting [listing] decisions,'' Conf. Rep. (H.R.) No. 97-835 (1982) 
(``Conf. Rep.''), at 19; ``[listing and delisting] decisions are based 
solely upon biological criteria,'' Conf. Rep., at 20; ``economic 
considerations have no relevance to [listing] determinations,'' Conf. 
Rep., at 20; ``to prevent [critical habitat] designation] from 
influencing the [listing] decision,'' H.R. Rep. No. 97-567, at 12. 
Because neither the statute nor the legislative history indicates that 
Congress intended to prohibit the Services from compiling economic 
information altogether, we removed the language at issue.
    Comment: Some commenters stated that Congress intended that ``the 
balancing between science and economics should occur subsequent to 
listing'' and pointed to statements in the legislative history and in 
the court's decision in Alabama Tombigbee Rivers Coal. v. Kempthorne, 
477 F.3d 1250, 1266 (11th Cir. 2007): ``While `economic analysis' is 
meant to `offer[ ] some counter-point to the listing of species without 
due consideration for the effects on land use and other development 
interests,' Congress wanted `to prevent [habitat] designation from 
influencing the decision on the listing of a species,' and for that 
reason intended that the `balancing between science and economics 
should occur subsequent to listing through the exemption process.' 
House Report at 12 (emphasis added); cf. Senate Report at 4.''
    Response: The commenters' characterizations of the legislative 
history and the court's decision in the Alabama-Tombigbee case are not 
accurate. In that case, FWS listed two fish without concurrently 
designating critical habitat, and the court concluded that Congress did 
not intend to prohibit designating critical habitat subsequent to the 
final listing decision. The court based its reasoning on the statute 
and legislative history: The requirement to complete final listing 
determinations within 1 year of listing proposals, the removal of the 
requirement to propose critical habitat concurrently with proposed 
listings, the addition of authority to make not-determinable findings 
for critical habitat, and the quoted language in the legislative 
history demonstrating Congress's intent to keep consideration of 
economic factors (part of the critical habitat designation process) 
separate from listing decisions. Thus, the court in that case was 
analyzing not whether compilation of economic information must come 
after the final listing decision, but whether compilation of economic 
information during the critical habitat designation may come after 
listing decisions. As a result, the decision in Alabama-Tombigbee and 
the legislative history that the court quoted in that case are an 
unsuitable comparison to the regulatory change the Services proposed. 
And, more fundamentally, the mandate that the Secretary ``shall, 
concurrently with making a [listing] determination . . ., designate any 
habitat of such species which is then considered to be critical 
habitat'' is qualified by the ``to the maximum extent prudent and 
determinable'' language. Therefore, Congress authorized, but did not 
require, the Services to designate critical habitat after the final 
listing decision, and the Services continue to publish final critical 
habitat designations (whenever designation is prudent) concurrently 
with final listing decisions unless they are not determinable at the 
time of listing.
    Comment: Some commenters stated that the Services' comparison to 
the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) practice of conducting 
cost-benefit analyses under the Clean Air Act's National Ambient Air 
Quality Standards is irrelevant and pointed to differences between the 
Act and the Clean Air Act. Specifically, the Clean Air Act directs the 
EPA to compile economic information and has a follow-on process 
(development of State implementation plans) that the economic 
information informs. Other commenters stated that EPA's process for 
completing a regulatory impact analysis (RIA) of the ambient air 
quality standards under the Clean Air Act is not comparable to the 
Services' process for listing a species under the Act. These commenters 
stated that the costs associated with ambient air quality measures are 
more easily estimated, and that costs associated with listing a species 
do not necessarily have an economic value and assessing their ``worth'' 
or ``value'' would be very difficult. Some commenters also noted that 
EPA typically does not ``make reference'' to the impact analysis in 
their rules proposing or adopting air standards.
    Response: While the Services recognize that there are differences 
between the statutory frameworks of the Clean Air Act and the Act, the 
EPA example illustrates that it is possible for an agency to compile 
and present

[[Page 45025]]

economic data for one purpose while not considering it in the course of 
carrying out a decision process where consideration of economic data is 
prohibited. Nothing in the Act precludes the agencies from compiling or 
disclosing information relating to the economic impacts for purposes of 
informing the public. With regard to whether EPA ``makes reference'' to 
its impact analyses in its rulemakings adopting national ambient air 
quality standards, we note that the commenter's observation highlights 
an ambiguity in the existing regulatory language that we are removing. 
The commenter seems to equate ``reference'' to economic impacts to mean 
``making reference to,'' i.e., ``citing,'' the information in agency 
determinations or giving such considerations significance in the 
decisionmaking. However, the term ``reference'' can be construed more 
broadly as an instance of simply referring to something as a source of 
information, i.e., to use or consult, which could be done in passing. 
It is not our intention to ``make reference'' to economic information 
in our listing determinations either by citing it or by considering it.
    Comment: Some commenters noted that the Act does not expressly 
authorize compiling or referring to economic information regarding 
listing determinations. Some noted that it would not be appropriate to 
attempt to do so to inform critical habitat designations (citing 
Arizona Cattle Growers' Ass'n v. Salazar, 606 F.3d 1160, 1173 (9th Cir. 
2010) (holding that analysis of the impacts of designation of critical 
habitat is separate from analyzing impacts from listing)).
    Response: The Act does not expressly authorize compiling economic 
information, and the statute does not prohibit compiling the 
information in order to inform the public. We rely on our inherent 
authority to administer our programs in the interest of public 
transparency in concluding that the Services have discretion to compile 
such information regarding a particular listing if they choose.
    Comment: Several commenters asserted that the Services' reasoning 
for deleting the ``without reference to economic or other impacts of 
listing'' phrase contradicts their interpretation and reasoning from 
when they adopted the previous regulations following the 1982 
amendments to the Act, which added the word ``solely.'' They cited to 
the Services' proposed rule, which stated: ``Changes made by the 
Amendments were designed to ensure that decisions in every phase of the 
listing process are based solely on biological consideration, and to 
prohibit considerations of economic or other non-biological factors 
from affecting such decisions. . . . This new paragraph is proposed to 
implement the requirement of the Amendments that determinations 
regarding the biological status of a given species not be affected or 
delayed by any consideration of the possible economic or other effects 
of such a determination.'' 48 FR 36062 (Aug. 8, 1983).
    Response: The preamble to the 1984 final rule originally adopting 
the existing language is illuminating. After the language was proposed 
in 1983, a commenter had recommended that the ``without reference to 
possible economic or other impacts of such determination'' not be 
included in the final language, but the Services responded that ``no 
substantial change'' would result from adopting such a recommendation. 
49 FR 38900, 38903 (Oct. 1, 1984). At the time, the Services felt that 
including the language would more clearly express Congressional intent 
and reflect the guidance in the Conference Report to the 1982 
amendments, but also made clear their understanding that the legal 
effect of the 1982 amendment adding the word ``solely'' was to insure 
economic or other impacts were not ``considered'' by the decision-maker 
``as part of the identification and listing process,'' id., and to 
prevent such considerations from ``affecting decisions regarding 
endangered or threatened status'' or being ``taken into account in 
deciding whether to list a given species.'' Id. at 38900.
    The statutory amendment requiring that listing determinations be 
based solely on the best scientific and commercial data did not address 
whether the Services could prepare information for the public on other 
aspects of the implications of their decisions. On its face, the 
statutory amendments merely required that the Services not take such 
matters into consideration in determining whether a species meets the 
definition of a threatened species or an endangered species. Some 
members of the public and Congress have become increasingly interested 
in better understanding the impacts of regulations including listing 
decisions. Therefore, we find it is in the public interest and 
consistent with the statutory framework to delete the unnecessary 
language from our regulation while still affirming that we will not 
consider information on economic or other impacts in the course of 
listing determinations.
    Comment: Several commenters opined that removing the existing 
regulatory language ``without reference to possible economic or other 
impacts of such determination'' would signal that the Services' 
commitment to abide by the will of Congress to base listing decisions 
solely on the best scientific and commercial data has weakened. Some 
commenters suggested that the Services' motives were suspect given that 
the regulation has been in place since 1984 with no indication that 
implementation was problematic. Some claimed that removing the 
regulatory language was inconsistent with the Supreme Court's holdings 
in T.V.A. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
    Response: Removing the phrase does not signal any difference in the 
basis upon which listing determinations will be made. As we have 
affirmed in several instances through the proposed and final rules, the 
Services understand and appreciate the statutory mandate to base 
listing determinations solely on whether a species is an endangered 
species or a threatened species because of any of the factors 
identified in section 4(a)(1) using the best scientific and commercial 
data available. Removing this phrase from the regulation, which could 
be construed to not allow the Services to inform the public of the 
economic implications of the Services' listing decisions, will not 
violate any direction of Congress or holdings of the Supreme Court. 
Rather, we are responding to strong and growing interest by some 
members of Congress and the public for increased transparency regarding 
the economic impacts of regulations. We note that the T.V.A. decision 
was decided in the particular context of compliance with section 7 
after a species had been listed and has no direct bearing on 
interpretation of the Act's listing provisions. T.V.A. was also decided 
before Congress amended section 4(a)(1) to include the term ``solely,'' 
so its holding has no relevance to the interpretation of this term in 
the statute.
    Comment: One commenter suggested that it was unnecessary to delete 
the ``without reference to economic or other impacts'' language if the 
Services' intent is merely to be able to inform the public of the 
impacts of listing. The commenter agreed that Congress did not prohibit 
doing so, as long as the listing determinations are not influenced by 
such information, but noted that the Services had not pointed to any 
situation where the existing language had presented a hurdle to 
providing desired public information. Rather, the commenter asserted, 
maintaining the existing language in the regulations would provide a 
daily reminder to Service staff about the importance of cabining 
consideration in listing

[[Page 45026]]

determinations to only the factors authorized under the Act.
    Response: We believe that the removal of the phrase will more 
closely align the regulatory language to the statutory language. 
Because the prior language could be read to preclude conducting an 
analysis merely for the purposes of informing the public, it is more 
transparent to delete the phrase.
    Comment: Many commenters asked for more information regarding when 
the Services would conduct an economic analysis for listing 
determinations, how the Services would estimate potential economic 
impacts, what criteria would be considered, and whether economic 
benefits of a particular species, which can be difficult to quantify, 
would be considered. Some commenters expressed concern that cost/
benefit analyses would be skewed toward only accounting for potential 
costs. Another commenter suggested our impacts analysis include an 
analysis of the negative impacts to other species, as management for a 
listed species could be a contributing factor for the endangerment of a 
non-listed species.
    Response: The Services are not creating a framework or guidelines 
for how or when the presentation of economic impacts of listing, 
reclassifying, or delisting species would occur as part of this 
rulemaking. We remain committed to basing species' classification 
decisions on the best available scientific and commercial data and will 
not consider economic or other impacts when making these decisions.
    Comment: Many commenters questioned how the Services would comply 
with the statutory timeframes if we conducted economic analyses on the 
listing determination. Commenters stated that the Services have not 
explained how they will deal with this additional workload. They also 
expressed concerns about the amount of time and effort it would take to 
gather the necessary economic or other impact information and stated 
that this added work would slow the number of listings that could be 
done under current budget conditions. Such a delay, the commenters 
stated, could make the Services more vulnerable to deadline litigation.
    Response: The Services intend to comply with statutory, court-
ordered, and settlement agreement timelines for classification 
determinations. The Services are equally committed to public 
transparency in the implementation of the Act. Additionally, we 
recognize the uncertainty of budget cycles and appropriated funding. 
Therefore, we will continue to prioritize our work according to the 
requirements of the Act and remain flexible to work on other actions as 
funding allows.
    Comment: At least one commenter suggested that the Services should 
affirmatively declare that information regarding the economic or 
related impacts of a potential listing can be considered in making 
listing determinations, in light of the statutory reference to the best 
scientific ``and commercial data'' available.
    Response: We decline to do so.
    Comment: Some commenters stated that even though the Act does not 
expressly prohibit presenting information regarding economic impacts, 
doing so will contravene Congress' intention that listing decisions 
should be purely a biological question immune from political concerns. 
They asserted that presenting analysis of economic impacts even merely 
to inform the public would open the Services to pressure to avoid 
listings where there are significant social, political, or economic 
implications. They noted that the provisions regarding designation of 
critical habitat expressly authorize consideration of economic and 
other impacts, demonstrating that Congress consciously chose not to 
authorize such for listing decisions. They cited the decision in 
Northern Spotted Owl v. Hodel, 716 F. Supp. 479 (W.D. Wash. 1988), as 
an example where the court set aside a decision not to list a species 
on the grounds that it was ``arbitrary and capricious or contrary to 
law,'' predicting that such litigation and adverse results would be 
more common if the proposed change is finalized.
    Response: Congress did not authorize the Services to consider the 
economic impacts of listing decisions. Therefore, the Services have 
expressly confirmed their intention that all listing determinations 
must be based solely on the best scientific and commercial data 
available. While the commenter is correct that the Hodel decision was 
unfavorable for FWS, resulting in remand of the determination not to 
list the northern spotted owl, the basis for the decision was the 
court's view of the sufficiency of the scientific support and 
explanation for the FWS' decision, rather than a direct consideration 
of whether economic considerations had impermissibly played a role in 
the determination.
    Comment: The Services cannot rely on the Regulatory Flexibility Act 
(RFA) as providing authority for presentation of economic impact 
information of listing determinations because the Services have taken 
the position that the RFA is not applicable to listing determinations. 
See, e.g., Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants: Final Rule to 
List the Taiwanese Humpback Dolphin as Endangered Under the Endangered 
Species Act, 83 FR 21182, 21186 (May 9, 2018).
    Response: We do not rely on the RFA as a basis for presentation of 
economic impacts of classification determinations (H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 
97-835, at 20 (1982)). The Services may elect to provide a presentation 
of economic impacts of particular listing decisions to inform the 
public of those costs. The Act does not preclude the compilation and 
presentation of those impacts to the public.

Comments on the Foreseeable Future

    Comment: Commenters stated that if the intended goal of the 
proposed foreseeable future framework is to continue to follow a 2009 
opinion from the Department of the Interior (M-37021) for 
interpretation of ``foreseeable future,'' as the Services indicate in 
the proposed rule, then there is no need to make the proposed revision 
to the regulations. Some commenters recommended that the Services 
simply base the ``foreseeable future'' on the best available data and 
not proceed with the proposed regulation, which does nothing to clarify 
how the Services will determine the foreseeable future.
    Response: Although listing determinations must be based on the best 
available scientific and commercial data, the Services also must be 
able to determine the likelihood of a species' future state, and in 
some circumstances the best available data may not be sufficient to go 
beyond speculation. In these cases, the data are insufficient to allow 
the Services to foresee the future threats and the species' response to 
those threats so as to be able to determine that a species is likely to 
become endangered in the future. To give meaning to the phrase 
``foreseeable future,'' the Services are providing a consistent 
explanation of this term, and we find that it is appropriate to do so 
in our implementing regulations. While the two Services have both 
applied the principles articulated in a 2009 opinion from the DOI 
Office of the Solicitor when interpreting the phrase ``foreseeable 
future,'' including a foreseeable future framework in our joint 
implementing regulations gives the public more transparency, provides 
the Services with a shared regulatory meaning for this important term, 
and makes it clear that both agencies will adhere to the same 
framework.
    Comment: Numerous commenters supported the Services' effort to 
clarify

[[Page 45027]]

the meaning of the term ``foreseeable future''; however, most of these 
commenters also stated that one or more of the terms used in the 
proposed ``foreseeable future'' framework, such as ``potential,'' 
``probable,'' ``reasonably,'' ``reasonably determine,'' and 
``reliable,'' are vague, unclear, or could be misinterpreted. 
Commenters specifically requested that one or more of these terms be 
clarified or removed, because they give the public little understanding 
of what criteria the Services will use to evaluate the foreseeable 
future. Various commenters were concerned that the proposed foreseeable 
future language could allow for speculation, prevent or undermine the 
Service's ability to rely on the best available science, result in a 
less streamlined process, or invite political interference with listing 
decisions.
    Several commenters recommended that the terms ``potentially'' and 
``reasonably'' be omitted, because those terms could be misread and 
dilute the statutory standard of ``likely.'' A commenter stated that 
``reasonably'' could be misconstrued to suggest a reasonable basis is 
sufficient, rather than the affirmative finding of ``likely'' actually 
required by the Act. Another commenter noted that a standard that 
relies on a mere ``potential'' for future conditions to pose a danger 
invites speculation about future circumstances, and, as the Services 
acknowledge, they should ``avoid speculating as to what is 
hypothetically possible.'' 83 FR at 35196, July 25, 2018.
    Other commenters recommend specific edits, such as replacing 
``reasonably determine'' with ``scientifically determine,'' and removal 
of the term being defined (i.e., ``foreseeable future'') from the 
proposed definition of ``foreseeable future.''
    Response: We appreciate the many comments regarding the wording of 
the proposed ``foreseeable future'' framework. We agree with the 
comments that including the term ``foreseeable future'' as part of the 
definition of this term is somewhat circular and therefore not 
appropriate, so we have revised the language to remove this circular 
phrasing. We have also removed the phrase containing the word 
``potentially'' as explained further in response to the comment below. 
However, we are not defining the terms ``reliable'' and ``reasonably 
determine,'' because these terms are commonly used and should be 
interpreted as having their everyday meaning. The regulatory framework 
is consistent with how these terms are used in the M-Opinion (M-37021, 
January 16, 2009), which states, in a footnote, that ``the words 
``rely'' and ``reliable'' [are used] according to their common, non-
technical meanings in ordinary usage. Thus, for the purposes of this 
memorandum, a prediction is reliable if it is reasonable to depend upon 
it in making decisions.'' As a concluding statement, the M-Opinion also 
states that ''reliable'' does not mean ``certain''; it means sufficient 
to provide a reasonable degree of confidence in the prediction, in 
light of the conservation purposes of the Act.'' We find that these 
statements make it clear how the Services intend to interpret these 
terms and conclude that further attempts to define words within the 
``foreseeable future'' framework are not necessary.
    Lastly, we find that the framework's term ``reasonably'' does not 
dilute or establish an incompatible, lower standard for the affirmative 
finding of ``likely'' required by the statute. The foreseeable future 
framework acknowledges that we must make a `reasonable determination,' 
based on the best available data. In other words, in the context of 
determining the foreseeable future, our conclusions need not be made 
with absolute certainty, but they must be reasonable, and must not be 
arbitrary or capricious. We also decline to replace the phrase 
``reasonably determine'' with ``scientifically determine,'' because the 
foreseeable framework does not in any way alter the requirement that 
the Services rely on the best available scientific and commercial data 
when interpreting the foreseeable future and listing species as 
threatened. We fully intend to continue to apply the best available 
data when making conclusions about the foreseeable future.
    Comment: Several commenters stated that the foreseeable future 
should not be based on general ``conditions'' and requested that we 
clarify that the word ``conditions'' refers to threats and species' 
responses to those threats. Commenters stated the statute does not 
allow for broader consideration of any ``conditions'' that are not 
encompassed within the five factors defined by Congress. Another 
commenter also stated that the use of the term ``conditions'' in the 
context of the proposed regulatory framework suggests that the Services 
will only examine the environmental conditions affecting a species 
(i.e., the threat factors) and not the corresponding response of the 
species when determining the species' future population status. The 
commenter noted that it is well established that a species cannot be 
listed merely because there is an identified threat (e.g., Ctr. for 
Biological Diversity v. Lubchenco, 758 F. Supp. 2d 945, 955 (N.D. Cal. 
2010); Defenders of Wildlife v. Norton, 258 F.3d 1136, 1143 (9th Cir. 
2001)). The commenter stated that by referencing conditions 
``potentially posing a danger of extinction,'' the Services are not 
incorporating the appropriate level of certainty with respect to 
whether the ``conditions'' will occur and the corresponding 
relationship to the future status of the species. The Services are also 
raising the possibility that a ``benefit of the doubt'' standard could 
erroneously be applied during the listing determination (Bennett v. 
Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 176 (1997); Greater Yellowstone Coal., Inc. v. 
Servheen, 665 F.3d 1015, 1028 (9th Cir. 2011)).
    Response: As some commenters point out, the Act requires listing 
determinations to be based on whether a species is an endangered 
species or threatened species because of one or more of the five 
factors in section 4(a)(1), and it is the Services' long-established 
practice to refer to these factors in listing determinations. The 
``foreseeable future'' framework in these final regulations does not 
supplant those five factors or the statutorily required status review. 
Rather, use of the word ``conditions'' was intended to capture the full 
range of possible natural and manmade threats that may be affecting a 
particular species and that would be considered under section 4(a)(1). 
However, we now find it is more clear to simply use the word 
``threats,'' rather than ``conditions,'' and thus have made this 
revision to the final regulatory text. In addition, after further 
consideration of the proposed language, we find that the phrase 
``potentially posing a danger of extinction'' could be interpreted as 
implying that the Services would rely on a ``benefit of the doubt'' 
standard for determining the existence of a threat or consider the mere 
possibility of threat occurring sufficient when assessing a species' 
future status. This was not our intention, and we acknowledge that the 
statutory requirement to use the ``best scientific and commercial data 
available'' is intended ``to ensure that the Act not be implemented 
haphazardly, or on the basis of speculation or surmise.'' See Bennett 
v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 176-77 (1997) (construing substantially 
identical requirement in section 7 context). Thus, we have removed this 
phrase from the final regulatory language to eliminate this source of 
confusion.
    Comment: A large number of comments addressed the Services' use of 
the word ``probable'' within the proposed foreseeable future framework. 
Several commenters stated that the use of the word ``probable'' 
introduces more

[[Page 45028]]

ambiguity to an already ambiguous framework and that it is unclear, for 
example, what degree of probability and certainty are required to be 
considered ``probable.'' Several commenters specifically requested that 
the Services clarify that the term ``probable'' means ``likely'' in 
this particular context, and others requested use of the word 
``likely'' in place of ``probable'' to reflect the statutory standard. 
Some commenters stated that the word ``probable'' implies that the 
Services will rely on too low of an evidence threshold and that the 
word ``probable'' should be replaced with ``clear and convincing.''
    The majority of commenters who addressed this issue stated that use 
of the word ``probable'' would set too high of a bar for threatened 
listings, provides the Services greater latitude to reject listings, 
and contravenes Congress's intent that the Act ``give the benefit of 
the doubt to the species'' (H.R. Rep. No. 96-697, at 12 (1979)). The 
commenters also argued that the proposed regulation would be 
inconsistent with the statements expressed in the M-Opinion (M-37021, 
January 16, 2009). Multiple commenters indicated specifically their 
view that the proposed framework is much narrower than that expressed 
in the 2009 M-Opinion, which does not use the term ``probable,'' and 
that the Services did not adequately explain their reasoning for 
departing from the standards expressed in the M-Opinion. Commenters 
further noted that the ``probable'' standard would undermine the 
Secretary's duty to list species that are primarily threatened by 
climate change. Others stated that it would prevent the application of 
the Act's requirement to rely on the ``best available scientific and 
commercial data'' and that the Services cannot interpret the 
foreseeable future in a way that sets an arbitrary threshold for how 
much science is required before a species can be listed as threatened. 
Multiple commenters recommended that if the Services wish to adopt a 
definition in line with the M-Opinion, they should adhere more closely 
to the 2009 Solicitor's opinion or publish it as a draft joint policy 
for notice and comment, which would accord with the Services' past 
practice of publishing joint policies to interpret the Act's key 
phrases such as ``significant portion of the range'' and ``distinct 
population segment.''
    Some commenters provided discussions of other reasons why use of a 
``probable'' standard would be inappropriate. A group of commenters 
stated that use of the term ``probable'' implies that the Services may 
only consider threats that have a 50 percent or greater chance of 
occurring during a particular time period and that the Services have 
not explained how they would reliably quantify the percentage of 
likelihood of threats to species. These commenters also noted that it 
would be unlawful and arbitrary to discount several threats that may 
be, say, 40 percent likely but that would be extremely dangerous to the 
species and that such an approach would be contrary to the Services' 
longstanding precautionary approach. Cf. 48 FR 43098, 43102-43103 
(Sept. 21, 1983) (FWS guidelines for reclassification from threatened 
species to endangered species status based on magnitude and immediacy 
of threats). Other commenters pointed out the only way to assess what 
is ``probable'' requires quantitative methods such as statistical 
prediction and modeling. Several commenters stated that this approach 
is flawed in that it does not take into account the severity of the 
threats or the different types or levels of uncertainty associated with 
various threats.
    Lastly, we received comments suggesting that because the Services 
used both terms--``likely'' and ``probable''--in the proposed 
regulatory framework, the inconsistent terminology suggests that 
different meanings are contemplated. Other comments noted that, to the 
extent that the Services intend ``probable'' to require any greater 
likelihood than the statutory term ``likely'' from the definition of 
``threatened species'' at 16 U.S.C. 1532(20), it would be an 
impermissible interpretation of the statute, and that neither 
``likely'' nor ``probable'' can permissibly be interpreted to require 
the probability of extinction is ``more likely than not.''
    Response: For maximum clarity and consistency with the statutory 
language, this final rule uses ``likely'' in place of ``probable'' in 
the relevant sentence of the provision describing the ``foreseeable 
future.'' We are making this change to avoid any unintended confusion. 
We further clarify that ``likely,'' in turn, means ``more likely than 
not.'' This interpretation is supported by case law (e.g., Alaska Oil 
and Gas Association v. Pritzker, 840 F.3d 671, 684 (9th Cir. 2016); 
Trout Unlimited v. Lohn, 645 F. Supp. 2d 929, 944 (D. Or. 2007); WWP v. 
FWS, 535 F.Supp.2d 1173, 1184 & n.3 (D. Idaho 2007). Our foreseeable 
future framework does not depart from the standards expressed in the 
2009 M-Opinion that forms the basis for the framework (M-37021, January 
16, 2009); rather, it is fully consistent with that opinion.
    Our replacement of the term ``probable'' with ``likely'' within the 
foreseeable future framework should also eliminate concerns that the 
Services are impermissibly raising the bar for listing species as 
threatened to something beyond a threshold of ``likely'' or allowing 
that classification determinations could be based on anything other 
than the ``best scientific and commercial data'' standard. We must rely 
on the ``best scientific and commercial data,'' available, but that 
data may or may not indicate whether something is likely. To determine 
an event is likely, we must be able to determine that it is more likely 
to occur than not after taking the ``best scientific and commercial 
data'' into account. We will continue to apply the best available 
scientific and commercial data in making our listing determinations as 
required under the Act.
    We appreciate the recommendation to develop and publish a more 
detailed policy based on the M-Opinion. However, at this time, we 
expect that the regulatory framework that we revise in this final 
regulation after considering public comment, in combination with the 
supporting text of the existing M-Opinion that further explains the 
background and reasoning for this longstanding approach, will provide 
adequate guidance to the Services.
    Comment: Some commenters stated that when concluding that a species 
should be listed, the Services must specifically find ``that both 
future threats and the species' responses to those threats are 
probable.'' In contrast, other commenters questioned the Services' 
proposal to assess the foreseeable future based on both ``future 
threats'' and the ``species' responses.'' These commenters said this 
would involve a combined evaluation of both time and impact and instead 
recommended that the Services separate the concept of foreseeable 
future from its analysis of the potential threats that the Service can 
concretely determine will affect the species during that time period. 
Others cautioned that we should evaluate the species' response at the 
population level because threats faced by one segment of the population 
do not necessarily result in a negative response by the population as a 
whole.
    Response: This regulation takes the position that ``the foreseeable 
future extends only so far into the future as the Services can 
reasonably determine that both the future threats and the species' 
responses to those threats are likely.'' This approach is consistent 
with the M-Opinion (M-37021, January 16, 2009). It is not sufficient 
for us to determine that a particular threat is likely; we must

[[Page 45029]]

also conclude that the manifestation of that threat is likely to result 
in a response from the species. By ``species' response'' we mean a 
change in the species' status after encountering the adverse effects of 
the threats. We cannot separate the forward-looking analysis of threats 
from the forward-looking consideration of how those threats are 
expected to affect the species. To do so would essentially prevent an 
evaluation of the species' status in the foreseeable future.
    With respect to consideration of threats operating in the 
foreseeable future that affect only a portion or some individuals 
within the species (i.e., species, subspecies, or DPS) being evaluated 
for listing, we agree with the commenter that during a status review we 
must consider how that threat is affecting the particular species at a 
population or higher level. Listing decisions are ultimately based on a 
synthesis of all relevant data regarding the status of the species and 
the threats, taking into consideration how those threats may vary 
spatially or temporally across individuals or populations of that 
species.
    Comment: Several commenters referred to the Council on 
Environmental Quality's (CEQ's) implementing regulations for the 
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA regulations) at 40 CFR 1502.22, 
which present discussion of reasonably foreseeable significant adverse 
impacts. The commenter noted that the NEPA regulations do not define 
``reasonably foreseeable,'' but requested that the Services adopt a 
regulatory definition for foreseeable future rather than apply a 
subjective, case-by-case approach for defining foreseeable future. 
Commenters specifically requested we adopt the following ``accepted 
legal definition'' or something similar: ``A consequence is reasonably 
foreseeable if it could have been anticipated by an ordinary person of 
average intelligence as naturally flowing from his actions.'' The 
commenters stated that a definition along these lines would inject 
reasonable consideration of common sense into decisions that have such 
profound impacts on the human environment.
    Response: As requested by the commenters, we reviewed the 
regulations at 40 CFR 1502.22, which address situations in which a 
Federal agency is evaluating reasonably foreseeable significant adverse 
effects on the human environment in an environmental impact statement 
and there is incomplete or unavailable information. The CEQ NEPA 
regulations, as noted by the commenter, do not provide a definition for 
the term ``reasonably foreseeable.'' Overall, we did not find these 
regulations useful in refining or revising the foreseeable future 
framework. The Act has a very different purpose and imposes different 
mandates on the Services than NEPA. Whereas NEPA directs agencies to 
engage in a process to consider a broad range of potential impacts as a 
means to guide the agencies in choosing among possible actions, the Act 
directs specific actions and imposes a mandate that decisions be based 
on the best available information. We have not adopted the commenters' 
proposed alternative definition.
    Comment: Many commenters stated that they supported the Services' 
attempt to clarify the term ``foreseeable future'' in the proposed 
regulations, and many agreed with the proposed qualitative framework in 
which the foreseeable future would be determined on a case-by-case 
basis using the best available scientific and commercial data for the 
particular species. However, some of these commenters stated that the 
foreseeable future should still be defined in terms of a specific 
period of time or range of years (e.g., 20-25 years) so that the 
reasonableness of this particular aspect of threatened listings can be 
assessed in a meaningful way by the public. In contrast, many other 
commenters stated that the same time period should be applied as the 
foreseeable future for all species, because the information on 
foreseeability is not species dependent. We also received a specific 
recommendation to use a definition for the foreseeable future that is 
already in place and used by many indigenous people--the next seven 
generations of human life.
    Response: Using a predetermined number of years or period of time 
(e.g., seven generations) as a universally applied ``foreseeable 
future'' for all listings would be arbitrary and would preclude the 
Services from relying on the best available data. Although some threats 
might manifest according to certain consistent timeframes, the species' 
likely response to those stressors is uniquely related to the 
particular plant or animal's characteristics, status, trends, habitats, 
and other operative threats. Furthermore, when multiple threats affect 
a particular species, these threats may have synergistic effects that 
are also unique to that particular species. Therefore, we do not intend 
to specify a particular timeframe to be applied universally to all 
species. However, we will continue to provide information regarding the 
particular timeframes used when evaluating threats and a species' risk 
of extinction to the extent possible in all listing decisions. 
Providing such information facilitates the public's ability to evaluate 
the reasonableness of the Services' listing decisions.
    Comment: Multiple commenters recommended that the Services adopt a 
more quantitative approach in determining the foreseeable future to 
reduce uncertainty and litigation and increase transparency and 
consistency. Many of these commenters also recommended adopting certain 
quantitative approaches, such as: Defining risk of extinction and 
uncertainty in a manner similar to approaches used by The 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change; identifying timeframes over 
which certain threats (e.g., wind-energy development) or certain 
population trends for specific taxonomic groups (e.g., salmonids) are 
foreseeable; and using previous listing decisions to identify any 
consistent patterns in the time horizons used for certain types of 
threats or taxa.
    Response: When quantitative methods are available and consistent 
with best practices, we use them along with other available data and 
methods. However, the `best available data' standard under the Act does 
not necessarily require use of quantitative methods and data, and we 
are not specifying particular quantitative methods in the regulations 
we are finalizing in this document.
    Comment: Several commenters stated that to assess the danger of 
extinction, and thus be able to list a species as threatened, the 
Services must first identify the extinction threshold for that species 
and the likelihood of reaching that point in the future. Commenters 
noted that NMFS has explained previously that ``[a] species is 
`threatened' if it exhibits a trajectory indicating that in the 
foreseeable future it is likely to be at or near a qualitative 
extinction threshold below which stochastic/depensatory processes 
dominate and extinction is expected.'' (NMFS, Interim Protocol for 
Conducting Endangered Species Act Status Reviews at 12 (2007).) 
Commenters also stated that in cases where the Services lack the data 
or ability to identify future population trends, assess the impact of 
population declines on the species' overall population status, or 
establish an extinction threshold, it is not possible to determine or 
foresee the likelihood of future extinction for purposes of the listing 
determination. A commenter noted that Congress explained that the 
threatened classification was included to give effect to the 
Secretary's ability to

[[Page 45030]]

forecast population trends (S. Rep. No. 93-307 at 3 (July 1, 1973)).
    Response: The Services do not need to identify an extinction 
threshold or the likelihood of reaching that threshold in the future in 
order to determine whether a species meets the definition of a 
threatened species. Rather than wait for such data and analyses to 
become available, the Services are required to apply the best available 
data to make a determination whether the species meets the definition 
of a ``threatened species'' or an ``endangered species'' as a result of 
any of the factors outlined in section 4(a)(1) of the Act. Secondly, 
predicting extinction thresholds requires certain data regarding 
population parameters and environmental variables, and it requires the 
use of appropriate models. Modeling extinction thresholds is often not 
possible with the nature or type of data available.
    Comment: A commenter recommended that the Services formally define 
``in danger of extinction'' and apply the definitions and analysis in 
the remanded memorandum that FWS filed with the United States District 
Court for the District of Columbia in In re: Polar Bear Endangered 
Species Act Listing and Sec.  4(d) Rule Litigation, No. 08-mc-00764-
EGS, Doc. No. 237 (Dec. 22, 2010) (``Polar Bear memo'').
    Response: FWS developed the Polar Bear memo after the court in that 
case held that the definition of ``endangered species'' under the Act 
is ambiguous and ordered the agency to provide on remand an additional 
explanation for the legal basis of the agency's decision to list the 
polar bear as a threatened species. To develop the Polar Bear memo, FWS 
surveyed the history of the agency's listing determinations in light of 
the text of the Act and the applicable legislative history and 
encapsulated FWS's overall, general understanding of the phrase ``in 
danger of extinction'' as ``currently on the brink of extinction in the 
wild.'' Polar Bear memo at 3. FWS noted that it does not employ its 
general understanding in a narrow or inflexible way and that a species 
need not be likely to become extinct to be ``on the brink of 
extinction.'' Id. The memo also described four categories of 
circumstances in which FWS had found species to be ``currently on the 
brink of extinction in the wild.'' Id. at 4-6.
    Although the Polar Bear memo is not binding and does not have the 
force of law, see Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Zinke, 265 F. Supp. 
3d 1161, 1180-81 (D. Mont. 2017), it remains a statement by FWS as to 
what may constitute ``in danger of extinction.'' FWS stated explicitly 
in the memo that it applied only to the listing decision for the polar 
bear. Polar bear memo at 1 n.1. FWS's general understanding, the 
historical survey of its listing decisions in the memo, and the 
associated discussion in the Polar Bear memo can still serve as a 
useful starting point for analyzing whether a species is in danger of 
extinction.
    As the Polar Bear memo noted, FWS has not promulgated a binding 
interpretation of ``in danger of extinction,'' due in part to the 
contextual and fact-dependent nature of listing determinations. Id. at 
3. The Services continue to conclude that codification of FWS's general 
understanding of ``in danger of extinction'' is not necessary at this 
time.
    Comment: We received comments expressing disagreement with the 
Services' proposed framework for foreseeable future in that it allows 
for different ``foreseeable futures'' depending on the particular 
threat being considered. Instead, the commenter recommended that the 
Services select a single number of years or range of years in which to 
determine the future status of the species. The commenter stated that 
if the Services adopt varying foreseeable futures for the different 
listing factors for a single species, they are conceivably assessing 
whether that species is likely to become an endangered species based on 
fewer than all the listing factors. While the Act allows the Service to 
list a species based on a single factor, it does not allow the Service 
to disregard any of the factors in making the holistic determination 
whether a species has ``become an endangered species.'' In addition, 
the listing factors assess both positive and negative impacts on the 
status of the species. So being unable to assess certain listing 
factors at the end of a long foreseeable future for other listing 
factors means the Service is ignoring potentially beneficial 
conditions, for example, the existing regulatory mechanisms.
    Response: We appreciate the commenter's concern and clarify in this 
response that, although there may be different degrees of 
``foreseeability'' with respect to particular threats and their impacts 
on the species, we ultimately base listing determinations on 
consideration of all of the available data and a review of all of the 
section 4(a)(1) factors. As stated in the M-Opinion, ``Although the 
Secretary's conclusion as to the future status of a species may be 
based on reliable predictions with respect to multiple trends and 
threats over different periods of time or even threats without specific 
time periods associated with them, the final conclusion is a synthesis 
of that information.'' (M-37021, January 16, 2009). The Services have 
been following this approach for nearly a decade, and courts have found 
it to be reasonable and appropriate (See, e.g., In Re Polar Bear 
Endangered Species Act Listing and Section 4(d) Rule Litigation, 709 
F.3d 1, 15-16 (D.C. Cir. 2013). The approach reflects the reality that 
there is a variation among the kinds and levels of information the 
Services typically have available when assessing specific threats. The 
approach allows the Services to comprehensively consider all that is 
known about the threats acting on the species, and the listing 
determination itself is based on a synthesis of that information. No 
information is disregarded merely because it relates to a time horizon 
that is different from that associated with other threats. As a matter 
of practice, the Services consider applicable data regarding both 
negative (e.g., poaching) and positive (e.g., enforcement efforts to 
reduce poaching) factors when making their listing determinations and 
will continue to do so under the ``foreseeable future'' framework being 
finalized in this rule.
    Comment: A commenter stated that the discussion included in the 
proposed rule on data and use of models is unclear. The commenter 
specifically pointed to the statements in the proposed rule that the 
foreseeable future can extend only as far as the Services can 
reasonably depend on the available data to formulate a reliable 
prediction and avoid speculation and preconception, and that ``in cases 
where the available data allow for quantitative modeling or projection, 
the time horizon presented in these analyses does not necessarily 
dictate what constitutes the `foreseeable future' or set the specific 
threshold for determining when a species may be in danger of 
extinction.'' The commenter said this seems to be contradictory, 
because if there is enough information to provide a reliable prediction 
that avoids speculation, based on quantitative modeling or projection, 
it seems that the Services should consider that as a ``foreseeable 
future.'' The commenter said this phrasing seems to indicate that 
models may show specific time periods, but that it can still be 
ignored. The commenter said all data and information should be reviewed 
and interpreted, including modeling.
    Response: We agree that, if available and reliable, quantified 
studies or analyses should not be ignored, and our proposed rule was 
not meant to imply otherwise. Our intention with the particular 
language quoted by the

[[Page 45031]]

commenter was to indicate that the existence of a quantitative model or 
projection will not necessarily determine the foreseeable future in all 
cases or situations. A particular model or analysis may in fact be used 
by the Services to determine the period of time that can be considered 
the foreseeable future. However, this will not always be the case. In 
some instances, a model's time horizon may fall short of how far into 
the future the Services can foresee; and in other instances, a model 
may extend out to a point at which the model's predictions become 
speculative or highly uncertain. In both cases, the time period covered 
by the particular model would not dictate the time period for what the 
Services consider to be ``foreseeable.'' In addition, even if a model 
is considered reliable, it may not be possible to limit the time 
horizon considered in the status review based on what one particular 
model or analysis indicates as a reasonable period of time. When we 
review a species' status over the foreseeable future, we must take all 
available data into account. In other words, while we fully agree that 
reliable predictions based on quantitative models should not be 
ignored, those quantitative models may not in themselves establish what 
constitutes the ``foreseeable future'' for the entire species or every 
threat. They may simply reflect possible, but not likely, outcomes.
    Comment: Multiple commenters stated that foreseeable-future 
timeframes are very uncertain with respect to forecasted climate-change 
impacts and that additional clarifications or modifications to the 
proposed ``foreseeable future'' framework are needed. Various 
commenters stated that there is too much uncertainty associated with 
foreseeable futures that extend too far (e.g., 100 years) and that the 
foreseeable future should be shorter (e.g., 10 years, 25-30 years). 
Commenters, citing Congressional reports, stated that Congress intended 
the foreseeable future to be in the near future. Commenters provided 
various suggested approaches or parameters that would dictate how far 
the foreseeable future could extend, such as using three generation 
lengths for long-lived species, and considering threats in light of the 
biology of the species (e.g., long generation versus short generation 
lengths). Commenters stated that if predictions are too speculative, 
then the Services cannot give the species the benefit of the doubt and 
must acknowledge that listing the species is not warranted. Lastly, 
commenters requested that NMFS align its procedures for determining 
foreseeable future with those of the FWS, particularly regarding 
incorporation of uncertainty in climate models and other elements.
    Response: We acknowledge that levels of uncertainty can increase 
the further into the future that climate-change impacts are projected. 
The magnitude of this increase in uncertainty over time will vary from 
case to case depending on the available data for the particular issues 
at hand. Nevertheless, we must carefully consider the available data 
and the levels of uncertainty, make a reasoned conclusion, and explain 
that conclusion in a transparent way in our proposed and final listing 
determinations. Our regulatory framework for the ``foreseeable future'' 
does not undermine these requirements.
    For these reasons, we do not agree that a predetermined period of 
years is appropriate in order to minimize uncertainty when making 
threatened species listing determinations. Including such a time limit 
in the foreseeable future regulation would be arbitrary and would 
preclude the Services from meeting the best-available-data standard 
required under section 4 of the Act. Furthermore, as noted in the M-
Opinion, Congress purposefully did not set a timeframe for the 
Secretary's consideration of whether a species was likely to become an 
endangered species, nor did Congress intend that the Secretary set a 
uniform timeframe. Thus, we do not intend to specify one in the 
regulatory framework being finalized in this document.
    We conclude that it is generally appropriate to consider the 
foreseeable future in light of the particular species' biology. This 
principle is explicitly embedded in the regulatory framework for the 
foreseeable future, which states: ``The Services will describe the 
foreseeable future on a case-by-case basis, using the best available 
data and taking into account considerations such as the species' life-
history characteristics, threat-projection timeframes, and 
environmental variability.''
    We agree that listing decisions cannot be based on speculation. As 
stated in our proposed rule, ``the foreseeable future can extend only 
as far as the Services can reasonably depend on the available data to 
formulate a reliable prediction and avoid speculation and 
preconception.'' 83 FR 35195, 35196, July 25, 2018. Our ``foreseeable 
future'' framework is explicit in this respect, because it states that 
foreseeable future extends only so far into the future as we can 
reasonably determine that both the future threats and the species' 
responses to those threats ``are likely.'' However, we note that as 
long as that standard is met, we are not required to wait to make 
listing determinations until better or more-concrete science is 
available, and that the Act requires that we base our decision on the 
best available data. See, e.g., San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water 
Authority v. Jewell, 747 F.3d 581, 602 (9th Cir. 2014) (``best 
available'' standard does not require perfection or best information 
possible) (citing Building Indus. Ass'n v. Norton, 247 F.3d 1241, 1246 
(D.C. Cir. 2001)); Alaska v. Lubchenco, 825 F. Supp. 2d 209, 223 
(D.D.C. 2011) (same); Maine v. Norton, 257 F. Supp. 2d 357, 389 (D. Me. 
2003) (noting that the ``best available'' standard ``is not a standard 
of absolute certainty''). By the same token, we acknowledge that the 
precautionary principle does not apply to listing determinations, so we 
do not list species merely as a precaution if there is not reliable 
evidence indicating that the species meets the definition of a 
``threatened species.'' E.g., Center for Biological Diversity v. 
Lubchenco, 758 F. Supp. 2d 945, 955 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (finding the 
``benefit of the doubt'' concept does not apply in the listing 
context); Trout Unlimited v. Lohn, 645 F. Supp. 2d 929, 947 (D. Or. 
2007).
    Lastly, as the two Services agree to these principles and have 
worked cooperatively to develop this rule, we find that the two 
Services have already largely aligned their approaches. Any apparent 
differences in outcomes stem from species-specific considerations 
rather than from having different interpretations of the statute.
    Comment: A few commenters stated that, although a uniform 
``foreseeable future'' time period should not be applied to all 
species, the Services must identify the period of foreseeability for 
each operative threat and the species' response to that threat. A 
commenter also stated the Services should be specific regarding what 
time period they are using for a particular decision and that, absent 
that information, their decisions will be extremely unclear, 
unpredictable, and difficult to review.
    Response: We agree that status reviews and listing determinations 
should transparently discuss the time horizons over which any analyses 
were conducted, threats were evaluated, and/or species' responses were 
projected. However, it is not always possible or even necessary in 
every circumstance to define the ``foreseeable future'' as a particular 
number of years. As stated in the M-Opinion: ``In some cases, 
quantifying the foreseeable future in terms of years may add rigor and 
transparency to the Secretary's analysis

[[Page 45032]]

if such information is available. Such definitive quantification, 
however, is rarely possible and not required for a `foreseeable future' 
analysis.'' (M-37021, January 16, 2009). Ultimately, although the 
Secretary has broad discretion to determine what is foreseeable, this 
discretion is exercised based on the best scientific and commercial 
data available and is subject to review in accordance with the 
applicable standards of the Act and the Administrative Procedure Act.
    Comment: Multiple commenters stated that the Services must modify 
the definition of the ``foreseeable future'' such that healthy, viable 
species are not listed as threatened species. Another commenter stated 
that the Services should only rarely list currently viable, stable 
species as threatened so that their resources can be more appropriately 
focused on species already in need of conservation. Commenters also 
stated that the Services should not list healthy species, like polar 
bears and ice seals, based on speculation or on the possibility of a 
future threat. Multiple commenters stated that Congress intended that 
only species experiencing current threats that are affecting their 
population numbers may be considered for listing and stated that a 
species must already be experiencing the effects of a threat and be 
``depleted in numbers'' to be considered for listing as threatened. 
Commenters also asserted that the Ninth Circuit's interpretation in 
Alaska Oil & Gas Assoc. v. Pritzker, 840 F.3d 671, 683 (9th Cir. 2016) 
was an illogical result of the potential application of the Act to 
every species based on the possibility that climate-related threats may 
pose some effect at some remote future time. Commenters noted this 
Congressional intent is also reflected by the definition of 
``conservation'' in section 3 of the Act, which they noted clearly does 
not apply to a healthy species that is not being affected by present 
threats to its existence because it would not be possible to ``bring'' 
that species ``to the point'' where the protections of the Act ``are no 
longer necessary.''
    Response: We agree that we cannot list a species as threatened due 
to speculation about future declines of that species; however, it does 
not follow that listing a species as threatened under the Act requires 
that a decline has already begun. If the best available scientific and 
commercial data allow us to make a reliable prediction (as opposed to 
speculating) that a not-yet-begun decline makes it likely that the 
species will become in danger of extinction, then that species meets 
the definition of a threatened species. In other words, the Services 
need not wait until a species has reached a particular tipping point if 
the best available data indicate the threats the species currently 
faces will result in it likely becoming an endangered species within 
the foreseeable future. Furthermore, the Services cannot ignore the 
threats a species faces even if the species has not yet begun to 
decline. Some species may also exhibit nonlinear changes in their 
population levels. For example, some species are vulnerable, due to 
demographic factors affecting their abundance, productivity, or other 
reasons, to sudden ecological regime shifts, which can cause population 
collapse even though population declines had not been previously 
evident.
    Lastly, we do not agree with the suggestion that the definition of 
``conservation'' in section 3 of the Act reflects an intention by 
Congress that only species with declining abundances be listed under 
the Act. The Act defines ``conserve,'' ``conserving,'' and 
``conservation'' as ``to use and the use of all methods and procedures 
which are necessary to bring any endangered species or threatened 
species to the point at which the measures provided pursuant to this 
Act are no longer necessary.'' A species that is properly listed due to 
reliable predictions of future declines can benefit from conservation 
methods and procedures that will forestall or ameliorate that decline. 
If successful, such conservation measures will eventually no longer be 
necessary, the species will no longer be ``likely to become an 
endangered species,'' and the species can be delisted. Listing a 
species as threatened due to future declines that are foreseeable is 
thus completely compatible with the definition of ``conservation.''
    Comment: Multiple commenters expressed concern that under the 
proposed ``foreseeable future'' framework the Services would consider 
climate change as a hypothetical and not a ``probable'' threat or would 
otherwise ignore the best available science on climate change. 
Commenters stated that under the proposed definition of ``foreseeable 
future,'' the Services could arbitrarily cite climate change as a 
justification to avoid species protections if none of the specific 
projections reaches the 50 percent ``probability'' threshold due to 
uncertainty stemming from environmental variability. They further 
stated that the regulations should instead be explicit that the best 
available science regarding the ``foreseeable future'' must include 
climate-change and ocean-acidification projections as well as any 
studies regarding what those projections will mean for both specific 
species and larger ecosystems. The commenters stated that the Services 
must consider the associated ranges of probabilities and uncertainties 
as best science even though they do not present a single likelihood of 
any particular impact. Commenters further noted that oftentimes there 
is high confidence in the directionality of a climate trend or impact 
(e.g., sea-level rise), even when there is lower confidence in the rate 
or ultimate magnitude of the change, and that under the proposed 
definition of ``foreseeable future'' it would be possible to dismiss 
such projections by focusing on the uncertainty in rate instead of the 
certainty in trend.
    Response: Consistent with our longstanding practice, in all 
classification decisions we will consider the best available science 
and evaluate impacts to the species that may result from changing 
climate within the foreseeable future. Also consistent with our 
standard practice and per the Act's section 4(a)(1) factors for 
listing, we will consider what the particular climate-related 
predictions mean in terms of impacts on the species as well as impacts 
on the larger ecosystem. In reviewing and applying the best available 
data in our foreseeable future framework, we will also consider the 
ranges of probabilities and uncertainties associated with the available 
data, and we will not arbitrarily dismiss reliable aspects of various 
climate change predictions or projections (e.g., directionality) even 
if other aspects (e.g., rate of change) have greater levels of 
uncertainty. We will take all of the available climate change data into 
consideration when making a reasonable determination regarding the 
foreseeable future and the status of the species in the foreseeable 
future.
    Comment: Numerous commenters expressed concern regarding how the 
Services will address uncertainty and reliability under the proposed 
foreseeable future framework when models are used. Commenters noted 
that models used to project future conditions are often flawed by the 
inclusion of too few factors, or the exclusion of factors that may be 
unknown or not fully known, and that models can be manipulated. 
Therefore, commenters recommended that explanatory language should 
state that models must be identified as such and data inputs used to 
construct them must be listed, and that model outputs do not constitute 
data in and of themselves. Other commenters stated that models often 
cannot provide reliable

[[Page 45033]]

predictions of future conditions at narrow geographical scales or on 
short time horizons sufficient to support specific conclusions about 
the future condition of species or habitat at precise locations. The 
commenters specifically noted that, in withdrawing their proposed rule 
to list the wolverine as threatened, the FWS recognized the significant 
disagreement and uncertainty regarding the accuracy of localized 
climate change projections for a species' habitat or population 
persistence (79 FR 47522, 47533; August 13, 2014). In contrast, other 
commenters stated the Services can rely on models even if they are not 
perfect, and that, under the proposed approach, species will 
impermissibly be left without protection until the science is developed 
enough to establish with ``reasonable certainty'' that they will be in 
danger of extinction.
    Response: We agree that, when models are applied in a status 
review, we should provide detailed, explanatory language to describe 
the particular data sources and inputs used to construct the model. We 
will also strive to explicitly describe the assumptions, limitations, 
and relevant measures of uncertainty associated with the particular 
models. However, it is important to note that models can often provide 
useful and robust predictions even in the absence of certain variables 
or data. Thus, the Services may consider, among other sources of 
scientific data, models that are not ``perfect'' or do not indicate a 
``reasonable certainty'' of a species being in danger of extinction. 
Indeed, nothing in the framework we have set forth for determining the 
``foreseeable future'' we adopt is designed or intended to require 
``reasonable certainty'' of a species being in danger of extinction in 
the foreseeable future before it may be listed as threatened. Models 
are analytical tools that can be applied to better understand complex 
datasets. We will continue to use various types of analytical tools, as 
appropriate and as transparently as possible, when conducting status 
reviews. We conclude that the requirement to use the ``best available'' 
data means that we cannot insist that information must be free from all 
uncertainty, and further agree that the Act's protections should not be 
withheld until a species' status has declined to the point that the 
future risk of extinction is certain.
    With respect to the comment regarding the degree of spatial and 
temporal precision of models, we agree that models will not always 
support specific conclusions about the future condition of species or 
habitat at fine scales or in precise locations. As stated previously, 
in reaching any conclusions regarding the foreseeable future or the 
extinction risk of a particular species, we will apply model results 
only to the extent that we have determined they are the best available 
data and they are relevant.
    Comment: A few commenters stated that ``professional judgment'' is 
ambiguous terminology and there is no clear indication on when use of 
professional judgment is considered appropriate. Some commenters 
expressed concern that subjectivity and opinion would take the place of 
data where gaps exist in the available science, and one commenter noted 
that the use of best professional judgment does not relieve the 
Services of their statutory duty to make listing determinations 
``solely on the basis of the best scientific and commercial data 
available.'' One commenter recommended adopting guidance requiring that 
experts provide their credentials demonstrating their expertise and 
that their detailed recommendations be made available to the public.
    Response: These comments refer to a discussion in the proposed rule 
regarding the types of data that may inform what is ``foreseeable.'' 
Specifically, we stated that, depending on the nature and quality of 
the available data, ``predictions regarding the future status of a 
particular species may be based on analyses that range in form from 
quantitative population-viability models and modelling of threats to 
qualitative analyses describing how threats will affect the status of 
the species. In some circumstances, such analyses may include reliance 
on the exercise of professional judgment by experts where 
appropriate.'' (83 FR 35193, July 25, 2018).
    This discussion was intended to clarify that the data underlying 
any ``foreseeable future'' could take several forms and that it would 
not, for example, exclusively depend on quantitative analysis. 
Professional judgment is not used in place of the best available 
scientific or commercial data; it is used when there are gaps in such 
data that require scientific interpretation to address. We note that 
when professional judgment is applied, it should be done transparently 
and in accordance with applicable standards.
    Comment: Multiple commenters raised concerns regarding what 
constitutes the ``best available scientific and commercial data'' in 
establishing a probable foreseeable future and requested we further 
clarify the term and its use. Several commenters stated it is 
imperative that the data considered during the listing process be made 
available to the public, and that any assumptions made are disclosed in 
a transparent manner. One commenter stated that the FWS has 
inconsistently applied standards for what constitutes the best 
available science and suggested that, to avoid interference with the 
application of the best available data, the words ``the Services'' 
should be replaced with ``the Services' biologists.'' We also received 
a request to insert the words ``scientific and commercial'' into the 
phrase ``best available data'' within the foreseeable future regulatory 
text. Lastly one commenter noted that the proposed rule fails to 
provide clarifying language regarding what constitutes ``commercial 
data'' and expressed concern that this could open the door to an over-
reliance on the use of potentially biased and non-peer-reviewed data 
for listing and delisting decisions.
    Response: Multiple requirements have already been established to 
guide the Services' use and application of the best available data and 
provide sufficient guidance on this topic. For example, the Information 
Quality Act (IQA, Pub. L. 106-554), agency policy directives for 
implementing the IQA (e.g., NMFS Policy Directive 04-108, June 2012, 
and FWS Information Quality Guidelines, June 2012; and the Office of 
Management and Budget's (OMB's) Final Information Quality Bulletin for 
Peer Review (M-05-03, December 16, 2004) guide the Services in ensuring 
and maximizing the quality, objectivity, utility, and integrity of 
information (including statistical information) disseminated by the 
Services. In addition, the Services comply with the policy memorandum 
issued on February 22, 2013, by the Office of Science and Technology 
Policy regarding public access to federally funded research results. 
That memorandum establishes a set of principles to guide Federal 
agencies in providing access to and archiving results of Federal or 
federally funded research. Lastly, as a matter of practice, the 
Services' status reviews are subjected to both peer and public review 
before they are relied upon in a final listing determination. Overall, 
we find these existing requirements sufficient to ensure the quality, 
integrity, and accessibility of the data used by the Services in 
support of their listing decisions.
    To ensure status reviews and listing decisions are transparently 
based on the best available scientific and commercial data, we fully 
disclose any assumptions made. The Services consider this to be a 
standard best practice. Additionally, the Services make available cited

[[Page 45034]]

literature that is used in listing rules and that are not already 
publicly available, taking into account issues of intellectual property 
law, copyright, and open access.
    We decline to specify in our regulations that the Services' 
biologists make any determination of what constitutes the best 
available data. The proposed wording change is both unnecessary and in 
conflict with the statute. In practice, it is the Services' biologists 
that gather, review, and synthesize the best available data, but as the 
statute clearly requires, the Secretary must make the ultimate 
determination regarding whether species meet the definition of a 
threatened or endangered species.
    Likewise, we decline to make the requested insertion of the words 
``scientific and commercial'' into the regulatory framework for the 
foreseeable future, which we had originally omitted for conciseness and 
readability. The addition of these words is unnecessary, because the 
Services are held to the requirement to rely on the best ``scientific 
and commercial data'' under section 4(b)(1)(A) of the Act. The 
regulatory foreseeable future framework does not alter this statutory 
requirement in any way.
    We also decline to add clarifying language to the regulations 
regarding the term ``commercial data,'' and we disagree that the 
absence of such language may lead to reliance on potentially biased and 
non-peer-reviewed data for listing and delisting decisions. The term 
``commercial data'' is used in the statute and, as clearly indicated by 
the legislative history, this term refers to trade data such as 
commercial harvest and landings data. See H.R. Rep. 97-657 (H.R. Rep. 
No. 567, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1982, 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2807, 1982 WL 
25083) at 20. While those data are not subject to a peer review process 
equivalent to the process applied to published scientific literature 
articles, the statute clearly allows the Services to consider them. 
When doing so, the Services apply their own assessment of the nature, 
quality, and limitations of the data, and use the data only to the 
extent appropriate. Furthermore, when commercial data are used, the 
Services discuss their application and interpretation of the data 
transparently and subject that interpretation to both peer and public 
review.
    Comment: Some commenters noted that, while they generally support 
the proposed changes to the regulations regarding the foreseeable 
future, the general framework for making threatened determinations 
would benefit from additional specific criteria. In particular, they 
requested that the framework require that the best available scientific 
and commercial data demonstrate that listing the species as threatened 
would have a measurable beneficial effect.
    Response: The suggested change is not consistent with the statute. 
Section 4(a)(1) sets out the factors by which the Secretaries may 
determine a species is threatened or endangered. These factors do not 
include a category that allows for or requires consideration of the 
beneficial effect of the listing. Therefore, we have no basis for 
requiring that a species listing have some measurable benefit in order 
for that species to receive the protections of the Act.
    Comment: Some commenters stated that the Services should provide 
additional clarification on how they will address future projections 
associated with a species' life-history characteristics and demographic 
factors, as well as divergent projections associated with each threat-
projection timeframe. The commenters stated that the Services should 
further explain how species' responses will be predicted and should 
explicitly state that the adaptability and resilience of a species to 
each operative threat will also be considered. The commenters 
specifically noted that adaptability and resilience are important 
considerations when contemplating the risk of extinction in relation to 
loss of range. Another commenter stated that, while they appreciate 
that the proposed foreseeable future framework takes into account 
considerations such as the species' life-history characteristics, 
threat-projection timeframes, and environmental variability, they 
recommended adding additional considerations, such as changes in 
climatic characteristics, phenology, geographic ranges, and home range 
sizes of some species, which can be particularly informative in the 
face of global changes to climate for which the only reference 
condition is the past.
    Response: As we indicated in the proposed rule, how we analyze and 
predict species' responses to threats will vary from case to case. For 
example, in data-rich cases, population viability analyses may be used 
to predict species' responses, whereas in data-poor situations, we will 
likely conduct a qualitative risk assessment. In all cases, species' 
likely responses to particular threats will be evaluated using the best 
data available for that species.
    We can and do take factors such as climate, adaptability, 
resilience, phenology, and home-range sizes into account when assessing 
a species' status into the foreseeable future. It is our longstanding 
practice to take such types of information into account, as 
appropriate, when conducting status reviews. The foreseeable future 
framework refers to several categories of considerations (i.e., ``such 
as life-history characteristics, threat-projection timeframes, and 
environmental variability'') as examples of relevant factors that will 
inform how far into the future the foreseeable future extends for a 
particular species. The framework does not exclude other relevant 
considerations. Thus, we conclude that additional revisions to 
foreseeable future framework are not necessary.

Comments on Delisting

    Comment: Several commenters agreed with the proposal that the 
criteria for determining whether a species qualifies for protection 
under the Act are the same whether the context is a potential decision 
to delist or the initial decision whether to list a species. Numerous 
commenters stated that the standard for delisting a species should be 
higher than for listing a species; thus, the Services have a higher 
burden in proving that a listed species has recovered such that it can 
be delisted than they have in listing the species in the first 
instance. Further, some stated that under the precautionary principle 
embodied in the Act, scientific uncertainty must be considered 
differently in the context of delistings and downlistings versus 
initial listings. Many commenters stated that the precautionary 
principle embodied in the Act necessarily means that, once a species is 
listed, a subsequent reversal of that conclusion must be specifically 
supported by evidence that explains why the species no longer meets the 
definition associated with its prior listing.
    Response: The standard for a decision to delist a species is the 
same as the standard for a decision not to list it in the first 
instance. This approach is consistent with the statute, under which the 
five-factor analysis in section 4(a)(1) and the definitions of 
``endangered species'' and ``threatened species'' in sections 3(6) and 
3(20) establish the parameters for both listing and delisting 
determinations without distinguishing between them. The Services 
determine whether species meet the definitions of a ``threatened 
species'' or an ``endangered species'' based on the best scientific and 
commercial data available. We must consider the best available 
scientific data the same way regardless of whether it is in the context 
of delistings and downlistings versus initial listings. This 
interpretation is

[[Page 45035]]

consistent with the Services' longstanding practice and the decision in 
Friends of Blackwater v. Salazar, 691 F.3d 428 (D.C. Cir. 2012). That 
decision confirms that, when reviewing whether a listed species should 
be delisted, the Services must apply the factors in section 4(a) of the 
Act. 691 F.3d at 433 (upholding FWS's decision to delist the West 
Virginia northern flying squirrel because the agency was not required 
to demonstrate that all of the recovery plan criteria had been met 
before it could delist the species and it was reasonable to construe 
the recovery plan as predictive of the delisting analysis rather than 
controlling it). In that case, the court held that ``Section 4(a)(1) of 
the Act provides the Secretary `shall' consider the five statutory 
factors when determining whether a species is endangered, and section 
4(c) makes clear that a decision to delist `shall be made in 
accordance' with the same five factors.'' Id. at 432. Therefore, we 
have finalized the proposed change.
    Comment: Some commenters stated that the only ``standard'' 
articulated in the proposed regulations is that the species ``shall be 
listed or reclassified if the Secretary determines on the basis of the 
best scientific and commercial data available after conducting a review 
of the species' status, that the species meets the definition of an 
endangered species or a threatened species.'' Further, they stated that 
a decision to delist a species is not made against a blank slate. 
Rather, it is made in light of a prior factual determination by the 
Service. Therefore, the Services must explain and factually 
substantiate the departure from that prior determination. In making a 
new evaluation of a species' status, the Services cannot base their 
decision only on the available scientific and commercial data but must 
also consider their prior determination and substantiate the reasons 
for departing from their prior conclusions. An agency must provide ``a 
more detailed justification'' when it makes a decision that ``rests 
upon factual findings that contradict'' its prior findings. A failure 
to do so violates the Administrative Procedure Act.
    Response: The Act defines ``threatened species'' and ``endangered 
species'' and directs the Services to make determinations regarding 
whether a species is threatened or endangered based upon the best 
available scientific and commercial data. This determination requires 
the Services to take into account all material in the record, including 
prior findings and the discussion of facts supporting those findings, 
and discuss how the newly available information has led to different 
conclusions in a transparent manner.
    The underlying obligation of the Services to articulate a rational 
connection between their decisions and facts in the record is the same 
regardless of the context of the determination being made (listing or 
delisting). Of course, where there is substantial information in the 
record that a listed species is likely to face a continuing threat, 
this responsibility is particularly acute. See Greater Yellowstone 
Coalition, Inc. v. Servheen, 665 F.3d 1015, 1030 (9th Cir. 2011) 
(holding that, in particular circumstance where strong evidence of 
continuing threat to species was documented in the record, the Act's 
policy of ``institutionalized caution'' required that FWS explain why 
delisting the species was appropriate in face of the uncertainty 
regarding the extent of the threat).
    Comment: Several commenters stated that the removal of recovery as 
one of the reasons for delisting is in direct conflict with the main 
stated purpose of the Act and will allow the Services to delist species 
before they are recovered. They also stated that the Services have 
failed to adequately explain the purpose of removing the word 
``recovery'' from Sec.  424.11(d)(2). They noted the only reasoning 
provided in the proposed rule was to align with statutory definitions 
of endangered and threatened species. The Services did not explain how 
removing this word creates better alignment.
    Response: We note that the Act does not use the term `recovery' or 
`recovered' when referring to removing a species from the list. Rather, 
a species is removed from the list when it does not meet the definition 
of an endangered species or threatened species. Furthermore, the 
Services do not agree that this change will allow species to be 
delisted before they are recovered. The Services will continue to use 
the best scientific and commercial data available to make 
determinations as to whether species meet the definition of an 
endangered species or a threatened species. If a review of a listed 
species indicates a species does not meet either definition, the 
Services will propose the species for delisting. Likewise if, following 
a review, a listed species is determined to still meet the definition 
of an endangered or a threatened species, the Services would not 
propose the species for delisting. Thus, this revision in no way 
conflicts with the intention of the Act.
    The Services removed the reference to ``recovery'' from Sec.  
424.11(d)(2) because the existing regulatory language, which was 
intended to provide examples of when a species should be removed from 
the lists, has been, in some instances, misinterpreted as establishing 
criteria for delisting. Although we are removing the word ``recovery'' 
from this section, the language will continue to include species that 
have recovered, because recovered species would no longer meet the 
definition of either an ``endangered species'' or a ``threatened 
species.'' However, the Services reiterate that the goal of the Act and 
the Services is to recover threatened and endangered species.
    Comment: Some commenters objected to the removal of recovery from 
Sec.  424.11 and stated the proposed rule appeared to circumvent 
recovery plans and improperly make section 4(f) of the Act meaningless. 
Additionally, they stated that removing this provision disconnects 
recovery from species recovery plans that in turn guide State-level 
actions and are effective means to address recovery. They argued the 
Services should include a discussion of recovery and recovery plans as 
part of this change and consider if protections are in place to support 
continued recovery of the species into the future.
    Response: This change does not make recovery meaningless. Section 
4(f) requires the development of recovery plans for most listed 
species. Recovery plans are a key component in conservation planning 
and provide an important roadmap for a species' recovery. This 
provision does not undermine the importance or effectiveness of 
recovery plans. Recovery plans will continue to guide the Services' 
recovery efforts.
    Comment: A commenter expressed concern that the proposed addition 
of new paragraph (e) to Sec.  424.11 would circumvent the requirement 
that delisting decisions must be made based on the best science and 
data available at the time of the decision. The commenter argued that 
the proposed revisions would allow for delisting based solely upon 
achieving any recovery criteria identified at the time of listing, even 
if this occurs prior to the attainment of the plan's recovery criteria 
and without regard to current information.
    Response: The Services are required to make delisting 
determinations based upon the best scientific and commercial data 
available at the time the determination is made. When the Services 
determine whether a species meets the definition of a ``threatened 
species'' or ``endangered species,'' they will rely upon the best 
available data. The Services will continue to review all relevant 
information when making a delisting determination, including whether 
the recovery criteria have been achieved. Recovery plans provide

[[Page 45036]]

important guidance to the Services, States, and other partners on 
methods of minimizing threats to listed species and measurable 
objectives against which to measure progress towards recovery, but they 
are not regulatory documents. A decision to revise the status of a 
species or remove a species from the List is ultimately based on an 
analysis of the best scientific and commercial data available to 
determine whether a species is no longer an endangered species or a 
threatened species, regardless of whether that information differs from 
the recovery plan.
    Comment: Some commenters suggested that the Services clarify that 
delisting decisions are not contingent upon the satisfaction of a 
recovery plan. Others requested that the proposed revision at 50 CFR 
424.11 also explicitly specify that species should be considered for 
delisting when the original recovery objective (i.e., target population 
goal) in the species' recovery plan is met.
    Response: The Services conclude that further clarification in this 
regard is not necessary. As noted in the proposed rule, the Services' 
intention is to clarify that the standard for whether a species merits 
protection under the Act should be applied consistently whether the 
context is potential listing or potential delisting. Thus, delisting 
decisions are not contingent upon the satisfaction of a recovery plan 
for that species. This interpretation is consistent with the Services' 
longstanding practice and the decision in Friends of Blackwater v. 
Salazar, 691 F.3d 428 (D.C. Cir. 2012). That decision confirms that, 
when reviewing whether a listed species should be delisted, the 
Services must apply the factors in section 4(a) of the Act. 691 F.3d at 
433 (upholding FWS's decision to delist the West Virginia northern 
flying squirrel because the agency was not required to demonstrate that 
all of the recovery plan criteria had been met before it could delist 
the species and it was reasonable to construe the recovery plan as 
predictive of the delisting analysis rather than controlling it). In 
that case, the court held that ``Section 4(a)(1) of the Act provides 
the Secretary `shall' consider the five statutory factors when 
determining whether a species is endangered, and section 4(c) makes 
clear that a decision to delist `shall be made in accordance' with the 
same five factors.'' Id. at 432. The Services will delist a species 
when, based upon the best available scientific and commercial data, 
they determine the species no longer meets the definition of a 
threatened or endangered species.
    Comment: Several commenters stated that removing the requirement 
that the data substantiate that the species is no longer endangered or 
threatened lowers the bar for delisting a species and will promote 
delisting species before they are actually recovered. Several 
commenters stated that the Services' proposed revisions to drop the 
requirement that data ``substantiate'' any delisting decision would 
strip listed species of the Act's protections and contravene the policy 
of ``institutionalized caution'' Congress adopted in enacting the Act. 
Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. at 194.
    Response: The Services do not agree that removing this language 
will lower the bar for delisting species and allow them to be delisted 
before they have recovered. As required by the Act, the Services make 
determinations as to whether species warrant listing, including 
decisions to remove species from the lists of threatened or endangered 
species, based on the best scientific and commercial data available. 
The Services will not proceed with a delisting determination unless the 
best scientific and commercial data support that conclusion. Because 
the statutory standard for delisting is whether a species meets the 
definition of a threatened or endangered species based on the best 
scientific and commercial data available, it is not necessary to have a 
separate requirement that the data substantiate that the species is no 
longer threatened or endangered. Therefore, removing the requirement 
that the data substantiate that the species is no longer endangered or 
threatened does not contravene the policy of institutionalized caution 
because, before making a determination to delist a species, the 
Services are already required to assess the best scientific and 
commercial data available about the status of the species, threats it 
may face, the adequacy of regulatory mechanisms, and the effectiveness 
of any conservation efforts.
    Comment: Some commenters stated that the Services inappropriately 
propose to be allowed to delist a species by simply reinterpreting data 
that were used to make the original listing determination.
    Response: In proposing this change, the Services attempted to 
address any ambiguities in the regulatory text by simplifying this 
provision and returning to the underlying statutory standard. In order 
to delist a species, the Services must evaluate the best scientific and 
commercial data available at the time a determination to delist a 
species is made. They must review all information that is available and 
may not limit their inquiry to the interpretation of data that were 
used to make the original listing determination. However, if the best 
available data supports reinterpreting the data used in the original 
listing determination, the Services may do so.
    Comment: Several commenters stated that the proposed revision to 
the regulation addressing delisting based on extinction provides no 
rationale for weakening the informational requirements imposed by the 
current regulations. They stated that the language describing the 
period of time that must pass before a species can be delisted due to 
extinction should be retained because it allows for consistent 
implementation of the Act and provides clarity to the public. 
Additionally, some commenters stated that the proposed changes stating 
that evidence may include survey information is inconsistent with the 
precautionary approach that should be used when protecting imperiled 
species. Others stated that criteria should be developed for 
determining ``extinction'' or defining the term ``extinct'' for 
purposes of removing a species from the list due to extinction.
    Response: The Services modified the text in this section because 
the Services' conclusion that a species is extinct will be based on the 
best scientific and commercial data available, as required under 
section 4(b)(1)(A). That decision may include, among other things, 
survey data and information regarding the period since the last 
documented occurrence or sighting of the species. We will make each 
determination on a case-by-case basis, considering the species-specific 
biological evidence for species extinction. We find it is more 
consistent with the statute to acknowledge this overarching obligation 
that all classification decisions must use the best available 
scientific and commercial data than to highlight only certain kinds of 
information as the current regulatory provision does. A determination 
that a species is ``extinct'' will be based on the best scientific and 
commercial data available, as required under section 4(b)(1)(A), 
according to the common understanding of the term.
    Comment: Some commenters supported the provision related to 
delisting due to extinction, but requested that the Services add 
another section to this provision that would state that, when a species 
that was extinct in one area is reintroduced into an area, the 
reintroduced species can be managed to protect the new ecosystem that 
developed in the absence of the extinct species.
    Response: The Services decline to add the proposed section. There 
are other

[[Page 45037]]

provisions of the Act, such as section 10(j), that govern the 
introduction of populations back into areas where they no longer exist, 
and that issue is therefore beyond the scope of the regulations 
implementing section 4 of the Act.
    Comment: Some commenters requested the Services add the term 
``extirpated'' in addition to ``extinct.'' They suggested this addition 
would be useful in cases where a particular species may be extirpated 
from a region or local area without being fully extinct from an 
adjoining State or region.
    Response: The Services decline to add ``extirpated'' to this 
section of the regulations. This provision of the regulations, and the 
Services' modifications to this section of the regulations, govern 
factors considered in delisting species. Extirpation of a population of 
a listed species from a particular area is not the equivalent of a 
species being extinct nor a valid reason to remove the species from the 
lists of threatened and endangered species.
    Comment: Several commenters opposed the clarification that listed 
entities would be delisted if they do not meet the definition of 
``species'' because they believe it is an effort to give the Services 
additional tools not to list species in need of listing and protection 
of the Act. Others argued that the proposed language would allow the 
Services to provide less or no protection to some populations within a 
larger species. And still others argued that, while it is true that new 
information could suggest a currently listed species is not a taxonomic 
species or subspecies, new science is not always definitive. Those 
commenters stated the proposed language could lead the Services to move 
prematurely to delist a species based on new information that may be 
inadequate, or later proved to be inaccurate, without any evaluation of 
whether the particular population in question is a threatened or 
endangered distinct population segment (DPS) of the new taxonomic 
subspecies or species into which the new evidence places it.
    Response: This provision merely reflects the text and intent of the 
Act, i.e., only ``species,'' as defined in section 3 of the Act, may be 
listed under the Act. If the Services determine that a group of 
organisms on the list does not constitute a ``species,'' then the 
listing is contrary to the Act, and the Services may initiate 
rulemaking procedures to delist the entity. We note that the Services 
may choose to consider whether there is an alternative, valid basis for 
listing some or all of the listed entity before finalizing a delisting. 
For example, in some circumstances, for vertebrate species, if the 
constituent vertebrate populations constitute DPSs, they may be 
separately listed. This does not preclude the Services from considering 
whether a valid ``species,'' comprising some or all of the organisms 
covered by the delisted entity, warrants listing as a threatened or 
endangered ``species.''
    This provision would apply if new information, or a new analysis of 
existing information, leads the Secretary to determine that a currently 
listed entity is not a taxonomic species, subspecies, or a DPS. When, 
after the time of listing, the Services conclude that a species or 
subspecies should no longer be recognized as a valid taxonomic entity, 
the listed entity should be removed from the list because it no longer 
meets the Act's definition of a ``species.'' In other instances, new 
data could indicate that a particular listed DPS does not meet the 
criteria of the Services' Policy Regarding the Recognition of Distinct 
Vertebrate Population Segments Under the Endangered Species Act (``DPS 
Policy''; 61 FR 4722, February 7, 1996). In either circumstance, the 
entity would not qualify for listing under the Act.
    Contrary to one of the comments, this provision would not allow 
some populations to be delisted while others remain listed if the 
combination of populations still meets the definition of a ``species'' 
and that species meets the definition of ``threatened species'' or 
``endangered species.'' The courts have made clear that, before 
delisting any DPS of a listed species, the Services must consider how 
the delisting will affect other members of the listed entity. E.g., 
Humane Soc'y of the U.S. v. Zinke, 865 F.3d 585, 602 (D.C. Cir. 2017) 
(holding that the delisting of the Western Great Lakes DPS of the grey 
wolf was invalid because FWS had failed to consider ``whether both the 
segment and the remainder of the already-listed wolves would have 
mutually independent statuses as species''); Crow Indian Tribe v. 
U.S.A., 343 F. Supp. 3d 999, 1014 (D. Mont. 2018) (delisting of the 
Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem population of grizzly was invalid because 
FWS had failed to consider how delisting would affect the remainder).
    The Services agree that new scientific data or information is not 
necessarily more definitive, and we acknowledge that scientific and 
taxonomic data are always evolving. Delisting a species following a 
determination that it no longer meets the definition of a species will 
only be undertaken after a rigorous review of the best available 
scientific and commercial data, and a proposed and final rulemaking 
process.
    Comment: Some commenters opposed the provision regarding delisting 
when an entity does not meet the definition of a ``species,'' because 
they are concerned the change would allow the Services to retroactively 
reanalyze original listing information and decide that a species, 
evolutionarily significant unit, or DPS no longer requires protection 
based on political factors.
    Response: The Services' determination that a species no longer 
meets the definition of a species must be based on the best available 
scientific and commercial data. Even under the current regulations 
(current 50 CFR 424.11(d)(3)), the Services have the ability to delist 
when the entity is found not to qualify as a listable entity. The 
Services do not intend the regulatory language change to allow for 
listing determinations to be based on anything but the statutory 
standard.
    Comment: Some commenters opposed delisting a species when it does 
not meet the definition of a ``species'' because they believe it will 
increase litigation and result in continuous listings, delistings, and 
relistings by focusing on how a species is defined rather than the 
species' status.
    Response: Under the current regulations, we have authority to 
delist entities that do not meet the definition of a ``species'' under 
the Act, so the language does not change our requirements in this 
regard. Acting consistently with the Act in this way allows the 
Services to focus their resources on recovering species that are 
threatened or endangered. If a species, subspecies, or DPS no longer 
meets the Act's definition of a ``species,'' it should be removed from 
the list so the Services can focus their resources on species most in 
need.
    Comment: Some commenters opposed delisting based on a listed entity 
not meeting the definition of ``species'' because they argued many 
taxonomic changes have been made in recent years based solely on DNA 
information and analysis. They argued that, while DNA analysis is a 
good tool, it has limitations and is still subjective in regard to 
distinct species because our taxonomic system is subject to human 
error.
    Response: As stated above, new information is not always 
definitive. The Services' determinations identifying species, 
subspecies, and DPSs are not typically made solely on the basis of DNA 
analyses. Determinations that a listed entity does not meet the 
definition of ``species'' will be based on the best available 
scientific and commercial data.

[[Page 45038]]

    Comment: Some commenters stated that delisting an entity when it 
does not meet the definition of ``species'' would allow the Services to 
forgo considering whether the taxonomic subspecies or species of which 
the Service now believes the entity to be a part must now be considered 
threatened or endangered in a significant portion of its range based on 
the status of that population.
    Response: This provision will not allow the Services to delist one 
or more populations of a species or subspecies without considering 
whether the species or subspecies is threatened or endangered 
throughout all or a significant portion of its range. As discussed 
earlier, the courts have made clear that, before delisting a population 
of a listed species, the Services must consider how the delisting will 
affect other members of the listed species.
    Comment: Several commenters objected to delisting a species when it 
does not meet the definition of ``species'' because they believe it 
would result in leaving highly imperiled populations at risk of a gap 
in the Act's protections merely because of a taxonomic 
reclassification.
    Response: Delisting a species when it does not meet the definition 
of a ``species'' under the Act would not leave imperiled populations 
that otherwise would merit listing at risk. This provision refers to 
taxonomic reclassifications. If a particular entity no longer meets the 
Act's definition of a species, that entity would not qualify for 
listing under the Act.
    Comment: Some commenters opposed delisting a species when it does 
not meet the definition of ``species'' because they believe it is 
unnecessary. They stated this type of taxonomic information would come 
out in a species assessment using the five factors. They argued the 
taxonomic proposal is duplicative, in that it singles out one issue for 
specific treatment, when it is already covered by the broader language 
of Sec.  424.11(e)(2). Further, some stated that, in addition to the 
regulatory change, the Services should also consider adopting objective 
standards and criteria for the Services' taxonomic determinations.
    Response: The Services conclude that this provision provides a 
helpful clarification of the basis for delisting a species. 
Specifically, if an entity is not a ``species'' within the meaning of 
the Act, then, by definition, it cannot be a ``threatened species'' or 
``endangered species.'' The Services will make their determinations 
based on the best available scientific information for determining 
whether a group of organisms is a species, subspecies, or DPS. The 
Services joint DPS Policy (61 FR 4722, February 7, 1996) already 
provides sufficient criteria and standards when determining whether 
vertebrate species are DPSs. In order to be designated a DPS, 
vertebrate populations must be discrete and significant to the taxon as 
a whole.
    Comment: Some commenters were concerned that recovery actions that 
mix genes of a DPS with other populations of the taxon, or 
significantly modify the distribution of the DPS, may inadvertently 
undermine protections of the Act. That outcome may occur if the 
proposed rule allows for the interpretation that a DPS for which 
recovery actions have modified genetic makeup or distribution is no 
longer discrete or significant and therefore does not meet the species 
definition required for protection under the Act.
    Response: We understand the commenter's concern; however, if a 
population or set of populations qualify as a DPS under the two 
criteria set out in the DPS Policy it is extremely unlikely that a 
situation such as described by the commenter would arise, and it is not 
the Services' intention to create such situations. Secondly, if, 
through the process of recovery, a listed DPS begins mixing or 
interbreeding with other populations of that taxon such that it no 
longer met the DPS criteria, the Services could still evaluate whether 
that altered or larger entity is a ``species'' at risk of extinction 
and that warrants listing under the Act. As with any listing and 
delisting determination, the Services would base any such determination 
on the best available scientific and commercial data and after 
conducting a status review of the particular ``species.''
    Comment: Several commenters stated that the reference to data in 
error as a reason for delisting should be retained because it is 
important for the public to know when an error has been made. Other 
commenters stated its removal is unnecessary and was not justified by 
the Services. They also requested the following be added as a fourth 
fact for delisting as 50 CFR 424.11(e)(4): ``The best scientific or 
commercial data available when the species was listed, or the 
interpretation of such data, were in error.''
    Response: The Services have determined this provision is 
unnecessary because the other delisting factors being finalized in this 
rule, including whether the listed entity meets the definition of 
``species'' or a determination that a species meets the definition of a 
``threatened species'' or ``endangered species,'' adequately capture 
instances in which a species was listed due to an error in the data, or 
in the interpretation of that data, at the time of the original 
classification. Furthermore, our delisting rules will clearly contain 
the rationale and justification for our proposed and final actions; if 
a species were listed in error, these rules would provide the requested 
transparency to the public. The Services had also rarely invoked the 
prior Sec.  424.11(e)(3) due to confusion about when it should apply, 
so adopting a more simple structure that tracks the foundational 
statutory standards is appropriate and will result in more transparent 
and fulsome explanations of precisely why particular species are no 
longer found to warrant protection under the Act. We have therefore 
decided not to make the requested regulatory text change.
    Comment: Some commenters stated that the revised Sec.  424.11(e) 
creates an expedited delisting process whereby a 5-year status review 
automatically leads to delisting. They suggested the proposed changes 
would trigger that automatic process for delisting, but not for 
uplisting a species.
    Response: Section 424.11(e) does not create an expedited or 
automatic delisting process following a 5-year review. Under the 
revised regulations finalized in this document, as is the case 
currently, no changes to a species' listing status will be made except 
through a rulemaking that complies with the notice and comment 
procedures of the Act. This is true regardless of whether a species is 
considered for uplisting, downlisting, or delisting.
    Comment: Some commenters suggested the introductory clause of 
proposed Sec.  424.11(e) be revised to read, ``The Secretary will 
delist a species if the Secretary, based on the best available 
scientific and commercial data available, including any information 
received in accordance with procedures set forth in Sec.  424.15 or 
Sec.  424.16(c), finds that:'' They believe this change will help 
clarify that the public will continue to have a role in reviewing, 
commenting on, and providing information concerning proposed 
delistings.
    Response: The additional language suggested by the commenter is not 
necessary. The procedures set forth in Sec.  424.15 and Sec.  424.16(c) 
relate to providing the public notice and an opportunity to review 
proposed regulations and other decisions such as identification of 
candidate species. As noted above, any determination by the Services to 
list, delist, or reclassify a species must be effectuated through the

[[Page 45039]]

rulemaking process, which provides the public the right to review and 
comment on those determinations before they are finalized.
    Comment: Some commenters suggested the Services should expressly 
permit a species to be delisted in part of its range because doing so 
would allow the Services to better tailor the protections of the Act to 
a species' conservation needs by removing unneeded protections while 
retaining protections in other parts of its range.
    Response: The Act authorizes the Services to list ``species,'' 
which includes species, subspecies, or DPSs. With regard to vertebrate 
species, the Services may determine there are DPSs within a listed 
species or subspecies. The Services may then assess the status of those 
DPSs. Should any of those DPSs be determined not to meet the definition 
of a threatened or endangered species, they could be delisted under the 
Act after the Services consider how delisting the DPS would affect the 
listed species or subspecies. This approach permits the Services to 
better tailor protections and prohibitions of the Act to the listed 
DPSs that warrant protection.
    Comment: Some commenters stated the delisting process should be 
streamlined to allow for easier removal of species once documentation 
shows they are no longer threatened or endangered.
    Response: The process that must be followed to delist or reclassify 
a species is the same as must be followed in listing a species. The 
Services are required to assess the status of a species based on the 
best available scientific and commercial data, applying the five 
factors, and engaging in the mandatory notice-and-comment rulemaking 
procedures as noted above.
    Comment: Some commenters requested that ``will'' be replaced with 
``shall'' in the first sentence of Sec.  424.11(e) to ensure the 
Services abide by the strict requirements of the Act.
    Response: The Services have made this change to make this provision 
consistent with the other paragraphs of Sec.  424.11.
    Comment: Some commenters stated that the Services should add 
conservation plans and agreements as a factor to consider in delisting 
decisions.
    Response: The Services consider conservation plans and agreements, 
as well as all other conservation efforts, in their decisions to list, 
reclassify, or delist a species. Section 4(b)(1)(A) of the Act requires 
the Secretary to make determinations solely on the basis of the best 
scientific and commercial data available after conducting a review of 
the status of the species and after taking into account those efforts, 
if any, by any State or foreign nation, or any political subdivision of 
a State or foreign nation, to protect such species when determining 
whether a species meets the definition of a ``threatened'' or 
``endangered'' species.
    Comment: Some commenters requested the regulatory text for the 
proposed delisting factors at 50 CFR 424.11(e) address these issues by 
being revised to add ``reclassify.'' They requested that the text would 
read: ``The Secretary will delist or reclassify a species if the 
Secretary finds that, after conducting a status review based on the 
best scientific and commercial data available. . . .''
    Response: As noted in the heading of 50 CFR 424.11, this section 
addresses factors for listing, delisting, and reclassifying species. 
Paragraph (e) of that section pertains only to delisting species. 
Therefore, it would not be appropriate to reclassify a species if any 
of the three findings in 50 CFR 424.11(e) are made by the Secretary. 
Reclassification is covered in existing (and revised) 50 CFR 424.11(c).
    Comment: Some commenters stated that the Services should develop 
criteria to inform the assessment of the ``adequacy'' of State or local 
regulatory programs when making a delisting or downlisting 
determination. To ensure that future delisting and downlisting 
decisions are fully explained, documented, and can proceed 
expeditiously, the Services should develop guidelines establishing the 
necessary criteria for the development, and the Services' review, of 
State and local regulatory mechanisms. They further requested the 
Services convene a working group that includes representatives of State 
and local governments and members of the regulated community to inform 
the development of the appropriate guidelines and that the Services 
make these guidelines available for public review and comment prior to 
adoption.
    Response: The Services decline to adopt or develop criteria at this 
time. The Services may in the future consider developing such criteria, 
such as in guidance.
    Comment: Some commenters stated the Act's five listing criteria are 
not particularly well suited to delisting. While they need to be 
addressed prior to delisting, they are focused on threats instead of 
recovery, and, therefore, do not provide a science-based recovery 
objective. They suggested the Services should provide recovery teams 
with additional clarity on how to identify recovery goals that are 
clear, consistent, measurable, and based on the best available science, 
in order to ensure that the long-term health and viability of recovered 
species will be maintained after they are returned to State management.
    Response: The Services decline to make revisions to these 
regulations in this regard. First, regarding the suggestion that 
section 4(a)(1) factors are not relevant to a delisting determination, 
the statute and case law are in fact clear that the section 4(a)(1) 
factors are intrinsically central to determining whether a species 
meets the definition of a ``threatened species'' or an ``endangered 
species,'' whether the question is asked in the context of a potential 
listing or a potential delisting. [See discussion above and citation to 
the Friends of Blackwater case.] In response to the suggestion to 
provide guidance to recovery teams, the Services note that they rely on 
their Joint Interim Recovery Planning Guidance to provide guidance to 
recovery teams and others on developing recovery goals.
    Comment: Some commenters stated the five listing criteria should be 
based on ``known'' data and information, instead of making assumptions 
in order to list a species.
    Response: The Services are required to make listing decisions based 
on the best available scientific and commercial data. Those data are 
not required to be free from uncertainty. We are not required to wait 
to make listing determinations until better or more concrete science is 
available, and the Act requires that we base our decision on the best 
available data. See, e.g., San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Authority v. 
Jewell, 747 F.3d 581, 602 (9th Cir. 2014) (``best available'' standard 
does not require perfection or best information possible) (citing 
Building Indus. Ass'n v. Norton, 247 F.3d 1241, 1246 (D.C. Cir. 2001)); 
Alaska v. Lubchenco, 825 F. Supp. 2d 209, 223 (D.D.C. 2011) (same); 
Maine v. Norton, 257 F. Supp.2d 357, 389 (D.Me. 2003) (noting that the 
``best available'' standard ``is not a standard of absolute 
certainty'').
    Comment: Some commenters expressed agreement that the standard and 
criteria for delisting should be no more than that for listing. The 
standards should be the same but for one exception the FWS has 
previously recognized. The commenter stated that the prioritization to 
list [sic] foreign species should be greater than for domestic listed 
species because of the lack of benefits for foreign listed species in 
the negative effects in the balance.
    Response: We assume the commenter to mean `prioritization for 
delisting',

[[Page 45040]]

rather than `list'. The Services agree that the standards for listing 
and delisting are the same. The Act does not allow the Services to use 
different standards with regard to listing domestic and foreign 
species. FWS recognizes that the benefits of listing species that are 
not under U.S. jurisdiction may be more limited than the benefits that 
domestic species realize and allocates its funding to reflect this 
difference. With the limited resources that FWS allocates to foreign 
species, we prioritize those where listing can result in conservation, 
for example, species that are in trade across U.S. borders.
    Comment: Some commenters noted that the proposed regulations 
include changes in paragraph designations and cross-references, but not 
in the substantive content of certain provisions, in particular new 
paragraphs (f) and (g). The commenter requested that these provisions 
be modified to better take into account State and foreign nation 
programs and species listings under the Convention on International 
Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) when making listing determinations.
    Response: The Services decline to make this change. Those 
provisions sufficiently take into account State and foreign programs 
and CITES listings when making listing determinations under the Act and 
do not merit revision at this time.
Comments Regarding Not Prudent Determinations Comment
    Several commenters thought the Services should retain as a basis 
for a not-prudent determination that designation of critical habitat 
for a species would not be beneficial to its conservation. Some noted 
that this approach would be consistent with legislative history and 
several court decisions that cited to the legislative history. See 
Natural Resources Council v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 113 F.3d 1121 
(9th Cir. 1997); Conservation Council of Hawaii v. Babbitt, 2 F. Supp. 
2d 1280 (D. Hawaii 1998).
    Response: The House Report for the 1978 amendments contains 
statements indicating that Congress intended for the Services to 
designate critical habitat except in those rare instances when critical 
habitat would not be ``beneficial to'' or ``in the best interests of'' 
the species. H.R. Rep. No. 97-1625, at 16-18 (1978). Consistent with 
this understanding of the authority to make not prudent findings, we 
identify in these revised regulations a number of specific 
circumstances in which we anticipate that it would not be prudent to 
designate critical habitat because it would not benefit the species. 
This final regulation includes some circumstances that were already 
captured in the current regulations at Sec.  424.12(a)(1)(ii) and some 
additional circumstances that we have identified based on our 
experience in designating critical habitat.
    Basing prudency determinations on whether particular circumstances 
are present, rather than on whether a designation would be 
``beneficial,'' provides an interpretation of the statute that is 
clearer, more transparent, and more straightforward. It also eliminates 
some confusion reflected in the courts' decisions in the NRDC and 
Conservation Council cases. In those decisions, the courts remanded the 
not prudent determinations at issue because the FWS had not articulated 
a rational connection between the facts and the agency's conclusion 
that designating critical habitat would not be beneficial for the 
species. 113 F.3d at 1125-26; 2 F. Supp. 2d at 1284. Although the 
courts held that FWS had failed to weigh the benefits and risks, or had 
failed to consider potential benefits beyond consultation benefits, the 
courts' reasoning indicates that the decisions were based on the 
insufficiency or absence of any factual analyses of the specific data 
available. The court in NRDC also found that, in implementing the 
regulations that were in place at the time, FWS had erroneously applied 
a ``beneficial to most of the species'' standard instead of a 
``beneficial to the species'' standard. Moreover, the decisions' 
reliance on the legislative history statements equating ``not prudent'' 
with ``not beneficial to the species'' is undermined by the fact that 
ultimately Congress did not choose to include the ``not beneficial to 
the species'' language as a standard or limitation in the statute.
    Further, we note that in both decisions the courts seem to have 
considered principles related to the discretionary process for weighing 
the impacts of critical habitat designation under section 4(b)(2) of 
the Act, which do not govern ``not prudent'' determinations. In part, 
this appears to be due to the courts' interpretations of statements the 
Services had made regarding their intentions in applying the regulatory 
provisions. See 113 F.3d at 1125 (citing 49 FR 38900, 38903 (1984) 
(noting that the Services would balance the risks to the species of 
designating and the benefits that might derive from designation and 
would forgo designations of critical habitat where the possible adverse 
consequences would outweigh the benefits)). We now take the opportunity 
to clarify the separate nature of ``not prudent'' designations and the 
discretionary analyses that we may elect to take under section 4(b)(2) 
of the Act. We intend these evaluations to address separate factors.
    We emphasize that determining that a species falls within one or 
more of the circumstances identified in the revised regulations does 
not bring the prudency analysis to an end. As the courts in both NRDC 
and Conservation Council found, in determining whether or not 
designation of critical habitat is prudent, the Services must take into 
account the specific factual circumstances at issue for each species. 
113 F.3d at 1125; 2 F. Supp. 2d at 1287-88. However, as we clarify 
below, this does not require the Services to engage in the type of 
area-by-area weighing process that applies under section 4(b)(2) of the 
Act.
    Comment: Numerous commenters stated that the expansion of 
circumstances when the Services may find critical habitat designation 
to be not prudent is not consistent with the Act or congressional 
intent. Commenters expressed concerns that this change will result in 
numerous species being denied the protections afforded by critical 
habitat designations. They also stated that determinations that 
critical habitat is not prudent will be much more common under the 
proposed regulations than they have been in the past, and that this is 
a major change from the current regulation.
    Response: It is permissible under the Act, as well as the current 
and revised regulations, for the Services to determine that designating 
critical habitat for a species is not prudent. See 16 U.S.C. 
1533(a)(3)(A) (directing the Secretary to designate critical habitat 
for listed species concurrent with listing that species ``to the 
maximum extent prudent and determinable''). The changes to the 
regulations are not intended to expand the circumstances in which the 
Services determine that designation of critical habitat is not prudent. 
Rather, the revisions are intended to provide clarity and specificity 
with respect to the circumstances in which it may not be prudent to 
designate critical habitat by replacing the vague phrase ``not 
beneficial.'' Congress recognized that not all listed species would be 
conserved by, or benefit from, the designation of critical habitat, but 
did not specify what those circumstances might be. While the statutory 
language allows us to forgo designating critical habitat in rare 
circumstances in which designation of critical habitat does not 
contribute to the conservation of the

[[Page 45041]]

species, the Services recognize the value of critical habitat as a 
conservation tool and expect to designate it in most cases. Therefore, 
the Services anticipate that not prudent findings will remain rare and 
would be limited to situations in which designating critical habitat 
would not further the conservation of the species.
    Comment: Several commenters stated that the Services may only 
properly make a not prudent determination if there is specific 
information that a species would be harmed by designating critical 
habitat.
    Response: Congress did not impose any such limitation on the 
Secretaries' authority to make not prudent determinations. The 
statutory language requires that the Services designate critical 
habitat ``to the maximum extent prudent.'' The Services have long 
interpreted that language to apply to a broader range of circumstances 
beyond those in which a species would be harmed by the designation. 
Other circumstances occasionally may arise where a designation is not 
wise, such as when a designation would apply additional regulation but 
not further the conservation of the species. The current regulations 
(81 FR 7414; February 11, 2016, and at 50 CFR 424.12(a)(1)) allow for a 
determination that critical habitat is not prudent for a species if 
such designation would: (1) Increase the degree of threat to the 
species through the identification of critical habitat, or (2) not be 
beneficial to the species. The determination that critical habitat is 
not prudent for a listed species is uncommon, especially because most 
species are listed, in part, because of impacts to their habitat or 
curtailment of their range. Most not prudent determinations have 
resulted from a determination that there would be increased harm or 
threats to a species through the identification of critical habitat. 
For example, if a species was highly prized for collection or trade, 
then identifying specific localities of the species could render it 
more vulnerable to collection and, therefore, further threaten it. 
However, Congress did not limit ``not prudent'' findings to those 
situations; in some circumstances, a species may be listed because of 
factors other than threats to its habitat or range, such as disease. In 
such a case, a not prudent determination may be appropriate.
    Comment: Several commenters suggested additional circumstances 
where designation may not be prudent, including when the economic and 
societal impacts outweigh the benefits to the species, when areas to be 
designated are already under Federal management for other purposes, or 
when areas are covered by a habitat conservation plan under section 
10(a)(1)(B) or other conservation plan.
    Response: Under section 4(b)(2) of the Act, the Secretaries have 
the discretion to determine whether areas should be excluded from a 
critical habitat designation if the benefits of exclusion outweigh the 
benefits of inclusion, unless the exclusion will result in the 
extinction of the species concerned. A discretionary weighing analysis 
under section 4(b)(2) can involve economic or other impacts and land 
management of the areas concerned. We note that the ``not prudent'' 
determination and any section 4(b)(2) weighing are separate processes. 
Because of the specific reference in section 4(b)(2) to weighing of 
benefits, we conclude that Congress intended the prudency language to 
address other matters, as reflected in this final regulation.
    As a result, we do not infer from the NRDC and Conservation Council 
decisions that, to determine whether or not it is prudent to designate 
critical habitat, the Services must undertake a balancing or weighing 
of benefits akin to the section 4(b)(2) analysis for determining 
whether or not to exclude specific areas from a critical habitat 
designation. We now take the opportunity to clarify the separate nature 
of ``not prudent'' designations and the discretionary analyses that we 
may elect to take under section 4(b)(2) of the Act. First, in making 
prudency determinations, the Services evaluate critical habitat 
designation as a whole for that species, while in making exclusion 
determinations under section 4(b)(2) the Services must evaluate 
specific areas. Second, as referenced earlier, unlike exclusion 
analyses under section 4(b)(2), the statute does not expressly require 
a balancing of benefits. Third, prudency determinations must be made at 
the time of listing based on the best scientific information available 
at that time, while exclusion determinations are only made if the 
Secretary first determines the boundaries of the areas that meet the 
definition of ``critical habitat.'' Based on these differences, 
prudency determinations must address different factors, on a different 
scale, based on a different set of data, and usually at a different 
time from section 4(b)(2) analyses. Indeed, a ``not prudent'' 
determination precludes the need to undertake the process of 
identifying specific areas and considering the impacts of designation 
of such specific areas under section 4(b)(2).
    Comment: Several commenters objected to the Services making a not 
prudent determination if areas within U.S. jurisdiction would provide 
only negligible conservation value to a species that occurs primarily 
outside the jurisdiction of the United States. Some expressed concern 
that ``negligible'' is vague and undefined. Some stated that this 
course of action is contrary to the plain language of the Act and does 
not consider the need for migratory or transitory areas that contribute 
to the conservation of the species.
    Response: In our 2016 revision of these regulations (81 FR 7414; 
February 11, 2016), we noted in the preamble that the consideration of 
whether areas within U.S. jurisdiction provide conservation value to a 
species that occurs in areas primarily outside U.S. jurisdiction could 
be a basis for determining that critical habitat designation would not 
be prudent (81 FR 7432; February 11, 2016). For the purposes of clarity 
and transparency, we proposed to add this consideration directly to the 
regulatory text. In the preamble to our proposed regulations, we 
explained that we would apply this determination only to species that 
primarily occur outside U.S. jurisdiction and where no areas under U.S. 
jurisdiction contain features essential to the conservation of the 
species.
    The dictionary defines ``negligible'' to mean ``so small or 
unimportant as to be not worth considering; insignificant.'' In the 
context of ``negligible conservation value'' we mean that the 
conservation value of habitats under U.S. jurisdiction would be 
insignificant to the conservation of the listed entity. The 
circumstances when a critical habitat designation would provide 
negligible conservation value for a species that primarily occurs 
outside of U.S. jurisdiction will be determined on a case-by-case 
basis, and factors such as threats to the species or its habitat and 
the species' recovery needs may be considered.
    Finally, if areas under U.S. jurisdiction are important to the 
species' conservation for migratory or transitory purposes, we expect 
that we would not make a determination that critical habitat is not 
prudent. Based on the Services' history of implementing critical 
habitat, we anticipate that not prudent determinations will continue to 
be rare.
    Comment: Some commenters suggested that critical habitat carries 
substantive and procedural benefits aside from those arising from the 
obligation to consult under section 7, even if consultation through 
section 7 is the sole regulatory mechanism for

[[Page 45042]]

protecting critical habitat under the Act. These benefits include 
educating the public and State and local governments about the 
importance of certain areas to listed species, assisting in species 
recovery planning efforts, protecting against unanticipated Federal 
actions affecting the habitat that could be important in allowing the 
species time to adapt or demonstrate possible resilience to encroaching 
effects of climate change, or establishing a uniform protection plan 
prior to consultation. They cited the decisions in NRDC and 
Conservation Council, 113 F.3d at 1121; 2 F. Supp. 2d at 1280. They 
also noted that the Services acknowledged such benefits at the time of 
adopting the prior regulations, at 81 FR 7414-7445 (Feb. 11, 2016) 
(describing ``several ways'' that critical habitat ``can contribute to 
the conservation of listed species''). In light of the myriad benefits 
of designating, the commenters assert that the threat of climate change 
actually emphasizes the importance of designating critical habitat 
rather than justifying creating an additional exception from 
designation where threats to habitat stem from climate change. They 
further urge that designation can still benefit a species even if 
section 7 alone cannot address all the threats to a species' habitat.
    Response: Although the direct benefit that the statute provides for 
designated critical habitat is through section 7 consultation, 
depending on the factual circumstances surrounding a given species, 
designating critical habitat may carry incidental additional benefits 
to the species beyond the protections from section 7 consultation. 
These regulatory revisions would not preclude us from designating 
critical habitat if any of the specific circumstances that the revised 
regulations identify, including climate change, is present--when we 
determine that designating critical habitat could still provide for the 
conservation of the species. However, through implementing the Act we 
have encountered situations in which threats to the species' habitat 
leading to endangered or threatened status stem solely from causes that 
cannot be addressed by management actions identified through 
consultations under the destruction or adverse modification standard of 
section 7(a)(2) of the Act.
    In those situations, a designation of critical habitat could create 
a regulatory burden, as well as divert resources away from listing and 
designating critical habitat for other species, without providing any 
overall conservation value to the species concerned. Examples would 
include species experiencing threats stemming from melting glaciers, 
sea level rise, or reduced snowpack but no other habitat-related 
threats. In such cases, a critical habitat designation and any 
resulting section 7(a)(2) consultation, or conservation effort 
identified through such consultation, could not ensure protection of 
the habitat. The revised regulations identify this situation as a 
circumstance in which designation of critical habitat is often not 
prudent, but determining that a species falls within this category does 
not make a not prudent finding mandatory, nor is the list of 
circumstances in which designation may not be prudent exhaustive. As we 
discussed in response to an earlier comment, in such situations (as 
with all not prudent analyses), the Services would need to take into 
account the specific factual circumstances at issue for the given 
species.
    Comment: Several commenters expressed concern that the proposed 
regulatory changes to the circumstances in which the designation of 
critical habitat would not be prudent would result in the Services not 
designating critical habitat for species threatened by climate change. 
This outcome would eliminate the possibility of designating unoccupied 
critical habitat that could provide habitat for species under a 
changing climate in the future.
    Response: The Services intend to make not prudent determinations 
only in the rare circumstance when the designation of critical habitat 
would not assist in conserving the species. For example, the Services 
might conclude that Federal action agencies could take no meaningful 
actions to address the threats to the habitat of a particular species 
that might arise from climate change. Under these circumstances, the 
Services might determine that it is not prudent to designate critical 
habitat because the designation would not be able to further the 
conservation of the species in the face of these threats, and our 
resources are better spent on other actions that assist in the 
conservation of listed species. These regulatory revisions would not 
preclude us from designating occupied or unoccupied critical habitat if 
any of the specific circumstances that the revised regulations 
identify, including climate change, is present if we determine that 
designating critical habitat could still provide for the conservation 
of the species.
    Comment: Several commenters stated that the Services should be 
required to determine that a designation is not prudent when any of the 
situations listed in the proposed regulation at Sec.  424.14(a)(1) 
exist, rather than stating that the Secretary ``may, but is not 
required to, determine that a designation would not be prudent.'' 
Others thought that use of phrases such as ``not limited to'' was too 
open-ended and would result in more not-prudent determinations. Both 
sets of commenters believe the proposed approach leaves too much 
discretion to the Services.
    Response: We recognize that some commenters would appreciate the 
greater certainty that would occur if a not prudent determination were 
mandatory rather than discretionary, while other commenters believe 
that critical habitat designation should be prudent in almost all 
cases. However, the question regarding whether designating critical 
habitat is prudent must be addressed on a case-by-case basis. Each 
species is different, and the threats they face can be complex; a one-
size-fits-all approach is not required by the statute and may not be in 
the best interests of the species. The inclusion of ``but not limited 
to'' to modify the statement ``the factors the Services may consider 
include'' allows for the consideration of circumstances where a 
determination that critical habitat is not prudent would be 
appropriate. It is important to expressly reflect this flexibility in 
the revised regulations. Any future rule that includes a not prudent 
determination will clearly lay out the Services' rationale as to why a 
not prudent determination is appropriate in that particular 
circumstance.
    In some situations, the Services may conclude, after a review of 
the best available scientific data, that a designation would 
nevertheless be prudent even in the enumerated circumstances.
    Comment: Several commenters thought the Services should simply 
delete Sec.  424.12(a)(1)(ii) instead of revising it. They further 
stated that the Act does not require that a species currently be 
threatened by habitat loss before critical habitat is designated and 
protected, and the spirit of the Act would not be served by the 
imposition of such a requirement by regulation.
    Response: The Services are finalizing the proposed revisions to 
Sec.  424.12(a)(1)(ii) because we have concluded that they will provide 
the public and the Services with a clearer, more transparent, and more 
straightforward interpretation of when it may not be prudent to 
designate critical habitat. Critical habitat is a conservation tool 
under the Act that can provide for the regulatory protection of a 
species' habitat. The previous regulations and these revisions do not 
establish a

[[Page 45043]]

requirement that a species be threatened by the modification, 
fragmentation, or curtailment of its range for critical habitat to be 
prudent to designate. However, the regulation and revisions establish a 
framework whereby if we list a species under the Act and determine 
through that process that its habitat is not threatened by destruction, 
modification, or fragmentation, or that threats to the species' habitat 
stem primarily from causes that cannot be addressed by management 
actions, then the Secretary may find that it would not be prudent to 
designate critical habitat. Examples would include species experiencing 
threats stemming from melting glaciers, sea level rise, or reduced 
snowpack but no other habitat-based threats. In such cases, a critical 
habitat designation and any resulting section 7(a)(2) consultation, or 
conservation effort identified through such consultation, could not 
ensure protection of the habitat. While this provision is intended to 
reduce the burden of regulation in rare circumstances in which 
designating critical habitat would not contribute to conserving the 
species, the Services recognize the value of critical habitat as a 
conservation tool and expect to designate it in most cases.
    Comment: Some commenters suggested that, by allowing for not 
prudent determinations where the threats stem solely from causes that 
cannot be addressed through management actions resulting from 
consultation under section 7(a)(2) of the Act, the Services would be 
pre-judging future Federal actions and outcomes of the consultations 
without basis for doing so. They cited two decisions from the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals holding that the Services may not rely on the 
availability of other protections as a basis for not carrying out the 
mandatory duty of designating critical habitat.
    Response: The Services will make a determination as to whether a 
designation of critical habitat is prudent based upon the best 
scientific data available to us at the time of listing. This 
determination includes a thorough analysis of the factors contributing 
to listing; therefore, we will be able to assess the degree to which 
these factors can be--not whether they will be--influenced by 
consultations under the destruction or adverse modification standard of 
section 7(a)(2) of the Act. In the rare circumstances in which we 
determine that the threats to the species' habitat are of such a nature 
that Federal action agencies are unable to modify or manage their 
actions such that the underlying causes posing risks to the habitat can 
be affected or influenced, then conducting consultations under the 
destruction or adverse modification standard of section 7(a)(2) of the 
Act on the impacts of the Federal action on critical habitat would not 
further the conservation of the species, and designation of critical 
habitat would be not prudent. If the best available information changes 
over time such that habitat-based human intervention is possible, we 
can designate critical habitat at that time. In reaching the conclusion 
that it may not be prudent to designate in such circumstances, we are 
not relying on the existence of other protections and thus the cited 
cases are not relevant. Our interpretation of the statutory term 
``prudent'' set forth in this rule is not contingent on there being 
other available protections.

Comments Regarding Unoccupied Critical Habitat

    Comment: Numerous commenters stated that the Services have not 
justified the proposed change from current regulations that were 
recently amended in 2016.
    Response: On May 12, 2014, the Services published a proposed rule 
revising the regulations at Sec.  424.12 (79 FR 27066), in which we 
changed the step-wise approach we had been using since 1984 to allow 
for simultaneous consideration of occupied and unoccupied habitat 
according to the definition of ``critical habitat'' in the Act. We 
finalized the rule on February 11, 2016 (81 FR 7414), eliminating the 
sequenced approach to considering occupied habitat before unoccupied 
habitat. In carrying out Executive Order 13777, ``Enforcing the 
Regulatory Reform Agenda,'' the Department of the Interior (DOI) and 
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) published 
documents in the Federal Register in summer 2017 (82 FR 28429, June 22, 
2017; 82 FR 31576, July 7, 2017) requesting public comment on how the 
agencies could implement regulatory reform and improve the efficiency 
and effectiveness of regulations. Both of these documents resulted in 
input from States, trade organizations, and private landowner groups 
indicating that the Services should go back to considering occupied 
habitat before unoccupied habitat when designating critical habitat.
    This final rule responds to those concerns as well as comments made 
on the proposed rule here by restoring the requirement that the 
Secretary will first evaluate areas occupied by the species. In 
addition, this approach furthers Congress's intent to place increased 
importance on habitat within the geographical area occupied by the 
species when it originally defined ``critical habitat'' in 1978. The 
Conference Report accompanying the amendments specified that Congress 
was defining ``critical habitat'' as ``specific areas within the 
geographical area occupied by the species at the time it is listed that 
is essential to the species conservation and requires special 
management.'' H.R. Rept. No. 95-1804 (emphasis in the original). The 
report went on to state in the paragraph that followed: ``In addition, 
the Secretary may designate critical habitat outside the geographical 
area occupied by the species at the time it is listed if he determines 
such areas are essential for the conservation of the species.''
    Comment: Returning to the sequenced approach of considering 
occupied habitat first will result in critical habitat designations 
that are not adequate to conserve species that may face range shifts 
into previously unoccupied habitat that will be species' best chance 
for survival in a rapidly changing environment as a result of climate 
change.
    Response: As the Act requires, we designate unoccupied critical 
habitat when it is essential to the conservation of the species. For 
species threatened by climate change, we will designate unoccupied 
habitat if we determine that occupied areas are inadequate to ensure 
the conservation of the species and we identify unoccupied areas that 
are essential for the conservation of the species (including that there 
is a reasonable certainty both that the area will contribute to the 
conservation of the species and that the area currently contains one or 
more of those physical or biological features essential to the 
conservation of the species).
    In specific circumstances where the best scientific data available 
indicate that a species may be shifting habitats or habitat use, it is 
permissible to include specific areas accommodating these changes in a 
designation, provided that the Services can explain why the areas meet 
the definition of ``critical habitat.'' In other words, we may find 
that an unoccupied area is currently ``essential for the conservation'' 
even though the functions the habitat is expected to provide may not be 
used by the species until a point in the future. The data and rationale 
on which such a designation is based will be clearly articulated in our 
proposed rule designating critical habitat. The Services will consider 
whether habitat is occupied or unoccupied when determining whether to 
designate it as critical habitat and use the best available scientific 
data on a case-by-

[[Page 45044]]

case basis regarding the current and future suitability of such habitat 
for recovery of the species.
    Comment: Many commenters stated that the changes to the procedures 
for designating unoccupied habitat do not adequately account for the 
species' recovery needs. Relatedly, some commenters suggested that the 
Services designate enough critical habitat at the time of listing to 
ensure that a species can recover.
    Response: Although designation of critical habitat and the 
development of recovery plans are guided by two separate provisions of 
the Act and implementing regulations, the ultimate goal of each is the 
same: To provide for the conservation of listed species. 
``Conservation'' is defined as the use of all methods and procedures 
that are necessary to bring any endangered or threatened species to the 
point at which the measures provided pursuant to the Act are no longer 
necessary, i.e., the species is recovered in accordance with Sec.  
402.02. Such methods and procedures include, but are not limited to, 
all activities associated with scientific resources management such as 
research, census, law enforcement, habitat acquisition and maintenance, 
propagation, live trapping, and transplantation, and, in the 
extraordinary case where population pressures within a given ecosystem 
cannot be otherwise relieved, may include regulated taking.
    In evaluating which areas qualify as critical habitat (subject to 
section 4(b)(2) exclusions), we follow the statutory requirements. 
Designation of critical habitat is one important tool that contributes 
to recovery, but a critical habitat designation alone may not be 
sufficient to achieve recovery. Indeed, given the limited regulatory 
role of a critical habitat designation (i.e., through section 7's 
mandate that Federal agencies avoid destruction or adverse modification 
of critical habitat), it is generally not possible for a critical 
habitat designation alone to ensure recovery. Also, we must designate 
critical habitat according to mandatory timeframes, very often prior to 
development of a formal recovery plan. See Home Builders Ass'n of 
Northern Cal. v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, 616 F.3d 983, 989-90 
(9th Cir. 2010). However, although a critical habitat designation will 
not necessarily ensure recovery, it will generally further recovery 
because the Services base the designation on the best available 
scientific data about the species' habitat needs at the time of 
designation.
    Comment: Many commenters did not agree with the Service's proposal 
that we would consider whether unoccupied areas could result in more 
efficient conservation when determining whether these areas are 
essential, for a variety of reasons. Some stated that ``less-efficient 
conservation'' is not defined and no thresholds were offered for 
determining what would be considered efficient conservation. Others 
thought this provision would grant the Services overreaching discretion 
to designate unoccupied areas that is not based on what is actually 
essential for conservation. Others stated that a decision on whether 
unoccupied areas are essential for conservation should be a scientific 
determination. Some commenters stated that the Services should not 
consider societal conflicts when designating critical habitat. They 
further stated that determining whether an area is essential for the 
survival or recovery of a species is an entirely different question 
than determining whether managing that area would be economically 
``efficient.''
    Response: Based on the confusion generated by this provision, we 
have removed the provision allowing the designation of unoccupied 
habitat where a designation limited to occupied habitat would result in 
less efficient conservation. We will only consider whether unoccupied 
areas are essential to the conservation of a species when occupied 
areas are not sufficient to conserve the species. When the Services 
propose to designate specific areas pursuant to section 3(5)(A)(ii), we 
will explain the basis for the determination, including the supporting 
data. Thus, the Services' explanation will be available for public 
comment in the context of each proposed critical habitat designation.
    Comment: Some commenters suggested that the Act requires concurrent 
consideration of potential occupied and unoccupied critical habitat 
together, based on data showing occupancy at the time of listing as 
well as at the time of designating critical habitat, which could be 
later. The commenters are concerned that, if the Services prioritize 
occupied habitat and are not designating until later in time, some 
areas that the species used to occupy at the time of listing will lose 
the opportunity for protection. They suggest this course of action 
would violate the approach of ``institutionalized caution'' mandated in 
T.V.A. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978).
    Response: As explained in the preamble to the final rule in 2016, 
the Services acknowledge that occupancy is to be determined with 
reference to where the species could be found at the time of listing. 
Where designation is taking place later in time, the Services will rely 
on evidence that was contemporaneous with the time of listing where 
possible or, where necessary, may rely on more current evidence of 
distribution if there is a reasonable basis to conclude that it 
reflects distribution at the time of listing. Thus, the Services are 
able to appropriately analyze areas for possible inclusion as occupied 
critical habitat using the touchstone of occupancy at the time of 
listing even where designation takes place later in time. This course 
of action adequately fulfills the Services' statutory mandate to 
designate critical habitat. We note that T.V.A. v. Hill was decided in 
the context of a section 7 consultation and an earlier version of the 
statute that predated even the statutory definition of ``critical 
habitat.'' The decision does not shed light on proper interpretation of 
the statutory provisions addressing designation of critical habitat.
    Comment: Several commenters were concerned that the Services must 
commit to using the best scientific data available when designating 
unoccupied areas as critical habitat.
    Response: We are mandated by the Act to use (and are committed to 
using) the best scientific data available in determining any specific 
areas as critical habitat, regardless of occupancy.
    Comment: Some commenters stated that landowner willingness is an 
undefined term and will lead to confusion and inconsistent 
implementation. They further stated that success of conserving species 
is dependent on working with non-Federal landowners, and facilitating a 
process where they would be relieved from the responsibility of 
conserving species will put an undue burden on Federal and State 
landowners.
    Response: We recognize that ``landowner willingness'' is not a 
defined term, but we are not required to define every term used in a 
preamble. Rather, it is appropriate to give such phrases their ordinary 
meaning in the context of making case-specific determinations. Given 
the varied circumstances that may be involved in designation of 
critical habitat, we conclude that it is a relevant factor to consider 
when we evaluate whether an unoccupied area is likely to contribute to 
the conservation of the species. We agree that conservation of most 
listed species is dependent on working with non-Federal landowners. 
That said, section 7 of the Act places special responsibility on 
Federal agencies to provide for the conservation of listed species. 
Therefore, it is appropriate to place more responsibility, relative to 
the

[[Page 45045]]

public generally or to private landowners, on Federal landowners to 
conserve listed species.
    Comment: Some commenters stated that the definition of 
``essential'' in the proposed regulations would limit Secretarial 
discretion to designate unoccupied areas as critical habitat.
    Response: The statute limits Secretarial discretion to designate 
unoccupied areas to when we can determine such areas are essential to 
the conservation of a species. In the final regulation we explain that 
to be a specific area that is essential to the conservation there must 
be a reasonable certainty that the area currently contains one or more 
of those physical or biological features that are essential to the 
conservation of the species. It is appropriate through regulation to 
describe the circumstances or considerations that would lead the 
Secretary to conclude that unoccupied habitat is essential. Consistent 
with the requirements of section 3(5)(A)(ii), the question of whether 
unoccupied areas are essential can be complex and include an evaluation 
of which unoccupied areas are best suited to provide for long-term 
conservation. For example, unoccupied areas might be in Federal or 
conservation ownership with willing partners already committed to 
working on restoration and reintroduction. Some unoccupied areas could 
be free of threats or face reduced threats in comparison with other 
areas. Some unoccupied areas might require fewer financial and human 
resources in order to contribute to the conservation of a species than 
other areas. These are the types of case-specific factors that could be 
considered when making a determination that we are reasonably certain 
an area will contribute to the conservation of a species.
    Comment: Numerous commenters raised issues with the proposed 
regulatory language that unoccupied areas needed to have a ``reasonable 
likelihood'' of contributing to conservation in order to be designated 
as critical habitat. Some thought this language provided too much 
deference to the willingness of the current landowner. Others raised 
concerns that the preamble language allowing the Services to use a 
lower threshold than ``likely'' to contribute to conservation would 
allow the Services too much discretion to designate unoccupied areas 
that would not be likely to contribute to species conservation and 
could lead to arbitrary decisions. Others suggested additional 
considerations of how we should determine that an area has a 
``reasonable likelihood'' of contributing to the species conservation.
    Response: In this final rule, we replace ``reasonable likelihood'' 
with ``reasonable certainty.'' As described above, in light of the 
public comments that the ``reasonable likelihood'' language was 
undefined, unclear, and could allow too much discretion to designate 
areas that would not ultimately contribute to species conservation, we 
concluded that the language of this final rule better reflects the need 
for high confidence that an area designated as unoccupied critical 
habitat will actually contribute to the conservation of the species. We 
consider the phrase ``reasonable certainty'' to confer a higher level 
of certainty than ``reasonable likelihood'' but not to require absolute 
certainty.
    Comment: Some commenters stated that the Services should require a 
higher bar for designation of unoccupied critical habitat and require 
that unoccupied habitat be ``habitable'' as is, without restoration. 
Other commenters recommended that the Services require that unoccupied 
areas contain all the physical or biological features that occupied 
habitat has in order to designate them, or, if the Services determine 
they have the authority to designate unoccupied lands that require 
restoration, they should expressly declare a policy that doing so is a 
disfavored approach, only appropriate in dire circumstances.
    Response: After considering these comments carefully, we agree that 
requiring reasonable certainty that any unoccupied area has, at the 
time of the designation, one or more of those physical or biological 
features that are essential to the conservation of the species comports 
with the language, legislative history, and purposes of the Act. 
Therefore, we have changed the regulatory text to substitute 
``reasonable certainty'' for ``reasonable likelihood'' and are 
requiring that one or more of the physical or biological features be 
present.
    Comment: Numerous commenters stated that the Services should have 
specific criteria for designating unoccupied critical habitat. They 
suggested criteria specifying: whether the area currently supports 
usable habitat for the species; the extent to which restoration may be 
needed for the area to become usable habitat; the financial and other 
resources available to accomplish any needed restoration; any landowner 
or other constraints on such restoration; how valuable the potential 
contributions will be to the biology of the species; and how likely it 
is that section 7 consultations will be triggered by Federal agency 
actions in the area.
    Response: We agree and have clarified that one or more of those 
physical or biological features essential to the conservation of the 
species must be present for an area to be designated, even an 
unoccupied area.
    Comment: A commenter recommended adding ``significantly'' to the 
last sentence of unoccupied habitat so that it reads, ``the Secretary 
must determine that there is a reasonable likelihood that the area will 
significantly contribute to the conservation of the species.''
    Response: The insertion of ``significantly'' is not necessary 
because the Act already requires unoccupied critical habitat to be 
``essential,'' and addition of the term ``significantly'' would be 
vague and unclear. Therefore, we decline to adopt the commenter's 
suggestion and will continue to rely on the statutory standard that 
unoccupied critical habitat must be ``essential for the conservation 
of'' a species.
    Comment: Some commenters suggested that the Services have not 
adequately identified a reasonable basis to shift back to the 
sequential approach for designating critical habitat (of focusing first 
on occupied habitat and then looking to unoccupied habitat only if 
limiting to the first type of habitat would be inadequate to conserve 
the species). They cited to the explanation provided by the Services in 
a 2014 rulemaking action that proposed revisions to this provision that 
indicated the Services did not believe Congress mandated this 
restriction and that such a restriction was unnecessary in light of the 
statutory limitation of designation of unoccupied areas to those that 
are ``essential'' for the species' conservation. See, e.g., 79 FR 
27066, 27073 (May 12, 2014). They stated that, in the face of such a 
definitive rejection of the approach in 2016, the Services now propose 
to revert to a version of the prior approach based merely on 
perceptions that the Services intended to designate expansive areas of 
unoccupied habitat.
    Response: The Services' preamble statements at the time of 
proposing the 2016 amendments to these regulations (in 2014) are not 
binding law, and we have explained the reasons for reconsidering these 
provisions. Even if the Services were correct in 2014 that the 
provision requiring sequencing of occupied and unoccupied habitat was 
not necessary, there was no suggestion that the prior provision had 
exceeded the Services' discretion. It is permissible for the Services 
to nevertheless reincorporate a similar provision back into the 
regulations that we have concluded is a preferable approach.

[[Page 45046]]

While we initially proposed during this rulemaking to adopt a slightly 
different approach from the one we followed prior to 2016 (in that we 
proposed to allow for designation of unoccupied areas in lieu of 
occupied areas where doing so would result in ``more efficient 
conservation,''), a number of commenters expressed concerns with that 
approach as being vague in that it introduces uncertainty and 
unpredictability into the determination and may be difficult to 
implement. After considering those comments, we concluded that the 
concept ultimately was not the best interpretation of the statute. 
Therefore, the approach in this final rule has been changed to be more 
aligned with the approach taken in the regulations prior to 2016.
    Comment: The Services should require that both (1) occupied areas 
are insufficient and (2) designation of occupied areas would result in 
less-efficient conservation.
    Response: As explained above, in response to comments that the 
``efficient conservation'' concept was vague, we have removed the 
provisions regarding ``efficient conservation.'' Thus, unoccupied areas 
can be considered for potential designation only if limiting the 
designation to occupied areas would be inadequate to ensure recovery.
    Comment: One State recommended that the Services develop a policy 
or metric to determine whether a particular area should be designated 
as critical habitat in unoccupied areas.
    Response: This final rule explains the Services' general parameters 
for designating critical habitat. The details of why a specific area is 
determined to be essential to the conservation of the species will be 
in part informed by any generalized conservation strategy that may have 
been developed for the species, which is an optional step, and clearly 
articulated in our proposed and final rules designating critical 
habitat. That determination is a fact-specific analysis and is based on 
the best available scientific data for the species and its conservation 
needs. The proposed rule for each critical habitat designation will be 
subject to public review and comment.

Comments on Geographical Area Occupied by the Species

    Comment: We received multiple comments stating that the regulatory 
definition of the ``geographical area occupied by the species'' gives 
the Services too much discretion and allows for the inclusion of areas 
that are not occupied by the species. Some commenters cited the court's 
decision in Arizona Cattlegrowers' Ass'n v. Salazar, 606 F.3d 1160, 
1166 (9th Cir. 2010), in support of this view. Some commenters 
requested that the Services revise the definition to avoid inclusion of 
areas that are only used temporarily or periodically by the species, or 
modify the definition to explicitly equate occupancy with sustained or 
regular use rather than mere presence or occurrence of the species. 
Several commenters requested we remove the term ``range'' because, as 
indicated by the statute's use of this word in section 4(c), ``range'' 
is a broader concept than ``geographical area occupied by the species'' 
and can include unoccupied areas. Some commenters requested that the 
existing definition be withdrawn.
    Response: We are not revising the regulatory definition of 
``geographical area occupied by the species'' at this time.
    Comment: Numerous commenters stated that protection of habitat is a 
key to species' survival and that the Services should not alter their 
existing definition of ``geographical area occupied by the species.'' 
Commenters stated that changing this definition could have a 
significant negative impact on habitat conservation. Multiple 
commenters stated that the existing regulatory definition should not be 
changed, because it appropriately reflects the importance of wildlife 
connectivity to the survival of migratory species in particular. Some 
comments also stated that, because the Services did not propose 
specific changes to the regulations, they could not provide meaningful 
comments regarding this regulation.
    Response: We are retaining the existing regulatory definition for 
``geographical area occupied by the species'' and are not revising the 
definition as part of this rulemaking.
    Comment: Multiple commenters stated that the current regulatory 
definition for ``geographical area occupied by the species'' 
inappropriately allows the Services to determine occupancy at the time 
of listing based on presumed migratory corridors or based on indirect 
or circumstantial evidence. Several commenters also stated that 
occupancy should be based on population-level information, and that it 
cannot be determined based on an ``occurrence'' of a species or on data 
for individual animals.
    Response: Although we requested comment on the definition of the 
phrase ``geographical area occupied by the species,'' we have decided 
not to include such a definition in the regulations at this time.
    Comment: We received comments stating that the existing regulatory 
definition for ``geographical area occupied by the species'' could be 
in conflict with the proposed changes to 50 CFR 424.12(b)(2), where the 
Secretary is given discretion to designate critical habitat ``at a 
scale determined by the Secretary to be appropriate, specific areas 
outside the geographical area occupied by the species only upon a 
determination that such areas are essential for the conservation of the 
species.'' In order to remove this conflict commenters suggested 
removing, ``Such areas may include those areas used throughout all or 
part of the species' life cycle, even if not used on a regular basis 
(e.g., migratory corridors, seasonal habitats, and habitats used 
periodically, but not solely by vagrant individuals).''
    Response: The existing regulatory definition for ``geographical 
area occupied by the species'' is not in conflict with the changes to 
50 CFR 424.12(b)(2) regarding the designation of unoccupied areas 
because areas that are not permanently occupied are still considered 
occupied for both determining the range of a species and when 
designating critical habitat. Some areas that may not be permanently 
occupied by the species may be crucial for a species to complete 
necessary phases of its life cycle. For example, terrestrial amphibians 
might only inhabit breeding ponds for a short time of year, but without 
these ponds the species would not be able to successfully reproduce.
    Comment: Some commenters stated that use of the term ``life-cycle'' 
is confusing and requires further clarification. The commenters noted 
that a species' occupancy of an area and its habitat needs from such 
area may fundamentally change depending upon the species' life-cycle 
stage, and that an area and its supporting habitat features may be 
``essential'' to conservation of the species in certain life stages, 
but not others. The commenters requested that the Services address 
these complexities by further detailing, in regulatory text, how they 
will identify the species' life-cycle stages, and habitat features for 
such life-cycle stages, requiring designation of critical habitat.
    Response: While we agree with the comment that a species' 
distribution and habitat use can change depending upon the particular 
stages in its life cycle, we disagree that additional clarification 
within our implementing regulations is required to explain how this 
possibility will affect the designation of critical habitat. The 
existing regulatory definition for

[[Page 45047]]

``geographical area occupied by the species'' makes clear that any 
areas used by the species, at any one or more stages of its life 
history, are considered ``occupied'' areas. To determine what specific 
areas within the ``geographical area occupied by the species'' meet the 
definition of critical habitat, the Services must evaluate the best 
available scientific data regarding that species' habitat requirements. 
A clear rationale, supported by the best available science, must then 
be articulated in any subsequent proposed rule to designate critical 
habitat. The nature and type of areas included in any proposed rule 
will depend on the particular species and the scientific understanding 
of that species' habitat needs during its life cycle.

Comments Related to Physical or Biological Features

    Comment: We received a number of comments in response to our 
request for feedback on the existing regulatory definition of 
``physical or biological features.'' Several commenters suggested that 
it would be preferable for the Services to return to the ``primary 
constituent elements'' approach followed since 1980 and until the 2016 
revisions to the Services' implementing regulations, which added the 
current definition, because the commenters claim that approach requires 
a higher degree of specificity in describing the attributes of critical 
habitat and is more consistent and objective than the approach codified 
in the current regulation.
    Response: While the Services understand and agree with the need for 
as much specificity in the description of the attributes of critical 
habitat as the best available scientific data allow, we conclude that 
it is neither necessary nor desirable to revive the prior approach. 
Over our three decades of experience implementing the prior regulatory 
provision, the Services found that the ``primary constituent elements'' 
terminology had unnecessarily complicated implementation of the 
statutory provision. Also, the language of the ``primary constituent 
elements'' provision was itself somewhat vague and non-specific. As 
explained when we proposed to add the regulatory definition of the term 
``physical or biological features,'' the ``primary constituent 
elements'' concept did not have a clear or consistent relationship to 
the operative statutory language--``physical or biological features'' 
(see 79 FR 27066 and 27071, May 12, 2014). In shifting away from the 
term ``primary constituent elements,'' our intent was to simplify the 
designation process and make it more transparent. We ensured continuity 
between the prior and current approaches by incorporating some of the 
previous regulatory language that had described primary constituent 
elements and emphasizing that designations should continue to be as 
specific as possible (See 81 FR 7414 and 7426, Feb. 11, 2016) (``The 
specificity of the primary constituent elements that has been discussed 
in previous designations will now be discussed in the descriptions of 
the physical or biological features essential to the conservation of 
the species.''). Because the statutory term ``physical or biological 
features'' is the operative concept under the statute, we concluded in 
our 2016 final rule (and reaffirm) that it is most efficient and 
transparent to focus on clarifying that concept rather than reintroduce 
unnecessary and complicated terminology.
    Comment: Several commenters suggested that the definition of 
physical or biological features should focus on those features that are 
``essential to the conservation of the species'' rather than those that 
``support the life-history needs of the species.'' The commenters 
stated that ``essential to the conservation of the species'' is a 
greater biological significance than ``supporting the life-history 
needs of the species'' and we should not be allowed to designate an 
area that is of lower significance than ``essential to the conservation 
of the species.''
    Response: As noted above, we have decided to clarify the term 
``physical or biological features'' to more specifically track some of 
the key statutory language from the Act's definition of ``critical 
habitat.'' We have slightly modified the defined term, which is now 
``physical or biological features essential to the conservation of the 
species.'' In doing so we have focused the definition more precisely on 
only those features that may be the basis for a designation of occupied 
critical habitat if the other conditions are met (i.e., that the 
features are found in specific areas and may require special management 
considerations or protections). We have made clear that the essential 
features are only the subset of physical or biological features that 
are necessary to support the species' life-history needs.
    Comment: Several commenters stated that the phrase ``including but 
not limited to'' in the definition of physical or biological features 
is too vague or broad and should be removed from the definition.
    Response: In defining physical and biological features and 
including this particular phrase, we provided a non-exhaustive list of 
examples of types of features and conditions that we have found to be 
essential to certain species based on experience over many years of 
designating critical habitat for a wide variety of species. The 
determination of specific features essential to the conservation of a 
particular species will be based on the best scientific data available 
and explained in the proposal to designate critical habitat for that 
species, which will be available for public comment and peer review.
    Comment: Several commenters stated that the Services should not 
include the phrase ``habitat characteristics that support ephemeral or 
dynamic habitat conditions'' as a feature that could be considered 
essential and a basis for designation under section 3(5)(A)(i) of the 
Act. They stated that the definition goes too far by allowing the 
Services to include areas that do not currently have the essential 
physical or biological features necessary for a species, and it 
improperly allows the critical habitat designation to include areas 
that may develop the essential features sometime in the future. 
Further, some stated that it is not clear what is meant by ``habitat 
characteristics that support ephemeral or dynamic habitat conditions.'' 
They stated that the language is unbounded, and the Services should 
define what is meant to support these conditions.
    Response: We decline to remove the phrase ``habitat characteristics 
that support ephemeral or dynamic habitat conditions'' from the 
definition of physical of biological features. However, our proposed 
and final rules designating critical habitat for each species always 
include a detailed explanation of how the essential features relate to 
the life-history and conservation needs of the species based on the 
best scientific data available. When considering what features are 
essential, it is sometimes necessary to allow for the dynamic nature of 
the habitat, such as seasonal variations in habitat or successional 
stages of habitat, which could consist of water flow or level changes 
throughout the year or old-growth habitat or habitat newly formed 
through disturbance events such as fire or flood events. Thus, the 
physical or biological features essential to the conservation of the 
species may include features that support the occurrence of ephemeral 
or dynamic habitat conditions. The example we gave in the 2016 final 
rule (81 FR 7430, February 11, 2016) was a species that may require 
early-successional riparian vegetation in the Southwest to breed or 
feed. Such vegetation may exist only 5 to 15 years after a local 
flooding event. The necessary features, then, may include not only the 
suitable vegetation itself,

[[Page 45048]]

but also the flooding events, topography, soil type, and flow regime, 
or a combination of these characteristics and the necessary amount of 
the characteristics that can result in the periodic occurrence of the 
suitable vegetation. The flooding event would not be a subsidiary 
characteristic, as suggested by the commenter, but would itself be a 
feature necessary for the vegetation to return. As is our general 
practice, this type of specificity regarding the features and how they 
relate to the needs of the species will be clearly explained in each 
proposed and final rule designating critical habitat.
    Comment: Several commenters suggested that we remove ``principles 
of conservation biology'' from the definition of ``physical or 
biological features.'' Further, they stated that this theory should not 
be included in regulations and it creates a higher bar than the best-
available-data standard.
    Response: The sentence that reads, ``Features may also be expressed 
in terms of relating to principles of conservation biology, such as 
patch size, distribution distances, and connectivity'' explains more 
clearly how we may identify the features. The principles of 
conservation biology are generally accepted among the scientific 
community and consistently used in species-at-risk status assessments 
and development of conservation measures and programs. We stated in the 
final rule (81 FR 7414, February 11, 2016) that, using principles of 
conservation biology such as the need for appropriate patch size, 
connectivity of habitat, dispersal ability of the species, or 
representation of populations across the range of the species, the 
Services may evaluate areas relative to the conservation needs of the 
species. The Services must identify the physical and biological 
features essential to the conservation of the species and unoccupied 
areas that are essential for the conservation of the species. When 
using this methodology to identify areas within the geographical area 
occupied by the species at the time of listing, the Services will 
expressly translate the application of the relevant principles of 
conservation biology into the articulation of the features. Aligning 
the physical and biological features identified as essential with the 
conservation needs of the species and any conservation strategy that 
may have been developed for the species allows us to develop more 
precise designations that can serve as more effective conservation 
tools, focusing conservation resources where needed and minimizing 
regulatory burdens where not necessary. Furthermore, not including 
widely accepted scientific concepts into our process and procedures for 
designating critical habitat would amount to ignoring some of the best 
available scientific data.

Comments on Required Determinations

    Comment: Many commenters stated the proposed changes are 
substantive and will have a significant impact on the environment and, 
therefore, the Services must comply with NEPA and issue either an 
environmental assessment or an environmental impact statement (EIS), 
including a robust set of alternatives. CEQ regulations state that, if 
a Federal action ``may adversely affect an endangered or threatened 
species or its habitat that has been determined to be critical under 
the'' Act, that possibility makes it more likely that the action may be 
considered significant and a full environmental review be conducted. 40 
CFR 1508.27(b)(9). Commenters stated the proposed changes constitute a 
major Federal action because there is ``the possibility that an action 
may have a significant environmental effect.'' See Citizens for Better 
Forestry v. USDA, 481 F. Supp. 2d 1059, 1087 (N.D. Cal. 2007). 
Furthermore, commenters stated the Services cannot delegate their 
authority in NEPA by asking the public for opinions regarding whether 
an EIS is or is not appropriate. Finally, the proposed changes cannot 
be considered administrative, financial, legal, technical, or 
procedural in nature and therefore do not qualify for categorical 
exclusion.
    Response: The Services have complied with NEPA by documenting their 
invocation of the categorical exclusions afforded under their relative 
procedures, including consideration as to whether the existence of any 
``extraordinary circumstances'' would preclude invoking an exclusion 
here. We have determined that this final regulation is categorically 
excluded from further NEPA review and that no extraordinary 
circumstances are present (see Required Determinations, below). We do 
not consider merely asking the public for input regarding the 
applicability of an EIS abrogating our authority in complying with the 
provisions of NEPA, and it has been our practice to do so for similar 
recent rulemakings.
    Comment: Several commenters stated that the proposed rule, if made 
final, would have significant economic impacts on small business, small 
government jurisdictions, and small organizations and therefore 
requires an initial regulatory flexibility analysis and economic 
analysis under the Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA).
    Response: We interpret the RFA, as amended, to require that Federal 
agencies evaluate the potential incremental impacts of rulemaking only 
on those entities directly regulated by the rulemaking itself and, 
therefore, not on indirectly regulated entities. Recent case law 
supports this interpretation (Small Business Association 2012, pages 
22-23). NMFS and FWS are the only entities that are directly affected 
by this rule because we are the only entities that add or remove 
species from the Lists and designate critical habitat. This rule 
pertains to the procedures for carrying out those authorities. No 
external entities, including any small businesses, small organizations, 
or small governments, will experience any direct economic impacts from 
this rule (see Required Determinations, Regulatory Flexibility Act, 
below, for certification).

General Comments

    Comment: We received many comments on topics that were not 
specifically addressed in our proposed regulatory amendments, such as 
recommendations to change our policies on DPSs and the significant 
portion of a species' range, define ``best available scientific and 
commercial information,'' modify the Services' implementation of 
section 6 of the Act, and revise the regulations at Sec.  424.19 
regarding how we consider the impacts of the designation of critical 
habitat.
    Response: The Services appreciate the many insightful comments and 
suggestions we received on various areas of section 4 implementation. 
While such input may inform the future development of additional 
regulatory amendments, policies, or guidance, we have determined at 
this time, in the interests of efficiency, to finalize the revisions 
for which we specifically proposed regulatory text or on which we 
sought particular comment (e.g., the term ``physical or biological 
features''), and to defer action on other issues until a later time. 
The Services are required only to respond to ``comments which, if true, 
. . . would require a change in [the] proposed rule,'' Am. Mining Cong. 
v. United States EPA, 907 F.2d 1179, 1188 (DC Cir. 1990) (quoting ACLU 
v. FCC, 823 F.2d 1554, 1581 (DC Cir. 1987)). Such comments constitute 
the universe of ``significant'' comments. Therefore, comments that 
pertain to issues that were not specifically addressed in our proposed 
regulatory amendments are not ``significant'' in the context of the 
proposed rule. See also Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 35 n. 
58 (DC Cir. 1977), cert. denied,

[[Page 45049]]

485 U.S. 959, 108 S.Ct. 1220, 99 L.Ed.2d 421 (1988). We are not 
responding to comments that are not ``significant.''
    Comment: Some commenters suggested that the Services should delay 
finalizing the proposed rule until the United States Supreme Court 
resolves the pending Weyerhaeuser litigation (Weyerhaeuser Co. v. U.S. 
Fish and Wildlife Service, No. 17-71 (docketed July 13, 2017)) because 
the Court's analysis of the Act's statutory framework could have 
implications for the interpretations of the proposed rule. The 
commenters suggest that waiting until spring 2019 to finalize the rule 
would allow time to digest the resulting decision, determine its 
implications for this rulemaking, and make any modifications or take 
any procedural steps that might be necessary in light of the decision.
    Response: The Services carefully evaluated the Supreme Court's 
recent opinion in the Weyerhaeuser litigation. The final rule has been 
modified in response to the decision to make clear that unoccupied 
habitat must be ``habitat,'' by requiring reasonable certainty that at 
least one physical or biological feature essential to the conservation 
of the species is present. This rule is therefore consistent with the 
Court's decision. While the Services are considering further 
clarification of the meaning of habitat through separate rulemaking, we 
find that the Services' and public's interests are served by clarifying 
the existing regulatory framework in this final rule without delay.
    Comment: Several commenters stated that the proposed regulatory 
changes to part 424 are an attempt by the Services to expand their own 
discretion and authority without congressional authorization and thus 
is neither justified nor lawful.
    Response: The amended regulations do not expand the Services' 
discretion beyond the authority provided in the Act. Rather, they 
clarify the existing process and, in some instances, narrow the 
Services' discretion when designating critical habitat based on lessons 
learned over many years of implementing the Act and relevant case law. 
The amendments synchronize the language in the implementing regulations 
with that in the Act to minimize confusion and clarify the discretion 
and authority that Congress provided to the Secretaries under the Act. 
The Services are exercising their discretion to resolve ambiguities and 
fill gaps in the statutory language, and the amended regulations are a 
permissible interpretation of the statute.
    Comment: Several commenters referred to the following statement in 
the proposed rule: ``the final rule may include revisions to any 
provisions in part 424 that are a logical outgrowth of this proposed 
rule.'' The commenters stated that any amendments adopted in the final 
rule must come from specific proposals announced in the proposed rule 
and not the Services' open-ended request for suggestions. Furthermore, 
commenters stated that if the Services make changes based on this open-
ended and vague premise, the final rule would fail the logical-
outgrowth test and be in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act 
(APA) because this outcome would deny the public and all stakeholders 
the opportunity to provide comments regarding these changes.
    Response: Although we do not necessarily agree with the commenters' 
interpretation of the APA, none of the changes we make in this final 
rule relies upon the assertion in the quoted sentence that the final 
rule may include changes to ``any provisions in part 424'' not 
addressed in the proposed rule. The regulatory changes we finalize in 
this document flow directly from the regulatory provisions in the 
proposed rule, with modifications made in response to comments as 
explained throughout this document, and from the Services' specific 
invitation for public comment on whether they should modify the 
definition of ``physical or biological features.'' We have determined 
to reserve for a later date our consideration of, and any action 
regarding, issues outside the scope of those specific provisions.
    Comment: Many commenters had concerns regarding specific proposed 
changes, calling them arbitrary and capricious and therefore in 
violation of the APA.
    Response: We do not agree with the assertion that the specific 
proposed changes to our implementing regulations are arbitrary and 
capricious. We published our proposal, detailed our proposed revised 
regulation changes, explained our rationale for changes and explicitly 
asked for public comment. We have now reviewed the public comments and 
in this final rule have provided responses to significant comments and 
made some changes in response to those comments as explained throughout 
this document. As to two issues (the definitions for ``geographical 
area occupied by the species'' and ``physical or biological 
features''), we sought specific public comment without proposing 
regulatory text. In this final rule, we have decided to address one of 
those issues (the definition of ``physical or biological features 
essential to the conservation of the species'') through minor 
regulatory edits that merely incorporate and interpret some of the 
statutory language from the Act's provision defining occupied critical 
habitat without substantively changing the meaning or process for 
identifying occupied critical habitat. We have provided the public with 
our rationale and a meaningful opportunity to comment on all aspects of 
the proposed rule. Thus, the process that we used to promulgate this 
rule complied with the applicable requirements of the APA.
    Comment: Several commenters stated that the Services have misled 
stakeholders and effectively failed to provide adequate notice and 
opportunity for public comment. The comments assert that we should 
withdraw our proposal, republish it with a more accurate and clear 
summary of the changes to the regulations and their implications, and 
provide further opportunity for public comment.
    Response: The Services have not misled stakeholders. We provided a 
60-day public comment period on the proposed rule. Following 
publication of our proposed rule, we held numerous webinars providing 
an opportunity for States, tribes, non-governmental organizations, and 
industry groups to ask questions and provide input directly to the 
Services. This process satisfies the Services' obligation to provide 
notice and comment under the APA.
    Comment: Several tribes commented that traditional ecological 
knowledge should constitute the best scientific data available and be 
used by the Services.
    Response: Traditional ecological knowledge (TEK) is important and 
useful information that can inform us as to the status of a species, 
historical and current trends, and threats that may be acting on it or 
its habitat. The Services have often used TEK to inform decisions under 
the Act regarding listings, critical habitat, and recovery. The Act 
requires that we use the best scientific and commercial data available 
to inform decisions to list a species and the best scientific data 
available to inform designation of critical habitat, and in some cases 
TEK may be included as part of what constitutes the best data 
available. However, the Services cannot predetermine, as a general 
rule, that TEK will be the best available data in every rulemaking. We 
will continue to consider TEK along with other available data, weighing 
all data appropriately in the decision process.
    Comment: A State agency requested that we codify a requirement for 
consultation with affected State wildlife management agencies, giving 
effect to

[[Page 45050]]

the statutory language contained in section 7(a)(2) of the Act to 
consult with the affected States on critical habitat designations, as 
appropriate, to interpret inconclusive information, particularly 
involving individuals.
    Response: We do not agree that additional requirements are needed 
to give effect to the statutory language in section 7(a)(2) regarding 
consulting affected States prior to designating critical habitat. The 
nature of this required consultation is already articulated in section 
4(b)(5)(A)(ii), which requires the Secretary to give actual notice of 
any proposed critical habitat designation to the appropriate State 
agencies and invite their comment on the proposed designation. The 
Services will continue to meet this requirement.

Required Determinations

Regulatory Planning and Review--Executive Orders 12866 and 13563

    Executive Order 12866 provides that the Office of Information and 
Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) in the Office of Management and Budget will 
review all significant rules. OIRA has determined that this rule is 
significant.
    Executive Order 13563 reaffirms the principles of E.O. 12866 while 
calling for improvements in the nation's regulatory system to promote 
predictability, to reduce uncertainty, and to use the best, most 
innovative, and least burdensome tools for achieving regulatory ends. 
The Executive order directs agencies to consider regulatory approaches 
that reduce burdens and maintain flexibility and freedom of choice for 
the public where these approaches are relevant, feasible, and 
consistent with regulatory objectives. E.O. 13563 emphasizes further 
that regulations must be based on the best available science and that 
the rulemaking process must allow for public participation and an open 
exchange of ideas. We have developed this rule in a manner consistent 
with these requirements. This rule is consistent with Executive Order 
13563, and in particular with the requirement of retrospective analysis 
of existing rules, designed ``to make the agency's regulatory program 
more effective or less burdensome in achieving the regulatory 
objectives.''

Executive Order 13771

    This rule is an Executive Order 13771 deregulatory action.

Regulatory Flexibility Act

    Under the Regulatory Flexibility Act (as amended by the Small 
Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA) of 1996; 5 U.S.C. 
601 et seq.), whenever a Federal agency is required to publish a notice 
of rulemaking for any proposed or final rule, it must prepare, and make 
available for public comment, a regulatory flexibility analysis that 
describes the effect of the rule on small entities (i.e., small 
businesses, small organizations, and small government jurisdictions). 
However, no regulatory flexibility analysis is required if the head of 
an agency, or his designee, certifies that the rule will not have a 
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. 
SBREFA amended the Regulatory Flexibility Act to require Federal 
agencies to provide a statement of the factual basis for certifying 
that a rule will not have a significant economic impact on a 
substantial number of small entities. The following discussion explains 
our rationale.
    This rulemaking revises and clarifies requirements for NMFS and FWS 
regarding factors for listing, delisting, or reclassifying species and 
designating critical habitat under the Endangered Species Act to 
reflect agency experience and to codify current agency practices. The 
changes to these regulations do not expand the reach of species 
protections or designations of critical habitat.
    NMFS and FWS are the only entities that are directly affected by 
this rule because we are the only entities that list species and 
designate critical habitat under the Endangered Species Act. No 
external entities, including any small businesses, small organizations, 
or small governments, will experience any economic impacts from this 
rule. At the proposed rule stage, we certified that this rule would not 
have a significant economic effect on a substantial number of small 
entities. Nothing in this final rule changes that conclusion.

Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (2 U.S.C. 1501 et seq.)

    In accordance with the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (2 U.S.C. 1501 
et seq.):
    (a) On the basis of information contained in Regulatory Flexibility 
Act, above, this rule would not ``significantly or uniquely'' affect 
small governments. We have determined and certify pursuant to the 
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act, 2 U.S.C. 1502, that this rule would not 
impose a cost of $100 million or more in any given year on local or 
State governments or private entities. A Small Government Agency Plan 
is not required. As explained above, small governments would not be 
affected because the rule would not place additional requirements on 
any city, county, or other local municipalities.
    (b) This rule would not produce a Federal mandate on State, local, 
or tribal governments or the private sector of $100 million or greater 
in any year; that is, this rule is not a ``significant regulatory 
action''' under the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act. This rule would 
impose no obligations on State, local, or tribal governments.

Takings (E.O. 12630)

    In accordance with Executive Order 12630, this rule would not have 
significant takings implications. This rule would not pertain to 
``taking'' of private property interests, nor would it directly affect 
private property. A takings implication assessment is not required 
because this rule (1) would not effectively compel a property owner to 
suffer a physical invasion of property and (2) would not deny all 
economically beneficial or productive use of the land or aquatic 
resources. This rule would substantially advance a legitimate 
government interest (conservation and recovery of endangered species 
and threatened species) and would not present a barrier to all 
reasonable and expected beneficial use of private property.

Federalism (E.O. 13132)

    In accordance with Executive Order 13132, we have considered 
whether this rule would have significant federalism effects and have 
determined that a federalism summary impact statement is not required. 
This rule pertains only to factors for listing, delisting, or 
reclassifying species and designation of critical habitat under the 
Endangered Species Act, and would not have substantial direct effects 
on the States, on the relationship between the Federal Government and 
the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among 
the various levels of government.

Civil Justice Reform (E.O. 12988)

    This rule does not unduly burden the judicial system and meets the 
applicable standards provided in sections 3(a) and 3(b)(2) of Executive 
Order 12988. This rule would clarify factors for listing, delisting, or 
reclassifying species and designation of critical habitat under the 
Endangered Species Act.

Government-to-Government Relationship With Tribes

    In accordance with Executive Order 13175 ``Consultation and 
Coordination with Indian Tribal Governments,'' the Department of the 
Interior's manual at 512 DM 2, and the Department of

[[Page 45051]]

Commerce (DOC) ``Tribal Consultation and Coordination Policy'' (May 21, 
2013), DOC Departmental Administrative Order (DAO) 218-8, and NOAA 
Administrative Order (NAO) 218-8 (April 2012), we have considered 
possible effects of this final rule on federally recognized Indian 
Tribes. Two informational webinars were held on July 31 and August 7, 
2018, to provide additional information to interested Tribes regarding 
the proposed regulations. After the opening of the public comment 
period, we received multiple requests for coordination or Government-
to-Government consultation from multiple tribes: Cowlitz Indian Tribe; 
Swinomish Indian Tribal Community; The Confederated Tribes of the Grand 
Ronde Community of Oregon; Confederated Tribes of Warm Springs, Oregon; 
Quinault Indian Nation; Makah Tribe; and the Suquamish Tribe. We 
subsequently hosted a conference call on November 15, 2018, to listen 
to Tribal concerns and answer questions about the proposed regulations. 
On March 6, 2019, Service representatives attended the Natural 
Resources Committee Meeting of the United and South and Eastern Tribes' 
Impact Week conference in Arlington (Crystal City), VA. At this 
meeting, we presented information, answered questions, and held 
discussion regarding the regulatory changes.
    The Services conclude that the changes to these implementing 
regulations make general changes to the Act's implementing regulations 
and do not directly affect specific species or Tribal lands or 
interest. These regulations streamline and clarify the processes for 
listing species and designating critical habitat and directly affect 
only the Services. With or without these regulatory revisions, the 
Services would be obligated to continue to list species and to 
designate critical habitat based on the best available data. Therefore, 
we conclude that these regulations do not have ``tribal implications'' 
under section 1(a) of E.O. 13175, and formal government-to-government 
consultation is not required by the Executive order and related 
policies of the Departments of Commerce and the Interior. We will 
continue to collaborate with Tribes on issues related to federally 
listed species and their habitats and work with them as we implement 
the provisions of the Act. See Joint Secretarial Order 3206 (``American 
Indian Tribal Rights, Federal-Tribal Trust Responsibilities, and the 
Endangered Species Act'', June 5, 1997).

Paperwork Reduction Act

    This rule does not contain any new collections of information that 
require approval by the OMB under the Paperwork Reduction Act. This 
rule will not impose recordkeeping or reporting requirements on State, 
local, or Tribal governments, individuals, businesses, or 
organizations. An agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is 
not required to respond to, a collection of information unless it 
displays a currently valid OMB control number.

National Environmental Policy Act

    We analyzed this final rule in accordance with the criteria of 
NEPA, the Department of the Interior regulations on implementation of 
NEPA (43 CFR 46.10-46.450), the Department of the Interior Manual (516 
DM 8), the NOAA Administrative Order 216-6A, and the Companion Manual, 
``Policy and Procedures for Compliance with the National Environmental 
Policy Act and Related Authorities,'' which became effective January 
13, 2017. We have determined that the final regulation is categorically 
excluded from further NEPA review and that no extraordinary 
circumstances are present. The rule qualifies for the substantially 
similar categorical exclusions set forth at 43 CFR 46.210(i) and NOAA 
Administrative Order 216-6A and Companion Manual at Appendix E 
(Exclusion G7).
    These revisions are an example of an action that is fundamentally 
administrative, legal, technical, or procedural in nature. The 
revisions go no further than to clarify the existing regulations and 
make them more consistent with the statutory language, case law, and 
plain-language standards. They are an effort to streamline and clarify 
the procedures and criteria that the Services use for listing or 
delisting species and for designating critical habitat. These revisions 
directly affect only the FWS and NMFS, which are the agencies charged 
with implementing the provisions of the statute, and they do not affect 
any specific areas. Specifically, rather than substantively changing 
the status quo, the effect of these revisions is to respond to court 
decisions and articulate the Services' understanding and practice with 
respect to the statutory provisions for listing species and designating 
critical habitat. Further, the Services must still continue to list 
species and to designate critical habitat based on the best available 
scientific information, with or without these regulatory revisions. 
Finally, none of these revisions will affect the opportunity for public 
involvement in, or outcome of, either agency's decisions on listing 
species or designating critical habitat.
    We also considered whether any ``extraordinary circumstances'' 
apply to this situation, such that the DOI categorical exclusion would 
not apply. See 43 CFR 46.215 (``Categorical Exclusions: Extraordinary 
Circumstances''). We have determined that none of the circumstances 
apply to this situation. Although the final regulations would revise 
the implementing regulations for section 4 of the Act, the effects of 
these changes would not ``have significant impacts on species listed, 
or proposed to be listed, on the List of Endangered or Threatened 
Species or have significant impacts on designated Critical Habitat for 
these species,'' as the effect of the revisions is to provide 
transparency about the Services' implementation of the Act based upon 
court decisions and the Services' understanding and practices. 
Furthermore, the revised regulations do not ``[e]stablish a precedent 
for future action or represent a decision in principle about future 
actions with potentially significant environmental effects'' (43 CFR 
46.215(e)), as any future listing, classification, or delisting 
decisions will continue to be based on the best available scientific 
information presented in a particular record. None of the extraordinary 
circumstances in 43 CFR 46.215(a) through (l) apply to the revised 
regulations in 50 CFR 17.31 or 17.71. Nor would the final regulations 
trigger any of the extraordinary circumstances under NOAA's Companion 
Manual to NAO 216-6A. This rule does not involve: (a) Adverse effects 
on human health or safety that are not negligible or discountable; (b) 
adverse effects on an area with unique environmental characteristics 
(e.g., wetlands and floodplains, national marine sanctuaries, or marine 
national monuments) that are not negligible or discountable; (c) 
adverse effects on species or habitats protected by the ESA, the MMPA, 
the MSA, NMSA, or the Migratory Bird Treaty Act that are not negligible 
or discountable; (d) the potential to generate, use, store, transport, 
or dispose of hazardous or toxic substances, in a manner that may have 
a significant effect on the environment; (e) adverse effects on 
properties listed or eligible for listing on the National Register of 
Historic Places authorized by the National Historic Preservation Act of 
1966, National Historic Landmarks designated by the Secretary of the 
Interior, or National Monuments designated through the Antiquities Act 
of 1906; Federally

[[Page 45052]]

recognized Tribal and Native Alaskan lands, cultural or natural 
resources, or religious or cultural sites that cannot be resolved 
through applicable regulatory processes; (f) a disproportionately high 
and adverse effect on the health or the environment of minority or low-
income communities, compared to the impacts on other communities; (g) 
contribution to the introduction, continued existence, or spread of 
noxious weeds or nonnative invasive species known to occur in the area 
or actions that may promote the introduction, growth, or expansion of 
the range of the species; (h) a potential violation of Federal, State, 
or local law or requirements imposed for protection of the environment; 
(i) highly controversial environmental effects; (j) the potential to 
establish a precedent for future action or an action that represents a 
decision; in principle about future actions with potentially 
significant environmental effects; (k) environmental effects that are 
uncertain, unique, or unknown; or (l) the potential for significant 
cumulative impacts when the proposed action is combined with other 
past, present and reasonably foreseeable future actions, even though 
the impacts of the proposed action may not be significant by 
themselves.
    FWS completed an Environmental Action Statement, which NOAA adopts, 
explaining the basis for invoking the agencies' substantially similar 
categorical exclusions for the regulatory revisions to 50 CFR 424.02, 
424.11 and 424.12. The environmental action statement is available at 
http://www.regulations.gov in Docket No. FWS-HQ-ES-2018-0006.

Energy Supply, Distribution or Use (E.O. 13211)

    Executive Order 13211 requires agencies to prepare statements of 
energy effects when undertaking certain actions. The revised 
regulations are not expected to affect energy supplies, distribution, 
and use. Therefore, this action is a not a significant energy action, 
and no Statement of Energy Effects is required.

Authority

    We issue this rule under the authority of the Endangered Species 
Act, as amended (16 U.S.C. 1531 et seq.).

List of Subjects in 50 CFR Part 424

    Administrative practice and procedure, Endangered and threatened 
species.

Regulation Promulgation

    For the reasons set out in the preamble, we hereby amend part 424, 
subchapter A of chapter IV, title 50 of the Code of Federal 
Regulations, as set forth below:

PART 424--LISTING ENDANGERED AND THREATENED SPECIES AND DESIGNATING 
CRITICAL HABITAT

0
1. The authority citation for part 424 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 16 U.S.C. 1531 et seq.


0
2. Amend Sec.  424.02 by removing the definition of ``Physical or 
biological features'' and in its place adding a definition for 
``Physical or biological features essential to the conservation of the 
species'' to read as follows:


Sec.  424.02   Definitions.

* * * * *
    Physical or biological features essential to the conservation of 
the species. The features that occur in specific areas and that are 
essential to support the life-history needs of the species, including 
but not limited to, water characteristics, soil type, geological 
features, sites, prey, vegetation, symbiotic species, or other 
features. A feature may be a single habitat characteristic, or a more 
complex combination of habitat characteristics. Features may include 
habitat characteristics that support ephemeral or dynamic habitat 
conditions. Features may also be expressed in terms relating to 
principles of conservation biology, such as patch size, distribution 
distances, and connectivity.
* * * * *

0
3. Amend Sec.  424.11 by revising paragraphs (b) through (f) and adding 
paragraph (g) to read as follows:


Sec.  424.11   Factors for listing, delisting, or reclassifying 
species.

* * * * *
    (b) The Secretary shall make any determination required by 
paragraphs (c), (d), and (e) of this section solely on the basis of the 
best available scientific and commercial information regarding a 
species' status.
    (c) A species shall be listed or reclassified if the Secretary 
determines, on the basis of the best scientific and commercial data 
available after conducting a review of the species' status, that the 
species meets the definition of an endangered species or a threatened 
species because of any one or a combination of the following factors:
    (1) The present or threatened destruction, modification, or 
curtailment of its habitat or range;
    (2) Overutilization for commercial, recreational, scientific, or 
educational purposes;
    (3) Disease or predation;
    (4) The inadequacy of existing regulatory mechanisms; or
    (5) Other natural or manmade factors affecting its continued 
existence.
    (d) In determining whether a species is a threatened species, the 
Services must analyze whether the species is likely to become an 
endangered species within the foreseeable future. The term foreseeable 
future extends only so far into the future as the Services can 
reasonably determine that both the future threats and the species' 
responses to those threats are likely. The Services will describe the 
foreseeable future on a case-by-case basis, using the best available 
data and taking into account considerations such as the species' life-
history characteristics, threat-projection timeframes, and 
environmental variability. The Services need not identify the 
foreseeable future in terms of a specific period of time.
    (e) The Secretary shall delist a species if the Secretary finds 
that, after conducting a status review based on the best scientific and 
commercial data available:
    (1) The species is extinct;
    (2) The species does not meet the definition of an endangered 
species or a threatened species. In making such a determination, the 
Secretary shall consider the same factors and apply the same standards 
set forth in paragraph (c) of this section regarding listing and 
reclassification; or
    (3) The listed entity does not meet the statutory definition of a 
species.
    (f) The fact that a species of fish, wildlife, or plant is 
protected by the Convention on International Trade in Endangered 
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (see part 23 of this title) or a 
similar international agreement on such species, or has been identified 
as requiring protection from unrestricted commerce by any foreign 
nation, or to be in danger of extinction or likely to become so within 
the foreseeable future by any State agency or by any agency of a 
foreign nation that is responsible for the conservation of fish, 
wildlife, or plants, may constitute evidence that the species is 
endangered or threatened. The weight given such evidence will vary 
depending on the international agreement in question, the criteria 
pursuant to which the species is eligible for protection under such 
authorities, and the degree of protection afforded the species. The 
Secretary shall give consideration to any species protected under such 
an international agreement, or by any State or foreign nation, to 
determine whether the species is endangered or threatened.

[[Page 45053]]

    (g) The Secretary shall take into account, in making determinations 
under paragraph (c) or (e) of this section, those efforts, if any, 
being made by any State or foreign nation, or any political subdivision 
of a State or foreign nation, to protect such species, whether by 
predator control, protection of habitat and food supply, or other 
conservation practices, within any area under its jurisdiction, or on 
the high seas.

0
4. Amend Sec.  424.12 by revising paragraphs (a)(1) and (b)(2) to read 
as follows:


Sec.  424.12   Criteria for designating critical habitat.

    (a) * * *
    (1) The Secretary may, but is not required to, determine that a 
designation would not be prudent in the following circumstances:
    (i) The species is threatened by taking or other human activity and 
identification of critical habitat can be expected to increase the 
degree of such threat to the species;
    (ii) The present or threatened destruction, modification, or 
curtailment of a species' habitat or range is not a threat to the 
species, or threats to the species' habitat stem solely from causes 
that cannot be addressed through management actions resulting from 
consultations under section 7(a)(2) of the Act;
    (iii) Areas within the jurisdiction of the United States provide no 
more than negligible conservation value, if any, for a species 
occurring primarily outside the jurisdiction of the United States;
    (iv) No areas meet the definition of critical habitat; or
    (v) The Secretary otherwise determines that designation of critical 
habitat would not be prudent based on the best scientific data 
available.
* * * * *
    (b) * * *
    (2) The Secretary will designate as critical habitat, at a scale 
determined by the Secretary to be appropriate, specific areas outside 
the geographical area occupied by the species only upon a determination 
that such areas are essential for the conservation of the species. When 
designating critical habitat, the Secretary will first evaluate areas 
occupied by the species. The Secretary will only consider unoccupied 
areas to be essential where a critical habitat designation limited to 
geographical areas occupied would be inadequate to ensure the 
conservation of the species. In addition, for an unoccupied area to be 
considered essential, the Secretary must determine that there is a 
reasonable certainty both that the area will contribute to the 
conservation of the species and that the area contains one or more of 
those physical or biological features essential to the conservation of 
the species.
* * * * *

    Dated: August 12, 2019.
David L. Bernhardt,
Secretary, Department of the Interior.
    Dated: August 9, 2019.
Wilbur Ross,
Secretary, Department of Commerce.
[FR Doc. 2019-17518 Filed 8-26-19; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 4333-15-P