[Federal Register Volume 84, Number 154 (Friday, August 9, 2019)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 39684-39722]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2019-16600]
[[Page 39683]]
Vol. 84
Friday,
No. 154
August 9, 2019
Part IV
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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10 CFR Parts 50 and 52
Mitigation of Beyond-Design-Basis Events; Rule
Federal Register / Vol. 84 , No. 154 / Friday, August 9, 2019 / Rules
and Regulations
[[Page 39684]]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
10 CFR Parts 50 and 52
[Docket Nos. PRM-50-96, PRM-50-97, PRM-50-98, PRM-50-100, PRM-50-101,
and PRM-50-102; NRC-2011-0069, NRC-2011-0189, and NRC-2014-0240]
RIN 3150-AJ49
Mitigation of Beyond-Design-Basis Events
AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
ACTION: Final rule.
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SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is amending its
regulations that establish regulatory requirements for nuclear power
reactor applicants and licensees to mitigate beyond-design-basis
events. The NRC is making generically applicable the requirements in
NRC orders for mitigation of beyond-design-basis events and for
reliable spent fuel pool instrumentation (SFPI). This rule also
addresses a number of petitions for rulemaking (PRMs) submitted to the
NRC following the March 2011 Fukushima Dai-ichi event. This rulemaking
is applicable to power reactor licensees and power reactor license
applicants.
DATES: This final rule is effective on September 9, 2019.
ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID NRC-2014-0240 when contacting the
NRC about the availability of information for this action. You may
obtain publicly-available information related to this action by any of
the following methods:
Federal Rulemaking Website: Go to http://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2014-0240. Address
questions about NRC dockets to Carol Gallagher; telephone: 301-415-
3463; email: [email protected]. For technical questions, contact
the individuals listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section
of this document.
NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System
(ADAMS): You may obtain publicly-available documents online in the
ADAMS Public Documents collection at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To begin the search, select ``ADAMS Public Documents'' and
then select ``Begin Web-based ADAMS Search.'' For problems with ADAMS,
please contact the NRC's Public Document Room (PDR) reference staff at
1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737, or by email to [email protected]. For
the convenience of the reader, instructions about obtaining materials
referenced in this document are provided in the ``Availability of
Documents'' section.
NRC's PDR: You may examine and purchase copies of public
documents at the NRC's PDR, Room O1-F21, One White Flint North, 11555
Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Timothy Reed, Office of Nuclear
Reactor Regulation, telephone: 301-415-1462, email:
[email protected]; or Eric Bowman, Office of Nuclear Reactor
Regulation, telephone: 301-415-2963, email: [email protected]. Both
are staff of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC
20555-0001.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION
Executive Summary
A. Need for the Regulatory Action
The NRC is amending its regulations to establish regulatory
requirements for nuclear power reactor applicants and licensees to
mitigate beyond-design-basis events. This rule makes NRC Order EA-12-
049, ``Order Modifying Licenses With Regard to Requirements for
Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events''
(Mitigation Strategies Order), and Order EA-12-051, ``Order Modifying
Licenses with Regard to Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation''
(SFPI Order), generically applicable; establishes regulatory
requirements for documentation of changes; and addresses a number of
PRMs submitted to the NRC following the March 2011 Fukushima Dai-ichi
event. This rule is applicable to power reactor licensees and power
reactor license applicants. The NRC conducted this rulemaking to amend
the regulations to reflect requirements imposed on current licensees by
order and to reflect the lessons learned from the Fukushima Dai-ichi
event.
B. Major Provisions
Major provisions of this rule include the following amendments or
additions to parts 50 and 52 of title 10 of the Code of Federal
Regulations (10 CFR):
Revise the 10 CFR part 50 ``Contents of applications;
technical information'' and 10 CFR part 52 ``Contents of applications;
additional technical information'' requirements to reflect the
additional information that would be required for applications.
Add Sec. 50.155, which contains beyond-design-basis
mitigation requirements that make the Mitigation Strategies and SFPI
Orders generically applicable.
C. Costs and Benefits
The NRC prepared a regulatory analysis to determine the expected
costs and benefits of this Mitigation of Beyond-Design-Basis Events
(MBDBE) final rule (MBDBE rule). The analysis examines the costs and
benefits of the rule requirements relative to the baseline case (i.e.,
no action alternative, which equates to implementation of the
Mitigation Strategies and SFPI Orders without this final rule being
issued). The final rule encompasses provisions that are either
completed or being implemented at this time under the Mitigation
Strategies Order and the SFPI Order. Because the NRC uses a no action
baseline to estimate incremental costs, the total cost of the rule is
estimated to be approximately $110,000 per site. The net present value
of these costs per site is approximately $110,000 using a 7 percent
discount rate. This incremental cost is primarily attributed to
licensees' efforts to review the rule against the previous
implementation of the Mitigation Strategies and SFPI Orders and make
any additional changes to plant programs and procedures. The final rule
is expected to result in a total one-time cost of approximately $7.2
million. The net present value of these costs is approximately $7.2
million using a 7 percent discount rate even though the MBDBE
requirements have largely been implemented prior to the effective date
of the rule under the requirements in the Mitigation Strategies Order
and the SFPI Order.
Based on the NRC's assessment of the costs and benefits of the
rule, the NRC has concluded that the MBDBE rule is justified. For more
information, please see the regulatory analysis.
As required by Sec. 50.109, ``Backfitting,'' (the Backfit Rule)
and Sec. 52.98, ``Finality of combined licenses; information
requests,'' a backfitting and issue finality assessment was prepared.
This document presents the reasons why the MBDBE rule provisions, with
one exception, do not constitute backfits and are consistent with issue
finality. The one instance of inconsistency with the issue finality
provisions of Sec. 52.98 is due to a correction to a drafting error in
the former Sec. 50.54(hh)(3), renumbered in this rulemaking as Sec.
50.54(hh)(2), which was intended to remove the requirements of Sec.
50.54(hh) upon the submittal of the certifications of permanent
cessation of operation and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor
vessel. This rulemaking corrects the citation of the requirements for
these certifications from Sec. 52.110(a)(1) to Sec. 52.110(a) in
order to include both the certification of permanent cessation of
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operations and the certification of permanent removal of fuel from the
reactor vessel. Further details are provided in Section X, ``Backing
and Issue Finality,'' of this document.
Table of Contents
I. Background
A. Fukushima Dai-ichi
B. Near-Term Task Force
C. Implementation of the Near-Term Task Force Recommendations
D. Consolidation of Regulatory Efforts
II. Opportunities for Public Involvement
III. Petitions for Rulemaking
IV. Public Comments and Changes to the Rule
V. Discussion
VI. Section-by-Section Analysis
VII. Regulatory Flexibility Certification
VIII. Availability of Regulatory Analysis
IX. Availability of Guidance
X. Backfitting and Issue Finality
XI. Cumulative Effects of Regulation
XII. Plain Writing
XIII. Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant
Environmental Impact
XIV. Paperwork Reduction Act
XV. Congressional Review Act
XVI. Criminal Penalties
XVII. Compatibility of Agreement State Regulations
XVIII. Voluntary Consensus Standards
XIX. Availability of Documents
I. Background
A. Fukushima Dai-ichi
On March 11, 2011, the Great East Japan Earthquake, rated a
magnitude 9.0, occurred off the coast of Honshu Island, resulting in
the automatic shutdown of 11 nuclear power plants (NPPs) at four sites
along the northeast coast of Japan, including three of six reactors at
the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPP (the three remaining plants were shutdown
for maintenance). The earthquake caused a large tsunami that is
estimated to have exceeded 14 meters in height at the Fukushima Dai-
ichi NPP. The earthquake and tsunami produced widespread devastation
across northeastern Japan, significantly impacting the infrastructure
and industry in the northeastern coastal areas of Japan. The earthquake
and tsunami disabled the majority of the external and internal
electrical power systems at the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPP, creating a
significant challenge for operators in responding to the event. In
addition, the combination of severe events challenged the
implementation of emergency plans and procedures.
B. Near-Term Task Force
The NRC Chairman's tasking memorandum, COMGBJ-11-0002, ``NRC
Actions Following the Events in Japan,'' established a senior-level
task force, referred to as the ``Near-Term Task Force'' (NTTF), to
review the NRC's regulations and processes to determine if the agency
should make improvements to the NRC's regulatory system in light of the
events in Japan. On July 12, 2011, the NRC staff provided the report of
the NTTF (NTTF Report) to the Commission as an enclosure to SECY-11-
0093, ``Near-Term Report and Recommendations for Agency Actions
Following the Events in Japan.'' The NTTF concluded that continued U.S.
plant operation and NRC licensing activities present no imminent risk
to public health and safety. While the NTTF also concluded that the
current regulatory system has served the NRC and the public well, it
found that enhancements to safety and emergency preparedness are
warranted and made 12 general recommendations for Commission
consideration. In examining the Fukushima Dai-ichi event for insights
for reactors in the United States, the NTTF addressed protecting
against accidents resulting from natural phenomena, mitigating the
consequences of such accidents, and ensuring emergency preparedness.
The NTTF found that the Commission's longstanding defense-in-depth
philosophy, supported and modified as necessary by state-of-the-art
probabilistic risk assessment techniques, should continue to serve as
the primary organizing principle of its regulatory framework. The NTTF
concluded that the application of the defense-in-depth philosophy could
be strengthened by including explicit requirements for beyond-design-
basis events.
C. Implementation of the Near-Term Task Force Recommendations
In response to the NTTF Report, the Commission directed the NRC
staff on August 19, 2011, in Staff Requirements Memorandum (SRM)--SECY-
11-0093, to engage with stakeholders to review and assess the NTTF
recommendations in a comprehensive and holistic manner and to provide
the Commission with fully-informed options and recommendations. The NRC
staff provided the Commission with recommendations for near-term action
in SECY-11-0124, ``Recommended Actions To Be Taken without Delay from
the Near-Term Task Force Report,'' dated September 9, 2011. The
suggested near-term actions addressed several NTTF recommendations
associated with this rulemaking, including NTTF recommendations 4, 8,
and 9.3. In SRM-SECY-11-0124, dated October 18, 2011, the Commission
directed the NRC staff to, among other things: Initiate a rulemaking to
address NTTF recommendation 4, station blackout (SBO) regulatory
actions, as an advance notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPR); designate
the SBO rulemaking associated with NTTF recommendation 4 as a high
priority rulemaking; craft recommendations that continue to realize the
strengths of a performance-based system as a guiding principle; and
consider approaches that are flexible and able to accommodate a diverse
range of circumstances and conditions. As discussed more fully in later
portions of this document, the regulatory actions associated with NTTF
recommendation 4 evolved substantially from this early Commission
direction and included issuance of Order EA-12-049, ``Order Modifying
Licenses With Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for
Beyond-Design-Basis External Events'' (Mitigation Strategies Order),
that, as implemented, ultimately addressed all of NTTF recommendation 4
as well as other recommendations.
In SECY-11-0137, ``Prioritization of Recommended Actions To Be
Taken in Response to Fukushima Lessons Learned,'' dated October 3,
2011, the NRC staff, based on its assessment of the NTTF
recommendations, proposed to the Commission a three-tiered
prioritization for implementing regulatory actions stemming from the
NTTF recommendations. The Tier 1 recommendations were those actions
having the greatest safety benefit that could be implemented without
unnecessary delay. The Tier 2 recommendations were those actions that
needed further technical assessment or critical skill sets to
implement, and the Tier 3 recommendations were longer-term actions that
depended on the completion of a shorter-term action or needed
additional study to support a regulatory action. On December 15, 2011,
the Commission approved the staff's recommended prioritization in SRM-
SECY-11-0137.
The NTTF recommendations that provide the initial regulatory
impetus for this rulemaking include the following:
NTTF recommendation 4: Strengthen SBO mitigation
capability at all operating and new reactors for design-basis and
beyond-design-basis external events;
NTTF recommendation 7: Enhance spent fuel pool (SFP)
makeup capability and instrumentation for the SFP;
NTTF recommendation 8: Strengthen and integrate onsite
emergency response capabilities such as emergency operating procedures
(EOPs), severe accident management guidelines
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(SAMGs), and extensive damage mitigation guidelines (EDMGs);
NTTF recommendation 9: Require that facility emergency
plans address staffing, dose assessment capability, communications,
training and exercises, and equipment and facilities for prolonged SBO,
multi-unit events, or both;
NTTF recommendation 10: Pursue additional emergency
protection topics related to multi-unit events and prolonged SBO,
including command and control structure and the qualifications of
decision makers; and
NTTF recommendation 11: Pursue emergency management topics
related to decision making, radiation monitoring, and public education,
including the ability to deliver equipment to the site with degraded
offsite infrastructure.
In response to input received from stakeholders, the NRC
accelerated the schedule originally proposed in SECY-11-0137. On
February 17, 2012, the NRC staff recommended in SECY-12-0025,
``Proposed Orders and Requests for Information in Response to Lessons
Learned From Japan's March 11, 2011, Great T[omacr]hoku Earthquake and
Tsunami,'' that the Commission issue orders for items that warranted
generic safety improvements and requests for information where further
consideration of the need for safety improvements would be necessary on
a site-specific basis.
To address Tier 1 NTTF recommendation 4, on March 12, 2012, the NRC
issued the Mitigation Strategies Order, requiring all U.S. nuclear
power plant licensees to have additional capability to mitigate beyond-
design-basis external events through the implementation of strategies
and guidelines that enable them to cope without their permanently
installed alternating current (ac) electrical power sources for an
indefinite period of time. These strategies would provide additional
capability to maintain or restore reactor core and spent fuel cooling,
as well as protect the reactor containment. This order also addressed:
Portions of NTTF recommendation 9 to require that facility emergency
plans address prolonged SBOs and multi-unit events; portions of NTTF
recommendation 10 to pursue additional emergency protection topics
related to multi-unit events and prolonged SBO; and portions of NTTF
recommendation 11 to pursue emergency procedure topics related to
decision making, radiation monitoring, and public education.
To address Tier 1 NTTF recommendation 7, on March 12, 2012, the NRC
issued Order EA-12-051, ``Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to
Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation'' (SFPI Order), requiring all
U.S. nuclear power plant licensees to have a reliable indication of the
water level in associated SFPs.
To address Tier 1 NTTF recommendation 8, the NRC issued an ANPR (77
FR 23161) on April 18, 2012, to engage stakeholders in rulemaking
activities associated with the methodology for the integration of
onsite emergency response processes, procedures, training and
exercises.
The requests for information were issued under Sec. 50.54(f) on
March 12, 2012, to address elements of NTTF recommendation 2,
concerning external hazard walkdowns and reevaluations, and NTTF
recommendation 9, concerning staffing and communications.
D. Consolidation of Regulatory Efforts
While developing the rulemakings discussed in the previous section,
the NRC staff recognized that efficiencies could be gained by
consolidating the rulemaking efforts due to the inter-relationships
among the proposed changes. The NRC staff recommended to the Commission
that rulemaking activities to address NTTF recommendations 4, 7, 8,
10.2, and 11.1, as well as portions of NTTF recommendation 9, be
consolidated. (See COMSECY-13-0002, ``Consolidation of Japan Lessons
Learned Near-Term Task Force Recommendations 4 and 7 Regulatory
Activities,'' dated January 25, 2013; COMSECY-13-0010, ``Schedule and
Plans for Tier 2 Order on Emergency Preparedness for Japan Lessons
Learned,'' dated March 27, 2013; and SECY-14-0046, ``Fifth 6-Month
Status Update on Response to Lessons Learned From Japan's March 11,
2011, Great T[omacr]hoku Earthquake and Subsequent Tsunami,'' dated
April 17, 2014.) Section I.C, ``Implementation of the Near-Term Task
Force Recommendations,'' of this document contains a more complete
discussion of the scope of NTTF recommendations addressed by the MBDBE
rule. The Commission approved these consolidations in the associated
SRMs. Consequently, the MBDBE rule combines two NRC activities for
which documents have been published in the Federal Register--Onsite
Emergency Response Capabilities (RIN 3150-AJ11; NRC-2012-0031) and
Station Blackout Mitigation Strategies (RIN 3150-AJ08; NRC-2011-0299).
The MBDBE rule identification number and regulations.gov docket number
are RIN 3150-AJ49 and NRC-2014-0240, respectively. These consolidations
were intended to meet the following objectives:
1. Align the regulatory framework with ongoing industry
implementation efforts to produce a more coherent and understandable
regulatory framework. Given the complexity of these requirements and
their associated implementation, the NRC concluded that this was an
important objective for the regulatory framework.
2. Reduce the potential for inconsistencies and complexities
between the related rulemaking actions that could occur if the efforts
remained as separate rulemakings.
3. Facilitate better understanding of the requirements for both
internal and external stakeholders, and thereby lessen the impact on
internal and external stakeholders who would otherwise need to review
and comment on multiple rulemakings while cross-referencing both
proposed rules and sets of guidance documents.
II. Opportunities for Public Involvement
As discussed in Section I.D, ``Consolidation of Regulatory
Efforts,'' of this document, the MBDBE rule is a consolidation of
several regulatory activities, including two previous rulemaking
efforts: The Station Blackout Mitigation Strategies rulemaking and the
Onsite Emergency Response Capabilities rulemaking. Both of these
rulemaking efforts offered extensive external stakeholder involvement
opportunities, including public meetings, ANPRs issued for public
comment, and draft regulatory basis documents issued for public
comment. The major opportunities for stakeholder involvement were as
follows:
1. Station Blackout ANPR (77 FR 16175; March 20, 2012);
2. Onsite Emergency Response Capabilities ANPR (77 FR 23161; April
18, 2012);
3. Station Blackout Mitigation Strategies draft regulatory basis
and draft rule concepts (78 FR 21275; April 10, 2013); and
4. Onsite Emergency Response Capabilities draft regulatory basis
(78 FR 1154; January 8, 2013).
The final Station Blackout Mitigation Strategies regulatory basis
was issued on July 23, 2013 (78 FR 44035), and the final Onsite
Emergency Response Capabilities regulatory basis, with preliminary
proposed rule language, was issued on October 25, 2013 (78 FR 63901).
The NRC described in each final regulatory basis document how it
considered stakeholder feedback in
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developing the respective final regulatory basis, including
consideration of ANPR comments and draft regulatory basis document
comments. Section 5 of the Station Blackout Mitigation Strategies
regulatory basis document includes a discussion of stakeholder feedback
used to develop the final regulatory basis. Appendix B to the Onsite
Emergency Response Capabilities regulatory basis includes a discussion
of stakeholder feedback used to develop that final regulatory basis.
The public has had multiple opportunities to engage in these
regulatory efforts. Most noteworthy were the following:
1. Preliminary proposed rule language for Onsite Emergency Response
Capabilities made available to the public on November 15, 2013 (78 FR
68774).
2. Consolidated rulemaking proof of concept language made available
to the public on February 21, 2014.
3. Preliminary proposed rule language for MBDBE rulemaking made
available to the public on August 15, 2014.
4. Preliminary proposed rule language for MBDBE rulemaking made
available to the public on November 13, 2014, and December 8, 2014, to
support public discussion with the Advisory Committee on Reactor
Safeguards (ACRS).
The NRC issued the MBDBE proposed rule on November 13, 2015 (80 FR
70609), for a 90-day public comment period. The comment period closed
on February 11, 2016. During the public comment period, on January 21,
2016, the NRC held a public meeting to provide external stakeholders
with a better understanding of the proposed requirements and thereby
facilitate more informed feedback. Twenty sets of comments were
received in response to the proposed rule. The NRC's consideration of
these comments is addressed in Section IV, ``Public Comments and
Changes to the Rule,'' of this document. The NRC staff has had numerous
interactions with the ACRS, and in all cases these were public
meetings, including the following:
1. The ACRS Plant Operations and Fire Protection subcommittee met
on February 6, 2013, to discuss the Onsite Emergency Response
Capabilities regulatory basis.
2. The ACRS Regulatory Policies and Practices subcommittee met on
December 5, 2013, and April 23, 2013, to discuss the Station Blackout
Mitigation Strategies regulatory basis.
3. The ACRS full committee met on June 5, 2013, to discuss the
Station Blackout Mitigation Strategies regulatory basis.
4. The ACRS Fukushima subcommittee met on June 23, 2014, to discuss
consolidation of Station Blackout Mitigation Strategies and Onsite
Emergency Response Capabilities rulemakings.
5. The ACRS full committee met on July 10, 2014, to discuss
consolidation of Station Blackout Mitigation Strategies and Onsite
Emergency Response Capabilities rulemakings.
6. The ACRS Fukushima subcommittee met on November 21, 2014, to
discuss preliminary proposed MBDBE rulemaking language.
7. The ACRS full committee met on December 4, 2014, to discuss
preliminary proposed MBDBE rulemaking language.
8. The ACRS Fukushima subcommittee met on March 19, 2015, to
discuss the proposed MBDBE rulemaking package.
9. The ACRS full committee met on April 9, 2015, to discuss the
proposed MBDBE rulemaking package.
10. The ACRS full committee met on June 10, 2015, to receive a
status update on the efforts to develop supporting guidance to
implement the MBDBE rule.
11. The ACRS Fukushima subcommittee met on April 22, 2016, to
receive an update on the public comments provided on the proposed MBDBE
rule.
12. The ACRS Fukushima subcommittee met on August 17, 2016, to
discuss the path forward on the substantive public comments provided on
the MBDBE rule.
13. The ACRS Fukushima subcommittee met on October 19, 2016, to
discuss the final MBDBE rule guidance.
14. The ACRS Fukushima subcommittee met on November 16, 2016, to
discuss the final MBDBE rule package.
15. The ACRS full committee met on November 30, 2016, to discuss
the final MBDBE rule package.
The NRC held a public meeting on November 10, 2016, to discuss
implementation issues associated with the MBDBE final rule as required
by its cumulative effects of regulation (CER) process.
III. Petitions for Rulemaking
During development of this rule, the NRC gave consideration to the
issues raised in six PRMs submitted to the NRC, five from the Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc. (NRDC) (PRM-50-97, PRM-50-98, PRM-50-
100, PRM-50-101, and PRM-50-102) and one submitted by Mr. Thomas Popik
(PRM-50-96). The NRDC petitions were dated July 26, 2011, and docketed
by the NRC on July 28, 2011. The NRC published a notice of receipt in
the Federal Register on September 20, 2011 (76 FR 58165), for the NRDC
petitions, and did not ask for public comment at that time. The
petitions filed by the NRDC use the NTTF Report as the sole basis for
the PRMs. The NTTF recommendations that the NRDC PRMs rely upon are:
4.1, 7.5, 8.4, 9.1, and 9.2. This rule addresses each of these
recommendations, and therefore it resolves the issues raised by the
NRDC PRMs. Accordingly, the NRC's issuance of the MBDBE rule completes
all planned regulatory activities for the NRDC petitions. The PRM-50-
96, filed by Mr. Popik, is still under consideration by the NRC and is
not fully addressed at this time, as discussed in greater detail below.
In PRM-50-97 (NRC-2011-0189), the NRDC requested emergency
preparedness enhancements for prolonged SBOs in the areas of
communications ability, Emergency Response Data System (ERDS)
capability, training and exercises, and equipment and facilities (NTTF
recommendation 9.2). The NRC considered the issues raised in this PRM
as part of the MBDBE rulemaking. The NRC's consideration of the issues
raised in PRM-50-97 are reflected in the provisions in Sec. 50.155(d)
concerning training. The NRC concludes that consideration of the PRM
issues and the underlying NTTF Report recommendations, as discussed in
this document, addresses PRM-50-97. This completes the NRC's
consideration of PRM-50-97.
In PRM-50-98 (NRC-2011-0189), the NRDC requested emergency
preparedness enhancements for multi-unit events in the areas of
personnel staffing, dose assessment capability, training and exercises,
and equipment and facilities (NTTF recommendation 9.1). The NRC
considered the issues raised in this PRM as part of the MBDBE
rulemaking. The NRC's consideration of the issues raised in PRM-50-98
are reflected in the provisions in Sec. 50.155(b)(1) concerning
development, implementation and maintenance of strategies and
guidelines, which subsumes staffing, and Sec. 50.155(d) concerning
training, which subsumes drills or exercises. The NRC concludes that
consideration of the PRM issues and the underlying NTTF Report
recommendations, as discussed in this document, addresses PRM-50-98.
This completes the NRC's consideration of PRM-50-98.
In PRM-50-100, the NRDC requested enhancement of SFP makeup
capability
[[Page 39688]]
and instrumentation for the SFP (NTTF recommendation 7.5). The NRC
determined that the issues raised in this PRM should be considered in
the NRC's rulemaking process, and the NRC published a document in the
Federal Register with this determination on July 23, 2013 (78 FR
44034). The NRC's consideration of the issues raised in PRM-50-100
within the MBDBE rulemaking are reflected in the provisions in Sec.
50.155(b)(1) concerning mitigation strategies for maintaining or
restoring SFP cooling capabilities and Sec. 50.155(e) concerning SFP
monitoring. The NRC concludes that consideration of the PRM issues and
the underlying NTTF Report recommendations, as discussed in this
document, addresses PRM-50-100. This completes the NRC's consideration
of PRM-50-100.
In PRM-50-101, the NRDC requested that Sec. 50.63, ``Loss of all
alternating current power,'' be revised to establish a minimum coping
time of 8 hours for a loss of all ac power; establish the equipment,
procedures, and training necessary to cope with an extended loss of ac
power (72 hours) for core and SFP cooling and for reactor coolant
system and primary containment integrity as needed; and establish
requirements to preplan/prestage offsite resources to support
uninterrupted core and SFP cooling and reactor coolant system and
containment integrity as needed (NTTF recommendation 4.1). The NRC
determined that the issues raised in this PRM should be considered in
the NRC's rulemaking process, and the NRC published a document in the
Federal Register with this determination on March 21, 2012 (77 FR
16483). The NRC's consideration of the issues raised in PRM-50-101
within the MBDBE rulemaking is reflected in the provisions in Sec.
50.155(b)(1) concerning mitigation strategies for maintaining or
restoring core cooling, containment, and SFP cooling capabilities;
Sec. 50.155(c) concerning equipment; Sec. 50.155(d) concerning
training; and Sec. 50.155(f) concerning documentation of changes. The
NRC concludes that consideration of the PRM issues and the underlying
NTTF Report recommendations, as discussed in this document, addresses
PRM-50-101. This completes the NRC's consideration of PRM-50-101.
In PRM-50-102, the NRDC requested more realistic, hands-on training
and exercises on SAMGs and EDMGs for licensee staff expected to
implement those guideline sets and make decisions during emergencies
(NTTF recommendation 8.4). The NRC determined that the issues raised in
this PRM should be considered in the NRC's rulemaking process, and the
NRC published a document in the Federal Register with this
determination on April 27, 2012 (77 FR 25104). The NRC's consideration
of the issues raised in PRM-50-102 within the MBDBE rulemaking are
reflected in the provisions in Sec. 50.155(d) concerning training. The
NRC concludes that consideration of the PRM issues and the underlying
NTTF Report recommendations, as discussed in this document, addresses
PRM-50-102. This completes the NRC's consideration of PRM-50-102.
In PRM-50-96, Mr. Thomas Popik requested that the NRC amend its
regulations to require facilities licensed by the NRC to assure long-
term cooling and unattended water makeup of SFPs in the event of
geomagnetic disturbances caused by solar storms resulting in long-term
loss of power. The NRC determined that the issues raised in this PRM
should be considered in the NRC's rulemaking process, and the NRC
published a document in the Federal Register with this determination on
December 18, 2012 (77 FR 74788). In that Federal Register document, the
NRC also closed the docket for PRM-50-96. Specifically, the NRC
indicated that it would monitor the progress of the MBDBE rule to
determine whether the requirements established therein would address,
in whole or in part, the issues raised in the PRM. In this context, the
requirements in Sec. 50.155(b)(1) and (c) and the associated
regulatory guidance, address, in part, the issues raised by the
petitioner because these regulations require licensees to establish
offsite assistance to support maintenance of the key functions
(including both reactor and SFP cooling) following an extended loss of
ac power, which has been postulated as a consequence of geomagnetic
disturbances.
The other issues raised in PRM-50-96 related to geomagnetic
disturbances remain under NRC consideration. The issue of geomagnetic
disturbances, as it impacts transmission system protection, is being
addressed at a national level by the White House's Office of Science
and Technology Policy (OSTP). The OSTP has been meeting with
representatives from several different Federal agencies, including the
NRC, over the last several years to develop the National Space Weather
Strategy (NSWS) and the National Space Weather Action Plan (NSWAP). On
October 13, 2016, President Obama issued Executive Order 13744,
``Coordinating Efforts To Prepare the Nation for Space Weather Events''
(81 FR 71573; October 18, 2016), requiring agencies to begin to
implement the NSWAP. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is the
sector-specific agency with lead responsibility for nuclear reactors,
materials, and waste; therefore, the NRC is working with DHS on
delineating the NRC authorities associated with the NSWAP.
Following completion of the MBDBE rulemaking, the NRC will address
PRM-50-96 giving consideration to the NSWAP, the MBDBE rule,
requirements established by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to
address geomagnetic disturbances (81 FR 67120; September 30, 2016), and
the additional comments that were submitted on this rulemaking that
further inform the consideration of geomagnetic disturbances.
IV. Public Comments and Changes to the Rule
A. Overview of Public Comments and Removal of Requirements That Would
Constitute Backfitting
During the public comment period for the MBDBE proposed rule and
draft guidance, the NRC received 20 comment submissions containing 185
individual comments. In developing the final rule and supporting
guidance, the NRC considered all the comments provided in response to
the MBDBE proposed rule and draft guidance. The detailed consideration
of the public comments is contained in a separate document that is
referenced in Section XIX, ``Availability of Documents,'' of this
document. While the NRC received many comments that enabled it to
significantly improve the MBDBE rule and its supporting statement of
considerations, this section focuses on the subset of those comments
that directly resulted in changes to the MBDBE rule requirements or
changes to the MBDBE rule supporting statement of considerations. This
section also discusses noteworthy feedback received in response to
specific questions in the Federal Register notice for the proposed rule
and through the CER questions.
In addition, the NRC reexamined the potential requirements that had
been included in the proposed MBDBE rule, particularly those that had
been previously addressed at the regulatory guidance level regarding
the Mitigation Strategies and SFPI Orders, in light of the requirements
of Sec. Sec. 50.109 and 52.98. Under Sec. 50.109(a)(3), when the
exceptions of Sec. 50.109(a)(4) (in this case the exception to ensure
adequate protection) do not apply, the NRC may require backfitting of a
facility when it determines, based upon an analysis as described in
Sec. 50.109(c), that there is a substantial increase in the overall
protection of the public health and
[[Page 39689]]
safety or the common defense and security to be derived from the
backfit and that the direct and indirect costs of implementation for
that facility are justified in view of the increased protection.
For items that were addressed at the regulatory guidance level, the
NRC considered first whether inclusion of a requirement on the subject
in the final rule would be necessary to ensure that there is adequate
protection of public health and safety. In each case, the NRC concluded
that the requirements imposed by the Orders were sufficient to provide
reasonable assurance of adequate protection of public health and safety
and no new information was developed with regard to the ``guidance''
items that would modify this conclusion. The NRC then considered
whether there would be a substantial increase in the overall protection
of the public health and safety or the common defense and security that
would result from including requirements in the final rule for those
items rather than continuing the practice of addressing them in the
regulatory guidance as had been done for the orders. As discussed in
the remainder of this section, the NRC concluded in general that, while
there would be some benefit in the form of clarity as to what had been
found acceptable for compliance with the orders being made generically
applicable in this rulemaking, the recharacterization of those items
from regulatory guidance to requirements would not constitute a
substantial increase in the overall protection of the public health and
safety or the common defense and security.
The NRC also took into consideration whether the items that had
been addressed in the regulatory guidance were supporting elements to
the overarching requirements for a capability to provide protection of
public health and safety or whether the items directly affect public
health and safety. For example, staffing and communications would be
considered supporting elements for the overarching requirement to
develop, implement, and maintain the mitigation strategies for beyond-
design-basis external events, which contributes to the protection of
public health and safety. Because of this, the NRC concludes that a
separate requirement for the staffing and communications elements would
not be needed, but could constrain an existing licensee or an applicant
for a new licensee from developing innovative mitigation strategies
that do not rely on staffing or communications. This follows the
Commission's direction in SRM-SECY-11-0124 that
[i]n order to be effective, approaches should be flexible and able
to accommodate a diverse range of circumstances and conditions. In
consideration of events beyond the design basis, a regulatory
approach founded on performance-based requirements will foster
development of the most effective and efficient, site-specific
mitigation strategies, similar to how the agency approached the
approval of licensee response strategies for the ``loss of large
area'' event under its B.5.b program.
A discussion of the specific consideration of these items is
provided in the remainder of this section.
B. Removal of Requirements To Address Seismic and Flooding Reevaluated
Hazards
The NRC received comments stating that the need for a licensee's
strategies and guidelines to be capable of execution in the context of
the reevaluated flooding and seismic hazards should be addressed in
Sec. 50.155(b) rather than Sec. 50.155(c)(2). The commenters noted
that addressing the effects of reevaluated hazards on the mitigation
strategies in Sec. 50.155(b) rather than Sec. 50.155(c)(2) provides
greater flexibility regarding how a licensee can address the hazard
effects through changes to mitigation strategies and guidelines,
including changes to equipment protection. Additionally, commenters
indicated that the regulation should allow for alternative approaches
that would not necessarily address the damage state assumed for Sec.
50.155(b)(1) nor necessarily assume the same success criteria and that
should also allow for the use of risk-informed approaches.
The NRC agrees in part with these comments and concludes that
including a requirement to address the effects of reevaluated hazards
on the mitigation strategies in the rule would not be consistent with
Sec. Sec. 50.109 and 52.98 and could unduly limit the flexibility the
commenters suggested should be in the rule.
The mitigation strategies under Sec. 50.155(b)(1) originated in
the Mitigation Strategies Order and were justified as necessary to
provide adequate protection of public health and safety in light of the
uncertainties associated with beyond-design-basis external events and
the possibility that extreme natural phenomena could challenge the
prevention, mitigation, and emergency preparedness defense-in-depth
layers. In COMSECY-14-0037, ``Integration of Mitigating Strategies for
Beyond-Design-Basis External Events and The Reevaluation of Flooding
Hazards,'' dated November 21, 2014, the NRC staff recognized the
interaction between the development and implementation of mitigation
strategies for beyond-design-basis external events under the Mitigation
Strategies Order and the reevaluation of flooding hazard levels using
present-day regulatory guidance and methodologies from flooding
evaluations used for early site permits and combined license reviews
under NTTF Recommendation 2.1. In its SRM dated March 30, 2015, ``Staff
Requirements--Integration of Mitigating Strategies for Beyond-Design-
Basis External Events and the Reevaluation of Flooding Hazards,'' the
Commission addressed this interaction by, in part, directing the staff
to evaluate potential changes to the guidance for the integrated
assessment of the effects of the flooding hazards on operating reactors
and to introduce more realism for the purpose of identifying potential
safety enhancements for operating reactors.
The changes to the regulatory decision-making process directed in
the SRM to COMSECY-14-0037 reflected the recognition that the present-
day regulatory guidance and methodologies are intended to identify a
necessary level of protection from flooding that would meet the
principal design criterion (PDC) of an application for an operating
license or combined license corresponding to Criterion 2, ``Design
bases for protection against natural phenomena,'' of appendix A to 10
CFR part 50, ``General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants.'' That
criterion requires applicants to design [s]tructures, systems and
components (SSCs) important to safety to withstand the effects of
natural phenomena such as earthquakes and floods without loss of
capability to perform their safety functions. The criterion also
requires that the design bases for these SSCs reflect, among other
factors, appropriate consideration of the most severe of the natural
phenomena that have been historically reported for the site and
surrounding area, with sufficient margin for the limited accuracy,
quantity, and period of time in which the historical data have been
accumulated. Historically, the margin specified in this criterion has
been achieved through the incorporation of conservatisms in the
analyses used to determine the flooding design bases for power reactors
rather than by the use of a minimum margin above the results of the
analyses. The existence of these conservatisms was addressed by the
Commission in its direction in the SRM to reduce any unnecessary
conservatisms and identify
[[Page 39690]]
any areas with insufficient conservatisms. In keeping with that
determination, the NRC concludes that adequate protection of public
health and safety does not require the operating power reactor
licensees to provide protection beyond those levels determined under
Criterion 2 of appendix A to 10 CFR part 50 and that any backfitting in
this area should be accomplished on an individualized basis under the
Backfit Rule. The consideration of whether individual operating
licenses for power reactor licensees should be modified, suspended, or
revoked is being accomplished under the NRC efforts associated with the
request for information issued under Sec. 50.54(f) on March 12, 2012.
Therefore, the NRC disagrees with the recommendation of these
comments that the reevaluated hazards levels be included in Sec.
50.155(b) because that treatment would be inconsistent with the Backfit
Rule and the issue finality provisions of 10 CFR part 52, but agrees
that the reevaluated hazards should not be included in Sec. 50.155(c).
The final rule is revised to remove reference to the reevaluated
hazards, allowing licensees to address them within their mitigating
strategies in a flexible and appropriate manner. Consideration of the
treatment of reevaluated hazards resulting from the March 12, 2012,
request for information issued under Sec. 50.54(f) is nearing
completion under a separate NRC process.
C. Protection of Equipment
The NRC received comments that indicated a lack of clarity
associated with the proposed requirements for ``reasonable protection''
of the equipment in Sec. 50.155(b)(1) from the effects of natural
phenomena. The commenters indicated that there appeared to be conflict
regarding the application of the reasonable protection requirement to
portable ``FLEX equipment'' as defined in NEI 12-06, ``Diverse and
Flexible Coping Strategies (FLEX) Implementation Guide,'' versus
application to installed SSCs relied on for the response to beyond-
design-basis external events. These are typically safety-related SSCs
relied on in the initial response to a beyond-design-basis external
event as well as design-basis events, that as a result of their
credited use for such events, have both beyond-design-basis and safety-
related functions. Comments suggested that the proposed approach for
``reasonable protection'' was too limiting because it appeared to
restrict licensees to applying ``reasonable protection'' only to
equipment itself and not allow licensees the flexibility to implement
broader changes in protection and/or changes to strategies.
The NRC agrees that the proposed requirements for reasonable
protection need to be clarified and revised to provide greater
flexibility. First, the reasonable protection requirements in the MBDBE
rule are clarified in part due to removal of the reevaluated hazards
from Sec. 50.155. Removal of the reevaluated hazards requirement
enabled the NRC to directly align the reasonable protection standard,
in terms of the magnitude of natural phenomena that must be considered
with the current external event design basis. Additionally, Sec.
50.155(c)(2) was revised to characterize more specifically the effects
of natural phenomena from which the equipment must be reasonably
protected as ``equivalent in magnitude to the phenomena assumed for
developing the design basis of the facility'' rather than ``equivalent
to the design basis of the facility,'' as was described in the proposed
rule.
Section VI of this document is revised to clarify how the concept
of ``reasonable protection'' establishes a degree of assurance that is
appropriate for the beyond-design-basis regulatory framework
established through the MBDBE rule. This concept contrasts with the
application of special treatment requirements, such as environmental
qualification and quality assurance requirements, which are applied to
safety-related SSCs for their design-basis-related functions to achieve
a high level of regulatory assurance appropriate for design-basis
requirements.
The NRC also clarifies the confusion that appears to stem from the
application of the ``reasonable protection'' standard to safety-related
SSCs that have both design-basis and beyond-design-basis functions.
Safety-related SSCs that function initially in response to beyond-
design-basis external events have two sets of functions: safety-related
functions and beyond-design-basis functions. The NRC imposes extensive,
special treatment requirements on these SSCs for their safety-related
functions for design-basis events. This framework produces an increased
level of assurance that the SSCs will perform those safety-related
functions during and/or following the design-basis events as
applicable. (See ``Risk-Informed Categorization and Treatment of
Structures, Systems and Components for Nuclear Power Reactors; Final
Rule'' (69 FR 68008; November 22, 2004).)
Through this final rule, the NRC places fewer regulatory
requirements associated with the beyond-design-basis functions that
dual-function SSCs perform to maintain or restore core cooling,
containment, and SFP cooling capabilities, as compared to their safety-
related, design-basis functions. The ``reasonable protection'' standard
is a means for enabling greater flexibility for addressing external
hazards, and in the process, enabling a beyond-design-basis regulatory
framework that establishes an appropriate level of assurance. The
fundamental applicability of the reasonable protection requirement is
to equipment that is relied on for the mitigation strategies for
beyond-design-basis events without regard to whether the equipment is
``FLEX equipment'' as defined in NEI 12-06 or ``plant equipment'' as
that term is used in NEI 12-06. Accordingly, the set of requirements
that are applicable, and by direct extension, the resulting level of
regulatory assurance required is directly linked to whether the SSC or
equipment is performing a design-basis function or a beyond-design-
basis function. The level of assurance is established by the function
performed by the SSC, not by the equipment or SSC alone.
D. Loss of All Alternating Current Power
The NRC received comments concerning the loss of all ac power
requirement in proposed Sec. 50.155(b)(1). Several commenters
indicated that the assumed damage state for developing the mitigation
strategies and guidelines for beyond-design-basis external events must
include a loss of all power systems including the loss of ac power from
batteries through inverters and direct current (dc) power direct from
batteries. The commenters stated that unless this damage state is
assumed, the lessons learned from the Fukushima Dai-ichi event would
not be fully addressed. Another set of commenters stated that the MBDBE
proposed rule's requirements for a loss of all ac power must be revised
to align with the definition of an extended loss of ac power (ELAP) in
the industry guidance document developed for the Mitigation Strategies
Order. In that ELAP definition, power directly or indirectly from
batteries is assumed available. These commenters also suggested that
the word ``all'' should be removed from the MBDBE rule requirements for
``loss of all ac power'' to align the requirement with the definition
of ELAP. Based on this feedback, the NRC concluded that the MBDBE
proposed rule language and supporting statement of considerations lack
clarity and therefore revised the
[[Page 39691]]
final rule as discussed in the next paragraph.
The final rule language and Section V.C, ``Final Rule Regulatory
Bases,'' of this document are clarified to better convey that the loss
of all ac power condition must be addressed. The first clarification is
the deletion of the word ``extended'' from Sec. 50.155(b)(1) because
the NRC concludes that the use of the word ``extended'' contributed to
the confusion regarding the requirement. Section 50.155(b)(1) requires
licensees to assume a loss of all ac power in developing strategies and
guidelines capable of maintaining or restoring the key safety
functions, indefinitely or until the mitigation strategies are no
longer needed, including the acquisition of offsite resources to
sustain those functions. As such, the regulation clearly requires a
capability to address an ``extended'' loss of ac power, and the word
``extended'' is not necessary in Sec. 50.155(b)(1). The deletion of
the word ``extended'' is intended to avoid confusion between the
requirement for licensees to address a loss of all ac power and the
condition of an ELAP as defined in the industry guidance. The
regulatory guidance for the MBDBE rule, RG 1.226, addresses the loss of
all ac power, including ac power from inverters fed by batteries or dc
power directly from batteries as follows:
1. An ELAP and loss of normal access to the ultimate heat sink (or
loss of access to the normal heat sink for passive power reactor
designs), hereafter referred to as LUHS, is assumed for the purposes of
developing the supporting analysis, determining the resultant
conditions, and establishing times for key actions that support the
development and implementation of mitigation strategies providing
additional capability for beyond-design-basis external events. As
discussed above, an ELAP is defined in the regulatory guidance as a
loss of ac power sources but assumes the availability of power directly
or indirectly from batteries.
2. To address conditions more severe than the assumed conditions
discussed above (i.e., potentially including loss of power from
batteries) and thereby provide a set of regulatory guidance that
implements the loss of all ac power requirement of the MBDBE rule, the
mitigation strategies contain contingencies. These contingencies
involve sending personnel to locally and manually operate non-ac driven
core cooling pumps (e.g., a turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater or
reactor core isolation cooling pump) to maintain or restore core
cooling. These contingencies include the capability to obtain
instrument readings using portable multimeters at locations that do not
rely on the functioning of intervening installed electrical
equipment.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ There are limitations to what instruments can be repowered
by a portable multimeter. While it is possible to repower, and
obtain readings from, a resistance temperature detector or a
thermocouple, there are many types of sensors that would need a more
specialized type of equipment to accomplish the repowering and
measurement. The choice of instrument readings to obtain through
these contingencies should allow a licensee to diagnose the symptoms
and verify system response to confirm the success of actions taken
or to select actions that should be taken in response to the
symptoms. Engineering evaluations and/or calculational aids needed
to facilitate the interpretation of readings from such
instrumentation when taken under the beyond-design-basis external
event conditions expected should be performed as part of the
planning process for the mitigating strategies, and should identify
constraints and limitations of such capabilities, including
uncertainties in the results.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
E. Multiple Source Term Dose Assessment
As a result of the NRC's consideration of NTTF recommendations 9.1
and 9.3, the proposed MBDBE rule included a requirement for licensees
to determine the magnitude of, and continually assess the impact of,
the release of radioactive materials, including from all reactor core
and SFP sources. This proposed requirement is referred to as ``multiple
source term dose assessment,'' as each source (e.g., core or SFP) has a
specific ``source term'' of radionuclides that could be released in an
accident.
The NRC received a public comment concerning its Sec. 50.109
backfitting justification for the proposed multiple source term dose
assessment requirements. The comment indicated that while the NRC had
correctly identified these requirements as backfits, it had failed to
justify their proposed imposition as satisfying the criterion under
Sec. 50.109(a)(4)(ii) that these proposed requirements are necessary
for adequate protection of public health and safety. The commenter
stated that the NRC's analysis failed to overcome the presumption that
current regulations and orders ensure adequate protection and noted
that the statement of considerations supporting issuance of the Backfit
Rule in 1988 states that ``that presumption can be overcome only by
significant new information or some showing that the regulations do not
address some significant safety issue.'' The commenter also noted that
beyond the extensive, required actions that licensees are already
taking, the industry is voluntarily implementing multiple source term
dose assessment capabilities to assist in the mitigation of remote, yet
potentially serious beyond-design-basis external events. The commenter
stated that the NRC needs to provide a systematic and documented
analysis that imposition of the new requirements would result in a
cost-justified substantial increase in public health and safety.
The NRC agrees that the backfit justification supporting the
proposed multiple source term dose assessment requirements was
insufficient. Based on the current emergency preparedness regulations
in appendix E to 10 CFR part 50, ``Emergency Planning and Preparedness
for Production and Utilization Facilities,'' and the Mitigation
Strategies Order requirements, which were implemented broadly to
provide an enhanced onsite emergency response capability, the NRC
concludes that there is no evidence of a safety issue that rises to the
level of undue risk that would warrant imposition of multiple source
term dose assessment requirements as necessary for adequate protection
of public health and safety.
The NRC additionally concludes that imposition of the multiple
source term dose assessment requirement would not provide a substantial
increase in the protection of public health and safety under Sec.
50.109(a)(3), taking into account the factors in Sec. 50.109(c). This
conclusion is based on the following:
1. The events that would challenge multiple source terms are rare
events, and the risk associated with such events is a very small
portion of the total plant risk. Furthermore, licensees' implementation
of the requirements of the Mitigation Strategies Order provides a
substantially enhanced mitigation capability for these events and
lowers the probability that such rare events would challenge multiple
source terms. These requirements constitute a significant portion of
the MBDBE rule.
2. The NRC concludes that the risk of offsite consequences from the
beyond-design-basis events addressed by the rule is very small based
upon a review of the recent work to understand plant risk. This
conclusion is based on both the state-of-the-art reactor consequence
analyses (see NUREG-1935, ``State-of-the-Art Reactor Consequence
Analyses (SOARCA) Report,'' November 2012), and the work performed for
the containment protection and release reduction regulatory effort (see
SECY-15-0085, ``Evaluation of the Containment Protection & Release
Reduction for Mark I and Mark II Boiling Water Reactors Rulemaking
Activities (10 CFR part 50) (RIN-3150-AJ26),'' dated June 18, 2015,
specifically the enclosure entitled, ``Containment
[[Page 39692]]
Protection and Release Reduction (CPRR) Rulemaking: Draft Regulatory
Basis''). The staff's evaluation took into account the safety
enhancements related to prevention of radioactive releases that were
achieved through implementation of the Mitigation Strategies Order and
implementation of the requirements of Order EA-13-109, ``Order
Modifying Licenses with Regard to Reliable Hardened Containment Vents
Capable of Operation under Severe Conditions,'' dated June 6, 2013, in
reaching this conclusion.
3. Further, the NRC concludes that the portion of overall plant
risk associated with the rare events that might challenge multiple
source terms is very small. As a result, the potential safety
enhancement associated with the multiple source term dose assessment
requirements cannot be considered to be substantial.
Accordingly, the NRC concludes that because there would not be a
substantial increase in the overall protection of public health and
safety, and, because the risk to public health and safety is very
small, backfitting a requirement for multiple source term dose
assessment cannot be justified as a matter of adequate protection or as
a cost-justified substantial safety improvement.
Finally, operating plants have installed this multiple source term
dose assessment capability and have committed to maintain the
capability. The NRC anticipates that licensees will maintain this
multiple source term assessment capability, even without an explicit
requirement. This installed capability for multiple source term dose
assessment is a computer capability installed in the existing emergency
preparedness infrastructure and serves to meet the existing
requirements in appendix E to 10 CFR part 50 to monitor and assess the
reactor source term. The NRC concludes that the optimal regulatory
approach for operating licensees is to continue to maintain the
multiple source term dose assessment as a voluntary initiative
following the endorsed guidance that supports this rule.
The final rule was revised to remove the multiple source term dose
assessment requirements.
F. Removal of the Proposed Staffing and Communications Requirements
The NRC received public comment that the proposed wording for
staffing and communications requirements to be located in a new section
VII of appendix E to 10 CFR part 50 could be interpreted by future
readers to mean that those proposed requirements must be described in
the licensee's emergency plan, notwithstanding the NRC language to the
contrary. A commenter noted that the clarity of these proposed
provisions could be improved if they were moved into Sec. 50.155. The
commenter proposed that these requirements could be incorporated into
Sec. 50.155 as a separate sub-paragraph.
The NRC agrees that locating the staffing and communications
requirements in a new section VII of appendix E to 10 CFR part 50 would
detract from clarity. Additionally, the NRC recognizes that the
staffing and communications requirements in the proposed MBDBE rule
were not requirements in the Mitigation Strategies Order. Instead, the
issue of staffing was addressed in the implementation of the order
through the inclusion of regulatory guidance on the subject in section
11.7 of each version of the industry document NEI 12-06 as endorsed by
the respective versions of JLD-ISG-2012-01 and taken into consideration
by licensees in developing and implementing their strategies and
guidelines. The issue of internal communications was addressed in
section 3.2.2.8 of NEI 12-06 and taken into consideration by licensees
in developing and implementing their strategies and guidelines. The
issue of communications between the site and offsite response
organizations was a subject covered in the March 12, 2012 request for
information issued under Sec. 50.54(f), which resulted in licensees
making commitments to upgrade their communications capabilities. These
upgraded communications capabilities became part of the licensees'
final integrated plans for the strategies and guidelines under the
Mitigation Strategies Order.
The NRC concludes that the requirements imposed by the Mitigation
Strategies Order were sufficient to provide reasonable assurance of
adequate protection and no new information was developed with regard to
staffing and communications that would modify this conclusion. The NRC
concludes that the imposition of requirements for staffing and
communications would not result in a substantial increase in the
overall protection of public health and safety or the common defense
and security. This follows the Commission's direction in SRM-SECY-11-
0124 that
[i]n order to be effective, approaches should be flexible and able
to accommodate a diverse range of circumstances and conditions. In
consideration of events beyond the design basis, a regulatory
approach founded on performance-based requirements will foster
development of the most effective and efficient, site-specific
mitigation strategies, similar to how the agency approached the
approval of licensee response strategies for the ``loss of large
area'' event under its B.5.b program.
As a result, the imposition of requirements for staffing and
communications would not meet the provisions of the Backfit Rule.
The final rule was revised to remove the staffing and
communications requirements.
G. Cumulative Effects of Regulation Feedback, Removal of Requirements
for Drills or Exercises, Removal of Requirements for Command and
Control, and Withdrawal of Orders
The NRC was aware that the nuclear industry would be challenged by
the proposed 2-year compliance date for the MBDBE rule, and requested
feedback focused on whether this provided sufficient time to address
the reevaluated hazard information. Additionally, the proposed rule
contained the standard CER questions that also sought feedback on
whether the implementation of the MBDBE requirements might involve CER.
The NRC received feedback that indicated that the degree to which
the proposed reevaluated seismic or flooding hazards could impact the
implementation of mitigation strategies varies widely across the
operating reactor fleet and the various evaluations necessary to
prepare for any necessary modifications are in different stages of
completion. The NRC considered using a flexible scheduling provision in
the final rule to address this concern but concluded that this would
not be necessary in light of the removal of requirements to address the
reevaluated hazards from the final rule. From a more general
perspective, CER feedback indicated that circumstances of each plant's
implementation of the final rule requirements would be unique and there
may be instances where licensees would need to request additional time
for full implementation of the rule. One commenter stated that there
will likely be instances where conflicts will arise in the
implementation of the MBDBE rule requirements, and that the NRC should
allow licensees the latitude to resolve the conflicts in a manner that
best meets the objectives of safety and security, including allowing
licensees to prioritize regulatory activities where conflicts in
schedule are identified or provide alternative means for compliance in
instances where conflicts require an alternative to be established. The
commenter also advocated that the NRC support the use of risk-informed
decision making consistent with the Commission direction on SECY-15-
[[Page 39693]]
0050, ``Cumulative Effects of Regulation Process Enhancements and Risk
Prioritization Initiative,'' dated April 1, 2015.
Other CER feedback concerned a potential unintended consequence
that may occur if implementation of the MBDBE rule conflicts with the
existing order requirements. The commenter said that the NRC should set
forth a transparent transition from the Mitigation Strategies and SFPI
Orders to Sec. 50.155. All operating power reactor licensees have
achieved compliance with the orders using approved guidance (JLD-ISG-
2012-01, ``Compliance with Order EA-12-049, Order Modifying Licenses
with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-
Design-Basis External Events,'' and JLD-ISG-2012-03, ``Compliance with
Order EA-12-051, Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation''). The MBDBE
rule and the supporting RGs could be perceived to specify actions that
are in addition to, or different from, the actions taken by licensees
following the approved guidance to achieve compliance with the NRC
orders, including actions that could be less restrictive than the
corresponding actions needed for compliance with the orders. Further,
the NRC received a comment that there is a lack of clarity regarding
the difference between compliance with the orders and issuance of Sec.
50.155 and the associated RGs. To avoid unintended consequences
associated with two similar--but potentially not identical--sets of
requirements, it was commented that the NRC should withdraw the
Mitigation Strategies and SFPI Orders once Sec. 50.155 becomes
effective.
Additionally, stakeholders provided CER feedback concerning a
potential schedule conflict for new plants regarding the need to
perform analyses that were proposed as section VII to appendix E to 10
CFR part 50 and the completion of the inspections, tests, and analyses
under the 10 CFR part 52 framework.
Finally, the NRC held a public meeting to discuss CER. During this
meeting, a representative of the Boiling-Water Reactor Owners Group
pointed out that those licensees that received Order EA-13-109, which
was issued more than a year after the Mitigation Strategies and SFPI
Orders, would have less time after attaining full compliance with Order
EA-13-109 than other licensees to complete training and verify that
they have completed all preparations to comply with the MBDBE rule.
The NRC agrees that the group of licensees that received Order EA-
13-109 would achieve full compliance with each of the orders issued in
response to the Fukushima Dai-ichi event approximately one year after
the remaining licensees. In order to alleviate CER for this group of
licensees, the final rule is revised to provide an additional year for
implementation, giving this group of licensees the same amount of time
after full compliance with the orders to attain compliance with the
rule.
The NRC also agrees that redundancy would exist between
requirements in the Mitigation Strategies and SFPI Orders and those in
the MBDBE rule. The final rule contains language that is intended to
ensure a smooth transition between the order requirements and the MBDBE
rule, including withdrawing the orders, to alleviate this issue.
Finally, the schedule issue associated with new reactors was
resolved as a result of the removal of the staffing and communication
requirements in favor of their treatment in the regulatory guidance for
the rule. As a result of the revision made to the MBDBE rule, the
scheduling requirements that were of concern are no longer operative.
Additionally, the NRC received feedback suggesting that licensees
that received Order EA-13-109 be allowed an additional year for
conducting an initial drill or exercise under the proposed rule.
Holders of operating licenses for power reactors (including those that
received Order EA-13-109) would have been required to conduct an
initial drill or exercise within 4 years of the effective date of the
final MBDBE rule under this paragraph. The NRC noted that the conduct
of drills or exercises was not included as a requirement in the
Mitigation Strategies Order, instead being an element of an acceptable
approach to meeting the order's requirement for training. Drills are
addressed in the regulatory guidance for the Mitigation Strategies
Order contained in section 11.6.5 of NEI 12-06, as endorsed by JLD-ISG-
2012-01 and carried forward to the regulatory guidance for the final
rule. NEI 12-06, Revisions 0 and 2 contained guidance on the content
and periodicity of these drills, specifying the same 8-year period as
was proposed for this rule. NEI 12-06, Revision 4, which is endorsed by
the final version of Regulatory Guide 1.226, incorporates by reference
further guidance on the performance of drills contained in the industry
document NEI 13-06, Revision 1, ``Enhancements to Emergency Response
Capabilities for Beyond Design Basis Accidents and Events,'' which also
specifies the 8-year period that was proposed for drill performance for
this rule. In addition, Appendix E of NEI 12-06, Revisions 2 and 4
includes guidance on the validation of time sensitive actions.
Validation of the time sensitive actions has been performed by all
operating power reactor licensees in order to ascertain that they are
capable of executing the time sensitive actions necessary to perform
the strategies and guidelines required under the Mitigation Strategies
Order and under the final rule in sufficient time to meet the time
constraints determined by a plant-specific thermal-hydraulic analysis.
These validations included, for example, the use of timed drills in
simulators for control room actions or physical walkthroughs for
actions in the field to demonstrate that the operating staff could
perform the time sensitive actions within the identified time
constraints.
The NRC concludes that the requirements imposed by the Mitigation
Strategies Order were sufficient to provide reasonable assurance of
adequate protection and no new information was developed with regard to
drills or exercises that would modify this conclusion. The NRC
similarly concludes that imposing a requirement for drills and
exercises would not provide a substantial increase in the overall
protection of public health and safety. Therefore, the imposition of a
requirement for drills or exercises would not meet the provisions of
the Backfit Rule. The requirement for drills and exercises has been
removed from the final rule. The removal of the requirement for an
initial drill or exercise from the final rule addresses the commenter's
concerns with scheduling of drills for licensees that received Order
EA-13-109.
The NRC also received feedback on CER suggesting that flexible
scheduling be extended to licensees that received Order EA-13-109 for
reasons other than addressing reevaluated hazards. No changes were made
to the final MBDBE rule as a result of this feedback. The NRC concludes
that any need for further schedule flexibility can be addressed under
Sec. 50.12 on an individual basis if it becomes necessary.
The NRC also received stakeholder feedback supporting the command
and control requirements in proposed Sec. 50.155(b)(6). The proposed
MBDBE rule would have required licensees to have a supporting
organizational structure with defined roles, responsibilities, and
authorities for directing and performing the strategies, guidelines,
and alternative approaches required by proposed Sec. 50.155(b).
The need for defined command and control structures and
responsibilities
[[Page 39694]]
for use in beyond-design-basis conditions was recognized in the course
of the development of the guidance and strategies for EDMGs. As stated
in the industry's guidance document for that set of requirements, NEI
06-12, Revision 2, ``[e]xperience with large scale incidents has shown
that command and control execution can be a key factor to mitigation
success.'' The guidance and strategies developed for that effort
include an EDMG for initial response to provide a bridge between normal
operational command and control and the command and control that is
provided by the emergency response organization personnel in the event
that the normal command and control structure is disabled. The NRC
considers that the actions taken in the development of the EDMGs for
initial response for the guidance and strategies for Sec. 50.155(b)(2)
are adequate to support implementation of the MBDBE rule requirements.
Evidence of this was demonstrated in the implementation of the EDMGs
and Mitigation Strategies Order without specific command and control
requirements.
The NRC concludes that the requirements imposed by the Mitigation
Strategies Order were sufficient to provide reasonable assurance of
adequate protection and no new information was developed with regard to
command and control that would modify this conclusion. The NRC
concludes that the imposition of requirements for command and control
would not result in a substantial increase in the overall protection of
public health and safety or the common defense and security. This
follows the Commission's direction in SRM-SECY-11-0124 that
[i]n order to be effective, approaches should be flexible and able
to accommodate a diverse range of circumstances and conditions. In
consideration of events beyond the design basis, a regulatory
approach founded on performance-based requirements will foster
development of the most effective and efficient, site-specific
mitigation strategies, similar to how the agency approached the
approval of licensee response strategies for the ``loss of large
area'' event under its B.5.b program.
As a result, the imposition of requirements for command and control
would not meet the provisions of the Backfit Rule.
The final rule has been modified to allow one additional year for
implementation for operating power reactor licensees that received NRC
Order EA-13-109, to remove the proposed requirement for drills or
exercises, to remove the proposed requirement for command and control,
and to provide for the withdrawal of the Mitigation Strategies and SFPI
Orders and associated license conditions.
H. Change Control Enhancements
The NRC requested and received comments on the proposed MBDBE
change control provisions. Commenters suggested that the NRC should
consider a ``prior review and approval'' type of regulatory approach,
and cited as an example the ``reduction in effectiveness'' criterion
that is used in several existing change control requirements. The
concern expressed by commenters is associated with the potential for
licensees to make changes to the implementation of the MBDBE rule
requirements that are outside endorsed guidance. Another commenter
echoed this concern, citing examples of licensees not properly
implementing the mitigation strategies and citing violations associated
with the implementation of the requirements of Sec. 50.59, ``Changes,
tests, and experiments.'' The NRC also received a comment recommending
a reporting requirement be part of the change control provisions. The
NRC received comments concerning the statement of considerations, which
confused stakeholders and suggested that prior review and approval may
still be required. Finally, the NRC received comments suggesting
revisions to the change control requirements that were intended to
clarify the requirements.
The NRC finds that its basic approach to change control does not
need revision. Specifically, the NRC continues to conclude that it does
not need to include reporting requirements or criteria for prior NRC
review and approval of changes. The suggestion for use of a ``reduction
in effectiveness'' criterion was understood to be an example of a
``prior review and approval'' type criterion, and the NRC considered
both of those specific examples and any others that it could identify.
First, the NRC concluded that use of a ``reduction in effectiveness''
or equivalent type of change control criterion would not clearly
differentiate significant changes (that would warrant NRC prior review)
from changes not warranting prior review.
Second, given the deterministic regulatory approach followed for
development and implementation of the strategies under the Mitigation
Strategies Order, many potential changes could have aspects that tend
to reduce the effectiveness while also having aspects that tend to
improve the effectiveness of the mitigation strategies. For example,
replacing a portable diesel-driven pump with a similar one of a larger
size could improve the effectiveness of a mitigation strategy by
allowing for greater flow rates of makeup water but reduce its
effectiveness because of a higher fuel usage rate and an associated
shorter run time without refueling. Judging such changes using a prior
review and approval type of approach is challenging at best and would
very likely result in an unwarranted diversion of licensee and NRC
resources to review and approve changes.
Other beyond-design-basis provisions currently applicable to
operating reactors in Sec. 50.62, ``Requirements for reduction of risk
from anticipated transients without scram (ATWS) events for light-
water-cooled nuclear power plants,'' Sec. 50.63, and Sec. 50.54(hh)
do not contain change control requirements. The only comparable set of
requirements addressing beyond-design-basis events containing
provisions that address the control of changes is Sec. 50.150,
``Aircraft impact assessment,'' which is applicable to new reactors.
Reviewing that requirement, and noting that the Aircraft Impact
Assessment Rule requires that changes meet certain assessment
requirements, the NRC concluded that the provisions in Sec. 50.155(f)
for documentation of changes are well aligned with the Aircraft Impact
Assessment Rule's control of changes provisions because the NRC is
requiring that changes be demonstrated to satisfy the requirements of
Sec. 50.155.
Finally, the NRC concludes that its regulatory approach that relies
on inspection and enforcement will identify any substantial problems
with a licensee's MBDBE change control process well before such
problems present a safety problem. Based on consideration of the
feedback provided, the NRC did not find a suitable criterion (or
criteria) that the NRC judged would result in a substantial improvement
over what was proposed for addressing changes in the proposed rule, and
accordingly the final rule continues with the same approach: Licensees
must demonstrate that the proposed change will result in continued
compliance with the requirements of Sec. 50.155, licensees must
maintain documentation of those changes, and the NRC will oversee
through inspection the changes and take enforcement action as
appropriate.
Notwithstanding this conclusion, the NRC clarified Section VI of
this document to address changes that apply neither to endorsed
guidance nor approved alternatives. This section now includes examples
of cases that the NRC concludes would not result in demonstrated
compliance.
[[Page 39695]]
The NRC agrees that there was confusion created when it described
the potential for licensees that may wish to consult with the NRC
concerning changes to the implementation of the MBDBE rule
requirements. This was not intended to suggest that the NRC was
requiring a prior review of changes, and this document is revised
accordingly.
Finally, the NRC agrees with suggested revisions to the provisions
that result in clarification of the requirements. The NRC clarified the
final requirements to refer to them as ``Documentation of Changes,''
simplified the provisions by combining two of the proposed provisions,
clarified the provision that addresses the application of other change
control processes, and removed the word ``all'' from the rule regarding
the need to maintain documentation of changes. As a result, the NRC
concludes it is necessary to provide additional description in the
statement of considerations to clarify what constitutes a ``change''
with regard to the documentation that the NRC requires licensees to
maintain. Changes to the implementation of the MBDBE requirements that
do not result in a significant change to the functional performance of
the equipment and also do not significantly impact the strategies and
guidelines would not constitute a ``change'' for this purpose. The NRC
recognizes that licensees would maintain all of this documentation as
part of their normal procurement and configuration control processes,
but for the regulatory purposes of Sec. 50.155(f), these types of
changes would not be significant in terms of implementation of the
MBDBE requirements. For example, a replacement of a FLEX pump with a
pump having the equivalent functional performance (i.e., no significant
impact to functional performance), equivalent weight, size, and
mobility (i.e., no significant impact to staging and deploying the
pump), and equivalent connections would not constitute a ``change'' for
the purposes of Sec. 50.155(f).
I. Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation Requirements
The NRC received several comments that the MBDBE rule must keep the
requirements for SFPI separate and distinct from the requirements for
mitigation strategies. The commenters noted that the requirement for
SFPI was issued by the SFPI Order, while the requirement for mitigation
strategies was issued by the Mitigation Strategies Order. The
commenters further noted that while the two orders were in response to
lessons learned from the Fukushima Dai-ichi event, they are distinctly
different in underlying purpose and character.
The NRC agrees with these comments and revised the final rule to
keep SFPI and mitigation strategies requirements separate. The MBDBE
rule provisions in Sec. 50.155(b)(1), which were initially imposed
through the Mitigation Strategies Order, require strategies and
guidelines to maintain or restore core cooling, containment, and SFP
cooling capabilities for beyond-design-basis external events, and these
requirements are independent of those initially imposed in the SFPI
Order and now located in Sec. 50.155(e). The SFPI requirements ensure
that information regarding the SFP is provided to decision makers to
enable the prioritization of resources. The SFPI requirements were not
intended to support mitigation action, but to simply provide
information. Accordingly, the NRC moved the SFPI requirement to Sec.
50.155(e) and decoupled the requirement from Sec. 50.155(b)(1) to
ensure it remains independent of mitigation strategies requirements.
As part of the industry response to the Mitigation Strategies
Order, licensees used the SFPI to support mitigation strategies to
maintain or restore SFP cooling. If licensees use the SFPI to comply
with Sec. 50.155(b)(1), then the SFPI would be subject to the
requirements of Sec. 50.155(b)(1).
J. Drill Frequency
The NRC received comments regarding the proposed 8-year frequency
for performance of drills under the proposed rule. One commenter
expressed the view that there is a relatively high frequency of extreme
events, and given the potentially high consequences associated with
such events, the final rule must require an exercise interval no longer
than once every 3 years. The commenter noted that an 8-year frequency
was too infrequent, resulting in a steady decline in capabilities
between tests. Finally, the commenter expressed the view that these
drills need to be comprehensive and as realistic as possible.
Another commenter suggested drills be conducted annually or every 2
years. The remaining commenters supported the proposed 8-year
frequency.
As discussed in Section IV.G, ``Cumulative Effects of Regulation
Feedback, Removal of Requirements for Drills or Exercises, and
Withdrawal of Orders,'' of this document, the NRC concludes that the
requirements imposed by the Mitigation Strategies Order were sufficient
to provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection of public health
and safety and no new information was developed with regard to drills
or exercises that would modify this conclusion. The NRC then considered
whether there would be a substantial increase in the overall protection
of the public health and safety or the common defense and security that
would result from including requirements in the final rule for drills
or exercises rather than continuing the practice of addressing them in
the regulatory guidance as had been done for the Mitigation Strategies
Order. The NRC concluded that, while there would be some benefit in the
form of clarity as to what had been found acceptable for compliance
with the orders being made generically applicable in this rulemaking,
the recharacterization of drills or exercises from regulatory guidance
to requirements would not constitute a substantial increase in the
overall protection of the public health and safety or the common
defense and security.
Because of this, the NRC concludes that a separate requirement for
drills or exercises would not be needed, but could constrain an
existing licensee or an applicant for a new licensee from developing
innovative training techniques that do not rely on drills or exercises.
This follows the Commission's direction in SRM-SECY-11-0124 that
[i]n order to be effective, approaches should be flexible and able
to accommodate a diverse range of circumstances and conditions. In
consideration of events beyond the design basis, a regulatory
approach founded on performance-based requirements will foster
development of the most effective and efficient, site-specific
mitigation strategies, similar to how the agency approached the
approval of licensee response strategies for the ``loss of large
area'' event under its B.5.b program.
In addition, the NRC did not revise the MBDBE drill frequency
because it is specified in the regulatory guidance for the final rule
in response to these comments. The NRC concluded that the 8-year
periodicity strikes the correct balance in terms of providing an
appropriate level of regulatory assurance, and, by aligning with the
current emergency preparedness exercise requirements, it provides
licensees with flexibility should they choose to implement the drills
in conjunction with emergency preparedness drills or exercises.
[[Page 39696]]
K. Consideration of Explicit Requirements for a Three-Phase Response
The NRC received a comment that the MBDBE rule should maintain the
three-phase response structure for mitigation that was described in the
Mitigation Strategies Order rather than use the proposed rule's
performance-based requirements. The commenter stated that the
substitution of ``higher level, performance-based requirements''
reduces confidence that the MBDBE measures will be successful if
needed. It is the commenter's view that the nuclear industry and the
NRC have consistently disagreed on what constitutes appropriate
compensatory measures and associated administrative controls and
provided an example to support the comment. The commenter expressed the
view that the three-phase structure provides clearer definition of what
is expected, better enabling licensees to meet those expectations and
NRC inspectors to independently verify that this desired outcome has
been achieved.
The NRC did not revise the MBDBE rule as a result of this comment.
The Mitigation Strategies Order included a separate attachment 3 for
the imposition of requirements on Vogtle Electric Generating Plant,
Units 3 and 4 to reflect their use of the AP1000 design. In the
Mitigation Strategies Order, attachment 3, the NRC documented that the
inherent features of the AP1000 design obviate the need for phase two
of the three-phase response required of currently operating power
reactors that is addressed in attachment 2 of the Mitigation Strategies
Order. The RG 1.226 provides implementation guidance for the three-
phase approach as one acceptable method of complying with the MBDBE
rule. Future designers may be able to develop and implement strategies
and guidelines that do not rely on a three-phase approach, and may
propose alternative approaches as updates to the existing guidance or
in their applications.
This framework is consistent with the Commission's direction in
SRM-SECY-11-0124 to follow performance-based approaches for beyond-
design-basis events, while harmonizing the treatment of currently
operating and new power reactors. Such approaches allow greater
flexibility and enable more effective and efficient implementation of
the requirements. The NRC, through its current review, audit, and
inspection activities supporting implementation of the Mitigation
Strategies Order, is identifying differences of interpretation such as
those noted by the commenter and ensuring that they are resolved.
L. Clarifications to Decommissioning Provisions
The NRC received comments concerning the proposed MBDBE provisions
in Sec. 50.155(a)(3) regarding the applicability of the MBDBE rule to
licensees with reactors in a decommissioning phase. The commenters
agreed with the underlying approach to the MBDBE decommissioning
provision and suggested revisions to clarify those provisions and
eliminate unnecessary language.
The NRC agrees with some of the suggestions, and the final rule
reflects those changes. Section 50.155(a)(2) in the final rule
explicitly identifies which portions of the MBDBE rule apply to a
licensee as it proceeds through the decommissioning process.
M. Clarifications to Equipment Requirements and Removal of Proposed
Maintenance Requirement
The NRC requested feedback concerning the proposed maintenance
provision in Sec. 50.155(c)(3). The Mitigation Strategies Order did
not contain a specific maintenance requirement, but instead contained a
performance-based requirement ``to develop, implement and maintain
strategies.'' This same language was included in proposed Sec.
50.155(b)(1), so that a failure to perform adequate maintenance would
likely lead to a failure to meet this requirement.
The feedback indicated that commenters did not see a need for a
separate maintenance provision in Sec. 50.155(c)(3) for the Sec.
50.155(b)(1) equipment. Commenters noted that the proposed maintenance
requirement of Sec. 50.155(b), along with the guidance in NEI 12-06,
as endorsed by JLD-ISG-2012-01 for the Mitigation Strategies Order (now
endorsed in RG 1.226), adequately addresses equipment maintenance. The
NRC agrees with this feedback. The intent is to carry forward the
maintenance requirements of the Mitigation Strategies Order as it was
included within the order's requirement for licensees to develop,
implement, and maintain the strategies. The corresponding requirement
for development, implementation and maintenance of the strategies is
included in Sec. 50.155(b) and the proposed separate maintenance
requirement is removed from the final rule.
Regarding maintenance, the NRC also received feedback suggesting
that the MBDBE rule be revised to state that the Maintenance Rule,
Sec. 50.65, ``Requirements for monitoring the effectiveness of
maintenance at nuclear power plants,'' does not apply to FLEX equipment
or SFPI whose primary design function is to support strategies
developed to solely comply with the MBDBE rule. The NRC agrees that the
criteria in Sec. 50.65(b) do not include FLEX equipment in the scope
of Sec. 50.65 if the FLEX equipment is used solely for compliance with
Sec. 50.155.\2\ Accordingly, the suggested revision is not necessary.
Furthermore, such an addition could result in complications if a
licensee chooses to use FLEX equipment in a future regulatory
application (separate from Sec. 50.155) that would result in the
equipment meeting the scoping criteria in Sec. 50.65.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ In the event that a licensee relies upon the mitigation
strategies equipment for other purposes such as mitigation of a
design-basis event, the application of scoping criteria for reliance
on the equipment for those purposes would govern. As a result,
equipment that has multiple purposes could have design-basis
functions that fall within the scope of the Maintenance Rule for one
purpose, and a mitigation strategy function that is not covered by
the Maintenance Rule, but instead within scope for the maintenance
programs established under Sec. 50.155 through the guidance of
Regulatory Guide 1.226 and NEI 12-06. For example, a turbine-driven
auxiliary feedwater (TDAFW) pump in a pressurized-water reactor
would fall within the scope of the monitoring requirements of Sec.
50.65(a) under the criteria of Sec. 50.65(b) for those functions
that meet the criteria, but not for the performance of beyond-design
basis functions for the strategies and guidelines required by Sec.
50.155. As a result, the monitoring under Sec. 50.65(a) would be
with the goal of providing reasonable assurance that the TDAFW pump
is capable of fulfilling its intended safety function (i.e.,
specific function) within the reference bounds of the design bases
as defined in Sec. 50.2 for the functions that result in its
inclusion in the scope of Sec. 50.65. The capability of the TDAFW
pump to remain functional in the context of a loss of all ac power
concurrent with an LUHS, which could expose the pump to
environmental and operational constraints outside the reference
bounds of the design bases for the events resulting in inclusion in
the scope of Sec. 50.65(a) due to a longer period with an absence
of normally available cooling, would not be addressed by the Sec.
50.65(a) monitoring program, but instead by the maintenance and
testing programs established under Sec. 50.155 through the guidance
of RG 1.226 and NEI 12-06.
Similarly, some licensees rely on a portable, ac-power
independent pump for the strategies and guidelines developed under
Sec. 50.155(b)(1), (2), or (3). These strategies and guidelines may
be referred to in the licensee's EOPs, but are not necessary in
order to conform to the NRC-approved emergency planning guidelines
that form the basis for the EOPs. Therefore, because the portable,
ac-power independent pump is not used in the EOPs, it would not be
one of the nonsafety-related SSCs included within the scope of Sec.
50.65(a)(1) under Sec. 50.65(b)(2)(i), unless otherwise required by
Sec. 50.65(b). Further details on scoping of equipment under Sec.
50.65 are provided in NUMARC 93-01, ``Industry Guideline for
Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power
Plants.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In response to one comment, the NRC changed Sec. 50.155(c)(1) in
the final rule to more clearly communicate the equipment capacity and
capability requirements. The remaining changes to
[[Page 39697]]
paragraph (c) in Sec. 50.155 are discussed in the ``Reasonable
Protection,'' ``Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation,'' and ``Removal of the
Proposed Staffing and Communications Requirements'' sections of this
portion of the document.
N. Removal of Integration Requirements
In the proposed MBDBE rule, the NRC had included a potential
requirement for an overarching integrated response capability including
the mitigation strategies for beyond-design-basis external events and
the EDMGs and an organizational structure specific to the integrated
response capability. In addition, the proposed MBDBE rule included a
potential requirement for integration of the integrated response
capability with the existing emergency operating procedures. In
reexamining the requirements of the proposed MBDBE rule, the NRC
recognized that the implementation of the strategies and guidelines
under Order EA-02-026, ``Interim Safeguards and Security Compensatory
Measures,'' dated February 25, 2002, which resulted in the EDMGs
included in Sec. 50.155(b)(2), and the implementation of the
strategies and guidelines under the Mitigation Strategies Order that
constitute the remainder of the proposed integrated response
capability, had both included a need for integration at the regulatory
guidance level. For example, the regulatory guidance in NEI 12-06 for
the Mitigation Strategies Order covers the interactions between the
procedures developed under the order and their interfaces with various
accident mitigation procedures to result in an overall coherent and
comprehensive structure in section 11.4, ``Procedure Guidance.'' In
addition, this regulatory guidance, which provides one acceptable means
of complying with the order, includes a need for validation of the
resulting strategies to show they are feasible; this validation
included drills and walkthroughs of the resulting procedural
documentation to show that it can be executed by the personnel that
would need to use the strategies in an actual event. The NRC concludes
that the requirements imposed by the Mitigation Strategies and the
Interim Safeguards and Security Compensatory Measures Orders were
sufficient to provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection and
no new information was developed with regard to integration that would
modify this conclusion. In addition, the NRC concludes that
requirements for integration would not result in a substantial increase
in the overall protection of public health and safety. Therefore,
imposing requirements for an integrated response capability and
integration with the existing emergency operating procedures would not
meet the provisions of the Backfit Rule. The final rule has been
revised to remove the proposed requirements for an integrated response
capability and integration with the existing emergency operating
procedures.
O. Training
The proposed MBDBE rule included potential requirements for
training that included qualification of personnel and the use of the
systems approach to training as defined in Sec. 55.4, ``Definitions.''
The training requirement in the proposed rule carried forward a
requirement for training from the Mitigation Strategies Order. The
elements of this requirement for qualification and the use of the
systems approach to training were addressed in the regulatory guidance
for the Mitigation Strategies Order. The NRC concluded that the
requirements imposed by the orders were sufficient to provide
reasonable assurance of adequate protection of public health and safety
and no new information was developed with regard to qualification or
the systems approach to training that would modify this conclusion. The
NRC also considered whether there would be a substantial increase in
the overall protection of the public health and safety or the common
defense and security that would result from including requirements in
the final rule for qualification or the systems approach to training
rather than continuing the practice of addressing them in the
regulatory guidance as had been done for the orders. The NRC concluded
that, while there would be some benefit in the form of clarity as to
what had been found acceptable for compliance with the orders being
made generically applicable in this rulemaking, the recharacterization
of those items from regulatory guidance to requirements would not
constitute a substantial increase in the overall protection of the
public health and safety or the common defense and security.
The NRC concludes that a separate requirement for qualification and
the systems approach to training is not needed, but could constrain an
existing licensee or an applicant for a new licensee from developing
innovative mitigation strategies that do not rely on them. This follows
the Commission's direction in SRM-SECY-11-0124 that
[i]n order to be effective, approaches should be flexible and able
to accommodate a diverse range of circumstances and conditions. In
consideration of events beyond the design basis, a regulatory
approach founded on performance-based requirements will foster
development of the most effective and efficient, site-specific
mitigation strategies, similar to how the agency approached the
approval of licensee response strategies for the ``loss of large
area'' event under its B.5.b program.
The final rule has been revised to remove requirements for
qualification and the use of the systems approach to training.
P. Discussion of Four Topics That Were Addressed Generically
The NRC received a number of comments that fell into four topical
areas. The comments were considered and addressed generically. These
comments did not result in changes to the MBDBE rule. A discussion of
these topics is provided below.
1. Comments That Suggest a Completely Different Approach to Mitigation
of Beyond-Design-Basis Events
Several commenters provided feedback that the MBDBE rule should
contain requirements that address various specific external events. The
suggestions included geomagnetic disturbances (which are addressed
separately in Section III, ``Petitions for Rulemaking,'' of this
document because they are the subject of a petition for rulemaking
currently under consideration by the NRC), cyber events that might
disable the electric grid, attacks involving devices that may disable
the electric grid, malicious attacks on a nuclear facility, and
explosions from gas lines running in the vicinity of a nuclear
facility. These comments suggest that the NRC take a different
regulatory approach in the MBDBE rule than the NRC took under the
Mitigation Strategies Order following the Fukushima Dai-ichi event. The
comments tend to explicitly identify external events or conditions that
commenters believe should be addressed by the MBDBE rule.
Rather than following the approach suggested by these commenters,
the NRC is continuing with the regulatory approach taken with the
issuance of the Mitigation Strategies Order. The order requires
licensees to postulate a challenging damage state that exceeds the
design basis, and to develop and implement the mitigation strategies to
address that damage state. These strategies give licensees a capability
for the mitigation of beyond-design-basis external events. This
regulatory approach provides additional mitigation capability as well.
Given the unbounded nature of the beyond-design-basis external events
to which these
[[Page 39698]]
requirements are directed, the NRC determined that licensees need to
address uncertainty by assuming a challenging damage state that such
events might create, and then adding to that damage state the
consideration of the effects the initiating event may have on the
physical protection of equipment and strategies. For a more detailed
explanation of this response, refer to the NRC response to General
Comment 9 in the Comment Response Document (see Section XIX of this
document).
2. Comments That Suggest the NRC Revisit Issues Associated With SFP
Safety
These comments included suggestions that the NRC, as part of the
MBDBE rule, should reconsider SFP fires, events that can lead to SFP
fires, malicious attacks involving SFPs, SFP integrity during and
following extreme events, and longer-term SFP aging issues. The
Commission has previously considered these issues, and the NRC
concluded that it was not within the scope of the MBDBE rule to revisit
these SFP safety issues. Moreover, the MBDBE rule is addressing and
enhancing SFP safety through the imposition of regulations that (1)
require licensees to have strategies that maintain or restore SFP
cooling capabilities for beyond-design-basis external events, and (2)
provide information, through the use of SFPI, that enables operators to
appropriately prioritize the use of resources following a beyond-
design-basis external event. Explanations of the NRC's considerations
of the commenters' issues are provided in the NRC response to General
Comment 8 in the Comment Response Document. (See Section XIX of this
document.)
3. Comment Regarding Decommissioning
The NRC received comments from stakeholders that were directed
towards the basis for previous NRC exemption decisions regarding power
reactor licensees in decommissioning. While the MBDBE rule does include
provisions that facilitate the reduction of its requirements at the
appropriate points within the decommissioning process, the rulemaking's
regulatory scope does not include revisiting the bases for previous
decisions on decommissioning exemptions. Instead, the MBDBE rule is
enabling systematic removal of the mitigation strategies requirements
as a facility proceeds through the process of decommissioning. The NRC
enables these requirements to be removed through regulation, rather
than requiring removal by the more resource-intensive exemption
process, based on the same set of acceptance criteria that were used in
granting the exemptions to licensees in decommissioning. Concerns about
the NRC's decommissioning regulations should be raised in the ongoing
regulatory effort to more broadly address decommissioning issues for
all applicable requirements. (See ``Regulatory Improvements for
Decommissioning Power Reactors; Advance notice of proposed rulemaking''
(80 FR 72358; November 19, 2015).) If, as a result of that regulatory
effort, the NRC changes its position with regard to the bases for
decommissioning and, specifically, if those changes affect the
decommissioning provisions that are part of the MBDBE rule, then the
NRC will make future conforming changes to the MBDBE rule to align it
with the revised decommissioning requirements.
4. Comments on Geomagnetic Disturbances
The NRC received comments on the subject of geomagnetic
disturbances. While these could be viewed as comments on a specific
beyond-design-basis external event, the NRC determined that the issue
warrants discussion given the NRC's ongoing consideration of
geomagnetic disturbances. Although the MBDBE rule puts in place
mitigation strategies that could be initially deployed and used to
address the effects of geomagnetic disturbances (should such
disturbances lead to adverse impacts on the transmission system and an
associated loss-of-offsite power), the rulemaking's regulatory scope
does not address the issue of geomagnetic disturbances in its entirety.
The impact of geomagnetic disturbances is the subject of PRM-50-96,
which the NRC accepted for consideration within its rulemaking process.
The NRC published this determination in the Federal Register on
December 18, 2012 (77 FR 74788). Accordingly, while not fully addressed
within the MBDBE rule, the issue of geomagnetic disturbances will be
addressed as part of the NRC's consideration of PRM-50-96, as discussed
in Section III of this document.
V. Discussion
A. Rulemaking Objectives
The MBDBE rule accomplishes the following objectives: (1) Makes the
requirements in the Mitigation Strategies and SFPI Orders generically
applicable, giving consideration to lessons learned from implementation
of the orders and public comment on the MBDBE proposed rule and (2)
addresses issues raised by PRMs that were submitted to the NRC.
1. Makes the requirements in the Mitigation Strategies and SFPI
Orders generically applicable, giving consideration to lessons learned
from implementation of the orders and public comment on the MBDBE
proposed rule.
This final rule places the requirements in the Mitigation
Strategies Order and SFPI Order into the NRC's regulations so that they
apply to all current and future power reactor applicants and provides
regulatory clarity and stability to power reactor licensees. In the
absence of this rule, these requirements would need to be imposed on
new reactor applicants or licensees through additional orders or
license conditions (as was done for all combined licenses (COLs) issued
to date). As part of this rulemaking, the NRC considered stakeholder
feedback and lessons learned from the implementation of the orders,
including any challenges or unintended consequences associated with
implementation. The NRC reflected this stakeholder input in the final
rule as discussed in the previous section of this document as well as
in regulatory guidance for this rule.
2. Addresses a number of PRMs submitted to the NRC.
This rulemaking addresses, and completes the regulatory actions
planned for, the five PRMs filed by the NRDC that raise issues that
pertain to the technical aspects of this rulemaking. The petitions rely
solely on the NTTF Report and request that the NRC undertake rulemaking
in a number of areas that are addressed by this rule. This rule also
addresses, in part, PRM-50-96 submitted by Mr. Thomas Popik; however,
broader issues raised in that petition regarding geomagnetic
disturbances remain under consideration by the NRC.
B. Rulemaking Scope
The MBDBE rule addresses a significant number of regulatory issues
that stem from NRC review of the NTTF recommendations that provided the
regulatory impetus for this rule:
1. NTTF recommendations 4 and 7 and portions of NTTF recommendation
11.1 regarding onsite emergency resources to support multi-unit events
with SBO, including the need to deliver equipment to the site despite
degraded offsite infrastructure. The implementation of licensees'
responses to these provisions of the MBDBE rule is largely complete,
because they were implemented under the Mitigation Strategies Order.
[[Page 39699]]
2. NTTF recommendation 8, and the command and control issues in
NTTF recommendation 10.2.
3. Numerous requirements regarding onsite emergency response
actions implemented by the Mitigation Strategies Order, including
supporting guidance to implement the emergency response aspects of this
rule. The specific regulatory actions related to emergency response in
this rule and the associated NTTF recommendations follow:
a. Staffing and communications guidance that address NTTF
recommendation 9.3 and were also discussed in NTTF recommendations 9.1
and 9.2. These regulatory issues were initially addressed in the
implementation of the Mitigation Strategies Order through the
regulatory guidance supporting the order. The regulatory guidance for
the MBDBE rule addresses supporting facilities and equipment, as
discussed in the same NTTF recommendations.
b. Training requirements and drill guidance that address NTTF
recommendation 9.3 and were also discussed in NTTF recommendations 9.1
and 9.2. These regulatory issues were implemented under the Mitigation
Strategies Order.
Accordingly, the MBDBE rule addresses NTTF recommendations 4, 7, 8,
9.1, 9.2, 9.3 (except for maintenance of ERDS capability throughout a
beyond-design-basis external event), 10.2, and 11.1.
The MBDBE rule also addresses NTTF recommendation 9.4 to modernize
ERDS. This action differs from the other regulatory actions because
ERDS is not an essential component of a licensee's capability to
mitigate a beyond-design-basis external event. However, ERDS is an
important form of communication between the licensee and the NRC. A
modernization effort for ERDS was completed voluntarily by industry
prior to issuance of this rule. The NRC includes amendments in this
rule to remove the technology-specific references to outdated equipment
in 10 CFR part 50, appendix E, section VI, ``Emergency Response Data
System.''
Severe Accident Management Guideline and Multiple Source Term Dose
Assessment
The Commission considered a proposed SAMG backfit analysis,
provided as part of SECY-15-0065, ``Proposed Rulemaking: Mitigation of
Beyond-Design-Basis Events (RIN 3150-AJ49),'' dated April 30, 2015. The
Commission concluded that the imposition of SAMG requirements was not
warranted and, consequently, SAMGs were removed as requirements in the
MBDBE rule (refer to SRM-SECY-15-0065, dated August 27, 2015). Instead,
SAMGs continue to be implemented and maintained through an industry
initiative. For more information on the industry implementation of
SAMGs, refer to the MBDBE proposed rule.
Multiple source term dose assessment requirements were part of the
proposed MBDBE rule and addressed NTTF recommendations 9.3 and 9.1.
These proposed requirements are removed in the final MBDBE rule and
instead have been implemented by licensees as discussed in Section
IV.E, ``Multiple Source Term Dose Assessment,'' of this document.
Procedure and Guideline Integration
Procedure and guideline integration were part of the proposed MBDBE
rule and addressed NTTF recommendation 8. These proposed requirements
are removed in the final MBDBE rule and instead have been implemented
by licensees as discussed in Section IV.N, ``Removal of Integration
Requirements,'' of this document.
C. Final Rule Regulatory Bases
Applicability
This final rule applies, in whole or in part, to applicants for and
holders of an operating license for a nuclear power reactor under 10
CFR part 50 or COL under 10 CFR part 52.
This rule does not apply to applicants for, or holders of, an
operating license for a non-power reactor under 10 CFR part 50, because
non-power reactors pose lower radiological risks to the public from
accidents than power reactors. These reduced risks result from two
primary features of non-power reactors: (1) The core radionuclide
inventories are lower than in power reactors as a result of their lower
power levels and often shorter operating cycle lengths and (2) non-
power reactors have lower decay heat associated with a lower risk of
core melt and fission product release in a loss-of-coolant accident
than power reactors.
A holder of a general or specific 10 CFR part 72 independent spent
fuel storage installation (ISFSI) license for dry cask storage is not
subject to this rule for the ISFSI because the decay heat load of the
irradiated fuel is sufficiently low prior to movement to dry cask
storage that it can be air-cooled. This situation would also meet the
criteria for ``sunsetting,'' or phased removal, of requirements
(discussed later in this section of this document) if the rule were to
apply to holders of such licenses.
The GE Morris facility in Illinois, which is the only SFP licensed
under 10 CFR part 72 as an ISFSI, does not need to comply with this
rule and is excluded by the rule applicability described in Sec.
50.155(a). The NRC considered including the GE Morris facility within
the scope of this rule but found that the age and corresponding low
decay heat load of the fuel in the facility made it unnecessary. The GE
Morris facility would also meet this rule's sunsetting criteria if the
rule were to apply to GE Morris. While this rule leaves in force the
EDMG requirements of Sec. 50.155(b)(2), those requirements are not
applicable to GE Morris because it is not a 10 CFR part 50 licensee. In
the course of the development and implementation of the guidance and
strategies required by Sec. 50.155(b)(2), the NRC evaluated whether
additional mitigation strategies were warranted at GE Morris and
concluded that no mitigation strategies were warranted beyond existing
measures, due to the extended decay time since the last criticality of
the fuel stored there, the resulting low decay heat levels, and the
assessment that a gravity drain of the GE Morris SFP is not possible
due to the low permeability of the surrounding rock and the high level
of upper strata groundwater.
Decommissioning Reactors
The MBDBE rule contains a regulatory structure for phasing out the
mitigation strategies requirements for a licensee as its reactor
decommissioning process proceeds. This structure consists of three
phases:
1. Once fuel is removed permanently from the reactor, the
mitigation strategies associated with the reactor and primary
containment are no longer needed. Consequently, the requirements of
Sec. 50.155 continue to apply, but only for the SFP.
2. When the decay heat of the spent fuel is reduced to a level that
provides ample time to enable ad hoc action to be taken in response to
an event to sustain the SFP cooling function indefinitely, then all the
requirements of Sec. 50.155 can be removed with the exception of Sec.
50.155(b)(2).
3. Once all fuel is removed from the SFP, all requirements of the
MBDBE rule no longer apply.
The following provides a more detailed discussion of this structure
and the regulatory decisions made for decommissioning licensees that
provide the basis for this structure.
Once a licensee has permanently ceased operation, permanently
removed
[[Page 39700]]
fuel from the reactor vessel, and submitted the certifications of
permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from
the reactor vessel required in Sec. 50.82(a)(1) or Sec. 52.110(a),
that licensee need only comply with the requirements of Sec. 50.155(b)
through (d), and (f) associated with maintaining or restoring SFP
cooling. As discussed previously, these proposed requirements are based
on the Mitigation Strategies Order. The licensees for the Kewaunee
Power Station, Crystal River Unit 3 Nuclear Generating Plant, San
Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3, Fort Calhoun Station,
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station, and Oyster Creek Nuclear
Generating Station submitted certifications of permanent fuel removal
required by Sec. 50.82(a)(1)(ii) after issuance of the Mitigation
Strategies Order. The NRC has withdrawn the Mitigation Strategies Order
for this group of NPP licensees (Shutdown NPP Group). These withdrawals
were based on the NRC's conclusion that the lack of fuel in the
licensee's reactor core and the absence of challenges to the
containment rendered unnecessary the development of guidance and
strategies to maintain or restore core cooling and containment
capabilities. Consistent with these withdrawals, the MBDBE rule
relieves licensees in decommissioning from the requirement to comply
with the Sec. 50.155(b) requirements to have mitigation strategies and
guidelines to maintain or restore core cooling and containment
capabilities. Moreover, these licensees do not need to comply with any
of the other requirements in this final rule that support compliance
with the Sec. 50.155(b) requirements to have mitigation strategies and
guidelines for maintaining or restoring core cooling and containment
capabilities.
This MBDBE rule treats the EDMG requirements in a manner similar to
the requirements for mitigation strategies developed under the
Mitigation Strategies Order as made generically applicable under Sec.
50.155(b)(1). For a licensee that has submitted the Sec. 50.82(a)(1)
or Sec. 52.110(a) certifications, the lack of fuel in its reactor core
and the absence of challenges to the containment would render
unnecessary EDMGs for core cooling and containment capabilities. This
licensee would not need to comply with the requirements in the MBDBE
rule associated with core cooling or containment capabilities; rather,
the licensee would be required to comply with the requirement to have
EDMGs based on the presence of fuel in the SFP.
Once the licensee has submitted the certifications required in
Sec. 50.82(a)(1) or Sec. 52.110(a), that licensee does not need to
comply with the requirement in Sec. 50.155(e) that the licensee
provide reliable means to remotely monitor wide-range SFP levels to
support effective prioritization of event mitigation and recovery
actions. The requirement in Sec. 50.155(e) makes generically
applicable the requirements in the SFPI Order. This order requires a
reliable means of remotely monitoring wide-range SFP levels to support
effective prioritization of event mitigation and recovery actions in
the event of a beyond-design-basis external event with the potential to
challenge both the reactor and SFP.
The NRC also withdrew the SFPI Order for the Shutdown NPP Group.
These withdrawals were based, in part, on the NRC's conclusions that
once a licensee certifies the permanent removal of the fuel from its
reactor vessel, the safety of the fuel in the SFP becomes the primary
safety function for site personnel. In the event of a challenge to the
safety of fuel stored in the SFP, decision makers would not have to
prioritize actions and the focus of the licensee staff would be the SFP
condition. Therefore, once fuel is permanently removed from the reactor
vessel, the basis for the SFPI Order no longer applies. Consistent with
the NRC order withdrawals, the NRC no longer requires licensees in
decommissioning to have a reliable means to remotely monitor wide-range
SFP levels to support effective prioritization of event mitigation and
recovery actions in the event of a beyond-design-basis external event
with the potential to challenge both the reactor and SFP.
The Mitigation Strategies Order also required power reactor
licensees to have certain SFP cooling capabilities. In the withdrawal
letters to the licensees for the Shutdown NPP Group, the NRC determined
that the passage of time, the fuel's low decay heat, and the long time
to boil off the water inventory in the SFP obviated the need for the
Shutdown NPP Group licensees to have guidance and strategies necessary
for compliance with the Mitigation Strategies Order. The withdrawal of
the Mitigation Strategies Order for those licensees eliminated the
requirement for them to comply with the order's requirements concerning
beyond-design-basis event strategies and guidelines for SFP cooling
capabilities. Consistent with the basis for the order withdrawals,
licensees in decommissioning are relieved from the requirements
concerning beyond-design-basis event strategies and guidelines for SFP
cooling capabilities and any related requirements. These licensees have
to perform and retain an analysis demonstrating that sufficient time
has passed since the fuel within the SFP was last irradiated, such that
the fuel's low decay heat and boil-off period provide sufficient time
for the licensee to obtain offsite resources to sustain the SFP cooling
function indefinitely. Licensees in decommissioning may use the
equipment in place for EDMGs should that equipment be available,
recognizing that the protection for that equipment is against the
hazards posed by events that result in losses of large areas of the
plant due to fires or explosions rather than beyond-design-basis
external events resulting from natural phenomena. If the EDMG equipment
is not available, offsite resources would be used by the licensee for
onsite emergency response (i.e., SFP cooling). This relief from the
requirements related to the Mitigation Strategies Order does not impact
any commitments licensees have made to support their requests for
exemptions from offsite emergency planning requirements. The NRC's
approval of such exemptions is based on the low radiological
consequences of a beyond-design-basis event in which a loss of SFP
inventory could result in a zirconium cladding fire and,
conservatively, do not consider the ability to use offsite resources to
mitigate such an event.
The NRC is maintaining the EDMG requirement for decommissioning
plants because an event for which EDMGs would be required is not based
on the condition of the fuel but may instead result from an aircraft
impact or a beyond-design-basis security event that could introduce
additional heat into the SFP independent from the decay heat of the
fuel. These types of events and their potential consequences were
considered as a part of the final rule dated March 7, 2009, on Power
Reactor Security Requirements (74 FR 13926). In the course of that
rulemaking, the NRC took into account stakeholder input and determined
that it would be inappropriate to apply the EDMG requirements to
permanently shutdown and defueled reactors where the fuel was removed
from the site or moved to an ISFSI. However, the resulting rule
inadvertently removed the EDMG requirements once the certifications of
permanent cessation of operations and removal of fuel from the reactor
vessel were submitted rather than upon removal of fuel from the SFP.
The NRC is correcting this error from the 2009
[[Page 39701]]
final rule in this final rule as explained in the ``EDMGs'' portion of
this section.
The NRC is excluding from Sec. 50.155 the licensee for Millstone
Power Station, Unit 1, Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. Dominion
Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. is also the licensee for Millstone Power
Station, Units 2 and 3, but this exclusion applies to Dominion Nuclear
Connecticut, Inc. in its capacity as licensee for only Unit 1, which is
not operating but has irradiated fuel in its SFP and satisfies the
proposed criteria for not having to comply with this final rule except
for the EDMG requirements. In the course of the development and
implementation of the guidance and strategies required by new Sec.
50.155(b)(2), the NRC evaluated whether additional mitigation
strategies were warranted at Millstone Power Station, Unit 1 and
concluded that no mitigation strategies were warranted beyond existing
measures. This conclusion is based principally on the extended decay
time since the last criticality occurred on November 4, 1995 and the
fact that this results in low decay heat levels that allow sufficient
time for the use of existing strategies. The exclusion for Millstone
Power Station, Unit 1 in this rule is based upon that conclusion, with
the understanding that additional mitigation capabilities will be
present because of the licensee's implementation of the Sec.
50.155(b)(2) strategies at the co-located Millstone Power Station,
Units 2 and 3.
Mitigating Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events
The requirements in Sec. 50.155(b)(1) for mitigating strategies
make generically applicable requirements previously imposed on
licensees by the Mitigation Strategies Order, as well as by license
conditions included in the COLs held by Detroit Edison Company (for
Enrico Fermi Nuclear Plant, Unit 3), Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (for
William States Lee III Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), Dominion
Virginia Power (for North Anna Unit 3) and Florida Power and Light
Company (for Turkey Point, Units 6 and 7).\3\
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\3\ License No. NPF-95, condition 2.D(12)(g); License No. NPF-
101, condition 2.D(12)(j) and License No. NPF-102, condition
2.D(12)(j); and License No. NPF-103, condition 2.D(12)(f) and
License No. NPF-104, condition 2.D(12)(h) and License No. NPF-105,
condition 2.D(12)(h).
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Recognizing that beyond-design-basis external events are unbounded,
and that these events can result in a multitude of damage states and
associated accident conditions, a significant regulatory challenge is
developing bounded requirements that meaningfully address the
regulatory issue. From a practical standpoint, development of
mitigation strategies requires that there be a reasonable definition
(or boundary conditions established) for an onsite damage state that
the strategies would then address and thereby provide an additional
capability to mitigate beyond-design-basis external event conditions
that might occur. The assumed damage state should ideally capture a
reasonable range of potential damage states that might occur as a
result of beyond-design-basis external events and it should present an
immediate challenge to the key safety functions for the facilities, so
that the resultant strategies provide greater capabilities and can
improve safety. An assumed damage state that accomplishes this
objective is the loss of all ac power.
The MBDBE rule and the Mitigation Strategies Order both require the
mitigation of a loss of all ac power condition. Both the MBDBE rule and
the Mitigation Strategies Order address this requirement in two parts:
(1) Through an assumed damage stage that is used to develop the
strategies and guidelines for the mitigation of beyond-design-basis
external events, and (2) through supporting contingencies within the
strategies that address conditions that are more severe than those
assumed to develop the strategies and guidelines. The assumed damage
state for this rule is the same as that assumed to implement the
requirements of attachment 2 to the Mitigation Strategies Order for
currently operating power reactors: A loss of all ac power condition
concurrent with an LUHS. This assumed damage state is effective at
immediately challenging the key safety functions of core cooling,
containment, and SFP cooling following a beyond-design-basis external
event. Requiring strategies to maintain or restore these key functions
under such circumstances results in an additional mitigation capability
consistent with the Commission's objective when it issued the
Mitigation Strategies Order.
As discussed in Section IV.D, ``Loss of All Alternating Current
Power,'' of this document, the public comments provided on the MBDBE
proposed rule showed some confusion regarding the requirement for loss
of all ac power. The proposed rule contained the language ``extended
loss of all ac power.'' The requirements in Sec. 50.155(b)(1) provide
for a capability to maintain or restore key functional capabilities
indefinitely, or until sufficient site functional capabilities can be
maintained without the need for mitigation strategies. As such, the
word ``extended'' was unnecessary, and the NRC deleted it to reduce
confusion with the ``ELAP'' term used in industry guidance;
implementation of the requirements in Sec. 50.155(b)(1) involves the
use of contingencies that address damage states more severe than an
assumed ELAP. Together, therefore, the assumed ELAP and the
contingencies are the means for meeting a loss of all ac power
requirement.
This MBDBE rule is not prescriptive in terms of the specific set of
initial and boundary conditions assumed for the loss of all ac power
and LUHS condition. The damage state for currently operating reactors,
defined in more detail in RG 1.226, reflects currently operating power
reactor designs and the reliance of those designs on ac power, while
the assumed damage state for a future design may be different depending
upon the design features. Specifically, the damage state of a loss of
all ac power condition concurrent with an LUHS in the Mitigation
Strategies Order was implemented first through the assumption of an
ELAP, while allowing ac power from the inverters to be assumed
available. This assumption is used to establish event sequence and the
associated times for when mitigation actions would be assumed to be
required. Secondly, to address the MBDBE rule and the Mitigation
Strategies Order requirement for a loss of all ac power, including ac
power from the batteries (through inverters), contingencies are
included in the mitigation strategies to enable actions to be taken
under those circumstances (e.g., sending operators to immediately take
manual control over a non ac-powered core cooling pump). As such, this
provision makes generically applicable the current implementation under
the Mitigation Strategies Order with no intent to either relax or
impose new requirements and is performance-based to allow some
flexibility for future designs. As an example, some reactor designs
(e.g., Westinghouse AP1000 and General Electric Economic Simplified
Boiling Water Reactor (ESBWR)) use passive safety systems to meet NRC
requirements for maintaining key safety functions. The inherent design
of those passive safety systems makes certain assumptions, such as
LUHS, inappropriate. Accordingly, the assumed condition for the
mitigation strategies requirements for passive reactors is the loss of
normal access to the normal heat sink, discussed further in this
section. Nevertheless, in this rule the NRC is requiring that the
strategies and guidelines be capable of
[[Page 39702]]
implementation during a loss of all ac power.
Regarding the assumed LUHS for COLs or applications referencing the
AP1000 or the ESBWR designs, the assumption was modified to be a loss
of normal access to the normal heat sink (see, e.g., attachment 3 to
the Mitigation Strategies Order and the Enrico Fermi Nuclear Plant,
Unit 3 license, License No. NPF-95, condition 2.D(12)(g)). This
modified language reflects the passive design features of the AP1000
and the ESBWR that provide core cooling, containment, and spent fuel
cooling capabilities for 72 hours without reliance on ac power. These
features do not rely on access to any external water sources for the
first 72 hours because the containment vessel and the passive
containment cooling system serve as the safety-related ultimate heat
sink for the AP1000 design and the isolation condenser system serves as
the safety-related ultimate heat sink for the ESBWR design.
As discussed previously, the range of beyond-design-basis external
events is unbounded. The MBDBE rule is not intended, and should not be
understood, to mean that the mitigation strategies can adequately
address all postulated beyond-design-basis external events. It is
always possible to postulate a more severe event that causes greater
damage and for which the mitigation strategies may not be able to
maintain or restore the functional capabilities (e.g., meteorite
impact). Instead, the MBDBE requirements provide additional mitigation
capability in light of uncertainties associated with external events,
consistent with the NRC's regulatory objective for issuance of the
Mitigation Strategies Order.
The MBDBE rule requires that the mitigating strategies for beyond-
design-basis external events in Sec. 50.155(b)(1) be capable of being
implemented site-wide. This recognizes that severe external events are
likely to impact the entire reactor site and for multi-unit sites,
damage all the power reactor units on the site. This requirement means
that there needs to be sufficient equipment and supporting staff to
enable the maintenance or restoration of core cooling, containment, and
SFP cooling functions for all the power reactor units on the site. This
is a distinguishing characteristic of this set of mitigation strategies
from those in Sec. 50.155(b)(2), for which the damage state is a more
limited, albeit large area of a single plant, reflecting the hazards
for which that set of strategies was developed.
The NRC gave consideration to whether there should be changes made
to Sec. 50.63 (the Station Blackout Rule) to link those requirements
with this rule. This consideration stemmed from recommendation 4.1 of
the NTTF Report to ``initiate rulemaking to revise 10 CFR 50.63'' and
the understanding that this rule could result in an increased SBO
coping capability, in addition to the regulatory objectives of the
MBDBE rule, which provide additional beyond-design-basis external event
mitigation. Because of the substantive differences between the
requirements of Sec. 50.63 for licensees to be able to withstand and
recover from an SBO and the MBDBE requirements, the NRC determined that
such a linkage is not necessary and could lead to regulatory confusion.
The principal regulatory objective of Sec. 50.63 was to establish
SBO coping durations for a specific scenario: The loss of offsite power
coincident with a failure of all trains of emergency onsite ac power
(typically, the failure of multiple emergency diesel generators). In
meeting this regulatory objective, the NRC understood that there would
be safety benefits accrued through the provision of an alternate ac
source diverse from the emergency diesel generators and therefore
defined ``alternate ac source'' in Sec. 50.2. The NRC defined the
event a licensee must withstand and recover from as a ``station
blackout'' rather than a ``loss of all ac power.'' An SBO allows for
continued availability of ac power to buses fed by station batteries
through inverters or by alternate ac sources. The MBDBE rule requires
an additional capability to mitigate beyond-design-basis external
events. Because the condition assumed for the mitigation strategies to
establish the additional mitigation capability includes a loss of all
ac power, which is more conservative than an SBO as defined in Sec.
50.2 (because it covers an indefinite period, not a loss for a certain
amount of time, and it also assumes the loss of alternate ac sources),
there can be a direct relationship between the two different sets of
requirements with regard to the actual implementation at the facility.
Specifically, implementation of the mitigation strategies links into
the SBO procedures (e.g., the applicable strategies would be
implemented to maintain or restore the key safety functions when the
EOPs reach a ``response not obtained'' juncture).\4\
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\4\ One of the formats for symptom-based EOPs that are used in
the operating power reactors has the operators take an action and
verify that the system responds to the action in a manner that
confirms that the action was effective. For example, a step in an
EOP could be to open a valve in order to allow cooling water flow,
and the verification would be obtained by confirming there are
indications that flow has commenced, such as a decrease in
temperature of the system being cooled. If those indications are not
obtained, the procedure would provide instructions on the next step
to accomplish in a separate column labeled ``response not
obtained.''
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Step-by-step procedures are not necessary for many aspects of the
mitigation strategies and guidelines. Rather, the strategies and
guidelines are intended to be flexible, and enable plant personnel to
adapt them to the conditions that result from the beyond-design-basis
external event. The provisions typically would result in strategies and
guidelines that use both installed and portable equipment, instead of
only relying on installed ac power sources (with the exception of
protected battery power) to maintain or restore core cooling,
containment, and SFP cooling capabilities. By using equipment that is
separate from the normal installed ac-powered equipment, the strategies
and guidelines have a diverse attribute. By having available multiple
sets of portable equipment that can be deployed and used in multiple
ways depending on the circumstances of the event, operators are able to
implement strategies and guidelines that are flexible and adaptable.
The mitigation strategies requirements are both performance-based
and functionally-based. The performance-based requirements recognize
that the new requirements provide most benefit to future reactors whose
designs could differ significantly from current power reactor designs
and as such, use of more prescriptive requirements could be problematic
and create unnecessary regulatory impact and need for exemptions. Use
of functionally-based requirements results from the need to have
requirements that can address a wide range of damage states that might
exist following beyond-design-basis external events. Maintaining or
restoring three key functions (core cooling, containment, and SFP
cooling) supports maintenance of the fission product barriers (i.e.,
fuel clad, reactor coolant pressure boundary, and containment) and
results in an effective means to mitigate these events, while remaining
flexible such that the strategies and guidelines can be adapted to the
damage state that occurs. Functionally-based requirements also result
in strategies that align well with the symptom-based procedures used by
power reactors to respond to accidents. Accordingly, the Mitigation
Strategies Order contained requirements for a three-phased approach for
current operating reactors. The MBDBE rule does not specify a number of
phases; instead, it establishes higher-level, performance-based
[[Page 39703]]
requirements consistent with this discussion. Section IV.K,
``Consideration of Explicit Requirements for a Three-Phase Response,''
of this document contains further discussion of this aspect of the
MBDBE rule.
The NRC considered incorporating into this rule a requirement that
licensees be capable of implementing the strategies and guidelines
``whenever there is irradiated fuel in the reactor vessel or spent fuel
pool.'' This provision would have been a means of making generically
applicable the requirement from the Mitigation Strategies Order that
licensees be capable of implementing the strategies and guidelines ``in
all modes.'' The NRC considered the terminology ``whenever there is
irradiated fuel in the reactor vessel or spent fuel pool'' to be a
better means to address the order requirement because the phrase did
not use technical specification type language (i.e., modes), which is
in effect when a licensee completely offloads the fuel from the reactor
vessel into the SFP during an outage. The NRC did not use the phrases,
``whenever there is irradiated fuel in the reactor vessel or spent fuel
pool,'' or, ``in all modes,'' in the MBDBE rule and instead structured
the applicability provisions to achieve this same objective by
requiring licensees to have mitigation strategies for beyond-design-
basis external events for the various configurations that can exist for
the reactor and SFPs throughout the operational, refueling, and
decommissioning phases.
The mitigation strategies and guidelines implemented under the
Mitigation Strategies Order assume a demanding condition that maximizes
decay heat that would need to be removed from the reactor core and SFP
source terms on site. This implementation results in a more restrictive
timeline (i.e., mitigation actions required sooner to maintain or
restore cooling to these source terms) and a greater resulting
additional capability. These assumed at-power conditions are 100 days
at 100 percent power prior to the occurrence of the beyond-design-basis
event for the reactor core, consistent with the assumption used for
Sec. 50.63. This assumption establishes a conservative decay heat for
the reactor source term. The assumed SFP conditions include the design
basis heat load for the SFP, which is typically a full core offload
following a refueling outage, as the heat load that is used for the
sizing of FLEX equipment. For the purposes of determining the response
time for the SFP strategies when fuel is in the reactor vessel, the
rate of inventory loss of the SFP is calculated based on the worst case
conditions for SFP heat load assuming the plant is at power. The NRC
considers the development of timelines for the mitigation strategies
using these assumptions for the reactor core and SFP to be appropriate.
The NRC recognizes the difficulty of developing engineered
strategies for the extraordinarily large number of possible plant and
equipment configurations that might exist under shutdown conditions
(i.e., at shutdown when equipment may be removed from service, when
there is ongoing maintenance and repairs or refueling operations, or
modifications are being implemented). Licensees must be cognizant of
such configurations, equipment availability, and decay heat states that
could present greater challenges under these conditions and design
mitigation strategies that can be implemented under such circumstances.
The NRC considered incorporating requirements into the MBDBE rule
that would require strategies to be developed that specifically assume
that delays in the receipt of offsite resources occur as a result of
damage to the transportation infrastructure. While severe events could
damage local infrastructure, and could create challenges with regard to
the delivery of offsite resources, the NRC concluded that having this
level of specificity in the MBDBE rule is not necessary. Instead, this
rule contains provisions that are more performance-based, requiring
continued maintenance or restoration of the functional capabilities
until acquisition of offsite assistance and resources. Potential delays
and other challenges presented by extreme events that affect
acquisition and use of offsite resources are addressed by licensee
programs that implement the provisions of this rule.
The Mitigation Strategies Order included a requirement that
licensees develop guidance and strategies to obtain ``sufficient
offsite resources to sustain [the functions of core cooling,
containment, and SFP cooling] indefinitely.'' The NRC considered using
this language in this rule, but concluded that this would be better
phrased as ``indefinitely, or until sufficient site functional
capabilities can be maintained without the need for the mitigation
strategies.'' The NRC concluded that this phrase more clearly
communicates the existence of a transition from the use of the
mitigation strategies to recovery operations.
EDMGs
In recognition of the similarity of the existing EDMGs formerly in
Sec. 50.54(hh)(2) to the strategies required by Sec. 50.155(b)(1),
the NRC relocated the EDMGs into the MBDBE rule as Sec. 50.155(b)(2).
In addition to moving the text, the NRC made a few editorial changes.
The wording used to describe these requirements has evolved from
``guidance and strategies,'' in Order EA-02-026, ``Interim Safeguards
and Security Compensatory Measures,'' dated February 25, 2002, to
``strategies,'' in the corresponding license conditions, to ``guidance
and strategies,'' in Sec. 50.54(hh)(2), to its current form,
``strategies and guidelines.'' The word ``guidelines'' was chosen
rather than ``guidance'' to more accurately reflect the nature of the
instructions that a licensee could develop and to avoid confusion with
the term ``regulatory guidance.'' The word ``strategies'' is used in
this rule to reflect its meaning, ``plans of action.'' The resulting
plans of action may include plant procedures, methods, or other
guideline documents, as deemed appropriate by the licensee during the
development of these strategies. These plans of action also include the
arrangements made with offsite responders for support during an actual
event. No substantive change to the requirements is intended by this
change in the wording.
The final rule clarifies the Sec. 50.155(b)(2) requirements by
adding the phrase ``impacted by the event'' in order to differentiate
these requirements from those located in Sec. 50.155(b)(1). The
requirements in Sec. 50.155(b)(2), which address the loss of large
areas of the plant, are limited to the areas of the plant impacted by
the event, and as such, are not intended to address a site-wide event.
This clarification was necessary as a result of the relocation of these
requirements to the MBDBE rule and their juxtaposition with the
mitigation strategies for beyond-design-basis external events in Sec.
50.155(b)(1), which are for a site-wide event. The events for which
EDMGs would be used can impact key equipment that is shared between
power reactor units (i.e., SFPs), and that is why the NRC did not use
language that would have limited the application of these requirements
to an individual power reactor unit. This clarification is to preserve
the scope of this requirement and specifically avoid an unintended
imposition of a new requirement.
Applicability of the requirements of Sec. 50.155(b)(2) was
formerly governed by Sec. 50.54(hh)(3), which made these requirements
inapplicable following the submittal of the certifications required
under Sec. 50.82(a) or Sec. 52.110(a)(1). As discussed in the Power
Reactor Security Requirements final rule, the NRC concludes that it is
inappropriate for the requirements for EDMGs to apply to a
[[Page 39704]]
permanently shutdown, defueled reactor, where the fuel was removed from
the site or moved to an ISFSI. The NRC is requiring EDMGs for a
licensee with permanently shutdown defueled reactors, but with
irradiated fuel still in its SFP, because the licensee must be able to
implement effective mitigation measures for large fires and explosions
that could impact the SFP while it contains irradiated fuel. The MBDBE
rule corrects the former Sec. 50.54(hh)(3) to implement the sunsetting
of the associated requirement as intended by the Commission in 2009.
This change does not constitute backfitting for currently operating
reactors (except Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 2), current COL holders,
and currently decommissioning reactors with spent irradiated fuel in
their SFP (except Millstone Power Station, Unit 1, as it is not subject
to Sec. 50.155) because the EDMGs are also required by the licensee's
license conditions. Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 2, does not have the
license condition, but TVA has consented to the imposition of this
requirement without the NRC conducting a backfit analysis for this
imposition on Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 2. The NRC request for
TVA's consent and TVA's response are referenced in Section XIX,
``Availability of Documents,'' of this document.
In the proposed MBDBE rule, the NRC discussed secondary containment
aspects of the mitigation strategies in the decommissioning provisions
of Sec. 50.155(a) for licensees that rely on secondary containment as
a fission product barrier for their SFPs. The intent of the proposed
requirement was to document the requirement without changing the
requirements that had been imposed under the Mitigation Strategies
Order and Sec. 50.54(hh)(2). In the course of interactions with the
ACRS and during the CER meeting, the NRC received feedback that this
phrasing of the requirement was confusing. Therefore, the NRC has
revised the final MBDBE rule to eliminate the discussion of secondary
containment in the decommissioning provisions of Sec. 50.155(a).
Equipment
The MBDBE rule contains requirements for licensee equipment that is
relied upon for use in mitigation strategies and guidelines. This final
rule makes generically applicable requirement (2) in attachments 2 and
3 of the Mitigation Strategies Order, which reads as follows: ``These
strategies must . . . have adequate capacity to address challenges to
core cooling, containment, and SFP cooling capabilities at all units on
a site subject to this Order.''
The industry guidance of NEI 12-06, as endorsed by NRC interim
staff guidance JLD-ISG-2012-01, included specifications for each
licensee's provision of a spare capability in order to assure the
reliability and availability of the equipment required to provide the
capacity and capability requirements of the Mitigation Strategies
Order. This ``spare capability'' was also referred to within the
guidance as an ``N+1'' capability, where ``N'' is the number of power
reactor units on a site. The NRC considered including requirements
similar to the spare capability specification of NEI 12-06 in this rule
but determined that such an inclusion would be too prescriptive and
could result in the need to grant exemptions for alternate approaches
that provide an effective and efficient means to provide the required
capability. One example of this is in the area of flexible hoses, for
which a strict application of the spare capability guidance could
necessitate a licensee's provision of spare hose or cable lengths
sufficient to replace the longest run of hoses being used by the
licensee, when significant operating experience with similar hoses for
fire protection does not show a failure rate that would support the
need for such a spare capability.
The development of the mitigation strategies in response to the
Mitigation Strategies Order relied upon a variety of initial and
boundary conditions that were provided in the regulatory guidance of
JLD-ISG-2012-01 and NEI 12-06. These initial and boundary conditions
followed the philosophy of the basis for imposition of the requirements
of the Mitigation Strategies Order, which was to require additional
defense-in-depth measures to provide continued reasonable assurance of
adequate protection of public health and safety. As a result, the
industry response to the Mitigation Strategies Order includes diverse
and flexible means of accomplishing safety functions rather than
providing an additional further hardened train of safety equipment.
These requirements and conditions included the acknowledgement that,
due to the fact that initiation of an event requiring use of the
strategies would include multiple failures of safety-related SSCs, it
is inappropriate to postulate further failures that are not
consequential to the initiating event. As a result, the NRC has
determined that the conditions to which the instrumentation (as a class
of equipment), that would be relied on for the mitigation strategies,
would be exposed do not include conditions stemming from fuel damage.
Instead, those conditions are limited to the initial and boundary
conditions set forth in the guidance and include the conditions assumed
to result from a postulated beyond-design-basis external event used in
developing the guidelines and strategies under the MBDBE rule. The NRC
has determined that it should not be necessary for the instrumentation
to be designed specifically for use in the mitigation strategies and
guidelines, but instead it would be necessary that the design and
associated functional performance be sufficient to meet the demands of
those strategies (i.e., a licensee may rely upon existing
instrumentation that is capable of operating in the conditions
anticipated for the required strategies and guidelines rather than
replacing it with new instrumentation specifically designed for those
conditions). For example, NEI 12-06, which is endorsed in RG 1.226,
includes a discussion in section 3.2.1.12 regarding the basis that
should be provided for plant equipment that is relied upon in the
mitigation strategies.
The MBDBE requirements cover events that are not included in
design-basis events as that term is used in the Sec. 50.2 definition
of ``safety-related structures, systems, and components.'' Because of
this, reliance on equipment for use in the mitigation strategies does
not result in the applicability of the PDC as described in GDC 2 of
appendix A to 10 CFR part 50. The MBDBE rule requires reasonable
protection for the equipment relied on for the mitigation strategies
against the effects of natural phenomena that are equivalent in
magnitude to the phenomena assumed for developing the design basis for
the facility.
Because the events for which the mitigation strategies are to be
used are outside the scope of the design-basis events considered in
establishing the basis for the design of the facility, equipment that
is relied upon solely for those mitigation strategies does not fall
within the scope of Sec. 50.65 (the Maintenance Rule). Nevertheless,
the equipment used to implement the mitigation strategies must receive
adequate maintenance in order to assure that it is capable of
fulfilling its intended function, and thereby ensure that the
requirement to develop, implement, and maintain the mitigation
strategies continues to be met.
This rulemaking does not revise the regulatory treatment of
equipment relied upon for the EDMGs now relocated to Sec.
50.155(b)(2). The regulatory treatment of that equipment remains as it
is described in NEI 06-12, the endorsed
[[Page 39705]]
guidance document for those strategies and guidelines.
The NRC recognizes that existing nuclear power reactors with
operating licenses issued under 10 CFR part 50 and those new nuclear
power reactors with COLs issued under 10 CFR part 52 or operating
licenses issued under 10 CFR part 50 may establish different approaches
in developing strategies to mitigate beyond-design-basis events. For
example, new nuclear power plants may use installed plant equipment for
both the initial and long-term response to a loss of all ac power with
less reliance on offsite resources than existing nuclear power
reactors. Under Sec. 50.155(c), the NRC will consider the specific
plant approach when evaluating the SSCs relied on as part of the
mitigation strategies for beyond-design-basis events.
Training
The mitigation of the effects of beyond-design-basis events using
the strategies and guidelines is principally accomplished through
manual actions rather than automated plant responses. Additionally, the
instructions provided for event mitigation may be largely provided as
high level strategies and guidelines rather than step-by-step
procedures. The use of strategies and guidelines supports the ability
to adapt the mitigation measures to the specific plant damage and
operational conditions presented by the event. However, effective use
of this flexibility depends upon the knowledge and abilities of
personnel to select appropriate strategies or guidelines from a range
of options and implement mitigation measures using equipment or methods
that may differ from those employed for normal operation or design-
basis event response. As a result, the NRC considers personnel training
necessary to ensure that individuals are capable of effectively
performing the roles and responsibilities established in the strategies
and guidelines that are required by this rule.
Spent Fuel Pool Monitoring
The MBDBE rule requires licensees to have a means to remotely
monitor wide-range SFP level as a separate requirement within the MBDBE
rule, which makes the requirements of the SFPI Order generically
applicable. While many licensees make use of this instrumentation to
support implementation of the mitigation strategies, the
instrumentation requirement was imposed under the SFPI Order to address
the potential for the licensee personnel to be distracted from other
issues by the status of the SFP and thereby enable the operators to re-
prioritize resources, if necessary, following a beyond-design-basis
external event. This requirement has a separate purpose from the
mitigation strategies requirements: To provide a reliable indication of
the water level in the SFP to allow prioritization of response actions
between the core and the SFP. Therefore, this requirement was moved to
paragraph (e) in the final rule to ensure a continued separation of the
requirements. The NRC considered including the detailed requirements
from the SFPI Order within the MBDBE rule but determined that the more
performance-based approach taken with this rule allows an applicant for
a new reactor license or design certification to provide innovative
solutions to address the need to effectively prioritize event
mitigation and recovery actions between the source term contained in
the reactor vessel and that contained within the SFP.
In the course of implementation of the SFPI Order requirements, one
lesson learned was that the need for prioritization of event mitigation
and recovery actions is inapplicable to SFPs for which the decay heat
load is sufficiently low that SFP cooling is not challenged in the same
time frame as event progression for the reactor core. This was
documented in the regulatory guidance of JLD-ISG-2012-03 and NEI 12-02,
``Industry Guidance for Compliance with NRC Order EA-12-051, `To Modify
License with Regard to Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation,' ''
Revision 1, which eliminates from the definition of an applicable SFP a
pool that does not contain fuel used for the generation of power within
the preceding 5 years. This is clarified in the MBDBE rule in Sec.
50.155(e) by including a termination of the requirement once 5 years
have elapsed since the fuel within the pool was last used for power
generation in a reactor vessel.
Documentation of Changes
Because the MBDBE rule requirements address beyond-design-basis
events, currently existing change control processes, including most
notably Sec. 50.59, may not address all aspects of a contemplated
change to the strategies and guidelines under this rule. Therefore, the
MBDBE rule includes a provision intended to supplement the existing
change control processes and focus on the beyond-design-basis aspects
of proposed changes. The MBDBE rule does not contain criteria typically
included in other change control processes that are used as a threshold
for determining when a licensee needs to seek NRC review and approval
prior to implementing the proposed change. Instead, the MBDBE rule
requires that licensees perform evaluations of proposed changes
sufficient to reach a conclusion that the MBDBE rule requirements
continue to be met and to document and maintain this evaluation to
support NRC oversight of these activities. The final rule is revised to
more clearly reflect this approach by referring to these requirements
in Sec. 50.155(f) as ``Documentation of Changes.''
The NRC requested stakeholder feedback concerning the change
control provisions for the MBDBE rule. The feedback provided is
discussed in Section IV of this document. The NRC concludes that the
final rule will follow the same approach contained in the proposed rule
as discussed in Section VI of this document. Notwithstanding this
conclusion, the NRC is revising the discussion in this document for
this provision to clarify its meaning and intent.
The NRC determined that the changes whose acceptability would be
most difficult to judge are those that do not fall within endorsed
guidance or are not NRC-approved alternative approaches taken at
another licensed facility that can be demonstrated to apply to the
licensee's facility. Changes to the implementation of the MBDBE
requirements that remain consistent with regulatory guidance are
clearly acceptable because such changes ensure continued compliance
with the MBDBE requirements. The NRC recognizes that licensees may wish
to make changes to the implementation of these requirements that do not
follow current regulatory guidance for this rulemaking and that are not
an approved alternative that the licensee can demonstrate applies to
their facility. To clarify the MBDBE rule requirements for
documentation of changes, the NRC added additional information to
Section VI of this document that discusses potential changes, which are
outside endorsed guidance or approved alternatives, that would clearly
not constitute ``demonstrated compliance.''
During public discussions before issuance of the proposed rule, a
stakeholder suggested that the NRC should consider a provision to allow
a licensee to request NRC review of a proposed change, and that if the
NRC did not act upon the request for a suggested time period (e.g., 180
days), then the request would be considered ``acceptable,'' similar to
the process for changes to the quality assurance program description
under
[[Page 39706]]
Sec. 50.54(a)(4)(iv). The NRC did not include this form of tacit
approval process in the MBDBE rule and instead included provisions in
the MBDBE rule to place on licensees the responsibility for ensuring
that proposed changes result in continued compliance with the rule,
subject to NRC oversight, or are otherwise submitted to the NRC under
the Sec. 50.12 exemption process.
A licensee may intend to change its facility, procedures, or
guideline sets to revise some aspect of beyond-design-basis mitigation
governed by the MBDBE rule in a manner that can impact multiple aspects
of the facility, including ``design basis'' aspects of the facility
subject to other regulations and change control processes. As
previously discussed, the NRC anticipates that licensees will ensure
that changes to the implementation of the MBDBE requirements are
consistent with endorsed guidance, or otherwise demonstrate continued
compliance with the MBDBE rule. This same change also could impact
safety-related SSCs, either directly (e.g., a proposed change that
impacts a physical connection of mitigation strategies equipment to a
safety-related component or system) or indirectly (e.g., a proposed
change that involves the physical location of mitigation equipment in
the vicinity of safety-related equipment that presents a potential for
adverse physical/spatial interactions with safety-related components).
As a result, Sec. 50.59 and other change control processes, as
appropriate, would need to be applied to evaluate the proposed change
for acceptability under any other applicable change control process.
Additionally, proposed changes can impact numerous aspects of the
facility beyond the safety-related impacts, including implementation of
fire protection requirements, security requirements, emergency
preparedness requirements, or safety/security interface requirements. A
licensee must therefore ensure that all applicable change control
provisions are used to judge the acceptability of facility changes.
Additionally, recognizing the nature of mitigation strategies and the
reliance on human actions, a licensee also needs to ensure that the
proposed changes satisfy the safety/security interface requirements of
Sec. 73.58. While the obligation of a licensee to comply with all
applicable requirements might be viewed as making the provision in
Sec. 50.155(f)(2) unnecessary, the NRC recognizes the potential
complexity of proposed facility changes and the complexity of existing
regulatory requirements that govern change control. Therefore, the NRC
concluded that adding the Sec. 50.155(f)(2) provision for
documentation of changes was warranted for the purposes of regulatory
clarity.
Implementation
Section 50.155(g) provides a 2-year implementation period to
provide sufficient time to allow licensees to review their previous
compliance with the Mitigation Strategies and SFPI Orders and make any
necessary changes to programs, plans, procedures, and guidelines to
reflect and reference the newly issued Sec. 50.155 requirements. This
implementation period is 3 years for licensees that received Order EA-
13-109. These licensees are allowed an additional year of
implementation in order to alleviate CER by allowing the same amount of
time following achievement of full compliance with that order, which
was issued a year after the Mitigation Strategies and SFPI Orders.
In contrast with the portions of the final MBDBE rule that make the
Mitigation Strategies and SFPI Orders generically applicable, Sec.
50.155(b)(2) continues the requirements that were previously in Sec.
50.54(hh)(2). Currently operating power reactor licensees have all
achieved compliance with these requirements. Therefore, Sec. 50.155(g)
requires that licensees subject to the requirements of Sec.
50.155(b)(2) continue to comply with those requirements during the
implementation period for the remainder of the final MBDBE rule.
Order Withdrawal and Removal of License Conditions
The NRC is including in the final rule specific terms that withdraw
orders and remove license conditions that are substantively redundant
with provisions in the final rule. As discussed in this section, a
primary objective of this rulemaking is to make the requirements of the
Mitigation Strategies and SFPI Orders generically applicable to power
reactor licensees and applicants, taking into account lessons learned
in the orders' implementation and stakeholder feedback received through
the regulatory process. As such, the requirements of Sec. 50.155 fully
replace the requirements of those orders. Although the orders provide
for their relaxation or rescission on a licensee-specific basis, use of
that process would be an inefficient and unnecessary administrative
burden on licensees and the NRC--with no impact on public health and
safety--because the final rule simultaneously replaces the orders in
their entirety for all applicable licensees. Therefore, the NRC finds
that good cause is shown to withdraw the Mitigation Strategies and SFPI
Orders for all licensees that received those orders once the MBDBE rule
goes into effect and licensees are in compliance with it. The
withdrawal date for these orders was set to be the latest date for
compliance by licensees in receipt of the orders to prevent a
regulatory gap.
The NRC is also removing certain license conditions contained
within the COLs held by Detroit Edison Company (for Enrico Fermi
Nuclear Plant, Unit 3), Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (for William States
Lee III Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), Dominion Virginia Power (for
North Anna Unit 3) and Florida Power and Light Company (for Turkey
Point, Units 6 and 7). These licensees did not receive the Mitigation
Strategies and SFPI Orders because the NRC had not issued COLs to these
licensees at the time the NRC issued the Orders. When the NRC issued
those COLs, it included license conditions that are equivalent to the
orders' requirements. Because the license conditions contain the same
requirements as the orders, and the provisions of Sec. 50.155 replace
the requirements imposed by the orders, the license conditions contain
requirements equivalent to Sec. 50.155 and will not be necessary once
the MBDBE rule goes into effect. Therefore, the mitigation strategies
for beyond-design-basis external events license conditions will be
deemed removed from the Enrico Fermi Nuclear Plant, Unit 3, William
States Lee III Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2, North Anna Unit 3, and
Turkey Point, Units 6 and 7 COLs on September 9, 2019.
In addition to license conditions corresponding to the Mitigation
Strategies Orders, the COLs for Enrico Fermi Nuclear Plant, Unit 3,
William States Lee III Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2, North Anna Unit
3, and Turkey Point, Units 6 and 7 included license conditions for the
performance of staffing and communications assessments that correspond
to the requests for information on those subjects in the NRC letter
issued under Sec. 50.54(f) on March 12, 2012. As discussed in COMSECY-
13-0010, ``Schedule and Plans for Tier 2 Order on Emergency
Preparedness for Japan Lessons Learned,'' with regard to the
interaction between licensee response to the Sec. 50.54(f) letter and
compliance with the Mitigation Strategies Order, ``the implementation
of NEI 12-06 has a dependency on NEI 12-01, `Guideline for Assessing
Beyond Design Basis Accident Response Staffing and Communications
Capabilities,' which was developed to address Tier 1 NTTF 9.3
Recommendation regarding staffing
[[Page 39707]]
and communications. NEI 12-06 will utilize the staffing and
communication resources identified in NEI 12-01.'' Because the
implementation of the final rule uses the same guidance as an
acceptable means of compliance, there is no longer a need to collect
this information for these licensees because there will be no
additional regulatory action taken to modify, suspend, or revoke their
licenses and the licensees are obligated to instead comply with the new
requirements. Therefore, the license conditions calling for staffing
and communications assessments for these licensees will be deemed
removed on September 9, 2019.
Because the final rule removes certain license conditions without
actually amending the associated licenses, the NRC will issue by letter
an administrative license amendment to each applicable licensee that
will remove the relevant license condition(s) from that licensee's
license and include revised license pages.
For each of these orders being withdrawn and license conditions
being removed, the NRC is replacing it with equivalent requirements in
the MBDBE rule. Although the NRC did not include these measures in the
MBDBE proposed rule, the NRC provided sufficient notice and an
opportunity to comment under the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C.
553(b)) when it issued the MBDBE proposed rule. In the proposed rule,
the Commission explained that the NRC would make generically applicable
certain requirements in the Mitigation Strategies and SFPI Orders and
related license conditions. The Commission's decision to remove these
license conditions now that they are unnecessary was reasonably
foreseeable, just as it was foreseeable that the Commission would
withdraw the orders. Additionally, the Commission was informed by
comments from the public that warned of potential unintended
consequences from having duplicate requirements in orders, license
conditions, and regulations. Thus, this aspect of the final rule, like
the rest of the final rule, is a logical outgrowth of the proposed
rule. Under the logical outgrowth line of legal decisions (e.g., Long
Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158 (2007); National Mining
Ass'n v. Mine Safety and Health Administration, 512 F.3d 696 (D.C. Cir.
2008)), the public had adequate notice and opportunity to comment on
the withdrawal of orders and removal of license conditions.
Technology-Neutral Emergency Response Data System
The requirements of section VI of appendix E to 10 CFR part 50, for
the ERDS are amended to reflect the use of up-to-date technologies and
remain technology-neutral so that the equipment supplied by the NRC
continues to be replaced as needed, without the need for future
rulemaking as equipment becomes obsolete. In 2005, the NRC initiated a
comprehensive, multi-year effort to modernize aspects of the ERDS,
including the hardware and software that constitute the ERDS
infrastructure at NRC headquarters, as well as the technology used to
transmit data from licensed power reactor facilities. As described in
NRC Regulatory Issue Summary 2009-13, ``Emergency Response Data System
Upgrade from Modem to Virtual Private Network Appliance,'' the NRC
engaged licensees in a program that replaced the existing modems used
to transmit ERDS data with virtual private network devices. The
licensees now have less burdensome testing requirements, faster data
transmission rates, and increased system security.
VI. Section-by-Section Analysis
Sec. 50.8 Information Collection Requirements: OMB Approval
This section, which lists all information collections in 10 CFR
part 50 that have been approved by the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB), is revised by adding a reference to Sec. 50.155, the MBDBE
rule. As discussed in Section XIV, ``Paperwork Reduction Act,'' of this
document, the OMB has approved the information collection and reporting
requirements in the MBDBE rule. No specific requirement or prohibition
is imposed on applicants or licensees in this section.
Sec. 50.34 Contents of Applications; Technical Information
Section 50.34 identifies the technical information that must be
provided in applications for construction permits and operating
licenses. Paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section identify the
information to be submitted as part of the preliminary or final safety
analysis report, respectively. Revised paragraph (i) of this section
identifies information to be submitted as part of an operating license
application but not necessarily included in the final safety analysis
report.
The NRC is making an administrative change to Sec. 50.34(a)(13)
and (b)(12) to remove the word ``stationary'' from the requirement for
power reactor applicants who apply for a construction permit or
operating license, respectively. Section 50.34(a)(13) and 50.34(b)(12)
were added to the regulations in 2009 to reflect the requirements of
Sec. 50.150(b) regarding the inclusion of information within the
preliminary or final safety analysis reports for applicants subject to
Sec. 50.150. Section 50.34(a)(13) and (b)(12) were inadvertently
limited to ``stationary power reactors,'' matching the wording of Sec.
50.34(a)(1), (a)(12), (b)(10), and (b)(11), which pertain to seismic
risk hazards for stationary power reactors. The NRC is not changing the
meaning of this requirement by removing the word ``stationary'' from
these requirements. This change is to ensure consistency in describing
the types of applications to which the requirements apply.
Section 50.34(i) requires each application for an operating license
to include the applicant's plans for implementing the requirements of
Sec. 50.155 including a schedule for achieving full compliance with
these requirements. This paragraph also requires the application to
include a description of the equipment upon which the strategies and
guidelines required by Sec. 50.155(b)(1) rely, including the planned
locations of the equipment and how the equipment and SSCs would meet
the design requirements of Sec. 50.155(c).
Sec. 50.54 Conditions of Licenses
This rulemaking redesignates Sec. 50.54(hh)(3) as Sec.
50.54(hh)(2) to reflect the movement of the requirements formerly in
Sec. 50.54(hh)(2) to Sec. 50.155(b)(2). Section 50.54(hh)(2) is
revised to reflect that Sec. 50.54(hh)(1) applies to the licensee
rather than the facility and to correct the section numbers for the
required certifications. To avoid an unnecessary backfit in Sec.
50.54(hh)(2), in the final rule the NRC removed the words ``once the
NRC has docketed those certifications'' from the proposed Sec.
50.54(hh)(2).
Sec. 50.155 Mitigation of Beyond-Design-Basis Events
This final rule adds new Sec. 50.155, ``Mitigation of beyond-
design-basis events,'' to 10 CFR part 50. The details of each paragraph
within Sec. 50.155 are explained in greater detail in the following
paragraphs in this section.
Paragraph (a), ``Applicability''
Paragraph (a) describes which entities are subject to the MBDBE
rule. Paragraph (a)(1) provides that each holder of an operating
license for a
[[Page 39708]]
nuclear power reactor under 10 CFR part 50, as well as each holder of a
COL under 10 CFR part 52 for which the Commission has made the finding
under Sec. 52.103(g) that the acceptance criteria are met, is required
to comply with the requirements of this rule until the time when the
NRC has docketed the certifications described in Sec. 50.82(a)(1) or
Sec. 52.110(a). These certifications inform the NRC that the licensee
has permanently ceased to operate the reactor and permanently removed
all fuel from the reactor vessel. The permanent removal of fuel from
the reactor vessel removes the possibility of core damage and
containment failure, making it appropriate to terminate the
requirements for strategies and guidelines to maintain or restore core
cooling and containment capabilities. At the time the licensee submits
these certifications, control of the applicability of the requirements
of Sec. 50.155 for licensees transitions to Sec. 50.155(a)(2).
Although neither an applicant for an operating license under 10 CFR
part 50 nor a COL holder before the Sec. 52.103(g) finding is required
to comply with Sec. 50.155 until issuance of the operating license or
the Sec. 52.103(g) finding, respectively, these entities must include
in their applications information under Sec. 50.34(i) or Sec.
52.80(d), respectively, including a schedule for achieving full
compliance with the requirements of Sec. 50.155.
Paragraph (a)(2) addresses power reactor licensees that permanently
stop operating and defuel their reactors and begin decommissioning the
reactors. Paragraph (a)(2)(i) provides that when an entity subject to
the requirements of Sec. 50.155 submits to the NRC the certifications
described in Sec. 50.82(a)(1) or Sec. 52.110(a), then that licensee
is required to comply only with the requirements of Sec. 50.155(b)
through (d), and (f) associated with maintaining or restoring SFP
cooling capabilities for the reactor described in the Sec. 50.82(a)(1)
or Sec. 52.110(a) certifications. In other words, the licensee may
discontinue compliance with the requirements in Sec. 50.155 associated
with maintaining or restoring core cooling or the containment
capability for the reactor described in the Sec. 50.82(a)(1) or Sec.
52.110(a) certifications. Compliance with the requirements of Sec.
50.155(b) through (d), and (f) associated with maintaining or restoring
SFP cooling capabilities continues as long as spent fuel remains in the
SFPs associated with the reactor described in the Sec. 50.82(a)(1) or
Sec. 52.110(a) certifications, or until the criterion of Sec.
50.155(a)(2)(ii) can be satisfied. Once those conditions are satisfied,
control of the applicability of the requirements of Sec. 50.155 for
licensees transitions to paragraphs (a)(2)(iv) or (a)(2)(ii),
respectively.
Paragraph (a)(2)(ii) discontinues all the requirements of Sec.
50.155 except those provided in Sec. 50.155(b)(2) once the decay heat
of the fuel in the SFP can be removed solely by heating and boiling of
water within the SFP and the boil-off period provides sufficient time
for the licensee to obtain off-site resources to sustain the SFP
cooling function indefinitely. To comply with the requirement of Sec.
50.155(a)(2)(ii), licensees must perform and retain an analysis
demonstrating that sufficient time has passed since the fuel within the
SFP was last irradiated such that the fuel's low decay heat and boil-
off period provide sufficient time in an emergency for the licensee to
obtain off-site resources to sustain the SFP cooling function
indefinitely.
Paragraph (a)(2)(iii) exempts the licensee for Millstone Power
Station, Unit 1, Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. from the
requirements of Sec. 50.155.
Paragraph (a)(2)(iv) allows holders of operating licenses or COLs
for which the certifications described in Sec. 50.82(a)(1) or Sec.
52.110(a) have been submitted to cease compliance with all requirements
in Sec. 50.155, once a power reactor licensee has permanently stopped
operating, defueled its reactor, and removed all irradiated fuel from
the SFP(s) associated with the reactor described in the Sec.
50.82(a)(1) or Sec. 52.110(a) certifications.
Paragraph (b), ``Strategies and Guidelines''
Paragraph (b) requires that each applicant or licensee develop,
implement, and maintain mitigation strategies for beyond-design-basis
external events and EDMGs. The intent of this requirement is that the
operating license and COL holders described in Sec. 50.155(a) be able
to mitigate the consequences of a wide range of initiating beyond-
design-basis events and plant damage states that can challenge public
health and safety.
Paragraph (b) specifies that the mitigation strategies for beyond-
design-basis external events and EDMGs be ``developed, implemented, and
maintained.'' The term ``implement'' is used in Sec. 50.155(b) to mean
that the mitigation strategies for beyond-design-basis external events
and EDMGs are established and available to respond, if needed (e.g.,
the licensee has approved the strategies, guidelines, and procedures
for use). The term ``maintain'' as used in Sec. 50.155(b) reflects the
NRC's intent that licensees ensure that the mitigation strategies for
beyond-design-basis external events and EDMGs, once established, be
preserved, including the need to maintain equipment relied on for the
mitigation strategies such that the equipment is capable of fulfilling
its intended function, and consistent with the provisions for
documentation of changes in Sec. 50.155(f).
Paragraph (b)(1) requires applicants and licensees to develop,
implement and maintain strategies and guidelines to mitigate beyond-
design-basis external events from natural phenomena. These strategies
and guidelines are developed assuming a loss of all ac power concurrent
with either an LUHS or, for passive reactor designs, a loss of normal
access to the normal heat sink. These provisions require that the
strategies and guidelines be capable of being implemented site-wide and
include the following:
i. Maintaining or restoring core cooling, containment, and SFP
cooling capabilities; and
ii. Enabling the use and receipt of offsite assistance and
resources to support the continued maintenance of the functional
capabilities for core cooling, containment, and SFP cooling
indefinitely, or until sufficient site functional capabilities can be
maintained without the need for the mitigation strategies.
New reactors may establish different approaches from those of
operating reactors in developing strategies to mitigate beyond-design-
basis events. For example, new reactors may use installed plant
equipment for both the initial and long-term response to a loss of all
ac power with less reliance on portable equipment and offsite resources
than currently operating nuclear power plants. The NRC would consider
the specific plant approach when evaluating the SSCs relied on as part
of the mitigation strategies for beyond-design-basis events. Additional
information on these strategies is provided in RG 1.226, which endorses
an updated version of the industry guidance, for use by applicants and
licensees, that incorporates lessons learned and feedback stemming from
the implementation of the Mitigation Strategies Order, consistent with
Commission direction.
Paragraph (b)(1) limits the requirements for mitigation strategies
to addressing ``external events from natural phenomena.'' This language
is meant to differentiate these requirements from those that previously
existed in Sec. 50.54(hh)(2) that are now located in Sec.
50.155(b)(2), and which address beyond-design-basis external
[[Page 39709]]
events leading to loss of large areas of the plant due to explosions
and fire.
The requirement to enable ``the acquisition and use of offsite
assistance and resources to support the functions required by Sec.
50.155(b)(1)(i) of this section indefinitely, or until sufficient site
functional capabilities can be maintained without the need for the
mitigation strategies'' means that licensees need to plan for obtaining
sufficient resources (e.g., fuel for generators and pumps, cooling and
makeup water) to continue removing decay heat from the irradiated fuel
in the reactor vessel and SFP as well as to remove heat from
containment as necessary until an alternate means of removing heat is
established. The alternate means of removing heat could be achieved
through repairs to existing SSCs, commissioning of new SSCs, or
reduction of decay heat levels through the passage of time sufficient
to allow heat removal through losses to the ambient environment. More
detailed planning for offsite assistance and resources is necessary for
the initial period following the event; less detailed planning is
necessary as the event progresses and the licensee can mobilize
additional support for recovery.
Paragraph (b)(2) contains the requirements for EDMGs that
previously existed in Sec. 50.54(hh)(2) and are described in the Power
Reactor Security Requirements final rule. The movement of these
requirements consolidates the requirements for beyond-design-basis
strategies and guidance into a single section to promote efficiency in
their consideration and allow for better integration. Although the
wording of Sec. 50.155(b)(2) differs from that of previous Sec.
50.54(hh)(2), no substantive change in the requirements is intended.
The introductory text of Sec. 50.155(b)(2) that is contained in
Sec. 50.155(b) is worded so that it requires that licensees ``develop,
implement, and maintain'' the strategies and guidance required in Sec.
50.155(b)(2) rather than using the wording of previous Sec.
50.54(hh)(2) to require that licensees ``develop and implement'' the
described guidance and strategies. The addition of the word
``maintain'' is to correct an inconsistency with the wording of Sec.
50.54(hh)(1), which was issued along with Sec. 50.54(hh)(2) in the
Power Reactor Security Requirements final rule. The requirement as it
was originally issued in Order EA-02-026 was worded to require
licensees to ``develop'' specific guidance, while the corresponding
license conditions imposed by the conforming license amendment was
worded to require each affected licensee to ``develop and maintain''
strategies. The NRC concludes that the phrase ``develop, implement, and
maintain'' provides better clarity of what is necessary for compliance
with the requirements without substantively changing the requirements.
Paragraph (c), ``Equipment''
Paragraph (c)(1) requires that equipment relied on for the
mitigation strategies and guidelines of Sec. 50.155(b)(1) must have
sufficient capacity and capability to perform the functions required by
Sec. 50.155(b)(1).
The phrase ``sufficient capacity and capability'' in Sec.
50.155(c)(1) means that the equipment, and the instrumentation relied
on to support the decision making necessary to accomplish the
associated mitigation strategies of Sec. 50.155(b)(1), has the design
specifications necessary to assure that it functions and provides the
requisite information on plant status when subjected to the conditions
it is expected to be exposed to in the course of the execution of those
mitigation strategies. These design specifications include appropriate
consideration of environmental conditions that are predicted in the
thermal-hydraulic and room heat up analyses used in the development of
the mitigation strategies required by Sec. 50.155(b)(1).
Paragraph (c)(2) requires reasonable protection of the equipment in
Sec. 50.155(b)(1) from the effects of natural phenomena that are
equivalent in magnitude to the phenomena assumed for developing the
external design basis of the facility. ``Reasonable protection'' is the
means by which the NRC applies the appropriate level of treatment to
equipment and SSCs that are required to function for Sec. 50.155,
without regard to whether the equipment is ``FLEX equipment,'' as
defined in NEI 12-06, or ``plant equipment,'' as that term is used in
NEI 12-06. Safety-related SSCs that function initially in response to
beyond-design-basis external events have two sets of functions: Safety-
related functions and beyond-design-basis functions. The requirements
placed on these SSCs to perform their safety-related functions for the
design-basis events are extensive and are intended to result in an
increased level of assurance that the SSCs will perform those safety-
related functions, during and/or following the design-basis events as
applicable.
For these dual-function SSCs, the regulatory requirements and
resulting level of regulatory assurance for the beyond-design-basis
functions addressed by Sec. 50.155(b)(1) for these dual-function SSCs
are intended to be less stringent than the requirements associated with
their safety-related functions. The ``reasonable protection''
requirement is the means for applying a reduced level of treatment for
the beyond-design-basis functions and establishes an appropriate level
of assurance. The phrase ``reasonable protection'' was initially
proposed in recommendation 4.2 of the NTTF Report in the context of a
recommendation for the NRC to issue an order to licensees to provide
``reasonable protection'' of equipment required by the former Sec.
50.54(hh)(2) from the effects of design-basis external events along
with providing additional sets of equipment as an interim measure
during a subsequent rulemaking on prolonged SBO. The NTTF based this
recommendation on the potential usefulness of the EDMGs in
circumstances that do not involve the loss of a large area of the plant
and explained that reasonable protection from external events as used
in the NTTF Report meant that the equipment must ``be stored in
existing locations that are reasonably protected from significant
floods and involve robust structures with enhanced protection from
seismic and wind-related events.''
The NRC carried forward the use of the phrase ``reasonable
protection'' in the Mitigation Strategies Order with regard to the
protection required for equipment associated with the mitigation
strategies. That order did not, however, define ``reasonable
protection.'' The NRC guidance in JLD-ISG-2012-01, Revision 0,
discussed ``reasonable protection'' as follows:
Storage locations chosen for the equipment must provide
protection from external events as necessary to allow the equipment
to perform its function without loss of capability. In addition, the
licensee must provide a means to bring the equipment to the
connection point under those conditions in time to initiate the
strategy prior to expiration of the estimated capability to maintain
core and spent fuel pool cooling and containment functions in the
initial response phase.
In JLD-ISG-2012-01, Revision 0, the NRC endorsed NEI 12-06,
Revision 0, as providing an acceptable method to provide reasonable
protection, storage, and deployment of the equipment associated with
the Mitigation Strategies Order. NEI 12-06, Revision 0, also omitted a
definition for the phrase ``reasonable protection,'' but did provide
guidelines for licensees for protecting the equipment from the hazards
that would be commonly applicable: (1) Seismic hazards; (2) flooding
hazards; (3) severe storms with high winds; (4) snow, ice and extreme
cold; and (5) high temperatures. Later revisions to the guidance for
the
[[Page 39710]]
Mitigation Strategies Order included further discussions on reasonable
protection. NEI 12-06, Revision 2, defined reasonable protection as
``[s]toring on-site FLEX equipment in configurations such that no one
external event can reasonably fail the site FLEX capability (N) when
the required FLEX equipment is available.'' The JLD-ISG-2012-01,
Revision 1, endorsed the approach of NEI 12-06, Revision 2, as an
acceptable method of providing reasonable protection to the equipment
associated with the strategies and guidelines developed under the
Mitigation Strategies Order, clarifying that the elements of the
approach that should be addressed are the following:
--Identification of the natural phenomena for which reasonable
protection is necessary,
--determination of the method of protection to be used,
--establishment of controls on unavailability of the equipment, and
--provision of a method of transporting the portable equipment from its
storage location to the site in which it will be used.
The RG 1.226 carries forward this guidance on reasonable
protection, endorsing the current version of NEI 12-06 as providing an
acceptable method of complying with Sec. 50.155(c)(2).
The guidance of RG 1.226 and NEI 12-06 includes the use of
structures designed to, or evaluated as equivalent to, American Society
for Civil Engineers Standard 7-10, ``Minimum Design Loads for Buildings
and Other Structures,'' for the seismic and high winds hazards, rather
than requiring the use of a structure that meets the plant's design
basis for the safe shutdown earthquake or high winds hazards including
missiles. The NEI 12-06 guidelines also allow storage of the equipment
above the flood elevation from the most recent site flood analysis,
storage within a structure designed to protect the equipment from the
flood, or storage below the flood level if sufficient time would be
available and plant procedures would address the need to relocate the
equipment above the flood level based on the timing of the limiting
flood scenario(s). The NEI 12-06 guidelines further provide that
multiple sets of equipment may be stored in diverse locations in order
to provide assurance that sufficient equipment could be deployed to
assure the success of the strategies following an initiating event. The
NRC-endorsed guidelines in NEI 12-06 do not consider concurrent,
unrelated beyond-design-basis external events to be within the scope of
the initiating events for the mitigation strategies. There is an
assumption of a beyond-design-basis external event that establishes the
event conditions for reasonable protection, and then it is assumed in
NEI 12-06 that the event leads to an ELAP and LUHS. There is not, for
example, an assumption of multiple beyond-design-basis external events
occurring at the same time. As a result, reasonable protection for the
purposes of compliance with Sec. 50.155(c)(2) allows the provision of
specific sets of equipment for specific hazards with the required
protection for those sets of equipment being against the hazard for
which the equipment is intended to be used.
The NRC use of the phrase ``reasonable protection'' in Sec.
50.155(c)(2) is intended to distinguish this approach from the approach
of the PDCs, consistent with GDC 2, which requires that SSCs important
to safety be designed to withstand the effects of natural phenomena.
Section 50.155(c)(2) allows damage to, or loss of, specific pieces of
equipment so long as the capability to use sufficient sets of the
remaining equipment to accomplish strategies and guidelines is
retained. ``Reasonable protection'' also allows for protection of the
equipment using structures that could deform as a result of natural
phenomena, so long as the equipment could be deployed from the
structure to its place of use.
The remaining portion of Sec. 50.155(c)(2) sets the hazard level
for which ``reasonable protection'' of the equipment must be provided.
The hazard level is the level determined for the design basis for the
facility for protection of safety-related SSCs from the effects of
natural phenomena under Sec. 50.155(c)(2).
Paragraph (d), ``Training Requirements''
Paragraph (d) requires that each licensee specified in Sec.
50.155(a) provide for the training of licensee personnel that perform
activities in accordance with the capabilities required under Sec.
50.155(b).
Paragraph (e), ``Spent Fuel Pool Monitoring''
Paragraph (e) requires each licensee to provide a reliable means to
remotely monitor wide-range water level for each SFP at its site until
5 years have elapsed since all of the fuel within that SFP was last
used in a reactor vessel for power operation. This requirement enables
effective prioritization of event mitigation and recovery actions
following beyond-design-basis external events. This provision does not
apply to General Electric Mark III upper containment pools. These pools
are referred to in the UFSARs for the applicable plants, Clinton Power
Station, Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Perry Nuclear Power Plant, and
River Bend Station, by different terms, such as ``upper containment
fuel storage pool,'' ``upper containment fuel pool,'' and ``containment
upper pool.'' The use of the term ``upper containment pool'' in Sec.
50.155(e) and in this discussion of the paragraph means the pools
described in those UFSARs by those terms. The Mark III upper
containment pools are only to store fuel during refueling outages, at
which time the upper pool and reactor coolant system are merged,
mitigating the potential for operator distraction should an extreme
event happen at that time. After refueling is completed, and the
reactor is critical, no fuel can be stored in the upper pool, and
instead fuel must either be in the reactor and used to generate power
or it is spent fuel and stored in the SFP.
Paragraph (f), ``Documentation of Changes''
Paragraph (f) establishes requirements that govern changes in the
implementation of the requirements of Sec. 50.155. Prior to
implementing a change, Sec. 50.155(f)(1) requires the licensee to
demonstrate that the provisions of Sec. 50.155 continue to be met and
to maintain documentation of changes until the requirements of Sec.
50.155 no longer apply. This documentation requirement applies to all
changes that impact the implementation of Sec. 50.155. The NRC
recognizes that the licensee will maintain documentation of non-
significant changes as part of their normal procurement and
configuration management programs.
Regarding the meaning of demonstrated compliance, changes to the
implementation of Sec. 50.155 that are consistent with the regulatory
guidance supporting the MBDBE rule are acceptable. Additionally,
changes to the implementation of the MBDBE requirements that are
approved alternative approaches, which are shown to apply to the
licensee's facility consistent with the NRC's approval, are also
acceptable. Changes that are outside of endorsed guidance or approved
alternatives can be demonstrated to comply with Sec. 50.155; however,
in this regard the NRC emphasizes that licensees should be mindful of
the following context.
1. The NRC initially issued requirements for the mitigation of
beyond-design-basis external events in the Mitigation Strategies Order
under the adequate protection provision of
[[Page 39711]]
Sec. 50.109(a)(4)(ii). The NRC seeks to ensure through Sec. 50.155(f)
that the resulting capabilities are maintained. A failure to maintain
the functional capabilities first imposed by the Mitigation Strategies
Order and now part of the MBDBE rule would challenge the continued
reasonable assurance of adequate protection of public health and safety
and not equate to demonstrated compliance with Sec. 50.155.
2. The mitigation strategies are intended to address uncertainties
associated with beyond-design-basis external events, and the
requirements as implemented provide a capability that can be used and
adapted to any event that exceeds the external design basis of the
facility. While it was necessary for practical reasons to make
assumptions concerning a damage state and conditions that could then be
used to provide this additional capability, it is equally important to
preserve the attributes of the mitigation strategies that provide
flexibility, and enable adaptation to unknown events. Significantly
impacting these attributes would reduce the capability for a licensee
to successfully apply the strategies to real events. Such a change
would not constitute demonstrated compliance with Sec. 50.155. For
example, the mitigation strategies use multiple sets of equipment, use
strategies and guidelines rather than step-by-step procedures, have
contingencies for conditions more severe than the assumed damage state
used to develop the capability, employ alternate connection points, and
are supported with offsite resources to provide for an indefinite
capability. All of these are important elements of the additional
mitigation capability for beyond-design-basis external events required
by Sec. 50.155. Changes that result in a significant reduction of
these attributes would result in the mitigation strategies being less
flexible and adaptable and therefore being less likely to be
successfully deployable following a beyond-design-basis external event.
Such changes would not constitute demonstrated compliance. For example,
permanent removal of a set of equipment clearly removes flexibility and
lessens the potential for successful mitigation of a beyond-design-
basis external event.
Paragraph (f)(2) requires that changes in the implementation of the
requirements of Sec. 50.155 subject to other change control
requirements be processed via their respective change control
processes, unless the changes being evaluated impact only the
implementation of Sec. 50.155. Changes to the implementation of Sec.
50.155 can impact multiple aspects of the facility. Paragraph (f)(2) is
intended to clearly identify that other change control requirements
such as those in Sec. Sec. 50.59, 50.54(p), 50.54(q), 73.58, and fire
protection change controls may apply depending on the extent of the
change and the aspects of the facility that are impacted. This
requirement is not essential because it is the licensee's obligation to
comply with all applicable regulations; however, given the complexity
of facility changes, the NRC is maintaining this requirement to provide
regulatory clarity in the final rule, consistent with public comment.
For example, a change to an SSC having both a beyond-design-basis
function for Sec. 50.155 and a design-basis function, would have the
aspects of the change involving its beyond-design-basis functions
addressed under Sec. 50.155(f), and the aspects of the change
involving the design-basis functions addressed under Sec. 50.59 or any
other applicable change control requirement. Another example may be a
change to deploy in place equipment for Sec. 50.155, that in turn
impacts ingress and egress for an area of the facility important for
security, and therefore needs to be evaluated under Sec. 73.58.
Paragraph (g), ``Implementation''
Paragraph (g) establishes the compliance schedule for the MBDBE
rule. Paragraph (g) establishes a compliance date of 3 years following
the effective date of the MBDBE rule for each holder of a 10 CFR part
50 operating license who received NRC Order EA-13-109 and a compliance
date of 2 years following the effective date of the MBDBE rule for each
holder of a 10 CFR part 50 operating license that did not receive NRC
Order EA-13-109 and each holder of a 10 CFR part 52 combined license
for which the Commission has made the Sec. 52.103(g) finding as of the
effective date of the rule.
Paragraph (h), ``Withdrawal of Orders and Removal of License
Conditions''
Under Sec. 50.155(h)(1), the Mitigation Strategies and SFPI Orders
will be withdrawn on September 9, 2022.
Under Sec. 50.155(h)(2), the reliable SFP/buffer pool level
instrumentation, mitigation strategies for beyond-design-basis external
events, and emergency planning license conditions, except for license
condition 2.D(12)(g)1, will be deemed removed from the Enrico Fermi
Nuclear Plant, Unit 3 license on September 9, 2019.
Under Sec. 50.155(h)(3), the mitigation strategies for beyond-
design-basis external events, reliable SFP instrumentation, and
emergency planning license conditions will be deemed removed with the
exception of license conditions 2.D(12)(j)1, from the William States
Lee III Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2 licenses September 9, 2019.
Under Sec. 50.155(h)(4), the reliable SFP/buffer pool level
instrumentation, mitigation strategies for beyond-design-basis external
events, and emergency planning license conditions will be deemed
removed with the exception of license condition 2.D(12)(f)1 from the
North Anna Unit 3 license on September 9, 2019.
Under Sec. 50.155(h)(5), the mitigation strategies for beyond-
design-basis external events, reliable SFP instrumentation, and
emergency planning license conditions will be deemed removed with the
exception of license condition 2.D(12)(h)1 from the Turkey Point, Units
6 and 7 licenses on September 9, 2019.
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV, Training
This final rule modifies the reference in the Sec. 50.54(hh)(2)
exercise requirement within 10 CFR part 50, appendix E, section
IV.F.2.j, to Sec. 50.155(b)(2) to reflect the movement of the EDMG
requirement. The final rule also includes administrative changes to use
the numeral ``8'' rather than the word ``eight'' in the phrases ``8-
year'' and ``8-calendar-year'' for consistency with other sections.
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section VI, Emergency Response Data Systems
The NRC is amending its Emergency Response Data Systems regulations
to allow the use of technology-neutral equipment. The requirements in
appendix E, section VI, paragraph 3.c are amended to replace the phrase
``onsite modem'' with ``equipment'' and remove the word ``unit.''
Sec. 52.80 Contents of Applications; Additional Technical Information
Section 52.80 identifies the required additional technical
information to be included in an application for a combined license.
Paragraph (d) is amended to require a combined license applicant to
include the applicant's plans for implementing the requirements of
Sec. 50.155, including a schedule for achieving full compliance with
these requirements. This paragraph requires the application to include
a description of the equipment upon which the strategies and guidelines
that are required by Sec. 50.155(b)(1) rely, including the planned
locations of the equipment and how the equipment and
[[Page 39712]]
SSCs meet the design requirements of Sec. 50.155(c).
VII. Regulatory Flexibility Certification
Under the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 605(b)), the NRC
certifies that this rule does not have a significant economic impact on
a substantial number of small entities. This rule affects only the
licensing and operation of nuclear power plants. The companies that own
these plants do not fall within the scope of the definition of ``small
entities'' set forth in the Regulatory Flexibility Act or established
in Sec. 2.810, ``NRC size standards.''
VIII. Availability of Regulatory Analysis
The NRC has prepared a regulatory analysis on this regulation. The
analysis examined the costs and benefits of the alternatives considered
by the NRC. The regulatory analysis is available as indicated in
Section XIX of this document.
IX. Availability of Guidance
The NRC is issuing regulatory guidance for the implementation of
the MBDBE rule. The guidance is available in ADAMS under Accession Nos.
ML19058A012 and ML19058A013. You may access information and comment
submissions related to the guidance by searching on http://www.regulations.gov under Docket ID NRC-2014-0240. The guidance to
implement the MBDBE rule consists of two RGs which are discussed below.
The RG 1.226, ``Flexible Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-
Basis Events,'' endorses, with clarifications, the methods and
procedures in NEI 12-06, ``Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies
(FLEX) Implementation Guide.'' This regulatory guidance provides
licensees and applicants with an acceptable method of implementing the
MBDBE rule primarily with regard to the provisions in Sec.
50.155(b)(1), (c), and (f) regarding measures for the mitigation of
beyond-design-basis external events. Previous versions of this guidance
were endorsed to support compliance with the Mitigation Strategies
Order. Licensees who used previous endorsed versions of NEI 12-06 are
not required to revise their implementation under the Mitigation
Strategies Order to address the MBDBE rule requirements. The later
revisions of the endorsed guidance contain additional information for
addressing reevaluated hazard information, frequently asked questions,
and acceptable alternatives, and accordingly provide a larger set of
guidance that licensees may use to implement the MBDBE rule, or to
consult when deciding on the acceptability of changes to the
implementation of the MBDBE rule requirements.
The RG 1.227, ``Wide-Range Spent Fuel Pool Level Instrumentation,''
endorses with exceptions and clarifications NEI 12-02, Revision 1. This
guidance provides an acceptable method of implementing the MBDBE rule
requirement in Sec. 50.155(e). This RG does not differ in a
significant manner from previously endorsed guidance for the SFPI
Order, which was JLD-ISG-2012-03.
The NRC is discontinuing further regulatory action on Draft
Regulatory Guide (DG) DG-1319, ``Integrated Response Capabilities for
Beyond-Design-Basis Events.'' Draft Regulatory Guide DG-1319 was a
proposed new regulatory guide (RG 1.228) developed by the staff to
provide implementing guidance for provisions that have been removed
from the final rule for the reasons discussed in Section IV, ``Public
Comments and Changes to the Rule.'' Because the relevant regulatory
requirements have been removed from the final rule, further NRC action
to develop and adopt DG-1319 as a final guidance document is not
needed. Therefore, this notice announces the NRC's decision to
discontinue further action on DG-1319 and documents the final NRC
action on DG-1319.
X. Backfitting and Issue Finality
Rule
As required by Sec. Sec. 50.109 and 52.98, the Commission has
completed a backfitting and issue finality assessment for this rule.
The Commission finds that the change to the types of certifications
that COL holders must submit before the requirements of Sec.
50.54(hh)(1) no longer apply is inconsistent with the issue finality
provisions of 10 CFR part 52. The change is justified as necessary for
adequate protection of public health and safety or common defense and
security. Availability of the backfit and issue finality assessment is
indicated in Section XIX of this document.
Regulatory Guidance
The NRC is issuing two RGs that provide guidance for the
implementation of this rule: RG 1.226 and RG 1.227. These RGs provide
guidance on the methods acceptable to the NRC for complying with this
final rule. The RGs apply to all current holders of, and applicants for
operating licenses under 10 CFR part 50 and COLs under 10 CFR part 52.
Issuance of the RGs does not constitute backfitting under Sec.
50.109 and is not otherwise inconsistent with the issue finality
provisions under 10 CFR part 52. As discussed in the ``Implementation''
section of each RG, the NRC has no current intention to impose the RGs
on current holders of an operating license or COL.
Applying the RGs to applications for operating licenses or COLs
does not constitute backfitting as defined in Sec. 50.109 and is not
otherwise inconsistent with issue finality under 10 CFR part 52,
because such applicants are not within the scope of entities protected
by Sec. 50.109 or the applicable issue finality provisions in 10 CFR
part 52.
XI. Cumulative Effects of Regulation
The NRC engaged extensively with external stakeholders throughout
this rulemaking and related regulatory activities. Public involvement
has included: (1) Issuance of two ANPRs and two draft regulatory basis
documents that requested stakeholder feedback; (2) issuance of
conceptual and preliminary proposed rule language in support of public
meetings; (3) numerous public meetings with the ACRS; (4) issuance of
draft final rule language to support meeting with the ACRS, (5) a
public meeting held during the final rule stage to gather additional
feedback concerning CER, and (6) many more public meetings that
supported both the development of the draft regulatory basis documents
as well as development of the implementing guidance for the two orders
that this rulemaking makes generically applicable (i.e., the Mitigation
Strategies and SFPI Orders). Section II, ``Opportunities for Public
Involvement,'' of this document provides a more detailed discussion of
public involvement.
The NRC requested and received feedback following its CER process.
The feedback received is discussed in more detail in conjunction with
the consideration of a flexible scheduling provision, in Section IV of
this document. Most significantly, this final rule includes an
additional year for implementation for licensees that received Order
EA-13-109 that is intended to address the CER feedback received.
Regarding the CER process requirements for issuance of guidance,
the NRC is issuing two RGs in conjunction with the issuance of the
final rule as discussed in Section IX of this document. Additionally,
the NRC issued draft guidance with the proposed rule for comment, which
enabled more informed external stakeholder feedback to be obtained.
[[Page 39713]]
XII. Plain Writing
The Plain Writing Act of 2010 (Pub. L. 111-274) requires Federal
agencies to write documents in a clear, concise, and well-organized
manner. The NRC has written this document to be consistent with the
Plain Writing Act as well as the Presidential Memorandum, ``Plain
Language in Government Writing,'' published June 10, 1998 (63 FR
31883).
XIII. Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant
Environmental Impact
The Commission has determined under the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969, as amended, and the Commission's regulations in
subpart A of 10 CFR part 51, that this rule is not a major Federal
action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment,
and therefore an environmental impact statement is not required. The
basis of this determination reads as follows: The action will not
result in any radiological effluent impact as it will not change any
design basis structures, systems, or components that function to limit
the release of radiological effluents during or after an accident. This
final rule does not change the standards and requirements for
radiological releases and effluents. None of the revisions or additions
in this rule affect current occupational or public radiation exposure.
The final rule will not cause any significant non-radiological impacts,
as it will not affect any historic sites or any non-radiological plant
effluents. The NRC concludes that this rule will not cause any
significant radiological or non-radiological impacts on the human
environment.
The NRC requested the views of the States on the environmental
assessment for this rule. No views were received.
The determination of this environmental assessment is that there
will be no significant effect on the quality of the human environment
from this action. The environmental assessment is available as
indicated in Section XIX of this document.
XIV. Paperwork Reduction Act
This rule contains new or amended information collection
requirements that are subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995
(44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.). The collections of information were approved
by the Office of Management and Budget, approval numbers 3150-0011 and
3150-0151.
The burden to the public for the information collections is
estimated to average 415 hours per response, including the time for
reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and
maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the
information collection.
The information collection is being conducted to make changes to
existing programs, plans, procedures, and guidelines implemented as a
result of the Mitigating Strategies and SFPI Orders to reflect the new
requirements of this rule, which replaces the order requirements. This
information will be used by the NRC to support oversight activities
associated with these requirements. Responses to this collection of
information are mandatory.
You may submit comments on any aspect of the information
collections, including suggestions for reducing the burden, by the
following methods:
Federal rulemaking website: Go to http://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2014-0240.
Mail comments to: Information Services Branch, Office of
the Chief Information Officer, Mail Stop: T6-A10M, U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001 or to: OMB Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs (3150-0011), Attn: Desk Officer for
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 725 17th Street NW, Washington, DC
20503; email: [email protected].
Public Protection Notification
The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to
respond to, a collection of information unless the document requesting
or requiring the collection displays a currently valid OMB control
number.
XV. Congressional Review Act
This final rule is a rule as defined in the Congressional Review
Act (5 U.S.C. 801-808). However, the Office of Management and Budget
has not found it to be a major rule as defined in the Congressional
Review Act.
XVI. Criminal Penalties
For the purposes of Section 223 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,
as amended (AEA), the NRC is issuing this rule that amends 10 CFR parts
50 and 52 under one or more of Sections 161b, 161i, or 161o of the AEA.
Willful violations of the rule are subject to criminal enforcement.
Criminal penalties as they apply to regulations in 10 CFR parts 50 and
52 are discussed in Sec. Sec. 50.111 and 52.303.
XVII. Compatibility of Agreement State Regulations
Under the ``Policy Statement on Adequacy and Compatibility of
Agreement State Programs,'' approved by the Commission on June 20,
1997, and published in the Federal Register (62 FR 46517; September 3,
1997), this rule is classified as compatibility category ``NRC.''
Compatibility is not required for Category ``NRC'' regulations. The NRC
program elements in this category are those that relate directly to
areas of regulation reserved to the NRC by the AEA or the provisions of
title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, and although an Agreement
State may not adopt program elements reserved to the NRC, it may wish
to inform its licensees of certain requirements via a mechanism that is
consistent with a particular State's administrative procedure laws, but
does not confer regulatory authority on the State.
XVIII. Voluntary Consensus Standards
The National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995,
Public Law 104-113, requires that Federal agencies use technical
standards that are developed or adopted by voluntary consensus
standards bodies unless the use of such a standard is inconsistent with
applicable law or otherwise impractical. In this rule, the NRC is
adding requirements for the mitigation of beyond-design-basis events.
This action does not constitute the establishment of a standard that
contains generally applicable requirements.
XIX. Availability of Documents
The documents identified in the following table are available to
interested persons through one or more of the following methods, as
indicated.
[[Page 39714]]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
ADAMS accession No./
Document web link/Federal
Register citation
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Primary Rulemaking Documents
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Regulatory Analysis Addendum--Final Rule to ML19058A009
Address Mitigation of Beyond-Design-Basis
Events.
Backfitting and Issue Finality Assessment ML19059A150
Supporting the Mitigation of Beyond-Design-
Basis Events Final Rule.
Environmental Assessment Supporting the ML19058A008
Mitigation of Beyond-Design-Basis Events Final
Rule.
Supporting Statement for Information Collections ML19058A010
Contained in Mitigation of Beyond-Design-Basis
Events Final Rule--10 CFR Part 50.
Supporting Statement for Information Collections ML19058A011
Contained in Mitigation of Beyond-Design-Basis
Events Final Rule--10 CFR Part 52.
NRC Response to Public Comments--Final Rule: ML19058A007
Mitigation of Beyond-Design-Basis Events.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Regulatory Guides
------------------------------------------------------------------------
RG 1.226, Flexible Mitigation Strategies for ML19058A012
Beyond-Design-Basis Events.
RG 1.227, Wide-Range Spent Fuel Pool Level ML19058A013
Instrumentation.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Other References
------------------------------------------------------------------------
ACRS Transcript--Fukushima Subcommittee, ML14337A671
``Discuss Preliminary Mitigation of Beyond-
Design-Basis Events Rulemaking Language,''
November 21, 2014.
ACRS Transcript--Full Committee, ``Discuss ML14223A631
Consolidation of Station Blackout Mitigation
Strategies and Onsite Emergency Response
Capabilities Rulemakings,'' July 10, 2014.
ACRS Transcript--Full Committee, ``Discuss ML14345A387
Preliminary Mitigation of Beyond-Design-Basis
Events Rulemaking Language,'' December 4, 2014.
ACRS Transcript--Full Committee, ``Discuss the ML13175A344
Station Blackout Mitigation Strategies
Regulatory Basis,'' June 5, 2013.
ACRS Transcript--Joint Fukushima and ML14265A059
Probabilistic Risk Assessment Subcommittees,
``Discuss CPRR Technical Analysis,'' August 22,
2014.
ACRS Transcript--Plant Operations and Fire ML13063A403
Protection Subcommittee, ``Discuss the Onsite
Emergency Response Capabilities Regulatory
Basis,'' February 6, 2013.
ACRS Transcript--Regulatory Policies and ML13148A404
Practices Subcommittee, ``Discuss the Station
Blackout Mitigation Strategies Regulatory
Basis,'' December 5, 2013, and April 23, 2013.
ACRS Transcript--Reliability and Probabilistic ML14337A651
Risk Assessment Subcommittee, ``Discuss CPRR
Technical Analysis,'' November 19, 2014.
American National Standards Institute/American http://www.ans.org/
Nuclear Society 3.2-2012, ``Administrative store/
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Operational Phase of Nuclear Power Plants''.
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10, ``Minimum Design Loads for Buildings and www.ascelibrary.org/
Other Structures,'' 2013.
COMGBJ-11-0002, ``NRC Actions Following the ML110800456
Events in Japan,'' March 21, 2011.
COMSECY-13-0002, ``Consolidation of Japan ML13011A037
Lessons Learned Near-Term Task Force
Recommendations 4 and 7 Regulatory
Activities,'' January 25, 2013.
COMSECY-13-0010, ``Schedule and Plans for Tier 2 ML12339A262
Order on Emergency Preparedness for Japan
Lessons Learned,'' March 27, 2013.
COMSECY-14-0037, ``Integration of Mitigating ML14309A256
Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External
Events and The Reevaluation of Flooding
Hazards,'' November 21, 2014.
``Consolidated Rulemaking--Proof of Concept'' ML14052A057
(Conceptual Consolidated Preliminary Proposed
Rule Language for NTTF Recommendations 4, 7, 8
and 9), February 21, 2014.
``Crystal River Unit 3--NRC Response to Duke ML13325A847
Energy's Final Response to the March 2012
Request for Information Letter,'' January 22,
2014.
``Crystal River Unit 3 Nuclear Generating Plant-- ML13212A366
Rescission of Order EA-12-049, `Order Modifying
Licenses with Regard to Requirements for
Mitigation Strategies for Beyond Design Basis
External Events,''' August 27, 2013.
``Crystal River Unit 3--Final Response to March ML13274A341
12, 2012 Information Request Regarding
Recommendations 2.1, 2.3 and 9.3,'' September
25, 2013.
``Crystal River Unit 3 Nuclear Generating Plant-- ML13203A161
Rescission of Order EA-12-051, `Order Modifying
Licenses with Regard to Reliable Spent Fuel
Pool Instrumentation,''' August 27, 2013.
``Draft Regulatory Basis for Containment ML15022A214
Protection and Release Reduction for Mark I and
Mark II Boiling Water Reactors (10 CFR Part
50),'' May 2015.
Executive Order 13744, ``Coordinating Efforts To 81 FR 71573
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Federal Register Notice--Enhancements to 76 FR 72560
Emergency Preparedness Regulations, Final Rule,
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Federal Register Notice--Mitigation of Beyond- 80 FR 70609
Design-Basis Events, Proposed Rule, November
13, 2015.
Federal Register Notice--Mitigation of Beyond- 80 FR 74717
Design-Basis Events, Proposed Rule; correction,
November 30, 2015.
Federal Register Notice--Onsite Emergency 77 FR 23161
Response Capabilities, Advance Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, April 18, 2012.
Federal Register Notice--Onsite Emergency 78 FR 1154
Response Capabilities, Draft Regulatory Basis,
January 8, 2013.
Federal Register Notice--Onsite Emergency 78 FR 68774
Response Capabilities, Preliminary Proposed
Rule Language, November 15, 2013.
Federal Register Notice--Onsite Emergency 78 FR 63901
Response Capabilities, Regulatory Basis,
October 25, 2013.
Federal Register Notice--Power Reactor Security 74 FR 13926
Requirements, Final Rule, March 27, 2009.
[[Page 39715]]
Federal Register Notice--PRM-50-100, Petition 78 FR 44034
for Rulemaking Submitted by the Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., July 23, 2013.
Federal Register Notice--PRM-50-101, Petition 77 FR 16483
for Rulemaking Submitted by the Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., March 21, 2012.
Federal Register Notice--PRM-50-102, Petition 77 FR 25104
for Rulemaking; Submitted by the Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., April 27, 2012.
Federal Register Notice--PRM-50-96, Long-Term 77 FR 74788
Cooling and Unattended Water Makeup of Spent
Fuel Pools, Consideration in the Rulemaking
Process, December 18, 2012.
Federal Register Notice--PRM-50-97, PRM-50-98, 76 FR 58165
PRM-50-99, PRM-50-100, PRM-50-101, PRM-50-102,
Petitions for Rulemaking Submitted by the
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., Notice
of Receipt, September 20, 2011.
Federal Register Notice--Regulatory Improvements 80 FR 72358
for Decommissioning Power Reactors, Advance
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, November 19,
2015.
Federal Register Notice--Risk-Informed 69 FR 68008
Categorization and Treatment of Structures,
Systems and Components for Nuclear Power
Reactors; Final Rule, November 22, 2004.
Federal Register Notice--Statement of Principles 62 FR 46517
and Policy for the Agreement State Program;
Policy Statement on Adequacy and Compatibility
of Agreement State Programs, Final Policy
Statements, September 3, 1997.
Federal Register Notice--Station Blackout, 77 FR 16175
Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, March
20, 2012.
Federal Register Notice--Station Blackout 78 FR 21275
Mitigation Strategies, Draft Regulatory Basis
and Draft Rule Concepts, April 10, 2013.
Federal Register Notice--Station Blackout 78 FR 44035
Mitigation Strategies, Regulatory Basis, July
23, 2013.
``Fort Calhoun Station, Unit 1--Relaxation of ML16277A509
the Schedule Requirements for Order EA-12-049,
`Issuance of Order to Modify Licenses with
Regard to Requirements for Mitigation
Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External
Events' (CAC No. MF0969),'' November 21, 2016.
``Fort Calhoun Station, Unit 1--Rescission of ML16320A287
Order EA-12-051, `Order Modifying Licenses with
Regard to Reliable Spent Fuel Pool
Instrumentation' (CAC No. MF0968),'' December
8, 2016.
Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0308, ``Reactor ML062890421
Oversight Process Basis Document,'' Attachment
2, ``Technical Basis for Inspection Program,''
October 16, 2006.
Interim Staff Guidance, NSIR/DPR-ISG-01, ML113010523
``Emergency Planning for Nuclear Power
Plants,'' November 2011.
JLD-ISG-2012-01, ``Compliance with Order EA-12- ML12229A174
049, Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to
Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for
Beyond-Design-Basis External Events,'' Revision
0, August 29, 2012.
JLD-ISG-2012-01, ``Compliance with Order EA-12- ML15357A163
049, Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to
Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for
Beyond-Design-Basis External Events,'' Revision
1, January 22, 2016.
JLD-ISG-2012-01, ``Compliance with Order EA-12- ML16277A617
049, Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to
Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for
Beyond-Design-Basis External Events,'' Draft
Revision 2, November 4, 2016.
JLD-ISG-2012-03, ``Compliance with Order EA-12- ML12221A339
051, Reliable Spent Fuel Pool
Instrumentation,'' Revision 0, August 29, 2012.
``Kewaunee Power Station--60-Day Response to ML13123A004
March 12, 2012, Information Request Regarding
Recommendation 2.1, Seismic Reevaluations,''
April 29, 2013.
``Kewaunee Power Station--Rescission of Order EA- ML14059A411
12-049, `Order Modifying Licenses with Regard
to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for
Beyond Design Basis External Events' (TAC No.
MF2774)'' June 10, 2014.
``Kewaunee Power Station--Response to Request ML13322B255
for Relief from Responding Further to the March
2012 Request for Information Letter for
Recommendation 9.3,'' January 22, 2014.
Letter from Anne T. Boland, NRC, to J.W. Shea, ML17040A353
TVA, ``Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 2--Request
for Tennessee Valley Authority's Consent to
Imposition of New Requirement Related to
Mitigation of Beyond-Design-Basis Events,''
February 15, 2017.
Letter from Anthony R. Pietrangelo, NEI, to Mark ML15217A314
A. Satorius, NRC, ``Use of Qualitative Factors
in Regulatory Decision Making,'' May 11, 2015.
Letter from Eric J. Leeds to Holders of Licenses ML111220447
for Operating Power Reactors as Listed in the
Enclosure, ``Rescission or Partial Rescission
of Certain Power Reactor Security Orders
Applicable to Nuclear Power Plants,'' November
28, 2011.
Letter from J. E. Dyer, NRC, to Holders of ML062300304
Licenses for Operating Power Reactors Listed in
the Enclosure, ``Order Requiring Compliance
with Key Radiological Protection Mitigation
Strategies,'' August 28, 2006.
Letter from J. Sam Armijo, ACRS Chairman, to Mr. ML12072A197
R. W. Borchardt, ``Response to February 27,
2012 Letter Regarding Final Disposition of
Fukushima-Related ACRS Recommendations in
Letters Dated October 13, 2011, and November 8,
2011,'' March 13, 2012.
Letter from J. W. Shea to NRC Document Control ML17061A121
Desk, ``Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 2--
Response to NRC Request for TVA's Consent to
Imposition of New Requirement Related to
Mitigation of Beyond-Design-Basis Events,''
March 1, 2017.
Letter from John W. Stetkar, ACRS Chairman, to ML15111A271
Chairman Stephen G. Burns, NRC, ``Draft SECY
Paper Proposed Rulemaking: Mitigation of Beyond-
Design-Basis Events (RIN 3150-AJ49),'' April
22, 2015.
Letter from Mark A. Satorius to John W. Stetkar, ML15125A485
ACRS, ``Draft SECY Paper `Proposed Rulemaking:
Mitigation of Beyond-Design-Basis Events (RIN
3150-AJ49)','' May 15, 2015.
Letter from Said Abdel-Khalik, ACRS Chairman, to ML11284A136
Chairman Gregory B. Jaczko, NRC, ``Initial ACRS
Review of: (1) the NRC Near-Term Task Force
Report on Fukushima and (2) Staff's Recommended
Actions To Be Taken Without Delay,'' October
13, 2011.
Memorandum from R. W. Borchardt to J. Sam ML12030A198
Armijo, ACRS Chairman, ``Final Disposition of
the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards'
Review of (1) the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission Near-Term Task Force Report on
Fukushima, (2) Staff's Recommended Actions To
Be Taken Without Delay
(SECY[dash]11[dash]0124), and (3) Staff's
Prioritization of Recommended Actions To Be
Taken in Response to Fukushima Lessons-Learned
(SECY-11-0137),'' February 27, 2012.
NEI 06-12, ``B.5.b Phase 2 & 3 Submittal ML070090060
Guideline,'' Revision 2, December 2006.
[[Page 39716]]
NEI 10-05, ``Assessment of On-Shift Emergency ML111751698
Response Organization Staffing and
Capabilities,'' Revision 0, June 2011.
NEI 12-01, ``Guideline for Assessing Beyond ML12125A412
Design Basis Accident Response Staffing and
Communications Capabilities,'' Revision 0, May
2012.
NEI 12-02, ``Industry Guidance for Compliance ML122400399
with NRC Order EA[dash]12[dash]051, `To Modify
License with Regard to Reliable Spent Fuel Pool
Instrumentation','' Revision 1, August 2012.
NEI 12-06, ``Diverse and Flexible Coping ML12242A378
Strategies (FLEX) Implementation Guide,''
Revision 0, August 2012.
NEI 12-06, ``Diverse and Flexible Coping ML15279A426
Strategies (FLEX) Implementation Guide,''
Revision 1A, October 2015.
NEI 12-06, ``Diverse and Flexible Coping ML16005A625
Strategies (FLEX) Implementation Guide,''
Revision 2, December 2015.
NEI 12-06, ``Diverse and Flexible Coping ML16267A274
Strategies (FLEX) Implementation Guide,''
Revision 3, September 2016.
NEI 13-06, ``Enhancements to Emergency Response ML14269A230
Capabilities for Beyond Design Basis Events and
Severe Accidents,'' Revision 0, September 2014.
NEI 13-06, ``Enhancements to Emergency Response ML16224A618
Capabilities for Beyond Design Basis Events and
Severe Accidents,'' Revision 1, February 2016.
NEI 14-01, ``Emergency Response Procedures and ML14269A236
Guidelines for Beyond Design Basis Events and
Severe Accidents,'' Revision 0, September 2014.
NEI 14-01, ``Emergency Response Procedures and ML16224A619
Guidelines for Beyond Design Basis Events and
Severe Accidents,'' Revision 1, February 2016.
NEI 91-04, ``Severe Accident Issue Closure ML072850981
Guidelines,'' Revision 1, December 1994.
Non-concurrence NCP-2015-003.................... ML15091A646
Non-concurrence NCP-2016-018.................... ML16312A020
NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, ``Criteria for ML040420012
Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological
Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in
Support of Nuclear Power Plants,'' Revision 1,
November 1980.
NUREG-0660, Vol. 1, ``NRC Action Plan Developed ML072470526
as a Result of the TMI-2 Accident,'' May 1980.
NUREG-0660, Vol. 2, ``NRC Action Plan Developed ML072470524
as a Result of the TMI-2 Accident,'' May 1980.
NUREG-0711, ``Human Factors Engineering Program ML12324A013
Review Model,'' Revision 3, November 2012.
NUREG-0737, ``Clarification of TMI Action Plan ML102560051
Requirements,'' November 1980.
NUREG-0737, ``Clarification of TMI Action Plan ML102560009
Requirements,'' Supplement 1, January 1983.
NUREG-0800, ``Standard Review Plan for the ML13316B202
Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear
Power Plants: LWR Edition,'' Section 19.4,
``Strategies and Guidance To Address Loss-of-
Large Areas of the Plant Due to Explosions and
Fires,'' June 2015.
NUREG-1935, ``State-of-the-Art Reactor ML12332A057
Consequence Analyses (SOARCA) Report,''
November 2012.
``Omaha Public Power District's Overall ML13116A208
Integrated Plan in Response to March 12, 2012,
Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard
to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for
Beyond Design Basis External Events (Order
Number EA-12-049,'' February 28, 2013.
Order EA-02-026, ``Order for Interim Safeguards ML020510635
and Security Compensatory Measures,'' February
25, 2002.
Order EA-06-137, ``Order Modifying Licenses,'' ML061600076
June 20, 2006.
Order EA-12-049, ``Order Modifying Licenses With ML12054A735
Regard to Requirements for Mitigation
Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External
Events,'' (Mitigation Strategies Order), March
12, 2012.
Order EA-12-051, ``Order Modifying Licenses with ML12056A044
Regard to Reliable Spent Fuel Pool
Instrumentation'' (SFPI Order), March 12, 2012.
Order EA-13-109, ``Order Modifying Licenses with ML13130A067
Regard to Reliable Hardened Containment Vents
Capable of Operation under Severe Accident
Conditions,'' June 6, 2013.
``Preliminary Proposed Rule Language for ML14218A253
Mitigation of Beyond-Design-Basis Events
Rulemaking,'' August 15, 2014.
``Preliminary Proposed Rule Language for ML14336A641
Mitigation of Beyond-Design-Basis Events
Rulemaking,'' made available to the public on
November 13, 2014, and December 8, 2014, to
support public discussion with the ACRS.
PRM-50-96, ``Petition for Rulemaking Submitted ML110750145
by Thomas Popik on Behalf of the Foundation for
Resilient Societies To Adopt Regulations that
Would Require Facilities Licensed by the NRC
under 10 CFR Part 50 To Assure Long-Term
Cooling and Unattended Water Makeup of Spent
Fuel Pools,'' March 14, 2011.
PRM-50-97, ``NRDC's Petition for Rulemaking To ML11216A237
Require Emergency Preparedness Enhancements for
Prolonged Station Blackouts,'' July 26, 2011.
PRM-50-98, ``NRDC's Petition for Rulemaking To ML11216A238
Require Emergency Preparedness Enhancements for
Multiunit Events,'' July 26, 2011.
PRM-50-100, ``NRDC's Petition for Rulemaking To ML11216A240
Require Licensees to Improve Spent Nuclear Fuel
Pool Safety,'' July 26, 2014.
PRM-50-101, ``NRDC's Petition for Rulemaking To ML11216A241
Revise 10 CFR Sec. 50.63,'' July 26, 2011.
PRM-50-102, ``NRDC's Petition for Rulemaking To ML11216A242
Require More Realistic Training on Severe
Accident Mitigation Guidelines,'' July 26, 2011.
Regulatory Issue Summary 2009-13, ``Emergency ML092670124
Response Data System Upgrade from Modem to
Virtual Private Network Appliance,'' September
28, 2009.
``Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 ML12053A340
of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f)
Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3, of
the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights
from the Fukushima Dai-Ichi Accident,'' March
12, 2012.
San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station Units 2 ML13276A020
and 3, ``Final Response to the March 12, 2012
Information Request Regarding Near-Term Task
Force Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3 and
Corresponding Commitments San Onofre Nuclear
Generating Station (SONGS) Units 2 and 3,''
September 30, 2013.
``San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 ML13329A826
and 3--NRC Response to Southern California
Edison's Final Response to the March 2012
Request for Information Letter,'' January 22,
2014.
``San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 ML14113A572
and 3--Rescission of Order EA-12-049, `Order
Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements
for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond Design
Basis External Events' (TAC Nos. MF2657 and
MF2658),'' June 30, 2014.
[[Page 39717]]
``San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 ML14111A069
and 3--Rescission of Order EA-12-051, `Order
Modifying Licenses with Regard to Reliable
Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation' (TAC Nos.
MF0917 and MF0918),'' June 30, 2014.
SECY-11-0093, ``Near-Term Report and ML11186A950
Recommendations for Agency Actions Following
the Events in Japan,'' July 12, 2011.
SECY-11-0124, ``Recommended Actions To Be Taken ML11245A127
Without Delay from the Near-Term Task Force
Report,'' September 9, 2011.
SECY-11-0137, ``Prioritization of Recommended ML11272A111
Actions To Be Taken in Response to Fukushima
Lessons Learned,'' October 3, 2011.
SECY-12-0025, ``Proposed Orders and Requests for ML12039A103
Information in Response to Lessons Learned from
Japan's March 11, 2011, Great T[omacr]hoku
Earthquake and Tsunami,'' February 17, 2012.
SECY-13-0132, ``Plan for Updating the U.S. ML13274A495
Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Cost Benefit
Guidance,'' January 2, 2014.
SECY-14-0046, ``Fifth 6-Month Status Update on ML14064A523
Response to Lessons Learned from Japan's March
11, 2011, Great T[omacr]hoku Earthquake and
Subsequent Tsunami,'' April 17, 2014.
SECY-15-0050, ``Cumulative Effects of Regulation ML15034A360
Process Enhancements and Risk Prioritization
Initiative,'' April 1, 2015.
SECY-15-0065, ``Proposed Rulemaking: Mitigation ML15049A201
of Beyond-Design-Basis Events (RIN 3150-
AJ49),'' April 30, 2015.
SECY-15-0085, ``Evaluation of the Containment ML15005A079
Protection & Release Reduction for Mark I and
Mark II Boiling Water Reactors Rulemaking
Activities (10 CFR Part 50) (RIN-3150-AJ26),''
enclosure entitled, ``Containment Protection
and Release Reduction (CPRR) Rulemaking: Draft
Regulatory Basis,'' June 18, 2015.
SECY-16-0142, ``Draft Final Rule--Mitigation of ML16301A005
Beyond-Design-Basis Events (RIN 3150-AJ49),''
December 15, 2016.
SECY-89-012, ``Staff Plans for Accident ML19126A278
Management Regulatory and Research Programs,''
January 18, 1989.
SECY-97-132, ``Status of the Integration Plan ML992930144
for Closure of Severe Accident Issues and the
Status of Severe Accident Research,'' June 23,
1997.
SECY-98-131, ``Status of the Integration Plan ML992880008
for Closure of Severe Accident Issues and the
Status of Severe Accident Research,'' June 8,
1998.
SRM-COMSECY-13-0002, ``Consolidation of Japan ML13063A548
Lessons Learned Near-Term Task Force
Recommendations 4 and 7 Regulatory
Activities,'' March 4, 2013.
SRM-COMSECY-14-0037, ``Integration of Mitigating ML15089A236
Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External
Events and The Reevaluation of Flooding
Hazards,'' March 30, 2015.
SRM-SECY-11-0093, ``Near-Term Report and ML112310021
Recommendations for Agency Actions Following
the Events in Japan,'' August 19, 2011.
SRM-SECY-11-0124, ``Recommended Actions To Be ML112911571
Taken Without Delay From the Near-Term Task
Force Report,'' October 18, 2011.
SRM-SECY-11-0137, ``Prioritization of ML113490055
Recommended Actions To Be Taken in Response to
Fukushima Lessons Learned,'' December 15, 2011.
SRM-SECY-13-0132, ``U.S. Nuclear Regulatory ML14139A104
Commission Staff Recommendation for the
Disposition of Recommendation 1 of the Near-
Term Task Force Report,'' May 19, 2014.
SRM-SECY-15-0065, ``Proposed Rulemaking: ML15239A767
Mitigation of Beyond-Design-Basis Events (RIN
3150-AJ49),'' August 27, 2015.
SRM-M190124A: Affirmation Session-SECY-16-0142: ML19023A038
Final Rule: Mitigation of Beyond-Design-Basis
Events (RIN 3150-AJ49), January 24, 2019.
Temporary Instruction 2515/191, ``Inspection of ML14273A444
the Licensee's Responses to Mitigation
Strategies Order EA-12-049, Spent Fuel Pool
Instrumentation Order EA-12-051 and Emergency
Preparedness Information Requested in NRC March
12, 2012,'' March 12, 2012.
``Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station-- ML14321A685
Rescission of Order EA[dash]12[dash]049, `Order
Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements
for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond Design
Basis External Events' (TAC No. MF4763),''
March 2, 2015.
``Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station-- ML14321A696
Rescission of Order EA[dash]12[dash]051, `Order
Modifying Licenses with Regard to Reliable
Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation' (TAC No.
MF4764),'' March 2, 2015.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The NRC may post documents related to this rulemaking, including
public comments, on the Federal rulemaking website at http://www.regulations.gov under Docket ID NRC-2014-0240. The Federal
rulemaking website allows you to receive alerts when changes or
additions occur in a docket folder. To subscribe: (1) Navigate to the
docket folder (NRC-2014-0240); (2) click the ``Sign up for Email
Alerts'' link; and (3) enter your email address and select how
frequently you would like to receive emails (daily, weekly, or
monthly).
List of Subjects
10 CFR Part 50
Administrative practice and procedure, Antitrust, Backfitting,
Classified information, Criminal penalties, Education, Fire prevention,
Fire protection, Incorporation by reference, Intergovernmental
relations, Nuclear power plants and reactors, Penalties, Radiation
protection, Reactor siting criteria, Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements, Whistleblowing.
10 CFR Part 52
Administrative practice and procedure, Antitrust, Backfitting,
Combined license, Early site permit, Emergency planning, Fees,
Incorporation by reference, Inspection, Limited work authorization,
Nuclear power plants and reactors, Penalties, Probabilistic risk
assessment, Prototype, Reactor siting criteria, Redress of site,
Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Standard design, Standard
design certification.
[[Page 39718]]
For the reasons set out in the preamble and under the authority of
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended; the Energy Reorganization
Act of 1974, as amended; and 5 U.S.C. 552 and 553, the NRC is adopting
the following amendments to 10 CFR parts 50 and 52:
PART 50--DOMESTIC LICENSING OF PRODUCTION AND UTILIZATION
FACILITIES
0
1. The authority citation for 10 CFR part 50 continues to read as
follows:
Authority: Atomic Energy Act of 1954, secs. 11, 101, 102, 103,
104, 105, 108, 122, 147, 149, 161, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186,
187, 189, 223, 234 (42 U.S.C. 2014, 2131, 2132, 2133, 2134, 2135,
2138, 2152, 2167, 2169, 2201, 2231, 2232, 2233, 2234, 2235, 2236,
2237, 2239, 2273, 2282); Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, secs.
201, 202, 206, 211 (42 U.S.C. 5841, 5842, 5846, 5851); Nuclear Waste
Policy Act of 1982, sec. 306 (42 U.S.C. 10226); National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42 U.S.C. 4332); 44 U.S.C. 3504
note; Sec. 109, Pub. L. 96-295, 94 Stat. 783.
Sec. 50.8 [Amended]
0
2. In Sec. 50.8(b), add the number ``50.155,'' sequentially.
0
3. In Sec. 50.34, remove the word ``stationary'' from paragraphs
(a)(13) and (b)(12), and revise paragraph (i).
The revision reads as follows:
Sec. 50.34 Contents of applications; technical information.
* * * * *
(i) Mitigation of beyond-design-basis events. Each application for
a power reactor operating license under this part must include the
applicant's plans for implementing the requirements of Sec. 50.155,
including a schedule for achieving full compliance with these
requirements and a description of the equipment upon which the
strategies and guidelines required by Sec. 50.155(b)(1) rely,
including the planned locations of the equipment and how the equipment
meets the requirements of Sec. 50.155(c).
0
4. In Sec. 50.54, remove paragraph (hh)(2), redesignate paragraph
(hh)(3) as (hh)(2) and revise it.
The revision reads as follows:
Sec. 50.54 Conditions of licenses.
* * * * *
(hh) * * *
(2) Paragraph (hh)(1) of this section does not apply to a licensee
that has submitted the certifications required under Sec. 50.82(a)(1)
or Sec. 52.110(a) of this chapter.
* * * * *
0
5. Add Sec. 50.155 to read as follows:
Sec. 50.155 Mitigation of beyond-design-basis events.
(a) Applicability. (1) Each holder of an operating license for a
nuclear power reactor under this part and each holder of a combined
license under part 52 of this chapter for which the Commission has made
the finding under Sec. 52.103(g) of this chapter shall comply with the
requirements of this section until submittal of the license holder's
certifications described in Sec. 50.82(a)(1) or Sec. 52.110(a) of
this chapter.
(2)(i) Once the certifications described in Sec. 50.82(a)(1) or
Sec. 52.110(a) of this chapter have been submitted by a licensee
subject to the requirements of this section, that licensee need only
comply with the requirements of paragraphs (b) through (d) and (f) of
this section associated with spent fuel pool cooling capabilities.
(ii) Holders of operating licenses or combined licenses for which
the certifications described in Sec. 50.82(a)(1) or Sec. 52.110(a) of
this chapter have been submitted need not meet the requirements of this
section except for the requirements of paragraph (b)(2) of this section
associated with spent fuel pool cooling capabilities once the decay
heat of the fuel in the spent fuel pool can be removed solely by
heating and boiling of water within the spent fuel pool and the boil-
off period provides sufficient time for the licensee to obtain off-site
resources to sustain the spent fuel pool cooling function indefinitely,
as demonstrated by an analysis performed and retained by the licensee.
(iii) The holder of the license for Millstone Power Station, Unit
1, is not subject to the requirements of this section.
(iv) Holders of operating licenses or combined licenses for which
the certifications described in Sec. 50.82(a)(1) or Sec. 52.110(a) of
this chapter have been submitted need not meet the requirements of this
section once all irradiated fuel has been permanently removed from the
spent fuel pool(s).
(b) Strategies and guidelines. Each applicant or licensee shall
develop, implement, and maintain:
(1) Mitigation strategies for beyond-design-basis external events--
Strategies and guidelines to mitigate beyond-design-basis external
events from natural phenomena that are developed assuming a loss of all
ac power concurrent with either a loss of normal access to the ultimate
heat sink or, for passive reactor designs, a loss of normal access to
the normal heat sink. These strategies and guidelines must be capable
of being implemented site-wide and must include the following:
(i) Maintaining or restoring core cooling, containment, and spent
fuel pool cooling capabilities; and
(ii) The acquisition and use of offsite assistance and resources to
support the functions required by paragraph (b)(1)(i) of this section
indefinitely, or until sufficient site functional capabilities can be
maintained without the need for the mitigation strategies.
(2) Extensive damage mitigation guidelines--Strategies and
guidelines to maintain or restore core cooling, containment, and spent
fuel pool cooling capabilities under the circumstances associated with
loss of large areas of the plant impacted by the event, due to
explosions or fire, to include strategies and guidelines in the
following areas:
(i) Firefighting;
(ii) Operations to mitigate fuel damage; and
(iii) Actions to minimize radiological release.
(c) Equipment. (1) The equipment relied on for the mitigation
strategies and guidelines required by paragraph (b)(1) of this section
must have sufficient capacity and capability to perform the functions
required by paragraph (b)(1) of this section.
(2) The equipment relied on for the mitigation strategies and
guidelines required by paragraph (b)(1) of this section must be
reasonably protected from the effects of natural phenomena that are
equivalent in magnitude to the phenomena assumed for developing the
design basis of the facility.
(d) Training requirements. Each licensee shall provide for the
training of personnel that perform activities in accordance with the
capabilities required by paragraphs (b)(1) and (2) of this section.
(e) Spent fuel pool monitoring. In order to support effective
prioritization of event mitigation and recovery actions, each licensee
shall provide reliable means to remotely monitor wide-range water level
for each spent fuel pool at its site until 5 years have elapsed since
all of the fuel within that spent fuel pool was last used in a reactor
vessel for power generation. This provision does not apply to General
Electric Mark III upper containment pools.
(f) Documentation of changes. (1) A licensee may make changes in
the implementation of the requirements in this section without NRC
approval, provided that before implementing each such change, the
licensee demonstrates that the provisions of this section continue to
be met and maintains documentation of changes until the
[[Page 39719]]
requirements of this section no longer apply.
(2) Changes in the implementation of requirements in this section
subject to change control processes in addition to paragraph (f) of
this section must be processed via their respective change control
processes, unless the changes being evaluated impact only the
implementation of the requirements of this section.
(g) Implementation. Each holder of an operating license for a
nuclear power reactor under this part on September 9, 2019, and each
holder of a combined license under part 52 of this chapter for which
the Commission made the finding specified in 10 CFR 52.103(g) as 10 CFR
52.103(g) as of September 9, 2019, shall continue to comply with the
provisions of paragraph (b)(2) of this section, and shall comply with
all other provisions of this section no later than September 9, 2022,
for licensees that received NRC Order EA-13-109 or September 9, 2021,
for all other applicable licensees.
(h) Withdrawal of orders and removal of license conditions. (1) On
September 9, 2022, Order EA-12-049, ``Order Modifying Licenses With
Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-
Basis External Events,'' and Order EA-12-051, ``Order Modifying
Licenses With Regard to Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation,'' are
withdrawn for each licensee or construction permit holder that was
issued those Orders.
(2) On September 9, 2019, Enrico Fermi Nuclear Plant Unit 3,
License No. NPF-95, license conditions 2.D(12)(h), ``Reliable Spent
Fuel Pool/Buffer Pool Level Instrumentation,'' 2.D(12)(i), ``Emergency
Planning Actions,'' and 2.D(12)(g), ``Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-
Design-Basis External Events,'' except for 2.D(12)(g)1, are deemed
removed from that license.
(3) On September 9, 2019, William States Lee III Nuclear Station,
Unit 1, License No. NPF-101, license conditions 2.D(12)(d)11 regarding
reliable spent fuel pool instrumentation, 2.D(12)(g), ``Emergency
Planning Actions,'' and 2.D(12)(j), ``Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-
Design-Basis External Events,'' except for 2.D(12)(j)1, and William
States Lee III Nuclear Station, Unit 2, License No. NPF-102, license
conditions 2.D(12)(d)11 regarding reliable spent fuel pool
instrumentation, 2.D(12)(g), ``Emergency Planning Actions,'' and
2.D(12)(j), ``Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External
Events,'' except for 2.D(12)(j)1, are deemed removed from those
licenses.
(4) On September 9, 2019, North Anna Unit 3, License No. NPF-103,
license conditions 2.D(12)(g), ``Reliable Spent Fuel Pool/Buffer Pool
Level Instrumentation,'' 2.D(12)(h), ``Emergency Planning Actions,''
and 2.D(12)(f), ``Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis
External Events,'' except for 2.D(12)(f)1, are deemed removed from the
license.
(5) On September 9, 2019, Turkey Point, Unit 6, License No. NPF-
104, license conditions 2.D(12)(e)11 regarding reliable spent fuel pool
instrumentation, 2.D(12)(g), ``Emergency Planning Actions,'' and
2.D(12)(h), ``Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External
Events,'' except for 2.D(12)(h)1, and Turkey Point, Unit 7, License No.
NPF-105, license conditions 2.D(12)(e)11 regarding reliable spent fuel
pool instrumentation, 2.D(12)(g), ``Emergency Planning Actions,'' and
2.D(12)(h), ``Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External
Events,'' except for 2.D(12)(h)1, are deemed removed from those
licenses.
0
6. In appendix E to part 50 revise paragraphs IV.F.2.j and VI.3.c to
read as follows:
Appendix E to Part 50--Emergency Planning and Preparedness for
Production and Utilization Facilities
* * * * *
IV. * * *
F. * * *
2. * * *
j. The exercises conducted under paragraph 2 of this section by
nuclear power reactor licensees must provide the opportunity for the
ERO to demonstrate proficiency in the key skills necessary to
implement the principal functional areas of emergency response
identified in paragraph 2.b of this section. Each exercise must
provide the opportunity for the ERO to demonstrate key skills
specific to emergency response duties in the control room, TSC, OSC,
EOF, and joint information center. Additionally, in each 8-calendar-
year exercise cycle, nuclear power reactor licensees shall vary the
content of scenarios during exercises conducted under paragraph 2 of
this section to provide the opportunity for the ERO to demonstrate
proficiency in the key skills necessary to respond to the following
scenario elements: hostile action directed at the plant site, no
radiological release or an unplanned minimal radiological release
that does not require public protective actions, an initial
classification of or rapid escalation to a Site Area Emergency or
General Emergency, implementation of strategies, procedures, and
guidance under Sec. 50.155(b)(2), and integration of offsite
resources with onsite response. The licensee shall maintain a record
of exercises conducted during each 8-year exercise cycle that
documents the content of scenarios used to comply with the
requirements of this paragraph. Each licensee shall conduct a
hostile action exercise for each of its sites no later than December
31, 2015. The first 8-year exercise cycle for a site will begin in
the calendar year in which the first hostile action exercise is
conducted. For a site licensed under 10 CFR part 52, the first 8-
year exercise cycle begins in the calendar year of the initial
exercise required by section IV.F.2.a of this appendix.
* * * * *
VI. * * *
3. * * *
c. In the event of a failure of NRC-supplied equipment, a
replacement will be furnished by the NRC for licensee installation.
* * * * *
PART 52--LICENSES, CERTIFICATIONS, AND APPROVALS FOR NUCLEAR POWER
PLANTS
0
7. The authority citation for part 52 continues to read as follows:
Authority: Atomic Energy Act of 1954, secs. 103, 104, 147, 149,
161, 181, 182, 183, 185, 186, 189, 223, 234 (42 U.S.C. 2133, 2134,
2167, 2169, 2201, 2231, 2232, 2233, 2235, 2236, 2239, 2273, 2282);
Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, secs. 201, 202, 206, 211 (42
U.S.C. 5841, 5842, 5846, 5851); 44 U.S.C. 3504 note.
0
8. In Sec. 52.80, revise paragraph (d) to read as follows:
Sec. 52.80 Contents of applications; additional technical
information.
* * * * *
(d) The applicant's plans for implementing the requirements of
Sec. 50.155 of this chapter including a schedule for achieving full
compliance with these requirements, and a description of the equipment
upon which the strategies and guidelines required by Sec. 50.155(b)(1)
of this chapter rely, including the planned locations of the equipment
and how the equipment meets the requirements of Sec. 50.155(c) of this
chapter.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 30th day of July, 2019.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Annette L. Vietti-Cook,
Secretary of the Commission.
The following will not appear in the Code of Federal Regulations:
Views of the Commission
Following the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident in Japan, the NRC
embarked on a program of work that has taken eight years and
involved a wide variety of people from the agency, from the
regulated industry and from our interested stakeholders. The
Commission's action on this final rule provides a holistic
conclusion to a large portion of this work, which has already
resulted in undeniable safety improvements throughout the operating
power reactor fleet in the United States. Other work continues
outside of the
[[Page 39720]]
rulemaking context; there is some analysis to determine whether
additional safety improvements are appropriate and further
evaluation is ongoing of the actual risk posed by external hazards
needed to make such determinations. This work is being performed and
will continue in the disciplined, site-specific processes that are
in use and are appropriate for resolving these issues. The
Commission's action on the final rule does not undermine, stop, or
modify these risk-informed, site-specific activities.
As our colleagues note, the final rule omits many provisions of
the draft final rule; we did not arrive at this result lightly.
Rather, as discussed in our votes and fully explained over the
course of the lengthy revisions to this document, after carefully
considering whether imposition of the underlying requirements would
comply with our existing regulations, specifically the Backfit Rule
in 10 CFR 50.109, we supported only those provisions for which such
compliance was substantiated by the staff's analysis in the decision
record. In that consideration, we primarily analyzed whether the new
requirements were necessary for adequate protection or provided a
cost-justified, substantial safety benefit. In general, we concluded
that the requirements already imposed by the Commission by the
Mitigation Strategies Order following the Fukushima Dai-ichi
accident are sufficient and no new information in the record before
us, including information developed by the staff or submitted by the
public, indicates otherwise.
Our colleagues also claim that the Staff Requirements Memorandum
(SRM) on COMSECY-14-0037, ``Integration of Mitigating Strategies for
Beyond-Design-Basis External Events and the Reevaluation of Flooding
Hazards,'' established that it is necessary that the mitigation
strategies under this final rule address the reevaluated seismic and
flooding hazards to ensure adequate protection of public health and
safety. To the extent our colleagues suggest that SRM-COMSECY-14-
0037 redefined the requirements needed for adequate protection
stated in the March 2012 Mitigation Strategies Order, that
suggestion is inconsistent with the agency's long standing practice
and with applicable procedural and safety requirements.
Staff Requirements Memoranda provide direction to the agency
staff from the Commission and are not appropriate vehicles for
imposing requirements on licensees and applicants. Under the
Administrative Procedure Act, such vehicles are generally
regulations and orders. Subsequent to COMSECY-14-0037, neither the
Commission nor the staff undertook any additional action to modify
and re-issue the March 2012 Mitigation Strategies Order or to issue
a new order as was done for the hardened containment venting system
orders when the NRC concluded venting systems should be capable of
use in a severe accident. It would be inappropriate and without
precedent for the agency to establish with finality what is required
of our licensees in a process lacking either the hearing rights of
our process for issuing orders or the public notice and comment of
our deliberative rulemaking process.
Moreover, our colleagues' suggestion regarding adequate
protection finds no support within the four corners of the SRM. As
noted in our underlying votes, seeking clear direction within the
plain text of that document is difficult. The SRM did not approve
the entirety of the staff's planned approach and in our view should
not be read to approve the staff's bases for their plan. Indeed,
COMSECY-14-0037 itself did not address the issue of the reevaluation
of seismic hazards.
Most importantly, the assertion that the Commission made an
adequate protection determination in its action on COMSECY-14-0037
is inconsistent with the Commission's conduct in the wake of the
issuance of the SRM. Under long-standing agency policy, when the NRC
identifies a need to impose a new or revised requirement to maintain
a reasonable assurance of adequate protection, the agency must next
determine whether an ``imminent threat'' to public health and safety
exists. If so, the agency must implement the requirement
immediately. In this case, the record surrounding SRM-COMSECY-14-
0037 does not contain any evidence that the Commission or staff
conducted such an imminent threat assessment. The lack of such an
assessment severely undercuts any suggestion that the SRM somehow
expanded the requirements in our March 2012 Mitigation Strategies
Order to maintain a reasonable assurance of adequate protection.
Moreover, to the extent our colleagues observe that SRM-COMSECY-
14-0037 directed the staff to include certain provisions in a draft
rule, the absence of those provisions in the final rule is not
surprising or problematic. Rather, this absence is a normal part of
the rulemaking process. As the Supreme Court has observed, ``Since
[a] proposed rule [is] simply a proposal, its presence mean[s] that
the [regulator is] considering the matter; after that consideration
the [regulator] might choose to adopt the proposal or to withdraw
it'' Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 175
(2007) (emphasis in the original). We certainly have the option, as
we have exercised here, to adopt certain aspects of a proposal and
to reject others.
Our colleagues appear to suggest that we are ignoring the actual
flooding and earthquake hazards that our licensees have determined
could occur at our nation's nuclear power plants. This is not the
case; we are simply choosing to complete the Commission-directed
site-specific process already underway rather than to enact
additional requirements on a generic basis. The hazard reevaluations
conducted by licensees at the Commission's request under 10 CFR
50.54(f) have been developed using the best available methods for
siting nuclear power plants and include conservative assumptions and
margin sufficient to show that the reevaluated hazards will not
affect the plants. Work continues on the assessment of the results
of these reevaluations to determine just what the actual hazards to
the plants are on a site-specific basis. To facilitate these
assessments, the Commission specifically directed the staff, in the
course of determining what regulatory actions are appropriate, to
``introduce more realism for the purpose of identifying potential
safety enhancements for operating reactors'' (SRM-COMSECY-14-0037)
and ``continue to look for additional opportunities to address any
over conservatism in the flood hazard evaluations and to streamline
the process as additional lessons are learned'' (SRM-COMSECY-15-
0019). The staff continues to make good progress in this area as it
completes its work under Sec. 50.54(f) to determine whether
individual licenses ``should be modified, suspended, or revoked.''
These efforts are, in our view, sufficient to provide reasonable
assurance of adequate protection at each facility.
Finally, our colleagues note the lack of specific requirements
in this final rule for items that have already been resolved in the
nuclear industry's response to the Mitigation Strategies Order. This
is, however, in keeping with our regulatory processes. Our Backfit
Rule itself provides that ``[i]f there are two or more ways to
achieve compliance with a license or the rules or orders of the
Commission, or with written licensee commitments, or there are two
or more ways to reach a level of protection which is adequate, then
ordinarily the applicant or licensee is free to choose the way which
best suits its purposes'' (10 CFR 50.109(a)(7)). Although we may
certainly constrain the manner in which applicants or licensees
develop their mitigation strategies to comply with this final rule,
we will not do so absent a sufficiently documented basis. We have
not been provided in the record before us--or anywhere else--a basis
for artificially constraining the means and methods of future
compliance as our colleagues would have us do. We have confidence
that all of the nation's currently operating power reactors are
capable of complying with the requirements of this final rule using
industry-developed and NRC-approved guidance because they have been
able to achieve compliance with the Mitigation Strategies Order,
which is made generically applicable by this Commission action.
Chairman Kristine L. Svinicki, Commissioners Annie Caputo and David
A. Wright
Separate Views of Commissioner Baran
This rule was meant to be the capstone of the agency's response
to the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident in Japan. The draft final rule
presented to the Commission by the NRC staff in December 2016 was
the culmination of years of work to establish new requirements for
the mitigation of beyond-design-basis events at nuclear power
plants. The draft final rule would have responded to Near-Term Task
Force (NTTF) recommendations 2 and 4 by requiring licensee
strategies to mitigate beyond-design-basis events to address each
plant's re-evaluated seismic and flooding hazards. The rule also
would have responded to NTTF recommendations 8 and 9 by requiring an
integrated emergency response capability and ``sufficient staffing,
command and control, training, drills, communications capability,
and documentation of changes to support the integrated response
capability.'' To address NTTF recommendations 10 and 11, the rule
[[Page 39721]]
would have set requirements for enhanced onsite emergency response
capabilities.
I strongly support requiring these updated standards and
critical safety improvements, which are necessary to provide
adequate protection of public health and safety. But the majority of
the Commission has decided to gut this key post-Fukushima safety
rule.
In the aftermath of Fukushima, licensees and the NRC staff spent
years using the latest science and modern methods to determine the
present-day flooding and earthquake hazards for the nation's nuclear
power plants. Now, the majority of the Commission has decided that
licensees can ignore these reevaluated hazards with their strategies
to mitigate beyond-design-basis events. Instead of requiring nuclear
power plants to be prepared for the actual flooding and earthquake
hazards that could occur at their sites, NRC will allow them to be
prepared only for the old, outdated hazards typically calculated
decades ago when the science of seismology and hydrology was far
less advanced than it is today. This decision is nonsensical.
The requirement for licensees to develop and maintain mitigating
strategies for beyond-design-basis events based on the modern,
reevaluated hazards was at the core of this rulemaking, and the
majority of the Commission has voted to jettison it. Under the final
rule written by the majority, the FLEX equipment at nuclear power
plants is not required to be reasonably protected from the up-to-
date flooding and earthquake hazards. Other vital safety protections
were completely excised from the rule. Licensees will not be
required to have sufficient staffing or communications capabilities
to implement the mitigating strategies. And there will be no
requirement for drills and exercises to test licensees' ability to
respond to these kinds of extreme events. Instead of establishing
these commonsense and non-controversial safety standards, the
majority of the Commission has opted to require only what was
already required in the Commission's March 2012 Mitigation
Strategies Order. That order was supposed to be a first step towards
improved safety, not the last. But the majority's version of this
rule does nothing to enhance the safety of nuclear power plants.
This outcome is a complete U-turn for NRC. In the 2012 order,
the Commission made it clear that mitigating strategies for beyond-
design-basis events were necessary to ensure adequate protection of
public health and safety. The Commission did not require the
mitigating strategies to account for the reevaluated hazards at that
time because the seismic and flooding analyses had not yet been
performed. But the NRC staff clearly understood that the mitigating
strategies would ultimately need to address the reevaluated hazards.
In 2014, the staff recommended that ``licensees' mitigating
strategies address the reevaluated flooding hazards as part of the
[mitigating beyond-design-basis-events] rulemaking.'' \5\ The
Commission unanimously approved that recommendation.\6\ As a result,
the proposed rule was written to ``resolve and clarify the necessary
actions a licensee must take to continue to show adequate protection
of public health and safety, in light of the reevaluated hazards.''
\7\ This central aspect of the proposed rule was likewise
unanimously approved by the Commission. In the comments submitted on
the proposed rule, no stakeholder disagreed that these requirements
should be included in the rule or disputed that they were necessary
for adequate protection of public health and safety. Thus, the
majority of the Commission has now voted for a final rule that bears
no resemblance to the proposed rule or any of the public comments
submitted to the agency in response to the proposed rule. Despite
the fact that the Commission had repeatedly and unanimously found
that updated safety standards were necessary to adequately protect
the public, those safety standards have now been abruptly dropped
from the final rule at the last minute, without any warning or
notice to stakeholders.
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\5\ COMSECY-14-0037 at 6-7. There was no ambiguity on this
point. The staff paper also stated: ``The NRC staff is asking the
Commission to support the planned approach by affirming that the
MBDBE rulemaking needs to require mitigating strategies that are
able to address the reevaluated flooding hazards developed in
response to the Sec. 50.54(f) letters in order to ensure reasonable
assurance of adequate protection of the public health and safety.''
Id. at 7. The paper further stated: ``The results of the
reevaluation of the flooding hazard are important to define the
necessary attributes of the mitigating strategies equipment and
actions to adequately protect against external events. The NRC staff
plans to include this requirement in the pending MBDBE rulemaking.
As such, the strategies required by the MBDBE rulemaking cannot be
completed without information about the site-specific reevaluated
flooding hazards.'' Id. at 6.
\6\ Staff Requirements Memorandum for COMSECY-14-0037.
\7\ SECY-15-0065 at 7. See also Proposed Rule Draft Federal
Register Notice at 22, 69, 71, 102, 118-119, 124-125.
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The guidance that has been developed by the NRC staff and
industry was intended to facilitate compliance with the requirements
included in the draft final rule. Licensees have been preparing for
years to implement mitigating strategies that account for the
reevaluated flooding and earthquake hazards at nuclear power plant
sites. This guidance is not a substitute for a regulation. It is not
a legally binding requirement.
This rule was always intended to be the agency's response to
several key Near-Term Task Force recommendations. Instead of
following through on these planned safety improvements, critical
aspects of those recommendations to enhance mitigation and
strengthen emergency preparedness are simply left unaddressed. As a
result, the rule fails to confront a fundamental lesson of the
Fukushima accident--that nuclear power plants must be fully prepared
for the natural hazards that could threaten their safe operation.
The majority of the Commission has chosen to leave this important
safety work for a future Commission. The unfortunate reality is that
this hollow shell of a rule does nothing beyond what the Commission
already did more than six years ago. Nuclear power plants will be no
safer with this rule than they are today.
Separate Views of Commissioner Burns
The version of the final rule supported by the majority of the
Commission will, in my view, significantly weaken what will be the
agency's most enduring action as a result of lessons learned from
the Fukushima Daiichi accident. In doing so, the Commission will
have systematically and inexplicably unraveled a framework for
addressing beyond-design-basis external events carefully crafted as
a collaborative effort between the NRC staff and our external
stakeholders in the years since the accident occurred in March 2011.
I am chiefly concerned with the position the Commission majority
has taken with respect to the reevaluated hazard analyses performed
by licensees. This position is particularly disconcerting given that
the accident at Fukushima was a direct result of the operator and
regulator failing to take action to account for new scientific
knowledge related to natural hazards, especially flooding hazards.
In this regard, I believe that the majority has undermined the
Commission's past position on these issues. In their edits to the
statements of consideration for the final rule as well as to the
supporting backfitting assessment, the majority has mischaracterized
the Commission decision on COMSECY-14-0037. In its March 2015 Staff
Requirements Memorandum on COMSECY-14-0037, the Commission approved
the staff's recommendation ``that licensees for operating nuclear
power plants need to address the reevaluated flooding hazards within
their mitigation strategies for beyond-design-basis external
events.'' The staff was explicit in COMSECY-14-0037 about what it
was asking of the Commission:
The NRC staff is asking the Commission to support the planned
approach by affirming that the MBDBE rulemaking needs to require
mitigating strategies that are able to address the reevaluated
flooding hazards developed in response to the Sec. 50.54(f) letters
in order to ensure reasonable assurance of adequate protection of
the public health and safety. (emphasis added)
The staff followed the Commission's unequivocal direction when
it presented the proposed rulemaking on the Mitigation of Beyond-
Design Basis Events to the Commission in April 2015. In the draft
proposed rule, the staff clearly stated that the proposed rulemaking
would apply to power reactor applicants and licensees and include
proposed ``requirements for the reasonable protection of mitigation
equipment for beyond-design-basis external events that reflect the
reevaluated hazards determined through regulatory efforts stemming
from the 10 CFR 50.54(f) request issued on March 12, 2012.'' In the
Commission paper transmitting the proposed rule (SECY-15-0065), the
staff highlighted the fact that the proposed rule would ``resolve
and clarify the necessary actions a licensee must take to continue
to show adequate protection of public health and safety, in light of
the reevaluated hazards, as directed in SRM-COMSECY-14-0037.'' The
Commission unanimously approved publication of the draft proposed
rule and noted only two exceptions it was taking to the staff's
proposals, neither of which involved the need for mitigation
strategies to reflect the reevaluated hazards.
We should recall that, in the SRM for SECY-11-0124,
``Recommended Actions to
[[Page 39722]]
be Taken Without Delay from the Near-Term Task Force Report,'' the
Commission approved the staff's intent to issue a request for
information to all operating reactor licensees to address, among
other things, reevaluations of seismic and flooding hazards in
accordance with Near-Term Task Force (NTTF) Recommendation 2.1. The
request for information, issued under the provisions of 10 CFR
50.54(f) on March 12, 2012, (Sec. 50.54(f) letter) stated that the
hazard evaluation developed consistent with Recommendation 2.1 would
be implemented in two phases. The first phase involved the
reevaluation of the seismic and flooding hazards at all sites. In
the second phase, the NRC staff was to determine, based upon the
results of Phase 1, whether additional regulatory actions were
necessary (e.g., updating the design basis and SSCs important to
safety) to provide additional protection against the updated
hazards.
As former Commissioner Apostolakis pointed out in his 2011 vote
on the NTTF Report, ``there is growing evidence that the historical
record of tsunamis had not been used properly to determine the
design basis at Fukushima Daiichi and, consequently, the protection
of the plants was not sufficient.'' In the United States, there
exists incontrovertible evidence that the current design bases for
some plants do not address a flood hazard identified by the
licensees' own analyses. Had the final rule been approved as
proposed by the staff, the Commission's carefully crafted strategy
would have dealt with this situation appropriately and effectively
by requiring that the mitigation strategies for all sites be able to
address the reevaluated hazards developed in response to the Sec.
50.54(f) letters as a matter of adequate protection of the public
health and safety. For plants with the most extreme exceedances from
their current design basis, additional actions may have been
necessary, but those decisions would only be made once their final
flooding and/or seismic evaluations (e.g., integrated assessments or
seismic PRAs) were completed. Absent a requirement in the MBDBE
final rule to protect the mitigation strategies from the reevaluated
hazard, the process for closing out NTTF Recommendation 2.1 and the
Sec. 50.54(f) letter for all plants will be made much more
burdensome for both licensees and the NRC staff and the outcome with
respect to protecting plants from beyond-design-basis external
events much more uncertain.
In addition, the majority's approach calls into question the
degree to which the NRC will be able to give credit for the
existence of the mitigation strategies in a number of risk-informed
regulatory initiatives like adaptation of alternative treatment
requirements for SSCs under 10 CFR 50.69, ``Risk-informed
categorization and treatment of structures, systems and components
for nuclear power reactors,'' and risk-informed technical
specifications. Licensees are also seeking credit for mitigation
strategies in the Reactor Oversight Process and have expressed
interest in pursuing credit for use of the strategies in the
physical security program. The assessment of the degree to which
credit for the mitigation strategies is possible will be much more
complex now that the mitigation strategies will not be required to
address the reevaluated hazards.
Moreover, the decision to strip out the draft final rule
requirements for an integrated response capability, as well as
requirements for sufficient staffing levels, means of communication,
and drills, also ignores primary lessons from the Fukushima Daiichi
accident. These requirements were approved by the Commission in the
proposed rule, and nothing has occurred in the interceding years to
change the need for these requirements to ensure a holistic approach
to the response to beyond-design basis accidents.
The decision of the Commission majority to reverse course now,
when the lion's share of the actions that would be required under
the rule have already been completed by industry, is baffling. It is
difficult to understand how the arguments put forth of regulatory
over-reach are defensible with anyone who was at the agency when the
accident occurred and has followed the activities of the agency,
including the decisions made by the Commission, in the intervening
years. It is equally baffling that some in the majority should lay
the blame on the shoulders of the NRC staff for the perceived
misapplication of the backfit rule when the staff was merely
following Commission direction in producing the draft final rule.
I would also point out that the changes reflected in the final
rule are troubling in two other respects. First, the changes seem to
be based in part on a presumption that the orders developed by staff
and approved by the Commission in 2012 were a fully informed and
complete regulatory solution to the Fukushima Daiichi accident. I do
not mean to suggest that the Commission and the staff didn't
implement thoughtful and effective solutions given what was known at
the time. However, the orders were approved by the Commission just
one year after the accident, and significant gaps still remained in
the NRC's and industry's knowledge. To now suggest, as the majority
has done, that the NRC could not improve upon the requirements of
the orders or address these gaps in knowledge through this
rulemaking makes little sense. I am also troubled that the final
rule eliminates a substantial number of requirements that were
included in the proposed rule for which no adverse public comments
were received.
Finally, although I have long supported the NRC's pursuit of a
rigorous application of its backfitting regulations and adherence to
its Principles of Good Regulation, this pursuit must be rational. In
defense of this rulemaking proposal, the staff produced appropriate
backfitting and regulatory analyses, which were consistent with
previous Commission direction. The majority has decided to reverse
these previous Commission decisions and takes issue with the staff's
supporting analysis based on little more than conclusory statements
in Commission votes that some of the requirements in the draft final
rule are not ``necessary'' or would not result in a ``substantial
increase in the overall protection of the public health and
safety.'' Such an approach is entirely inconsistent with the
principles of clarity, reliability, and openness that are supposed
to drive this agency's work.
In the official report of the National Diet of Japan's Fukushima
Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission, Chairman
Kiyoshi Kurokawa noted:
The earthquake and tsunami of March 11, 2011 were natural
disasters of a magnitude that shocked the entire world. Although
triggered by these cataclysmic events, the subsequent accident at
the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant cannot be regarded as a
natural disaster. It was a profoundly manmade disaster--that could
and should have been foreseen and prevented. And its effects could
have been mitigated by a more effective human response.
The issuance of the NRC's final rule was meant to be the
culmination of the agency's efforts to learn the lessons of the
Fukushima Daiichi accident. Given the final form of the rule
approved by the Commission majority, it will be difficult to
convince others that the agency has learned those lessons well.
[FR Doc. 2019-16600 Filed 8-8-19; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P