[Federal Register Volume 84, Number 147 (Wednesday, July 31, 2019)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 37155-37162]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2019-16298]


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BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION

12 CFR Part 1026

[Docket No. CFPB-2019-0039]
RIN 3170-AA98


Qualified Mortgage Definition Under the Truth in Lending Act 
(Regulation Z)

AGENCY: Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection.

ACTION: Advance notice of proposed rulemaking.

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SUMMARY: With certain exceptions, Regulation Z requires creditors to 
make a reasonable, good faith determination of a consumer's ability to 
repay any residential mortgage loan, and loans that meet Regulation Z's 
requirements for ``qualified mortgages'' obtain certain protections 
from liability. One category of qualified mortgages (QMs) is loans that 
are eligible for purchase or guarantee by either the Federal National 
Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) or the Federal Home Loan Mortgage 
Corporation (Freddie Mac). Under Regulation Z, this category of QMs 
(Temporary GSE QM loans) is scheduled to expire no later than January 
10, 2021. The Bureau currently plans to allow the Temporary GSE QM loan 
category to expire in January 2021 or after a short extension, if 
necessary, to facilitate a smooth and orderly transition away from the 
Temporary GSE QM loan category. The Bureau is considering whether to 
propose revisions to Regulation Z's general qualified mortgage 
definition in light of that planned expiration and is issuing this ANPR 
to request information about possible revisions.

DATES: Comments must be received on or before September 16, 2019.

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments, identified by Docket No. CFPB-2019-
0039 or RIN 3170-AA98, by any of the following methods:
     Federal eRulemaking Portal: http://www.regulations.gov. 
Follow the instructions for submitting comments.
     Email: [email protected]. Include Docket No. CFPB-
2019-0039 or RIN 3170-AA98 in the subject line of the email.
     Mail: Comment Intake--ATR/QM ANPR, Bureau of Consumer 
Financial Protection, 1700 G Street NW, Washington, DC 20552.
     Hand Delivery/Courier: Comment Intake--ATR/QM ANPR, Bureau 
of Consumer Financial Protection, 1700 G Street NW, Washington, DC 
20552.
    Instructions: The Bureau encourages the early submission of 
comments. All submissions should include the agency name and docket 
number or Regulatory Information Number (RIN) for this rulemaking. 
Because paper mail in the Washington, DC area and at the Bureau is 
subject to delay, commenters are encouraged to submit comments 
electronically. In general, all comments received will be posted 
without change to http://www.regulations.gov. In addition, comments 
will be available for public inspection and copying at 1700 G Street 
NW, Washington, DC 20552, on official business days between the hours 
of 10:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. Eastern Time. You can make an appointment 
to inspect the documents by telephoning 202-435-7275.
    All comments, including attachments and other supporting materials, 
will become part of the public record and subject to public disclosure. 
Proprietary or sensitive personal information, such as account numbers, 
Social Security numbers, or names of other individuals, should not be 
included. Comments will not be edited to remove any identifying or 
contact information.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Seth Caffrey, Joseph Devlin, or 
Courtney Jean, Senior Counsels, Office of Regulations, at 202-435-7700. 
If you require this document in an alternative electronic format, 
please contact [email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The Bureau is issuing this ANPR to request 
information regarding Regulation Z's definition of qualified mortgage 
loans.\1\ The Bureau invites comment on all aspects of this ANPR from 
all interested parties, including consumers, consumer advocacy groups, 
industry members and trade groups, and other members of the public.
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    \1\ See 12 CFR 1026.43.
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I. Background

A. Dodd-Frank Amendments to the Truth in Lending Act

    The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
(Dodd-Frank Act) amended the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) to establish, 
among other things, ability-to-repay (ATR) requirements in connection 
with the origination of most residential mortgage loans.\2\ The 
amendments were intended ``to assure that consumers are offered and 
receive residential mortgage loans on terms that reasonably reflect 
their ability to repay the loans and that are understandable and not 
unfair, deceptive or abusive.'' \3\ As amended, TILA prohibits a 
creditor from making a residential mortgage loan unless the creditor 
makes a reasonable and good faith determination based on verified and 
documented information that the consumer has a reasonable ability to 
repay the loan.\4\
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    \2\ Public Law 111-203, sec. 1411-12, 1414, 124 Stat. 1376 
(2010); 15 U.S.C. 1639c.
    \3\ 15 U.S.C. 1639b(a)(2).
    \4\ 15 U.S.C. 1639c(a)(1). TILA section 103 defines 
``residential mortgage loan'' to mean, with some exceptions 
including open-end credit plans, ``any consumer credit transaction 
that is secured by a mortgage, deed of trust, or other equivalent 
consensual security interest on a dwelling or on residential real 
property that includes a dwelling.''. 15 U.S.C. 1602(dd)(5). TILA 
section 129C also exempts certain residential mortgage loans from 
the ability-to-repay requirements. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. 1639c(a)(8) 
(exempting reverse mortgages and temporary or bridge loans with a 
term of 12 months or less).
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    TILA identifies the factors a creditor must consider in making a 
reasonable and good faith assessment of a consumer's ability to repay. 
These factors are the consumer's credit history, current and expected 
income, current obligations, debt-to-income ratio or residual income 
after paying non-mortgage debt and mortgage-related obligations, 
employment status, and other financial resources other than equity in 
the dwelling or real property that secures repayment of the loan.\5\ A 
creditor, however, may not be certain whether its ATR determination is 
reasonable in a particular case, and it risks liability if a court or a 
regulator, including the Bureau, later concludes

[[Page 37156]]

that the determination was not reasonable.
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    \5\ 15 U.S.C. 1639c(a)(3).
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    TILA addresses this uncertainty by defining a category of loans--
called qualified mortgages (QMs)--for which a creditor ``may presume 
that the loan has met'' the ATR requirements.\6\ The statute generally 
defines qualified mortgage to mean any residential mortgage loan for 
which:
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    \6\ 15 U.S.C. 1639c(b)(1).
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     There is no negative amortization, interest-only payments, 
or balloon payments;
     The loan term does not exceed 30 years;
     The total points and fees generally do not exceed 3 
percent of the loan amount;
     The income and assets relied upon for repayment are 
verified and documented;
     The underwriting uses a monthly payment based on the 
maximum rate during the first five years, uses a payment schedule that 
fully amortizes the loan over the loan term, and takes into account all 
mortgage-related obligations; and
     The loan complies with any guidelines or regulations 
established by the Bureau relating to the ratio of total monthly debt 
to monthly income or alternative measures of ability to pay regular 
expenses after payment of total monthly debt.\7\
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    \7\ 15 U.S.C. 1639c(b)(2)(A).
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B. The Ability-to-Repay/Qualified Mortgage Rule

    In January 2013, the Bureau issued a final rule amending Regulation 
Z to implement TILA's ATR requirements (January 2013 Final Rule).\8\ 
The January 2013 Final Rule became effective on January 14, 2014, and 
the Bureau amended it several times through 2016.\9\ This ANPR refers 
to the January 2013 Final Rule and later amendments to it collectively 
as the Ability-to-Repay/Qualified Mortgage Rule, the ATR/QM Rule, or 
the Rule.
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    \8\ 78 FR 6408 (Jan. 30, 2013).
    \9\ See 78 FR 35429 (June 12, 2013); 78 FR 44686 (July 24, 
2013); 78 FR 60382 (Oct. 1, 2013); 79 FR 65300 (Nov. 3, 2014); 80 FR 
59944 (Oct. 2, 2015); 81 FR 16074 (Mar. 25, 2016).
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    The ATR/QM Rule implements the statutory ATR provisions discussed 
above and defines several categories of QM loans.\10\ Under the Rule, a 
creditor that makes a QM loan is protected from liability presumptively 
or conclusively, depending on whether the loan is ``higher priced.'' 
\11\
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    \10\ 12 CFR 1026.43(c), (e).
    \11\ The Rule generally defines a ``higher priced'' loan to mean 
a first-lien mortgage with an annual percentage rate (APR) that 
exceeded the average prime offer rate (APOR) for a comparable 
transaction as of the date the interest rate was set by 1.5 or more 
percentage points; or a subordinate-lien mortgage with an APR that 
exceeded the APOR for a comparable transaction as of the date the 
interest rate was set by 3.5 or more percentage points. 12 CFR 
1026.43(b)(4). A creditor that makes a QM loan that is not ``higher 
priced'' is entitled to a conclusive presumption that it has 
complied with the Rule--i.e., the creditor receives a safe harbor. 
12 CFR 1026.43(e)(1)(i). A creditor that makes a QM loan that is 
``higher priced'' is entitled to a rebuttable presumption that it 
has complied with the Rule. 12 CFR 1026.43(e)(1)(ii).
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    One category of QM loans defined by the Rule consists of ``General 
QM loans.'' A loan is a General QM loan if:
     The loan does not have negative-amortization, interest-
only, or balloon-payment features, a term that exceeds 30 years, or 
points and fees that exceed specified limits; \12\
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    \12\ 12 CFR 1026.43(e)(2)(i)-(iii).
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     The creditor underwrites the loan based on a fully 
amortizing schedule using the maximum rate permitted during the first 
five years; \13\
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    \13\ 12 CFR 1026.43(e)(2)(iv).
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     The creditor considers and verifies the consumer's income 
and debt obligations in accordance with Appendix Q of the Rule; \14\ 
and
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    \14\ 12 CFR 1026.43(e)(v).
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     The ratio of the consumer's total monthly debt to total 
monthly income (DTI ratio) is no more than 43 percent, determined in 
accordance with Appendix Q of the Rule.\15\
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    \15\ 12 CFR 1026.43(e)(vi).
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    Appendix Q contains standards for calculating and verifying debt 
and income for purposes of determining whether a mortgage satisfies the 
43 percent DTI limit for General QM loans. The standards in Appendix Q 
were adapted from guidelines maintained by the Department of Housing 
and Urban Development's Federal Housing Administration (FHA) when the 
January 2013 Final Rule was issued.\16\ Appendix Q addresses how to 
determine a consumer's employment-related income (e.g., income from 
wages, commissions, and retirement plans); non-employment related 
income (e.g., income from alimony and child support payments, 
investments, and property rentals); and liabilities, including 
recurring and contingent liabilities and projected obligations.\17\
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    \16\ 78 FR 6408, 6527-28 (Jan. 30, 2013) (noting that Appendix Q 
incorporates, with certain modifications, the definitions and 
standards in HUD Handbook 4155.1, Mortgage Credit Analysis for 
Mortgage Insurance on One-to-Four-Unit Mortgage Loans).
    \17\ 12 CFR 1026, Appendix Q.
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    A second, temporary category of QM loans defined by the Rule 
consists of mortgages that: (1) Comply with the Rule's prohibitions on 
certain loan features, its underwriting requirements, and its 
limitations on points and fees; \18\ and (2) are eligible to be 
purchased or guaranteed by either Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac 
(collectively, the GSEs) while under the conservatorship of the Federal 
Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) (Temporary GSE QM loans).\19\ Unlike for 
General QM loans, Regulation Z does not prescribe a DTI limit for 
Temporary GSE QM loans. Thus, a loan can qualify as a Temporary GSE QM 
loan even if the DTI ratio exceeds 43 percent, as long as the DTI ratio 
meets the GSEs' DTI requirements and other underwriting criteria. In 
addition, income and debt for such loans, and DTI ratios, generally are 
verified and calculated using GSE standards, rather than Appendix Q. 
The Temporary GSE QM loan category--also known as the GSE Patch--is 
scheduled to expire when the GSEs exit conservatorship or on January 
10, 2021, whichever comes first.\20\
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    \18\ 12 CFR 1026.43(e)(2)(i)-(iii).
    \19\ 12 CFR 1026.43(e)(4).
    \20\ 12 CFR 1026.43(e)(4)(iii)(B). The ATR/QM Rule created 
several additional categories of QM loans. The first additional 
category consisted of mortgages eligible to be insured or guaranteed 
(as applicable) by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (FHA loans), the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (VA 
loans), the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA loans), and the 
Rural Housing Service (RHS loans). 12 CFR 1026.43(e)(4)(ii)(B)-(E). 
This temporary category of QM loans no longer exists because the 
relevant Federal agencies have since issued their own qualified 
mortgage rules. See, e.g., 24 CFR 203.19 (HUD rule). Other 
categories of QM loans provide more flexible standards for certain 
loans originated by certain small creditors. 12 CFR 1026.43(e)(5), 
(f); cf. 12 CFR 1026.43(e)(6) (applicable only to covered 
transactions for which the application was received before April 1, 
2016).
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    In the January 2013 Final Rule, the Bureau explained why it created 
the Temporary GSE QM loan category. The Bureau observed that it did not 
believe that a 43 percent DTI ratio ``represents the outer boundary of 
responsible lending'' and acknowledged that historically, and even 
after the financial crisis, over 20 percent of mortgages exceeded that 
threshold.\21\ The Bureau believed, however, that, as DTI ratios 
increase, ``the general ability-to-repay procedures, rather than the 
qualified mortgage framework, is better suited for consideration of all 
relevant factors that go to a consumer's ability to repay a mortgage 
loan'' and that ``[o]ver the long term . . . there will be a robust and 
sizable market for prudent loans beyond the 43 percent threshold even 
without the benefit of the presumption of compliance that applies to 
qualified mortgages.'' \22\
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    \21\ 78 FR 6408, 6527 (Jan. 30, 2013).
    \22\ Id. at 6527-28.
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    At the same time, the Bureau noted that the mortgage market was 
especially

[[Page 37157]]

fragile following the mortgage crisis, and GSE-eligible loans and other 
federally insured or guaranteed loans made up a significant majority of 
the market.\23\ In light of the FHFA's focus on ensuring affordability 
of GSE-eligible loans following the mortgage crisis, the Bureau 
believed that it was appropriate to consider for a period of time that 
GSE-eligible loans were originated with an appropriate assessment of 
the consumer's ability to repay and therefore warranted being treated 
as QMs.\24\ The Bureau believed in 2013 that this temporary category of 
QM loans would, in the near term, help to ensure access to responsible, 
affordable credit for consumers with DTI ratios above 43 percent, as 
well as facilitate compliance by creditors by promoting the use of 
widely recognized, federally related underwriting standards.\25\
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    \23\ Id. at 6533-34.
    \24\ Id. at 6534.
    \25\ Id. at 6533.
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    In making the Temporary GSE QM loan provision temporary, the Bureau 
sought to ``provide an adequate period for economic, market, and 
regulatory conditions to stabilize'' and ``a reasonable transition 
period to the general qualified mortgage definition.'' \26\ The Bureau 
believed that the Temporary GSE QM loan provision would benefit 
consumers by preserving access to credit while the mortgage industry 
adjusted to the ATR/QM Rule.\27\ The Bureau also explained that it 
structured the Temporary GSE QM loan provision to cover loans eligible 
to be purchased or guaranteed by the GSEs--regardless of whether the 
loans are actually purchased or guaranteed--to leave room for private 
investors to return to the market and secure the same legal protections 
as the GSEs.\28\ The Bureau believed that, as the market recovered, the 
GSEs and the Federal agencies would be able to reduce their market 
presence, the percentage of Temporary GSE QM loans would decrease, and 
the market would shift toward General QM loans and non-QM loans above a 
43 percent DTI ratio.\29\ The Bureau's view was that a shift towards 
non-QM loans could be supported by the private market--i.e., by 
institutions holding such loans in portfolio, selling them in whole, or 
securitizing them in a rejuvenated private label securities (PLS) 
market. The Bureau noted that, pursuant to its statutory obligations 
under the Dodd-Frank Act, it would assess the impact of the ATR/QM Rule 
five years after the Rule's effective date, and the assessment would 
provide an opportunity to analyze the Temporary GSE QM loan 
provision.\30\
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    \26\ Id. at 6534.
    \27\ Id. at 6536.
    \28\ Id. at 6534.
    \29\ Id.
    \30\ Id.
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C. The Bureau's Assessment of the Ability-to-Repay/Qualified Mortgage 
Rule

    Section 1022(d) of the Dodd-Frank Act requires the Bureau to assess 
each of its significant rules and orders and to publish a report of 
each assessment within five years of the effective date of the rule or 
order.\31\ In June 2017, the Bureau published a request for information 
in connection with its assessment of the ATR/QM Rule (Assessment 
RFI).\32\ In response to the Assessment RFI, the Bureau received 
approximately 480 comments from creditors, industry groups, consumer 
advocacy groups, and individuals.\33\
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    \31\ 12 U.S.C. 5512(d).
    \32\ 82 FR 25246 (June 1, 2017).
    \33\ See Bureau of Consumer Fin. Prot., Ability-to-Repay and 
Qualified Mortgage Rule Assessment Report, at 243 (Jan. 2019), 
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/documents/7165/cfpb_ability-to-repay-qualified-mortgage_assessment-report.pdf (Assessment Report or 
Report).
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Summary of Select Assessment RFI Comments \34\
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    \34\ See id. at Appendix B (summarizing comments received in 
response to the Assessment RFI).
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    Commenters addressed a variety of topics, including the General QM 
loan definition and the 43 percent DTI limit. One industry group stated 
that, if there is no significant change in mortgage performance if the 
DTI ratio exceeds 43 percent, the DTI limit should be eliminated or 
alternative ways to satisfy the General QM loan definition should be 
considered. Several industry groups, creditors, and individual 
commenters advocated raising the DTI limit from 43 percent to 45 
percent or higher.\35\ Two individual commenters argued against 
increasing the DTI limit, while one individual commenter argued that 
investors should be permitted to establish their own DTI limits. 
Several industry groups, a creditor, and individual commenters stated 
that the DTI limit should be eliminated because it has disadvantaged 
consumers who have income that is difficult to document, and because 
other measurements, such as cash flow, better indicate a consumer's 
ability to repay a loan.
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    \35\ The Bureau's analysis of GSE loan data suggests that the 
GSEs have used a DTI threshold of 45 percent on loans eligible for 
purchase or guarantee. See id. at 97-98.
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    Many commenters discussed perceived problems with Appendix Q of 
Regulation Z. An industry group stated that Appendix Q was borrowed 
from static, vague, and outdated guidelines that do not reflect today's 
employment and income trends and documentation standards. Several 
industry groups and creditors stated that calculating and verifying 
debt and income in accordance with Appendix Q is particularly 
burdensome for applications from consumers who receive income from 
self- or part-time employment, have irregular income, or wish to use 
asset depletion as income. A coalition of consumer advocacy groups 
stated that the documentation standards for self-employment income can 
discourage creditors and borrowers from pursuing loans when such income 
is present.
    Multiple industry groups and creditors advocated for specific 
changes to discrete elements of Appendix Q, such as the provisions 
addressing employment verification, work-history gaps, Social Security 
income, and the use of tax information. Two industry groups and two 
individual commenters stated that the Bureau should approve 
alternatives to Appendix Q, such as the standards used by the GSEs, 
FHA, the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Rural Housing 
Service. Several industry groups, a creditor, and a consumer advocacy 
group stated that Appendix Q should be eliminated altogether.
    Commenters also specifically addressed the Temporary GSE QM loan 
provision. While commenters generally agreed that the provision has 
been beneficial, they disagreed about how the Bureau should address its 
expiration. Regarding beneficial effects, multiple commenters stated 
that the Temporary GSE QM loan provision has prevented significant 
disruption in the mortgage market and has enabled creditors to lend 
efficiently and to more consumers. Several industry groups stated that 
the Temporary GSE QM loan provision has combined a regulatory bright 
line with flexibility, allowing creditors to reach deeper into the 
population of creditworthy consumers.
    Commenters expressed a range of ideas for addressing the Temporary 
GSE QM loan provision's expiration, from making the provision 
permanent, to extending it for a period of time or to other products, 
to eliminating it. For example, two consumer advocacy groups and two 
industry groups stated that the Temporary GSE QM loan provision should 
be maintained, citing the negative effect that expiration could have on 
the availability of credit, the need to encourage responsible lending 
above a 43 percent DTI ratio, and the

[[Page 37158]]

benefits of maintaining the flexibility that the GSE standards 
incorporate. Three industry groups, two creditors, and a consumer 
advocacy group also argued for making the Temporary GSE QM loan 
provision permanent. Three other industry groups and a consumer 
advocacy group suggested an indefinite extension until an alternative 
is in place, an individual commenter suggested extending the provision 
for seven years, and a creditor and two industry groups supported 
extending it to jumbo mortgages.\36\ One industry group stated that, 
although it believes the Temporary GSE QM loan provision is essential 
for mortgage market support at present, the provision must eventually 
expire. Finally, two industry groups and an individual commenter argued 
that the Temporary GSE QM loan provision should be eliminated and the 
Bureau should rely only on TILA's statutory requirements to define a 
qualified mortgage.
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    \36\ Jumbo mortgages are mortgages for amounts greater than the 
maximum conforming loan limits set by the FHFA. See, e.g., Fed. 
Hous. Fin. Agency, FHFA Announces Maximum Conforming Loan Limits for 
2019 (Nov. 27, 2018), https://www.fhfa.gov/Media/PublicAffairs/Pages/FHFA-Announces-Maximum-Conforming-Loan-Limits-for-2019.aspx.
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The Bureau's 2018 Call for Evidence
    Beginning in January 2018, the Bureau issued a general call for 
evidence seeking comment on its enforcement, supervision, rulemaking, 
market monitoring, and financial education activities.\37\ As part of 
the call for evidence, the Bureau published requests for information 
relating to, among other things, the Bureau's rulemaking process,\38\ 
the Bureau's adopted regulations and new rulemaking authorities,\39\ 
and the Bureau's inherited regulations and inherited rulemaking 
authorities.\40\
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    \37\ See Bureau of Consumer Fin. Prot., Call for Evidence, 
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/policy-compliance/notice-opportunities-comment/archive-closed/call-for-evidence (last updated 
Apr. 17, 2018).
    \38\ 83 FR 10437 (Mar. 9, 2018).
    \39\ 83 FR 12286 (Mar. 21, 2018).
    \40\ 83 FR 12881 (Mar. 26, 2018).
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    In response to the call for evidence and requests for information, 
the Bureau received comments on the ATR/QM Rule from stakeholders, 
including consumer advocacy groups and industry groups. Commenters 
addressed a variety of topics, including the General QM loan 
definition, Appendix Q, and the Temporary GSE QM loan provision. 
Commenters raised concerns about, among other things, the inflexibility 
of the General QM loan definition's 43 percent DTI limit, the 
difficulty of applying Appendix Q in certain circumstances, and the 
risks of allowing the Temporary GSE QM loan provision to expire without 
any changes to the General QM loan definition or Appendix Q. The 
concerns raised in these comments were similar to those raised in 
response to the Assessment RFI, discussed above.
Assessment Report Findings Regarding Temporary GSE QM Loans
    In January 2019, the Bureau published its ATR/QM Rule Assessment 
Report.\41\ The Report included a number of findings about the effects 
of the ATR/QM Rule on the mortgage market generally, as well as 
specific findings about Temporary GSE QM loan originations.
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    \41\ See generally Assessment Report, supra note 33.
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    The Report found that loans with higher DTI levels are historically 
associated with higher levels of ``early delinquency'' (i.e., 
delinquency within two years of origination), which can serve as a 
proxy for measuring whether a consumer had the ability to repay at the 
time the mortgage loan was consummated.\42\ The Report also found that, 
for high-DTI borrowers--i.e., borrowers with DTI ratios above 43 
percent--who qualify for loans eligible for purchase or guarantee by 
the GSEs, the Rule has not decreased access to credit.\43\ However, 
based on application-level data obtained from nine large lenders, the 
Report found that the Rule eliminated between 63 and 70 percent of non-
GSE eligible, high-DTI home purchase loans.\44\
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    \42\ See, e.g., id. at 83-84, 100-05.
    \43\ See, e.g., id. at 10, 194-96.
    \44\ See, e.g., id. at 10-11, 117, 131-47.
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    One main finding about Temporary GSE QM loans was that such loans 
represent a ``large and persistent'' share of originations in the 
conforming segment of the mortgage market.\45\ As discussed, the GSEs' 
share of the conventional, conforming purchase-mortgage market was 
large before the ATR/QM Rule, and the assessment found a small increase 
in that share since the Rule's effective date, reaching 71 percent in 
2017.\46\ The Assessment Report noted that, at least for loans intended 
for sale in the secondary market, creditors generally offer a Temporary 
GSE QM loan even when a General QM loan could be originated.\47\
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    \45\ Id. at 188. Because the Temporary GSE QM loan provision 
generally affects only loans that conform to the GSEs' guidelines, 
the Assessment Report's discussion of the Temporary GSE QM loan 
provision focused on the conforming segment of the market, not on 
non-conforming (e.g., jumbo) loans.
    \46\ Id. at 191.
    \47\ Id. at 192.
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    The continued prevalence of Temporary GSE QM loan originations is 
contrary to the Bureau's expectation at the time of the ATR/QM 
Rule.\48\ The Assessment Report discussed several possible reasons for 
this outcome. The first is Appendix Q. The Report highlighted 
commenters' concerns with the perceived lack of clarity in Appendix Q 
and found that such concerns ``may have contributed to investors'--and 
at least derivatively, creditors'--preference'' for Temporary GSE QM 
loans.\49\ Appendix Q, unlike other standards for calculating and 
verifying debt and income, has not been revised since the January 2013 
Final Rule.\50\
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    \48\ Id. at 13, 190, 238.
    \49\ Id. at 193.
    \50\ Id. at 193-94.
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    A second possible reason for the continued prevalence of Temporary 
GSE QM loans is that the GSEs were able to accommodate demand for 
mortgages above the General QM loan DTI limit of 43 percent as the DTI 
distribution in the market shifted upward. According to the Report, in 
the years since the ATR/QM Rule took effect, house prices have 
increased, and consumers hold more mortgage and other debt (including 
student loan debt), all of which have caused the DTI distribution to 
shift up.\51\ Mortgages with DTI ratios greater than 43 percent 
recently have been an increasing share of Temporary GSE QM loan 
originations.\52\
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    \51\ Id. at 194.
    \52\ Id. at 194-95.
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    The Assessment Report found that a third possible reason for the 
persistence of Temporary GSE QM loans is the structure of the secondary 
market. If lenders adhere to the GSEs' guidelines, they gain access to 
a robust, highly liquid secondary market.\53\ In contrast, while 
private market securitizations have grown somewhat in recent years, 
their volume is still a fraction of their pre-crisis levels.\54\ 
According to the Assessment Report, recently there appears to have been 
some momentum toward a long-term structure with a greater role for 
private market securitization.\55\
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    \53\ Id. at 196.
    \54\ Id.
    \55\ Id. at 198.
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D. Possible Market Impact of Expiration of Temporary GSE QM Loan 
Provision

    Based on National Mortgage Database (NMDB) data,\56\ the Bureau 
estimates

[[Page 37159]]

that there were approximately 6.01 million closed-end first-lien 
residential mortgage originations in the United States in 2018. Based 
on supplemental data provided by the FHFA, the Bureau estimates that 
the GSEs purchased or guaranteed 52 percent--roughly 3.12 million--of 
those loans. Of those 3.12 million loans, the Bureau estimates that 31 
percent--approximately 957,000 loans--had DTI ratios greater than 43 
percent.\57\ Thus, the Bureau estimates that, as a result of the 
General QM loan definition's 43 percent DTI limit, approximately 
957,000 loans--16 percent of all closed-end first-lien residential 
mortgage originations in 2018--fell within the Temporary GSE QM loan 
definition but not the General QM loan definition.\58\ Throughout this 
ANPR, the Bureau refers to loans that fall within the Temporary GSE QM 
loan definition but not the General QM loan definition as High-DTI GSE 
loans. The Bureau expects that High-DTI GSE loans will continue to 
comprise a significant proportion of mortgage originations through 
January 2021, when the Temporary GSE QM loan definition is scheduled to 
expire.
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    \56\ The NMDB, jointly developed by the FHFA and the Bureau, 
provides de-identified loan characteristics and performance 
information for a 5 percent sample of all mortgage originations from 
1998 to the present, supplemented by de-identified loan and borrower 
characteristics from Federal administrative sources and credit 
reporting data. See Bureau of Consumer Fin. Prot., Sources and Uses 
of Data at the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection, at 55-56 
(Sept. 2018), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/documents/6850/bcfp_sources-uses-of-data.pdf. Differences in total market size 
estimates between NMDB data and Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) 
data are attributable to differences in coverage and data 
construction methodology.
    \57\ The Bureau estimates that 616,000 of these loans were for 
home purchases, and 341,000 were refinance loans. In addition, the 
Bureau estimates that the share of these loans with DTI ratios over 
45 percent has varied over time due to changes in market conditions 
and GSE underwriting standards, rising from 47 percent in 2016 to 56 
percent in 2017, and further to 69 percent in 2018.
    \58\ This estimate only includes GSE-purchased Temporary GSE QM 
loans that do not fall within the General QM loan definition because 
they have a DTI ratio over 43 percent. An additional, smaller number 
of Temporary GSE QM loans purchased by the GSEs may not fall within 
the General QM loan definition because of documentation or other 
underwriting differences. The estimate also does not include 
Temporary GSE QM loans that were eligible for purchase by the GSEs 
but were not sold to the GSEs.
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    The Bureau has identified several ways that the market for loans 
that would have been High-DTI GSE loans may respond to the expiration 
of the Temporary GSE QM loan definition. The Bureau recognizes the 
inherent challenges of identifying possible market responses that may 
be contingent on future economic, legal, and policy developments; 
nevertheless, the Bureau believes that possible market responses need 
to be considered in determining the best possible response to the 
expiration of the Temporary GSE QM loan definition. In identifying 
these possible market responses, the Bureau makes several assumptions 
about the future behavior of market participants. The GSEs currently 
are not permitted to purchase non-QM loans, and the Bureau assumes no 
change in this policy. The Bureau also assumes that lenders' preference 
for making Temporary GSE QM loans, and investors' preference for 
purchasing such loans, is driven in part by the safe harbor provided to 
such loans, and that these preferences will continue at least for some 
lenders and investors.
    Given these assumptions, it seems likely, first, that many 
borrowers who would have obtained High-DTI GSE loans will instead 
obtain FHA-guaranteed loans since FHA currently guarantees loans with 
DTI ratios up to 57 percent.\59\ The number of loans that move to FHA 
would depend in the first instance on FHA's willingness and ability to 
guarantee such loans, whether FHA continues to treat all loans that it 
guarantees as QMs under its own QM rule, and on how many High-DTI GSE 
loans exceed FHA's loan-amount limit. For example, the Bureau estimates 
that, in 2018, 11 percent of High-DTI GSE loans exceeded FHA's loan-
amount limit.\60\ This creates an outer limit on the share of High-DTI 
GSE loans that could move to FHA.
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    \59\ In fiscal year 2018, approximately 55 percent of FHA-
insured purchase mortgages had a DTI ratio above 43 percent. U.S. 
Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., Annual Report to Congress Regarding the 
Financial Status of the FHA Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund, Fiscal 
Year 2018, at 30 (Nov. 15, 2018), https://www.hud.gov/sites/dfiles/Housing/documents/2018fhaannualreportMMIFund.pdf.
    \60\ In 2018, FHA's county-level maximum loan limits ranged from 
$271,050 to $721,050. See U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., FHA 
Mortgage Limits, https://entp.hud.gov/idapp/html/hicostlook.cfm 
(last visited July 24, 2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Second, it is possible that some borrowers who would have sought 
High-DTI GSE loans will be able to obtain loans in the private market. 
The number of loans would likely depend, in part, on whether actors in 
the private market are willing to assume the credit risk associated 
with funding High-DTI GSE loans as non-QM loans or small-creditor 
portfolio QM loans \61\ and, if so, whether actors in the private 
market would offer more competitive pricing or terms. For example, the 
Bureau estimates that 55 percent of High-DTI GSE loans in 2018 had 
credit scores at or above 680 and loan-to-value (LTV) ratios at or 
below 80 percent--credit characteristics traditionally considered 
attractive to actors in the private market. The Bureau also notes that 
there are certain built-in costs to FHA loans--namely, mortgage 
insurance premiums--which could be a basis for competition, and that 
depository institutions in recent years have shied away from 
originating and servicing FHA loans due to the obligations and risks 
associated with such loans. At the same time, as the Assessment Report 
found, there recently has been some momentum toward a greater role for 
private market non-QM loans, but it is uncertain how great this role 
will be in the future.
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    \61\ See 12 CFR 1026.43(e)(5) (extending QM status to certain 
portfolio loans originated by certain small creditors). In addition, 
Section 101 of the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer 
Protection Act, Public Law 115-174, 101, 132 Stat. 1296 (2018), 
amended TILA to add a safe-harbor for small-creditor portfolio 
loans. See 15 U.S.C. 1639c(b)(2)(F).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Third, if FHA and actors in the private market together do not 
guarantee or make all of the High-DTI GSE loans, some borrowers who 
would have sought High-DTI GSE loans might not obtain loans at all. 
Other borrowers who would have sought High-DTI GSE loans may simply 
adapt to changing options and make different choices. For example, some 
consumers may respond to the expiration of the Temporary GSE QM loan 
definition by adjusting their borrowing to result in a lower DTI ratio.

II. Topics on Which the Bureau Seeks Comment

    As discussed above, the Temporary GSE QM loan provision is 
scheduled to expire no later than January 10, 2021. The Bureau does not 
intend to make the Temporary GSE QM loan provision permanent. The 
Bureau continues to believe, as it did in issuing the ATR/QM Rule, that 
consumers would be disserved if ``the qualified mortgage rule [were to] 
define the limit of credit availability.'' \62\ The Bureau also is 
concerned about presuming indefinitely that loans eligible to be 
purchased or guaranteed by the GSEs--whether or not the GSEs are under 
conservatorship--have been originated with appropriate consideration of 
consumers' ability to repay. Indeed, one GSE loosened its underwriting 
standards in ways that proved unsustainable.\63\ In addition, the 
Bureau is concerned that making the Temporary GSE QM loan provision 
permanent could stifle innovation and the development of competitive 
private-sector approaches to underwriting. The Bureau also is concerned 
that, as long as the Temporary GSE QM loan provision continues, the 
private market is less likely to rebound. Indeed, the existence of the 
Temporary GSE QM loan provision may be contributing to the

[[Page 37160]]

continuing anemic state of the private mortgage-backed securities 
market. For all these reasons, the Bureau believes that making the 
Temporary GSE QM loan provision permanent appears to be inconsistent 
with the purposes of TILA's ATR provision, and with the Bureau's 
mandate. The Bureau therefore seeks comment on the topics and questions 
listed below in light of the Bureau's intent not to make the GSE Patch 
permanent.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \62\ 78 FR 6408, 6528 (Jan. 30, 2013).
    \63\ Assessment Report, supra note 33, at 194-95.
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A. Assessing Ability To Repay Under the General QM Loan Definition

    The Bureau is considering whether to propose to revise Regulation 
Z's General QM Loan definition in light of the planned expiration of 
the Temporary GSE QM loan provision in January 2021. The Bureau is 
considering whether the definition should retain a direct measure of a 
consumer's personal finances, such as DTI ratio or residual income, and 
how that measure should be structured. The Bureau is also seeking 
comment on whether the definition should instead include an alternative 
method for assessing financial capacity or should be limited to the 
express statutory criteria.
    To assist the Bureau in developing any such proposals, the Bureau 
requests public comment on the questions below. The Bureau requests 
that commenters provide data and analysis to support their views. 
Commenters need not resubmit data provided to the Bureau in connection 
with the Assessment RFI or the 2018 call for evidence initiative.
1. Direct Measures of a Consumer's Personal Finances
    The Dodd-Frank Act amended TILA to authorize the Bureau to adopt a 
DTI limit as part of the General QM loan definition.\64\ In the 
preamble to the January 2013 Final Rule, the Bureau provided several 
reasons for using DTI ratio and for setting the limit at 43 percent. 
First, the Bureau stated that the QM criteria should include a standard 
for evaluating whether consumers have the ability to repay their 
mortgage loans, in addition to the statute's product feature and 
general underwriting requirements.\65\ Second, the Bureau noted that 
DTI ratios are a common and useful tool for evaluating a consumer's 
ability to repay a loan over time because, as the available data 
showed, DTI ratio correlates with loan performance as measured by 
delinquency rate.\66\ With respect to the particular threshold chosen, 
the Bureau noted that, for many years, FHA used a 43 percent DTI limit 
as its general boundary for defining affordability.\67\ Third, the 
Bureau predicted that, in incorporating a well-understood bright-line 
threshold, the 43 percent DTI limit would provide certainty for 
creditors and help to minimize the potential for disputes and costly 
litigation over whether a mortgage is a QM.\68\ Finally, the Bureau 
recognized that there would be many instances in which individual 
consumers could afford a higher DTI ratio based on their particular 
circumstances, but stated that the general ATR framework, rather than 
the QM framework, would be better suited for such cases.\69\ The Bureau 
predicted that the 43 percent DTI limit over time would allow room for 
a robust and sizable market for non-QMs.\70\ The Bureau also suggested 
that a higher DTI threshold might require a corresponding weakening of 
the strength of the presumption of compliance, which would largely 
defeat the point of adopting a higher DTI threshold.\71\
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    \64\ 15 U.S.C. 1639c(b)(3); 15 U.S.C. 1639c(b)(2)(A)(vi).
    \65\ 78 FR 6408, 6526.
    \66\ Id. at 6505, 6526-27.
    \67\ Id. at 6505.
    \68\ Id. at 6505-06.
    \69\ Id. at 6527-28.
    \70\ Id. at 6506.
    \71\ Id. at 6528.
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    The Bureau's Assessment Report found that, both before and after 
the financial crisis, loans with higher DTI ratios are historically 
associated with higher levels of early delinquency, which, in turn, is 
indicative of the lack of ability to repay at origination.\72\ The 
Report also found that, overall, inclusion of a DTI limit in the 
General QM loan definition appears to have reduced the number of loan 
originations with DTI ratios above 43 percent and increased the number 
with DTI ratios at or just below the limit.\73\ In addition, the Report 
found that a robust market for non-QM loans above the 43 percent DTI 
limit has not materialized as the Bureau had predicted when it 
promulgated the Rule.\74\ The Report also noted recent academic 
research indicating that DTI limits can have broader housing market 
effects, potentially decreasing house price fluctuations and the 
resulting borrower responses to pricing corrections.\75\
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    \72\ Assessment Report, supra note 33, at 83-84, 100-05.
    \73\ Id. at 115-47.
    \74\ Id. at 198.
    \75\ Id. at 99-100. Respondents to the Bureau's Assessment RFI 
noted that high-DTI lending can lead to house price booms. 
Respondents also observed that the General QM loan DTI limit of 43 
percent may help constrain such house price growth, but such effects 
likely have been diluted by the Temporary GSE QM loan provision's 
allowance of DTIs above 43 percent. See Lynn Fisher, Norbert Michel, 
Tobias Peter & Edward J. Pinto, Analysis of the BCFP's (CFPB's) 
temporary Qualified Mortgage category announced in January 2013, 
commonly known as the ``Patch'' (Mar. 1, 2019), http://www.aei.org/publication/analysis-of-the-bcfps-cfpbs-temporary-qualified-mortgage-category-announced-in-january-2013-commonly-known-as-the-patch.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In adopting a DTI limit in the January 2013 Final Rule, the Bureau 
acknowledged arguments that residual income--generally defined as the 
monthly income that remains after a consumer pays all personal debts 
and obligations, including the prospective mortgage--may be a better 
measure of repayment ability in the long run. The Bureau concluded, 
however, that it lacked sufficient evidence to prescribe a bright-line 
rule based on residual income.\76\ Some stakeholders have continued to 
suggest that residual income, rather than DTI ratio, should be used in 
the General QM loan definition. Other stakeholders have suggested 
combining a higher DTI ratio with a requirement that creditors also 
consider residual income.\77\ The Bureau has authority under TILA to 
prescribe regulations requiring creditors to consider such alternative 
measures of ability to repay as part of the General QM loan 
definition.\78\
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    \76\ 78 FR 6408, 6528.
    \77\ See Eric Kaplan, Michael Stegman, Phillip Swagel & Theodore 
Tozer, Milken Institute, A Blueprint for Administrative Reform of 
the Housing Finance System, at 17 (Jan. 2019), https://assets1b.milkeninstitute.org/assets/Publication/Viewpoint/PDF/Blueprint-Admin-Reform-HF-System-1.7.2019-v2.pdf (suggesting that 
the Bureau both (1) expand the 43 percent DTI limit to 45 percent to 
move market share of higher-DTI loans from the GSEs and FHA to the 
non-agency market, and (2) establish a residual income test to 
protect against the risk of higher-DTI loans).
    \78\ 15 U.S.C. 1639c(b)(3); 15 U.S.C. 1639c(b)(2)(A)(vi).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    a. Assuming without deciding that, in addition to the statutory 
factors, the Bureau retains as part of the General QM loan definition a 
criterion that directly measures a consumer's personal finances, should 
the Bureau continue to include only a DTI limit, or should the Bureau 
replace or supplement the DTI limit with another method (e.g., residual 
income or another method)? If so, which method and why? The Bureau 
requests that commenters provide data and analysis to support their 
views about the use of DTI, residual income, or any suggested 
alternatives that directly measure a consumer's personal finances.
    b. Assuming without deciding that the Bureau retains a DTI limit as 
part of the General QM loan definition, should the limit remain 43 
percent? Should the Bureau increase or decrease the DTI limit to some 
other percentage? Should the Bureau grant QM status to loans

[[Page 37161]]

with DTI ratios above a prescribed limit if certain compensating 
factors are present? \79\ The Bureau requests that commenters provide 
data and analysis to support their views about the optimal DTI limit if 
the Bureau were to retain a DTI limit as part of the General QM loan 
definition.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \79\ For example, typical required compensating factors for GSE 
loans with DTIs above 45 percent include twelve months of cash 
reserves for the borrower and a maximum LTV ratio of 80 percent. See 
Assessment Report, supra note 33, at 98 n.233. See also U.S. Dep't 
of the Treasury, A Financial System that Creates Economic 
Opportunities: Banks and Credit Unions, at 99 (June 2017), https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Documents/A%20Financial%20System.pdf (revised QM loan requirements should 
permit higher DTI loans with compensating factors).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    c. Assuming without deciding that the Bureau retains a criterion 
that directly measures a consumer's personal finances--DTI ratio, 
residual income, or some other measure--the Bureau is considering what 
standards creditors should be permitted or required to use to calculate 
and verify debt and income. Currently, Appendix Q provides these 
standards. Appendix Q incorporates FHA's guidelines as they existed 
when the January 2013 Final Rule was developed (i.e., FHA's 2011 
Guidelines). The Bureau intended for Appendix Q to provide creditors 
with certainty about whether they had calculated a loan's DTI ratio in 
a way that the Bureau or a court would accept, so that the loan's 
compliance with the General QM loan definition's DTI limit could be 
ensured. Based on extensive public feedback and its own experience, the 
Bureau recognizes that Appendix Q's methods for documenting debt and 
income can be rigid, that its provisions for determining what debt and 
income can be included in DTI calculations can be difficult to apply, 
and that it does not provide the level of compliance certainty that the 
Bureau anticipated. Stakeholders have reported that these documentation 
and determination concerns are particularly acute for self-employed 
consumers, consumers with part-time employment, and consumers with 
irregular or unusual income streams.
    i. Assuming without deciding that the Bureau retains a criterion 
that directly measures a consumer's personal finances--DTI ratio, 
residual income, or some other measure--should creditors be required to 
continue using Appendix Q to calculate and verify debt and income? 
Should the Bureau replace Appendix Q? If the Bureau retains Appendix Q, 
how should it be changed or supplemented? The Bureau requests that 
commenters provide data and analysis to support their views about any 
suggested changes to Appendix Q.
    ii. If the Bureau does not retain Appendix Q or permits use of an 
alternative, what standard should the Bureau require or permit 
creditors to use to calculate and verify debt and income? Should the 
Bureau specify in Regulation Z an existing version of a widely used 
method of calculating and verifying debt and income that creditors 
would be required to use? Or, to provide flexibility to creditors, 
should the Bureau combine a general requirement to use a ``reasonable 
method'' with the option to use, as a safe harbor, a specified, 
existing version of a widely used method for calculating and verifying 
debt and income? If the Bureau were to specify an existing version of a 
widely used method for calculating and verifying debt and income under 
either of the approaches described in this paragraph, which method (or 
methods) should be allowed? Should Appendix Q be one of them? The 
Bureau requests that commenters provide data and analysis to support 
their views about the appropriate approach to calculating and verifying 
debt and income.
2. Alternatives to Direct Measures of a Consumer's Personal Finances
    The purpose of TILA's ATR requirement is to ensure that consumers 
are offered and receive residential mortgage loans on terms that 
reasonably reflect their ability to repay the loans and that are 
understandable and not unfair, deceptive, or abusive.\80\ The ATR/QM 
Rule sought to achieve this purpose, in part, by including a DTI limit 
in the General QM loan definition. Some stakeholders have suggested 
that the Bureau rely on the statutory QM loan restrictions only (i.e., 
prohibitions on certain loan features, requirements for underwriting, 
and a limitation on points and fees) to define a General QM loan.\81\ 
Others have argued that the General QM loan definition should 
incorporate counter-cyclical limits, such as LTV ratio, that become 
more restrictive as housing prices increase.\82\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \80\ 15 U.S.C. 1639b(a)(2).
    \81\ See Edward DeMarco, Three Ways to Draw Private Capital Back 
into Mortgages, Am. Banker (June 14, 2019), https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/three-ways-to-draw-private-capital-back-into-mortgages.
    \82\ See Fisher et al., supra note 75, at 34.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Still other stakeholders have suggested that the Bureau rely on 
factors that do not directly measure a consumer's personal finances 
because such factors may be more predictive of default than DTI or 
other direct measurements. For example, one stakeholder has suggested 
that the Bureau eliminate the DTI criterion and provide a QM safe 
harbor to a loan if the difference between the loan's annual percentage 
rate (APR) and the average prime offer rate (APOR) for a comparable 
first-lien transaction--i.e., the rate spread--is less than 150 basis 
points, as long as the loan also meets the statutory QM criteria.\83\ 
This stakeholder states that mortgage rates reflect credit risk more 
holistically than DTI ratios and that a rate-spread approach would 
encourage innovation in the high-DTI loan market.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \83\ See Karan Kaul & Laurie Goodman, Urban Inst. Hous. Fin. 
Pol'y Ctr., Updated: What, If Anything, Should Replace the QM GSE 
Patch, at 6-7 (Oct. 2018), https://www.urban.org/research/publication/updated-what-if-anything-should-replace-qm-gse-patch.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Similarly, another stakeholder has suggested eliminating the DTI 
criterion for certain loans, depending on their pricing.\84\ Under such 
an approach, for example, a loan with a rate spread of: (1) Less than 
150 basis points over APOR would receive a QM safe harbor regardless of 
DTI ratio, as long as the loan met the statutory QM criteria; (2) 
between 150 and 300 basis points over APOR would receive a QM 
rebuttable presumption regardless of DTI ratio, as long as the loan met 
the statutory QM criteria; \85\ and (3) 300 basis points or more over 
APOR would receive a QM rebuttable presumption only if the DTI ratio 
did not exceed 43 percent and the loan met the statutory QM criteria. 
This stakeholder suggests that near-prime loans with high DTI ratios 
can still perform well, rendering it unnecessary to impose a DTI limit 
on these loans. By contrast, according to this stakeholder, because 
higher-rate loans pose greater risks to consumers, it is critical to 
include a DTI threshold for such loans. Loans with improperly 
calculated DTI ratios would lose their QM status, thus exposing lenders 
to liability; to minimize that risk, lenders would be careful when 
originating such loans.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \84\ See generally Eric Stein & Michael Calhoun, Ctr. for 
Responsible Lending, A Smarter Qualified Mortgage Can Benefit 
Borrowers, Taxpayers, and the Economy (July 2019), https://www.responsiblelending.org/sites/default/files/nodes/files/research-publication/crl-a-smarter-qualified-mortgage-july2019.pdf.
    \85\ A slight variation would require a lender originating a 
loan in this category to use a validated underwriting model with 
statistically-predictive compensating factors, including DTI or 
residual income, in order for the loan to obtain QM status. See id. 
at 12.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Others have suggested that the Bureau amend the Rule so that any 
performing loan that has been on a financial institution's books for at 
least two years (or some slightly longer time frame) would 
automatically convert to a QM

[[Page 37162]]

loan.\86\ These stakeholders argue that, when a loan defaults after 
performing for two or three years, it is not reasonable to conclude 
that the default was caused by the creditor's failure to consider the 
consumer's ability to repay.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \86\ See, e.g., Norbert Michel, The Best Housing Finance Reform 
Options for the Trump Administration, Forbes (July 15, 2019), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/norbertmichel/2019/07/15/the-best-housing-finance-reform-options-for-the-trump-administration/#4f5640de7d3f.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Another possibility would be to require creditors to consider other 
credit risk factors, such as credit score or LTV ratio, in lieu of DTI 
ratio. The rationale for such an approach would be similar to the 
rationale for the pricing-based approaches already discussed. That is, 
because credit risk factors such as credit score and LTV ratio are 
predictive of default, they arguably are more useful criteria than DTI 
for determining whether a loan will be repaid.\87\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \87\ See, e.g., Assessment Report, supra note 33, at 100 n.239.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    a. The Bureau requests comment on whether standards that do not 
directly measure a consumer's personal finances are consistent with, 
and further TILA's purpose of, ensuring that consumers are offered and 
receive residential mortgage loans on terms that reasonably reflect 
their ability to repay the loans. The Bureau requests that commenters 
provide data and analysis to support their views.
    b. The Bureau requests comment on the advantages and disadvantages 
of such standards relative to standards that directly measure a 
consumer's personal finances, including DTI ratio and residual income. 
The Bureau requests that commenters provide data and analysis to 
support their views.
    c. Assuming without deciding that the Bureau were to adopt 
standards that do not directly measure a consumer's personal finances, 
should the Bureau retain the current line separating safe-harbor and 
rebuttable-presumption QMs or modify it and, if so, how? The Bureau 
requests that commenters provide data and analysis to support their 
views.
    d. The Rule currently provides that a consumer may rebut the 
presumption of compliance only by proving that, based on the 
information available to the creditor at the time of consummation, the 
consumer lacked sufficient residual income to meet living expenses, 
including any recurring and material non-debt obligations of which the 
creditor was aware.\88\ Assuming without deciding that the Bureau were 
to adopt standards that do not directly measure a consumer's personal 
finances, should the Bureau further specify or clarify the grounds on 
which the presumption of compliance can be rebutted? The Bureau 
requests that commenters provide data and analysis to support their 
views.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \88\ 12 CFR 1026.43(e)(1)(ii)(B).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

B. Other Temporary GSE QM Loan Issues

    1. The Temporary GSE QM loan provision will remain in effect until 
the earlier of January 10, 2021, or the date that the GSEs exit 
conservatorship.\89\ To minimize disruption to the mortgage market when 
the Temporary GSE QM loan provision expires, should the Bureau consider 
any other changes to Regulation Z's ability-to-repay and qualified 
mortgage provisions (i.e., other than changes discussed in response to 
prior questions)? The Bureau requests that commenters provide data and 
analysis to support their views.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \89\ 12 CFR 1026.43(e)(4)(iii)(B).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    2. The Bureau recognizes that industry will need time to change its 
practices to respond to the expiration of the Temporary GSE QM loan 
provision and any changes the Bureau makes to the General QM loan 
definition. To conduct an orderly rulemaking process and to smooth the 
transition to any new General QM loan definition, the Bureau requests 
comment, with supporting data, on how much time industry would need to 
change its practices following the issuance of a final rule with such a 
new definition. If the answer depends on how the Bureau revises the 
definition, the Bureau requests answers based on alternative possible 
definitions.

    Dated: July 25, 2019.
Kathleen L. Kraninger,
Director, Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection.
[FR Doc. 2019-16298 Filed 7-30-19; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 4810-AM-P