## UNCLASSIFIED - 3 -

forces' widespread use of landmines along Yemen's western coast since mid-2017 has killed and injured hundreds of civilians and prevented aid groups from reaching vulnerable communities." Despite the humanitarian catastrophe, the Houthis continue to escalate the conflict in Yemen, most recently disregarding their own commitments under the UN-sponsored ceasefire deal regarding the port city of Hudaydah.

- (U) The United States strongly backs peace efforts brokered by UN Special Envoy Martin Griffiths. Griffiths' painstaking endeavor to have parties reach agreements in peace talks in Sweden in 2018 would lay a solid track for a political process to end the conflict.
- (U) For the reasons cited above, an emergency exists requiring immediate provision of certain defense systems to Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Jordan in the national security interest of the United States. Such transfers, whether provided via the Foreign Military Sales system, or through the licensing of Direct Commercial Sales, must occur as quickly as possible in order to deter further Iranian adventurism in the Gulf and throughout the Middle East. The Secretary of State, therefore, has certified an emergency exists under sections 36(b)(1), 36(c)(2), and 36(d)(2) of the Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. 2776, thereby waiving the congressional review requirements of those provisions.

## UNCLASSIFIED

[FR Doc. 2019-15724 Filed 7-23-19; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 5001-06-C

#### **DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE**

Office of the Secretary [Transmittal No. 17-73]

### **Arms Sales Notification**

**AGENCY:** Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Department of Defense. **ACTION:** Arms sales notice.

**SUMMARY:** The Department of Defense is publishing the unclassified text of an arms sales notification.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Karma Job at karma.d.job.civ@mail.mil or (703) 697-8976.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This 36(b)(1) arms sales notification is published to fulfill the requirements of section 155 of Public Law 104-164

dated July 21, 1996. The following is a copy of a letter to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, Transmittal 17–73 with attached Policy Justification; Sensitivity of Technology; and State

Department Emergency Determination and Justification.

Dated: July 19, 2019. Aaron T. Siegel,

Alternate OSD Federal Register Liaison Officer, Department of Defense.

BILLING CODE 5001-06-P



#### DEFENSE SECURITY COOPERATION AGENCY 201 12™ STREET SOUTH, STE 203 ARLINGTON, VA 22202-5408

The Honorable Nancy Pelosi Speaker of the House U.S. House of Representatives H-209, The Capitol Washington, DC 20515

MAY 2 4 2019

Dear Madam Speaker:

On May 23, 2019, the Secretary of State, pursuant to section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended, determined that an emergency exists which requires the immediate sale of the defense articles and defense services identified in the attached transmittals to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates through the Foreign Military Sales process, including any further amendments specific to costs, quantity, or requirements, occurring within the duration of circumstances giving rise to these emergency sales, in order to deter further the malign influence of the Government of Iran throughout the Middle East region.

Please find attached (Tab 1) the Secretary of State Determination and Justification waiving the Congressional review requirements under Section 36(b)(1) and 36 (b)(5)(C) of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended, for the attached list of Transmittals of proposed Letters of Offer and Acceptance to the United Arab Emirates and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia for defense articles and services pursuant to the notification requirements of Section 36(b)(1) and Section 36(b)(5)(C) of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), as amended. The determination and detailed justification are a part of each Transmittal. After this letter is delivered to your office, we plan to issue a news release to notify the public of the proposed sales.

Sincere

Charles W. Hooper Lieutenant General

Director

#### Enclosures:

- 1. Secretary of State Determination and Justification Transmittal
- 2. Transmittal 17-0B for the United Arab Emirates
- 3. Transmittal 17-39 for the United Arab Emirates
- 4. Transmittal 17-70 for the United Arab Emirates
- 5. Transmittal 17-73 for the United Arab Emirates
- 6. Transmittal 18-21 for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
- 7. Transmittal 18-31 for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
- 8. Transmittal 19-18 for the United Arab Emirates
- 9. Transmittal 19-01 for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
- 10. Regional Balance Determinations (Classified document provided under separate cover)

Transmittal No. 17-73

Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended

- (i) Prospective Purchaser: Government of the United Arab Emirates
  - (ii) Total Estimated Value:

 $\begin{tabular}{lll} Major Defense Equipment * .. & $850 million \\ Other ...... & $50 million \\ \end{tabular}$ 

TOTAL ...... \$900 million

(iii) Description and Quantity or Quantities of Articles or Services under Consideration for Purchase:

Major Defense Equipment (MDE): Twenty thousand four (20,004) Advanced Precision Kill Weapon Systems (APKWS) II All-Up-Rounds Non-MDE:

Also included is weapon support and test equipment, spares, technical publications, personnel training, other training equipment, transportation, U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical and logistics support services, and other related elements of logistical and program support.

- (iv) *Military Department:* Navy (AE–P–ABL)
- (v) Prior Related Cases, if any: AE-P-ABH (P&A) and AE-P-ABI (P&A)
- (vi) Sales Commission, Fee, etc., Paid, Offered, or Agreed to be Paid: None
- (vii) Sensitivity of Technology Contained in the Defense Article or Defense Services Proposed to be Sold: See Attached Annex
- (viii) Date Report Delivered to Congress: May 24, 2019
- \* As defined in Section 47(6) of the Arms Export Control Act.

#### POLICY JUSTIFICATION

United Arab Emirates (UAE)— Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System (APKWS)

The Government of the United Arab Emirates has requested a possible sale of twenty thousand four (20,004) Advanced Precision Kill Weapon Systems (APKWS) II All-Up-Rounds. Also included is weapon support and test equipment, spares, technical publications, personnel training, other training equipment, transportation, U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical and logistics support services, and other related elements of logistical and program support. The estimated total case value is \$900 million.

The Secretary of State has determined and provided detailed justification that an emergency exists that requires the immediate sale to the United Arab Emirates of the above defense articles (and defense services) in the national security interests of the United States, thereby waiving the Congressional review requirements under Section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended.

This proposed sale will contribute to the foreign policy and national security of the United States by improving the security of an important partner in the region. This sale is consistent with U.S. initiatives to provide key partners in the region with modern systems that will enhance interoperability with U.S. forces and increase security.

The APKWS will provide the UAE with flexibility in the use of proportional, precision fires when operating in remote and mountainous regions as well as populated areas. The APKWS will complement the Hellfire II missile as a secondary precision munition with lower collateral damage potential. These aspects make the APKWS, employed in conjunction with UAE's multiple types of helicopters and Hellfire II missiles, an appropriate munition for the UAE's counterterrorism operations. UAE will have no difficulty absorbing the APKWS into its armed forces.

The proposed sale of this equipment and support will not alter the basic military balance in the region.

The prime contractor will be BAE Systems, Nashua, NH. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale.

Implementation of this proposed sale will require up to 20 U.S. Government and up to 30 contractor representatives to travel to UAE.

There will be no adverse impact on U.S. defense readiness as a result of this proposed sale.

#### Transmittal No. 17-73

Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act

#### Annex Item No. vii

(vii) Sensitivity of Technology:

1. The APKWS II All-Up-Round

1. The APKWŚ II All-Up-Round (AUR) is an air-to-ground weapon that consists of an APKWS II Guidance Section (GS), legacy 2.75-inch MK66 Mod 4 rocket motor and legacy MK152, MK282 and MK435/436 warhead/fuze. The APKWS II GS is installed between the rocket motor and warhead and provides a Semi-Active Laser (SAL) precision capability to legacy unguided 2.75-inch rockets. The APKWS II is procured as an independent component to be mated to the appropriate 2.75-inch warhead/fuze. The GS is manually set

with the appropriate laser code during loading and is launched from any platform configured with a LAU–68F/A, or similar launcher(s). After launch, the GS activates and the seeker detects laser energy reflected from a target designated with a remote or autonomous laser. The control system then guides the rocket to the target. The only interface required with the host platform is a 28V direct current (DC) firing pulse.

- 2. APKWS II increases stowed kills by providing precise engagements at standoff ranges with sufficient accuracy for a high single-shot probability of hit against soft and lightly armored targets, thereby minimizing collateral damage. The APKWS II is capable of day and night operation and performance in many adverse environments.
- 3. The APKWS II requires no depot maintenance. Activities to prepare the APKWS II for use include setting the laser code switches, turning on the Electronic Thermal Battery Initiator, and loading the AUR into the launcher. Wing Slot Seals (WSS) may be replaced, if necessary, at an I-level maintenance facility.
- 4. All training for APKWS II is unclassified. The training required is:
- a. Pilot training to effectively employ the APKWS II,
- b. Ordnance Handler training for safe handling and preparation of the APKWS II and AUR; and
- c. Maintenance training for replacement of WSS.
- 5. If a technologically advanced adversary were to obtain knowledge of specific hardware, the information could be used to develop countermeasures which might reduce weapons system effectiveness or be used in the development of a system with similar or advanced capabilities.
- 6. A determination has been made that the United Arab Emirates can provide substantially the same degree of protection for sensitive technology being released as the U.S. Government. This proposed sustainment program is necessary to the furtherance of the U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives outlined in the policy justification.
- 7. All defense articles and services listed in this transmittal are authorized for release and export to the Government of the United Arab Emirates.

BILLING CODE 5001-06-P

UNCLASSIFIED

DATE DSCA RECEIVED MAY 2 4 2019

#### DETERMINATION UNDER THE ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT

SUBJECT:

Emergency Arms Sales to Saudi Arabia, the United Arab

Emirates, and Jordan

Pursuant to sections 36(b)(1), 36(c)(2), and 36(d)(2) of the Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. 2776, I hereby state that an emergency exists which requires the immediate sale of the following foreign military sales and direct commercial sales cases, including any further amendments specific to the cost, quantity, or requirements of these cases, in the national security interest of the United States:

## For the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia:

- F-15 Support
- Payeway Precision Guided Munitions (sale and co-production)
- Aircraft Maintenance Support
- Aurora Bomb Fuzing System
- 120mm M933A1 Mortar Bombs
- F110 Engines for F-15s
- \* F/A-18 Panel Manufacture in Saudi Arabia for other end-users
- Advising and support of Ministry of Defense reform
- Continuation of follow-on logistics support and services for Royal Saudi Air Force, including Tactical Air Surveillance System support

#### For the United Arab Emirates:

- AH-64 Equipment
- APKWS Laser-guided Rockets
- Javelin Anti-Tank Missiles
- Paveway Precision Guided Munitions and Maverick missile support
- RQ-21 Blackjack UAS
- M107A1.50 caliber Rifles
- FMU-152A/B Programmable Bomb Fuse
- Patriot Guidance Enhanced Missile Tactical Ballistic Missile
- U.S. Marine Corps training of UAE Presidential Guard
- F-16 engine parts
- Amendment to previously Congressionally notified case for ScanEagle and Integrator Unmanned Aerial Systems

## UNCLASSIFIED

-2-

## For Jordan:

 Transfer of Paveway II Precision Guided Munitions from the United Arab Emirates.

This determination shall be published in the Federal Register and, along with the accompanying Memorandum of Justification, shall be transmitted to Congress.

Mixeley Pompeo

## **UNCLASSIFIED**

(U) MEMORANDUM OF JUSTIFICATION
FOR EMERGENCY ARMS TRANSFERS AND AUTHORIZATIONS TO THE
KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA,
THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES, AND THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF
JORDAN TO DETER IRANIAN MALIGN INFLUENCE

- (U) Iranian malign activity poses a fundamental threat to the stability of the Middle East and to American security at home and abroad. Iran's actions have led directly to the deaths of over six hundred U.S. military personnel in Iraq, untold suffering in Syria, and significant threats to Israeli security. In Yemen, Iran helps fuel a conflict creating the world's greatest humanitarian crisis. Iran directed repeated attacks on civilian and military infrastructure in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates by Iranian-designed explosives-laden drones and ballistic missiles fired by the Houthis, also known as Ansar Allah, who receive financial, technical, and materiel support from Iran.
- (U) Current threat reporting indicates Iran engages in preparations for further malign activities throughout the Middle East region, including potential targeting of U.S. and allied military forces in the region. As the Administration publicly noted and briefed to Congress in greater detail in the appropriate setting, a number of troubling and escalatory indications and warnings from the Iranian regime have prompted an increased U.S. force posture in the region. The Iranbacked Houthis publicly threatened to increase operations targeting vital military targets in the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Saudi-Led Coalition positions in Yemen. The rapidly-evolving security situation in the region requires an accelerated delivery of certain capabilities to U.S. partners in the region.
- (U) As President Trump noted in National Security Memorandum 11 of May 8, 2018, "the actions and policies of the Government of Iran, including its proliferation and development of missiles and other asymmetric and conventional weapons capabilities, its network and campaign of regional aggression, its support for terrorist groups, and the malign activities of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and its surrogates continue to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States."
- (U) Iran's actions pose a critical threat to regional stability and the national security of the United States, which has been long acknowledged. Since 1984, Iran remains designated by the United States as a State Sponsor of Terrorism pursuant to section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act, section 40 of the Arms Export

## UNCLASSIFIED - 2 -

Control Act, and section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act. In addition, the recent designation of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a Foreign Terrorist Organization under section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act notes the Government of Iran, through the IRGC-Quds Force, provides material support to the Taliban, Lebanese Hizballah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC). Iran is also identified as constituting an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy and economy of the United States under Executive Orders dating back to the Carter and Clinton Administrations.

- (U) In 2014, the Houthis, an Iran-supported force increasingly contributing to the Iranian regime's efforts to destabilize the Arabian Peninsula, attempted to overthrow the internationally recognized government of Yemen. The Houthis have greatly increased regional instability, threatened the global economy, destroyed infrastructure, and terrorized the Yemeni people.
- (U) The Houthis have attacked civilian areas within Saudi Arabia and the UAE with ballistic missile and unmanned aerial vehicle attacks in addition to cross-border raids; these have resulted in the deaths of over five hundred Saudi civilians, and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was fortunate in 2017 to have intercepted a ballistic missile aimed at Mecca which could have led to in a regional conflagration.
- (U) The Houthi threat to stability extends beyond the security of their immediate neighbors. Over 10% of global shipping passes through the Bab-el-Mandeb straits separating Yemen from Africa, including an estimated 4.8 million barrels of oil per day, or about 5% of the global oil trade. Since 2016, the Houthis have repeatedly targeted international shipping transiting these straits to or from the Suez Canal. Houthi-controlled media recently announced the Houthis' intent to target Saudi ARAMCO infrastructure. Utilizing anti-ship cruise missiles, small boat attacks, and remote-controlled explosive vessels, the Houthis continue to strike not only commercial oil tankers, but also struck a cargo ship carrying grain to a Yemeni port. The Houthis conducted maritime attacks on the USS Mason and the USS Ponce, demonstrating the direct nature of the Houthi threat to U.S. personnel, assets, and our national security.
- (U) Within Yemen, the Houthis severely limited the ability of the international community to provide humanitarian assistance to the population under their control. International humanitarian organizations report the "Houthi

# UNCLASSIFIED - 3 -

forces' widespread use of landmines along Yemen's western coast since mid-2017 has killed and injured hundreds of civilians and prevented aid groups from reaching vulnerable communities." Despite the humanitarian catastrophe, the Houthis continue to escalate the conflict in Yemen, most recently disregarding their own commitments under the UN-sponsored ceasefire deal regarding the port city of Hudaydah.

- (U) The United States strongly backs peace efforts brokered by UN Special Envoy Martin Griffiths. Griffiths' painstaking endeavor to have parties reach agreements in peace talks in Sweden in 2018 would lay a solid track for a political process to end the conflict.
- (U) For the reasons cited above, an emergency exists requiring immediate provision of certain defense systems to Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Jordan in the national security interest of the United States. Such transfers, whether provided via the Foreign Military Sales system, or through the licensing of Direct Commercial Sales, must occur as quickly as possible in order to deter further Iranian adventurism in the Gulf and throughout the Middle East. The Secretary of State, therefore, has certified an emergency exists under sections 36(b)(1), 36(c)(2), and 36(d)(2) of the Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. 2776, thereby waiving the congressional review requirements of those provisions.

## **UNCLASSIFIED**

[FR Doc. 2019-15746 Filed 7-23-19; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 5001-06-C

#### **DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE**

Office of the Secretary [Transmittal No. 18-21]

### **Arms Sales Notification**

**AGENCY:** Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Department of Defense. **ACTION:** Arms sales notice.

**SUMMARY:** The Department of Defense is publishing the unclassified text of an arms sales notification.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Karma Job at karma.d.job.civ@mail.mil or (703) 697–8976.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This 36(b)(1) arms sales notification is published to fulfill the requirements of section 155 of Public Law 104-164