[Federal Register Volume 84, Number 140 (Monday, July 22, 2019)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 35234-35280]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2019-15131]



[[Page 35233]]

Vol. 84

Monday,

No. 140

July 22, 2019

Part III





Department of the Treasury





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Office of the Comptroller of the Currency





Federal Reserve System





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Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation





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12 CFR Parts 3, 217 and 324





Regulatory Capital Rule: Simplifications to the Capital Rule Pursuant 
to the Economic Growth and Regulatory Paperwork Reduction Act of 1996; 
Final Rule

  Federal Register / Vol. 84 , No. 140 / Monday, July 22, 2019 / Rules 
and Regulations  

[[Page 35234]]


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DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

Office of the Comptroller of the Currency

12 CFR Part 3

[Docket ID OCC-2017-0018]
RIN 1557-AE10

FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM

12 CFR Part 217

[Regulation Q; Docket No. R-1576]
RIN 7100 AE74

FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION

12 CFR Part 324

RIN 3064-AE59


Regulatory Capital Rule: Simplifications to the Capital Rule 
Pursuant to the Economic Growth and Regulatory Paperwork Reduction Act 
of 1996

AGENCY: Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Treasury; the Board 
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; and the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation.

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, and the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (collectively, the agencies) are adopting a final 
rule (final rule) to simplify certain aspects of the capital rule. The 
final rule is responsive to the agencies' March 2017 report to Congress 
pursuant to the Economic Growth and Regulatory Paperwork Reduction Act 
of 1996, in which the agencies committed to meaningfully reduce 
regulatory burden, especially on community banking organizations. The 
key elements of the final rule apply solely to banking organizations 
that are not subject to the advanced approaches capital rule (non-
advanced approaches banking organizations). Under the final rule, non-
advanced approaches banking organizations will be subject to simpler 
regulatory capital requirements for mortgage servicing assets, certain 
deferred tax assets arising from temporary differences, and investments 
in the capital of unconsolidated financial institutions than those 
currently applied. The final rule also simplifies, for non-advanced 
approaches banking organizations, the calculation for the amount of 
capital issued by a consolidated subsidiary of a banking organization 
and held by third parties (sometimes referred to as a minority 
interest) that is includable in regulatory capital. In addition, the 
final rule makes technical amendments to, and clarifies certain aspects 
of, the agencies' capital rule for both non-advanced approaches banking 
organizations and advanced approaches banking organizations (technical 
amendments). Revisions to the definition of high-volatility commercial 
real estate exposure in the agencies' capital rule are being addressed 
in a separate rulemaking.

DATES: This rule is effective October 1, 2019, except for the 
amendments to 12 CFR 3.21, 3.22, 3.300, 217.21, 217.22, 217.300(b) and 
(d), 324.21, 324.22, and 324.300, which are effective April 1, 2020. 
For more information, see SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 
    OCC: David Elkes, Risk Expert, Capital and Regulatory Policy (202) 
649-6370; or Carl Kaminski, Special Counsel, or Henry Barkhausen, 
Counsel, or Chris Rafferty Attorney, Chief Counsel's Office, (202) 649-
5490, for persons who are deaf or hearing impaired, TTY, (202) 649-
5597, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, 400 7th Street SW, 
Washington, DC 20219.
    Board: Constance M. Horsley, Deputy Associate Director, (202) 452-
5239; Juan Climent, Manager, (202) 872-7526; or Andrew Willis, Lead 
Financial Institutions Policy Analyst, (202) 912-4323, Division of 
Supervision and Regulation; or Benjamin McDonough, Assistant General 
Counsel (202) 452-2036; Gillian Burgess, Senior Counsel (202) 736-5564, 
or Mark Buresh, Counsel (202) 452-5270, Legal Division, Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 20th and C Streets NW, 
Washington, DC 20551.
    FDIC: Benedetto Bosco, Chief, Capital Policy Section, 
[email protected]; Richard Smith, Capital Markets Policy Analyst, 
[email protected]; Michael Maloney, Senior Policy Analyst, 
[email protected]; [email protected]; Capital Markets Branch, 
Division of Risk Management Supervision, (202) 898-6888; or Catherine 
Wood, Counsel, [email protected]; Michael Phillips, Counsel, 
[email protected]; Supervision Branch, Legal Division, Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation, 550 17th Street NW, Washington, DC 20429.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The portions of the final rule related to 
simpler requirements for mortgage servicing assets, certain deferred 
tax assets, investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial 
institutions, and minority interest (incorporated in the amendatory 
instructions 7, 8, 24, 30, 31, 47.b, 53, 54, and 70) are effective on 
April 1, 2020. The portions of the final rule related to the technical 
amendments (incorporated in the amendatory instructions 1-6, 9-23, 25-
29, 32-46, 47.a, 48-52, and 55-69) are effective October 1, 2019. Any 
banking organization subject to the capital rule may elect to adopt the 
technical amendments that are effective October 1, 2019, prior to that 
date.

Table of Contents

I. Introduction
    A. Related Rulemakings
    B. Current Capital Treatment
    1. MSAs, Temporary Difference DTAs and Investments in the 
Capital of Unconsolidated Financial Institutions
    2. Minority Interest
II. Summary of the Simplifications Proposal
    A. Proposed Simplifications to the Capital Rule
    B. Summary of Comments Received on the Simplifications Proposal
III. Final Rule
    A. MSAs, Temporary Difference DTAs, and Investments in the 
Capital of Unconsolidated Financial Institutions
    1. MSAs and Temporary Difference DTAs
    2. Investments in the Capital of Unconsolidated Financial 
Institutions
    3. Regulatory Treatment for Advanced Approaches Banking 
Organizations
    B. Minority Interest
    C. Capital Treatment for Advanced Approaches Banking 
Organizations
    D. Technical Amendments to the Capital Rule
    E. Effective Dates of Amendments
IV. Abbreviations
V. Regulatory Analyses
    A. Paperwork Reduction Act
    B. Regulatory Flexibility Act Analysis
    C. Plain Language
    D. OCC Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 Determination
    E. Riegle Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act 
of 1994

I. Introduction

    On October 27, 2017, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 
(OCC), the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Board), 
and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) published a notice 
of proposed rulemaking (simplifications proposal) \1\ with the goal of 
reducing regulatory compliance burden, particularly on community 
banking organizations, by simplifying certain aspects of the agencies' 
risk-based and leverage capital requirements (capital rule).\2\
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    \1\ 82 FR 49984 (October 27, 2017).
    \2\ The Board and the OCC issued a joint final rule on October 
11, 2013 (78 FR 62018) and the FDIC issued a substantially identical 
interim final rule on September 10, 2013 (78 FR 55340). In April 
2014, the FDIC adopted the interim final rule as a final rule with 
no substantive changes. 79 FR 20754 (April 14, 2014).

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[[Page 35235]]

    The agencies had previously adopted in 2013 rules designed to 
strengthen the capital rule's requirements and improve risk 
sensitivity. These rules were intended to address weaknesses that 
became apparent during the financial crisis of 2007-08. Since 2013, the 
quality of banking organizations' capital has significantly improved 
and the quantity of capital has increased.
    The capital rule adopted in 2013 provides two methodologies for 
determining risk-weighted assets: (i) A standardized approach and (ii) 
a more complex, models-based approach, which includes both the internal 
ratings-based approach for measuring credit risk exposure and the 
advanced measurement approach for measuring operational risk exposure 
(advanced approaches).\3\ The standardized approach applies to all 
banking organizations that are subject to the agencies' risk-based 
capital rule, whereas the advanced approaches apply only to certain 
large or internationally active banking organizations (advanced 
approaches banking organizations).\4\
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    \3\ 12 CFR part 3, subparts D & E (OCC); 12 CFR part 217, 
subparts D & E (Board); 12 CFR part 324, subparts D & E (FDIC).
    \4\ 12 CFR 3.1(c), 12 CFR 3.100(b) (OCC); 12 CFR 217.1(c), 12 
CFR 217.100(b) (Board); 12 CFR 324.1(c), 12 CFR 324.100(b) (FDIC). 
Advanced approaches banking organizations are required to calculate 
capital ratios under both the standardized and advanced approaches 
in the capital rule and are subject to whichever ratio is lower 
between the two approaches.
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    In connection with the agencies' review of all the banking 
regulations under the Economic Growth and Regulatory Paperwork 
Reduction Act of 1996 (EGRPRA),\5\ the agencies received over 230 
comment letters from depository institutions and their holding 
companies, trade associations, consumer and community groups, and other 
interested parties.\6\ The agencies also received numerous oral and 
written comments at public outreach meetings.\7\ Many of the commenters 
stated that certain aspects of the capital rule are unduly burdensome 
and complex. After reviewing the comments, the agencies issued a Joint 
Report to Congress: Economic Growth and Regulatory Paperwork Reduction 
Act (the 2017 EGRPRA report) in March 2017,\8\ highlighting the 
agencies' intent to meaningfully reduce regulatory burden, especially 
on community banking organizations, while maintaining safety and 
soundness in the banking system and retaining the quality and quantity 
of regulatory capital.
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    \5\ EGRPRA requires that regulations prescribed by the agencies 
be reviewed at least once every 10 years. The purpose of this review 
is to identify, with input from the public, outdated or unnecessary 
regulations and consider how to reduce regulatory burden on insured 
depository institutions while, at the same time, ensuring their 
safety and soundness and the safety and soundness of the financial 
system. Public Law 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996).
    \6\ 79 FR 32172 (June 4, 2014); 80 FR 7980 (February 13, 2015); 
80 FR 32046 (June 5, 2015); and 80 FR 79724 (December 23, 2015).
    \7\ Comments received during the EGRPRA review process and 
transcripts of outreach meetings can be found at http://egrpra.ffiec.gov/.
    \8\ 82 FR 15900 (March 30, 2017).
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    In particular, the agencies indicated in the 2017 EGRPRA report 
their intent to issue a rule that would simplify, for non-advanced 
approaches banking organizations, (i) the current regulatory capital 
treatment for concentrations of mortgage servicing assets (MSAs), 
deferred tax assets (DTAs) arising from temporary differences that an 
institution could not realize through net operating loss carrybacks 
(temporary difference DTAs), and investments in the capital of 
unconsolidated financial institutions; and (ii) the calculation for the 
amount of minority interest includable in regulatory 
capital.9 10 The 2017 EGRPRA report also highlighted the 
agencies' intent to replace the capital rule's treatment of high 
volatility commercial real estate (HVCRE) exposures with a simpler 
treatment for most acquisition, development, or construction exposures.
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    \9\ Temporary differences arise when financial events or 
transactions are recognized in one period for financial reporting 
purposes and in another period, or periods, for tax purposes.
    \10\ Minority interest is the amount of capital that can count 
toward regulatory requirements in cases in which a banking 
organization's consolidated subsidiary has issued capital that is 
held by third parties.
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A. Related Rulemakings

    The agencies have issued several other rulemakings over the last 
two years to simplify certain aspects of the capital rule. For example, 
the capital rule included transitional arrangements for certain 
requirements. Under such transitional arrangements in the capital rule, 
any amount of MSAs, temporary difference DTAs, and investments in the 
capital of unconsolidated financial institutions that a banking 
organization did not deduct from common equity tier 1 capital was risk 
weighted at 100 percent until January 1, 2018. In 2017, the agencies 
adopted a rule (transition rule) to allow non-advanced approaches 
banking organizations to continue to apply the transition treatment in 
effect in 2017 (including the 100 percent risk weight for MSAs, 
temporary difference DTAs, and significant investments in the capital 
of unconsolidated financial institutions) while the agencies considered 
the simplifications proposal. This final rule supersedes the transition 
rule and eliminates the transition provisions that are no longer 
operative.\11\
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    \11\ 82 FR 55309 (Nov. 21, 2017). These changes to the capital 
rule's transition provisions did not apply to advanced approaches 
banking organizations.
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    On May 24, 2018, the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and 
Consumer Protection Act (EGRRCPA) \12\ became law. As described in more 
detail below, section 214 of EGRRCPA amended the capital treatment for 
HVCRE exposures. Accordingly, the agencies proposed changes to the 
regulatory capital treatment of HVCRE exposures to implement section 
214 through a separate rulemaking.\13\
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    \12\ Public Law 115-174 (May 24, 2018).
    \13\ 83 FR 48990 (September 28, 2018).
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    Additionally, consistent with section 201 of EGRRCPA,\14\ the 
agencies issued a notice of proposed rulemaking providing an optional 
simple leverage-based measure of capital adequacy for certain community 
banking organizations (community bank leverage ratio (CBLR) 
proposal).\15\ Under the CBLR proposal, certain qualifying community 
banking organizations that maintain a community bank leverage ratio 
above 9 percent would be considered to have met the well capitalized 
ratio requirements for purposes of section 38 of the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Act, as applicable, and the generally applicable capital 
requirements under the capital rule.\16\
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    \14\ Public law 115-174, section 201; 84 FR 3062 (February 8, 
2019).
    \15\ 84 FR 3062 (February 8, 2019).
    \16\ See 12 CFR 3.10(a) (OCC); 12 CFR 217.10(a) (Board); 12 CFR 
324.10(a) (FDIC).
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    The agencies recently published two notices of proposed rulemakings 
on frameworks that would more closely match the regulatory capital and 
liquidity requirements for certain large banking organizations with 
their risk profiles (tailoring proposals).\17\ The tailoring proposals, 
which are consistent with changes mandated by section 401 of EGRRCPA, 
would revise the scope of which banking organizations meet the 
definition of advanced approaches banking organizations, thereby 
potentially affecting which banking organizations would be able to 
apply the final rule. Each of these related rulemakings and their 
interactions are described in further detail in various sections of 
this Supplementary Information.
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    \17\ 83 FR 61408 (November 29, 2018); 83 FR 66024 (December 21, 
2018). See also https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/bcreg20190408a.htm.

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B. Current Capital Treatment

1. MSAs, Temporary Difference DTAs, and Investments in the Capital of 
Unconsolidated Financial Institutions
    Under the current capital rule, a banking organization must deduct 
from common equity tier 1 capital amounts of MSAs, temporary difference 
DTAs, and significant investments in the capital of unconsolidated 
financial institutions in the form of common stock (collectively, 
threshold items) that individually exceed 10 percent of the banking 
organization's common equity tier 1 capital.\18\ In addition, a banking 
organization must also deduct from its common equity tier 1 capital the 
aggregate amount of threshold items not deducted under the 10 percent 
threshold deduction but that nonetheless exceeds 15 percent of the 
banking organization's common equity tier 1 capital minus certain 
deductions from and adjustments to common equity tier 1 capital (15 
percent common equity tier 1 capital deduction threshold). In the 
absence of the agencies' transition rule described above, any amount of 
these three items that a banking organization did not deduct from 
common equity tier 1 capital was risk weighted at 100 percent until 
December 31, 2017 and at 250 percent thereafter.19 20
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    \18\ A significant investment in the capital of an 
unconsolidated financial institution is defined as an investment in 
the capital of an unconsolidated financial institution where the 
banking organization owns more than 10 percent of the issued and 
outstanding common stock of the unconsolidated financial 
institution. 12 CFR 3.2 (OCC); 12 CFR 217.2 (Board); 12 CFR 324.2 
(FDIC).
    \19\ In addition, the calculation of the aggregate 15 percent 
common equity tier 1 capital deduction threshold for these items was 
to become stricter as any amount above 15 percent of common equity 
tier 1, less the amount of those items already deducted as a result 
of the 10 percent common equity tier 1 capital deduction threshold, 
would be deducted from a banking organization's common equity tier 1 
capital. 12 CFR 3.22(d) (OCC); 12 CFR 217.22(d) (Board); 12 CFR 
324.22(d) (FDIC).
    \20\ See 82 FR 55309 (Nov. 21, 2017).
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    In addition to deductions for the threshold items, the capital rule 
requires deductions from regulatory capital if a banking organization 
holds (i) non-significant investments in the capital of an 
unconsolidated financial institution above a certain threshold \21\ or 
(ii) significant investments in the capital of an unconsolidated 
financial institution that are not in the form of common stock. 
Specifically, the capital rule requires that a banking organization 
deduct from its regulatory capital any amount of the organization's 
non-significant investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial 
institutions that exceeds 10 percent of the banking organization's 
common equity tier 1 capital (the 10 percent threshold for non-
significant investments) \22\ in accordance with the corresponding 
deduction approach of the capital rule.\23\ In addition, significant 
investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial institutions not 
in the form of common stock also must be deducted from regulatory 
capital in their entirety in accordance with the capital rule's 
corresponding deduction approach.\24\
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    \21\ A non-significant investment in the capital of an 
unconsolidated financial institution is defined as an investment in 
the capital of an unconsolidated financial institution where the 
institution owns 10 percent or less of the issued and outstanding 
common stock of the unconsolidated financial institution (non-
significant investment in the capital of an unconsolidated financial 
institution). 12 CFR 3.2 (OCC); 12 CFR 217.2 (Board); 12 CFR 324.2 
(FDIC).
    \22\ 12 CFR 3.22(c)(4) (OCC); 12 CFR 217.22(c)(4) (Board); 12 
CFR 324.22(c)(4) (FDIC).
    \23\ 12 CFR 3.22(c)(2) (OCC); 12 CFR 217.22(c)(2) (Board); 12 
CFR 324.22(c)(2) (FDIC).
    \24\ 12 CFR 3.22(c)(5) (OCC); 12 CFR 217.22(c)(5) (Board); 12 
CFR 324.22(c)(5) (FDIC).
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2. Minority Interest
    Because minority interest is generally not available to absorb 
losses at the banking organization's consolidated level, the capital 
rule limits the amount of minority interest that a banking organization 
may include in regulatory capital. For example, tier 1 minority 
interest is created when a consolidated subsidiary of the banking 
organization issues tier 1 capital to third parties. The restrictions 
in the capital rule relating to minority interest are currently based 
on the amount of capital held by a consolidated subsidiary relative to 
the amount of capital the subsidiary would need to hold to avoid any 
restrictions on capital distributions and certain discretionary bonus 
payments under the capital rule's capital conservation buffer 
framework. Many community banking organizations have asserted that the 
capital rule's current calculation of the minority interest limitation 
is complex and results in burdensome regulatory capital calculations 
and confusing regulatory capital reporting instructions.

II. Summary of the Simplifications Proposal

A. Proposed Simplifications to the Capital Rule

    Consistent with the 2017 EGRPRA report, the agencies issued the 
simplifications proposal with the aim of simplifying the capital rule 
and reducing regulatory burden for certain banking organizations. 
Specifically, for non-advanced approaches banking organizations, the 
simplifications proposal would have eliminated: (i) The 10 percent 
common equity tier 1 capital deduction threshold, which applies 
individually to holdings of MSAs, temporary difference DTAs, and 
significant investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial 
institutions in the form of common stock; (ii) the 15 percent common 
equity tier 1 capital deduction threshold, which applies to the 
aggregate amount of such items; (iii) the 10 percent threshold for non-
significant investments, which applies to holdings of regulatory 
capital of unconsolidated financial institutions; and (iv) the 
deduction treatment for significant investments in the capital of 
unconsolidated financial institutions that are not in the form of 
common stock.\25\ Under the simplifications proposal, for non-advanced 
approaches banking organizations, the capital rule would have no longer 
applied distinct treatments to significant and to non-significant 
investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial institutions. 
Rather, the regulatory capital treatment for an investment in the 
capital of unconsolidated financial institutions would be based on the 
type of instrument underlying the investment.
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    \25\ 12 CFR 3.22(c) and (d) (OCC); 12 CFR 217.22(c) and (d) 
(Board); 12 CFR 324.22(c) and (d) (FDIC).
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    Instead of the current capital rule's complex treatments for MSAs, 
temporary difference DTAs, and investments in the capital of 
unconsolidated financial institutions, the simplifications proposal 
would have required non-advanced approaches banking organizations to 
deduct from common equity tier 1 capital any amount of MSAs, temporary 
difference DTAs, and investments in the capital of unconsolidated 
financial institutions that individually exceed 25 percent of common 
equity tier 1 capital of the banking organization (the 25 percent 
common equity tier 1 capital deduction threshold). The simplifications 
proposal would have required a banking organization to apply a 250 
percent risk weight to MSAs or temporary difference DTAs \26\ not 
deducted from capital.\27\ For investments in the capital of

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unconsolidated financial institutions, the simplifications proposal 
would have required a banking organization to risk weight each exposure 
not deducted according to the risk weight applicable to the exposure 
category of the investment.
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    \26\ The agencies note that they are not proposing to change the 
current treatment of DTAs arising from timing differences that could 
be realized through net operating loss carrybacks. Such DTAs are not 
subject to deduction and are assigned a 100 percent risk weight.
    \27\ As noted, on November 21, 2017, the agencies finalized a 
rule applicable to non-advanced approaches banking organizations to 
maintain the transition provisions in the capital rule in effect 
during 2017 for several regulatory capital deductions and for 
minority interest while the agencies considered the simplifications 
proposal. 82 FR 55309. See 12 CFR 3.300(b)(4)-(5) and (d) (OCC); 12 
CFR 217.300(b)(4)-(5) and (d) (Board); 12 CFR 324.300(b)(4)-(5) and 
(d) (FDIC).
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    Second, the simplifications proposal would have introduced a 
significantly simpler methodology for non-advanced approaches banking 
organizations to calculate minority interest limitations.\28\ The 
existing capital rule's limitations for common equity tier 1 minority 
interest, tier 1 minority interest, and total capital minority interest 
are based on the capital requirements and capital ratios of each of the 
banking organization's consolidated subsidiaries that have issued 
capital instruments held by third parties. The proposal would have 
simplified the minority interest limitations for non-advanced 
approaches banking organizations by basing such limitations on the 
parent banking organization's capital levels rather than on the amount 
of capital its subsidiaries would need to meet the minimum capital 
requirements on their own. Specifically, under the proposal, a non-
advanced approaches banking organization would have been allowed to 
include common equity tier 1, tier 1, and total capital minority 
interest up to 10 percent of the banking organization's common equity 
tier 1, tier 1, and total capital (before the inclusion of any minority 
interest), respectively.
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    \28\ 12 CFR 3.21 (OCC); 12 CFR 217.21 (Board); 12 CFR 324.21 
(FDIC).
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    Third, the simplifications proposal would have replaced the 
existing HVCRE exposure category as applied in the standardized 
approach with a newly defined exposure category titled high volatility 
acquisition, development, or construction (HVADC) exposure. The 
simplifications proposal introduced the HVADC exposure in an effort to 
simplify and clarify the capital requirements for acquisition, 
development, and construction exposures. Given its broader proposed 
scope of application, the simplifications proposal would have 
introduced a reduced risk weight for HVADC exposures relative to the 
current risk weight for HVCRE exposures under the capital rule's 
standardized approach. Subsequent to the proposal, on May 24, 2018, 
section 214 of EGRRCPA became law, which provides a statutory 
definition of a high volatility commercial real estate acquisition, 
development, or construction (HVCRE ADC) loan.\29\ On September 18, 
2018, the agencies published a proposed rule to conform the capital 
rule with the statutory definition of HVCRE ADC, which superseded the 
aspect of the simplifications proposal that would have replaced the 
HVCRE exposure definition with HVADC exposure definition.\30\ The 
agencies are issuing another proposal in connection with the 
statutorily mandated revisions to the capital rule's definition of 
HVCRE exposure in a separate rulemaking.
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    \29\ 12 U.S.C. 1831bb.
    \30\ 83 FR 48990 (Sept. 28, 2018).
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    Under the simplifications proposal, advanced approaches banking 
organizations would not have been permitted to apply the simplified 
treatment for MSAs, temporary difference DTAs, investments in the 
capital of unconsolidated financial institutions and minority interest. 
These banking organizations would continue to apply the more risk 
sensitive treatments included in the capital rule.
    The simplifications proposal also would have made certain technical 
changes to the capital rule, including some changes to the advanced 
approaches, to clarify certain provisions, update cross-references, and 
correct typographical errors.

B. Summary of Comments

    Collectively, the agencies received nearly 100 comment letters on 
the simplifications proposal from banking organizations, trade 
associations, public interest groups, and individuals. This summary 
excludes any comments pertaining to the proposed revisions to the 
definition of HVCRE exposure, as such matters are being addressed in a 
different rulemaking.
    As described in further detail in subsequent sections of this 
Supplementary Information, commenters generally supported the 
simplifications proposal. Several commenters, however, requested that 
the agencies apply the proposed simplifications to a broader set of 
banking organizations. A number of commenters believed the proposed 
simplifications were insufficient with respect to the threshold 
deductions for MSAs, temporary difference DTAs, and investments in the 
capital of unconsolidated financial institutions. Some commenters 
favored increasing or removing the 25 percent common equity tier 1 
capital deduction threshold while other commenters disagreed with the 
proposed 250 percent risk weight for these exposures. While commenters 
expressed general support for the simplifications proposal's simpler 
regulatory capital limitations for minority interest, a few commenters 
asserted this revision could result in unintended consequences. The 
agencies also received comments related to potential additional 
technical amendments and simplifications to the capital rule, which are 
also described below.

III. Final Rule

A. MSAs, Temporary Difference DTAs, and Investments in the Capital of 
Unconsolidated Financial Institutions

    The simplification proposal would have set the 25 percent common 
equity tier 1 capital deduction threshold for MSAs, temporary 
difference DTAs, and investments in the capital of unconsolidated 
financial institutions to prevent, in a simple manner, unsafe and 
unsound concentration levels of these exposure categories in regulatory 
capital. The agencies believe that the 25 percent common equity tier 1 
capital deduction threshold would have appropriately balanced risk-
sensitivity and complexity for non-advanced approaches banking 
organizations.
    The agencies received various comments that generally supported the 
proposed revisions to the treatment of MSAs, temporary difference DTAs, 
and investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial 
institutions. Several commenters requested that the scope of these 
proposed simplifications be applied universally to all banking 
organizations, including advanced approaches banking organizations. 
Many commenters favored the increased 25 percent deduction threshold, 
while other commenters requested higher deduction limits (e.g., 50 
percent or 100 percent of tier 1 capital). Some commenters requested 
the full removal of the deduction threshold while others suggested that 
such treatment be required only for banking organizations meeting 
certain size and/or capital levels.
    Numerous commenters requested that a 100 percent risk weight be 
applied to non-deducted MSAs, arguing that this lower risk weight is 
consistent with historical practice and evolving risk-management 
policies. These commenters stated that the proposed 250 percent risk 
weight would place banking organizations at a competitive disadvantage, 
potentially driving their MSA business line out of the banking sector 
and leading to increased MSA concentrations among mortgage servicers 
that are not subject to the same prudential requirements as banking 
organizations. Several commenters were particularly concerned that the 
proposed 250 percent risk weight would reduce aggregate demand for 
MSAs, create a less liquid market for MSAs and

[[Page 35238]]

result in fewer mortgages being sold in the secondary market and higher 
rates for mortgage borrowers. Many of the commenters requested that 
more liberal deduction thresholds and risk weights be applied to 
banking organizations with consolidated assets below a certain amount 
(e.g., $50 billion). Some commenters argued that instead of applying a 
250 percent risk weight for MSAs, the agencies should apply a 250 
percent risk weight for MSAs associated with holdings of subprime 
mortgages. A few commenters questioned the agencies' analysis in 
support of the proposal, arguing that it overstated the risks posed by 
MSAs and that corrections to the agencies' analysis would lead to the 
potential conclusion that any deduction threshold for MSAs is 
unnecessary.
    Some of the comments regarding the proposal on temporary difference 
DTAs and investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial 
institutions overlapped with comments on the proposed revisions to 
MSAs. For instance, while there was general support for the proposed 
deduction threshold for those items, some commenters favored higher 
thresholds and a reduced risk weight (e.g., a 100 percent risk weight 
instead of the proposed 250 risk weight). Regarding temporary 
difference DTAs, several commenters cited other factors such as the 
U.S. generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) current expected 
credit loss framework (CECL) \31\ and changes to the tax code as 
support for a more favorable capital treatment for such exposures. 
These commenters stated that a higher capital threshold and lower risk 
weight should be applied to temporary difference DTAs because these 
external factors affect the size and volatility of DTAs. Regarding the 
proposed revisions for investments in the capital of unconsolidated 
financial institutions, several commenters specified that, for smaller 
banking organizations, the threshold deduction should be 50 percent of 
common equity tier 1 capital rather than the proposed 25 percent limit, 
and that the agencies should retain the existing 100 percent risk 
weight for certain non-deducted investments in the capital of 
unconsolidated financial institutions. One commenter suggested that 
further increases may be appropriate if certain long-term debt 
instruments issued by global systemically important bank holding 
companies (GSIBs) are within the scope of investments in the capital of 
unconsolidated financial institutions.
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    \31\ See Joint statement on New Accounting Standard on Financial 
Instruments--Credit Loss, https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/files/bcreg20160617b1.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As discussed below, the agencies have considered the concerns 
raised by commenters and believe that the proposed treatment of MSAs, 
temporary difference DTAs, and investments in the capital of 
unconsolidated financial institutions provides an appropriate balance 
of burden relief while maintaining safety and soundness in the banking 
industry. As such, the agencies are finalizing these proposed 
simplifications, without modification. The agencies expect that these 
changes will reduce regulatory compliance burden, but will not have a 
significant impact on the capital ratios for most non-advanced 
approaches firms. Some non-advanced approaches banking organizations 
with substantial holdings of MSAs, temporary difference DTAs, and 
investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial institutions may 
experience a capital benefit.
a. MSAs and Temporary Difference DTAs
    The agencies have long limited the inclusion of intangible and 
higher-risk assets, such as MSAs and DTAs, in regulatory capital due to 
the relatively high level of uncertainty regarding the ability of 
banking organizations to both value and realize value from these 
assets, especially under adverse financial conditions. The agencies 
believe that it is therefore important to limit the inclusion of MSAs 
and temporary difference DTAs in regulatory capital. In addition, the 
agencies believe that the uncertainty regarding the ability of banking 
organizations to realize value from MSAs and temporary difference DTAs 
warrants an elevated risk weight for the amount of these assets not 
deducted from regulatory capital.
    In June 2016, the agencies, together with the National Association 
of Credit Unions, submitted a Report to the Congress entitled The 
Effect of Capital Rules on Mortgage Servicing Assets (MSA report).\32\ 
One of the key conclusions of the MSA report is that MSA valuations are 
inherently subjective and subject to uncertainty, as they rely on 
assessments of future economic variables. This reliance can lead to 
variance in MSA valuations across banking organizations. Moreover, 
adverse financial conditions may cause liquidity strains for banking 
organizations seeking to sell or transfer their MSAs.
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    \32\ Report to the Congress on the Effect of Capital Rules on 
Mortgage Servicing Assets (June 2016).
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    The concerns that led to the conclusion in the MSA report that MSAs 
are inherently subject to valuation risk remain valid. MSAs do not 
trade in active, open markets with readily available and observable 
prices. In addition, MSA portfolios typically do not share homogenous 
risk characteristics. As noted in the MSA report, the factors that make 
MSAs challenging to value, including predicting changes in market 
interest rates and default rates, also make it challenging to 
successfully hedge MSAs. The MSA report also noted that the 
profitability of banking organizations can be affected by holdings of 
MSAs because of the business risk related to litigation and compliance 
costs associated with mortgage servicing.
    The final rule's revised treatment for MSAs should continue to 
protect banking organizations from the uncertainty arising from the 
liquidity risk, valuation risk, and business risks described above. 
Moreover, during periods of financial stress, MSAs may be subject to 
sudden and large fluctuations in value and to limited marketability 
that calls into question the ability to quickly divest of MSAs at their 
full estimated value during periods of financial stress.
    The regulatory capital framework in effect prior to 2013 permitted 
limited recognition of qualifying intangible assets, including MSAs, in 
regulatory capital. In addition, that framework required banking 
organizations to value each intangible asset included in tier 1 capital 
at least quarterly at the lesser of 90 percent of the fair value of 
each intangible asset, or 100 percent of the remaining unamortized book 
value. The fair value limitation for MSAs was consistent with section 
475 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 
1991 (FDICIA), which states that the amount of readily marketable 
purchased mortgage servicing assets (PMSAs) that an insured depository 
institution may include in regulatory capital cannot be more than 90 
percent of the PMSAs' fair value.\33\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \33\ 12 U.S.C. 1828 note.
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    The capital rule requires deduction of all intangible assets except 
MSAs, which are deducted when the amount exceeds certain thresholds, as 
described above. However, since 2013, the capital rule removed the 90 
percent fair value limitation on MSAs. Section 475 of FDICIA provides 
the agencies with the authority to remove the 90 percent limitation on 
PMSAs, subject to a joint determination by the agencies that its 
removal would not have an adverse effect on the deposit insurance fund 
or the safety and soundness of insured

[[Page 35239]]

depository institutions. The agencies determined that the treatment of 
MSAs (including PMSAs) under the capital rule was consistent with a 
determination that the 90 percent limitation could be removed because 
the treatment under the capital rule (that is, applying a 250 percent 
risk weight to any non-deducted MSAs) was more conservative than the 
FDICIA fair value limitation and a 100 percent risk weight, which was 
the risk weight applied to MSAs under the regulatory capital framework 
prior to 2013.\34\
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    \34\ As noted in the MSA Report, the limitation of MSAs to 90 
percent of their fair value under the previous regulatory capital 
framework could result in an effective risk weight of up to 215 
percent for MSAs to the extent that a banking institution either (1) 
used the fair value measurement method to determine the carrying 
amount of the MSAs or (2) used the amortization method and took an 
impairment on the MSAs to bring the carrying amount down to fair 
value.
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    The treatment of MSAs under the final rule is consistent with a 
determination that the 90 percent fair value limitation is not 
necessary given the 25 percent common equity tier 1 capital deduction 
threshold for MSAs in addition to the requirement that any non-deducted 
MSA exposures (including PMSAs) be risk weighted at 250 percent. The 
agencies believe that risk-weighting non-deducted MSAs at less than 250 
percent, e.g., 100 percent, would require the agencies to reevaluate 
the need for a fair value limitation to mitigate the additional risk, 
which would introduce additional complexity.
    Temporary difference DTAs are assets from which banking 
organizations may not be able to realize value, especially under 
adverse financial conditions. A banking organization's ability to 
realize its temporary difference DTAs is dependent on future taxable 
income; thus, the revised deduction threshold, together with a 250 
percent risk weight for non-deducted temporary difference DTAs, will 
continue to protect banking organization capital against the 
possibility that the banking organization would need to establish or 
increase valuation allowances for DTAs during periods of financial 
stress. Relative to the treatment in the current rule, the 25 percent 
common equity tier 1 capital deduction threshold in the final rule may 
also serve to mitigate the adverse effects of potential increases in 
temporary difference DTAs stemming from CECL or from changes to the tax 
code.
b. Investments in the Capital of Unconsolidated Financial Institutions
    As noted, the agencies proposed removing, for non-advanced 
approaches banking organizations, the distinct treatment for the 
capital rule's different categories of investments in the capital of 
unconsolidated financial institutions in the capital rule (i.e., non-
significant investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial 
institutions, significant investments in the capital of unconsolidated 
financial institutions that are in the form of common stock, and 
significant investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial 
institutions that are not in the form of common stock). Commenters 
generally supported the proposed removal of this distinction, and the 
agencies are finalizing the revision as proposed. In order to avoid 
adding complexity and regulatory burden, the final rule does not 
dictate which specific investments a non-advanced approaches banking 
organization must deduct and which it must risk weight in cases where 
the banking organization exceeds the 25 percent common equity tier 1 
capital deduction threshold for investments in the capital of 
unconsolidated financial institutions. Consistent with the proposal, 
the final rule will provide banking organization with flexibility when 
deciding which investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial 
institutions to risk weight and which to deduct. The agencies would be 
able to address any potential safety and soundness concerns that may 
arise from this flexible treatment through the supervisory process.
    The final rule's treatment of investments in the capital of 
unconsolidated financial institutions should reduce complexity while 
maintaining appropriate incentives to reduce interconnectedness among 
financial companies. Under the final rule, and consistent with the 
proposal, non-advanced approaches banking organizations are required to 
risk weight any investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial 
institutions that are not deducted according to the relevant treatment 
for the exposure category of the investment.
    One commenter asked that the agencies clarify whether a non-
advanced approaches banking organization will be able to include 
significant equity investments in the capital of unconsolidated 
financial institutions in the 100 percent risk weight category similar 
to non-significant equity exposures under section 52(b)(3)(iii).
    Under the final rule, non-advanced approaches banking organizations 
will not be required to differentiate among categories of investments 
in the capital of unconsolidated financial institutions. The risk 
weight for such equity exposures generally will be 100 percent, 
provided the exposures qualify for this preferential risk weight.\35\ 
For non-advanced approaches banking organizations, the final rule 
eliminates the exclusion of significant investments in the capital of 
unconsolidated financial institutions in the form of common stock from 
being eligible for a 100 percent risk weight.\36\ The application of 
the 100 percent risk weight (i) requires a banking organization to 
follow an enumerated process for calculating adjusted carrying value 
and (ii) mandates the equity exposures that must be included in 
determining whether the threshold has been reached. Equity exposures 
that do not qualify for a preferential risk weight will generally 
receive risk weights of either 300 percent or 400 percent, depending on 
whether the equity exposures are publicly traded.
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    \35\ 12 CFR 3.52 and .53 (OCC); 12 CFR 217.52 and .53 (Board); 
12 CFR 324.52 and .53 (FDIC). Note that for purposes of calculating 
the 10 percent non-significant equity bucket, the capital rule 
excludes equity exposures that are assigned a risk weight of zero 
percent and 20 percent, and community development equity exposures 
and the effective portion of hedge pairs, both of which are assigned 
a 100 percent risk weight. In addition, the 10 percent non-
significant bucket excludes equity exposures to an investment firm 
that would not meet the definition of traditional securitization 
were it not for the application of criterion 8 of the definition of 
traditional securitization, and has greater than immaterial 
leverage.
    \36\ Equity exposures that exceed, in the aggregate, 10 percent 
of a non-advanced approaches banking organization's total capital 
would then be assigned a risk weight based upon the approaches 
available in sections 52 and 53 of the capital rule. 12 CFR 3.52 and 
.53 (OCC); 12 CFR 217.52 and .53 (Board); 12 CFR 324.52 and .53 
(FDIC).
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    This revised approach is intended to balance simplicity and risk-
sensitivity for non-advanced approaches banking organizations by 
applying a single definition of investments in the capital of 
unconsolidated financial institutions, and simplifying the capital 
requirements for investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial 
institutions.
    One commenter asked that the agencies clarify the definition of 
financial institution, and within that definition, explain what is 
meant by financial instruments, asset management activities, and 
investment or financial advisory activities. This issue is beyond the 
scope of the final rule; however, the agencies will consider if 
clarifications to the capital rule's definition of financial 
institution are necessary.

B. Minority Interest

    Under the simplifications proposal, the agencies would have 
simplified, for non-advanced approaches banking organizations, the 
calculations limiting

[[Page 35240]]

the inclusion of minority interest in regulatory capital. Specifically, 
the proposal would have allowed non-advanced approaches banking 
organizations to include: (i) Common equity tier 1 minority interest 
comprising up to 10 percent of the parent banking organization's common 
equity tier 1 capital; (ii) tier 1 minority interest comprising up to 
10 percent of the parent banking organization's tier 1 capital; and 
(iii) total capital minority interest comprising up to 10 percent of 
the parent banking organization's total capital. In each case, the 
parent banking organization's regulatory capital for purposes of these 
limitations would be measured before the inclusion of any minority 
interest and after the deductions from and adjustments to the 
regulatory capital of the parent banking organization described in 
sections 22(a) and (b) of the capital rule.\37\
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    \37\ 12 CFR 3.22(a) and (b) (OCC); 12 CFR 217.22(a) and (b) 
(Board); 12 CFR 324.22 (a) and (b) (FDIC).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Many commenters expressed general support for the proposed 
revisions to simplify the regulatory capital limitations for minority 
interest. A few commenters, however, asserted that the proposal could 
result in unintended consequences. For example, one commenter stated 
that determining the amount of includable minority interest solely 
based on the capital level of the banking organization parent without 
reference to its subsidiary's regulatory capital levels and risk-
weighted assets could amplify the effects of a decrease in capital 
levels, particularly in a stressed environment. While the agencies are 
concerned with capital at each level of the banking organization 
structure, in developing a more simplified calculation, emphasis was 
placed on the parent and its ability to support the entire 
organization. At present, few institutions have minority interest 
holdings that are significant enough to be adversely affected by such a 
scenario. However, the agencies will continue monitor banks' positions 
through their respective supervisory processes and will address any 
concerns at individual banking organizations on a case-by-case basis, 
as appropriate. Another commenter favored an alternative method for 
calculating includable minority interest that would vary depending on 
each measure of regulatory capital (e.g., 80 percent of banking 
organization parent's common equity tier 1 capital, 85 percent of its 
tier 1 capital, and 115 percent of its total capital), arguing that a 
banking organization's total capital ratio at the consolidated level is 
likely to decline more rapidly than its other capital ratios when in 
stress. The agencies do not see any particular advantage to this 
alternative method and maintain that capital levels of the parent are 
of paramount importance, particularly in a stressed environment.
    One commenter asserted that the proposal may create an undue 
incentive to issue tier 2 capital instruments at the holding company 
level rather than at the subsidiary bank level, thereby potentially 
increasing funding costs. Again, in a stressed environment the parent's 
soundness and its capital strength is of paramount importance and by 
action of the final rule, the agencies limit the amount of includable 
capital instruments that have been issued to minority investors from 
subsidiaries.
    As with other areas of the simplifications proposal, some 
commenters objected to the scope of the proposal related to minority 
interest and requested that all banking organizations, including 
advanced approaches banking organizations, be allowed to apply the 
proposed revisions when calculating capital ratios under the capital 
rule's generally applicable capital requirements. One commenter 
requested that when a non-advanced approaches banking organization 
becomes an advanced approaches banking organization, the banking 
organization should be given three years to transition to the more 
complex approach for minority interest. Another commenter favored the 
complete removal of all minority interest limitations for all non-
advanced approaches banking organizations.
    After considering all the comments on this issue, the agencies 
continue to have the view that removing the current complex calculation 
for the amount of includable minority interest will reduce regulatory 
burden without reducing the safety and soundness of non-advanced 
approaches banking organizations. In addition, the regulatory capital 
of a banking organization should not reflect unlimited amounts of 
minority interest because equity and other investments made by a third 
party in a consolidated subsidiary of a banking organization merely 
supports the separate risks inherent in the subsidiary, and therefore 
that capital cannot be expected to be available to fully support risks 
in the consolidated organization. In other words, losses within the 
consolidated banking organization, outside of the subsidiary, will not 
be absorbed by minority interest as it is not freely available to 
absorb losses throughout the consolidated banking organization. 
Therefore, the minority interest limitation will help to ensure that a 
consolidated banking organization's regulatory capital ratios are more 
reflective of the loss absorbency of the organization's capital base. 
The agencies believe that the minority interest limitations in the 
final rule are simpler to calculate than those in the capital rule but 
are still appropriately restrictive for non-advanced approaches banking 
organizations. These revisions to the treatment of minority interest 
are expected to not have a significant impact on the capital ratios for 
most non-advanced approaches banking organizations.
    The agencies remain focused on ensuring that the capital 
requirements applied to banking organizations are appropriately 
tailored to an organization's size, complexity, and risk profile. As 
described above, the final rule will continue to apply the more risk-
sensitive minority interest calculation to advanced approaches banking 
organizations because the agencies believe the largest and most 
internationally active banking organizations should be required to 
comply with regulations that are commensurate with their size, 
complexity, and risk profile. Given the potential complexity in the 
capital structures of the largest and most systemically important 
institutions, the agencies believe that maintaining the more risk-
sensitive approach for advanced approaches banking organizations better 
ensures these organizations do not overstate capital ratios at the 
consolidated level as a result of capital held at subsidiaries that 
might not be fully available to the parent, thereby protecting the 
safety and soundness of the banking sector. For these reasons, 
consistent with the proposal, the agencies are finalizing the proposed 
revisions to the regulatory capital limitations for minority interest 
without revision.

C. Capital Treatment for Advanced Approaches Banking Organizations

    Under the proposal, the regulatory treatment for advanced 
approaches banking organizations would have continued to apply the 
capital rule's current treatment for MSAs, temporary difference DTAs, 
investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial institutions, 
and minority interest. The proposal stated that the more complex 
capital deduction treatments in the capital rule are appropriate for 
advanced approaches banking organizations, because their size, 
complexity, and international exposure warrant a risk-sensitive 
treatment that more aggressively reduces potential interconnectedness 
among such firms.

[[Page 35241]]

Some commenters objected to the scope of the simplifications proposal 
and requested that all banking organizations, including advanced 
approaches banking organizations, be allowed to apply the proposed 
revisions when calculating capital ratios under the capital rule's 
generally applicable capital requirements.
    Subsequent to issuing the simplifications proposal, the agencies 
published a tailoring proposal applicable to domestic banking 
organizations with total consolidated assets of $100 billion.\38\ The 
agencies subsequently issued a separate tailoring proposal to determine 
the application of regulatory capital requirements to certain U.S. 
intermediate holding companies of foreign banking organizations and 
their depository institution subsidiaries and the application of 
standardized liquidity requirements with respect to certain U.S. 
intermediate holding companies of foreign banking organizations, and 
certain subsidiary depository institutions of such U.S. intermediate 
holding companies.\39\ Both tailoring proposals were designed to more 
closely match the capital and liquidity rules for large banking 
organizations with their risk profiles.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \38\ 83 FR 66024 (December 21, 2018).
    \39\ See https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/bcreg20190408a.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Currently, banking organizations with total consolidated assets of 
$250 billion or more, or at least $10 billion in foreign exposure, 
generally are considered ``advanced approaches banking organizations.'' 
\40\ If the agencies were to adopt the tailoring proposals as proposed, 
the consequent change in the scope of application of certain 
requirements could result in some banking organizations being able to 
apply this final rule's changes for threshold deductions and minority 
interest when calculating their regulatory capital ratios.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \40\ See 12 CFR 3.100(b) (OCC); 12 CFR 217.100(b) (Board); 12 
CFR 324.100(b) (FDIC).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) recently 
completed revisions to its capital standards, revising the 
methodologies for credit risk, operational risk, and market risk.\41\ 
The agencies are considering how to most appropriately implement these 
standards in the United States, including potentially replacing the 
advanced approaches with the risk-based capital requirements based on 
the Basel standardized approaches for credit and operational risk. Any 
such changes to applicable risk-based capital requirements would be 
subject to notice and comment through a future rulemaking.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \41\ Available at: https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d424.pdf.
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    The agencies are not amending the capital rule to allow advanced 
approaches banking organizations to use this final rule when 
calculating their risk-based capital ratios for the generally 
applicable capital requirements. As the agencies consider implementing 
aspects of the Basel reforms, they will further consider the 
calculation of regulatory capital for advanced approaches banking 
organizations.

D. Technical Amendments to the Capital Rule

    The simplifications proposal would have made certain technical 
corrections and clarifications to the capital rule. The agencies 
identified typographical and technical errors in several provisions of 
the capital rule that warrant clarification or updating. Most of the 
proposed corrections or technical changes were self-explanatory. In 
addition, there were several incorrect or imprecise cross-references 
that the agencies proposed to change in an effort to better clarify the 
capital rule's requirements, as well as other changes to references 
necessary to implement the simplifications described elsewhere in this 
Supplementary Information.
    The agencies received only a handful of comments related to the 
simplifications proposal's technical amendments. There were more 
comments about additional potential revisions to the capital rule 
spanning a range of topics for the agencies' consideration. For 
instance, some commenters requested that the agencies implement the 
BCBS's standards related to counterparty credit risk, securities 
financing transactions, and securities firms. There were additional 
suggested revisions related to the capital rule's operational 
requirements for credit risk mitigation, client clearing transactions, 
commitments to securitization vehicles, the asset threshold for 
advanced approaches and market risk capital rules, as well as 
accounting considerations.
    Some of the commenters' suggestions have been addressed in 
rulemakings that were issued subsequent to this proposal, including 
comments related to the HVCRE, CBLR, and tailoring proposals. The 
agencies are considering other comments that requested additional 
changes outside the scope of this rulemaking and will determine whether 
and how to address them in subsequent rulemakings.
    The final rule adopts the technical changes as proposed, but 
differs from the proposal in minor ways to conform with changes to the 
capital rule related to the implementation and transition of the 
current expected credit losses methodology for allowances, which were 
implemented subsequent to the simplifications proposal.\42\
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    \42\ 83 FR 22312 (July 13, 2018). Consistent with the proposal, 
the final rule includes various minor corrections and updates in 
addition to the items specified in this discussion.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In section 1 of the OCC's capital rule, the final rule clarifies 
that the minimum capital requirements and overall capital adequacy 
standards set forth in 12 CFR part 3 do not apply to Federal branches 
and agencies of foreign banks that are regulated by the OCC. The OCC 
regulates Federal branches and agencies of foreign banks.\43\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \43\ 12 U.S.C. 3101-3111.
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    In section 2, the final rule corrects an error in the definition of 
investment in the capital of an unconsolidated financial institution by 
changing the word ``and'' to ``or.'' This revision clarifies that an 
instrument meeting the definition can be either recognized as capital 
for regulatory purposes by a primary supervisor of an unconsolidated 
financial institution or can be part of the equity of an unconsolidated 
unregulated financial institution, in accordance with GAAP.
    The final rule adds ``the European Stability Mechanism'' and ``the 
European Financial Stability Facility'' to the capital rule with 
respect to (i) the definition of eligible guarantor in section 2, (ii) 
the list of entities eligible for a zero percent risk weight in section 
32(b), (iii) the list of equity exposures eligible for a zero percent 
risk weight in section 52(b)(1), (iv) the list of entities eligible for 
assignment of a rating grade associated with a probability of default 
of less than 0.03 percent in section 131(d)(2), and (v) certain 
supranational entities and multilateral development bank debt positions 
eligible for assignment of a zero percent specific risk weighting 
factor in section 210(b)(2)(ii). The final rule also excludes such 
entities from the definition of (i) corporate exposure in section 2, 
(ii) private sector credit exposure in section 11, and (iii) corporate 
debt position in section 202. The agencies are making this change to 
reflect the roles and functions of the European Stability Mechanism and 
the European Financial Stability Facility, which were in early stages 
of operation when the current capital rule was issued in 2013 and 
therefore were not addressed. The final rule updates the list of 
entities included or excluded, as applicable, for these purposes in the 
standardized approach and advanced

[[Page 35242]]

approaches of the capital rule and the market risk capital rule.
    The agencies are making technical amendments to section 11(a) of 
the capital rule, on the capital conservation buffer, to clarify the 
calculation of a banking organization's maximum payout amount for a 
specific calendar quarter. First, the final rule clarifies that the 
eligible retained income during a specific current calendar quarter is 
the banking organization's net income, calculated in accordance with 
the instructions for the Call Report or the FR Y-9C, as appropriate, 
for the four calendar quarters preceding the current calendar 
quarter.\44\ Second, the final rule clarifies that the key inputs for 
the calculation of a banking organization's capital conservation buffer 
during the current calendar quarter are the banking organization's 
regulatory capital ratios as of the last day of the previous calendar 
quarter.\45\
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    \44\ 12 CFR 3.11(a)(2)(i) (OCC); 12 CFR 217.11(a)(2)(i) (Board); 
12 CFR 324.11(a)(2)(i) (FDIC).
    \45\ 12 CFR 3.11(a)(3)(i) (OCC); 12 CFR 217.11(a)(3)(i) (Board); 
12 CFR 324.11(a)(3)(i) (FDIC).
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    In section 20(d)(5) of the Board's and OCC's capital rule, the 
final rule provides that the reference to AOCI opt-out election is 
section 22(b)(2) instead of section 20(b)(2).
    In section 20(c) of the capital rule, the OCC's and FDIC's 
regulations mistakenly provide that cash dividend payments on 
additional tier 1 capital instruments may not be subject to a ``limit'' 
imposed by the contractual terms governing the instrument. This 
requirement was intended to apply only to common equity tier 1 capital 
instruments, and not to additional tier 1 capital instruments. The 
final rule harmonizes the language of the agencies' capital rule in 
section 20(c) by removing this requirement for additional tier 1 
instruments.
    Through proposed section 20(f) of the Board's capital rule, the 
simplifications proposal would have introduced a standalone 
requirement, outside the existing qualification criteria for capital, 
that a Board-regulated institution obtain the prior approval of the 
Board before redeeming a common equity tier 1 capital instrument, 
additional tier 1 capital instrument, or tier 2 capital instrument. The 
Board has received feedback regarding requiring prior approval for 
redemptions and repurchases of capital instruments. In particular, this 
feedback noted that there was a high burden associated with obtaining 
prior approval for all redemptions and repurchases of common stock 
instruments, especially with respect to standard common stock buyback 
programs, and that the supervisory function of requiring prior approval 
seemed limited where a firm was not subject to other limitations on 
capital actions, such as the capital conservation buffer.
    In response to the feedback, the Board is modifying proposed 
section 20(f). For common equity tier 1 capital instruments, a Board-
regulated institution will be required to obtain the prior approval of 
the Board before redeeming or repurchasing common equity tier 1 capital 
instruments only to the extent otherwise required by law or regulation. 
Thus, prior approval for common equity tier 1 capital redemptions or 
repurchases will be required under section 217.20 of the capital rule 
only to the extent that a Board-regulated institution is subject to a 
separate legal requirement to obtain prior approval for the redemption 
or repurchase, such as section 217.11 of the capital rule, sections 
225.4 or 225.8 of the Board's Regulation Y, or section 11 of the 
Federal Reserve Act.\46\ Depository institution holding companies are 
not subject to the same legal requirements as state member banks and, 
therefore, generally would be able to redeem or repurchase common 
equity tier 1 capital instruments without the prior approval of the 
Board, unless there is an independent approval requirement, such as 
under the capital plan rule (12 CFR 225.8) as noted above. With respect 
to redemptions or repurchases of additional tier 1 capital instruments 
and tier 2 capital instruments, the prior approval requirements in the 
final rule are the same as in the proposal.
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    \46\ 12 CFR 217.11; 12 CFR 225.4; 12 CFR 225.8; 12 U.S.C. 329.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In section 22(g) of the capital rule, the final rule removes 
specific references to certain assets to exclude them from risk 
weighting if they are required to be deducted from regulatory capital. 
The effect of this change is to exclude from standardized total risk-
weighted assets and, as applicable, advanced approaches total risk-
weighted assets, any items deducted from capital, not only the items 
specifically enumerated.
    In section 22(h) of the capital rule, the final rule replaces 
inaccurate terminology with the properly defined terms ``investment in 
the capital of an unconsolidated financial institution'' and 
``investment in the [AGENCY]-regulated institution's own capital 
instrument,'' as provided in section 2.
    The final rule revises, for purposes of clarity, the capital rule's 
sections 32(d)(2)(iii) and (iv), and creates a new section 32(d)(2)(v). 
The revised section 32(d)(2)(iii) requires banking organizations to 
``assign a 20 percent risk weight to an exposure that is a self-
liquidating, trade-related contingent item that arises from the 
movement of goods and that has a maturity of three months or less to a 
foreign bank whose home country has a CRC of 0, 1, 2, or 3, or is an 
OECD member with no CRC.'' This requirement is currently embedded in 
section 32(d)(2)(iii) of the capital rule, together with rule text 
related to the risk weighting of exposures to a foreign bank whose home 
country is not a member of the OECD and does not have a CRC. This 
latter provision is a stand-alone requirement in the revised section 
32(d)(2)(iv) under the final rule.
    In sections 34(c)(1) and 34(c)(2)(i) of the capital rule, the final 
rule provides that the counterparty credit risk capital requirement 
references subpart D of the capital rule in its entirety rather than 
just section 32 of subpart D.
    In sections 35(b)(3)(ii), 35(b)(4)(ii), 35(c)(3)(ii), 35(c)(4)(ii), 
36(c), 37(b)(2)(i), 38(e)(2), 42(j)(2)(ii)(A), 133(b)(3)(ii), and 
133(c)(3)(ii) of the capital rule, the final rule provides that the 
risk weight substitution references subpart D of the capital rule in 
its entirety rather than just section 32 of subpart D.
    In section 61 of the capital rule, the final rule clarifies the 
requirement that a non-advanced approaches banking organization with 
$50 billion or more in total consolidated assets must complete the 
disclosure requirements described in sections 62 and 63, unless it is a 
consolidated subsidiary of a bank holding company, savings and loan 
holding company, or depository institution that is subject to the 
disclosure requirements of section 62, or a subsidiary of a non-U.S. 
banking organization that is subject to comparable public disclosure 
requirements in its home jurisdiction.
    Table 8 of section 63 of the capital rule describes information 
related to securitization exposures that banking organizations are 
required to disclose. The capital rule revised the risk-based capital 
treatment of these items, including the regulatory capital treatment of 
after-tax gain-on-sale resulting from a securitization and credit-
enhancing interest-only strips that do not constitute after-tax gain-
on-sale. Because Table 8 does not properly reflect these revisions, the 
final rule updates line (i)(2) under quantitative disclosures to 
appropriately reflect these revisions.
    In section 210(b)(2)(vii) of the Board's capital rule, the final 
rule adds references to U.S. intermediate holding companies to clarify 
for these firms how

[[Page 35243]]

to calculate capital requirements related to securitization positions 
under the Board's market risk capital rule depending on whether they 
are using the advanced approaches to calculate risk-weighted assets.
    In section 300 of the capital rule, the final rule removes several 
transition provisions in order to rescind the transition rule 
simultaneously with the simplifications of the threshold deductions and 
the treatment of minority interest. In connection with these revisions, 
the final rule also would remove several paragraphs that are no longer 
operative because the transition period provided ended at the beginning 
of 2018. These revisions would take effect on April 1, 2020, 
concurrently with the effective date of the simplifications of the 
threshold deductions and the treatment of minority interest.
    In section 300(c)(2) of the Board's capital rule, the final rule 
clarifies that the mergers and acquisitions that can potentially affect 
the inclusion of certain non-qualifying capital instruments in a Board-
regulated banking organization's regulatory capital must have occurred 
after December 31, 2013.

E. Effective Dates of Amendments

    The amendments in this final rule will take effect on either April 
1, 2020, or October 1, 2019. Specifically, the simplifications of the 
threshold deductions and the treatment of minority interest discussed 
in sections III.A and III.B of this Supplementary Information will take 
effect on April 1, 2020, in order to allow banking organizations 
sufficient time to update systems and the agencies sufficient time to 
update reporting forms to reflect the changes to the capital rule made 
by this final rule. In addition, the amendments to rescind the 
transitions rule discussed in section III.C of this Supplementary 
Information also would take effect on April 1, 2020, simultaneously 
with the simplifications of the threshold deductions and the treatment 
of minority interest. All of the other technical amendments discussed 
in section III.C of this Supplementary Information will take effect on 
October 1, 2019. The agencies believe that the technical amendments 
will require minimal, if any, updates to systems and no updates to 
reporting forms and thus should take effect as soon as possible. Any 
banking organization subject to the capital rule may elect to adopt the 
amendments that are effective October 1, 2019, before that date.

IV. Abbreviations

ADC Acquisition, Development, or Construction
BHC Bank Holding Company
CFR Code of Federal Regulations
CRC Country Risk Classification
DTA Deferred Tax Asset
EGRPRA Economic Growth and Regulatory Paperwork Reduction Act of 
1996
FAQ Frequently Asked Question
FR Federal Register
FDIC Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
FDICIA Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991
GAAP U.S. generally accepted accounting principles
GSIB Global Systemically Important Bank Holding Company
HVADC High Volatility Acquisition, Construction, or Development
HVCRE High Volatility Commercial Real Estate
IHC U.S. Intermediate Holding Company
LTV Loan-to-Value
MDB Multilateral Development Bank
MSA Mortgage Servicing Asset
NPR Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
OCC Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OMB Office of Management and Budget
PD Probability of Default
PMSA Purchased Mortgage Servicing Asset
PRA Paperwork Reduction Act
RCDRIA Riegle Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act 
of 1994
RFA Regulatory Flexibility Act
RIN Regulation Identifier Number
SBA Small Business Administration
SLHC Savings and Loan Holding Company
SMB State Member Banks
UMRA Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995
U.S.C. United States Code

V. Regulatory Analyses

A. Paperwork Reduction Act

    Certain provisions of the final rule contain ``collection of 
information'' requirements within the meaning of the Paperwork 
Reduction Act (PRA) of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501-3521). In accordance with 
the requirements of the PRA, the agencies may not conduct or sponsor, 
and the respondent is not required to respond to, an information 
collection unless it displays a currently-valid Office of Management 
and Budget (OMB) control number. The revised disclosure requirements 
are found in section _.63 of the proposed rule. The OMB control number 
for the OCC is 1557-0318, Board is 7100-0313, and FDIC is 3064-0153.
    These information collections will be extended for three years, 
with revision. The information collection requirements contained in 
this final rulemaking have been submitted by the OCC and FDIC to OMB 
for review and approval under section 3507(d) of the PRA (44 U.S.C. 
3507(d)) and section 1320.11 of the OMB's implementing regulations (5 
CFR 1320).
    The OCC submitted the information collection requirements at the 
proposed rule stage. OMB filed a comment requiring that the OCC examine 
public comment in response to the proposed rule and will include in the 
supporting statement of the next Information Collection Request (ICR), 
to be submitted to OMB at the final rule stage, a description of how 
the agency has responded to any public comments on the ICR, including 
comments on maximizing the practical utility of the collection and 
minimizing the burden. No comments were received regarding the 
information collection. The FDIC will be making a nonmaterial 
submission to OMB to reflect its updated number of respondents.
    The Board reviewed the proposed rule under the authority delegated 
to the Board by OMB.
    Comments are invited on:
    a. Whether the collections of information are necessary for the 
proper performance of the Board's functions, including whether the 
information has practical utility;
    b. The accuracy or the estimate of the burden of the information 
collections, including the validity of the methodology and assumptions 
used;
    c. Ways to enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of the 
information to be collected;
    d. Ways to minimize the burden of the information collections on 
respondents, including through the use of automated collection 
techniques or other forms of information technology; and
    e. Estimates of capital or startup costs and costs of operation, 
maintenance, and purchase of services to provide information.
Proposed Information Collection
    Title of Information Collection: Recordkeeping and Disclosure 
Requirements Associated with Capital Adequacy.
    Frequency: Quarterly, annual.
    Affected Public: Businesses or other for-profit.
    Respondents:
    OCC: National banks, state member banks, state nonmember banks, and 
state and Federal savings associations.
    Board: State member banks (SMBs), bank holding companies (BHCs), 
U.S. intermediate holding companies (IHCs), savings and loan holding 
companies (SLHCs), and global systemically important bank holding 
companies (GSIBs).

[[Page 35244]]

    FDIC: State nonmember banks, state savings associations, and 
certain subsidiaries of those entities.
    Current Actions: Section _.63 of the final rule would break out the 
disclosures in Table 8 to include (i) after-tax gain-on-sale on a 
securitization that has been deducted from common equity tier 1 capital 
and (ii) credit-enhancing interest-only strip that is assigned a 1,250 
percent risk weight. There are no changes in burden associated with the 
final rulemaking.
PRA Burden Estimates
OCC
    OMB control number: 1557-0318.
    Estimated number of respondents: 1,365.
    Estimated annual burden hours: 66,081.
Board
    Agency form number: FR Q.
    OMB control number: 7100-0313.
    Estimated number of respondents: 1,431.
    Estimated annual burden hours: 79,727 hours.
FDIC
    OMB control number: 3064-0153.
    Estimated number of respondents: 3,483.
    Estimated annual burden hours: 127,840 hours.
    The final rule will also require changes to the Consolidated 
Reports of Condition and Income (Call Reports) (FFIEC 031, FFIEC 041, 
and FFIEC 051; OMB No. 1557-0081, 7100-0036, and 3064-0052), 
Consolidated Financial Statements for Holding Companies (FR Y-9C; OMB 
No. 7100-0128), and Capital Assessments and Stress Testing (FR Y-14A 
and Q; OMB No. 7100-0341), which will be addressed in a separate 
Federal Register notice.

B. Regulatory Flexibility Act Analysis

    OCC: The Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. 601 et seq., (RFA), 
requires an agency, in connection with a final rule, to prepare a Final 
Regulatory Flexibility Analysis describing the impact of the rule on 
small entities (defined by the Small Business Administration (SBA) for 
purposes of the RFA to include commercial banks and savings 
institutions with total assets of $550 million or less and trust 
companies with total assets of $38.5 million or less) or to certify 
that the rule will not have a significant economic impact on a 
substantial number of small entities.
    As of June 30, 2017, the OCC supervised 907 small entities.\47\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \47\ The OCC calculated the number of small entities using the 
SBA's size thresholds for commercial banks and savings institutions, 
and trust companies, which are $550 million and $38.5 million, 
respectively. Consistent with the General Principles of Affiliation, 
13 CFR 121.103(a), the OCC counted the assets of affiliated 
financial institutions when determining whether to classify a 
national bank or Federal savings association as a small entity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The rule will apply to all OCC-supervised entities that are not 
subject to the advanced approaches risk-based capital rules, and thus 
potentially affects a substantial number of small entities. Further, 
the OCC has determined that 131 such entities report either threshold 
deduction amounts or minority interest and thus engage in affected 
activities to an extent that they would be impacted directly by the 
final rule. For the purposes of this analysis, the OCC believes a 
substantial number of small entities is five percent of OCC-supervised 
small entities, or 45 as of June 30, 2017. Thus, a substantial number 
of small entities will be directly impacted by the final rule.
    Although a substantial number of small entities will be impacted by 
the final rule, the OCC does not find that this impact is economically 
significant. To determine whether a final rule will have a significant 
effect, the OCC considers whether projected cost increases associated 
with the rule are greater than or equal to either 5 percent of a small 
bank's total annual salaries and benefits or 2.5 percent of an OCC-
supervised small entity's total non-interest expense. Based on 
supervisory experience, the OCC estimates that small banks, on average, 
will make a one-time investment of one business week, or 40 hours, to 
update policies and procedures, and another one-time investment of 40 
hours to make the accounting ledger changes for currently held 
threshold deduction amounts and minority interests. Therefore, the OCC 
estimates that small banks that do not report any items subject to 
threshold deductions or minority interest will incur an estimated one-
time compliance cost of $4,560 per institution (40 hours x $114 per 
hour), while those that report items subject to threshold deductions or 
minority interest will incur an estimated one-time compliance cost of 
$9,120 per institution (80 hours x $114 per hour). The OCC finds that 
the value of the change in capital exceeded both of these thresholds 
for 1 of the 907 OCC-supervised small entities. For this single small 
institution, the decrease in required regulatory capital is $93.3 
thousand.
    Therefore, the OCC certifies that the final rule will not have a 
significant economic impact on a substantial number of OCC-supervised 
small entities.
    Board: The Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. 601 et seq. (RFA), 
requires an agency to consider whether the rules it finalizes will have 
a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small 
entities. The RFA generally requires that an agency prepare and make 
available an initial regulatory flexibility analysis (IRFA) in 
connection with a notice of proposed rulemaking and that an agency 
prepare a final regulatory flexibility analysis (FRFA) in connection 
with promulgating a final rule. A FRFA issued by the Board must contain 
(1) a statement of the need for, and objectives of, the rule; (2) a 
statement of the significant issues raised by the public comments in 
response to the IRFA, a statement of the assessment of the agency of 
such issues, and a statement of any changes made in the simplifications 
proposal as a result of such comments; (3) the response of the agency 
to any comments filed by the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small 
Business Administration in response to the proposal, and a detailed 
statement of any change made to the proposal in the final rule as a 
result of the comments; (4) a description of and an estimate of the 
number of small entities to which the rule will apply or an explanation 
of why no such estimate is available; (5) a description of the 
projected reporting, recordkeeping and other compliance requirements of 
the rule, including an estimate of the classes of small entities which 
will be subject to the requirement and the type of professional skills 
necessary for preparation of the report or record; (6) a description of 
the steps the agency has taken to minimize the significant economic 
impact on small entities consistent with the stated objectives of 
applicable statutes, including a statement of the factual, policy, and 
legal reasons for selecting the alternative adopted in the final rule 
and why each one of the other significant alternatives to the rule 
considered by the agency which affect the impact on small entities was 
rejected.\48\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \48\ 5 U.S.C. 604(a).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As discussed in the Supplementary Information section, the final 
rule revises the treatment of certain assets under the capital rule and 
would also make various corrections and clarifications to the capital 
rule to address issues that have been identified since the rule was 
issued. Under regulations issued by the Small Business Administration, 
a small entity includes a bank, bank holding company,

[[Page 35245]]

or savings and loan holding company with assets of $550 million or less 
and trust companies with total assets of $38.5 million or less (small 
banking organization).\49\ On average during 2018, there were 
approximately 3,191 small bank holding companies, 204 small savings and 
loan holding companies, and 549 small state member banks.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \49\ See 13 CFR 121.201. Effective July 14, 2014, the Small 
Business Administration revised the size standards for banking 
organizations to $550 million in assets from $500 million in assets. 
79 FR 33647 (June 12, 2014).
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    The Board solicited public comment on this rule in a notice of 
proposed rulemaking and has considered the potential impact of this 
rule on small entities in accordance with section 604 of the RFA.\50\ 
Based on the Board's analysis, and for the reasons stated below, the 
Board believes the final rule will not have a significant economic 
impact on a substantial number of small entities.
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    \50\ 83 FR 18160 (April 25, 2018).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    1. Statement of the need for, and objectives of, the final rule.
    As discussed, the Board is issuing this final rule to simplify 
aspects of the capital rule for non-advanced approaches banking 
organizations and to clarify and correct certain technical items in the 
capital rule.
    2. Significant issues raised by the public comments in response to 
the IRFA and comments filed by the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the 
Small Business Administration in response to the simplifications 
proposal and summary of any changes made in the final rule as a result 
of such comments.
    Commenters did not raise any issues in response to the IRFA. The 
Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business Administration did not 
file any comments in response to the proposal.
    3. Description and estimate of the number of small entities to 
which the final rule will apply.
    Aspects of the final rule apply to all state member banks, as well 
as all bank holding companies and savings and loan holding companies 
that are subject to the Board's regulatory capital rule. Certain 
portions of the proposal would not apply to state member banks, bank 
holding companies, and savings and loan holding companies that are 
subject to the advanced approaches. In general, the Board's capital 
rule only apply to bank holding companies and savings and loan holding 
companies that are not subject to the Board's Small Bank Holding 
Company and Savings and Loan Holding Company Policy Statement, which 
applies to bank holding companies and savings and loan holding 
companies with less than $3 billion in total assets that also meet 
certain additional criteria.\51\ Thus, most bank holding companies and 
savings and loan holding companies that would be subject to the final 
rule exceed the $550 million asset threshold at which a banking 
organization would qualify as a small banking organization.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \51\ See 12 CFR 217.1(c)(1)(ii) and (iii); 12 CFR part 225, 
appendix C; 12 CFR 238.9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    4. Significant alternatives to the final rule.
    The Board does not believe that this final rule will have a 
significant economic impact on a substantial number small entities. As 
a result, the Board has not adopted any alternatives to the final rule 
pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 604(a)(6).
    5. Description of the projected reporting, recordkeeping and other 
compliance requirements of the rule.
    Because the final rule makes only minor changes to the 
recordkeeping and reporting requirements that affected small banking 
organizations are currently subject to by slightly expanding the 
disclosure requirements for securitizations under section 217.63 of the 
rule, there would be minimal changes to the information that small 
banking organizations must track and report. This is described in 
greater detail in the Paperwork Reduction Act portion of this 
Supplementary Information.
    For non-advanced approaches banking organizations, the final rule 
revises the capital deductions for MSAs, temporary difference DTAs, and 
investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial institutions by 
raising the threshold at which such items must be deducted and 
simplifying the number and interaction of required deductions. The 
Board expects that the final rule would result in slightly lower 
capital requirements compared to the capital rule for a few small 
banking organizations that currently deduct MSAs, temporary difference 
DTAs, and/or investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial 
institutions. Specifically, the Board estimates that 19 small state 
member banks and zero small holding companies will have reduced capital 
requirements because of the change in the treatment to MSAs, resulting 
in an aggregate reduction in capital requirements of approximately 
$24.7 million. Further, the Board estimates that 14 small state member 
banks and zero small holding companies will have reduced capital 
requirements because of the change in treatment to temporary difference 
DTAs, resulting in an aggregate reduction in capital requirements of 
approximately $6.5 million. The Board does not have sufficient data to 
estimate the impact on capital as a result of the change to the 
treatment of investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial 
institutions. Because few banking organizations are currently subject 
to these deductions, the number of affected small banking organizations 
and the estimated impact on capital requirements appears to be minimal.
    Also for non-advanced approaches banking organizations, the final 
rule simplifies the requirements related to the inclusion of minority 
interest of subsidiaries in capital. The Board expects that the final 
rule generally will result in more minority interest being includable 
in capital than is permitted under the current rule. The Board does not 
have sufficient data to estimate the impact on capital as a result of 
this change. However, only a few small banking organizations currently 
include minority interest in capital and minority interest represents a 
significant portion of capital for very few banking organizations. As a 
result, the impact of this portion of the final rule is not expected to 
be significant.
    The remaining revisions to the capital rule consist of technical 
corrections and clarifications that have been identified since the rule 
was issued. None of these revisions constitutes a significant change to 
the capital rule and the impact of these revisions on banking 
organizations is expected to be immaterial.
    Small banking entities are likely to incur some implementation 
costs in order to comply with the final rule, such as sytems updates to 
calculate, monitor, and report regulatory capital metrics. The changes 
necessary to comply with the final rule are limited in nature and thus 
the cost of these changes are expected to be minimal. In addition, the 
changes are generally simplifying or clarifying and therefore should 
help reduce ongoing compliance expenses associated with the capital 
rule.
    6. Steps taken to minimize the significant economic impact on small 
entities.
    The Board does not believe that this final rule will have a 
significant economic impact on small entities. Further, to the extent 
that the final rule impacts small entities, the Board expects that the 
final rule will have a beneficial economic impact on small entities by 
reducing the burden of the capital rule.
    FDIC: The Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA) generally requires an 
agency, in connection with a final rule, to prepare and make available 
for public comment

[[Page 35246]]

a final regulatory flexibility analysis that describes the impact of 
the final rule on small entities.\52\ However, a regulatory flexibility 
analysis is not required if the agency certifies that the rule will not 
have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small 
entities. The Small Business Administration (SBA) has defined ``small 
entities'' to include banking organizations with total assets of less 
than or equal to $550 million who are independently owned and operated 
or owned by a holding company with less than $550 million in total 
assets.\53\ For the reasons described below and under section 605(b) of 
the RFA, the FDIC certifies that the final rule will not have a 
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \52\ 5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.
    \53\ The SBA defines a small banking organization as having $550 
million or less in assets, where ``a financial institution's assets 
are determined by averaging the assets reported on its four 
quarterly financial statements for the preceding year.'' See 13 CFR 
121.201 (as amended, effective December 2, 2014). ``SBA counts the 
receipts, employees, or other measure of size of the concern whose 
size is at issue and all of its domestic and foreign affiliates.'' 
See 13 CFR 121.103. Following these regulations, the FDIC uses a 
covered entity's affiliated and acquired assets, averaged over the 
preceding four quarters, to determine whether the covered entity is 
``small'' for the purposes of RFA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The FDIC supervises 3,483 depository institutions,\54\ of which, 
2,674 are defined as small banking entities by the terms of the 
RFA.\55\ The final rule removes the individual and aggregate deduction 
thresholds and replaces them with individual, higher deduction 
thresholds for: (i) MSAs; (ii) temporary differences DTAs; and (iii) 
investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial institutions. 
Finally, the final rule amends the methodology that determines the 
amount of minority interest that is includable in regulatory capital. 
According to Call Report data as of December 31, 2018, 1,586 FDIC-
supervised small banking entities reported some amount of MSAs, net 
DTAs, deductions related to investments in unconsolidated financial 
institutions, or minority interests that could be affected by this rule 
making.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \54\ FDIC-supervised institutions are set forth in 12 U.S.C. 
1813(q)(2).
    \55\ FDIC Call Report, December 31, 2018.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Estimation Methodology
    To estimate the effects of the final rule, the FDIC estimated the 
changes to capital that would result by treating MSAs, temporary 
difference DTAs, investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial 
institutions, and minority interests as prescribed by the final rule, 
compared with how they are treated in the agencies' fully phased-in 
capital rule, using Call Report data from December 31, 2018.
    In cases where an institution reported some minority interest 
included in a particular capital tier, the FDIC estimated that 
additional minority interest includable in the respective capital tier 
under the final rule equaled the smaller of 10 percent of the 
institution's respective capital tier base amount (before including any 
minority interest) or its total balance sheet minority interest, minus 
the amount of minority interest currently included in the respective 
capital tier. It is difficult to estimate how the final rule might 
change an institution's likelihood to include minority interest in 
regulatory capital in the future because it depends upon the future 
financial characteristics of individual institutions and the future 
decisions of senior management at those institutions, therefore the 
FDIC did not estimate it.
    In cases where an institution reported taking one or more of the 
individual threshold deductions for MSAs, temporary difference DTAs, or 
investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial institutions, 
the FDIC estimated the effect of the increase in the deduction 
thresholds from 10 percent to 25 percent in the final rule by grossing 
up the amount deducted, and comparing it to the institution's estimated 
capital under the final rule. Additional regulatory capital under the 
final rule equaled the amount deducted, grossed up, that was between 
the 10 percent and 25 percent thresholds. Any amounts of MSAs and 
temporary difference DTAs not deducted were risk-weighted at 250 
percent, while non-deducted amounts of investments in the capital of 
unconsolidated financial institutions were risk-weighted at 100 
percent. It is difficult to estimate how the final rule might change an 
institution's likelihood to acquire or retain MSAs, temporary 
difference DTAs, or to make investments in the capital of 
unconsolidated financial institutions because it depends upon the 
future financial characteristics of individual institutions and the 
future decisions of senior management at those institutions, therefore 
the FDIC did not estimate it.
    In cases where an institution did not report taking a threshold 
deduction for either temporary difference DTAs or MSAs, the FDIC 
estimated the amount of these assets on the balance sheet using 
information from the Call Report, as any amounts not deducted under the 
final rule are risk-weighted at 250 percent. For temporary difference 
DTAs, the FDIC used the difference between net DTAs reported on 
schedule RC-F line 2 and net operating loss DTAs reported on RC-R Part 
I line 8 as a proxy. For MSAs, the FDIC used gross MSAs reported on RC-
M line 2a. It is difficult to estimate the amounts of investments in 
the capital of unconsolidated financial institutions when an 
institution did not report taking a threshold deduction for such 
investments, therefore the FDIC did not estimate it.
Threshold Deductions
    The final rule changes the regulatory capital treatment of MSAs, 
temporary difference DTAs, and investments in the capital of 
unconsolidated financial institutions for FDIC-supervised small banking 
entities. It does so by removing the individual and aggregate deduction 
thresholds for these assets and by adopting a single 25 percent common 
equity tier 1 capital deduction threshold for each type of asset. 
According to the December 31, 2018 Call Report data, 1,582 FDIC-
supervised small banking entities reported holding some MSAs, net DTAs, 
or reported taking a threshold deduction due to investments in the 
capital of unconsolidated financial institutions. Only 31 small 
institutions reported taking one or more of the individual threshold 
deductions, or taking the aggregate threshold deduction, due to their 
holdings of these assets.\56\ The FDIC estimates that this aspect of 
the final rule will provide a net benefit of $45.6 million in the form 
of an increase in tier 1 capital to those institutions that currently 
have to calculate a deduction, representing approximately 0.08 percent 
of tier 1 capital reported by FDIC-supervised small banking entities. 
The FDIC expects that the final rule will yield future benefits to 
affected FDIC-supervised small banking entities by reducing the 
likelihood of regulatory capital deductions due to holding these asset 
types. In particular, the final rule relaxes a capital constraint on 
FDIC-supervised small banking entities that specialize in mortgage 
servicing. The increase in the threshold deduction for MSAs makes it 
less likely that a small banking entity would exit or reduce its 
activity in the mortgage servicing market.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \56\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Minority Interest
    The final rule simplifies the capital rule's limitation on the 
inclusion of minority interest in regulatory capital. It does so by 
allowing FDIC-supervised small banking entities to include minority 
interest up to 10 percent of the parent banking organization's common

[[Page 35247]]

equity tier 1, tier 1, or total capital, not including the minority 
interest. The FDIC estimates that 6 FDIC-supervised small banking 
entities will be affected by the inclusion of minority interest in 
regulatory capital calculations.\57\ The FDIC estimates that these 
small banking entities will experience a decline in tier 1 capital of 
$184,000 due to the inclusion of minority interest, representing less 
than 0.01 percent of tier 1 capital reported by FDIC-supervised small 
banking entities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \57\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Compliance Costs
    Finally, FDIC-supervised small banking entities are likely to incur 
some implementation costs in order to comply with the final rule. These 
costs would encompass changes to their systems designed to calculate, 
manage, and report risk-weighted assets and regulatory capital. Given 
the limited nature of the changes necessary to comply with the final 
rule, the implementation costs are expected to be minimal. 
Additionally, the FDIC believes that the simplifying changes in this 
final rule will help reduce some of the compliance costs associated 
with capital regulations in the long-term by making the regulations 
easier to apply.
    The final rule does not impact the recordkeeping and reporting 
requirements that affect FDIC-supervised small banking entities and 
there is no change to the information that FDIC-supervised small 
banking entities must track and report. The FDIC anticipates updating 
the relevant reporting forms at a later date to the extent necessary to 
align with the capital rule.
Conclusion
    The threshold-deduction provisions of the final rule will increase 
the amount of eligible regulatory capital for a limited number of FDIC-
supervised small banking entities currently subject to deductions or 
limitations on these items, as described above. The minority-interest 
provisions of the final rule will slightly decrease the amount of 
eligible regulatory capital for a small number of FDIC-supervised small 
banking entities.
    The agencies received nearly 100 comment letters on the proposed 
capital simplifications. Comments on the proposed revisions to the 
definition of HVCRE exposure are addressed in a different rulemaking. 
Commenters suggested a variety of alternatives to the proposed capital 
simplifications. The agencies have provided a discussion of the 
comments received and the agencies' consideration of those comments in 
Section III of this rulemaking.
    The FDIC received two comments on the analysis it presented in the 
proposal's RFA Analysis Section. Although both commenters were 
concerned with the proposed revisions to the definition of HVCRE 
exposure, the FDIC is addressing them to clarify the scope of analysis 
done pursuant to the RFA. Both commenters pointed out that the analysis 
presented did not consider the effects of the proposal on the entire 
banking industry, with one commenter also stating that the sample size 
used in the analysis was relatively small. The scope of analysis done 
by the FDIC pursuant to the RFA is limited to those institutions which 
meet the definition of ``small entities'' as set forth by the Small 
Business Administration.
    The FDIC does not believe that the final rule duplicates, overlaps, 
or conflicts with any other Federal rules.
    In light of the foregoing discussion, the FDIC certifies that the 
final rule will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial 
number of small entities.

C. Plain Language

    Section 722 of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act \58\ requires the Federal 
banking agencies to use plain language in all proposed and final rules 
published after January 1, 2000. The agencies have sought to present 
the final rule in a simple and straightforward manner, did not receive 
any comments on the use of plain language.
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    \58\ Public Law 106-102, section 722, 113 Stat. 1338, 1471 
(1999).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

D. OCC Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 Determination

    The OCC analyzed the final rule under the factors set forth in the 
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA) (2 U.S.C. 1532). Under this 
analysis, the OCC considered whether the rule includes a Federal 
mandate that may result in the expenditure by State, local, and Tribal 
governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector, of $100 
million or more in any one year (adjusted for inflation). The OCC has 
determined that this rule will not result in expenditures by State, 
local, and Tribal governments, or the private sector, of $100 million 
or more in any one year.\59\ Accordingly, the OCC has not prepared a 
written statement to accompany this rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \59\ The final rule applies to all OCC-supervised non-advanced 
approaches institutions, and as of June 30, 2017, 225 OCC-supervised 
banks reported threshold deduction amounts or minority interest. To 
estimate administrative costs associated with the final rule, the 
OCC estimates the number of employees each activity is likely to 
require and the number of hours necessary to assess, implement, and 
perfect the required activity. Based on supervisory experience, the 
OCC estimates it will take an OCC-supervised institution, on 
average, a one-time investment of one business week, or 40 hours, to 
update policies and procedures, and another one-time investment of 
40 hours to make the accounting ledger changes for currently held 
threshold deduction amounts and minority interests. Assuming a 
compensation cost of $114 per hour, the OCC estimates that the rule 
would impose administrative costs associated with compliance 
activities of approximately $6.8 million for OCC supervised non-
advanced approaches institutions in the first year. [(40 hours x 
$114 per hour x 1,237 banks) + (40 hours x $114 per hour x 225 banks 
with threshold deduction items or minority interest) = $6,666,720)]. 
The OCC expects these additional administrative costs to occur in 
the first year and to be near zero after the first year.
    The OCC further estimates that final rule will lead to an 
aggregate increase in reported regulatory capital of $1.8 billion 
for national banks and Federal savings associations compared to the 
amount they would report if they were required to continue to apply 
the current capital requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

E. Riegle Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994

    Pursuant to section 302(a) of the Riegle Community Development and 
Regulatory Improvement Act (RCDRIA),\60\ in determining the effective 
date and administrative compliance requirements for new regulations 
that impose additional reporting, disclosure, or other requirements on 
insured depository institutions, each Federal banking agency must 
consider, consistent with principles of safety and soundness and the 
public interest, any administrative burdens that such regulations would 
place on depository institutions, including small depository 
institutions, and customers of depository institutions, as well as the 
benefits of such regulations. In addition, section 302(b) of RCDRIA 
requires new regulations and amendments to regulations that impose 
additional reporting, disclosures, or other new requirements on insured 
depository institutions generally to take effect on the first day of a 
calendar quarter that begins on or after the date on which the 
regulations are published in final form.\61\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \60\ 12 U.S.C. 4802(a).
    \61\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In accordance with these provisions of RCDRIA, the agencies 
considered any administrative burdens, as well as benefits, that the 
final rule would place on depository institutions and their customers 
in determining the effective date and administrative compliance 
requirements of the final rule. In conjunction with the requirements of 
RCDRIA, the final rule is effective on October 1, 2019, except that 
amendatory instructions 7, 8, 24, 30, 31, 47.b, 53, 54, and 70 are 
effective April 1, 2020. Any banking organization subject to the

[[Page 35248]]

capital rule may elect to adopt the amendments that are effective 
October 1, 2019, prior to that date.

List of Subjects

12 CFR Part 3

    Administrative practice and procedure, Capital, National banks, 
Risk.

12 CFR Part 217

    Administrative practice and procedure, Banks, Banking, Capital, 
Federal Reserve System, Holding companies.

12 CFR Part 324

    Administrative practice and procedure, Banks, Banking, Capital 
adequacy, Savings associations, State non-member banks.

Office of the Comptroller of the Currency

    For the reasons set out in the joint preamble, 12 CFR part 3 is 
amended as follows.

PART 3--CAPITAL ADEQUACY STANDARDS

0
1. The authority citation for part 3 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 12 U.S.C. 93a, 161, 1462, 1462a, 1463, 1464, 1818, 
1828(n), 1828 note, 1831n note, 1835, 3907, 3909, and 5412(b)(2)(B).

Subpart A--General Provisions

0
2. Effective October 1, 2019, Sec.  3.1 is amended by revising 
paragraph (a) to read as follows:


Sec.  3.1   Purpose, applicability, reservation of authority, and 
timing.

    (a) Purpose. This part establishes minimum capital requirements and 
overall capital adequacy standards for national banks and Federal 
savings associations. This part does not apply to Federal branches and 
agencies of foreign banks. This part includes methodologies for 
calculating minimum capital requirements, public disclosure 
requirements related to the capital requirements, and transition 
provisions for the application of this part.
* * * * *

0
3. Effective October 1, 2019, Sec.  3.2 is amended by:
0
a. Revising the definitions of ``corporate exposure'', ``eligible 
guarantor'', ``International Lending Supervision Act'', and 
``Investment in the capital of an unconsolidated financial 
institution'';
0
b. Adding in alphabetical order a definition for ``Nonsignificant 
investment in the capital of an unconsolidated financial institution''; 
and
0
c. Revising the definition of ``Significant investment in the capital 
of an unconsolidated financial institution''.
    The revisions and addition read as follows:


Sec.  3.2   Definitions.

* * * * *
    Corporate exposure means an exposure to a company that is not:
    (1) An exposure to a sovereign, the Bank for International 
Settlements, the European Central Bank, the European Commission, the 
International Monetary Fund, the European Stability Mechanism, the 
European Financial Stability Facility, a multi-lateral development bank 
(MDB), a depository institution, a foreign bank, a credit union, or a 
public sector entity (PSE);
    (2) An exposure to a GSE;
    (3) A residential mortgage exposure;
    (4) A pre-sold construction loan;
    (5) A statutory multifamily mortgage;
    (6) A high volatility commercial real estate (HVCRE) exposure;
    (7) A cleared transaction;
    (8) A default fund contribution;
    (9) A securitization exposure;
    (10) An equity exposure; or
    (11) An unsettled transaction.
    (12) A policy loan; or
    (13) A separate account.
* * * * *
    Eligible guarantor means:
    (1) A sovereign, the Bank for International Settlements, the 
International Monetary Fund, the European Central Bank, the European 
Commission, a Federal Home Loan Bank, Federal Agricultural Mortgage 
Corporation (Farmer Mac), the European Stability Mechanism, the 
European Financial Stability Facility, a multilateral development bank 
(MDB), a depository institution, a bank holding company, a savings and 
loan holding company, a credit union, a foreign bank, or a qualifying 
central counterparty; or
    (2) An entity (other than a special purpose entity):
    (i) That at the time the guarantee is issued or anytime thereafter, 
has issued and outstanding an unsecured debt security without credit 
enhancement that is investment grade;
    (ii) Whose creditworthiness is not positively correlated with the 
credit risk of the exposures for which it has provided guarantees; and
    (iii) That is not an insurance company engaged predominately in the 
business of providing credit protection (such as a monoline bond 
insurer or re-insurer).
* * * * *
    International Lending Supervision Act means the International 
Lending Supervision Act of 1983 (12 U.S.C. 3901 et seq.).
* * * * *
    Investment in the capital of an unconsolidated financial 
institution means a net long position calculated in accordance with 
Sec.  3.22(h) in an instrument that is recognized as capital for 
regulatory purposes by the primary supervisor of an unconsolidated 
regulated financial institution or is an instrument that is part of the 
GAAP equity of an unconsolidated unregulated financial institution, 
including direct, indirect, and synthetic exposures to capital 
instruments, excluding underwriting positions held by the national bank 
or Federal savings association for five or fewer business days.
* * * * *
    Non-significant investment in the capital of an unconsolidated 
financial institution means an investment by an advanced approaches 
national bank or Federal savings association in the capital of an 
unconsolidated financial institution where the advanced approaches 
national bank or Federal savings association owns 10 percent or less of 
the issued and outstanding common stock of the unconsolidated financial 
institution.
* * * * *
    Significant investment in the capital of an unconsolidated 
financial institution means an investment by an advanced approaches 
national bank or Federal savings association in the capital of an 
unconsolidated financial institution where the advanced approaches 
national bank or Federal savings association owns more than 10 percent 
of the issued and outstanding common stock of the unconsolidated 
financial institution.
* * * * *

0
4. Effective October 1, 2019, Sec.  3.10 is amended by revising 
paragraph (c)(4)(ii)(H) to read as follows:


Sec.  3.10   Minimum capital requirements.

* * * * *
    (c) * * *
    (4) * * *
    (ii) * * *
    (H) The credit equivalent amount of all off-balance sheet exposures 
of the national bank or Federal savings association, excluding repo-
style transactions, repurchase or reverse repurchase or securities 
borrowing or lending transactions that qualify for sales treatment 
under U.S. GAAP, and derivative transactions, determined using the 
applicable credit conversion

[[Page 35249]]

factor under Sec.  3.33(b), provided, however, that the minimum credit 
conversion factor that may be assigned to an off-balance sheet exposure 
under this paragraph is 10 percent; and
* * * * *

0
5. Effective October 1, 2019, Sec.  3.11 is amended by revising 
paragraphs (a)(2)(i) and (iv), (a)(3)(i), and Table 1 to Sec.  3.11 to 
read as follows:


Sec.  3.11   Capital conservation buffer and countercyclical capital 
buffer amount.

* * * * *
    (a) * * *
    (2) * * *
    (i) Eligible retained income. The eligible retained income of a 
national bank or Federal savings association is the national bank's or 
Federal savings association's net income, calculated in accordance with 
the instructions to the Call Report, for the four calendar quarters 
preceding the current calendar quarter, net of any distributions and 
associated tax effects not already reflected in net income.
* * * * *
    (iv) Private sector credit exposure. Private sector credit exposure 
means an exposure to a company or an individual that is not an exposure 
to a sovereign, the Bank for International Settlements, the European 
Central Bank, the European Commission, the European Stability 
Mechanism, the European Financial Stability Facility, the International 
Monetary Fund, a MDB, a PSE, or a GSE.
    (3) Calculation of capital conservation buffer. (i) A national 
bank's or Federal savings association's capital conservation buffer is 
equal to the lowest of the following ratios, calculated as of the last 
day of the previous calendar quarter:
    (A) The national bank or Federal savings association's common 
equity tier 1 capital ratio minus the national bank or Federal savings 
association 's minimum common equity tier 1 capital ratio requirement 
under Sec.  3.10;
    (B) The national bank or Federal savings association's tier 1 
capital ratio minus the national bank or Federal savings association's 
minimum tier 1 capital ratio requirement under Sec.  3.10; and
    (C) The national bank or Federal savings association's total 
capital ratio minus the national bank or Federal savings association's 
minimum total capital ratio requirement under Sec.  3.10; or
* * * * *

                          Table 1 to Sec.   3.11--Calculation of Maximum Payout Amount
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
               Capital conservation buffer                                 Maximum payout ratio
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Greater than 2.5 percent plus 100 percent of the          No payout ratio limitation applies.
 national bank's or Federal savings association's
 applicable countercyclical capital buffer amount.
Less than or equal to 2.5 percent plus 100 percent of     60 percent.
 the national bank's or Federal savings association's
 applicable countercyclical capital buffer amount, and
 greater than 1.875 percent plus 75 percent of the
 national bank's or Federal savings association's
 applicable countercyclical capital buffer amount.
Less than or equal to 1.875 percent plus 75 percent of    40 percent.
 the national bank's or Federal savings association's
 applicable countercyclical capital buffer amount, and
 greater than 1.25 percent plus 50 percent of the
 national bank's or Federal savings association's
 applicable countercyclical capital buffer amount.
Less than or equal to 1.25 percent plus 50 percent of     20 percent.
 the national bank's or Federal savings association's
 applicable countercyclical capital buffer amount, and
 greater than 0.625 percent plus 25 percent of the
 national bank's or Federal savings association's
 applicable countercyclical capital buffer amount.
Less than or equal to 0.625 percent plus 25 percent of    0 percent.
 the national bank's or Federal savings association's
 applicable countercyclical capital buffer amount.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

* * * * *

0
6. Effective October 1, 2019, Section 3.20 is amended by revising 
paragraphs (b)(4), (c)(1)(viii), (c)(2), and (d)(2), and (5) to read as 
follows:


Sec.  3.20   Capital components and eligibility criteria for regulatory 
capital instruments.

* * * * *
    (b) * * *
    (4) Any common equity tier 1 minority interest, subject to the 
limitations in Sec.  3.21.
* * * * *
    (c) * * *
    (1) * * *
    (viii) Any cash dividend payments on the instrument are paid out of 
the national bank's or Federal savings association's net income or 
retained earnings.
* * * * *
    (2) Tier 1 minority interest, subject to the limitations in Sec.  
3.21, that is not included in the national bank's or Federal savings 
association's common equity tier 1 capital.
* * * * *
    (d) * * *
    (2) Total capital minority interest, subject to the limitations set 
forth in Sec.  3.21, that is not included in the national bank's or 
Federal savings association's tier 1 capital.
* * * * *
    (5) For a national bank or Federal savings association that makes 
an AOCI opt-out election (as defined in paragraph (b)(2) of Sec.  
3.22), 45 percent of pretax net unrealized gains on available-for-sale 
preferred stock classified as an equity security under GAAP and 
available-for-sale equity exposures.
* * * * *

0
7. Effective April 1, 2020, Section 3.21 is revised to read as follows:


Sec.  3.21   Minority interest.

    (a)(1) Applicability. For purposes of Sec.  3.20, a national bank 
or Federal savings association that is not an advanced approaches 
national bank or Federal savings association is subject to the minority 
interest limitations in this paragraph (a) if a consolidated subsidiary 
of the national bank or Federal savings association has issued 
regulatory capital that is not owned by the national bank or Federal 
savings association.
    (2) Common equity tier 1 minority interest includable in the common 
equity tier 1 capital of the national bank or Federal savings 
association. The amount of common equity tier 1 minority interest that 
a national bank or Federal savings association may include in common 
equity tier 1 capital must be no greater than 10 percent of the sum of 
all common equity tier 1 capital elements of the national bank or 
Federal savings association (not including the common equity tier 1 
minority interest itself), less any common equity tier 1 capital 
regulatory adjustments and deductions in accordance with Sec.  3.22(a) 
and (b).
    (3) Tier 1 minority interest includable in the tier 1 capital of 
the national bank or Federal savings association. The amount of tier 1 
minority interest that a national bank or Federal savings association 
may include in tier 1 capital

[[Page 35250]]

must be no greater than 10 percent of the sum of all tier 1 capital 
elements of the national bank or Federal savings association (not 
including the tier 1 minority interest itself), less any tier 1 capital 
regulatory adjustments and deductions in accordance with Sec.  3.22(a) 
and (b).
    (4) Total capital minority interest includable in the total capital 
of the national bank or Federal savings association. The amount of 
total capital minority interest that a national bank or Federal savings 
association may include in total capital must be no greater than 10 
percent of the sum of all total capital elements of the national bank 
or Federal savings association (not including the total capital 
minority interest itself), less any total capital regulatory 
adjustments and deductions in accordance with Sec.  3.22(a) and (b).
    (b)(1) Applicability. For purposes of Sec.  3.20, an advanced 
approaches national bank or Federal savings association is subject to 
the minority interest limitations in this paragraph (b) if:
    (i) A consolidated subsidiary of the advanced approaches national 
bank or Federal savings association has issued regulatory capital that 
is not owned by the national bank or Federal savings association; and
    (ii) For each relevant regulatory capital ratio of the consolidated 
subsidiary, the ratio exceeds the sum of the subsidiary's minimum 
regulatory capital requirements plus its capital conservation buffer.
    (2) Difference in capital adequacy standards at the subsidiary 
level. For purposes of the minority interest calculations in this 
section, if the consolidated subsidiary issuing the capital is not 
subject to capital adequacy standards similar to those of the advanced 
approaches national bank or Federal savings association, the advanced 
approaches national bank or Federal savings association must assume 
that the capital adequacy standards of the advanced approaches national 
bank or Federal savings association apply to the subsidiary.
    (3) Common equity tier 1 minority interest includable in the common 
equity tier 1 capital of the national bank or Federal savings 
association. For each consolidated subsidiary of an advanced approaches 
national bank or Federal savings association, the amount of common 
equity tier 1 minority interest the advanced approaches national bank 
or Federal savings association may include in common equity tier 1 
capital is equal to:
    (i) The common equity tier 1 minority interest of the subsidiary; 
minus
    (ii) The percentage of the subsidiary's common equity tier 1 
capital that is not owned by the advanced approaches national bank or 
Federal savings association, multiplied by the difference between the 
common equity tier 1 capital of the subsidiary and the lower of:
    (A) The amount of common equity tier 1 capital the subsidiary must 
hold, or would be required to hold pursuant to this paragraph (b), to 
avoid restrictions on distributions and discretionary bonus payments 
under Sec.  3.11 or equivalent standards established by the 
subsidiary's home country supervisor; or
    (B)(1) The standardized total risk-weighted assets of the advanced 
approaches national bank or Federal savings association that relate to 
the subsidiary multiplied by
    (2) The common equity tier 1 capital ratio the subsidiary must 
maintain to avoid restrictions on distributions and discretionary bonus 
payments under Sec.  3.11 or equivalent standards established by the 
subsidiary's home country supervisor.
    (4) Tier 1 minority interest includable in the tier 1 capital of 
the advanced approaches national bank or Federal savings association. 
For each consolidated subsidiary of the advanced approaches national 
bank or Federal savings association, the amount of tier 1 minority 
interest the advanced approaches national bank or Federal savings 
association may include in tier 1 capital is equal to:
    (i) The tier 1 minority interest of the subsidiary; minus
    (ii) The percentage of the subsidiary's tier 1 capital that is not 
owned by the advanced approaches national bank or Federal savings 
association multiplied by the difference between the tier 1 capital of 
the subsidiary and the lower of:
    (A) The amount of tier 1 capital the subsidiary must hold, or would 
be required to hold pursuant to this paragraph (b), to avoid 
restrictions on distributions and discretionary bonus payments under 
Sec.  3.11 or equivalent standards established by the subsidiary's home 
country supervisor, or
    (B)(1) The standardized total risk-weighted assets of the advanced 
approaches national bank or Federal savings association that relate to 
the subsidiary multiplied by
    (2) The tier 1 capital ratio the subsidiary must maintain to avoid 
restrictions on distributions and discretionary bonus payments under 
Sec.  3.11 or equivalent standards established by the subsidiary's home 
country supervisor.
    (5) Total capital minority interest includable in the total capital 
of the national bank or Federal savings association. For each 
consolidated subsidiary of the advanced approaches national bank or 
Federal savings association, the amount of total capital minority 
interest the advanced approaches national bank or Federal savings 
association may include in total capital is equal to:
    (i) The total capital minority interest of the subsidiary; minus
    (ii) The percentage of the subsidiary's total capital that is not 
owned by the advanced approaches national bank or Federal savings 
association multiplied by the difference between the total capital of 
the subsidiary and the lower of:
    (A) The amount of total capital the subsidiary must hold, or would 
be required to hold pursuant to this paragraph (b), to avoid 
restrictions on distributions and discretionary bonus payments under 
Sec.  3.11 or equivalent standards established by the subsidiary's home 
country supervisor, or
    (B)(1) The standardized total risk-weighted assets of the advanced 
approaches national bank or Federal savings association that relate to 
the subsidiary multiplied by
    (2) The total capital ratio the subsidiary must maintain to avoid 
restrictions on distributions and discretionary bonus payments under 
Sec.  3.11 or equivalent standards established by the subsidiary's home 
country supervisor.

0
8. Effective April 1, 2020, Sec.  3.22 is amended by revising 
paragraphs (a)(1), (c), (d), (g), and (h) to read as follows:


Sec.  3.22   Regulatory capital adjustments and deductions.

    (a) * * *
    (1)(i) Goodwill, net of associated deferred tax liabilities (DTLs) 
in accordance with paragraph (e) of this section; and
    (ii) For an advanced approaches national bank or Federal savings 
association, goodwill that is embedded in the valuation of a 
significant investment in the capital of an unconsolidated financial 
institution in the form of common stock (and that is reflected in the 
consolidated financial statements of the advanced approaches national 
bank or Federal savings association), in accordance with paragraph (d) 
of this section;
* * * * *
    (c) Deductions from regulatory capital related to investments in 
capital

[[Page 35251]]

instruments \23\--(1) Investment in the national bank's or Federal 
savings association's own capital instruments. A national bank or 
Federal savings association must deduct an investment in the national 
bank's or Federal savings association's own capital instruments as 
follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \23\ The national bank or Federal savings association must 
calculate amounts deducted under paragraphs (c) through (f) of this 
section after it calculates the amount of ALLL or AACL, as 
applicable, includable in tier 2 capital under Sec.  3.20(d)(3).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (i) A national bank or Federal savings association must deduct an 
investment in the national bank's or Federal savings association's own 
common stock instruments from its common equity tier 1 capital elements 
to the extent such instruments are not excluded from regulatory capital 
under Sec.  3.20(b)(1);
    (ii) A national bank or Federal savings association must deduct an 
investment in the national bank's or Federal savings association's own 
additional tier 1 capital instruments from its additional tier 1 
capital elements; and
    (iii) A national bank or Federal savings association must deduct an 
investment in the national bank's or Federal savings association's own 
tier 2 capital instruments from its tier 2 capital elements.
    (2) Corresponding deduction approach. For purposes of subpart C of 
this part, the corresponding deduction approach is the methodology used 
for the deductions from regulatory capital related to reciprocal cross 
holdings (as described in paragraph (c)(3) of this section), 
investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial institutions for 
a national bank or Federal savings association that is not an advanced 
approaches national bank or Federal savings association (as described 
in paragraph (c)(4) of this section), non-significant investments in 
the capital of unconsolidated financial institutions for an advanced 
approaches national bank or Federal savings association (as described 
in paragraph (c)(5) of this section), and non-common stock significant 
investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial institutions for 
an advanced approaches national bank or Federal savings association (as 
described in paragraph (c)(6) of this section). Under the corresponding 
deduction approach, a national bank or Federal savings association must 
make deductions from the component of capital for which the underlying 
instrument would qualify if it were issued by the national bank or 
Federal savings association itself, as described in paragraphs 
(c)(2)(i) through (iii) of this section. If the national bank or 
Federal savings association does not have a sufficient amount of a 
specific component of capital to effect the required deduction, the 
shortfall must be deducted according to paragraph (f) of this section.
    (i) If an investment is in the form of an instrument issued by a 
financial institution that is not a regulated financial institution, 
the national bank or Federal savings association must treat the 
instrument as:
    (A) A common equity tier 1 capital instrument if it is common stock 
or represents the most subordinated claim in liquidation of the 
financial institution; and
    (B) An additional tier 1 capital instrument if it is subordinated 
to all creditors of the financial institution and is senior in 
liquidation only to common shareholders.
    (ii) If an investment is in the form of an instrument issued by a 
regulated financial institution and the instrument does not meet the 
criteria for common equity tier 1, additional tier 1 or tier 2 capital 
instruments under Sec.  3.20, the national bank or Federal savings 
association must treat the instrument as:
    (A) A common equity tier 1 capital instrument if it is common stock 
included in GAAP equity or represents the most subordinated claim in 
liquidation of the financial institution;
    (B) An additional tier 1 capital instrument if it is included in 
GAAP equity, subordinated to all creditors of the financial 
institution, and senior in a receivership, insolvency, liquidation, or 
similar proceeding only to common shareholders; and
    (C) A tier 2 capital instrument if it is not included in GAAP 
equity but considered regulatory capital by the primary supervisor of 
the financial institution.
    (iii) If an investment is in the form of a non-qualifying capital 
instrument (as defined in Sec.  3.300(c)), the national bank or Federal 
savings association must treat the instrument as:
    (A) An additional tier 1 capital instrument if such instrument was 
included in the issuer's tier 1 capital prior to May 19, 2010; or
    (B) A tier 2 capital instrument if such instrument was included in 
the issuer's tier 2 capital (but not includable in tier 1 capital) 
prior to May 19, 2010.
    (3) Reciprocal cross holdings in the capital of financial 
institutions. A national bank or Federal savings association must 
deduct investments in the capital of other financial institutions it 
holds reciprocally, where such reciprocal cross holdings result from a 
formal or informal arrangement to swap, exchange, or otherwise intend 
to hold each other's capital instruments, by applying the corresponding 
deduction approach.
    (4) Investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial 
institutions. A national bank or Federal savings association that is 
not an advanced approaches national bank or Federal savings association 
must deduct its investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial 
institutions (as defined in Sec.  3.2) that exceed 25 percent of the 
sum of the national bank's or Federal savings association's common 
equity tier 1 capital elements minus all deductions from and 
adjustments to common equity tier 1 capital elements required under 
paragraphs (a) through (c)(3) of this section by applying the 
corresponding deduction approach.\24\ The deductions described in this 
section are net of associated DTLs in accordance with paragraph (e) of 
this section. In addition, a national bank or Federal savings 
association that underwrites a failed underwriting, with the prior 
written approval of the OCC, for the period of time stipulated by the 
OCC, is not required to deduct an investment in the capital of an 
unconsolidated financial institution pursuant to this paragraph (c) to 
the extent the investment is related to the failed underwriting.\25\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \24\ With the prior written approval of the OCC, for the period 
of time stipulated by the OCC, a national bank or Federal savings 
association that is not an advanced approaches national bank or 
Federal savings association is not required to deduct an investment 
in the capital of an unconsolidated financial institution pursuant 
to this paragraph if the financial institution is in distress and if 
such investment is made for the purpose of providing financial 
support to the financial institution, as determined by the OCC.
    \25\ Any investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial 
institutions that do not exceed the 25 percent threshold for 
investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial institutions 
under this section must be assigned the appropriate risk weight 
under subparts D or F of this part, as applicable.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (5) Non-significant investments in the capital of unconsolidated 
financial institutions. (i) An advanced approaches national bank or 
Federal savings association must deduct its non-significant investments 
in the capital of unconsolidated financial institutions (as defined in 
Sec.  3.2) that, in the aggregate, exceed 10 percent of the sum of the 
advanced approaches national bank's or Federal savings association's 
common equity tier 1 capital elements minus all deductions from and 
adjustments to common equity tier 1 capital elements required under 
paragraphs (a) through (c)(3) of this section (the 10 percent threshold 
for non-significant investments) by applying the

[[Page 35252]]

corresponding deduction approach.\26\ The deductions described in this 
section are net of associated DTLs in accordance with paragraph (e) of 
this section. In addition, an advanced approaches national bank or 
Federal savings association that underwrites a failed underwriting, 
with the prior written approval of the OCC, for the period of time 
stipulated by the OCC, is not required to deduct a non-significant 
investment in the capital of an unconsolidated financial institution 
pursuant to this paragraph (c) to the extent the investment is related 
to the failed underwriting.\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \26\ With the prior written approval of the OCC, for the period 
of time stipulated by the OCC, an advanced approaches national bank 
or Federal savings association is not required to deduct a non-
significant investment in the capital of an unconsolidated financial 
institution pursuant to this paragraph if the financial institution 
is in distress and if such investment is made for the purpose of 
providing financial support to the financial institution, as 
determined by the OCC.
    \27\ Any non-significant investments in the capital of 
unconsolidated financial institutions that do not exceed the 10 
percent threshold for non-significant investments under this section 
must be assigned the appropriate risk weight under subparts D, E, or 
F of this part, as applicable.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (ii) The amount to be deducted under this section from a specific 
capital component is equal to:
    (A) The advanced approaches national bank's or Federal savings 
association's non-significant investments in the capital of 
unconsolidated financial institutions exceeding the 10 percent 
threshold for non-significant investments, multiplied by
    (B) The ratio of the advanced approaches national bank's or Federal 
savings association's non-significant investments in the capital of 
unconsolidated financial institutions in the form of such capital 
component to the advanced approaches national bank's or Federal savings 
association's total non-significant investments in unconsolidated 
financial institutions.
    (6) Significant investments in the capital of unconsolidated 
financial institutions that are not in the form of common stock. An 
advanced approaches national bank or Federal savings association must 
deduct its significant investments in the capital of unconsolidated 
financial institutions that are not in the form of common stock by 
applying the corresponding deduction approach.\28\ The deductions 
described in this section are net of associated DTLs in accordance with 
paragraph (e) of this section. In addition, with the prior written 
approval of the OCC, for the period of time stipulated by the OCC, an 
advanced approaches national bank or Federal savings association that 
underwrites a failed underwriting is not required to deduct a 
significant investment in the capital of an unconsolidated financial 
institution pursuant to this paragraph (c) if such investment is 
related to such failed underwriting.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \28\ With prior written approval of the OCC, for the period of 
time stipulated by the OCC, an advanced approaches national bank or 
Federal savings association is not required to deduct a significant 
investment in the capital instrument of an unconsolidated financial 
institution in distress which is not in the form of common stock 
pursuant to this section if such investment is made for the purpose 
of providing financial support to the financial institution as 
determined by the OCC.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (d) MSAs and certain DTAs subject to common equity tier 1 capital 
deduction thresholds. (1) A national bank or Federal savings 
association that is not an advanced approaches national bank or Federal 
savings association must make deductions from regulatory capital as 
described in this paragraph (d)(1).
    (i) The national bank or Federal savings association must deduct 
from common equity tier 1 capital elements the amount of each of the 
items set forth in this paragraph (d)(1) that, individually, exceeds 25 
percent of the sum of the national bank's or Federal savings 
association's common equity tier 1 capital elements, less adjustments 
to and deductions from common equity tier 1 capital required under 
paragraphs (a) through (c)(3) of this section (the 25 percent common 
equity tier 1 capital deduction threshold).\29\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \29\ The amount of the items in paragraph (d)(1) of this section 
that is not deducted from common equity tier 1 capital must be 
included in the risk-weighted assets of the national bank or Federal 
savings association and assigned a 250 percent risk weight.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (ii) The national bank or Federal savings association must deduct 
from common equity tier 1 capital elements the amount of DTAs arising 
from temporary differences that the national bank or Federal savings 
association could not realize through net operating loss carrybacks, 
net of any related valuation allowances and net of DTLs, in accordance 
with paragraph (e) of this section. A national bank or Federal savings 
association is not required to deduct from the sum of its common equity 
tier 1 capital elements DTAs (net of any related valuation allowances 
and net of DTLs, in accordance with Sec.  3.22(e)) arising from timing 
differences that the national bank or Federal savings association could 
realize through net operating loss carrybacks. The national bank or 
Federal savings association must risk weight these assets at 100 
percent. For a national bank or Federal savings association that is a 
member of a consolidated group for tax purposes, the amount of DTAs 
that could be realized through net operating loss carrybacks may not 
exceed the amount that the national bank or Federal savings association 
could reasonably expect to have refunded by its parent holding company.
    (iii) The national bank or Federal savings association must deduct 
from common equity tier 1 capital elements the amount of MSAs net of 
associated DTLs, in accordance with paragraph (e) of this section.
    (iv) For purposes of calculating the amount of DTAs subject to 
deduction pursuant to paragraph (d)(1) of this section, a national bank 
or Federal savings association may exclude DTAs and DTLs relating to 
adjustments made to common equity tier 1 capital under paragraph (b) of 
this section. A national bank or Federal savings association that 
elects to exclude DTAs relating to adjustments under paragraph (b) of 
this section also must exclude DTLs and must do so consistently in all 
future calculations. A national bank or Federal savings association may 
change its exclusion preference only after obtaining the prior approval 
of the OCC.
    (2) An advanced approaches national bank or Federal savings 
association must make deductions from regulatory capital as described 
in this paragraph (d)(2).
    (i) An advanced approaches national bank or Federal savings 
association must deduct from common equity tier 1 capital elements the 
amount of each of the items set forth in this paragraph (d)(2) that, 
individually, exceeds 10 percent of the sum of the advanced approaches 
national bank's or Federal savings association's common equity tier 1 
capital elements, less adjustments to and deductions from common equity 
tier 1 capital required under paragraphs (a) through (c) of this 
section (the 10 percent common equity tier 1 capital deduction 
threshold).
    (A) DTAs arising from temporary differences that the advanced 
approaches national bank or Federal savings association could not 
realize through net operating loss carrybacks, net of any related 
valuation allowances and net of DTLs, in accordance with paragraph (e) 
of this section. An advanced approaches national bank or Federal 
savings association is not required to deduct from the sum of its 
common equity tier 1 capital elements DTAs (net of any related 
valuation allowances and net of DTLs, in accordance with Sec.  3.22(e)) 
arising from timing differences that the advanced approaches national 
bank or Federal savings association could realize

[[Page 35253]]

through net operating loss carrybacks. The advanced approaches national 
bank or Federal savings association must risk weight these assets at 
100 percent. For a national bank or Federal savings association that is 
a member of a consolidated group for tax purposes, the amount of DTAs 
that could be realized through net operating loss carrybacks may not 
exceed the amount that the national bank or Federal savings association 
could reasonably expect to have refunded by its parent holding company.
    (B) MSAs net of associated DTLs, in accordance with paragraph (e) 
of this section.
    (C) Significant investments in the capital of unconsolidated 
financial institutions in the form of common stock, net of associated 
DTLs in accordance with paragraph (e) of this section.\30\ Significant 
investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial institutions in 
the form of common stock subject to the 10 percent common equity tier 1 
capital deduction threshold may be reduced by any goodwill embedded in 
the valuation of such investments deducted by the advanced approaches 
national bank or Federal savings association pursuant to paragraph 
(a)(1) of this section. In addition, with the prior written approval of 
the OCC, for the period of time stipulated by the OCC, an advanced 
approaches national bank or Federal savings association that 
underwrites a failed underwriting is not required to deduct a 
significant investment in the capital of an unconsolidated financial 
institution in the form of common stock pursuant to this paragraph 
(d)(2) if such investment is related to such failed underwriting.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \30\ With the prior written approval of the OCC, for the period 
of time stipulated by the OCC, an advanced approaches national bank 
or Federal savings association is not required to deduct a 
significant investment in the capital instrument of an 
unconsolidated financial institution in distress in the form of 
common stock pursuant to this section if such investment is made for 
the purpose of providing financial support to the financial 
institution as determined by the OCC.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (ii) An advanced approaches national bank or Federal savings 
association must deduct from common equity tier 1 capital elements the 
items listed in paragraph (d)(2)(i) of this section that are not 
deducted as a result of the application of the 10 percent common equity 
tier 1 capital deduction threshold, and that, in aggregate, exceed 
17.65 percent of the sum of the advanced approaches national bank's or 
Federal savings association's common equity tier 1 capital elements, 
minus adjustments to and deductions from common equity tier 1 capital 
required under paragraphs (a) through (c) of this section, minus the 
items listed in paragraph (d)(2)(i) of this section (the 15 percent 
common equity tier 1 capital deduction threshold). Any goodwill that 
has been deducted under paragraph (a)(1) of this section can be 
excluded from the significant investments in the capital of 
unconsolidated financial institutions in the form of common stock.\31\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \31\ The amount of the items in paragraph (d)(2) of this section 
that is not deducted from common equity tier 1 capital pursuant to 
this section must be included in the risk-weighted assets of the 
advanced approaches national bank or Federal savings association and 
assigned a 250 percent risk weight.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (iii) For purposes of calculating the amount of DTAs subject to the 
10 and 15 percent common equity tier 1 capital deduction thresholds, an 
advanced approaches national bank or Federal savings association may 
exclude DTAs and DTLs relating to adjustments made to common equity 
tier 1 capital under paragraph (b) of this section. An advanced 
approaches national bank or Federal savings association that elects to 
exclude DTAs relating to adjustments under paragraph (b) of this 
section also must exclude DTLs and must do so consistently in all 
future calculations. An advanced approaches national bank or Federal 
savings association may change its exclusion preference only after 
obtaining the prior approval of the OCC.
* * * * *
    (g) Treatment of assets that are deducted. A national bank or 
Federal savings association must exclude from standardized total risk-
weighted assets and, as applicable, advanced approaches total risk-
weighted assets any item that is required to be deducted from 
regulatory capital.
    (h) Net long position. (1) For purposes of calculating an 
investment in the national bank's or Federal savings association's own 
capital instrument and an investment in the capital of an 
unconsolidated financial institution under this section, the net long 
position is the gross long position in the underlying instrument 
determined in accordance with paragraph (h)(2) of this section, as 
adjusted to recognize a short position in the same instrument 
calculated in accordance with paragraph (h)(3) of this section.
    (2) Gross long position. The gross long position is determined as 
follows:
    (i) For an equity exposure that is held directly, the adjusted 
carrying value as that term is defined in Sec.  3.51(b);
    (ii) For an exposure that is held directly and is not an equity 
exposure or a securitization exposure, the exposure amount as that term 
is defined in Sec.  3.2;
    (iii) For an indirect exposure, the national bank's or Federal 
savings association's carrying value of the investment in the 
investment fund, provided that, alternatively:
    (A) A national bank or Federal savings association may, with the 
prior approval of the Board, use a conservative estimate of the amount 
of its investment in the national bank's or Federal savings 
association's own capital instruments or its investment in the capital 
of an unconsolidated financial institution held through a position in 
an index; or
    (B) A national bank or Federal savings association may calculate 
the gross long position for investments in the national bank's or 
Federal savings association's own capital instruments or investments in 
the capital of an unconsolidated financial institution by multiplying 
the national bank's or Federal savings association's carrying value of 
its investment in the investment fund by either:
    (1) The highest stated investment limit (in percent) for 
investments in the national bank's or Federal savings association's own 
capital instruments or investments in the capital of unconsolidated 
financial institutions as stated in the prospectus, partnership 
agreement, or similar contract defining permissible investments of the 
investment fund; or
    (2) The investment fund's actual holdings of investments in the 
national bank's or Federal savings association's own capital 
instruments or investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial 
institutions.
    (iv) For a synthetic exposure, the amount of the national bank's or 
Federal savings association's loss on the exposure if the reference 
capital instrument were to have a value of zero.
    (3) Adjustments to reflect a short position. In order to adjust the 
gross long position to recognize a short position in the same 
instrument, the following criteria must be met:
    (i) The maturity of the short position must match the maturity of 
the long position, or the short position has a residual maturity of at 
least one year (maturity requirement); or
    (ii) For a position that is a trading asset or trading liability 
(whether on- or off-balance sheet) as reported on the national bank's 
or Federal savings association's Call Report, if the national bank or 
Federal savings association has a contractual right or obligation to 
sell the long position at a specific point in time and the counterparty 
to the contract has an obligation to purchase the long position if the 
national bank or

[[Page 35254]]

Federal savings association exercises its right to sell, this point in 
time may be treated as the maturity of the long position such that the 
maturity of the long position and short position are deemed to match 
for purposes of the maturity requirement, even if the maturity of the 
short position is less than one year; and
    (iii) For an investment in the national bank's or Federal savings 
association's own capital instrument under paragraph (c)(1) of this 
section or an investment in the capital of an unconsolidated financial 
institution under paragraphs (c) and (d) of this section:
    (A) A national bank or Federal savings association may only net a 
short position against a long position in an investment in the national 
bank's or Federal savings association's own capital instrument under 
paragraph (c) of this section if the short position involves no 
counterparty credit risk.
    (B) A gross long position in an investment in the national bank's 
or Federal savings association's own capital instrument or an 
investment in the capital of an unconsolidated financial institution 
resulting from a position in an index may be netted against a short 
position in the same index. Long and short positions in the same index 
without maturity dates are considered to have matching maturities.
    (C) A short position in an index that is hedging a long cash or 
synthetic position in an investment in the national bank's or Federal 
savings association's own capital instrument or an investment in the 
capital of an unconsolidated financial institution can be decomposed to 
provide recognition of the hedge. More specifically, the portion of the 
index that is composed of the same underlying instrument that is being 
hedged may be used to offset the long position if both the long 
position being hedged and the short position in the index are reported 
as a trading asset or trading liability (whether on- or off-balance 
sheet) on the national bank's or Federal savings association's Call 
Report, and the hedge is deemed effective by the national bank's or 
Federal savings association's internal control processes, which have 
not been found to be inadequate by the OCC.

0
9. Effective October 1, 2019, Sec.  3.32 is amended by revising 
paragraphs (b), (d)(2), (d)(3)(ii), (j), (k), and (l) to read as 
follows:


Sec.  3.32   General risk weights.

* * * * *
    (b) Certain supranational entities and multilateral development 
banks (MDBs). A national bank or Federal savings association must 
assign a zero percent risk weight to an exposure to the Bank for 
International Settlements, the European Central Bank, the European 
Commission, the International Monetary Fund, the European Stability 
Mechanism, the European Financial Stability Facility, or an MDB.
* * * * *
    (d) * * *
    (2) Exposures to foreign banks. (i) Except as otherwise provided 
under paragraphs (d)(2)(iii), (d)(2)(v), and (d)(3) of this section, a 
national bank or Federal savings association must assign a risk weight 
to an exposure to a foreign bank, in accordance with Table 2 to Sec.  
3.32, based on the CRC that corresponds to the foreign bank's home 
country or the OECD membership status of the foreign bank's home 
country if there is no CRC applicable to the foreign bank's home 
country.

   Table 2 to Sec.   3.32--Risk Weights for Exposures to Foreign Banks
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                            Risk weight
                                                           (in percent)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
CRC:
  0-1...................................................              20
  2.....................................................              50
  3.....................................................             100
  4-7...................................................             150
OECD Member with No CRC.................................              20
Non-OECD Member with No CRC.............................             100
Sovereign Default.......................................             150
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (ii) A national bank or Federal savings association must assign a 
20 percent risk weight to an exposure to a foreign bank whose home 
country is a member of the OECD and does not have a CRC.
    (iii) A national bank or Federal savings association must assign a 
20 percent risk-weight to an exposure that is a self-liquidating, 
trade-related contingent item that arises from the movement of goods 
and that has a maturity of three months or less to a foreign bank whose 
home country has a CRC of 0, 1, 2, or 3, or is an OECD member with no 
CRC.
    (iv) A national bank or Federal savings association must assign a 
100 percent risk weight to an exposure to a foreign bank whose home 
country is not a member of the OECD and does not have a CRC, with the 
exception of self-liquidating, trade-related contingent items that 
arise from the movement of goods, and that have a maturity of three 
months or less, which may be assigned a 20 percent risk weight.
    (v) A national bank or Federal savings association must assign a 
150 percent risk weight to an exposure to a foreign bank immediately 
upon determining that an event of sovereign default has occurred in the 
bank's home country, or if an event of sovereign default has occurred 
in the foreign bank's home country during the previous five years.
    (3) * * *
    (ii) A significant investment in the capital of an unconsolidated 
financial institution in the form of common stock pursuant to Sec.  
3.22(d)(2)(i)(c);
* * * * *
    (j) High-volatility commercial real estate (HVCRE) exposures. A 
national bank or Federal savings association must assign a 150 percent 
risk weight to an HVCRE exposure.
    (k) Past due exposures. Except for an exposure to a sovereign 
entity or a residential mortgage exposure or a policy loan, if an 
exposure is 90 days or more past due or on nonaccrual:
    (1) A national bank or Federal savings association must assign a 
150 percent risk weight to the portion of the exposure that is not 
guaranteed or that is unsecured;
    (2) A national bank or Federal savings association may assign a 
risk weight to the guaranteed portion of a past due exposure based on 
the risk weight that applies under Sec.  3.36 if the guarantee or 
credit derivative meets the requirements of that section; and
    (3) A national bank or Federal savings association may assign a 
risk weight to the collateralized portion of a past due exposure based 
on the risk weight that applies under Sec.  3.37 if the collateral 
meets the requirements of that section.
    (l) Other assets. (1) A national bank or Federal savings 
association must assign a zero percent risk weight to cash owned and 
held in all offices of the national bank or Federal savings association 
or in transit; to gold bullion held in the national bank's or Federal 
savings association's own vaults or held in another depository 
institution's vaults on an allocated basis, to the extent the gold 
bullion assets are offset by gold bullion liabilities; and to exposures 
that arise from the settlement of cash transactions (such as equities, 
fixed income, spot foreign exchange and spot commodities) with a 
central counterparty where there is no assumption of ongoing 
counterparty credit risk by the central counterparty after settlement 
of the trade and associated default fund contributions.
    (2) A national bank or Federal savings association must assign a 20 
percent risk weight to cash items in the process of collection.
    (3) A national bank or Federal savings association must assign a 
100 percent risk weight to DTAs arising from temporary differences that 
the national bank or Federal savings association

[[Page 35255]]

could realize through net operating loss carrybacks.
    (4) A national bank or Federal savings association must assign a 
250 percent risk weight to the portion of each of the following items 
to the extent it is not deducted from common equity tier 1 capital 
pursuant to Sec.  3.22(d):
    (i) MSAs; and
    (ii) DTAs arising from temporary differences that the national bank 
or Federal savings association could not realize through net operating 
loss carrybacks.
    (5) A national bank or Federal savings association must assign a 
100 percent risk weight to all assets not specifically assigned a 
different risk weight under this subpart and that are not deducted from 
tier 1 or tier 2 capital pursuant to Sec.  3.22.
    (6) Notwithstanding the requirements of this section, a national 
bank or Federal savings association may assign an asset that is not 
included in one of the categories provided in this section to the risk 
weight category applicable under the capital rules applicable to bank 
holding companies and savings and loan holding companies at 12 CFR part 
217, provided that all of the following conditions apply:
    (i) The national bank or Federal savings association is not 
authorized to hold the asset under applicable law other than debt 
previously contracted or similar authority; and
    (ii) The risks associated with the asset are substantially similar 
to the risks of assets that are otherwise assigned to a risk weight 
category of less than 100 percent under this subpart.
* * * * *

0
10. Effective October 1, 2019, Sec.  3.34 is amended by revising 
paragraph (c) to read as follows:


Sec.  3.34   OTC derivative contracts.

* * * * *
    (c) Counterparty credit risk for OTC credit derivatives--(1) 
Protection purchasers. A national bank or Federal savings association 
that purchases an OTC credit derivative that is recognized under Sec.  
3.36 as a credit risk mitigant for an exposure that is not a covered 
position under subpart F is not required to compute a separate 
counterparty credit risk capital requirement under this subpart D 
provided that the national bank or Federal savings association does so 
consistently for all such credit derivatives. The national bank or 
Federal savings association must either include all or exclude all such 
credit derivatives that are subject to a qualifying master netting 
agreement from any measure used to determine counterparty credit risk 
exposure to all relevant counterparties for risk-based capital 
purposes.
    (2) Protection providers. (i) A national bank or Federal savings 
association that is the protection provider under an OTC credit 
derivative must treat the OTC credit derivative as an exposure to the 
underlying reference asset. The national bank or Federal savings 
association is not required to compute a counterparty credit risk 
capital requirement for the OTC credit derivative under this subpart D, 
provided that this treatment is applied consistently for all such OTC 
credit derivatives. The national bank or Federal savings association 
must either include all or exclude all such OTC credit derivatives that 
are subject to a qualifying master netting agreement from any measure 
used to determine counterparty credit risk exposure.
    (ii) The provisions of this paragraph (c)(2) apply to all relevant 
counterparties for risk-based capital purposes unless the national bank 
or Federal savings association is treating the OTC credit derivative as 
a covered position under subpart F, in which case the national bank or 
Federal savings association must compute a supplemental counterparty 
credit risk capital requirement under this section.
* * * * *

0
11. Effective October 1, 2019, Sec.  3.35 is amended by revising 
paragraphs (b)(3)(ii), (b)(4)(ii), (c)(3)(ii), and (c)(4)(ii) to read 
as follows:


Sec.  3.35   Cleared transactions.

* * * * *
    (b) * * *
    (3) * * *
    (ii) For a cleared transaction with a CCP that is not a QCCP, a 
clearing member client national bank or Federal savings association 
must apply the risk weight appropriate for the CCP according to this 
subpart D.
    (4) * * *
    (ii) A clearing member client national bank or Federal savings 
association must calculate a risk-weighted asset amount for any 
collateral provided to a CCP, clearing member, or custodian in 
connection with a cleared transaction in accordance with the 
requirements under this subpart D.
    (c) * * *
    (3) * * *
    (ii) For a cleared transaction with a CCP that is not a QCCP, a 
clearing member national bank or Federal savings association must apply 
the risk weight appropriate for the CCP according to this subpart D.
    (4) * * *
    (ii) A clearing member national bank or Federal savings association 
must calculate a risk-weighted asset amount for any collateral provided 
to a CCP, clearing member, or a custodian in connection with a cleared 
transaction in accordance with requirements under this subpart D.
* * * * *

0
12. Effective October 1, 2019, Sec.  3.36 is amended by revising 
paragraph (c) to read as follows:


Sec.  3.36   Guarantees and credit derivatives: Substitution treatment.

* * * * *
    (c) Substitution approach--(1) Full coverage. If an eligible 
guarantee or eligible credit derivative meets the conditions in 
paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section and the protection amount (P) of 
the guarantee or credit derivative is greater than or equal to the 
exposure amount of the hedged exposure, a national bank or Federal 
savings association may recognize the guarantee or credit derivative in 
determining the risk-weighted asset amount for the hedged exposure by 
substituting the risk weight applicable to the guarantor or credit 
derivative protection provider under this subpart D for the risk weight 
assigned to the exposure.
    (2) Partial coverage. If an eligible guarantee or eligible credit 
derivative meets the conditions in paragraphs (a) and (b) of this 
section and the protection amount (P) of the guarantee or credit 
derivative is less than the exposure amount of the hedged exposure, the 
national bank or Federal savings association must treat the hedged 
exposure as two separate exposures (protected and unprotected) in order 
to recognize the credit risk mitigation benefit of the guarantee or 
credit derivative.
    (i) The national bank or Federal savings association may calculate 
the risk-weighted asset amount for the protected exposure under this 
subpart D, where the applicable risk weight is the risk weight 
applicable to the guarantor or credit derivative protection provider.
    (ii) The national bank or Federal savings association must 
calculate the risk-weighted asset amount for the unprotected exposure 
under this subpart D, where the applicable risk weight is that of the 
unprotected portion of the hedged exposure.
    (iii) The treatment provided in this section is applicable when the 
credit risk of an exposure is covered on a partial pro rata basis and 
may be applicable when an adjustment is made to the effective notional 
amount of the guarantee or credit derivative under paragraphs (d), (e), 
or (f) of this section.
* * * * *

[[Page 35256]]


0
13. Effective October 1, 2019, Sec.  3.37 is amended by revising 
paragraph (b)(2)(i) to read as follows:


Sec.  3.37   Collateralized transactions.

* * * * *
    (b) * * *
    (2) * * *
    (i) A national bank or Federal savings association may apply a risk 
weight to the portion of an exposure that is secured by the fair value 
of financial collateral (that meets the requirements of paragraph 
(b)(1) of this section) based on the risk weight assigned to the 
collateral under this subpart D. For repurchase agreements, reverse 
repurchase agreements, and securities lending and borrowing 
transactions, the collateral is the instruments, gold, and cash the 
national bank or Federal savings association has borrowed, purchased 
subject to resale, or taken as collateral from the counterparty under 
the transaction. Except as provided in paragraph (b)(3) of this 
section, the risk weight assigned to the collateralized portion of the 
exposure may not be less than 20 percent.
* * * * *

0
14. Effective October 1, 2019, Sec.  3.38 is amended by revising 
paragraph (e)(2) to read as follows:


Sec.  3.38   Unsettled transactions.

* * * * *
    (e) * * *
    (2) From the business day after the national bank or Federal 
savings association has made its delivery until five business days 
after the counterparty delivery is due, the national bank or Federal 
savings association must calculate the risk-weighted asset amount for 
the transaction by treating the current fair value of the deliverables 
owed to the national bank or Federal savings association as an exposure 
to the counterparty and using the applicable counterparty risk weight 
under this subpart D.
* * * * *

0
15. Effective October 1, 2019, Sec.  3.42 is amended by revising 
paragraph (j)(2)(ii)(A) to read as follows:


Sec.  3.42   Risk-weighted assets for securitization exposures.

* * * * *
    (j) * * *
    (2) * * *
    (ii) * * *
    (A) If the national bank or Federal savings association purchases 
credit protection from a counterparty that is not a securitization SPE, 
the national bank or Federal savings association must determine the 
risk weight for the exposure according to this subpart D.
* * * * *

0
 16. Effective October 1, 2019, Sec.  3.52 is amended by revising 
paragraphs (b)(1) and (4) to read as follows:


Sec.  3.52   Simple risk-weight approach (SRWA).

* * * * *
    (b) * * *
    (1) Zero percent risk weight equity exposures. An equity exposure 
to a sovereign, the Bank for International Settlements, the European 
Central Bank, the European Commission, the International Monetary Fund, 
the European Stability Mechanism, the European Financial Stability 
Facility, an MDB, and any other entity whose credit exposures receive a 
zero percent risk weight under Sec.  3.32 may be assigned a zero 
percent risk weight.
* * * * *
    (4) 250 percent risk weight equity exposures. Significant 
investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial institutions in 
the form of common stock that are not deducted from capital pursuant to 
Sec.  3.22(d)(2) are assigned a 250 percent risk weight.
* * * * *

0
17. Effective October 1, 2019, Sec.  3.61 is revised to read as 
follows:


Sec.  3.61   Purpose and scope.

    Sections 3.61 through 3.63 of this subpart establish public 
disclosure requirements related to the capital requirements described 
in subpart B of this part for a national bank or Federal savings 
association with total consolidated assets of $50 billion or more as 
reported on the national bank's or Federal savings association's most 
recent year-end Call Report that is not an advanced approaches national 
bank or Federal savings association making public disclosures pursuant 
to Sec.  3.172. An advanced approaches national bank or Federal savings 
association that has not received approval from the OCC to exit 
parallel run pursuant to Sec.  3.121(d) is subject to the disclosure 
requirements described in Sec. Sec.  3.62 and 3.63. A national bank or 
Federal savings association with total consolidated assets of $50 
billion or more as reported on the national bank's or Federal savings 
association's most recent year-end Call Report that is not an advanced 
approaches national bank or Federal savings association making public 
disclosures subject to Sec.  3.172 must comply with Sec.  3.62 unless 
it is a consolidated subsidiary of a bank holding company, savings and 
loan holding company, or depository institution that is subject to the 
disclosure requirements of Sec.  3.62 or a subsidiary of a non-U.S. 
banking organization that is subject to comparable public disclosure 
requirements in its home jurisdiction. For purposes of this section, 
total consolidated assets are determined based on the average of the 
national bank's or Federal savings association's total consolidated 
assets in the four most recent quarters as reported on the Call Report 
or the average of the national bank or Federal savings association's 
total consolidated assets in the most recent consecutive quarters as 
reported quarterly on the national bank's or Federal savings 
association's Call Report if the national bank or Federal savings 
association has not filed such a report for each of the most recent 
four quarters.

0
18. Effective October 1, 2019, Sec.  3.63 is amended by revising Tables 
3 and 8 to Sec.  3.63 to read as follows:


Sec.  3.63   Disclosures by national bank or Federal savings 
associations described in Sec.  3.61.

* * * * *

                                    Table 3 to Sec.   3.63--Capital Adequacy
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Qualitative disclosures...............................  (a) A summary discussion of the national bank's or
                                                         Federal savings association's approach to assessing the
                                                         adequacy of its capital to support current and future
                                                         activities.
Quantitative disclosures..............................  (b) Risk-weighted assets for:
                                                           (1) Exposures to sovereign entities;
                                                           (2) Exposures to certain supranational entities and
                                                            MDBs;
                                                           (3) Exposures to depository institutions, foreign
                                                            banks, and credit unions;
                                                           (4) Exposures to PSEs;
                                                           (5) Corporate exposures;
                                                           (6) Residential mortgage exposures;
                                                           (7) Statutory multifamily mortgages and pre-sold
                                                            construction loans;
                                                           (8) HVCRE exposures;

[[Page 35257]]

 
                                                           (9) Past due loans;
                                                           (10) Other assets;
                                                           (11) Cleared transactions;
                                                           (12) Default fund contributions;
                                                           (13) Unsettled transactions;
                                                           (14) Securitization exposures; and
                                                           (15) Equity exposures.
                                                        (c) Standardized market risk-weighted assets as
                                                         calculated under subpart F of this part.
                                                        (d) Common equity tier 1, tier 1 and total risk-based
                                                         capital ratios:
                                                           (1) For the top consolidated group; and
                                                           (2) For each depository institution subsidiary.
                                                        (e) Total standardized risk-weighted assets.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

* * * * *

                                     Table 8 to Sec.   3.63--Securitization
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Qualitative Disclosures...............................  (a) The general qualitative disclosure requirement with
                                                         respect to a securitization (including synthetic
                                                         securitizations), including a discussion of:
                                                           (1) The national bank's or Federal savings
                                                            association 's objectives for securitizing assets,
                                                            including the extent to which these activities
                                                            transfer credit risk of the underlying exposures
                                                            away from the national bank or Federal savings
                                                            association to other entities and including the type
                                                            of risks assumed and retained with resecuritization
                                                            activity; \1\
                                                           (2) The nature of the risks (e.g., liquidity risk)
                                                            inherent in the securitized assets;
                                                           (3) The roles played by the national bank or Federal
                                                            savings association in the securitization process
                                                            \2\ and an indication of the extent of the national
                                                            bank's or Federal savings association 's involvement
                                                            in each of them;
                                                           (4) The processes in place to monitor changes in the
                                                            credit and market risk of securitization exposures
                                                            including how those processes differ for
                                                            resecuritization exposures;
                                                           (5) The national bank's or Federal savings
                                                            association's policy for mitigating the credit risk
                                                            retained through securitization and resecuritization
                                                            exposures; and
                                                           (6) The risk-based capital approaches that the
                                                            national bank or Federal savings association follows
                                                            for its securitization exposures including the type
                                                            of securitization exposure to which each approach
                                                            applies.
                                                        (b) A list of:
                                                           (1) The type of securitization SPEs that the national
                                                            bank or Federal savings association, as sponsor,
                                                            uses to securitize third-party exposures. The
                                                            national bank or Federal savings association must
                                                            indicate whether it has exposure to these SPEs,
                                                            either on- or off-balance sheet; and
                                                           (2) Affiliated entities:
                                                             (i) That the national bank or Federal savings
                                                              association manages or advises; and
                                                             (ii) That invest either in the securitization
                                                              exposures that the national bank or Federal
                                                              savings association has securitized or in
                                                              securitization SPEs that the national bank or
                                                              Federal savings association sponsors.\3\
                                                        (c) Summary of the national bank's or Federal savings
                                                         association's accounting policies for securitization
                                                         activities, including:
                                                           (1) Whether the transactions are treated as sales or
                                                            financings;
                                                           (2) Recognition of gain-on-sale;
                                                           (3) Methods and key assumptions applied in valuing
                                                            retained or purchased interests;
                                                           (4) Changes in methods and key assumptions from the
                                                            previous period for valuing retained interests and
                                                            impact of the changes;
                                                           (5) Treatment of synthetic securitizations;
                                                           (6) How exposures intended to be securitized are
                                                            valued and whether they are recorded under subpart D
                                                            of this part; and
                                                           (7) Policies for recognizing liabilities on the
                                                            balance sheet for arrangements that could require
                                                            the national bank or Federal savings association to
                                                            provide financial support for securitized assets.
                                                        (d) An explanation of significant changes to any
                                                         quantitative information since the last reporting
                                                         period.
Quantitative Disclosures..............................  (e) The total outstanding exposures securitized by the
                                                         national bank or Federal savings association in
                                                         securitizations that meet the operational criteria
                                                         provided in Sec.   3.41 (categorized into traditional
                                                         and synthetic securitizations), by exposure type,
                                                         separately for securitizations of third-party exposures
                                                         for which the bank acts only as sponsor.\4\
                                                        (f) For exposures securitized by the national bank or
                                                         Federal savings association in securitizations that
                                                         meet the operational criteria in Sec.   3.41:
                                                           (1) Amount of securitized assets that are impaired/
                                                            past due categorized by exposure type; \5\ and
                                                           (2) Losses recognized by the national bank or Federal
                                                            savings association during the current period
                                                            categorized by exposure type.\6\
                                                        (g) The total amount of outstanding exposures intended
                                                         to be securitized categorized by exposure type.
                                                        (h) Aggregate amount of:
                                                           (1) On-balance sheet securitization exposures
                                                            retained or purchased categorized by exposure type;
                                                            and
                                                           (2) Off-balance sheet securitization exposures
                                                            categorized by exposure type.
                                                        (i)(1) Aggregate amount of securitization exposures
                                                         retained or purchased and the associated capital
                                                         requirements for these exposures, categorized between
                                                         securitization and resecuritization exposures, further
                                                         categorized into a meaningful number of risk weight
                                                         bands and by risk-based capital approach (e.g., SSFA);
                                                         and

[[Page 35258]]

 
                                                           (2) Aggregate amount disclosed separately by type of
                                                            underlying exposure in the pool of any:
                                                             (i) After-tax gain-on-sale on a securitization that
                                                              has been deducted from common equity tier 1
                                                              capital; and
                                                             (ii) Credit-enhancing interest-only strip that is
                                                              assigned a 1,250 percent risk weight.
                                                        (j) Summary of current year's securitization activity,
                                                         including the amount of exposures securitized (by
                                                         exposure type), and recognized gain or loss on sale by
                                                         exposure type.
                                                        (k) Aggregate amount of resecuritization exposures
                                                         retained or purchased categorized according to:
                                                           (1) Exposures to which credit risk mitigation is
                                                            applied and those not applied; and
                                                           (2) Exposures to guarantors categorized according to
                                                            guarantor creditworthiness categories or guarantor
                                                            name.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The national bank or Federal savings association should describe the structure of resecuritizations in which
  it participates; this description should be provided for the main categories of resecuritization products in
  which the national bank or Federal savings association is active.
\2\ For example, these roles may include originator, investor, servicer, provider of credit enhancement,
  sponsor, liquidity provider, or swap provider.
\3\ Such affiliated entities may include, for example, money market funds, to be listed individually, and
  personal and private trusts, to be noted collectively.
\4\ ``Exposures securitized'' include underlying exposures originated by the national bank or Federal savings
  association, whether generated by them or purchased, and recognized in the balance sheet, from third parties,
  and third-party exposures included in sponsored transactions. Securitization transactions (including
  underlying exposures originally on the national bank's or Federal savings association's balance sheet and
  underlying exposures acquired by the national bank or Federal savings association from third-party entities)
  in which the originating bank does not retain any securitization exposure should be shown separately but need
  only be reported for the year of inception. National banks and Federal savings associations are required to
  disclose exposures regardless of whether there is a capital charge under this part.
\5\ Include credit-related other than temporary impairment (OTTI).
\6\ For example, charge-offs/allowances (if the assets remain on the national bank's or Federal savings
  association's balance sheet) or credit-related OTTI of interest-only strips and other retained residual
  interests, as well as recognition of liabilities for probable future financial support required of the
  national bank or Federal savings association with respect to securitized assets.

* * * * *

0
19. Effective October 1, 2019, Sec.  3.131 is amended by revising 
paragraph (d)(2) to read as follows:


Sec.  3.131   Mechanics for calculating total wholesale and retail 
risk-weighted assets.

* * * * *
    (d) * * *
    (2) Floor on PD assignment. The PD for each wholesale obligor or 
retail segment may not be less than 0.03 percent, except for exposures 
to or directly and unconditionally guaranteed by a sovereign entity, 
the Bank for International Settlements, the International Monetary 
Fund, the European Commission, the European Central Bank, the European 
Stability Mechanism, the European Financial Stability Facility, or a 
multilateral development bank, to which the national bank or Federal 
savings association assigns a rating grade associated with a PD of less 
than 0.03 percent.
* * * * *

0
20. Effective October 1, 2019, Sec.  3.133 is amended by revising 
paragraphs (b)(3)(ii) and (c)(3)(ii) to read as follows:


Sec.  3.133   Cleared transactions.

* * * * *
    (b) * * *
    (3) * * *
    (ii) For a cleared transaction with a CCP that is not a QCCP, a 
clearing member client national bank or Federal savings association 
must apply the risk weight applicable to the CCP under subpart D of 
this part.
* * * * *
    (c) * * *
    (3) * * *
    (ii) For a cleared transaction with a CCP that is not a QCCP, a 
clearing member national bank or Federal savings association must apply 
the risk weight applicable to the CCP according to subpart D of this 
part.
* * * * *

0
21. Effective October 1, 2019, Sec.  3.152 is amended by revising 
paragraphs (b)(5) and (6) to read as follows:


Sec.  3.152   Simple risk weight approach (SRWA).

* * * * *
    (b) * * *
    (5) 300 percent risk weight equity exposures. A publicly traded 
equity exposure (other than an equity exposure described in paragraph 
(b)(7) of this section and including the ineffective portion of a hedge 
pair) is assigned a 300 percent risk weight.
    (6) 400 percent risk weight equity exposures. An equity exposure 
(other than an equity exposure described in paragraph (b)(7) of this 
section) that is not publicly traded is assigned a 400 percent risk 
weight.
* * * * *

0
22. Effective October 1, 2019, Sec.  3.202 is amended by revising the 
definition of ``Corporate debt position'' in paragraph (b) to read as 
follows:


Sec.  3.202   Definitions.

* * * * *
    (b) * * *
    Corporate debt position means a debt position that is an exposure 
to a company that is not a sovereign entity, the Bank for International 
Settlements, the European Central Bank, the European Commission, the 
International Monetary Fund, the European Stability Mechanism, the 
European Financial Stability Facility, a multilateral development bank, 
a depository institution, a foreign bank, a credit union, a public 
sector entity, a GSE, or a securitization.
* * * * *

0
23. Effective October 1, 2019, Sec.  3.210 is amended by revising 
paragraph (b)(2)(ii) to read as follows:


Sec.  3.210   Standardized measurement method for specific risk.

* * * * *
    (b) * * *
    (2) * * *
    (ii) Certain supranational entity and multilateral development bank 
debt positions. A national bank or Federal savings association may 
assign a 0.0 percent specific risk-weighting factor to a debt position 
that is an exposure to the Bank for International Settlements, the 
European Central Bank, the European Commission, the International 
Monetary Fund, the European Stability Mechanism, the European Financial 
Stability Facility, or an MDB.
* * * * *


Sec.  3.300  [Amended]

0
24. Effective April 1, 2020, Sec.  3.300 is amended by removing 
paragraphs (b) and (d).

[[Page 35259]]

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

    For the reasons set out in the joint preamble, the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System amends 12 CFR part 217 as 
follows:

PART 217--CAPITAL ADEQUACY OF BANK HOLDING COMPANIES, SAVINGS AND 
LOAN HOLDING COMPANIES, AND STATE MEMBER BANKS (REGULATION Q)

0
25. The authority citation for part 217 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 12 U.S.C. 248(a), 321-338a, 481-486, 1462a, 1467a, 
1818, 1828, 1831n, 1831o, 1831p-l, 1831w, 1835, 1844(b), 1851, 3904, 
3906-3909, 4808, 5365, 5368, 5371.

Subpart A--General Provisions

0
 26. Effective October 1, 2019, Sec.  217.2 is amended by revsing the 
definitions of ``corporate exposure'' and ``eligible guarantor'', 
``International Lending Supervision Act'', ``investment in the capital 
of an unconsolidated financial institution'', ``non-significant 
investment in the capital of an unconsolidated financial institution'', 
and ``significant investment in the capital of an unconsolidated 
financial institution'' to read as follows:


Sec.  217.2   Definitions.

* * * * *
    Corporate exposure means an exposure to a company that is not:
    (1) An exposure to a sovereign, the Bank for International 
Settlements, the European Central Bank, the European Commission, the 
International Monetary Fund, the European Stability Mechanism, the 
European Financial Stability Facility, a multi-lateral development bank 
(MDB), a depository institution, a foreign bank, a credit union, or a 
public sector entity (PSE);
    (2) An exposure to a GSE;
    (3) A residential mortgage exposure;
    (4) A pre-sold construction loan;
    (5) A statutory multifamily mortgage;
    (6) A high volatility commercial real estate (HVCRE) exposure;
    (7) A cleared transaction;
    (8) A default fund contribution;
    (9) A securitization exposure;
    (10) An equity exposure; or
    (11) An unsettled transaction.
    (12) A policy loan; or
    (13) A separate account.
* * * * *
    Eligible guarantor means:
    (1) A sovereign, the Bank for International Settlements, the 
International Monetary Fund, the European Central Bank, the European 
Commission, a Federal Home Loan Bank, Federal Agricultural Mortgage 
Corporation (Farmer Mac), the European Stability Mechanism, the 
European Financial Stability Facility, a multilateral development bank 
(MDB), a depository institution, a bank holding company, a savings and 
loan holding company, a credit union, a foreign bank, or a qualifying 
central counterparty; or
    (2) An entity (other than a special purpose entity):
    (i) That at the time the guarantee is issued or anytime thereafter, 
has issued and outstanding an unsecured debt security without credit 
enhancement that is investment grade;
    (ii) Whose creditworthiness is not positively correlated with the 
credit risk of the exposures for which it has provided guarantees; and
    (iii) That is not an insurance company engaged predominately in the 
business of providing credit protection (such as a monoline bond 
insurer or re-insurer).
* * * * *
    International Lending Supervision Act means the International 
Lending Supervision Act of 1983 (12 U.S.C. 3901 et seq.).
* * * * *
    Investment in the capital of an unconsolidated financial 
institution means a net long position calculated in accordance with 
Sec.  217.22(h) in an instrument that is recognized as capital for 
regulatory purposes by the primary supervisor of an unconsolidated 
regulated financial institution or is an instrument that is part of the 
GAAP equity of an unconsolidated unregulated financial institution, 
including direct, indirect, and synthetic exposures to capital 
instruments, excluding underwriting positions held by the Board-
regulated institution for five or fewer business days.
* * * * *
    Non-significant investment in the capital of an unconsolidated 
financial institution means an investment by an advanced approaches 
Board-regulated institution in the capital of an unconsolidated 
financial institution where the advanced approaches Board-regulated 
institution owns 10 percent or less of the issued and outstanding 
common stock of the unconsolidated financial institution.
* * * * *
    Significant investment in the capital of an unconsolidated 
financial institution means an investment by an advanced approaches 
Board-regulated institution in the capital of an unconsolidated 
financial institution where the advanced approaches Board-regulated 
institution owns more than 10 percent of the issued and outstanding 
common stock of the unconsolidated financial institution.
* * * * *

0
27. Effective October 1, 2019, Sec.  217.10 is amended by revising 
paragraph (c)(4)(ii)(H) to read as follows:


Sec.  217.10   Minimum capital requirements.

* * * * *
    (c) * * *
    (4) * * *
    (ii) * * *
    (H) The credit equivalent amount of all off-balance sheet exposures 
of the Board-regulated institution, excluding repo-style transactions, 
repurchase or reverse repurchase or securities borrowing or lending 
transactions that qualify for sales treatment under U.S. GAAP, and 
derivative transactions, determined using the applicable credit 
conversion factor under Sec.  217.33(b), provided, however, that the 
minimum credit conversion factor that may be assigned to an off-balance 
sheet exposure under this paragraph is 10 percent; and
* * * * *

0
28. Effective October 1, 2019, Sec.  217.11 is amended by revising 
paragraphs (a)(2)(i) and (iv) and (a)(3)(i) and Table 1 to Sec.  217.11 
to read as follows:


Sec.  217.11   Capital conservation buffer, countercyclical capital 
buffer amount, and GSIB surcharge.

* * * * *
    (a) * * *
    (2) * * *
    (i) Eligible retained income. The eligible retained income of a 
Board-regulated institution is the Board-regulated institution's net 
income, calculated in accordance with the instructions to the Call 
Report or the FR Y-9C, as applicable, for the four calendar quarters 
preceding the current calendar quarter, net of any distributions and 
associated tax effects not already reflected in net income.
* * * * *
    (iv) Private sector credit exposure. Private sector credit exposure 
means an exposure to a company or an individual that is not an exposure 
to a sovereign, the Bank for International Settlements, the European 
Central Bank, the European Commission, the European Stability 
Mechanism, the European Financial Stability Facility, the International 
Monetary Fund, a MDB, a PSE, or a GSE.
* * * * *
    (3) * * *
    (i) A Board-regulated institution's capital conservation buffer is 
equal to the lowest of the following ratios, calculated as of the last 
day of the previous calendar quarter:

[[Page 35260]]

    (A) The Board-regulated institution's common equity tier 1 capital 
ratio minus the Board-regulated institution's minimum common equity 
tier 1 capital ratio requirement under Sec.  217.10;
    (B) The Board-regulated institution's tier 1 capital ratio minus 
the Board-regulated institution's minimum tier 1 capital ratio 
requirement under Sec.  217.10; and
    (C) The Board-regulated institution's total capital ratio minus the 
Board-regulated institution's minimum total capital ratio requirement 
under Sec.  217.10; or
* * * * *

                         Table 1 to Sec.   217.11--Calculation of Maximum Payout Amount
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
               Capital conservation buffer                                 Maximum payout ratio
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Greater than 2.5 percent plus 100 percent of the Board-   No payout ratio limitation applies.
 regulated institution's applicable countercyclical
 capital buffer amount and 100 percent of the Board-
 regulated institution's applicable GSIB surcharge.
Less than or equal to 2.5 percent plus 100 percent of     60 percent.
 the Board-regulated institution's applicable
 countercyclical capital buffer amount and 100 percent
 of the Board-regulated institution's applicable GSIB
 surcharge, and greater than 1.875 percent plus 75
 percent of the Board-regulated institution's applicable
 countercyclical capital buffer amount and 75 percent of
 the Board-regulated institution's applicable GSIB
 surcharge.
Less than or equal to 1.875 percent plus 75 percent of    40 percent.
 the Board-regulated institution's applicable
 countercyclical capital buffer amount and 75 percent of
 the Board-regulated institution's applicable GSIB
 surcharge, and greater than 1.25 percent plus 50
 percent of the Board-regulated institution's applicable
 countercyclical capital buffer amount and 50 percent of
 the Board-regulated institution's applicable GSIB
 surcharge.
Less than or equal to 1.25 percent plus 50 percent of     20 percent.
 the Board-regulated institution's applicable
 countercyclical capital buffer amount and 50 percent of
 the Board-regulated institution's applicable GSIB
 surcharge, and greater than 0.625 percent plus 25
 percent of the Board-regulated institution's applicable
 countercyclical capital buffer amount and 25 percent of
 the Board-regulated institution's applicable GSIB
 surcharge.
Less than or equal to 0.625 percent plus 25 percent of    0 percent.
 the Board-regulated institution's applicable
 countercyclical capital buffer amount and 25 percent of
 the Board-regulated institution's applicable GSIB
 surcharge.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

* * * * *

0
29. Effective October 1, 2019, Sec.  217.20 is amended by revising 
paragraphs (b)(1)(iii), (b)(4), (c)(2), and (d)(2) and (5) and adding 
paragraph (f) to read as follows:


Sec.  217.20   Capital components and eligibility criteria for 
regulatory capital instruments.

* * * * *
    (b) * * *
    (1) * * *
    (iii) The instrument has no maturity date, can only be redeemed via 
discretionary repurchases with the prior approval of the Board to the 
extent otherwise required by law or regulation, and does not contain 
any term or feature that creates an incentive to redeem;
* * * * *
    (4) Any common equity tier 1 minority interest, subject to the 
limitations in Sec.  217.21.
* * * * *
    (c) * * *
    (2) Tier 1 minority interest, subject to the limitations in Sec.  
217.21, that is not included in the Board-regulated institution's 
common equity tier 1 capital.
* * * * *
    (d) * * *
    (2) Total capital minority interest, subject to the limitations set 
forth in Sec.  217.21, that is not included in the Board-regulated 
institution's tier 1 capital.
* * * * *
    (5) For a Board-regulated institution that makes an AOCI opt-out 
election (as defined in paragraph (b)(2) of Sec.  217.22), 45 percent 
of pretax net unrealized gains on available-for-sale preferred stock 
classified as an equity security under GAAP and available-for-sale 
equity exposures.
* * * * *
    (f) A Board-regulated institution may not repurchase or redeem any 
common equity tier 1 capital, additional tier 1, or tier 2 capital 
instrument without the prior approval of the Board to the extent such 
prior approval is required by paragraph (b), (c), or (d) of this 
section, as applicable.

0
30. Effective April 1, 2020, Sec.  217.21 is revised to reads as 
follows:


Sec.  217.21   Minority interest.

    (a)(1) Applicability. For purposes of Sec.  217.20, a Board-
regulated institution that is not an advanced approaches Board-
regulated institution is subject to the minority interest limitations 
in this paragraph (a) if a consolidated subsidiary of the Board-
regulated institution has issued regulatory capital that is not owned 
by the Board-regulated institution.
    (2) Common equity tier 1 minority interest includable in the common 
equity tier 1 capital of the Board-regulated institution. The amount of 
common equity tier 1 minority interest that a Board-regulated 
institution may include in common equity tier 1 capital must be no 
greater than 10 percent of the sum of all common equity tier 1 capital 
elements of the Board-regulated institution (not including the common 
equity tier 1 minority interest itself), less any common equity tier 1 
capital regulatory adjustments and deductions in accordance with Sec.  
217.22 (a) and (b).
    (3) Tier 1 minority interest includable in the tier 1 capital of 
the Board-regulated institution. The amount of tier 1 minority interest 
that a Board-regulated institution may include in tier 1 capital must 
be no greater than 10 percent of the sum of all tier 1 capital elements 
of the Board-regulated institution (not including the tier 1 minority 
interest itself), less any tier 1 capital regulatory adjustments and 
deductions in accordance with Sec.  217.22(a) and (b).
    (4) Total capital minority interest includable in the total capital 
of the Board-regulated institution. The amount of total capital 
minority interest that a Board-regulated institution may include in 
total capital must be no greater than 10 percent of the sum of all 
total capital elements of the Board-regulated institution (not 
including the total capital minority interest itself), less any total 
capital regulatory adjustments and deductions in accordance with Sec.  
217.22(a) and (b).
    (b)(1) Applicability. For purposes of Sec.  217.20, an advanced 
approaches Board-regulated institution is subject to the minority 
interest limitations in this paragraph (b) if:
    (i) A consolidated subsidiary of the advanced approaches Board-
regulated institution has issued regulatory capital that is not owned 
by the Board-regulated institution; and

[[Page 35261]]

    (ii) For each relevant regulatory capital ratio of the consolidated 
subsidiary, the ratio exceeds the sum of the subsidiary's minimum 
regulatory capital requirements plus its capital conservation buffer.
    (2) Difference in capital adequacy standards at the subsidiary 
level. For purposes of the minority interest calculations in this 
section, if the consolidated subsidiary issuing the capital is not 
subject to capital adequacy standards similar to those of the advanced 
approaches Board-regulated institution, the advanced approaches Board-
regulated institution must assume that the capital adequacy standards 
of the advanced approaches Board-regulated institution apply to the 
subsidiary.
    (3) Common equity tier 1 minority interest includable in the common 
equity tier 1 capital of the Board-regulated institution. For each 
consolidated subsidiary of an advanced approaches Board-regulated 
institution, the amount of common equity tier 1 minority interest the 
advanced approaches Board-regulated institution may include in common 
equity tier 1 capital is equal to:
    (i) The common equity tier 1 minority interest of the subsidiary; 
minus
    (ii) The percentage of the subsidiary's common equity tier 1 
capital that is not owned by the advanced approaches Board-regulated 
institution, multiplied by the difference between the common equity 
tier 1 capital of the subsidiary and the lower of:
    (A) The amount of common equity tier 1 capital the subsidiary must 
hold, or would be required to hold pursuant this paragraph (b), to 
avoid restrictions on distributions and discretionary bonus payments 
under Sec.  217.11 or equivalent standards established by the 
subsidiary's home country supervisor; or
    (B)(1) The standardized total risk-weighted assets of the advanced 
approaches Board-regulated institution that relate to the subsidiary 
multiplied by
    (2) The common equity tier 1 capital ratio the subsidiary must 
maintain to avoid restrictions on distributions and discretionary bonus 
payments under Sec.  217.11 or equivalent standards established by the 
subsidiary's home country supervisor.
    (4) Tier 1 minority interest includable in the tier 1 capital of 
the advanced approaches Board-regulated institution. For each 
consolidated subsidiary of the advanced approaches Board-regulated 
institution, the amount of tier 1 minority interest the advanced 
approaches Board-regulated institution may include in tier 1 capital is 
equal to:
    (i) The tier 1 minority interest of the subsidiary; minus
    (ii) The percentage of the subsidiary's tier 1 capital that is not 
owned by the advanced approaches Board-regulated institution multiplied 
by the difference between the tier 1 capital of the subsidiary and the 
lower of:
    (A) The amount of tier 1 capital the subsidiary must hold, or would 
be required to hold pursuant to this paragraph (b), to avoid 
restrictions on distributions and discretionary bonus payments under 
Sec.  217.11 or equivalent standards established by the subsidiary's 
home country supervisor, or
    (B)(1) The standardized total risk-weighted assets of the advanced 
approaches Board-regulated institution that relate to the subsidiary 
multiplied by
    (2) The tier 1 capital ratio the subsidiary must maintain to avoid 
restrictions on distributions and discretionary bonus payments under 
Sec.  217.11 or equivalent standards established by the subsidiary's 
home country supervisor.
    (5) Total capital minority interest includable in the total capital 
of the Board-regulated institution. For each consolidated subsidiary of 
the advanced approaches Board-regulated institution, the amount of 
total capital minority interest the advanced approaches Board-regulated 
institution may include in total capital is equal to:
    (i) The total capital minority interest of the subsidiary; minus
    (ii) The percentage of the subsidiary's total capital that is not 
owned by the advanced approaches Board-regulated institution multiplied 
by the difference between the total capital of the subsidiary and the 
lower of:
    (A) The amount of total capital the subsidiary must hold, or would 
be required to hold pursuant to this paragraph (b), to avoid 
restrictions on distributions and discretionary bonus payments under 
Sec.  217.11 or equivalent standards established by the subsidiary's 
home country supervisor, or
    (B)(1) The standardized total risk-weighted assets of the advanced 
approaches Board-regulated institution that relate to the subsidiary 
multiplied by
    (2) The total capital ratio the subsidiary must maintain to avoid 
restrictions on distributions and discretionary bonus payments under 
Sec.  217.11 or equivalent standards established by the subsidiary's 
home country supervisor.

0
31. Effective April 1, 2020, Sec.  217.22 is amended by revising 
paragraphs (a)(1)(i), (c), (d), (g), and (h) to read as follows:


Sec.  217.22   Regulatory capital adjustments and deductions.

    (a) * * *
    (1) * * *
    (i) Goodwill, net of associated deferred tax liabilities (DTLs) in 
accordance with paragraph (e) of this section; and
    (ii) For an advanced approaches Board-regulated institution, 
goodwill that is embedded in the valuation of a significant investment 
in the capital of an unconsolidated financial institution in the form 
of common stock (and that is reflected in the consolidated financial 
statements of the advanced approaches Board-regulated institution), in 
accordance with paragraph (d) of this section;
* * * * *
    (c) Deductions from regulatory capital related to investments in 
capital instruments \23\--(1) Investment in the Board-regulated 
institution's own capital instruments. A Board-regulated institution 
must deduct an investment in the Board-regulated institution's own 
capital instruments as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \23\ The Board-regulated institution must calculate amounts 
deducted under paragraphs (c) through (f) of this section after it 
calculates the amount of ALLL or AACL, as applicable, includable in 
tier 2 capital under Sec.  217.20(d)(3).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (i) A Board-regulated institution must deduct an investment in the 
Board-regulated institution's own common stock instruments from its 
common equity tier 1 capital elements to the extent such instruments 
are not excluded from regulatory capital under Sec.  217.20(b)(1);
    (ii) A Board-regulated institution must deduct an investment in the 
Board-regulated institution's own additional tier 1 capital instruments 
from its additional tier 1 capital elements; and
    (iii) A Board-regulated institution must deduct an investment in 
the Board-regulated institution's own tier 2 capital instruments from 
its tier 2 capital elements.
    (2) Corresponding deduction approach. For purposes of subpart C of 
this part, the corresponding deduction approach is the methodology used 
for the deductions from regulatory capital related to reciprocal cross 
holdings (as described in paragraph (c)(3) of this section), 
investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial institutions for 
a Board-regulated institution that is not an advanced approaches Board-
regulated institution (as described in paragraph (c)(4) of this 
section), non-

[[Page 35262]]

significant investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial 
institutions for an advanced approaches Board-regulated institution (as 
described in paragraph (c)(5) of this section), and non-common stock 
significant investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial 
institutions for an advanced approaches Board-regulated institution (as 
described in paragraph (c)(6) of this section). Under the corresponding 
deduction approach, a Board-regulated institution must make deductions 
from the component of capital for which the underlying instrument would 
qualify if it were issued by the Board-regulated institution itself, as 
described in paragraphs (c)(2)(i) through (iii) of this section. If the 
Board-regulated institution does not have a sufficient amount of a 
specific component of capital to effect the required deduction, the 
shortfall must be deducted according to paragraph (f) of this section.
    (i) If an investment is in the form of an instrument issued by a 
financial institution that is not a regulated financial institution, 
the Board-regulated institution must treat the instrument as:
    (A) A common equity tier 1 capital instrument if it is common stock 
or represents the most subordinated claim in liquidation of the 
financial institution; and
    (B) An additional tier 1 capital instrument if it is subordinated 
to all creditors of the financial institution and is senior in 
liquidation only to common shareholders.
    (ii) If an investment is in the form of an instrument issued by a 
regulated financial institution and the instrument does not meet the 
criteria for common equity tier 1, additional tier 1 or tier 2 capital 
instruments under Sec.  217.20, the Board-regulated institution must 
treat the instrument as:
    (A) A common equity tier 1 capital instrument if it is common stock 
included in GAAP equity or represents the most subordinated claim in 
liquidation of the financial institution;
    (B) An additional tier 1 capital instrument if it is included in 
GAAP equity, subordinated to all creditors of the financial 
institution, and senior in a receivership, insolvency, liquidation, or 
similar proceeding only to common shareholders; and
    (C) A tier 2 capital instrument if it is not included in GAAP 
equity but considered regulatory capital by the primary supervisor of 
the financial institution.
    (iii) If an investment is in the form of a non-qualifying capital 
instrument (as defined in Sec.  217.300(c)), the Board-regulated 
institution must treat the instrument as:
    (A) An additional tier 1 capital instrument if such instrument was 
included in the issuer's tier 1 capital prior to May 19, 2010; or
    (B) A tier 2 capital instrument if such instrument was included in 
the issuer's tier 2 capital (but not includable in tier 1 capital) 
prior to May 19, 2010.
    (3) Reciprocal cross holdings in the capital of financial 
institutions. A Board-regulated institution must deduct investments in 
the capital of other financial institutions it holds reciprocally, 
where such reciprocal cross holdings result from a formal or informal 
arrangement to swap, exchange, or otherwise intend to hold each other's 
capital instruments, by applying the corresponding deduction approach.
    (4) Investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial 
institutions. A Board-regulated institution that is not an advanced 
approaches Board-regulated institution must deduct its investments in 
the capital of unconsolidated financial institutions (as defined in 
Sec.  217.2) that exceed 25 percent of the sum of the Board-regulated 
institution's common equity tier 1 capital elements minus all 
deductions from and adjustments to common equity tier 1 capital 
elements required under paragraphs (a) through (c)(3) of this section 
by applying the corresponding deduction approach.\24\ The deductions 
described in this section are net of associated DTLs in accordance with 
paragraph (e) of this section. In addition, a Board-regulated 
institution that underwrites a failed underwriting, with the prior 
written approval of the Board, for the period of time stipulated by the 
Board, is not required to deduct an investment in the capital of an 
unconsolidated financial institution pursuant to this paragraph (c) to 
the extent the investment is related to the failed underwriting.\25\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \24\ With the prior written approval of the Board, for the 
period of time stipulated by the Board, a Board-regulated 
institution that is not an advanced approaches Board-regulated 
institution is not required to deduct an investment in the capital 
of an unconsolidated financial institution pursuant to this 
paragraph if the financial institution is in distress and if such 
investment is made for the purpose of providing financial support to 
the financial institution, as determined by the Board.
    \25\ Any investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial 
institutions that do not exceed the 25 percent threshold for 
investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial institutions 
under this section must be assigned the appropriate risk weight 
under subparts D or F of this part, as applicable.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (5) Non-significant investments in the capital of unconsolidated 
financial institutions. (i) An advanced approaches Board-regulated 
institution must deduct its non-significant investments in the capital 
of unconsolidated financial institutions (as defined in Sec.  217.2) 
that, in the aggregate, exceed 10 percent of the sum of the advanced 
approaches Board-regulated institution's common equity tier 1 capital 
elements minus all deductions from and adjustments to common equity 
tier 1 capital elements required under paragraphs (a) through (c)(3) of 
this section (the 10 percent threshold for non-significant investments) 
by applying the corresponding deduction approach.\26\ The deductions 
described in this section are net of associated DTLs in accordance with 
paragraph (e) of this section. In addition, an advanced approaches 
Board-regulated institution that underwrites a failed underwriting, 
with the prior written approval of the Board, for the period of time 
stipulated by the Board, is not required to deduct a non-significant 
investment in the capital of an unconsolidated financial institution 
pursuant to this paragraph (c) to the extent the investment is related 
to the failed underwriting.\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \26\ With the prior written approval of the Board, for the 
period of time stipulated by the Board, an advanced approaches 
Board-regulated institution is not required to deduct a non-
significant investment in the capital of an unconsolidated financial 
institution pursuant to this paragraph if the financial institution 
is in distress and if such investment is made for the purpose of 
providing financial support to the financial institution, as 
determined by the Board.
    \27\ Any non-significant investments in the capital of 
unconsolidated financial institutions that do not exceed the 10 
percent threshold for non-significant investments under this section 
must be assigned the appropriate risk weight under subparts D, E, or 
F of this part, as applicable.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (ii) The amount to be deducted under this section from a specific 
capital component is equal to:
    (A) The advanced approaches Board-regulated institution's non-
significant investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial 
institutions exceeding the 10 percent threshold for non-significant 
investments, multiplied by
    (B) The ratio of the advanced approaches Board-regulated 
institution's non-significant investments in the capital of 
unconsolidated financial institutions in the form of such capital 
component to the advanced approaches Board-regulated institution's 
total non-significant investments in unconsolidated financial 
institutions.
    (6) Significant investments in the capital of unconsolidated 
financial institutions that are not in the form of common stock. An 
advanced approaches Board-regulated institution must deduct its 
significant investments

[[Page 35263]]

in the capital of unconsolidated financial institutions that are not in 
the form of common stock by applying the corresponding deduction 
approach.\28\ The deductions described in this section are net of 
associated DTLs in accordance with paragraph (e) of this section. In 
addition, with the prior written approval of the Board, for the period 
of time stipulated by the Board, an advanced approaches Board-regulated 
institution that underwrites a failed underwriting is not required to 
deduct a significant investment in the capital of an unconsolidated 
financial institution pursuant to this paragraph (c) if such investment 
is related to such failed underwriting.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \28\ With prior written approval of the Board, for the period of 
time stipulated by the Board, an advanced approaches Board-regulated 
institution is not required to deduct a significant investment in 
the capital instrument of an unconsolidated financial institution in 
distress which is not in the form of common stock pursuant to this 
section if such investment is made for the purpose of providing 
financial support to the financial institution as determined by the 
Board.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (d) MSAs and certain DTAs subject to common equity tier 1 capital 
deduction thresholds. (1) A Board-regulated institution that is not an 
advanced approaches Board-regulated institution must make deductions 
from regulatory capital as described in this paragraph (d)(1).
    (i) The Board-regulated institution must deduct from common equity 
tier 1 capital elements the amount of each of the items set forth in 
this paragraph (d)(1) that, individually, exceeds 25 percent of the sum 
of the Board-regulated institution's common equity tier 1 capital 
elements, less adjustments to and deductions from common equity tier 1 
capital required under paragraphs (a) through (c)(3) of this section 
(the 25 percent common equity tier 1 capital deduction threshold).\29\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \29\ The amount of the items in paragraph (d)(1) of this section 
that is not deducted from common equity tier 1 capital must be 
included in the risk-weighted assets of the Board-regulated 
institution and assigned a 250 percent risk weight.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (ii) The Board-regulated institution must deduct from common equity 
tier 1 capital elements the amount of DTAs arising from temporary 
differences that the Board-regulated institution could not realize 
through net operating loss carrybacks, net of any related valuation 
allowances and net of DTLs, in accordance with paragraph (e) of this 
section. A Board-regulated institution is not required to deduct from 
the sum of its common equity tier 1 capital elements DTAs (net of any 
related valuation allowances and net of DTLs, in accordance with Sec.  
217.22(e)) arising from timing differences that the Board-regulated 
institution could realize through net operating loss carrybacks. The 
Board-regulated institution must risk weight these assets at 100 
percent. For a state member bank that is a member of a consolidated 
group for tax purposes, the amount of DTAs that could be realized 
through net operating loss carrybacks may not exceed the amount that 
the state member bank could reasonably expect to have refunded by its 
parent holding company.
    (iii) The Board-regulated institution must deduct from common 
equity tier 1 capital elements the amount of MSAs net of associated 
DTLs, in accordance with paragraph (e) of this section.
    (iv) For purposes of calculating the amount of DTAs subject to 
deduction pursuant to paragraph (d)(1) of this section, a Board-
regulated institution may exclude DTAs and DTLs relating to adjustments 
made to common equity tier 1 capital under paragraph (b) of this 
section. A Board-regulated institution that elects to exclude DTAs 
relating to adjustments under paragraph (b) of this section also must 
exclude DTLs and must do so consistently in all future calculations. A 
Board-regulated institution may change its exclusion preference only 
after obtaining the prior approval of the Board.
    (2) An advanced approaches Board-regulated institution must make 
deductions from regulatory capital as described in this paragraph 
(d)(2).
    (i) An advanced approaches Board-regulated institution must deduct 
from common equity tier 1 capital elements the amount of each of the 
items set forth in this paragraph (d)(2) that, individually, exceeds 10 
percent of the sum of the advanced approaches Board-regulated 
institution's common equity tier 1 capital elements, less adjustments 
to and deductions from common equity tier 1 capital required under 
paragraphs (a) through (c) of this section (the 10 percent common 
equity tier 1 capital deduction threshold).
    (A) DTAs arising from temporary differences that the advanced 
approaches Board-regulated institution could not realize through net 
operating loss carrybacks, net of any related valuation allowances and 
net of DTLs, in accordance with paragraph (e) of this section. An 
advanced approaches Board-regulated institution is not required to 
deduct from the sum of its common equity tier 1 capital elements DTAs 
(net of any related valuation allowances and net of DTLs, in accordance 
with Sec.  217.22(e)) arising from timing differences that the advanced 
approaches Board-regulated institution could realize through net 
operating loss carrybacks. The advanced approaches Board-regulated 
institution must risk weight these assets at 100 percent. For a state 
member bank that is a member of a consolidated group for tax purposes, 
the amount of DTAs that could be realized through net operating loss 
carrybacks may not exceed the amount that the state member bank could 
reasonably expect to have refunded by its parent holding company.
    (B) MSAs net of associated DTLs, in accordance with paragraph (e) 
of this section.
    (C) Significant investments in the capital of unconsolidated 
financial institutions in the form of common stock, net of associated 
DTLs in accordance with paragraph (e) of this section.\30\ Significant 
investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial institutions in 
the form of common stock subject to the 10 percent common equity tier 1 
capital deduction threshold may be reduced by any goodwill embedded in 
the valuation of such investments deducted by the advanced approaches 
Board-regulated institution pursuant to paragraph (a)(1) of this 
section. In addition, with the prior written approval of the Board, for 
the period of time stipulated by the Board, an advanced approaches 
Board-regulated institution that underwrites a failed underwriting is 
not required to deduct a significant investment in the capital of an 
unconsolidated financial institution in the form of common stock 
pursuant to this paragraph (d)(2) if such investment is related to such 
failed underwriting.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \30\ With the prior written approval of the Board, for the 
period of time stipulated by the Board, an advanced approaches 
Board-regulated institution is not required to deduct a significant 
investment in the capital instrument of an unconsolidated financial 
institution in distress in the form of common stock pursuant to this 
section if such investment is made for the purpose of providing 
financial support to the financial institution as determined by the 
Board.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (ii) An advanced approaches Board-regulated institution must deduct 
from common equity tier 1 capital elements the items listed in 
paragraph (d)(2)(i) of this section that are not deducted as a result 
of the application of the 10 percent common equity tier 1 capital 
deduction threshold, and that, in aggregate, exceed 17.65 percent of 
the sum of the advanced approaches Board-regulated institution's common 
equity tier 1 capital elements, minus adjustments to and deductions 
from common equity tier 1 capital required under paragraphs (a) through 
(c) of this section, minus the items listed in paragraph (d)(2)(i) of 
this section (the 15 percent common equity tier 1 capital

[[Page 35264]]

deduction threshold). Any goodwill that has been deducted under 
paragraph (a)(1) of this section can be excluded from the significant 
investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial institutions in 
the form of common stock.\31\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \31\ The amount of the items in paragraph (d)(2) of this section 
that is not deducted from common equity tier 1 capital pursuant to 
this section must be included in the risk-weighted assets of the 
advanced approaches Board-regulated institution and assigned a 250 
percent risk weight.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (iii) For purposes of calculating the amount of DTAs subject to the 
10 and 15 percent common equity tier 1 capital deduction thresholds, an 
advanced approaches Board-regulated institution may exclude DTAs and 
DTLs relating to adjustments made to common equity tier 1 capital under 
paragraph (b) of this section. An advanced approaches Board-regulated 
institution that elects to exclude DTAs relating to adjustments under 
paragraph (b) of this section also must exclude DTLs and must do so 
consistently in all future calculations. An advanced approaches Board-
regulated institution may change its exclusion preference only after 
obtaining the prior approval of the Board.
* * * * *
    (g) Treatment of assets that are deducted. A Board-regulated 
institution must exclude from standardized total risk-weighted assets 
and, as applicable, advanced approaches total risk-weighted assets any 
item that is required to be deducted from regulatory capital.
    (h) Net long position. (1) For purposes of calculating an 
investment in the Board-regulated institution's own capital instrument 
and an investment in the capital of an unconsolidated financial 
institution under this section, the net long position is the gross long 
position in the underlying instrument determined in accordance with 
paragraph (h)(2) of this section, as adjusted to recognize a short 
position in the same instrument calculated in accordance with paragraph 
(h)(3) of this section.
    (2) Gross long position. The gross long position is determined as 
follows:
    (i) For an equity exposure that is held directly, the adjusted 
carrying value as that term is defined in Sec.  217.51(b);
    (ii) For an exposure that is held directly and is not an equity 
exposure or a securitization exposure, the exposure amount as that term 
is defined in Sec.  217.2;
    (iii) For an indirect exposure, the Board-regulated institution's 
carrying value of the investment in the investment fund, provided that, 
alternatively:
    (A) A Board-regulated institution may, with the prior approval of 
the Board, use a conservative estimate of the amount of its investment 
in the Board-regulated institution's own capital instruments or its 
investment in the capital of an unconsolidated financial institution 
held through a position in an index; or
    (B) A Board-regulated institution may calculate the gross long 
position for investments in the Board-regulated institution's own 
capital instruments or investments in the capital of an unconsolidated 
financial institution by multiplying the Board-regulated institution's 
carrying value of its investment in the investment fund by either:
    (1) The highest stated investment limit (in percent) for 
investments in the Board-regulated institution's own capital 
instruments or investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial 
institutions as stated in the prospectus, partnership agreement, or 
similar contract defining permissible investments of the investment 
fund; or
    (2) The investment fund's actual holdings of investments in the 
Board-regulated institution's own capital instruments or investments in 
the capital of unconsolidated financial institutions.
    (iv) For a synthetic exposure, the amount of the Board-regulated 
institution's loss on the exposure if the reference capital instrument 
were to have a value of zero.
    (3) Adjustments to reflect a short position. In order to adjust the 
gross long position to recognize a short position in the same 
instrument, the following criteria must be met:
    (i) The maturity of the short position must match the maturity of 
the long position, or the short position has a residual maturity of at 
least one year (maturity requirement); or
    (ii) For a position that is a trading asset or trading liability 
(whether on- or off-balance sheet) as reported on the Board-regulated 
institution's Call Report, for a state member bank, or FR Y-9C, for a 
bank holding company or savings and loan holding company, as 
applicable, if the Board-regulated institution has a contractual right 
or obligation to sell the long position at a specific point in time and 
the counterparty to the contract has an obligation to purchase the long 
position if the Board-regulated institution exercises its right to 
sell, this point in time may be treated as the maturity of the long 
position such that the maturity of the long position and short position 
are deemed to match for purposes of the maturity requirement, even if 
the maturity of the short position is less than one year; and
    (iii) For an investment in the Board-regulated institution's own 
capital instrument under paragraph (c)(1) of this section or an 
investment in the capital of an unconsolidated financial institution 
under paragraphs (c) and (d) of this section:
    (A) A Board-regulated institution may only net a short position 
against a long position in an investment in the Board-regulated 
institution's own capital instrument under paragraph (c) of this 
section if the short position involves no counterparty credit risk.
    (B) A gross long position in an investment in the Board-regulated 
institution's own capital instrument or an investment in the capital of 
an unconsolidated financial institution resulting from a position in an 
index may be netted against a short position in the same index. Long 
and short positions in the same index without maturity dates are 
considered to have matching maturities.
    (C) A short position in an index that is hedging a long cash or 
synthetic position in an investment in the Board-regulated 
institution's own capital instrument or an investment in the capital of 
an unconsolidated financial institution can be decomposed to provide 
recognition of the hedge. More specifically, the portion of the index 
that is composed of the same underlying instrument that is being hedged 
may be used to offset the long position if both the long position being 
hedged and the short position in the index are reported as a trading 
asset or trading liability (whether on- or off-balance sheet) on the 
Board-regulated institution's Call Report, for a state member bank, or 
FR Y-9C, for a bank holding company or savings and loan holding 
company, as applicable, and the hedge is deemed effective by the Board-
regulated institution's internal control processes, which have not been 
found to be inadequate by the Board.

0
32. Effective October 1, 2019, Sec.  217.32 is amended by revising 
paragraphs (b), (d)(2), (d)(3)(ii), (k), and (l) to read as follows:


Sec.  217.32   General risk weights.

* * * * *
    (b) Certain supranational entities and multilateral development 
banks (MDBs). A Board-regulated institution must assign a zero percent 
risk weight to an exposure to the Bank for International Settlements, 
the European Central Bank, the European Commission, the International 
Monetary Fund, the

[[Page 35265]]

European Stability Mechanism, the European Financial Stability 
Facility, or an MDB.
* * * * *
    (d) * * *
    (2) Exposures to foreign banks. (i) Except as otherwise provided 
under paragraphs (d)(2)(iii), (d)(2)(v), and (d)(3) of this section, a 
Board-regulated institution must assign a risk weight to an exposure to 
a foreign bank, in accordance with Table 2 to Sec.  217.32, based on 
the CRC that corresponds to the foreign bank's home country or the OECD 
membership status of the foreign bank's home country if there is no CRC 
applicable to the foreign bank's home country.

  Table 2 to Sec.   217.32--Risk Weights for Exposures to Foreign Banks
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                            Risk weight
                                                           (in percent)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
CRC:
  0-1...................................................              20
  2.....................................................              50
  3.....................................................             100
  4-7...................................................             150
OECD Member with No CRC.................................              20
Non-OECD Member with No CRC.............................             100
Sovereign Default.......................................             150
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (ii) A Board-regulated institution must assign a 20 percent risk 
weight to an exposure to a foreign bank whose home country is a member 
of the OECD and does not have a CRC.
    (iii) A Board-regulated institution must assign a 20 percent risk-
weight to an exposure that is a self-liquidating, trade-related 
contingent item that arises from the movement of goods and that has a 
maturity of three months or less to a foreign bank whose home country 
has a CRC of 0, 1, 2, or 3, or is an OECD member with no CRC.
    (iv) A Board-regulated institution must assign a 100 percent risk 
weight to an exposure to a foreign bank whose home country is not a 
member of the OECD and does not have a CRC, with the exception of self-
liquidating, trade-related contingent items that arise from the 
movement of goods, and that have a maturity of three months or less, 
which may be assigned a 20 percent risk weight.
    (v) A Board-regulated institution must assign a 150 percent risk 
weight to an exposure to a foreign bank immediately upon determining 
that an event of sovereign default has occurred in the bank's home 
country, or if an event of sovereign default has occurred in the 
foreign bank's home country during the previous five years.
    (3) * * *
    (ii) A significant investment in the capital of an unconsolidated 
financial institution in the form of common stock pursuant to Sec.  
217.22(d)(2)(i)(c);
* * * * *
    (k) Past due exposures. Except for an exposure to a sovereign 
entity or a residential mortgage exposure or a policy loan, if an 
exposure is 90 days or more past due or on nonaccrual:
    (1) A Board-regulated institution must assign a 150 percent risk 
weight to the portion of the exposure that is not guaranteed or that is 
unsecured;
    (2) A Board-regulated institution may assign a risk weight to the 
guaranteed portion of a past due exposure based on the risk weight that 
applies under Sec.  217.36 if the guarantee or credit derivative meets 
the requirements of that section; and
    (3) A Board-regulated institution may assign a risk weight to the 
collateralized portion of a past due exposure based on the risk weight 
that applies under Sec.  217.37 if the collateral meets the 
requirements of that section.
    (l) Other assets. (1)(i) A bank holding company or savings and loan 
holding company must assign a zero percent risk weight to cash owned 
and held in all offices of subsidiary depository institutions or in 
transit, and to gold bullion held in a subsidiary depository 
institution's own vaults, or held in another depository institution's 
vaults on an allocated basis, to the extent the gold bullion assets are 
offset by gold bullion liabilities.
    (ii) A state member bank must assign a zero percent risk weight to 
cash owned and held in all offices of the state member bank or in 
transit; to gold bullion held in the state member bank's own vaults or 
held in another depository institution's vaults on an allocated basis, 
to the extent the gold bullion assets are offset by gold bullion 
liabilities; and to exposures that arise from the settlement of cash 
transactions (such as equities, fixed income, spot foreign exchange and 
spot commodities) with a central counterparty where there is no 
assumption of ongoing counterparty credit risk by the central 
counterparty after settlement of the trade and associated default fund 
contributions.
    (2) A Board-regulated institution must assign a 20 percent risk 
weight to cash items in the process of collection.
    (3) A Board-regulated institution must assign a 100 percent risk 
weight to DTAs arising from temporary differences that the Board-
regulated institution could realize through net operating loss 
carrybacks.
    (4) A Board-regulated institution must assign a 250 percent risk 
weight to the portion of each of the following items to the extent it 
is not deducted from common equity tier 1 capital pursuant to Sec.  
217.22(d):
    (i) MSAs; and
    (ii) DTAs arising from temporary differences that the Board-
regulated institution could not realize through net operating loss 
carrybacks.
    (5) A Board-regulated institution must assign a 100 percent risk 
weight to all assets not specifically assigned a different risk weight 
under this subpart and that are not deducted from tier 1 or tier 2 
capital pursuant to Sec.  217.22.
    (6) Notwithstanding the requirements of this section, a state 
member bank may assign an asset that is not included in one of the 
categories provided in this section to the risk weight category 
applicable under the capital rules applicable to bank holding companies 
and savings and loan holding companies under this part, provided that 
all of the following conditions apply:
    (i) The Board-regulated institution is not authorized to hold the 
asset under applicable law other than debt previously contracted or 
similar authority; and
    (ii) The risks associated with the asset are substantially similar 
to the risks of assets that are otherwise assigned to a risk weight 
category of less than 100 percent under this subpart.
* * * * *

0
 33. Effective October 1, 2019, Sec.  217.34 is amended by revising 
paragraph (c) to read as follows:


Sec.  217.34   OTC derivative contracts.

* * * * *
    (c) Counterparty credit risk for OTC credit derivatives--(1) 
Protection purchasers. A Board-regulated institution that purchases an 
OTC credit derivative that is recognized under Sec.  217.36 as a credit 
risk mitigant for an exposure that is not a covered position under 
subpart F is not required to compute a separate counterparty credit 
risk capital requirement under this subpart D provided that the Board-
regulated institution does so consistently for all such credit 
derivatives. The Board-regulated institution must either include all or 
exclude all such credit derivatives that are subject to a qualifying 
master netting agreement from any measure used to determine 
counterparty credit risk exposure to all relevant counterparties for 
risk-based capital purposes.
    (2) Protection providers. (i) A Board-regulated institution that is 
the protection provider under an OTC credit derivative must treat the 
OTC credit

[[Page 35266]]

derivative as an exposure to the underlying reference asset. The Board-
regulated institution is not required to compute a counterparty credit 
risk capital requirement for the OTC credit derivative under this 
subpart D, provided that this treatment is applied consistently for all 
such OTC credit derivatives. The Board-regulated institution must 
either include all or exclude all such OTC credit derivatives that are 
subject to a qualifying master netting agreement from any measure used 
to determine counterparty credit risk exposure.
    (ii) The provisions of this paragraph (c)(2) apply to all relevant 
counterparties for risk-based capital purposes unless the Board-
regulated institution is treating the OTC credit derivative as a 
covered position under subpart F, in which case the Board-regulated 
institution must compute a supplemental counterparty credit risk 
capital requirement under this section.
* * * * *

0
34. Effective October 1, 2019, Sec.  217.35 is amended by revising 
paragraphs (b)(3)(ii), (b)(4)(ii), (c)(3)(ii), and (c)(4)(ii) to read 
as follows:


Sec.  217.35   Cleared transactions.

* * * * *
    (b) * * *
    (3) * * *
    (ii) For a cleared transaction with a CCP that is not a QCCP, a 
clearing member client Board-regulated institution must apply the risk 
weight appropriate for the CCP according to this subpart D.
    (4) * * *
    (ii) A clearing member client Board-regulated institution must 
calculate a risk-weighted asset amount for any collateral provided to a 
CCP, clearing member, or custodian in connection with a cleared 
transaction in accordance with the requirements under this subpart D.
    (c) * * *
    (3) * * *
    (ii) For a cleared transaction with a CCP that is not a QCCP, a 
clearing member Board-regulated institution must apply the risk weight 
appropriate for the CCP according to this subpart D.
    (4) * * *
    (ii) A clearing member Board-regulated institution must calculate a 
risk-weighted asset amount for any collateral provided to a CCP, 
clearing member, or a custodian in connection with a cleared 
transaction in accordance with requirements under this subpart D.
* * * * *

0
35. Effective October 1, 2019, Sec.  217.36 is amended by revising 
paragraph (c) to read as follows:


Sec.  217.36   Guarantees and credit derivatives: substitution 
treatment.

* * * * *
    (c) Substitution approach--(1) Full coverage. If an eligible 
guarantee or eligible credit derivative meets the conditions in 
paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section and the protection amount (P) of 
the guarantee or credit derivative is greater than or equal to the 
exposure amount of the hedged exposure, a Board-regulated institution 
may recognize the guarantee or credit derivative in determining the 
risk-weighted asset amount for the hedged exposure by substituting the 
risk weight applicable to the guarantor or credit derivative protection 
provider under this subpart D for the risk weight assigned to the 
exposure.
    (2) Partial coverage. If an eligible guarantee or eligible credit 
derivative meets the conditions in paragraphs (a) and (b) of this 
section and the protection amount (P) of the guarantee or credit 
derivative is less than the exposure amount of the hedged exposure, the 
Board-regulated institution must treat the hedged exposure as two 
separate exposures (protected and unprotected) in order to recognize 
the credit risk mitigation benefit of the guarantee or credit 
derivative.
    (i) The Board-regulated institution may calculate the risk-weighted 
asset amount for the protected exposure under this subpart D, where the 
applicable risk weight is the risk weight applicable to the guarantor 
or credit derivative protection provider.
    (ii) The Board-regulated institution must calculate the risk-
weighted asset amount for the unprotected exposure under this subpart 
D, where the applicable risk weight is that of the unprotected portion 
of the hedged exposure.
    (iii) The treatment provided in this section is applicable when the 
credit risk of an exposure is covered on a partial pro rata basis and 
may be applicable when an adjustment is made to the effective notional 
amount of the guarantee or credit derivative under paragraphs (d), (e), 
or (f) of this section.
* * * * *

0
36. Effective October 1, 2019, Sec.  217.37 is amended by revising 
paragraph (b)(2)(i) to read as follows:


Sec.  217.37   Collateralized transactions.

* * * * *
    (b) * * *
    (2) * * *
    (i) A Board-regulated institution may apply a risk weight to the 
portion of an exposure that is secured by the fair value of financial 
collateral (that meets the requirements of paragraph (b)(1) of this 
section) based on the risk weight assigned to the collateral under this 
subpart D. For repurchase agreements, reverse repurchase agreements, 
and securities lending and borrowing transactions, the collateral is 
the instruments, gold, and cash the Board-regulated institution has 
borrowed, purchased subject to resale, or taken as collateral from the 
counterparty under the transaction. Except as provided in paragraph 
(b)(3) of this section, the risk weight assigned to the collateralized 
portion of the exposure may not be less than 20 percent.
* * * * *

0
 37. Effective October 1, 2019, Sec.  217.38 is amended by revising 
paragraph (e)(2) to read as follows:


Sec.  217.38   Unsettled transactions.

* * * * *
    (e) * * *
    (2) From the business day after the Board-regulated institution has 
made its delivery until five business days after the counterparty 
delivery is due, the Board-regulated institution must calculate the 
risk-weighted asset amount for the transaction by treating the current 
fair value of the deliverables owed to the Board-regulated institution 
as an exposure to the counterparty and using the applicable 
counterparty risk weight under this subpart D.
* * * * *

0
38. Effective October 1, 2019, Sec.  217.42 is amended by revising 
paragraph (j)(2)(ii)(A) to read as follows:


Sec.  217.42   Risk-weighted assets for securitization exposures.

* * * * *
    (j) * * *
    (2) * * *
    (ii) * * *
    (A) If the Board-regulated institution purchases credit protection 
from a counterparty that is not a securitization SPE, the Board-
regulated institution must determine the risk weight for the exposure 
according to this subpart D.
* * * * *

0
39. Effective October 1, 2019, Sec.  217.52 is amended by revising 
paragraphs (b)(1) and (4) to read as follows:


Sec.  217.52   Simple risk-weight approach (SRWA).

* * * * *
    (b) * * *
    (1) Zero percent risk weight equity exposures. An equity exposure 
to a sovereign, the Bank for International Settlements, the European 
Central Bank, the European Commission, the International Monetary Fund, 
the

[[Page 35267]]

European Stability Mechanism, the European Financial Stability 
Facility, an MDB, and any other entity whose credit exposures receive a 
zero percent risk weight under Sec.  217.32 may be assigned a zero 
percent risk weight.
* * * * *
    (4) 250 percent risk weight equity exposures. Significant 
investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial institutions in 
the form of common stock that are not deducted from capital pursuant to 
Sec.  217.22(d)(2) are assigned a 250 percent risk weight.
* * * * *

0
40. Effective October 1, 2019, Sec.  217.61 is revised to read as 
follows:


Sec.  217.61   Purpose and scope.

    Sections 217.61 through 217.63 of this subpart establish public 
disclosure requirements related to the capital requirements described 
in subpart B of this part for a Board-regulated institution with total 
consolidated assets of $50 billion or more as reported on the Board-
regulated institution's most recent year-end Call Report, for a state 
member bank, or FR Y-9C, for a bank holding company or savings and loan 
holding company, as applicable that is not an advanced approaches 
Board-regulated institution making public disclosures pursuant to Sec.  
217.172. An advanced approaches Board-regulated institution that has 
not received approval from the Board to exit parallel run pursuant to 
Sec.  217.121(d) is subject to the disclosure requirements described in 
Sec. Sec.  217.62 and 217.63. A Board-regulated institution with total 
consolidated assets of $50 billion or more as reported on the Board-
regulated institution's most recent year-end Call Report, for a state 
member bank, or FR Y-9C, for a bank holding company or savings and loan 
holding company, as applicable, that is not an advanced approaches 
Board-regulated institution making public disclosures subject to Sec.  
217.172 must comply with Sec.  217.62 unless it is a consolidated 
subsidiary of a bank holding company, savings and loan holding company, 
or depository institution that is subject to the disclosure 
requirements of Sec.  217.62 or a subsidiary of a non-U.S. banking 
organization that is subject to comparable public disclosure 
requirements in its home jurisdiction. For purposes of this section, 
total consolidated assets are determined based on the average of the 
Board-regulated institution's total consolidated assets in the four 
most recent quarters as reported on the Call Report, for a state member 
bank, or FR Y-9C, for a bank holding company or savings and loan 
holding company, as applicable; or the average of the Board-regulated 
institution's total consolidated assets in the most recent consecutive 
quarters as reported quarterly on the Board-regulated institution's 
Call Report, for a state member bank, or FR Y-9C, for a bank holding 
company or savings and loan holding company, as applicable if the 
Board-regulated institution has not filed such a report for each of the 
most recent four quarters.

0
41. Effective October 1, 2019, Sec.  217.63 is amended by revising 
Tables 3 and 8 to Sec.  217.63 to read as follows:


Sec.  217.63   Disclosures by Board-regulated institutions described in 
Sec.  217.61.

* * * * *

                                   Table 3 to Sec.   217.63--Capital Adequacy
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Qualitative disclosures...............................  (a) A summary discussion of the Board-regulated
                                                         institution's approach to assessing the adequacy of its
                                                         capital to support current and future activities.
Quantitative disclosures..............................  (b) Risk-weighted assets for:
                                                           (1) Exposures to sovereign entities;
                                                           (2) Exposures to certain supranational entities and
                                                            MDBs;
                                                           (3) Exposures to depository institutions, foreign
                                                            banks, and credit unions;
                                                           (4) Exposures to PSEs;
                                                           (5) Corporate exposures;
                                                           (6) Residential mortgage exposures;
                                                           (7) Statutory multifamily mortgages and pre-sold
                                                            construction loans;
                                                           (8) HVCRE exposures;
                                                           (9) Past due loans;
                                                           (10) Other assets;
                                                           (11) Cleared transactions;
                                                           (12) Default fund contributions;
                                                           (13) Unsettled transactions;
                                                           (14) Securitization exposures; and
                                                           (15) Equity exposures.
                                                        (c) Standardized market risk-weighted assets as
                                                         calculated under subpart F of this part.
                                                        (d) Common equity tier 1, tier 1 and total risk-based
                                                         capital ratios:
                                                           (1) For the top consolidated group; and
                                                           (2) For each depository institution subsidiary.
                                                        (e) Total standardized risk-weighted assets.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

* * * * *

                                    Table 8 to Sec.   217.63--Securitization
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Qualitative Disclosures...............................  (a) The general qualitative disclosure requirement with
                                                         respect to a securitization (including synthetic
                                                         securitizations), including a discussion of:
                                                           (1) The Board-regulated institution's objectives for
                                                            securitizing assets, including the extent to which
                                                            these activities transfer credit risk of the
                                                            underlying exposures away from the Board-regulated
                                                            institution to other entities and including the type
                                                            of risks assumed and retained with resecuritization
                                                            activity; \1\
                                                           (2) The nature of the risks (e.g., liquidity risk)
                                                            inherent in the securitized assets;
                                                           (3) The roles played by the Board-regulated
                                                            institution in the securitization process \2\ and an
                                                            indication of the extent of the Board-regulated
                                                            institution's involvement in each of them;
                                                           (4) The processes in place to monitor changes in the
                                                            credit and market risk of securitization exposures
                                                            including how those processes differ for
                                                            resecuritization exposures;

[[Page 35268]]

 
                                                           (5) The Board-regulated institution's policy for
                                                            mitigating the credit risk retained through
                                                            securitization and resecuritization exposures; and
                                                           (6) The risk-based capital approaches that the Board-
                                                            regulated institution follows for its securitization
                                                            exposures including the type of securitization
                                                            exposure to which each approach applies.
                                                        (b) A list of:
                                                           (1) The type of securitization SPEs that the Board-
                                                            regulated institution, as sponsor, uses to
                                                            securitize third-party exposures. The Board-
                                                            regulated institution must indicate whether it has
                                                            exposure to these SPEs, either on- or off-balance
                                                            sheet; and
                                                           (2) Affiliated entities:
                                                             (i) That the Board-regulated institution manages or
                                                              advises; and
                                                             ` (ii) That invest either in the securitization
                                                              exposures that the Board-regulated institution has
                                                              securitized or in securitization SPEs that the
                                                              Board-regulated institution sponsors.\3\
                                                        (c) Summary of the Board-regulated institution's
                                                         accounting policies for securitization activities,
                                                         including:
                                                           (1) Whether the transactions are treated as sales or
                                                            financings;
                                                           (2) Recognition of gain-on-sale;
                                                           (3) Methods and key assumptions applied in valuing
                                                            retained or purchased interests;
                                                           (4) Changes in methods and key assumptions from the
                                                            previous period for valuing retained interests and
                                                            impact of the changes;
                                                           (5) Treatment of synthetic securitizations;
                                                           (6) How exposures intended to be securitized are
                                                            valued and whether they are recorded under subpart D
                                                            of this part; and
                                                           (7) Policies for recognizing liabilities on the
                                                            balance sheet for arrangements that could require
                                                            the Board-regulated institution to provide financial
                                                            support for securitized assets.
                                                        (d) An explanation of significant changes to any
                                                         quantitative information since the last reporting
                                                         period.
Quantitative Disclosures..............................  (e) The total outstanding exposures securitized by the
                                                         Board-regulated institution in securitizations that
                                                         meet the operational criteria provided in Sec.   217.41
                                                         (categorized into traditional and synthetic
                                                         securitizations), by exposure type, separately for
                                                         securitizations of third-party exposures for which the
                                                         bank acts only as sponsor.\4\
                                                        (f) For exposures securitized by the Board-regulated
                                                         institution in securitizations that meet the
                                                         operational criteria in Sec.   217.41:
                                                           (1) Amount of securitized assets that are impaired/
                                                            past due categorized by exposure type; \5\ and
                                                           (2) Losses recognized by the Board-regulated
                                                            institution during the current period categorized by
                                                            exposure type.\6\
                                                        (g) The total amount of outstanding exposures intended
                                                         to be securitized categorized by exposure type.
                                                        (h) Aggregate amount of:
                                                           (1) On-balance sheet securitization exposures
                                                            retained or purchased categorized by exposure type;
                                                            and
                                                           (2) Off-balance sheet securitization exposures
                                                            categorized by exposure type.
                                                        (i) (1) Aggregate amount of securitization exposures
                                                         retained or purchased and the associated capital
                                                         requirements for these exposures, categorized between
                                                         securitization and resecuritization exposures, further
                                                         categorized into a meaningful number of risk weight
                                                         bands and by risk-based capital approach (e.g., SSFA);
                                                         and
                                                           (2) Aggregate amount disclosed separately by type of
                                                            underlying exposure in the pool of any:
                                                             (i) After-tax gain-on-sale on a securitization that
                                                              has been deducted from common equity tier 1
                                                              capital; and
                                                             (ii) Credit-enhancing interest-only strip that is
                                                              assigned a 1,250 percent risk weight.
                                                        (j) Summary of current year's securitization activity,
                                                         including the amount of exposures securitized (by
                                                         exposure type), and recognized gain or loss on sale by
                                                         exposure type.
                                                        (k) Aggregate amount of resecuritization exposures
                                                         retained or purchased categorized according to:
                                                           (1) Exposures to which credit risk mitigation is
                                                            applied and those not applied; and
                                                           (2) Exposures to guarantors categorized according to
                                                            guarantor creditworthiness categories or guarantor
                                                            name.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The Board-regulated institution should describe the structure of resecuritizations in which it participates;
  this description should be provided for the main categories of resecuritization products in which the Board-
  regulated institution is active.
\2\ For example, these roles may include originator, investor, servicer, provider of credit enhancement,
  sponsor, liquidity provider, or swap provider.
\3\ Such affiliated entities may include, for example, money market funds, to be listed individually, and
  personal and private trusts, to be noted collectively.
\4\ ``Exposures securitized'' include underlying exposures originated by the bank, whether generated by them or
  purchased, and recognized in the balance sheet, from third parties, and third-party exposures included in
  sponsored transactions. Securitization transactions (including underlying exposures originally on the bank's
  balance sheet and underlying exposures acquired by the bank from third-party entities) in which the
  originating bank does not retain any securitization exposure should be shown separately but need only be
  reported for the year of inception. Banks are required to disclose exposures regardless of whether there is a
  capital charge under this part.
\5\ Include credit-related other than temporary impairment (OTTI).
\6\ For example, charge-offs/allowances (if the assets remain on the bank's balance sheet) or credit-related
  OTTI of interest-only strips and other retained residual interests, as well as recognition of liabilities for
  probable future financial support required of the bank with respect to securitized assets.

* * * * *

0
 42. Effective October 1, 2019, Sec.  217.131 is amended by revising 
paragraph (d)(2) to read as follows:


Sec.  217.131  Mechanics for calculating total wholesale and retail 
risk-weighted assets.

* * * * *
    (d) * * *
    (2) Floor on PD assignment. The PD for each wholesale obligor or 
retail segment may not be less than 0.03 percent, except for exposures 
to or directly and unconditionally guaranteed by a sovereign entity, 
the Bank for International Settlements, the International Monetary 
Fund, the European Commission, the European Central Bank, the European 
Stability

[[Page 35269]]

Mechanism, the European Financial Stability Facility, or a multilateral 
development bank, to which the Board-regulated institution assigns a 
rating grade associated with a PD of less than 0.03 percent.
* * * * *

0
 43. Effective October 1, 2019, Sec.  217.133 is amended by revising 
paragraphs (b)(3)(ii) and (c)(3)(ii) to read as follows:


Sec.  217.133  Cleared transactions.

* * * * *
    (b) * * *
    (3) * * *
    (ii) For a cleared transaction with a CCP that is not a QCCP, a 
clearing member client Board-regulated institution must apply the risk 
weight applicable to the CCP under subpart D of this part.
* * * * *
    (c) * * *
    (3) * * *
    (ii) For a cleared transaction with a CCP that is not a QCCP, a 
clearing member Board-regulated institution must apply the risk weight 
applicable to the CCP according to subpart D of this part.
* * * * *

0
 44. Effective October 1, 2019, Sec.  217.152 is amended by revising 
paragraphs (b)(5) and (6) to read as follows:


Sec.  217.152  Simple risk weight approach (SRWA).

* * * * *
    (b) * * *
    (5) 300 percent risk weight equity exposures. A publicly traded 
equity exposure (other than an equity exposure described in paragraph 
(b)(7) of this section and including the ineffective portion of a hedge 
pair) is assigned a 300 percent risk weight.
    (6) 400 percent risk weight equity exposures. An equity exposure 
(other than an equity exposure described in paragraph (b)(7) of this 
section) that is not publicly traded is assigned a 400 percent risk 
weight.
* * * * *

0
 45. Effective October 1, 2019, Sec.  217.202, paragraph (b) is amended 
by revising the definition of ``Corporate debt position'' to read as 
follows:


Sec.  217.202  Definitions.

* * * * *
    (b) * * *
    Corporate debt position means a debt position that is an exposure 
to a company that is not a sovereign entity, the Bank for International 
Settlements, the European Central Bank, the European Commission, the 
International Monetary Fund, the European Stability Mechanism, the 
European Financial Stability Facility, a multilateral development bank, 
a depository institution, a foreign bank, a credit union, a public 
sector entity, a GSE, or a securitization.
* * * * *

0
 46. Effective October 1, 2019, Sec.  217.210 is amended by revising 
paragraphs (b)(2)(ii) and (b)(2)(vii)(A) to read as follows:


Sec.  217.210  Standardized measurement method for specific risk.

* * * * *
    (b) * * *
    (2) * * *
    (ii) Certain supranational entity and multilateral development bank 
debt positions. A Board-regulated institution may assign a 0.0 percent 
specific risk-weighting factor to a debt position that is an exposure 
to the Bank for International Settlements, the European Central Bank, 
the European Commission, the International Monetary Fund, the European 
Stability Mechanism, the European Financial Stability Facility, or an 
MDB.
* * * * *
    (vii) * * *
    (A) General requirements. (1) A Board-regulated institution that is 
not an advanced approaches Board-regulated institution or is a U.S. 
intermediate holding company that is required to be established or 
designated pursuant to 12 CFR 252.153 and that is not calculating risk-
weighted assets according to Subpart E must assign a specific risk-
weighting factor to a securitization position using either the 
simplified supervisory formula approach (SSFA) in paragraph 
(b)(2)(vii)(C) of this section (and Sec.  217.211) or assign a specific 
risk-weighting factor of 100 percent to the position.
    (2) A Board-regulated institution that is an advanced approaches 
Board-regulated institution or is a U.S. intermediate holding company 
that is required to be established or designated pursuant to 12 CFR 
252.153 and that is calculating risk-weighted assets according to 
Subpart E must calculate a specific risk add-on for a securitization 
position in accordance with paragraph (b)(2)(vii)(B) of this section if 
the Board-regulated institution and the securitization position each 
qualifies to use the SFA in Sec.  217.143. A Board-regulated 
institution that is an advanced approaches Board-regulated institution 
or is a U.S. intermediate holding company that is required to be 
established or designated pursuant to 12 CFR 252.153 and that is 
calculating risk-weighted assets according to Subpart E with a 
securitization position that does not qualify for the SFA under 
paragraph (b)(2)(vii)(B) of this section may assign a specific risk-
weighting factor to the securitization position using the SSFA in 
accordance with paragraph (b)(2)(vii)(C) of this section or assign a 
specific risk-weighting factor of 100 percent to the position.
    (3) A Board-regulated institution must treat a short securitization 
position as if it is a long securitization position solely for 
calculation purposes when using the SFA in paragraph (b)(2)(vii)(B) of 
this section or the SSFA in paragraph (b)(2)(vii)(C) of this section.
* * * * *

0
 47. Section 217.300 is amended:
0
a. Effective October 1, 2019, by revising paragraphs (c)(2) and (3); 
and
0
b. Effective April 1, 2020, by removing paragraphs (b) and (d).
    The revsions read as follows:


Sec.  217.300  Transitions.

    (c) * * *
    (2) Mergers and acquisitions. (i) A depository institution holding 
company of $15 billion or more that acquires after December 31, 2013 
either a depository institution holding company with total consolidated 
assets of less than $15 billion as of December 31, 2009 (depository 
institution holding company under $15 billion) or a depository 
institution holding company that is a 2010 MHC, may include in 
regulatory capital the non-qualifying capital instruments issued by the 
acquired organization up to the applicable percentages set forth in 
Table 8 to Sec.  217.300.
    (ii) If a depository institution holding company under $15 billion 
acquires after December 31, 2013 a depository institution holding 
company under $15 billion or a 2010 MHC, and the resulting organization 
has total consolidated assets of $15 billion or more as reported on the 
resulting organization's FR Y-9C for the period in which the 
transaction occurred, the resulting organization may include in 
regulatory capital non-qualifying instruments of the resulting 
organization up to the applicable percentages set forth in Table 8 to 
Sec.  217.300.

[[Page 35270]]



                        Table 8 to Sec.   217.300
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                   Percentage of non-
                                                   qualifying capital
                                                 instruments includable
                                                 in additional tier 1 or
      Transition period  (calendar year)          tier 2 capital for a
                                                 depository institution
                                                 holding company of $15
                                                     billion or more
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Calendar year 2014............................                       50
Calendar year 2015............................                       25
Calendar year 2016 and thereafter.............                        0
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (3) Depository institution holding companies under $15 billion and 
2010 MHCs. (i) Non-qualifying capital instruments issued by depository 
institution holding companies under $15 billion and 2010 MHCs prior to 
May 19, 2010, may be included in additional tier 1 or tier 2 capital if 
the instrument was included in tier 1 or tier 2 capital, respectively, 
as of January 1, 2014.
    (ii) Non-qualifying capital instruments includable in tier 1 
capital are subject to a limit of 25 percent of tier 1 capital 
elements, excluding any non-qualifying capital instruments and after 
applying all regulatory capital deductions and adjustments to tier 1 
capital.
    (iii) Non-qualifying capital instruments that are not included in 
tier 1 as a result of the limitation in paragraph (c)(3)(ii) of this 
section are includable in tier 2 capital.
* * * * *

12 CFR Part 324

FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION

    For the reasons set out in the joint preamble, 12 CFR part 324 is 
amended as follows.

PART 324--CAPITAL ADEQUACY OF FDIC-SUPERVISED INSTITUTIONS

0
48. The authority citation for part 324 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 12 U.S.C. 1815(a), 1815(b), 1816, 1818(a), 1818(b), 
1818(c), 1818(t), 1819(Tenth), 1828(c), 1828(d), 1828(i), 1828(n), 
1828(o), 1831o, 1835, 3907, 3909, 4808; 5371; 5412; Pub. L. 102-233, 
105 Stat. 1761, 1789, 1790 (12 U.S.C. 1831n note); Pub. L. 102-242, 
105 Stat. 2236, 2355, as amended by Pub. L. 103-325, 108 Stat. 2160, 
2233 (12 U.S.C. 1828 note); Pub. L. 102-242, 105 Stat. 2236, 2386, 
as amended by Pub. L. 102-550, 106 Stat. 3672, 4089 (12 U.S.C. 1828 
note); Pub. L. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1887 (15 U.S.C. 78o-7 note).

Subpart A--General Provisions

0
49. Effective October 1, 2019, Sec.  324.2 is amended by revising the 
definitions of ``corporate exposure,'' ``eligible guarantor,'' 
``investment in the capital of an unconsolidated financial 
institution,'' ``non-significant investment in the capital of an 
unconsolidated financial institution,'' and ``significant investment in 
the capital of an unconsolidated financial institution'' to read as 
follows:


Sec.  324.2  Definitions.

* * * * *
    Corporate exposure means an exposure to a company that is not:
    (1) An exposure to a sovereign, the Bank for International 
Settlements, the European Central Bank, the European Commission, the 
International Monetary Fund, the European Stability Mechanism, the 
European Financial Stability Facility, a multi-lateral development bank 
(MDB), a depository institution, a foreign bank, a credit union, or a 
public sector entity (PSE);
    (2) An exposure to a GSE;
    (3) A residential mortgage exposure;
    (4) A pre-sold construction loan;
    (5) A statutory multifamily mortgage;
    (6) A high volatility commercial real estate (HVCRE) exposure;
    (7) A cleared transaction;
    (8) A default fund contribution;
    (9) A securitization exposure;
    (10) An equity exposure;
    (11) An unsettled transaction;
    (12) A policy loan; or
    (13) A separate account.
* * * * *
    Eligible guarantor means:
    (1) A sovereign, the Bank for International Settlements, the 
International Monetary Fund, the European Central Bank, the European 
Commission, a Federal Home Loan Bank, Federal Agricultural Mortgage 
Corporation (Farmer Mac), the European Stability Mechanism, the 
European Financial Stability Facility, a multilateral development bank 
(MDB), a depository institution, a bank holding company, a savings and 
loan holding company, a credit union, a foreign bank, or a qualifying 
central counterparty; or
    (2) An entity (other than a special purpose entity):
    (i) That at the time the guarantee is issued or anytime thereafter, 
has issued and outstanding an unsecured debt security without credit 
enhancement that is investment grade;
    (ii) Whose creditworthiness is not positively correlated with the 
credit risk of the exposures for which it has provided guarantees; and
    (iii) That is not an insurance company engaged predominately in the 
business of providing credit protection (such as a monoline bond 
insurer or re-insurer).
* * * * *
    Investment in the capital of an unconsolidated financial 
institution means a net long position calculated in accordance with 
Sec.  324.22(h) in an instrument that is recognized as capital for 
regulatory purposes by the primary supervisor of an unconsolidated 
regulated financial institution or is an instrument that is part of the 
GAAP equity of an unconsolidated unregulated financial institution, 
including direct, indirect, and synthetic exposures to capital 
instruments, excluding underwriting positions held by the FDIC-
supervised institution for five or fewer business days.
* * * * *
    Non-significant investment in the capital of an unconsolidated 
financial institution means an investment by an advanced approaches 
FDIC-supervised institution in the capital of an unconsolidated 
financial institution where the advanced approaches FDIC-supervised 
institution owns 10 percent or less of the issued and outstanding 
common stock of the unconsolidated financial institution.
* * * * *
    Significant investment in the capital of an unconsolidated 
financial institution means an investment by an advanced approaches 
FDIC-supervised institution in the capital of an unconsolidated 
financial institution where the advanced approaches FDIC-supervised 
institution owns more than 10 percent of the issued and outstanding 
common stock of the unconsolidated financial institution.
* * * * *

0
 50. Effective October 1, 2019, Sec.  324.10 is amended by revising 
paragraph (c)(4)(ii)(H) to read as follows:


Sec.  324.10  Minimum capital requirements.

* * * * *
    (c) * * *
    (4) * * *
    (ii) * * *
    (H) The credit equivalent amount of all off-balance sheet exposures 
of the FDIC-supervised institution, excluding repo-style transactions, 
repurchase or reverse repurchase or securities borrowing or lending 
transactions that qualify for sales treatment under U.S. GAAP, and 
derivative transactions, determined using the applicable credit 
conversion factor under Sec.  324.33(b), provided, however, that the 
minimum credit conversion factor that may be assigned to an off-balance 
sheet exposure under this paragraph is 10 percent; and
* * * * *

0
51. Effective October 1, 2019, Sec.  324.11 is amended by revising 
paragraphs (a)(2)(i) and (iv) and (a)(3)(i) and Table 1 to Sec.  324.11 
to read as follows:

[[Page 35271]]

Sec.  324.11  Capital conservation buffer and countercyclical capital 
buffer amount.

    (a) * * *
    (2) * * *
    (i) Eligible retained income. The eligible retained income of an 
FDIC-supervised institution is the FDIC-supervised institution's net 
income, calculated in accordance with the instructions to the Call 
Report, for the four calendar quarters preceding the current calendar 
quarter, net of any distributions and associated tax effects not 
already reflected in net income.
* * * * *
    (iv) Private sector credit exposure. Private sector credit exposure 
means an exposure to a company or an individual that is not an exposure 
to a sovereign, the Bank for International Settlements, the European 
Central Bank, the European Commission, the European Stability 
Mechanism, the European Financial Stability Facility, the International 
Monetary Fund, a MDB, a PSE, or a GSE.
    (3) Calculation of capital conservation buffer. (i) An FDIC-
supervised institution's capital conservation buffer is equal to the 
lowest of the following ratios, calculated as of the last day of the 
previous calendar quarter:
    (A) The FDIC-supervised institution's common equity tier 1 capital 
ratio minus the FDIC-supervisedsupervised institution's minimum common 
equity tier 1 capital ratio requirement under Sec.  324.10;
    (B) The FDIC-supervisedsupervised institution's tier 1 capital 
ratio minus the FDIC-supervisedsupervised institution's minimum tier 1 
capital ratio requirement under Sec.  324.10; and
    (C) The FDIC-supervisedsupervised institution's total capital ratio 
minus the FDIC-supervisedsupervised institution's minimum total capital 
ratio requirement under Sec.  324.10; or
* * * * *

                         Table 1 to Sec.   324.11--Calculation of Maximum Payout Amount
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
               Capital conservation buffer                                 Maximum payout ratio
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Greater than 2.5 percent plus 100 percent of the FDIC-    No payout ratio limitation applies.
 supervised institution's applicable countercyclical
 capital buffer amount.
Less than or equal to 2.5 percent plus 100 percent of     60 percent.
 the FDIC-supervised institution's applicable
 countercyclical capital buffer amount, and greater than
 1.875 percent plus 75 percent of the FDIC-supervised
 institution's applicable countercyclical capital buffer
 amount.
Less than or equal to 1.875 percent plus 75 percent of    40 percent.
 the FDIC-supervised institution's applicable
 countercyclical capital buffer amount, and greater than
 1.25 percent plus 50 percent of the FDIC-supervised
 institution's applicable countercyclical capital buffer
 amount.
Less than or equal to 1.25 percent plus 50 percent of     20 percent.
 the FDIC-supervised institution's applicable
 countercyclical capital buffer amount, and greater than
 0.625 percent plus 25 percent of the FDIC-supervised
 institution's applicable countercyclical capital buffer
 amount.
Less than or equal to 0.625 percent plus 25 percent of    0 percent.
 the FDIC-supervised institution's applicable
 countercyclical capital buffer amount.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

* * * * *

0
52. Effective October 1, 2019, Sec.  324.20 is amended by revising 
paragraphs (b)(4), (c)(1)(viii), (c)(2), and (d)(2) to read as follows:


Sec.  324.20  Capital components and eligibility criteria for 
regulatory capital instruments.

* * * * *
    (b) * * *
    (4) Any common equity tier 1 minority interest, subject to the 
limitations in Sec.  324.21.
* * * * *
    (c) * * *
    (1) * * *
    (viii) Any cash dividend payments on the instrument are paid out of 
the FDIC-supervised institution's net income or retained earnings. An 
FDIC-supervised institution must obtain prior FDIC approval for any 
dividend payment involving a reduction or retirement of capital stock 
in accordance with 12 CFR 303.241.
* * * * *
    (2) Tier 1 minority interest, subject to the limitations in Sec.  
324.21, that is not included in the FDIC-supervised institution's 
common equity tier 1 capital.
* * * * *
    (d) * * *
    (2) Total capital minority interest, subject to the limitations set 
forth in Sec.  324.21, that is not included in the FDIC-supervised 
institution's tier 1 capital.
* * * * *

0
53. Effective April 1, 2020, Sec.  324.21 is revised to read as 
follows:


Sec.  324.21  Minority interest.

    (a)(1) Applicability. For purposes of Sec.  324.20, an FDIC-
supervised institution that is not an advanced approaches FDIC-
supervised institution is subject to the minority interest limitations 
in this paragraph (a) if a consolidated subsidiary of the FDIC-
supervised institution has issued regulatory capital that is not owned 
by the FDIC-supervised institution.
    (2) Common equity tier 1 minority interest includable in the common 
equity tier 1 capital of the FDIC-supervised institution. The amount of 
common equity tier 1 minority interest that an FDIC-supervised 
institution may include in common equity tier 1 capital must be no 
greater than 10 percent of the sum of all common equity tier 1 capital 
elements of the FDIC-supervised institution (not including the common 
equity tier 1 minority interest itself), less any common equity tier 1 
capital regulatory adjustments and deductions in accordance with Sec.  
324.22(a) and (b).
    (3) Tier 1 minority interest includable in the tier 1 capital of 
the FDIC-supervised institution. The amount of tier 1 minority interest 
that an FDIC-supervised institution may include in tier 1 capital must 
be no greater than 10 percent of the sum of all tier 1 capital elements 
of the FDIC-supervised institution (not including the tier 1 minority 
interest itself), less any tier 1 capital regulatory adjustments and 
deductions in accordance with Sec.  324.22(a) and (b).
    (4) Total capital minority interest includable in the total capital 
of the FDIC-supervised institution. The amount of total capital 
minority interest that an FDIC-supervised institution may include in 
total capital must be no greater than 10 percent of the sum of all 
total capital elements of the FDIC-supervised institution (not 
including the total capital minority interest itself), less any total 
capital regulatory adjustments and deductions in accordance with Sec.  
324.22(a) and (b).
    (b)(1) Applicability. For purposes of Sec.  324.20, an advanced 
approaches FDIC-supervised institution is subject to the minority 
interest limitations in this paragraph (b) if:

[[Page 35272]]

    (i) A consolidated subsidiary of the advanced approaches FDIC-
supervised institution has issued regulatory capital that is not owned 
by the FDIC-supervised institution; and
    (ii) For each relevant regulatory capital ratio of the consolidated 
subsidiary, the ratio exceeds the sum of the subsidiary's minimum 
regulatory capital requirements plus its capital conservation buffer.
    (2) Difference in capital adequacy standards at the subsidiary 
level. For purposes of the minority interest calculations in this 
section, if the consolidated subsidiary issuing the capital is not 
subject to capital adequacy standards similar to those of the advanced 
approaches FDIC-supervised institution, the advanced approaches FDIC-
supervised institution must assume that the capital adequacy standards 
of the advanced approaches FDIC-supervised institution apply to the 
subsidiary.
    (3) Common equity tier 1 minority interest includable in the common 
equity tier 1 capital of the FDIC-supervised institution. For each 
consolidated subsidiary of an advanced approaches FDIC-supervised 
institution, the amount of common equity tier 1 minority interest the 
advanced approaches FDIC-supervised institution may include in common 
equity tier 1 capital is equal to:
    (i) The common equity tier 1 minority interest of the subsidiary; 
minus
    (ii) The percentage of the subsidiary's common equity tier 1 
capital that is not owned by the advanced approaches FDIC-supervised 
institution, multiplied by the difference between the common equity 
tier 1 capital of the subsidiary and the lower of:
    (A) The amount of common equity tier 1 capital the subsidiary must 
hold, or would be required to hold pursuant to this paragraph (b), to 
avoid restrictions on distributions and discretionary bonus payments 
under Sec.  324.11 or equivalent standards established by the 
subsidiary's home country supervisor; or
    (B)(1) The standardized total risk-weighted assets of the advanced 
approaches FDIC-supervised institution that relate to the subsidiary 
multiplied by
    (2) The common equity tier 1 capital ratio the subsidiary must 
maintain to avoid restrictions on distributions and discretionary bonus 
payments under Sec.  324.11 or equivalent standards established by the 
subsidiary's home country supervisor.
    (4) Tier 1 minority interest includable in the tier 1 capital of 
the advanced approaches FDIC-supervised institution. For each 
consolidated subsidiary of the advanced approaches FDIC-supervised 
institution, the amount of tier 1 minority interest the advanced 
approaches FDIC-supervised institution may include in tier 1 capital is 
equal to:
    (i) The tier 1 minority interest of the subsidiary; minus
    (ii) The percentage of the subsidiary's tier 1 capital that is not 
owned by the advanced approaches FDIC-supervised institution multiplied 
by the difference between the tier 1 capital of the subsidiary and the 
lower of:
    (A) The amount of tier 1 capital the subsidiary must hold, or would 
be required to hold pursuant to this paragraph (b), to avoid 
restrictions on distributions and discretionary bonus payments under 
Sec.  324.11 or equivalent standards established by the subsidiary's 
home country supervisor, or
    (B)(1) The standardized total risk-weighted assets of the advanced 
approaches FDIC-supervised institution that relate to the subsidiary 
multiplied by
    (2) The tier 1 capital ratio the subsidiary must maintain to avoid 
restrictions on distributions and discretionary bonus payments under 
Sec.  324.11 or equivalent standards established by the subsidiary's 
home country supervisor.
    (5) Total capital minority interest includable in the total capital 
of the FDIC-supervised institution. For each consolidated subsidiary of 
the advanced approaches FDIC-supervised institution, the amount of 
total capital minority interest the advanced approaches FDIC-supervised 
institution may include in total capital is equal to:
    (i) The total capital minority interest of the subsidiary; minus
    (ii) The percentage of the subsidiary's total capital that is not 
owned by the advanced approaches FDIC-supervised institution multiplied 
by the difference between the total capital of the subsidiary and the 
lower of:
    (A) The amount of total capital the subsidiary must hold, or would 
be required to hold pursuant to this paragraph (b), to avoid 
restrictions on distributions and discretionary bonus payments under 
Sec.  324.11 or equivalent standards established by the subsidiary's 
home country supervisor, or
    (B)(1) The standardized total risk-weighted assets of the advanced 
approaches FDIC-supervised institution that relate to the subsidiary 
multiplied by
    (2) The total capital ratio the subsidiary must maintain to avoid 
restrictions on distributions and discretionary bonus payments under 
Sec.  324.11 or equivalent standards established by the subsidiary's 
home country supervisor.

0
54. Effective April 1, 2020, Sec.  324.22 is amended by revising 
paragraphs (a)(1), (c), (d), (g), and (h) to read as follows:


Sec.  324.22  Regulatory capital adjustments and deductions.

    (a) * * *
    (1)(i) Goodwill, net of associated deferred tax liabilities (DTLs) 
in accordance with paragraph (e) of this section; and
    (ii) For an advanced approaches FDIC-supervised institution, 
goodwill that is embedded in the valuation of a significant investment 
in the capital of an unconsolidated financial institution in the form 
of common stock (and that is reflected in the consolidated financial 
statements of the advanced approaches FDIC-supervised institution), in 
accordance with paragraph (d) of this section;
* * * * *
    (c) Deductions from regulatory capital related to investments in 
capital instruments \23\--(1) Investment in the FDIC-supervised 
institution's own capital instruments. An FDIC-supervised institution 
must deduct an investment in the FDIC-supervised institution's own 
capital instruments as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \23\ The FDIC-supervised institution must calculate amounts 
deducted under paragraphs (c) through (f) of this section after it 
calculates the amount of ALLL or AACL, as applicable, includable in 
tier 2 capital under Sec.  324.20(d)(3).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (i) An FDIC-supervised institution must deduct an investment in the 
FDIC-supervised institution's own common stock instruments from its 
common equity tier 1 capital elements to the extent such instruments 
are not excluded from regulatory capital under Sec.  324.20(b)(1);
    (ii) An FDIC-supervised institution must deduct an investment in 
the FDIC-supervised institution's own additional tier 1 capital 
instruments from its additional tier 1 capital elements; and
    (iii) An FDIC-supervised institution must deduct an investment in 
the FDIC-supervised institution's own tier 2 capital instruments from 
its tier 2 capital elements.
    (2) Corresponding deduction approach. For purposes of subpart C of 
this part, the corresponding deduction approach is the methodology used 
for the deductions from regulatory capital related to reciprocal cross 
holdings (as described in paragraph (c)(3) of this section), 
investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial institutions for

[[Page 35273]]

an FDIC-supervised institution that is not an advanced approaches FDIC-
supervised institution (as described in paragraph (c)(4) of this 
section), non-significant investments in the capital of unconsolidated 
financial institutions for an advanced approaches FDIC-supervised 
institution (as described in paragraph (c)(5) of this section), and 
non-common stock significant investments in the capital of 
unconsolidated financial institutions for an advanced approaches FDIC-
supervised institution (as described in paragraph (c)(6) of this 
section). Under the corresponding deduction approach, an FDIC-
supervised institution must make deductions from the component of 
capital for which the underlying instrument would qualify if it were 
issued by the FDIC-supervised institution itself, as described in 
paragraphs (c)(2)(i) through (iii) of this section. If the FDIC-
supervised institution does not have a sufficient amount of a specific 
component of capital to effect the required deduction, the shortfall 
must be deducted according to paragraph (f) of this section.
    (i) If an investment is in the form of an instrument issued by a 
financial institution that is not a regulated financial institution, 
the FDIC-supervised institution must treat the instrument as:
    (A) A common equity tier 1 capital instrument if it is common stock 
or represents the most subordinated claim in liquidation of the 
financial institution; and
    (B) An additional tier 1 capital instrument if it is subordinated 
to all creditors of the financial institution and is senior in 
liquidation only to common shareholders.
    (ii) If an investment is in the form of an instrument issued by a 
regulated financial institution and the instrument does not meet the 
criteria for common equity tier 1, additional tier 1 or tier 2 capital 
instruments under Sec.  324.20, the FDIC-supervised institution must 
treat the instrument as:
    (A) A common equity tier 1 capital instrument if it is common stock 
included in GAAP equity or represents the most subordinated claim in 
liquidation of the financial institution;
    (B) An additional tier 1 capital instrument if it is included in 
GAAP equity, subordinated to all creditors of the financial 
institution, and senior in a receivership, insolvency, liquidation, or 
similar proceeding only to common shareholders; and
    (C) A tier 2 capital instrument if it is not included in GAAP 
equity but considered regulatory capital by the primary supervisor of 
the financial institution.
    (iii) If an investment is in the form of a non-qualifying capital 
instrument (as defined in Sec.  324.300(c)), the FDIC-supervised 
institution must treat the instrument as:
    (A) An additional tier 1 capital instrument if such instrument was 
included in the issuer's tier 1 capital prior to May 19, 2010; or
    (B) A tier 2 capital instrument if such instrument was included in 
the issuer's tier 2 capital (but not includable in tier 1 capital) 
prior to May 19, 2010.
    (3) Reciprocal cross holdings in the capital of financial 
institutions. An FDIC-supervised institution must deduct investments in 
the capital of other financial institutions it holds reciprocally, 
where such reciprocal cross holdings result from a formal or informal 
arrangement to swap, exchange, or otherwise intend to hold each other's 
capital instruments, by applying the corresponding deduction approach.
    (4) Investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial 
institutions. An FDIC-supervised institution that is not an advanced 
approaches FDIC-supervised institution must deduct its investments in 
the capital of unconsolidated financial institutions (as defined in 
Sec.  324.2) that exceed 25 percent of the sum of the FDIC-supervised 
institution's common equity tier 1 capital elements minus all 
deductions from and adjustments to common equity tier 1 capital 
elements required under paragraphs (a) through (c)(3) of this section 
by applying the corresponding deduction approach.\24\ The deductions 
described in this section are net of associated DTLs in accordance with 
paragraph (e) of this section. In addition, an FDIC-supervised 
institution that underwrites a failed underwriting, with the prior 
written approval of the FDIC, for the period of time stipulated by the 
FDIC, is not required to deduct an investment in the capital of an 
unconsolidated financial institution pursuant to this paragraph (c) to 
the extent the investment is related to the failed underwriting.\25\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \24\ With the prior written approval of the FDIC, for the period 
of time stipulated by the FDIC, an FDIC-supervised institution that 
is not an advanced approaches FDIC-supervised institution is not 
required to deduct an investment in the capital of an unconsolidated 
financial institution pursuant to this paragraph if the financial 
institution is in distress and if such investment is made for the 
purpose of providing financial support to the financial institution, 
as determined by the FDIC.
    \25\ Any investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial 
institutions that do not exceed the 25 percent threshold for 
investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial institutions 
under this section must be assigned the appropriate risk weight 
under subparts D or F of this part, as applicable.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (5) Non-significant investments in the capital of unconsolidated 
financial institutions. (i) An advanced approaches FDIC-supervised 
institution must deduct its non-significant investments in the capital 
of unconsolidated financial institutions (as defined in Sec.  324.2) 
that, in the aggregate, exceed 10 percent of the sum of the advanced 
approaches FDIC-supervised institution's common equity tier 1 capital 
elements minus all deductions from and adjustments to common equity 
tier 1 capital elements required under paragraphs (a) through (c)(3) of 
this section (the 10 percent threshold for non-significant investments) 
by applying the corresponding deduction approach.\26\ The deductions 
described in this section are net of associated DTLs in accordance with 
paragraph (e) of this section. In addition, an advanced approaches 
FDIC-supervised institution that underwrites a failed underwriting, 
with the prior written approval of the FDIC, for the period of time 
stipulated by the FDIC, is not required to deduct a non-significant 
investment in the capital of an unconsolidated financial institution 
pursuant to this paragraph (c) to the extent the investment is related 
to the failed underwriting.\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \26\ With the prior written approval of the FDIC, for the period 
of time stipulated by the FDIC, an advanced approaches FDIC-
supervised institution is not required to deduct a non-significant 
investment in the capital of an unconsolidated financial institution 
pursuant to this paragraph if the financial institution is in 
distress and if such investment is made for the purpose of providing 
financial support to the financial institution, as determined by the 
FDIC.
    \27\ Any non-significant investments in the capital of 
unconsolidated financial institutions that do not exceed the 10 
percent threshold for non-significant investments under this section 
must be assigned the appropriate risk weight under subparts D, E, or 
F of this part, as applicable.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (ii) The amount to be deducted under this section from a specific 
capital component is equal to:
    (A) The advanced approaches FDIC-supervised institution's non-
significant investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial 
institutions exceeding the 10 percent threshold for non-significant 
investments, multiplied by
    (B) The ratio of the advanced approaches FDIC-supervised 
institution's non-significant investments in the capital of 
unconsolidated financial institutions in the form of such capital 
component to the advanced approaches FDIC-supervised institution's 
total non-significant investments in unconsolidated financial 
institutions.

[[Page 35274]]

    (6) Significant investments in the capital of unconsolidated 
financial institutions that are not in the form of common stock. An 
advanced approaches FDIC-supervised institution must deduct its 
significant investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial 
institutions that are not in the form of common stock by applying the 
corresponding deduction approach.\28\ The deductions described in this 
section are net of associated DTLs in accordance with paragraph (e) of 
this section. In addition, with the prior written approval of the FDIC, 
for the period of time stipulated by the FDIC, an advanced approaches 
FDIC-supervised institution that underwrites a failed underwriting is 
not required to deduct a significant investment in the capital of an 
unconsolidated financial institution pursuant to this paragraph (c) if 
such investment is related to such failed underwriting.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \28\ With prior written approval of the FDIC, for the period of 
time stipulated by the FDIC, an advanced approaches FDIC-supervised 
institution is not required to deduct a significant investment in 
the capital instrument of an unconsolidated financial institution in 
distress which is not in the form of common stock pursuant to this 
section if such investment is made for the purpose of providing 
financial support to the financial institution as determined by the 
FDIC.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (d) MSAs and certain DTAs subject to common equity tier 1 capital 
deduction thresholds.
    (1) An FDIC-supervised institution that is not an advanced 
approaches FDIC-supervised institution must make deductions from 
regulatory capital as described in this paragraph (d)(1).
    (i) The FDIC-supervised institution must deduct from common equity 
tier 1 capital elements the amount of each of the items set forth in 
this paragraph (d)(1) that, individually, exceeds 25 percent of the sum 
of the FDIC-supervised institution's common equity tier 1 capital 
elements, less adjustments to and deductions from common equity tier 1 
capital required under paragraphs (a) through (c)(3) of this section 
(the 25 percent common equity tier 1 capital deduction threshold).\29\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \29\ The amount of the items in paragraph (d)(1) of this section 
that is not deducted from common equity tier 1 capital must be 
included in the risk-weighted assets of the FDIC-supervised 
institution and assigned a 250 percent risk weight.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (ii) The FDIC-supervised institution must deduct from common equity 
tier 1 capital elements the amount of DTAs arising from temporary 
differences that the FDIC-supervised institution could not realize 
through net operating loss carrybacks, net of any related valuation 
allowances and net of DTLs, in accordance with paragraph (e) of this 
section. An FDIC-supervised institution is not required to deduct from 
the sum of its common equity tier 1 capital elements DTAs (net of any 
related valuation allowances and net of DTLs, in accordance with Sec.  
324.22(e)) arising from timing differences that the FDIC-supervised 
institution could realize through net operating loss carrybacks. The 
FDIC-supervised institution must risk weight these assets at 100 
percent. For an FDIC-supervised institution that is a member of a 
consolidated group for tax purposes, the amount of DTAs that could be 
realized through net operating loss carrybacks may not exceed the 
amount that the FDIC-supervised institution could reasonably expect to 
have refunded by its parent holding company.
    (iii) The FDIC-supervised institution must deduct from common 
equity tier 1 capital elements the amount of MSAs net of associated 
DTLs, in accordance with paragraph (e) of this section.
    (iv) For purposes of calculating the amount of DTAs subject to 
deduction pursuant to paragraph (d)(1) of this section, an FDIC-
supervised institution may exclude DTAs and DTLs relating to 
adjustments made to common equity tier 1 capital under paragraph (b) of 
this section. An FDIC-supervised institution that elects to exclude 
DTAs relating to adjustments under paragraph (b) of this section also 
must exclude DTLs and must do so consistently in all future 
calculations. An FDIC-supervised institution may change its exclusion 
preference only after obtaining the prior approval of the FDIC.
    (2) An advanced approaches FDIC-supervised institution must make 
deductions from regulatory capital as described in this paragraph 
(d)(2).
    (i) An advanced approaches FDIC-supervised institution must deduct 
from common equity tier 1 capital elements the amount of each of the 
items set forth in this paragraph (d)(2) that, individually, exceeds 10 
percent of the sum of the advanced approaches FDIC-supervised 
institution's common equity tier 1 capital elements, less adjustments 
to and deductions from common equity tier 1 capital required under 
paragraphs (a) through (c) of this section (the 10 percent common 
equity tier 1 capital deduction threshold).
    (A) DTAs arising from temporary differences that the advanced 
approaches FDIC-supervised institution could not realize through net 
operating loss carrybacks, net of any related valuation allowances and 
net of DTLs, in accordance with paragraph (e) of this section. An 
advanced approaches FDIC-supervised institution is not required to 
deduct from the sum of its common equity tier 1 capital elements DTAs 
(net of any related valuation allowances and net of DTLs, in accordance 
with Sec.  324.22(e)) arising from timing differences that the advanced 
approaches FDIC-supervised institution could realize through net 
operating loss carrybacks. The advanced approaches FDIC-supervised 
institution must risk weight these assets at 100 percent. For an FDIC-
supervised institution that is a member of a consolidated group for tax 
purposes, the amount of DTAs that could be realized through net 
operating loss carrybacks may not exceed the amount that the FDIC-
supervised institution could reasonably expect to have refunded by its 
parent holding company.
    (B) MSAs net of associated DTLs, in accordance with paragraph (e) 
of this section.
    (C) Significant investments in the capital of unconsolidated 
financial institutions in the form of common stock, net of associated 
DTLs in accordance with paragraph (e) of this section.\30\ Significant 
investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial institutions in 
the form of common stock subject to the 10 percent common equity tier 1 
capital deduction threshold may be reduced by any goodwill embedded in 
the valuation of such investments deducted by the advanced approaches 
FDIC-supervised institution pursuant to paragraph (a)(1) of this 
section. In addition, with the prior written approval of the FDIC, for 
the period of time stipulated by the FDIC, an advanced approaches FDIC-
supervised institution that underwrites a failed underwriting is not 
required to deduct a significant investment in the capital of an 
unconsolidated financial institution in the form of common stock 
pursuant to this paragraph (d)(2) if such investment is related to such 
failed underwriting.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \30\ With the prior written approval of the FDIC, for the period 
of time stipulated by the FDIC, an advanced approaches FDIC-
supervised institution is not required to deduct a significant 
investment in the capital instrument of an unconsolidated financial 
institution in distress in the form of common stock pursuant to this 
section if such investment is made for the purpose of providing 
financial support to the financial institution as determined by the 
FDIC.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (ii) An advanced approaches FDIC-supervised institution must deduct 
from common equity tier 1 capital elements the items listed in 
paragraph (d)(2)(i) of this section that are not deducted as a result 
of the application of the 10 percent common equity tier 1 capital 
deduction threshold, and that, in aggregate, exceed 17.65 percent of 
the sum of the advanced approaches FDIC-supervised institution's common 
equity tier 1 capital elements, minus

[[Page 35275]]

adjustments to and deductions from common equity tier 1 capital 
required under paragraphs (a) through (c) of this section, minus the 
items listed in paragraph (d)(2)(i) of this section (the 15 percent 
common equity tier 1 capital deduction threshold). Any goodwill that 
has been deducted under paragraph (a)(1) of this section can be 
excluded from the significant investments in the capital of 
unconsolidated financial institutions in the form of common stock.\31\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \31\ The amount of the items in paragraph (d)(2) of this section 
that is not deducted from common equity tier 1 capital pursuant to 
this section must be included in the risk-weighted assets of the 
advanced approaches FDIC-supervised institution and assigned a 250 
percent risk weight.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (iii) For purposes of calculating the amount of DTAs subject to the 
10 and 15 percent common equity tier 1 capital deduction thresholds, an 
advanced approaches FDIC-supervised institution may exclude DTAs and 
DTLs relating to adjustments made to common equity tier 1 capital under 
paragraph (b) of this section. An advanced approaches FDIC-supervised 
institution that elects to exclude DTAs relating to adjustments under 
paragraph (b) of this section also must exclude DTLs and must do so 
consistently in all future calculations. An advanced approaches FDIC-
supervised institution may change its exclusion preference only after 
obtaining the prior approval of the FDIC.
* * * * *
    (g) Treatment of assets that are deducted. An FDIC-supervised 
institution must exclude from standardized total risk-weighted assets 
and, as applicable, advanced approaches total risk-weighted assets any 
item that is required to be deducted from regulatory capital.
    (h) Net long position. (1) For purposes of calculating an 
investment in the FDIC-supervised institution's own capital instrument 
and an investment in the capital of an unconsolidated financial 
institution under this section, the net long position is the gross long 
position in the underlying instrument determined in accordance with 
paragraph (h)(2) of this section, as adjusted to recognize a short 
position in the same instrument calculated in accordance with paragraph 
(h)(3) of this section.
    (2) Gross long position. The gross long position is determined as 
follows:
    (i) For an equity exposure that is held directly, the adjusted 
carrying value as that term is defined in Sec.  324.51(b);
    (ii) For an exposure that is held directly and is not an equity 
exposure or a securitization exposure, the exposure amount as that term 
is defined in Sec.  324.2;
    (iii) For an indirect exposure, the FDIC-supervised institution's 
carrying value of the investment in the investment fund, provided that, 
alternatively:
    (A) An FDIC-supervised institution may, with the prior approval of 
the FDIC, use a conservative estimate of the amount of its investment 
in the FDIC-supervised institution's own capital instruments or its 
investment in the capital of an unconsolidated financial institution 
held through a position in an index; or
    (B) An FDIC-supervised institution may calculate the gross long 
position for investments in the FDIC-supervised institution's own 
capital instruments or investments in the capital of an unconsolidated 
financial institution by multiplying the FDIC-supervised institution's 
carrying value of its investment in the investment fund by either:
    (1) The highest stated investment limit (in percent) for 
investments in the FDIC-supervised institution's own capital 
instruments or investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial 
institutions as stated in the prospectus, partnership agreement, or 
similar contract defining permissible investments of the investment 
fund; or
    (2) The investment fund's actual holdings of investments in the 
FDIC-supervised institution's own capital instruments or investments in 
the capital of unconsolidated financial institutions.
    (iv) For a synthetic exposure, the amount of the FDIC-supervised 
institution's loss on the exposure if the reference capital instrument 
were to have a value of zero.
    (3) Adjustments to reflect a short position. In order to adjust the 
gross long position to recognize a short position in the same 
instrument, the following criteria must be met:
    (i) The maturity of the short position must match the maturity of 
the long position, or the short position has a residual maturity of at 
least one year (maturity requirement); or
    (ii) For a position that is a trading asset or trading liability 
(whether on- or off-balance sheet) as reported on the FDIC-supervised 
institution's Call Report if the FDIC-supervised institution has a 
contractual right or obligation to sell the long position at a specific 
point in time and the counterparty to the contract has an obligation to 
purchase the long position if the FDIC-supervised institution exercises 
its right to sell, this point in time may be treated as the maturity of 
the long position such that the maturity of the long position and short 
position are deemed to match for purposes of the maturity requirement, 
even if the maturity of the short position is less than one year; and
    (iii) For an investment in the FDIC-supervised institution's own 
capital instrument under paragraph (c)(1) of this section or an 
investment in the capital of an unconsolidated financial institution 
under paragraphs (c) and (d) of this section:
    (A) An FDIC-supervised institution may only net a short position 
against a long position in an investment in the FDIC-supervised 
institution's own capital instrument under paragraph (c) of this 
section if the short position involves no counterparty credit risk.
    (B) A gross long position in an investment in the FDIC-supervised 
institution's own capital instrument or an investment in the capital of 
an unconsolidated financial institution resulting from a position in an 
index may be netted against a short position in the same index. Long 
and short positions in the same index without maturity dates are 
considered to have matching maturities.
    (C) A short position in an index that is hedging a long cash or 
synthetic position in an investment in the FDIC-supervised 
institution's own capital instrument or an investment in the capital of 
an unconsolidated financial institution can be decomposed to provide 
recognition of the hedge. More specifically, the portion of the index 
that is composed of the same underlying instrument that is being hedged 
may be used to offset the long position if both the long position being 
hedged and the short position in the index are reported as a trading 
asset or trading liability (whether on- or off-balance sheet) on the 
FDIC-supervised institution's Call Report and the hedge is deemed 
effective by the FDIC-supervised institution's internal control 
processes, which have not been found to be inadequate by the FDIC.

0
 55. Effective October 1, 2019, Sec.  324.32 is amended by revising 
paragraphs (b), (d)(2), (d)(3)(ii), (k), and (l) to read as follows:


Sec.  324.32   General risk weights.

* * * * *
    (b) Certain supranational entities and multilateral development 
banks (MDBs). An FDIC-supervised institution must assign a zero percent 
risk weight to an exposure to the Bank for International Settlements, 
the European Central Bank, the European Commission, the International 
Monetary Fund, the European Stability Mechanism, the

[[Page 35276]]

European Financial Stability Facility, or an MDB.
* * * * *
    (d) * * *
    (2) Exposures to foreign banks. (i) Except as otherwise provided 
under paragraphs (d)(2)(iii), (d)(2)(v), and (d)(3) of this section, an 
FDIC-supervised institution must assign a risk weight to an exposure to 
a foreign bank, in accordance with Table 2 to Sec.  324.32, based on 
the CRC that corresponds to the foreign bank's home country or the OECD 
membership status of the foreign bank's home country if there is no CRC 
applicable to the foreign bank's home country.

  Table 2 to Sec.   324.32--Risk Weights for Exposures to Foreign Banks
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                            Risk weight
                                                           (in percent)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
CRC:
  0-1...................................................              20
  2.....................................................              50
  3.....................................................             100
  4-7...................................................             150
OECD Member with No CRC.................................              20
Non-OECD Member with No CRC.............................             100
Sovereign Default.......................................             150
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (ii) An FDIC-supervised institution must assign a 20 percent risk 
weight to an exposure to a foreign bank whose home country is a member 
of the OECD and does not have a CRC.
    (iii) An FDIC-supervised institution must assign a 20 percent risk-
weight to an exposure that is a self-liquidating, trade-related 
contingent item that arises from the movement of goods and that has a 
maturity of three months or less to a foreign bank whose home country 
has a CRC of 0, 1, 2, or 3, or is an OECD member with no CRC.
    (iv) An FDIC-supervised institution must assign a 100 percent risk 
weight to an exposure to a foreign bank whose home country is not a 
member of the OECD and does not have a CRC, with the exception of self-
liquidating, trade-related contingent items that arise from the 
movement of goods, and that have a maturity of three months or less, 
which may be assigned a 20 percent risk weight.
    (v) An FDIC-supervised institution must assign a 150 percent risk 
weight to an exposure to a foreign bank immediately upon determining 
that an event of sovereign default has occurred in the bank's home 
country, or if an event of sovereign default has occurred in the 
foreign bank's home country during the previous five years.
    (3) * * *
    (ii) A significant investment in the capital of an unconsolidated 
financial institution in the form of common stock pursuant to Sec.  
324.22(d)(2)(i)(c);
* * * * *
    (k) Past due exposures. Except for an exposure to a sovereign 
entity or a residential mortgage exposure or a policy loan, if an 
exposure is 90 days or more past due or on nonaccrual:
    (1) An FDIC-supervised institution must assign a 150 percent risk 
weight to the portion of the exposure that is not guaranteed or that is 
unsecured;
    (2) An FDIC-supervised institution may assign a risk weight to the 
guaranteed portion of a past due exposure based on the risk weight that 
applies under Sec.  324.36 if the guarantee or credit derivative meets 
the requirements of that section; and
    (3) An FDIC-supervised institution may assign a risk weight to the 
collateralized portion of a past due exposure based on the risk weight 
that applies under Sec.  324.37 if the collateral meets the 
requirements of that section.
    (l) Other assets. (1) An FDIC-supervised institution must assign a 
zero percent risk weight to cash owned and held in all offices of the 
FDIC-supervised institution or in transit; to gold bullion held in the 
FDIC-supervised institution's own vaults or held in another depository 
institution's vaults on an allocated basis, to the extent the gold 
bullion assets are offset by gold bullion liabilities; and to exposures 
that arise from the settlement of cash transactions (such as equities, 
fixed income, spot foreign exchange and spot commodities) with a 
central counterparty where there is no assumption of ongoing 
counterparty credit risk by the central counterparty after settlement 
of the trade and associated default fund contributions.
    (2) An FDIC-supervised institution must assign a 20 percent risk 
weight to cash items in the process of collection.
    (3) An FDIC-supervised institution must assign a 100 percent risk 
weight to DTAs arising from temporary differences that the FDIC-
supervised institution could realize through net operating loss 
carrybacks.
    (4) An FDIC-supervised institution must assign a 250 percent risk 
weight to the portion of each of the following items to the extent it 
is not deducted from common equity tier 1 capital pursuant to Sec.  
324.22(d):
    (i) MSAs; and
    (ii) DTAs arising from temporary differences that the FDIC-
supervised institution could not realize through net operating loss 
carrybacks.
    (5) An FDIC-supervised institution must assign a 100 percent risk 
weight to all assets not specifically assigned a different risk weight 
under this subpart and that are not deducted from tier 1 or tier 2 
capital pursuant to Sec.  324.22.
    (6) Notwithstanding the requirements of this section, an FDIC-
supervised institution may assign an asset that is not included in one 
of the categories provided in this section to the risk weight category 
applicable under the capital rules applicable to bank holding companies 
and savings and loan holding companies under 12 CFR part 217, provided 
that all of the following conditions apply:
    (i) The FDIC-supervised institution is not authorized to hold the 
asset under applicable law other than debt previously contracted or 
similar authority; and
    (ii) The risks associated with the asset are substantially similar 
to the risks of assets that are otherwise assigned to a risk weight 
category of less than 100 percent under this subpart.

0
56. Effective October 1, 2019, Sec.  324.34 is amended by revising 
paragraph (c) to read as follows:


Sec.  324.34   OTC derivative contracts.

* * * * *
    (c) Counterparty credit risk for OTC credit derivatives--(1) 
Protection purchasers. An FDIC-supervised institution that purchases an 
OTC credit derivative that is recognized under Sec.  324.36 as a credit 
risk mitigant for an exposure that is not a covered position under 
subpart F is not required to compute a separate counterparty credit 
risk capital requirement under this subpart D provided that the FDIC-
supervised institution does so consistently for all such credit 
derivatives. The FDIC-supervised institution must either include all or 
exclude all such credit derivatives that are subject to a qualifying 
master netting agreement from any measure used to determine 
counterparty credit risk exposure to all relevant counterparties for 
risk-based capital purposes.
    (2) Protection providers. (i) An FDIC-supervised institution that 
is the protection provider under an OTC credit derivative must treat 
the OTC credit derivative as an exposure to the underlying reference 
asset. The FDIC-supervised institution is not required to compute a 
counterparty credit risk capital requirement for the OTC credit 
derivative under this subpart D, provided that this treatment is 
applied consistently for all such OTC credit derivatives. The FDIC-
supervised institution must either include all or exclude all such OTC 
credit derivatives that are subject to a qualifying master netting 
agreement from any measure

[[Page 35277]]

used to determine counterparty credit risk exposure.
    (ii) The provisions of this paragraph (c)(2) apply to all relevant 
counterparties for risk-based capital purposes unless the FDIC-
supervised institution is treating the OTC credit derivative as a 
covered position under subpart F, in which case the FDIC-supervised 
institution must compute a supplemental counterparty credit risk 
capital requirement under this section.
* * * * *

0
57. Effective October 1, 2019, Sec.  324.35 is amended by revising 
paragraph (b)(3)(ii), (b)(4)(ii), (c)(3)(ii), and (c)(4)(ii) to read as 
follows:


Sec.  324.35   Cleared transactions.

* * * * *
    (b) * * *
    (3) * * *
    (ii) For a cleared transaction with a CCP that is not a QCCP, a 
clearing member client FDIC-supervised institution must apply the risk 
weight appropriate for the CCP according to this subpart D.
    (4) * * *
    (ii) A clearing member client FDIC-supervised institution must 
calculate a risk-weighted asset amount for any collateral provided to a 
CCP, clearing member, or custodian in connection with a cleared 
transaction in accordance with the requirements under this subpart D.
    (c) * * *
    (3) * * *
    (ii) For a cleared transaction with a CCP that is not a QCCP, a 
clearing member FDIC-supervised institution must apply the risk weight 
appropriate for the CCP according to this subpart D.
    (4) * * *
    (ii) A clearing member FDIC-supervised institution must calculate a 
risk-weighted asset amount for any collateral provided to a CCP, 
clearing member, or a custodian in connection with a cleared 
transaction in accordance with requirements under this subpart D.
* * * * *

0
58. Effective October 1, 2019, Sec.  324.36 is amended by revising 
paragraph (c) to read as follows:


Sec.  324.36   Guarantees and credit derivatives: substitution 
treatment.

* * * * *
    (c) Substitution approach--(1) Full coverage. If an eligible 
guarantee or eligible credit derivative meets the conditions in 
paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section and the protection amount (P) of 
the guarantee or credit derivative is greater than or equal to the 
exposure amount of the hedged exposure, an FDIC-supervised institution 
may recognize the guarantee or credit derivative in determining the 
risk-weighted asset amount for the hedged exposure by substituting the 
risk weight applicable to the guarantor or credit derivative protection 
provider under this subpart D for the risk weight assigned to the 
exposure.
    (2) Partial coverage. If an eligible guarantee or eligible credit 
derivative meets the conditions in paragraphs (a) and (b) of this 
section and the protection amount (P) of the guarantee or credit 
derivative is less than the exposure amount of the hedged exposure, the 
FDIC-supervised institution must treat the hedged exposure as two 
separate exposures (protected and unprotected) in order to recognize 
the credit risk mitigation benefit of the guarantee or credit 
derivative.
    (i) The FDIC-supervised institution may calculate the risk-weighted 
asset amount for the protected exposure under this subpart D, where the 
applicable risk weight is the risk weight applicable to the guarantor 
or credit derivative protection provider.
    (ii) The FDIC-supervised institution must calculate the risk-
weighted asset amount for the unprotected exposure under this subpart 
D, where the applicable risk weight is that of the unprotected portion 
of the hedged exposure.
    (iii) The treatment provided in this section is applicable when the 
credit risk of an exposure is covered on a partial pro rata basis and 
may be applicable when an adjustment is made to the effective notional 
amount of the guarantee or credit derivative under paragraphs (d), (e), 
or (f) of this section.
* * * * *

0
59. Effective October 1, 2019, Sec.  324.37 is amended by revising 
paragraph (b)(2)(i) to read as follows:


Sec.  324.37   Collateralized transactions.

* * * * *
    (b) * * *
    (2) Risk weight substitution. (i) An FDIC-supervised institution 
may apply a risk weight to the portion of an exposure that is secured 
by the fair value of financial collateral (that meets the requirements 
of paragraph (b)(1) of this section) based on the risk weight assigned 
to the collateral under this subpart D. For repurchase agreements, 
reverse repurchase agreements, and securities lending and borrowing 
transactions, the collateral is the instruments, gold, and cash the 
FDIC-supervised institution has borrowed, purchased subject to resale, 
or taken as collateral from the counterparty under the transaction. 
Except as provided in paragraph (b)(3) of this section, the risk weight 
assigned to the collateralized portion of the exposure may not be less 
than 20 percent.
* * * * *

0
60. Effective October 1, 2019, Sec.  324.38 is amended by revising 
paragraph (e)(2) to read as follows:


Sec.  324.38   Unsettled transactions.

* * * * *
    (e) * * *
    (2) From the business day after the FDIC-supervised institution has 
made its delivery until five business days after the counterparty 
delivery is due, the FDIC-supervised institution must calculate the 
risk-weighted asset amount for the transaction by treating the current 
fair value of the deliverables owed to the FDIC-supervised institution 
as an exposure to the counterparty and using the applicable 
counterparty risk weight under this subpart D.
* * * * *

0
 61. Effective October 1, 2019, Sec.  324.42 is amended by revising 
paragraph (j)(2)(ii)(A) to read as follows:


Sec.  324.42   Risk-weighted assets for securitization exposures.

* * * * *
    (j) * * *
    (2) * * *
    (ii) * * *
    (A) If the FDIC-supervised institution purchases credit protection 
from a counterparty that is not a securitization SPE, the FDIC-
supervised institution must determine the risk weight for the exposure 
according to this subpart D.
* * * * *

0
62. Effective October 1, 2019, Sec.  324.52 is amended by revising 
paragraphs (b)(1) and (4) to read as follows:


Sec.  324.52   Simple risk-weight approach (SRWA).

* * * * *
    (b) * * *
    (1) Zero percent risk weight equity exposures. An equity exposure 
to a sovereign, the Bank for International Settlements, the European 
Central Bank, the European Commission, the International Monetary Fund, 
the European Stability Mechanism, the European Financial Stability 
Facility, an MDB, and any other entity whose credit exposures receive a 
zero percent risk weight under Sec.  324.32 may be assigned a zero 
percent risk weight.
* * * * *
    (4) 250 percent risk weight equity exposures. Significant 
investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial institutions in 
the form of common

[[Page 35278]]

stock that are not deducted from capital pursuant to Sec.  324.22(d)(2) 
are assigned a 250 percent risk weight.
* * * * *

0
63. Effective October 1, 2019, Sec.  324.61 is revised to read as 
follows:


Sec.  324.61   Purpose and scope.

    Sections 324.61 through 324.63 of this subpart establish public 
disclosure requirements related to the capital requirements described 
in subpart B of this part for an FDIC-supervised institution with total 
consolidated assets of $50 billion or more as reported on the FDIC-
supervised institution's most recent year-end Call Report that is not 
an advanced approaches FDIC-supervised institution making public 
disclosures pursuant to Sec.  324.172. An advanced approaches FDIC-
supervised institution that has not received approval from the FDIC to 
exit parallel run pursuant to Sec.  324.121(d) is subject to the 
disclosure requirements described in Sec. Sec.  324.62 and 324.63. An 
FDIC-supervised institution with total consolidated assets of $50 
billion or more as reported on the FDIC-supervised institution's most 
recent year-end Call Report that is not an advanced approaches FDIC-
supervised institution making public disclosures subject to Sec.  
324.172 must comply with Sec.  324.62 unless it is a consolidated 
subsidiary of a bank holding company, savings and loan holding company, 
or depository institution that is subject to the disclosure 
requirements of Sec.  324.62 or a subsidiary of a non-U.S. banking 
organization that is subject to comparable public disclosure 
requirements in its home jurisdiction. For purposes of this section, 
total consolidated assets are determined based on the average of the 
FDIC-supervised institution's total consolidated assets in the four 
most recent quarters as reported on the Call Report; or the average of 
the FDIC-supervised institution's total consolidated assets in the most 
recent consecutive quarters as reported quarterly on the FDIC-
supervised institution's Call Report if the FDIC-supervised institution 
has not filed such a report for each of the most recent four quarters.

0
 64. Effective October 1, 2019, Sec.  324.63 is amended by revising 
Tables 3 and 8 to Sec.  324.63 to read as follows:


Sec.  324.63   Disclosures by FDIC-supervised institutions described in 
Sec.  324.61.

* * * * *

                                   Table 3 to Sec.   324.63--Capital Adequacy
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Qualitative disclosures...............................  (a) A summary discussion of the FDIC-supervised
                                                         institution's approach to assessing the adequacy of its
                                                         capital to support current and future activities.
Quantitative disclosures..............................  (b) Risk-weighted assets for:
                                                           (1) Exposures to sovereign entities;
                                                           (2) Exposures to certain supranational entities and
                                                            MDBs;
                                                           (3) Exposures to depository institutions, foreign
                                                            banks, and credit unions;
                                                           (4) Exposures to PSEs;
                                                           (5) Corporate exposures;
                                                           (6) Residential mortgage exposures;
                                                           (7) Statutory multifamily mortgages and pre-sold
                                                            construction loans;
                                                           (8) HVCRE exposures;
                                                           (9) Past due loans;
                                                           (10) Other assets;
                                                           (11) Cleared transactions;
                                                           (12) Default fund contributions;
                                                           (13) Unsettled transactions;
                                                           (14) Securitization exposures; and
                                                           (15) Equity exposures.
                                                        (c) Standardized market risk-weighted assets as
                                                         calculated under subpart F of this part.
                                                        (d) Common equity tier 1, tier 1 and total risk-based
                                                         capital ratios:
                                                           (1) For the top consolidated group; and
                                                           (2) For each depository institution subsidiary.
                                                        (e) Total standardized risk-weighted assets.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

* * * * *

                                    Table 8 to Sec.   324.63--Securitization
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Qualitative Disclosures...............................  (a) The general qualitative disclosure requirement with
                                                         respect to a securitization (including synthetic
                                                         securitizations), including a discussion of:
                                                           (1) The FDIC-supervised institution's objectives for
                                                            securitizing assets, including the extent to which
                                                            these activities transfer credit risk of the
                                                            underlying exposures away from the FDIC-supervised
                                                            institution to other entities and including the type
                                                            of risks assumed and retained with resecuritization
                                                            activity; \1\
                                                           (2) The nature of the risks (e.g. liquidity risk)
                                                            inherent in the securitized assets;
                                                           (3) The roles played by the FDIC-supervised
                                                            institution in the securitization process \2\ and an
                                                            indication of the extent of the FDIC-supervised
                                                            institution's involvement in each of them;
                                                           (4) The processes in place to monitor changes in the
                                                            credit and market risk of securitization exposures
                                                            including how those processes differ for
                                                            resecuritization exposures;
                                                           (5) The FDIC-supervised institution's policy for
                                                            mitigating the credit risk retained through
                                                            securitization and resecuritization exposures; and
                                                           (6) The risk-based capital approaches that the FDIC-
                                                            supervised institution follows for its
                                                            securitization exposures including the type of
                                                            securitization exposure to which each approach
                                                            applies.
                                                        (b) A list of:
                                                           (1) The type of securitization SPEs that the FDIC-
                                                            supervised institution, as sponsor, uses to
                                                            securitize third-party exposures. The FDIC-
                                                            supervised institution must indicate whether it has
                                                            exposure to these SPEs, either on- or off-balance
                                                            sheet; and

[[Page 35279]]

 
                                                           (2) Affiliated entities:
                                                             (i) That the FDIC-supervised institution manages or
                                                              advises; and
                                                             (ii) That invest either in the securitization
                                                              exposures that the FDIC-supervised institution has
                                                              securitized or in securitization SPEs that the
                                                              FDIC-supervised institution sponsors.\3\
                                                        (c) Summary of the FDIC-supervised institution's
                                                         accounting policies for securitization activities,
                                                         including:
                                                           (1) Whether the transactions are treated as sales or
                                                            financings;
                                                           (2) Recognition of gain-on-sale;
                                                           (3) Methods and key assumptions applied in valuing
                                                            retained or purchased interests;
                                                           (4) Changes in methods and key assumptions from the
                                                            previous period for valuing retained interests and
                                                            impact of the changes;
                                                           (5) Treatment of synthetic securitizations;
                                                           (6) How exposures intended to be securitized are
                                                            valued and whether they are recorded under subpart D
                                                            of this part; and
                                                           (7) Policies for recognizing liabilities on the
                                                            balance sheet for arrangements that could require
                                                            the FDIC-supervised institution to provide financial
                                                            support for securitized assets.
                                                        (d) An explanation of significant changes to any
                                                         quantitative information since the last reporting
                                                         period.
Quantitative Disclosures..............................  (e) The total outstanding exposures securitized by the
                                                         FDIC-supervised institution in securitizations that
                                                         meet the operational criteria provided in Sec.   324.41
                                                         (categorized into traditional and synthetic
                                                         securitizations), by exposure type, separately for
                                                         securitizations of third-party exposures for which the
                                                         bank acts only as sponsor.\4\
                                                        (f) For exposures securitized by the FDIC-supervised
                                                         institution in securitizations that meet the
                                                         operational criteria in Sec.   324.41:
                                                           (1) Amount of securitized assets that are impaired/
                                                            past due categorized by exposure type; \5\ and
                                                           (2) Losses recognized by the FDIC-supervised
                                                            institution during the current period categorized by
                                                            exposure type.\6\
                                                        (g) The total amount of outstanding exposures intended
                                                         to be securitized categorized by exposure type.
                                                        (h) Aggregate amount of:
                                                           (1) On-balance sheet securitization exposures
                                                            retained or purchased categorized by exposure type;
                                                            and
                                                           (2) Off-balance sheet securitization exposures
                                                            categorized by exposure type.
                                                        (i) (1) Aggregate amount of securitization exposures
                                                         retained or purchased and the associated capital
                                                         requirements for these exposures, categorized between
                                                         securitization and resecuritization exposures, further
                                                         categorized into a meaningful number of risk weight
                                                         bands and by risk-based capital approach (e.g., SSFA);
                                                         and
                                                           (2) Aggregate amount disclosed separately by type of
                                                            underlying exposure in the pool of any:
                                                             (i) After-tax gain-on-sale on a securitization that
                                                              has been deducted from common equity tier 1
                                                              capital; and
                                                             (ii) Credit-enhancing interest-only strip that is
                                                              assigned a 1,250 percent risk weight.
                                                        (j) Summary of current year's securitization activity,
                                                         including the amount of exposures securitized (by
                                                         exposure type), and recognized gain or loss on sale by
                                                         exposure type.
                                                        (k) Aggregate amount of resecuritization exposures
                                                         retained or purchased categorized according to:
                                                           (1) Exposures to which credit risk mitigation is
                                                            applied and those not applied; and
                                                           (2) Exposures to guarantors categorized according to
                                                            guarantor creditworthiness categories or guarantor
                                                            name.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The FDIC-supervised institution should describe the structure of resecuritizations in which it participates;
  this description should be provided for the main categories of resecuritization products in which the FDIC-
  supervised institution is active.
\2\ For example, these roles may include originator, investor, servicer, provider of credit enhancement,
  sponsor, liquidity provider, or swap provider.
\3\ Such affiliated entities may include, for example, money market funds, to be listed individually, and
  personal and private trusts, to be noted collectively.
\4\ ``Exposures securitized'' include underlying exposures originated by the FDIC-supervised institution,
  whether generated by them or purchased, and recognized in the balance sheet, from third parties, and third-
  party exposures included in sponsored transactions. Securitization transactions (including underlying
  exposures originally on the FDIC-supervised institution's balance sheet and underlying exposures acquired by
  the FDIC-supervised institution from third-party entities) in which the originating bank does not retain any
  securitization exposure should be shown separately but need only be reported for the year of inception. FDIC-
  supervised institutions are required to disclose exposures regardless of whether there is a capital charge
  under this part.
\5\ Include credit-related other than temporary impairment (OTTI).
\6\ For example, charge-offs/allowances (if the assets remain on the FDIC-supervised institution's balance
  sheet) or credit-related OTTI of interest-only strips and other retained residual interests, as well as
  recognition of liabilities for probable future financial support required of the FDIC-supervised institution
  with respect to securitized assets.

* * * * *

0
65. Effective October 1, 2019, Sec.  324.131 is amended by revising 
paragraph (d)(2) to read as follows:


Sec.  324.131   Mechanics for calculating total wholesale and retail 
risk-weighted assets.

* * * * *
    (d) * * *
    (2) Floor on PD assignment. The PD for each wholesale obligor or 
retail segment may not be less than 0.03 percent, except for exposures 
to or directly and unconditionally guaranteed by a sovereign entity, 
the Bank for International Settlements, the International Monetary 
Fund, the European Commission, the European Central Bank, the European 
Stability Mechanism, the European Financial Stability Facility, or a 
multilateral development bank, to which the FDIC-supervised institution 
assigns a rating grade associated with a PD of less than 0.03 percent.
* * * * *

0
 66. Effective October 1, 2019, Sec.  324.133 is amended by revising 
paragraphs (b)(3)(ii) and (c)(3)(ii) to read as follows:


Sec.  324.133   Cleared transactions.

* * * * *
    (b) * * *
    (3) * * *
    (ii) For a cleared transaction with a CCP that is not a QCCP, a 
clearing member client FDIC-supervised institution must apply the risk 
weight

[[Page 35280]]

applicable to the CCP under subpart D of this part.
* * * * *
    (c) * * *
    (3) * * *
    (ii) For a cleared transaction with a CCP that is not a QCCP, a 
clearing member FDIC-supervised institution must apply the risk weight 
applicable to the CCP according to subpart D of this part.
* * * * *

0
67. Effective October 1, 2019, Sec.  324.152 is amended by revising 
paragraphs (b)(5) and (6) to read as follows:


Sec.  324.152   Simple risk weight approach (SRWA).

* * * * *
    (b) * * *
    (5) 300 percent risk weight equity exposures. A publicly traded 
equity exposure (other than an equity exposure described in paragraph 
(b)(7) of this section and including the ineffective portion of a hedge 
pair) is assigned a 300 percent risk weight.
    (6) 400 percent risk weight equity exposures. An equity exposure 
(other than an equity exposure described in paragraph (b)(7) of this 
section) that is not publicly traded is assigned a 400 percent risk 
weight.
* * * * *

0
68. Effective October 1, 2019, Sec.  324.202 is amended by revising the 
definition of ``Corporate debt position'' in paragraph (b) to read as 
follows:


Sec.  324.202   Definitions.

* * * * *
    (b) * * *
    Corporate debt position means a debt position that is an exposure 
to a company that is not a sovereign entity, the Bank for International 
Settlements, the European Central Bank, the European Commission, the 
International Monetary Fund, the European Stability Mechanism, the 
European Financial Stability Facility, a multilateral development bank, 
a depository institution, a foreign bank, a credit union, a public 
sector entity, a GSE, or a securitization.
* * * * *

0
69. Effective October 1, 2019, Sec.  324.210 is amended by revising 
paragraph (b)(2)(ii) to read as follows:


Sec.  324.210   Standardized measurement method for specific risk.

* * * * *
    (b) * * *
    (2) * * *
    (ii) Certain supranational entity and multilateral development bank 
debt positions. An FDIC-supervised institution may assign a 0.0 percent 
specific risk-weighting factor to a debt position that is an exposure 
to the Bank for International Settlements, the European Central Bank, 
the European Commission, the International Monetary Fund, the European 
Stability Mechanism, the European Financial Stability Facility, or an 
MDB.
* * * * *


Sec.  324.300  [Amended]

0
70. Effective April 1, 2020, Sec.  324.300 is amended by removing 
paragraphs (b) and (d).

    Dated: June 3, 2019.
Joseph M. Otting,
Comptroller of the Currency.
    By order of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System, July 9, 2019.
Yao-Chin Chao,
Assistant Secretary of the Board.

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.

    By order of the Board of Directors.

    Dated at Washington, DC, on May 28, 2019.
Valerie J. Best,
Assistant Executive Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2019-15131 Filed 7-19-19; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE P