[Federal Register Volume 84, Number 136 (Tuesday, July 16, 2019)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 33829-33845]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2019-15246]


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DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

8 CFR Part 208

RIN 1615-AC44

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Executive Office for Immigration Review

8 CFR Parts 1003 and 1208

[EOIR Docket No. 19-0504; A.G. Order No. 4488-2019]
RIN 1125-AA91


Asylum Eligibility and Procedural Modifications

AGENCY: Executive Office for Immigration Review, Department of Justice; 
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Department of Homeland 
Security.

ACTION: Interim final rule; request for comment.

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SUMMARY: The Department of Justice and the Department of Homeland 
Security (``DOJ,'' ``DHS,'' or collectively, ``the Departments'') are 
adopting an interim final rule (``interim rule'' or ``rule'') governing 
asylum claims in the context of aliens who enter or attempt to enter 
the United States across the southern land border after failing to 
apply for protection from persecution or torture while in a third 
country through which

[[Page 33830]]

they transited en route to the United States. Pursuant to statutory 
authority, the Departments are amending their respective regulations to 
provide that, with limited exceptions, an alien who enters or attempts 
to enter the United States across the southern border after failing to 
apply for protection in a third country outside the alien's country of 
citizenship, nationality, or last lawful habitual residence through 
which the alien transited en route to the United States is ineligible 
for asylum. This basis for asylum ineligibility applies only 
prospectively to aliens who enter or arrive in the United States on or 
after the effective date of this rule. In addition to establishing a 
new mandatory bar for asylum eligibility for aliens who enter or 
attempt to enter the United States across the southern border after 
failing to apply for protection from persecution or torture in at least 
one third country through which they transited en route to the United 
States, this rule would also require asylum officers and immigration 
judges to apply this new bar on asylum eligibility when administering 
the credible-fear screening process applicable to stowaways and aliens 
who are subject to expedited removal under section 235(b)(1) of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act. The new bar established by this 
regulation does not modify withholding or deferral of removal 
proceedings. Aliens who fail to apply for protection in a third country 
of transit may continue to apply for withholding of removal under the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (``INA'') and deferral of removal under 
regulations issued pursuant to the legislation implementing U.S. 
obligations under Article 3 of the Convention against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.

DATES: 
    Effective date: This rule is effective July 16, 2019.
    Submission of public comments: Written or electronic comments must 
be submitted on or before August 15, 2019. Written comments postmarked 
on or before that date will be considered timely. The electronic 
Federal Docket Management System will accept comments prior to midnight 
eastern standard time at the end of that day.

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments, identified by EOIR Docket No. 19-
0504, by one of the following methods:
     Federal eRulemaking Portal: http://www.regulations.gov. 
Follow the instructions for submitting comments.
     Mail: Lauren Alder Reid, Assistant Director, Office of 
Policy, Executive Office for Immigration Review, 5107 Leesburg Pike, 
Suite 2616, Falls Church, VA 22041. To ensure proper handling, please 
reference EOIR Docket No. 19-0504 on your correspondence. This mailing 
address may be used for paper, disk, or CD-ROM submissions.
     Hand Delivery/Courier: Lauren Alder Reid, Assistant 
Director, Office of Policy, Executive Office for Immigration Review, 
5107 Leesburg Pike, Suite 2616, Falls Church, VA 22041. Contact 
Telephone Number (703) 305-0289 (not a toll-free call).

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Lauren Alder Reid, Assistant Director, 
Office of Policy, Executive Office for Immigration Review, 5107 
Leesburg Pike, Suite 2616, Falls Church, VA 22041. Contact Telephone 
Number (703) 305-0289 (not a toll-free call).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Public Participation

    Interested persons are invited to participate in this rulemaking by 
submitting written data, views, or arguments on all aspects of this 
rule. The Departments also invite comments that relate to the potential 
economic or federalism effects that might result from this rule. To 
provide the most assistance to the Departments, comments should 
reference a specific portion of the rule; explain the reason for any 
recommended change; and include data, information, or authority that 
supports the recommended change. Comments received will be considered 
and addressed in the process of drafting the final rule.
    All comments submitted for this rulemaking should include the 
agency name and EOIR Docket No. 19-0504. Please note that all comments 
received are considered part of the public record and made available 
for public inspection at www.regulations.gov. Such information includes 
personally identifiable information (such as a person's name, address, 
or any other data that might personally identify that individual) that 
the commenter voluntarily submits.
    If you want to submit personally identifiable information as part 
of your comment, but do not want it to be posted online, you must 
include the phrase ``PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION'' in the first 
paragraph of your comment and precisely and prominently identify the 
information of which you seek redaction.
    If you want to submit confidential business information as part of 
your comment, but do not want it to be posted online, you must include 
the phrase ``CONFIDENTIAL BUSINESS INFORMATION'' in the first paragraph 
of your comment and precisely and prominently identify the confidential 
business information of which you seek redaction. If a comment has so 
much confidential business information that it cannot be effectively 
redacted, all or part of that comment may not be posted on 
www.regulations.gov. Personally identifiable information and 
confidential business information provided as set forth above will be 
placed in the public docket file of DOJ's Executive Office for 
Immigration Review (``EOIR''), but not posted online. To inspect the 
public docket file in person, you must make an appointment with EOIR. 
Please see the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT paragraph above for the 
contact information specific to this rule.

II. Purpose of This Interim Rule

    As discussed further below, asylum is a discretionary immigration 
benefit that generally can be sought by eligible aliens who are 
physically present or arriving in the United States, irrespective of 
their status, as provided in section 208 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1158. 
Congress, however, has provided that certain categories of aliens 
cannot receive asylum and has further delegated to the Attorney General 
and the Secretary of Homeland Security (``Secretary'') the authority to 
promulgate regulations establishing additional bars on eligibility to 
the extent consistent with the asylum statute, as well as the authority 
to establish ``any other conditions or limitations on the consideration 
of an application for asylum'' that are consistent with the INA. See 
INA 208(b)(2)(C), (d)(5)(B), 8 U.S.C. 1158(b)(2)(C), (d)(5)(B). This 
interim rule will limit aliens' eligibility for this discretionary 
benefit if they enter or attempt to enter the United States across the 
southern land border after failing to apply for protection in at least 
one third country through which they transited en route to the United 
States, subject to limited exceptions.
    The United States has experienced a dramatic increase in the number 
of aliens encountered along or near the southern land border with 
Mexico. This increase corresponds with a sharp increase in the number, 
and percentage, of aliens claiming fear of persecution or torture when 
apprehended or encountered by DHS. For example, over the past decade, 
the overall percentage of aliens subject to expedited removal and 
referred, as part of the initial screening process, for a credible-fear 
interview on claims of a fear of return has jumped from approximately 5

[[Page 33831]]

percent to above 40 percent. The number of cases referred to DOJ for 
proceedings before an immigration judge has also risen sharply, more 
than tripling between 2013 and 2018. These numbers are projected to 
continue to increase throughout the remainder of Fiscal Year (``FY'') 
2019 and beyond. Only a small minority of these individuals, however, 
are ultimately granted asylum.
    The large number of meritless asylum claims places an extraordinary 
strain on the nation's immigration system, undermines many of the 
humanitarian purposes of asylum, has exacerbated the humanitarian 
crisis of human smuggling, and affects the United States' ongoing 
diplomatic negotiations with foreign countries. This rule mitigates the 
strain on the country's immigration system by more efficiently 
identifying aliens who are misusing the asylum system to enter and 
remain in the United States rather than legitimately seeking urgent 
protection from persecution or torture. Aliens who transited through 
another country where protection was available, and yet did not seek 
protection, may fall within that category.
    Apprehending the great number of aliens crossing illegally into the 
United States and processing their credible-fear and asylum claims 
consumes an inordinate amount of resources of the Departments. DHS must 
surveil, apprehend, screen, and process the aliens who enter the 
country. DHS must also devote significant resources to detain many 
aliens pending further proceedings and to represent the United States 
in immigration court proceedings. The large influx of aliens also 
consumes substantial resources of DOJ, whose immigration judges 
adjudicate aliens' claims and whose officials are responsible for 
prosecuting and maintaining custody over those who violate Federal 
criminal law. Despite DOJ deploying close to double the number of 
immigration judges as in 2010 and completing historic numbers of cases, 
currently more than 900,000 cases are pending before the immigration 
courts. This represents an increase of more than 100,000 cases (or a 
greater than 13 percent increase in the number of pending cases) since 
the start of FY 2019. And this increase is on top of an already 
sizeable jump over the previous five years in the number of cases 
pending before immigration judges. From the end of FY 2013 to the close 
of FY 2018, the number of pending cases more than doubled, increasing 
nearly 125 percent.
    That increase is owing, in part, to the continued influx of aliens 
and record numbers of asylum applications being filed: More than 
436,000 of the currently pending immigration cases include an asylum 
application. But a large majority of the asylum claims raised by those 
apprehended at the southern border are ultimately determined to be 
without merit. The strain on the immigration system from those 
meritless cases has been extreme and extends to the judicial system. 
The INA provides many asylum-seekers with rights of appeal to the 
Article III courts of the United States. Final disposition of asylum 
claims, even those that lack merit, can take years and significant 
government resources to resolve, particularly where Federal courts of 
appeals grant stays of removal when appeals are filed. See De Leon v. 
INS, 115 F.3d 643 (9th Cir. 1997).
    The rule's bar on asylum eligibility for aliens who fail to apply 
for protection in at least one third country through which they transit 
en route to the United States also aims to further the humanitarian 
purposes of asylum. It prioritizes individuals who are unable to obtain 
protection from persecution elsewhere and individuals who are victims 
of a ``severe form of trafficking in persons'' as defined by 8 CFR 
214.11, many of whom do not volitionally transit through a third 
country to reach the United States. By deterring meritless asylum 
claims and de-prioritizing the applications of individuals who could 
have obtained protection in another country, the Departments seek to 
ensure that those refugees who have no alternative to U.S.-based asylum 
relief or have been subjected to an extreme form of human trafficking 
are able to obtain relief more quickly.
    Additionally, the rule seeks to curtail the humanitarian crisis 
created by human smugglers bringing men, women, and children across the 
southern border. By reducing the incentive for aliens without an urgent 
or genuine need for asylum to cross the border--in the hope of a 
lengthy asylum process that will enable them to remain in the United 
States for years, typically free from detention and with work 
authorization, despite their statutory ineligibility for relief--the 
rule aims to reduce human smuggling and its tragic effects.
    Finally, the rule aims to aid the United States in its negotiations 
with foreign nations on migration issues. Addressing the eligibility 
for asylum of aliens who enter or attempt to enter the United States 
after failing to seek protection in at least one third country through 
which they transited en route to the United States will better position 
the United States as it engages in ongoing diplomatic negotiations with 
Mexico and the Northern Triangle countries (Guatemala, El Salvador, and 
Honduras) regarding migration issues in general, related measures 
employed to control the flow of aliens into the United States (such as 
the recently implemented Migrant Protection Protocols \1\), and the 
urgent need to address the humanitarian and security crisis along the 
southern land border between the United States and Mexico.
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    \1\ See Notice of Availability for Policy Guidance Related to 
Implementation of the Migrant Protection Protocols, 84 FR 6811 (Feb. 
28, 2019).
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    In sum, this rule provides that, with limited exceptions, an alien 
who enters or arrives in the United States across the southern land 
border is ineligible for the discretionary benefit of asylum unless he 
or she applied for and received a final judgment denying protection in 
at least one third country through which he or she transited en route 
to the United States. The alien would, however, remain eligible to 
apply for statutory withholding of removal and for deferral of removal 
under the CAT.
    In order to alleviate the strain on the U.S. immigration system and 
more effectively provide relief to those most in need of asylum--
victims of a severe form of trafficking and refugees who have no other 
option--this rule incorporates the eligibility bar on asylum into the 
credible-fear screening process applicable to stowaways and aliens 
placed in expedited removal proceedings.

III. Background

A. Joint Interim Rule

    The Attorney General and the Secretary publish this joint interim 
rule pursuant to their respective authorities concerning asylum 
determinations.
    The Homeland Security Act of 2002 (``HSA''), Public Law 107-296, as 
amended, transferred many functions related to the execution of Federal 
immigration law to the newly created DHS. The HSA charged the Secretary 
``with the administration and enforcement of this chapter and all other 
laws relating to the immigration and naturalization of aliens,'' 8 
U.S.C. 1103(a)(1), and granted the Secretary the power to take all 
actions ``necessary for carrying out'' the provisions of the INA, id. 
at 1103(a)(3). The HSA also transferred to DHS some responsibility for 
affirmative asylum applications, i.e., applications for asylum made 
outside the removal context. See 6 U.S.C. 271(b)(3). That authority has 
been delegated within DHS to U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 
(``USCIS''). USCIS asylum officers

[[Page 33832]]

determine in the first instance whether an alien's affirmative asylum 
application should be granted. See 8 CFR 208.4(b), 208.9.
    But the HSA retained authority over certain individual immigration 
adjudications (including those related to defensive asylum 
applications) for DOJ, under EOIR and subject to the direction and 
regulation of the Attorney General. See 6 U.S.C. 521; 8 U.S.C. 1103(g). 
Thus, immigration judges within DOJ continue to adjudicate all asylum 
applications made by aliens during the removal process (defensive 
asylum applications), and they also review affirmative asylum 
applications referred by USCIS to the immigration court. See INA 
101(b)(4), 8 U.S.C. 1101(b)(4); 8 CFR 1208.2; Dhakal v. Sessions, 895 
F.3d 532, 536-37 (7th Cir. 2018) (describing affirmative and defensive 
asylum processes). The Board of Immigration Appeals (Board), also 
within DOJ, hears appeals from certain decisions by immigration judges. 
8 CFR 1003.1(b)-(d). Asylum-seekers may appeal certain Board decisions 
to the Article III courts of the United States. See INA 242(a), 8 
U.S.C. 1252(a).
    The HSA also provided ``[t]hat determination and ruling by the 
Attorney General with respect to all questions of law shall be 
controlling.'' INA 103(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. 1103(a)(1). This broad division 
of functions and authorities informs the background of this interim 
rule.

B. Legal Framework for Asylum

    Asylum is a form of discretionary relief under section 208 of the 
INA, 8 U.S.C. 1158, that generally, if granted, keeps an alien from 
being subject to removal, creates a path to lawful permanent resident 
status and U.S. citizenship, and affords a variety of other benefits, 
such as allowing certain alien family members to obtain lawful 
immigration status derivatively. See R-S-C v. Sessions, 869 F.3d 1176, 
1180 (10th Cir. 2017); see also, e.g., INA 208(c)(1)(A), (C), 8 U.S.C. 
1158(c)(1)(A), (C) (asylees cannot be removed subject to certain 
exceptions and can travel abroad with prior consent); INA 208(c)(1)(B), 
(d)(2), 8 U.S.C. 1158(c)(1)(B), (d)(2) (asylees shall be given work 
authorization; asylum applicants may be granted work authorization 180 
days after the filing of their applications); INA 208(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. 
1158(b)(3) (allowing derivative asylum for an asylee's spouse and 
unmarried children); INA 209(b), 8 U.S.C. 1159(b) (allowing the 
Attorney General or Secretary to adjust the status of an asylee to that 
of a lawful permanent resident); 8 CFR 209.2; 8 U.S.C. 1612(a)(2)(A) 
(asylees are eligible for certain Federal means-tested benefits on a 
preferential basis compared to most legal permanent residents); INA 
316(a), 8 U.S.C. 1427(a) (describing requirements for the 
naturalization of lawful permanent residents).
    Aliens applying for asylum must establish that they meet the 
definition of a ``refugee,'' that they are not subject to a bar to the 
granting of asylum, and that they merit a favorable exercise of 
discretion. INA 208(b)(1), 240(c)(4)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1158(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. 
1229a(c)(4)(A); see Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184, 187 (2013) 
(describing asylum as a form of ``discretionary relief from removal''); 
Delgado v. Mukasey, 508 F.3d 702, 705 (2d Cir. 2007) (``Asylum is a 
discretionary form of relief . . . . Once an applicant has established 
eligibility . . . it remains within the Attorney General's discretion 
to deny asylum.''). Because asylum is a discretionary form of relief 
from removal, the alien bears the burden of showing both eligibility 
for asylum and why the Attorney General or Secretary should exercise 
the discretion to grant relief. See INA 208(b)(1), 240(c)(4)(A), 8 
U.S.C. 1158(b)(1), 1229a(c)(4)(A)(ii); 8 CFR 1240.8(d); see Romilus v. 
Ashcroft, 385 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2004).
    Section 208 of the INA provides that, in order to apply for asylum, 
an applicant must be ``physically present'' or ``arriving'' in the 
United States, INA 208(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. 1158(a)(1). Furthermore, to 
obtain asylum, the alien must demonstrate that he or she meets the 
statutory definition of a ``refugee,'' INA 208(b)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. 
1158(b)(1)(A), and is not subject to an exception or bar, INA 
208(b)(2), 8 U.S.C. 1158(b)(2); 8 CFR 1240.8(d). The alien bears the 
burden of proof to establish that he or she meets these criteria. INA 
208(b)(1)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. 1158(b)(1)(B)(i); 8 CFR 1240.8(d).
    For an alien to establish that he or she is a ``refugee,'' the 
alien generally must be someone who is outside of his or her country of 
nationality and ``is unable or unwilling to return to . . . that 
country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on 
account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular 
social group, or political opinion.'' INA 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. 
1101(a)(42)(A). In addition, if evidence indicates that one or more of 
the grounds for mandatory denial may apply, see INA 208(b)(2)(A)(i)-
(vi), 8 U.S.C. 1158(b)(2)(A)(i)-(vi), an alien must show not only that 
he or she does not fit within one of the statutory bars to granting 
asylum but also that he or she is not subject to any ``additional 
limitations and conditions . . . under which an alien shall be 
ineligible for asylum'' established by a regulation that is 
``consistent with'' section 208 of the INA, see INA 208(b)(2)(C), 8 
U.S.C. 1158(b)(2)(C). The asylum applicant bears the burden of 
establishing that the bar at issue does not apply. 8 CFR 1240.8(d); see 
also, e.g., Rendon v. Mukasey, 520 F.3d 967, 973 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(applying 8 CFR 1240.8(d) in the context of the aggravated felony bar 
to asylum); Chen v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 513 F.3d 1255, 1257 (11th Cir. 
2008) (applying 8 CFR 1240.8(d) in the context of the persecutor bar); 
Gao v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 500 F.3d 93, 98 (2d Cir. 2007) (same).
    Because asylum is a discretionary benefit, those aliens who are 
statutorily eligible for asylum (i.e., those who meet the definition of 
``refugee'' and are not subject to a mandatory bar) are not entitled to 
it. After demonstrating eligibility, aliens must further meet their 
burden of showing that the Attorney General or Secretary should 
exercise his or her discretion to grant asylum. See INA 208(b)(1)(A), 8 
U.S.C. 1158(b)(1)(A) (the ``Secretary of Homeland Security or the 
Attorney General may grant asylum to an alien'' who applies in 
accordance with the required procedures and meets the definition of a 
``refugee''). The asylum statute's grant of discretion ``[i]s a broad 
delegation of power, which restricts the Attorney General's discretion 
to grant asylum only by requiring the Attorney General to first 
determine that the asylum applicant is a `refugee.' '' Komarenko v. 
INS, 35 F.3d 432, 436 (9th Cir. 1994), overruled on other grounds by 
Abebe v. Mukasey, 554 F.3d 1203 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (per curiam). 
Immigration judges and asylum officers exercise that delegated 
discretion on a case-by-case basis.

C. Establishing Bars to Asylum

    The availability of asylum has long been qualified both by 
statutory bars and by administrative discretion to create additional 
bars. Those bars have developed over time in a back-and-forth process 
between Congress and the Attorney General. The original asylum statute, 
as set out in the Refugee Act of 1980, Public Law 96-212, simply 
directed the Attorney General to ``establish a procedure for an alien 
physically present in the United States or at a land border or port of 
entry, irrespective of such alien's status, to apply for asylum, and 
the alien may be granted asylum in the discretion of the Attorney 
General if the Attorney General determines that such alien is a 
refugee'' within the meaning of the INA. See 8 U.S.C. 1158(a) (1982); 
see also INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 427-

[[Page 33833]]

29 (1987) (describing the 1980 provisions).
    In the 1980 implementing regulations, the Attorney General, in his 
discretion, established several mandatory bars to granting asylum that 
were modeled on the mandatory bars to eligibility for withholding of 
deportation under the then-existing section 243(h) of the INA. See 
Refugee and Asylum Procedures, 45 FR 37392, 37392 (June 2, 1980). Those 
regulations required denial of an asylum application if it was 
determined that (1) the alien was ``not a refugee within the meaning of 
section 101(a)(42)'' of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(42); (2) the alien 
had been ``firmly resettled in a foreign country'' before arriving in 
the United States; (3) the alien ``ordered, incited, assisted, or 
otherwise participated in the persecution of any person on account of 
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular group, or 
political opinion''; (4) the alien had ``been convicted by a final 
judgment of a particularly serious crime'' and therefore constituted 
``a danger to the community of the United States''; (5) there were 
``serious reasons for considering that the alien ha[d] committed a 
serious nonpolitical crime outside the United States prior to the 
arrival of the alien in the United States''; or (6) there were 
``reasonable grounds for regarding the alien as a danger to the 
security of the United States.'' See 45 FR at 37394-95.
    In 1990, the Attorney General substantially amended the asylum 
regulations while retaining the mandatory bars for aliens who (1) 
persecuted others on account of a protected ground; (2) were convicted 
of a particularly serious crime in the United States; (3) firmly 
resettled in another country; or (4) presented reasonable grounds to be 
regarded as a danger to the security of the United States. See Asylum 
and Withholding of Deportation Procedures, 55 FR 30674, 30683 (July 27, 
1990); see also Yang v. INS, 79 F.3d 932, 936-39 (9th Cir. 1996) 
(upholding firm-resettlement bar); Komarenko, 35 F.3d at 436 (upholding 
particularly-serious-crime bar), abrogated on other grounds, Abebe v. 
Mukasey, 554 F.3d 1203 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc). In the Immigration 
Act of 1990, Congress added an additional mandatory bar to applying for 
or being granted asylum for ``an[y] alien who has been convicted of an 
aggravated felony.'' Public Law 101-649, sec. 515 (1990).
    In the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act 
of 1996 (``IIRIRA''), Public Law 104-208, div. C, and the Antiterrorism 
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Public Law 104-132, Congress 
amended section 208 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1158, to include the asylum 
provisions in effect today: Among other things, Congress designated 
three categories of aliens who, with limited exceptions, are ineligible 
to apply for asylum: (1) Aliens who can be removed to a safe third 
country pursuant to a bilateral or multilateral agreement; (2) aliens 
who failed to apply for asylum within one year of arriving in the 
United States; and (3) aliens who have previously applied for asylum 
and had the application denied. Public Law 104-208, div. C, sec. 
604(a); see INA 208(a)(2)(A)-(C), 8 U.S.C. 1158(a)(2)(A)-(C). Congress 
also adopted six mandatory bars to granting asylum, which largely 
tracked the pre-existing asylum regulations. These bars prohibited 
asylum for (1) aliens who ``ordered, incited, or otherwise 
participated'' in the persecution of others on account of a protected 
ground; (2) aliens convicted of a ``particularly serious crime'' in the 
United States; (3) aliens who committed a ``serious nonpolitical crime 
outside the United States'' before arriving in the United States; (4) 
aliens who are a ``danger to the security of the United States''; (5) 
aliens who are inadmissible or removable under a set of specified 
grounds relating to terrorist activity; and (6) aliens who have 
``firmly resettled in another country prior to arriving in the United 
States.'' Public Law 104-208, div. C, sec. 604(a); see INA 
208(b)(2)(A)(i)-(vi), 8 U.S.C. 1158(b)(2)(A)(i)-(vi). Congress further 
added that aggravated felonies, defined in 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43), would 
be considered ``particularly serious crime[s].'' Public Law 104-208, 
div. C, sec. 604(a); see INA 201(a)(43), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43).
    Although Congress enacted specific bars to asylum eligibility, that 
statutory list is not exhaustive. Congress, in IIRIRA, expressly 
authorized the Attorney General to expand upon two of those 
exceptions--the bars for ``particularly serious crimes'' and ``serious 
nonpolitical offenses.'' While Congress prescribed that all aggravated 
felonies constitute particularly serious crimes, Congress further 
provided that the Attorney General may ``designate by regulation 
offenses that will be considered'' a ``particularly serious crime,'' 
the perpetrator of which ``constitutes a danger to the community of the 
United States.'' Public Law 104-208, div. C, sec. 604(a); see INA 
208(b)(2)(A)(ii), (B)(ii), 8 U.S.C. 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii), (B)(ii). Courts 
and the Board have long held that this grant of authority also 
authorizes the Board to identify additional particularly serious crimes 
(beyond aggravated felonies) through case-by-case adjudication. See, 
e.g., Delgado v. Holder, 648 F.3d 1095, 1106 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc) 
(finding that Congress's decisions over time to amend the particularly 
serious crime bar by statute did not call into question the Board's 
additional authority to name serious crimes via case-by-case 
adjudication); Ali v. Achim, 468 F.3d 462, 468-69 (7th Cir. 2006) 
(relying on the absence of an explicit statutory mandate that the 
Attorney General designate ``particular serious crimes'' only via 
regulation). Congress likewise authorized the Attorney General to 
designate by regulation offenses that constitute ``a serious 
nonpolitical crime outside the United States prior to the arrival of 
the alien in the United States.'' Public Law 104-208, div. C, sec. 
604(a); see INA 208(b)(2)(A)(iii), (B)(ii), 8 U.S.C. 
1158(b)(2)(A)(iii), (B)(ii).\2\
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    \2\ These provisions continue to refer only to the Attorney 
General, but the Departments interpret the provisions to also apply 
to the Secretary by operation of the HSA, Public Law 107-296. See 6 
U.S.C. 552; 8 U.S.C. 1103(a)(1).
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    Congress further provided the Attorney General with the authority, 
by regulation, to ``establish additional limitations and conditions, 
consistent with [section 208 of the INA], under which an alien shall be 
ineligible for asylum under paragraph (1).'' Public Law 104-208, div. 
C, sec. 604(a); see INA 208(b)(2)(C), 8 U.S.C. 1158(b)(2)(C). As the 
Tenth Circuit has recognized, ``the statute clearly empowers'' the 
Attorney General and the Secretary to ``adopt[ ] further limitations'' 
on asylum eligibility. R-S-C, 869 F.3d at 1187 & n.9. By allowing the 
creation by regulation of ``additional limitations and conditions,'' 
the statute gives the Attorney General and the Secretary broad 
authority in determining what the ``limitations and conditions'' should 
be. The additional limitations on eligibility must be established ``by 
regulation,'' and must be ``consistent with'' the rest of section 208 
of the INA. INA 208(b)(2)(C), 8 U.S.C. 1158(b)(2)(C).
    Thus, the Attorney General has previously invoked section 
208(b)(2)(C) of the INA to limit eligibility for asylum based on a 
``fundamental change in circumstances'' and on the ability of an 
applicant to safely relocate internally within the alien's country of 
nationality or of last habitual residence. See Asylum Procedures, 65 FR 
76121, 76126 (Dec. 6, 2000). More recently, the Attorney General and 
Secretary invoked section 208(b)(2)(C) to limit eligibility for asylum 
for aliens subject to a bar on entry under certain presidential 
proclamations. See Aliens Subject to a Bar on Entry Under Certain 
Presidential

[[Page 33834]]

Proclamations; Procedures for Protection Claims, 83 FR 55934 (Nov. 9, 
2018).\3\ The courts have also viewed section 208(b)(2)(C) as 
conferring broad discretion, including to render aliens ineligible for 
asylum based on fraud. See R-S-C, 869 F.3d at 1187; Nijjar v. Holder, 
689 F.3d 1077, 1082 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that fraud can be ``one of 
the `additional limitations . . . under which an alien shall be 
ineligible for asylum' that the Attorney General is authorized to 
establish by regulation'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \3\ This rule is currently subject to a preliminary injunction 
against its enforcement. See East Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump, 
354 F. Supp. 3d 1094, 1115, 1121 (N.D. Cal. 2018), on remand from 
909 F.3d 1219 (9th Cir. 2018).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Section 208(d)(5) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1158(d)(5), also establishes 
certain procedures for consideration of asylum applications. But 
Congress specified that the Attorney General ``may provide by 
regulation for any other conditions or limitations on the consideration 
of an application for asylum,'' so long as those limitations are ``not 
inconsistent with this chapter.'' INA 208(d)(5)(B), 8 U.S.C. 
1158(d)(5)(B).
    In sum, the current statutory framework leaves the Attorney General 
(and, after the HSA, also the Secretary) significant discretion to 
adopt additional bars to asylum eligibility. As noted above, when 
creating mandatory bars to asylum eligibility in the IIRIRA, Congress 
simultaneously delegated the authority to create additional bars in 
section 1158(b)(2)(C). Public Law 104-208, sec. 604 (codified at 8 
U.S.C. 1158(b)(2)). Pursuant to this broad delegation of authority, the 
Attorney General and the Secretary have in the past acted to protect 
the integrity of the asylum system by limiting eligibility for those 
who do not truly require this country's protection, and do so again 
here. See, e.g., 83 FR at 55944; 65 FR at 76126.
    In promulgating this rule, the Departments rely on the broad 
authority granted by 8 U.S.C. 1158(b)(2)(C) to protect the ``core 
regulatory purpose'' of asylum law by prioritizing applicants ``with 
nowhere else to turn.'' Matter of B-R-, 26 I&N Dec. 119, 122 (BIA 2013) 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (explaining that, in light of asylum 
law's ``core regulatory purpose,'' several provisions of the U.S. Code 
``limit an alien's ability to claim asylum in the United States when 
other safe options are available''). Such prioritization is consistent 
with the purpose of the statutory firm-resettlement bar (8 U.S.C. 
1158(b)(2)(A)(vi)), which likewise was implemented to limit the 
availability of asylum for those who are seeking to choose among a 
number of safe countries. See Sall v. Gonzales, 437 F.3d 229, 233 (2d 
Cir. 2006); Matter of A-G-G-, 25 I&N Dec. 486, 503 (BIA 2011); see also 
8 U.S.C. 1158(a)(2)(A) (providing that aliens who may be removed, 
pursuant to a bilateral or multilateral agreement, to a safe third 
country may not apply for asylum, and further demonstrating the 
intention of Congress to afford asylum protection only to those 
applicants who cannot seek effective protection in third countries). 
The concern with avoiding such forum-shopping has only been heightened 
by the dramatic increase in aliens entering or arriving in the United 
States along the southern border after transiting through one or more 
third countries where they could have sought protection, but did not. 
See infra at 33-41; Kalubi v. Ashcroft, 364 F.3d 1134, 1140 (9th Cir. 
2004) (noting that forum-shopping might be ``part of the totality of 
circumstances that sheds light on a request for asylum in this 
country''). While under the current regulatory regime the firm-
resettlement bar applies only in circumstances in which offers of 
permanent status have been extended by third countries, see 8 CFR 
208.15, 1208.15, the additional bar created by this rule also seeks--
like the firm-resettlement bar--to deny asylum protection to those 
persons effectively choosing among several countries where avenues to 
protection from return to persecution are available by waiting until 
they reach the United States to apply for protection. See Sall, 437 
F.3d at 233. Thus, the rule is well within the authority conferred by 
section 208(b)(2)(C).

D. Other Forms of Protection

    Aliens who are not eligible to apply for or receive a grant of 
asylum, or who are denied asylum on the basis of the Attorney General's 
or the Secretary's discretion, may nonetheless qualify for protection 
from removal under other provisions of the immigration laws. A 
defensive application for asylum that is submitted by an alien in 
removal proceedings is deemed an application for statutory withholding 
of removal under section 241(b)(3) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1231(b)(3). See 
8 CFR 208.30(e)(2)-(4); 8 CFR 1208.16(a). And an immigration judge may 
also consider an alien's eligibility for withholding and deferral of 
removal under regulations issued pursuant to the implementing 
legislation regarding U.S. obligations under Article 3 of the 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment (``CAT''). See Foreign Affairs Reform and 
Restructuring Act of 1998, Public Law 105-277, sec. 2242(b) (1998); 8 
CFR 1208.13(c); 8 CFR 1208.3(b), see also 8 CFR 1208.16(c) and 1208.17.
    Those forms of protection bar an alien's removal to any country 
where the alien would ``more likely than not'' face persecution or 
torture, meaning that the alien would face a clear probability that his 
or her life or freedom would be threatened on account of a protected 
ground or a clear probability of torture. 8 CFR 1208.16(b)(2), (c)(2); 
see Kouljinski v. Keisler, 505 F.3d 534, 544 (6th Cir. 2007); Sulaiman 
v. Gonzales, 429 F.3d 347, 351 (1st Cir. 2005). Thus, if an alien 
proves that it is more likely than not that the alien's life or freedom 
would be threatened on account of a protected ground, but is denied 
asylum for some other reason--for instance, because of a statutory 
exception, an eligibility bar adopted by regulation, or a discretionary 
denial of asylum--the alien nonetheless may be entitled to statutory 
withholding of removal if not otherwise barred from that form of 
protection. INA 241(b)(3)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1231(b)(3)(A); 8 CFR 208.16, 
1208.16; see also Garcia v. Sessions, 856 F.3d 27, 40 (1st Cir. 2017) 
(``[W]ithholding of removal has long been understood to be a mandatory 
protection that must be given to certain qualifying aliens, while 
asylum has never been so understood.''). Likewise, an alien who 
establishes that he or she will more likely than not face torture in 
the country of removal will qualify for CAT protection. See 8 CFR 
208.16(c), 208.17(a), 1208.16(c), 1208.17(a). In contrast to the more 
generous benefits available through asylum, statutory withholding and 
CAT protection do not: (1) Prohibit the Government from removing the 
alien to a third country where the alien would not face the requisite 
probability of persecution or torture (even in the absence of an 
agreement with that third country); (2) create a path to lawful 
permanent resident status and citizenship; or (3) afford the same 
ancillary benefits (such as derivative protection for family members) 
and access to Federal means-tested public benefits. See R-S-C, 869 F.3d 
at 1180.

E. Implementation of International Treaty Obligations

    The framework described above is consistent with certain U.S. 
obligations under the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees 
(``Refugee Protocol''), which incorporates Articles 2-34 of the 1951 
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (``Refugee Convention''), 
as well as U.S. obligations under Article 3 of the CAT. Neither the 
Refugee Protocol nor the CAT is self-executing in the United States. 
See Khan v.

[[Page 33835]]

Holder, 584 F.3d 773, 783 (9th Cir. 2009) (``[T]he [Refugee] Protocol 
is not self-executing.''); Auguste v. Ridge, 395 F.3d 123, 132 (3d Cir. 
2005) (the CAT ``was not self-executing''). These treaties are not 
directly enforceable in U.S. law, but some of their obligations have 
been implemented by domestic legislation. For example, the United 
States has implemented the non-refoulement provisions of these 
treaties--i.e., provisions prohibiting the return of an individual to a 
country where he or she would face persecution or torture--through the 
withholding of removal provisions at section 241(b)(3) of the INA and 
the CAT regulations, rather than through the asylum provisions at 
section 208 of the INA. See Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 440-41; 
Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 at sec. 2242(b); 8 
CFR 208.16(b)-(c), 208.17-208.18; 1208.16(b)-(c), 1208.17-1208.18. 
Limitations on the availability of asylum that do not affect the 
statutory withholding of removal or protection under the CAT 
regulations are consistent with these provisions. See R-S-C, 869 F.3d 
at 1188 & n. 11; Cazun v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 856 F.3d 249, 257 & n.16 (3d 
Cir. 2017); Ramirez-Mejia v. Lynch, 813 F.3d 240, 241 (5th Cir. 2016).
    Courts have rejected arguments that the Refugee Convention, as 
implemented, requires that every qualified refugee receive asylum. For 
example, the Supreme Court has made clear that Article 34, which 
concerns the assimilation and naturalization of refugees, is precatory 
and not mandatory, and, accordingly, does not mandate that all refugees 
be granted asylum. See Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 441. Section 208 of 
the INA reflects that Article 34 is precatory and not mandatory, and 
accordingly does not provide that all refugees shall receive asylum. 
See id.; see also R-S-C, 869 F.3d at 1188; Mejia v. Sessions, 866 F.3d 
573, 588 (4th Cir. 2017); Cazun, 856 F.3d at 257 & n. 16; Garcia, 856 
F.3d at 42; Ramirez-Mejia, 813 F.3d at 241. As noted above, Congress 
has also recognized the precatory nature of Article 34 by imposing 
various statutory exceptions and by authorizing the creation of new 
bars to asylum eligibility through regulation.
    Courts have likewise rejected arguments that other provisions of 
the Refugee Convention require every refugee to receive asylum. For 
example, courts have held, in the context of upholding the bar on 
eligibility for asylum in reinstatement proceedings under section 
241(a)(5) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1231(a)(5), that limiting the ability to 
apply for asylum does not constitute a prohibited ``penalty'' under 
Article 31(1) of the Refugee Convention. Mejia, 866 F.3d at 588; Cazun, 
856 F.3d at 257 & n.16. Courts have also rejected the argument that 
Article 28 of the Refugee Convention, governing the issuance of 
international travel documents for refugees ``lawfully staying'' in a 
country's territory, mandates that every person who might qualify for 
statutory withholding must also be granted asylum. R-S-C, 869 F.3d at 
1188; Garcia, 856 F.3d at 42.

IV. Regulatory Changes

A. Limitation on Eligibility for Asylum for Aliens Who Enter or Attempt 
To Enter the United States Across the Southern Land Border After 
Failing To Apply for Protection in at Least One Country Through Which 
They Transited En Route to the United States

    Pursuant to section 208(b)(2)(C) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 
1158(b)(2)(C), the Departments are revising 8 CFR 208.13(c) and 8 CFR 
1208.13(c) to add a new mandatory bar to eligibility for asylum for an 
alien who enters or attempts to enter the United States across the 
southern border, but who did not apply for protection from persecution 
or torture where it was available in at least one third country outside 
the alien's country of citizenship, nationality, or last lawful 
habitual residence through which he or she transited en route to the 
United States, such as in Mexico via that country's robust protection 
regime. The bar would be subject to several limited exceptions, for (1) 
an alien who demonstrates that he or she applied for protection from 
persecution or torture in at least one of the countries through which 
the alien transited en route to the United States, and the alien 
received a final judgment denying the alien protection in such country; 
(2) an alien who demonstrates that he or she satisfies the definition 
of ``victim of a severe form of trafficking in persons'' provided in 8 
CFR 214.11; or (3) an alien who has transited en route to the United 
States through only a country or countries that were not parties to the 
1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, the 1967 Protocol, 
or the CAT.
    In all cases the burden would remain with the alien to establish 
eligibility for asylum consistent with current law, including--if the 
evidence indicates that a ground for mandatory denial applies--the 
burden to prove that a ground for mandatory denial of the asylum 
application does not apply. 8 CFR 1240.8(d).
    In addition to establishing a new mandatory bar for asylum 
eligibility for an alien who enters or attempts to enter the United 
States across the southern border after failing to apply for protection 
from persecution or torture in at least one third country outside the 
alien's country of citizenship, nationality, or last lawful habitual 
residence through which he or she transited en route to the United 
States, this rule would also modify certain aspects of the process for 
screening fear claims asserted by such aliens who are subject to 
expedited removal under section 235(b)(1) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 
1225(b)(1). Under current procedures, aliens subject to expedited 
removal may avoid being removed by making a threshold showing of a 
credible fear of persecution or torture at an initial screening 
interview. At present, those aliens are often released into the 
interior of the United States pending adjudication of such claims by an 
immigration court in removal proceedings under section 240 of the INA, 
especially if those aliens travel as family units. Once an alien is 
released, adjudications can take months or years to complete because of 
the increasing volume of claims and the need to expedite cases in which 
aliens have been detained. The Departments expect that a substantial 
proportion of aliens subject to a third-country-transit asylum 
eligibility bar would be subject to expedited removal, since 
approximately 234,534 aliens in FY 2018 who presented at a port of 
entry or were apprehended at the border were referred to expedited-
removal proceedings. The procedural changes within expedited removal 
would be confined to aliens who are ineligible for asylum because they 
are subject to a regulatory bar for contravening the new mandatory 
third-country-transit asylum eligibility bar imposed by the present 
rule.
    1. Under existing law, expedited-removal procedures--streamlined 
procedures for expeditiously reviewing claims and removing certain 
aliens--apply to those individuals who arrive at a port of entry or 
those who have entered illegally and are encountered by an immigration 
officer within 100 miles of the border and within 14 days of entering. 
See INA 235(b), 8 U.S.C. 1225(b); Designating Aliens For Expedited 
Removal, 69 FR 48877, 48880 (Aug. 11, 2004). To be subject to expedited 
removal, an alien must also be inadmissible under section 212(a)(6)(C) 
or (a)(7) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(C) or (a)(7), meaning that 
the alien has either tried to procure documentation through 
misrepresentation or lacks such documentation altogether. Thus, an

[[Page 33836]]

alien encountered in the interior of the United States who entered the 
country after the publication of this rule imposing the third-country-
transit bar and who is not otherwise amenable to expedited removal 
would be placed in proceedings under section 240 of the INA.
    Section 235(b)(1) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1225(b)(1), prescribes 
procedures in the expedited-removal context for screening an alien's 
eligibility for asylum. When these provisions were being debated in 
1996, the House Judiciary Committee expressed particular concern that 
``[e]xisting procedures to deny entry to and to remove illegal aliens 
from the United States are cumbersome and duplicative,'' and that 
``[t]he asylum system has been abused by those who seek to use it as a 
means of `backdoor' immigration.'' H.R. Rep. No. 104-469, pt. 1, at 107 
(1996). The Committee accordingly described the purpose of expedited 
removal and related procedures as ``streamlin[ing] rules and procedures 
in the Immigration and Nationality Act to make it easier to deny 
admission to inadmissible aliens and easier to remove deportable aliens 
from the United States.'' Id. at 157; see Am. Immigration Lawyers Ass'n 
v. Reno, 18 F. Supp. 2d 38, 41 (D.D.C. 1998), aff'd, 199 F.3d 1352 
(D.C. Cir. 2000) (rejecting several constitutional challenges to IIRIRA 
and describing the expedited-removal process as a ``summary removal 
process for adjudicating the claims of aliens who arrive in the United 
States without proper documentation'').
    Congress thus provided that aliens ``inadmissible under [8 U.S.C.] 
1182(a)(6)(C) or 1182(a)(7)'' shall be ``removed from the United States 
without further hearing or review unless the alien indicates either an 
intention to apply for asylum under [8 U.S.C. 1158] or a fear of 
persecution.'' INA 235(b)(1)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. 1225(b)(1)(A)(i); see INA 
235(b)(1)(A)(ii), 8 U.S.C. 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii) (such aliens shall be 
referred ``for an interview by an asylum officer''). On its face, the 
statute refers only to proceedings to establish eligibility for an 
affirmative grant of asylum, not to statutory withholding of removal or 
CAT protection against removal to a particular country.
    An alien referred for a credible-fear interview must demonstrate a 
``credible fear,'' defined as a ``significant possibility, taking into 
account the credibility of the statements made by the alien in support 
of the alien's claim and such other facts as are known to the officer, 
that the alien could establish eligibility for asylum under [8 U.S.C. 
1158].'' INA 235(b)(1)(B)(v), 8 U.S.C. 1225(b)(1)(B)(v). According to 
the House report, ``[t]he credible-fear standard [wa]s designed to weed 
out non-meritorious cases so that only applicants with a likelihood of 
success will proceed to the regular asylum process.'' H.R. Rep. No. 
104-69, at 158.
    If the asylum officer determines that the alien lacks a credible 
fear, then the alien may request review by an immigration judge. INA 
235(b)(1)(B)(iii)(III), 8 U.S.C. 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(III). If the 
immigration judge concurs with the asylum officer's negative credible-
fear determination, then the alien shall be removed from the United 
States without further review by either the Board or the courts. INA 
235(b)(1)(B)(iii)(I), (b)(1)(C), 8 U.S.C. 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(I), 
(b)(1)(C); INA 242(a)(2)(A)(iii), (e)(5), 8 U.S.C. 1252(a)(2)(A)(iii), 
(e)(5). By contrast, if the asylum officer or immigration judge 
determines that the alien has a credible fear--i.e., ``a significant 
possibility . . . that the alien could establish eligibility for 
asylum,'' INA 235(b)(1)(B)(v), 8 U.S.C. 1225(b)(1)(B)(v)--then the 
alien, under current regulations, is placed in section 240 proceedings 
for a full hearing before an immigration judge, with appeal available 
to the Board and review in the Federal courts of appeals, see INA 
235(b)(1)(B)(ii), (b)(2)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii), (b)(2)(A); INA 
242(a), 8 U.S.C. 1252(a); 8 CFR 208.30(e)(5), 1003.1.
    By contrast, section 235 of the INA is silent regarding procedures 
for the granting of statutory withholding of removal and CAT 
protection; indeed, section 235 predates the legislation directing 
implementation of U.S. obligations under Article 3 of the CAT. See 
Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 at sec. 2242(b) 
(requiring implementation of the CAT); IIRIRA at sec. 302 (revising 
section 235 of the INA to include procedures for dealing with 
inadmissible aliens who intend to apply for asylum). The legal 
standards for ultimately meeting the statutory standards for asylum on 
the merits versus statutory withholding or CAT protection are also 
different. Asylum requires an applicant to ultimately establish a 
``well-founded fear'' of persecution, which has been interpreted to 
mean a ``reasonable possibility'' of persecution--a ``more generous'' 
standard than the ``clear probability'' of persecution or torture 
standard that applies to statutory withholding or CAT protection. See 
INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 425, 429-30 (1984); Santosa v. Mukasey, 
528 F.3d 88, 92 & n.1 (1st Cir. 2008); compare 8 CFR 
1208.13(b)(2)(i)(B), with 8 CFR 1208.16(b)(2), (c)(2). As a result, 
applicants who establish eligibility for asylum are not necessarily 
eligible for statutory withholding or CAT protection.
    Current regulations instruct USCIS adjudicators and immigration 
judges to treat an alien's request for asylum in expedited-removal 
proceedings under section 1225(b) as a request for statutory 
withholding and CAT protection as well. See 8 CFR 208.13(c)(1), 
208.30(e)(2)-(4), 1208.13(c)(1), 1208.16(a). In the context of 
expedited-removal proceedings, ``credible fear of persecution'' is 
defined to mean a ``significant possibility'' that the alien ``could 
establish eligibility for asylum,'' not the CAT or statutory 
withholding. INA 235(b)(1)(B)(v), 8 U.S.C. 1225(b)(1)(B)(v). 
Regulations nevertheless have generally provided that aliens in 
expedited removal should be subject to the same process and screening 
standard for considering statutory withholding of removal claims under 
INA 241(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. 1231(b)(3), and claims for protection under the 
CAT regulations, as they are for asylum claims. See 8 CFR 208.30(e)(2)-
(4).
    Thus, when the former Immigration and Naturalization Service 
provided for claims for statutory withholding of removal and CAT 
protection to be considered in the same expedited-removal proceedings 
as asylum, the result was that if an alien showed that there was a 
significant possibility of establishing eligibility for asylum and was 
therefore referred for removal proceedings under section 240 of the 
INA, any potential statutory withholding and CAT claims the alien might 
have had were referred as well. This was done on the assumption that it 
would not ``disrupt[] the streamlined process established by Congress 
to circumvent meritless claims.'' Regulations Concerning the Convention 
Against Torture, 64 FR 8478, 8485 (Feb. 19, 1999). But while the INA 
authorizes the Attorney General and Secretary to provide for 
consideration of statutory withholding and CAT claims together with 
asylum claims or other matters that may be considered in removal 
proceedings, the INA does not mandate that approach, see Foti v. INS, 
375 U.S. 217, 229-30 & n.16 (1963), or that they be considered in the 
same manner.
    Since 1999, regulations also have provided for a distinct 
``reasonable fear'' screening process for certain aliens who are 
categorically ineligible for asylum and can thus make claims only for 
statutory withholding or CAT protection. See 8 CFR 208.31. 
Specifically, if an alien is subject to having a previous order of 
removal reinstated or is a non-permanent

[[Page 33837]]

resident alien subject to an administrative order of removal resulting 
from an aggravated felony conviction, then he or she is categorically 
ineligible for asylum. See id. Sec.  208.31(a), (e). Such an alien can 
be placed in withholding-only proceedings to adjudicate his statutory 
withholding or CAT claims, but only if he first establishes a 
``reasonable fear'' of persecution or torture through a screening 
process that tracks the credible-fear process. See id. Sec.  208.31(c), 
(e).
    To establish a reasonable fear of persecution or torture, an alien 
must establish a ``reasonable possibility that [the alien] would be 
persecuted on account of his or her race, religion, nationality, 
membership in a particular social group or political opinion, or a 
reasonable possibility that he or she would be tortured in the country 
of removal.'' Id. Sec.  208.31(c). ``This . . . screening process is 
modeled on the credible-fear screening process, but requires the alien 
to meet a higher screening standard.'' Regulations Concerning the 
Convention Against Torture, 64 FR at 8485; see also Garcia v. Johnson, 
No. 14-CV-01775, 2014 WL 6657591, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2014) 
(describing the aim of the regulations as providing ``fair and 
efficient procedures'' in reasonable-fear screening that would comport 
with U.S. international obligations).
    Significantly, when establishing the reasonable-fear screening 
process, DOJ explained that the two affected categories of aliens 
should be screened based on the higher reasonable-fear standard 
because, ``[u]nlike the broad class of arriving aliens who are subject 
to expedited removal, these two classes of aliens are ineligible for 
asylum,'' and may be entitled only to statutory withholding of removal 
or CAT protection. Regulations Concerning the Convention Against 
Torture, 64 FR at 8485. ``Because the standard for showing entitlement 
to these forms of protection (a clear probability of persecution or 
torture) is significantly higher than the standard for asylum (a well-
founded fear of persecution), the screening standard adopted for 
initial consideration of withholding and deferral requests in these 
contexts is also higher.'' Id.
    2. Drawing on the established framework for considering whether to 
grant withholding of removal or CAT protection in the reasonable-fear 
context, this interim rule establishes a bifurcated screening process 
for aliens subject to expedited removal who are ineligible for asylum 
by virtue of falling subject to this rule's third-country-transit 
eligibility bar, but who express a fear of return or seek statutory 
withholding or CAT protection. The Attorney General and Secretary have 
broad authority to implement the immigration laws, see INA 103, 8 
U.S.C. 1103, including by establishing regulations, see INA 103(a)(3), 
8 U.S.C. 1103(a)(3), and to regulate ``conditions or limitations on the 
consideration of an application for asylum,'' id. 1158(d)(5)(B). 
Furthermore, the Secretary has the authority--in his ``sole and 
unreviewable discretion,'' the exercise of which may be ``modified at 
any time''--to designate additional categories of aliens that will be 
subject to expedited-removal procedures, so long as the designated 
aliens have not been admitted or paroled nor continuously present in 
the United States for two years. INA 235(b)(1)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. 
1225(b)(1)(A)(iii). The Departments have frequently invoked these 
authorities to establish or modify procedures affecting aliens in 
expedited-removal proceedings, as well as to adjust the categories of 
aliens subject to particular procedures within the expedited-removal 
framework.
    This rule does not change the credible-fear standard for asylum 
claims, although the regulation would expand the scope of the inquiry 
in the process. An alien who is subject to the third-country-transit 
bar and nonetheless has entered the United States along the southern 
land border after the effective date of this rule creating the bar 
would be ineligible for asylum and would thus not be able to establish 
a ``significant possibility . . . [of] eligibility for asylum under 
section 1158.'' INA 235(b)(1)(B)(v), 8 U.S.C. 1225(b)(1)(B)(v). 
Consistent with section 235(b)(1)(B)(iii)(III) of the INA, the alien 
could still obtain review from an immigration judge regarding whether 
the asylum officer correctly determined that the alien was subject to a 
limitation or suspension on entry imposed by the third-country-transit 
bar. Further, consistent with section 235(b)(1)(B) of the INA, if the 
immigration judge reversed the asylum officer's determination, the 
alien could assert the asylum claim in section 240 proceedings.
    Aliens determined to be ineligible for asylum by virtue of falling 
subject to the third-country-transit bar, however, would still be 
screened, but in a manner that reflects that their only viable claims 
could be for statutory withholding or CAT protection pursuant to 8 CFR 
208.30(e)(2)-(4) and 1208.16. After determining the alien's 
ineligibility for asylum under the credible-fear standard, the asylum 
officer would apply the long-established reasonable-fear standard to 
assess whether further proceedings on a possible statutory withholding 
or CAT protection claim are warranted. If the asylum officer determined 
that the alien had not established the requisite reasonable fear, the 
alien then could seek review of that decision from an immigration judge 
(just as the alien may under existing 8 CFR 208.30 and 208.31), and 
would be subject to removal only if the immigration judge agreed with 
the negative reasonable-fear finding. Conversely, if either the asylum 
officer or the immigration judge determined that the alien cleared the 
reasonable-fear threshold, the alien would be put in section 240 
proceedings, just like aliens who receive a positive credible-fear 
determination for asylum. Employing a reasonable-fear standard in this 
context, for this category of ineligible aliens, would be consistent 
with DOJ's longstanding rationale that ``aliens ineligible for 
asylum,'' who could only be granted statutory withholding of removal or 
CAT protection, should be subject to a different screening standard 
that would correspond to the higher bar for actually obtaining these 
forms of protection. See Regulations Concerning the Convention Against 
Torture, 64 FR at 8485 (``Because the standard for showing entitlement 
to these forms of protection . . . is significantly higher than the 
standard for asylum[,] . . . the screening standard adopted for initial 
consideration of withholding and deferral requests in these contexts is 
also higher.'').
    3. The screening process established by the interim rule 
accordingly will proceed as follows. For an alien subject to expedited 
removal, DHS will ascertain whether the alien seeks protection, 
consistent with INA 235(b)(1)(A)(ii), 8 U.S.C. 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii). All 
such aliens will continue to go before an asylum officer for screening, 
consistent with INA 235(b)(1)(B), 8 U.S.C. 1225(b)(1)(B). The asylum 
officer will ask threshold questions to elicit whether an alien is 
ineligible for a grant of asylum pursuant to the third-country-transit 
bar. If there is a significant possibility that the alien is not 
subject to the eligibility bar (and the alien otherwise demonstrates 
that there is a significant possibility that he or she can establish 
eligibility for asylum), then the alien will have established a 
credible fear.
    If, however, an alien lacks a significant possibility of 
eligibility for asylum because of the third-country-transit bar, then 
the asylum officer will make a negative credible-fear finding.

[[Page 33838]]

The asylum officer will then apply the reasonable-fear standard to 
assess the alien's claims for statutory withholding of removal or CAT 
protection.
    An alien subject to the third-country-transit asylum eligibility 
bar who clears the reasonable-fear screening standard will be placed in 
section 240 proceedings, just as an alien who clears the credible-fear 
standard will be. In those proceedings, the alien will also have an 
opportunity to raise whether the alien was correctly identified as 
subject to the third-country-transit ineligibility bar to asylum, as 
well as other claims. If an immigration judge determines that the alien 
was incorrectly identified as subject to the third-country-transit bar, 
the alien will be able to apply for asylum. Such aliens can appeal the 
immigration judge's decision in these proceedings to the Board and then 
seek review from a Federal court of appeals.
    Conversely, an alien who is found to be subject to the third-
country-transit asylum eligibility bar and who does not clear the 
reasonable-fear screening standard can obtain review of both of those 
determinations before an immigration judge, just as immigration judges 
currently review negative credible-fear and reasonable-fear 
determinations. If the immigration judge finds that either 
determination was incorrect, then the alien will be placed into section 
240 proceedings. In reviewing the determinations, the immigration judge 
will decide de novo whether the alien is subject to the third-country-
transit asylum eligibility bar. If, however, the immigration judge 
affirms both determinations, then the alien will be subject to removal 
without further appeal, consistent with the existing process under 
section 235 of the INA. In short, aliens subject to the third-country-
transit asylum eligibility bar will be processed through existing 
procedures by DHS and EOIR in accordance with 8 CFR 208.30 and 1208.30, 
but will be subject to the reasonable-fear standard as part of those 
procedures with respect to their statutory withholding and CAT 
protection claims.
    4. The above process will not affect the process in 8 CFR 
208.30(e)(5) (to be redesignated as 8 CFR 208.30(e)(5)(i) under this 
rule) for certain existing statutory bars to asylum eligibility. Under 
that regulatory provision, many aliens who appear to fall within an 
existing statutory bar, and thus appear to be ineligible for asylum, 
can nonetheless be placed in section 240 proceedings and have their 
asylum claim adjudicated by an immigration judge, if they establish a 
credible fear of persecution, followed by further review of any denial 
of their asylum application before the Board and the courts of appeals.

B. Anticipated Effects of the Rule

    When the expedited procedures were first implemented approximately 
two decades ago, very few aliens within those proceedings claimed a 
fear of persecution. Since then, the numbers have dramatically 
increased. In FY 2018, USCIS received 99,035 credible-fear claims, a 
175 percent increase from five years earlier and a 1,883 percent 
increase from ten years earlier. FY 2019 is on track to see an even 
greater increase in claims, with more than 35,000 credible-fear claims 
received in the first four months of the fiscal year. This 
unsustainable, increased burden on the U.S. immigration system also 
extends to DOJ: Immigration courts received over 162,000 asylum 
applications in FY 2018, a 270 percent increase from five years 
earlier.
    This dramatic increase in credible-fear claims has been complicated 
by a demographic shift in the alien population crossing the southern 
border from Mexican single adult males to predominantly Central 
American family units and unaccompanied alien minors. Historically, 
aliens coming unlawfully to the United States along the southern land 
border were predominantly Mexican single adult males who generally were 
removed or who voluntarily departed within 48 hours if they had no 
legal right to stay in the United States. As of January 2019, more than 
60 percent are family units and unaccompanied alien children; 60 
percent are non-Mexican. In FY 2017, CBP apprehended 94,285 family 
units from the Northern Triangle countries at the southern land border. 
Of those family units, 99 percent remained in the country (as of 
January 2019). And, while Mexican single adults who are not legally 
eligible to remain in the United States may be immediately repatriated 
to Mexico, it is more difficult to expeditiously repatriate family 
units and unaccompanied alien children not from Mexico or Canada. And 
the long and arduous journey of children to the United States brings 
with it a great risk of harm that could be relieved if individuals were 
to more readily avail themselves of legal protection from persecution 
in a third country closer to the child's country of origin.
    Even though the overall number of apprehensions of illegal aliens 
was relatively higher two decades ago than it is today (around 1.6 
million in 2000), given the demographic of aliens arriving to the 
United States at that time, they could be processed and removed more 
quickly, often without requiring detention or lengthy court 
proceedings. Moreover, apprehension numbers in past years often 
reflected individuals being apprehended multiple times over the course 
of a given year.
    In recent years, the United States has seen a large increase in the 
number and proportion of inadmissible aliens subject to expedited 
removal who claim a fear of persecution or torture and are subsequently 
placed into removal proceedings before an immigration judge. This is 
particularly true for non-Mexican aliens, who now constitute the 
overwhelming majority of aliens encountered along the southern border 
with Mexico, and the overwhelming majority of aliens who assert claims 
of fear. But while the number of non-Mexican aliens encountered at the 
southern border has dramatically increased, a substantial number of 
such aliens failed to apply for asylum or refugee status in Mexico--
despite the availability of a functioning asylum system.
    In May of FY 2017, DHS recorded 7,108 enforcement actions with non-
Mexican aliens along the southern border--which accounted for roughly 
36 percent of all enforcement actions along the southern border that 
month. In May of FY 2018, DHS recorded 32,477 enforcement actions with 
non-Mexican aliens along the southern border--which accounted for 
roughly 63 percent of that month's enforcement actions along the 
southern border. And in May of FY 2019, DHS recorded 121,151 
enforcement actions with non-Mexican aliens along the southern border--
which accounted for approximately 84 percent of enforcement actions 
along the southern border that month. Accordingly, the number of 
enforcement actions involving non-Mexican aliens increased by more than 
1,600 percent from May FY 2017 to May FY 2019, and the percentage of 
enforcement actions at the southern land border involving non-Mexican 
aliens increased from 36 percent to 84 percent. Overall, southern 
border non-Mexican enforcement actions in FY 2017 totaled 233,411; they 
increased to 298,503 in FY 2018; and, in the first eight months of FY 
2019 (through May) they already total 524,446.
    This increase corresponds to a growing trend over the past decade, 
in which the overall percentage of all aliens subject to expedited 
removal who are referred for a credible-fear interview by DHS jumped 
from approximately 5 percent to above 40 percent. The total number of 
aliens referred by DHS for credible-fear screening increased from

[[Page 33839]]

fewer than 5,000 in FY 2008 to more than 99,000 in FY 2018. The 
percentage of aliens who receive asylum remains small. In FY 2018, DHS 
asylum officers found over 75 percent of interviewed aliens to have a 
credible fear of persecution or torture and referred them for 
proceedings before an immigration judge within EOIR under section 240 
of the INA. In addition, EOIR immigration judges overturn about 20 
percent of the negative credible-fear determinations made by asylum 
officers, finding those aliens also to have a credible fear. Such 
aliens are referred to immigration judges for full hearings on their 
asylum claims.
    But many aliens who receive a positive credible-fear determination 
never file an application for asylum. From FY 2016 through FY 2018, 
approximately 40 percent of aliens who received a positive credible-
fear determination failed to file an asylum application. And of those 
who did proceed to file asylum applications, relatively few established 
that they should be granted such relief. From FY 2016 through FY 2018, 
among aliens who received a positive credible-fear determination, only 
12,062 aliens \4\--an average of 4,021 per year--were granted asylum 
(14 percent of all completed asylum cases, and about 36 percent of 
asylum cases decided on the merits).\5\ The many cases that lack merit 
occupy a large portion of limited docket time and absorb scarce 
government resources, exacerbating the backlog and diverting attention 
from other meritorious cases. Indeed, despite DOJ deploying the largest 
number of immigration judges in history and completing historic numbers 
of cases, a significant backlog remains. There are more than 900,000 
pending cases in immigration courts, at least 436,000 of which include 
an asylum application.
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    \4\ These numbers are based on data generated by EOIR on April 
12, 2019.
    \5\ Completed cases include both those in which an asylum 
application was filed and those in which an application was not 
filed. Cases decided on the merits include only those completed 
cases in which an asylum application was filed and the immigration 
judge granted or denied that application.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Apprehending and processing this growing number of aliens who cross 
illegally into the United States and invoke asylum procedures consumes 
an ever-increasing amount of resources of DHS, which must surveil, 
apprehend, screen, and process the aliens who enter the country and 
must represent the U.S. Government in cases before immigration judges, 
the Board, and the U.S. Courts of Appeals. The interim rule seeks to 
ameliorate these strains on the immigration system.
    The rule also aims to further the humanitarian purposes of asylum 
by prioritizing individuals who are unable to obtain protection from 
persecution elsewhere and individuals who have been victims of a 
``severe form of trafficking in persons'' as defined by 8 CFR 
214.11,\6\ many of whom do not volitionally transit through a third 
country to reach the United States.\7\ By deterring meritless asylum 
claims and de-prioritizing the applications of individuals who could 
have sought protection in another country before reaching the United 
States, the Departments seek to ensure that those asylees who need 
relief most urgently are better able to obtain it.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \6\ ``Severe form of trafficking in persons means sex 
trafficking in which a commercial sex act is induced by force, 
fraud, or coercion, or in which the person induced to perform such 
act is under the age of 18 years; or the recruitment, harboring, 
transportation, provision, or obtaining of a person for labor or 
services through the use of force, fraud, or coercion for the 
purpose of subjection to involuntary servitude, peonage, debt 
bondage, or slavery.'' 8 CFR 214.11. Determinations made with 
respect to this exception will not be binding on Federal departments 
or agencies in subsequent determinations of eligibility for T or U 
nonimmigrant status under section 101(a)(15)(T) or (U) of the Act or 
for benefits or services under 22 U.S.C. 7105 or 8 U.S.C. 
1641(c)(4).
    \7\ This rule does not provide for a categorical exception for 
unaccompanied alien children (``UAC''), as defined in 6 U.S.C. 
279(g)(2). The Departments recognize that UAC are exempt from two of 
three statutory bars to applying for asylum: The ``safe third 
country'' bar and the one-year filing deadline, see INA 
208(a)(2)(E), 8 U.S.C. 1158(a)(2)(E). Congress, however, did not 
exempt UAC from the bar on filing successive applications for 
asylum, see INA 208(a)(2)(C), 8 U.S.C. 1158(a)(2)(C), the various 
bars to asylum eligibility in INA 208(b)(2)(A), 8 U.S.C. 
1158(b)(2)(A), or the bars, like this one, established pursuant to 
the Departments' authorities under INA 208(b)(2)(C), 8 U.S.C. 
1158(b)(2)(C). But UAC, like others subject to this rule, will be 
able to apply for withholding of removal under INA section 
241(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. 1231(b)(3), or the CAT regulations. UAC will not 
be returned to the transit country for consideration of these 
protection claims.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The interim rule would further this objective by restricting the 
claims of aliens who, while ostensibly fleeing persecution, chose not 
to seek protection at the earliest possible opportunity. An alien's 
decision not to apply for protection at the first available 
opportunity, and instead wait for the more preferred destination of the 
United States, raises questions about the validity and urgency of the 
alien's claim and may mean that the claim is less likely to be 
successful.\8\ By barring such claims, the interim final rule would 
encourage those fleeing genuine persecution to seek protection as soon 
as possible and dissuade those with non-viable claims, including aliens 
merely seeking employment, from further overburdening the Nation's 
immigration system.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \8\ Indeed, the Board has previously held that this is a 
relevant consideration in asylum applications. In Matter of Pula, 19 
I&N Dec. 467, 473-74 (BIA 1987), the Board stated that ``in 
determining whether a favorable exercise of discretion is 
warranted'' for an applicant under the asylum statute, INA 208(a), 8 
U.S.C. 1158(2)(a), ``[a]mong those factors which should be 
considered are whether the alien passed through any other countries 
or arrived in the United States directly from his country, whether 
orderly refugee procedures were in fact available to help him in any 
country he passed through, and whether he made any attempts to seek 
asylum before coming to the United States.'' Consistent with the 
reasoning in Pula, this rule establishes that an alien who failed to 
request asylum in a country where it was available is not eligible 
for asylum in the United States. Even though the Board in Pula 
indicated that a range of factors is relevant to evaluating 
discretionary asylum relief under the general statutory asylum 
provision, the INA also authorizes the establishment of additional 
limitations to asylum eligibility by regulation--beyond those 
embedded in the statute. See INA 208(b)(2)(C), 8 U.S.C. 
1158(b)(2)(C). This rule uses that authority to establish one of the 
factors specified as relevant in Pula as the foundation of a new 
categorical asylum bar. This rule's prioritization of the third-
country-transit factor, considered as just one of many factors in 
Pula, is justified, as explained above, by the increased numbers and 
changed nature of asylum claims in recent years.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Many of the aliens who wait to seek asylum until they arrive in the 
United States transit through not just one country, but multiple 
countries in which they may seek humanitarian protection. Yet they do 
not avail themselves of that option despite their claims of fear of 
persecution or torture in their home country. Under these 
circumstances, it is reasonable to question whether the aliens 
genuinely fear persecution or torture, or are simply economic migrants 
seeking to exploit our overburdened immigration system by filing a 
meritless asylum claim as a way of entering, remaining, and legally 
obtaining employment in the United States.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \9\ Economic migrants are not eligible for asylum. See, e.g., In 
re: Brenda Leticia Sonday-Chavez, No. A-7-969, 2017 WL 4946947, at 
*1 (BIA Sept. 7, 2017) (``[E]conomic reasons for coming to the 
United States . . . would generally not render an alien eligible for 
relief from removal.''); see also Sale v. Haitian Centers Council 
Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 161-62 & n.11 (1993); Hui Zhuang v. Gonzales, 
471 F.3d 884, 890 (8th Cir. 2006) (``Fears of economic hardship or 
lack of opportunity do not establish a well-founded fear of 
persecution.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    All seven countries in Central America plus Mexico are parties to 
both the Refugee Convention and the Refugee Protocol. Moreover, Mexico 
has expanded its capacity to adjudicate asylum claims in recent years, 
and the number of claims submitted in Mexico has increased. In 2016, 
the Mexican government received 8,789 asylum applications. In 2017, it 
received 14,596. In 2018, it received 29,623 applications. And in just 
the first three months of 2019, Mexico received 12,716 asylum

[[Page 33840]]

applications, putting Mexico on track to receive more than 50,000 
asylum applications by the end of 2019 if that quarterly pace 
continues. Instead of availing themselves of these available 
protections, many aliens transiting through Central America and Mexico 
decide not to seek protection, likely based upon a preference for 
residing in the United States. The United States has experienced an 
overwhelming surge in the number of non-Mexican aliens crossing the 
southern border and seeking asylum. This overwhelming surge and its 
accompanying burden on the United States has eroded the integrity of 
our borders, and it is inconsistent with the national interest to 
provide a discretionary benefit to those who choose not to seek 
protection at the first available opportunity.
    The interim final rule also is in keeping with the efforts of other 
liberal democracies to prevent forum-shopping by directing asylum-
seekers to present their claims in the first safe country in which they 
arrive. In 1990, European states adopted the Dublin Regulation in 
response to an asylum crisis as refugees and economic migrants fled 
communism at the end of the Cold War; it came into force in 1997. See 
Convention Determining the State Responsible for Examining Applications 
for Asylum Lodged in One of the Member States of the European 
Communities, 1997 O.J. (C 254). The United Nations High Commission for 
Refugees praised the Dublin Regulation's ``commendable efforts to share 
and allocate the burden of review of refugee and asylum claims.'' See 
UN High Comm'r for Refugees, UNHCR Position on Conventions Recently 
Concluded in Europe (Dublin and Schengen Conventions), 3 Eur. Series 2, 
385 (1991). Now in its third iteration, the Dublin III Regulation sets 
asylum criteria and protocol for the European Union (``EU''). It 
instructs that asylum claims ``shall be examined by a single Member 
State.'' Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 26 June 2013, Establishing the Criteria and Mechanisms 
for Determining the Member State Responsible for Examining an 
Application for International Protection Lodged in One of the Member 
States by a Third-Country National or a Stateless Person (Recast), 2013 
O.J. (L 180) 31, 37. Typically, for irregular migrants seeking asylum, 
the member state by which the asylum applicant first entered the EU 
``shall be responsible for examining the application for international 
protection.'' Id. at 40. Generally, when a third-country national seeks 
asylum in a member state other than the state of first entry into the 
EU, that state may transfer the asylum-seeker back to the state of 
first safe entry. Id. at 2.
    This rule also seeks to curtail the humanitarian crisis created by 
human smugglers bringing men, women, and children across the southern 
border. By reducing a central incentive for aliens without a genuine 
need for asylum to cross the border--the hope of a lengthy asylum 
process that will enable them to remain in the United States for years 
despite their statutory ineligibility for relief--the rule aims to 
reduce human smuggling and its tragic effects.
    Finally, as discussed further below, this rule will facilitate 
ongoing diplomatic negotiations with Mexico and the Northern Triangle 
countries regarding general migration issues, related measures employed 
to control the flow of aliens (such as the Migrant Protection 
Protocols), and the humanitarian and security crisis along the southern 
land border between the United States and Mexico.
    In sum, the rule would bar asylum for any alien who has entered or 
attempted to enter the United States across the southern border and who 
has failed to apply for protection from persecution or torture in at 
least one country outside the alien's country of citizenship, 
nationality, or last lawful habitual residence through which the alien 
transited en route to the United States, unless the alien demonstrates 
that the alien only transited through countries that were not parties 
to the 1951 United Nations Convention relating to the Status of 
Refugees, the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, or the 
CAT, or the alien was a victim of ``a severe form of trafficking in 
persons'' as defined by 8 CFR 214.11.
    Such a rule would ensure that the ever-growing influx of meritless 
asylum claims do not further overwhelm the country's immigration 
system, would promote the humanitarian purposes of asylum by speeding 
relief to those who need it most (i.e., individuals who have no 
alternative country where they can escape persecution or torture or who 
are victims of a severe form of trafficking and thus did not 
volitionally travel through a third country to reach the United 
States), would help curtail the humanitarian crisis created by human 
smugglers, and would aid U.S. negotiations on migration issues with 
foreign countries.

V. Regulatory Requirements

A. Administrative Procedure Act

1. Good Cause Exception
    While the Administrative Procedure Act (``APA'') generally requires 
agencies to publish notice of a proposed rulemaking in the Federal 
Register for a period of public comment, it provides an exception 
``when the agency for good cause finds . . . that notice and public 
procedure thereon are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the 
public interest.'' 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(B). That exception relieves agencies 
of the notice-and-comment requirement in emergency situations, or in 
circumstances where ``the delay created by the notice and comment 
requirements would result in serious damage to important interests.'' 
Woods Psychiatric Inst. v. United States, 20 Cl. Ct. 324, 333 (1990), 
aff'd, 925 F.2d 1454 (Fed. Cir. 1991); see also United States v. Dean, 
604 F.3d 1275, 1279 (11th Cir. 2010); Nat'l Fed'n of Federal Emps. v. 
Nat'l Treasury Emps. Union, 671 F.2d 607, 611 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
Agencies have previously relied on that exception in promulgating 
immigration-related interim rules.\10\ Furthermore, DHS has relied on 
that exception as additional legal justification when issuing orders 
related to expedited removal--a context in which Congress explicitly 
recognized the need for dispatch in addressing large volumes of aliens 
by giving the Secretary significant discretion to ``modify at any 
time'' the classes of aliens who would be subject to such procedures. 
See INA 235(b)(1)(A)(iii)(I), 8 U.S.C. 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii)(I).\11\
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    \10\ See, e.g., Visas: Documentation of Nonimmigrants Under the 
Immigration and Nationality Act, as Amended, 81 FR 5906, 5907 (Feb. 
4, 2016) (interim rule citing good cause to immediately require 
additional documentation from certain Caribbean agricultural workers 
to avoid ``an increase in applications for admission in bad faith by 
persons who would otherwise have been denied visas and are seeking 
to avoid the visa requirement and consular screening process during 
the period between the publication of a proposed and a final 
rule''); Suspending the 30-Day and Annual Interview Requirements 
From the Special Registration Process for Certain Nonimmigrants, 68 
FR 67578, 67581 (Dec. 2, 2003) (interim rule claiming the good cause 
exception for suspending certain automatic registration requirements 
for nonimmigrants because ``without [the] regulation approximately 
82,532 aliens would be subject to 30-day or annual re-registration 
interviews'' over a six-month period).
    \11\ See, e.g., Eliminating Exception to Expedited Removal 
Authority for Cuban Nationals Arriving by Air, 82 FR 4769, 4770 
(Jan. 17, 2017) (identifying the APA good cause factors as 
additional justification for issuing an immediately effective 
expedited removal order because the ability to detain certain Cuban 
nationals ``while admissibility and identity are determined and 
protection claims are adjudicated, as well as to quickly remove 
those without protection claims or claims to lawful status, is a 
necessity for national security and public safety''); Designating 
Aliens For Expedited Removal, 69 FR 48877, 48880 (Aug. 11, 2004) 
(identifying the APA good cause factors as additional justification 
for issuing an immediately effective order to expand expedited 
removal due to ``[t]he large volume of illegal entries, and 
attempted illegal entries, and the attendant risks to national 
security presented by these illegal entries,'' as well as ``the need 
to deter foreign nationals from undertaking dangerous border 
crossings, and thereby prevent the needless deaths and crimes 
associated with human trafficking and alien smuggling operations'').

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[[Page 33841]]

    The Departments have concluded that the good cause exceptions in 5 
U.S.C. 553(b)(B) and (d)(3) apply to this rule. Notice and comment on 
this rule, along with a 30-day delay in its effective date, would be 
impracticable and contrary to the public interest. The Departments have 
determined that immediate implementation of this rule is essential to 
avoid a surge of aliens who would have strong incentives to seek to 
cross the border during pre-promulgation notice and comment or during 
the 30-day delay in the effective date under 5 U.S.C. 553(d). As courts 
have recognized, smugglers encourage migrants to enter the United 
States based on changes in U.S. immigration policy, and in fact ``the 
number of asylum seekers entering as families has risen'' in a way that 
``suggests a link to knowledge of those policies.'' East Bay Sanctuary 
Covenant v. Trump, 354 F. Supp. 3d 1094, 1115 (N.D. Cal. 2018). If this 
rule were published for notice and comment before becoming effective, 
``smugglers might similarly communicate the Rule's potentially relevant 
change in U.S. immigration policy, albeit in non-technical terms,'' and 
the risk of a surge in migrants hoping to enter the country before the 
rule becomes effective supports a finding of good cause under 5 U.S.C. 
553. See id.
    This determination is consistent with the historical view of the 
agencies regulating in this area. DHS concluded in January 2017 that it 
was imperative to give immediate effect to a rule designating Cuban 
nationals arriving by air as eligible for expedited removal because 
``pre-promulgation notice and comment would . . . . endanger[ ] human 
life and hav[e] a potential destabilizing effect in the region.'' 
Eliminating Exception to Expedited Removal Authority for Cuban 
Nationals Arriving by Air, 82 FR 4769, 4770 (Jan. 17, 2017). DHS cited 
the prospect that ``publication of the rule as a proposed rule, which 
would signal a significant change in policy while permitting 
continuation of the exception for Cuban nationals, could lead to a 
surge in migration of Cuban nationals seeking to travel to and enter 
the United States during the period between the publication of a 
proposed and a final rule.'' Id. DHS found that ``[s]uch a surge would 
threaten national security and public safety by diverting valuable 
Government resources from counterterrorism and homeland security 
responsibilities. A surge could also have a destabilizing effect on the 
region, thus weakening the security of the United States and 
threatening its international relations.'' Id. DHS concluded that ``a 
surge could result in significant loss of human life.'' Id.; accord, 
e.g., Designating Aliens for Expedited Removal, 69 FR 48877 (Aug. 11, 
2004) (noting similar destabilizing incentives for a surge during a 
delay in the effective date); Visas: Documentation of Nonimmigrants 
Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, as Amended, 81 FR 5906, 5907 
(Feb. 4, 2016) (finding the good cause exception applicable because of 
similar short-run incentive concerns).
    DOJ and DHS raised similar concerns and drew similar conclusions in 
the November 2018 joint interim final rule that limited eligibility for 
asylum for aliens, subject to a bar on entry under certain presidential 
proclamations. See 83 FR at 55950. These same concerns would apply to 
an even greater extent to this rule. Pre-promulgation notice and 
comment, or a delay in the effective date, would be destabilizing and 
would jeopardize the lives and welfare of aliens who could surge to the 
border to enter the United States before the rule took effect. The 
Departments' experience has been that when public announcements are 
made regarding changes in our immigration laws and procedures, there 
are dramatic increases in the numbers of aliens who enter or attempt to 
enter the United States along the southern border. See East Bay 
Sanctuary Covenant, 354 F. Supp. 3d at 1115 (citing a newspaper article 
suggesting that such a rush to the border occurred due to knowledge of 
a pending regulatory change in immigration law). Thus, there continues 
to be an ``urgent need to deter foreign nationals from undertaking 
dangerous border crossings, and thereby prevent the needless deaths and 
crimes associated with human trafficking and alien smuggling 
operations.'' 69 FR at 48878.
    Furthermore, an additional surge of aliens who sought to enter via 
the southern border prior to the effective date of this rule would be 
destabilizing to the region, as well as to the U.S. immigration system. 
The massive increase in aliens arriving at the southern border who 
assert a fear of persecution is overwhelming our immigration system as 
a result of a variety of factors, including the significant proportion 
of aliens who are initially found to have a credible fear and therefore 
are referred to full hearings on their asylum claims; the huge volume 
of claims; a lack of detention space; and the resulting high rate of 
release into the interior of the United States of aliens with a 
positive credible-fear determination, many of whom then abscond without 
pursuing their asylum claims. Recent initiatives to track family unit 
cases revealed that close to 82 percent of completed cases have 
resulted in an in absentia order of removal. A large additional influx 
of aliens who intend to enter unlawfully or who lack proper 
documentation to enter this country, all at once, would exacerbate the 
existing border crisis. This concern is particularly acute in the 
current climate in which illegal immigration flows fluctuate 
significantly in response to news events. This interim final rule is 
thus a practical means to address the time-sensitive influx of aliens 
and avoid creating an even larger short-term influx. An extended 
notice-and-comment rulemaking process would be impracticable and self-
defeating for the public.
2. Foreign Affairs Exemption
    Alternatively, the Departments may forgo notice-and-comment 
procedures and a delay in the effective date because this rule involves 
a ``foreign affairs function of the United States.'' 5 U.S.C. 
553(a)(1), and proceeding through notice and comment may ``provoke 
definitely undesirable international consequences,'' City of New York 
v. Permanent Mission of India to United Nations, 618 F.3d 172, 201 (2d 
Cir. 2010) (quoting the description of the purpose of the foreign 
affairs exception in H.R. Rep. No. 79-1980, 69th Cong., 2d Sess. 257 
(1946)). The flow of aliens across the southern border, unlawfully or 
without appropriate travel documents, directly implicates the foreign 
policy and national security interests of the United States. See, e.g., 
Exec. Order 13767 (Jan. 25, 2017) (discussing the important national 
security and foreign affairs-related interests associated with securing 
the border); Presidential Memorandum on Additional Measures to Enhance 
Border Security and Restore Integrity to Our Immigration System (Apr. 
29, 2019) (``This strategic exploitation of our Nation's humanitarian 
programs undermines our Nation's security and sovereignty.''); see 
also, e.g., Malek-Marzban v. INS, 653 F.2d 113, 115-16 (4th Cir. 1981) 
(finding that a regulation

[[Page 33842]]

requiring the expedited departure of Iranians from the United States in 
light of the international hostage crisis clearly related to foreign 
affairs and fell within the notice-and-comment exception).
    This rule will facilitate ongoing diplomatic negotiations with 
foreign countries regarding migration issues, including measures to 
control the flow of aliens into the United States (such as the Migrant 
Protection Protocols), and the urgent need to address the current 
humanitarian and security crisis along the southern land border between 
the United States and Mexico. See City of New York, 618 F.3d at 201 
(finding that rules related to diplomacy with a potential impact on 
U.S. relations with other countries fall within the scope of the 
foreign affairs exemption). Those ongoing discussions relate to 
proposals for how these other countries could increase efforts to help 
reduce the flow of illegal aliens north to the United States and 
encourage aliens to seek protection at the safest and earliest point of 
transit possible.
    Those negotiations would be disrupted if notice-and-comment 
procedures preceded the effective date of this rule--provoking a 
disturbance in domestic politics in Mexico and the Northern Triangle 
countries, and eroding the sovereign authority of the United States to 
pursue the negotiating strategy it deems to be most appropriate as it 
engages its foreign partners. See, e.g., Am. Ass'n of Exps. & Imps.-
Textile & Apparel Grp. v. United States, 751 F.2d 1239, 1249 (Fed. Cir. 
1985) (the foreign affairs exemption facilitates ``more cautious and 
sensitive consideration of those matters which so affect relations with 
other Governments that . . . public rulemaking provisions would provoke 
definitely undesirable international consequences'' (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). During a notice-and-comment process, public 
participation and comments may impact and potentially harm the goodwill 
between the United States and Mexico and the Northern Triangle 
countries--actors with whom the United States must partner to ensure 
that refugees can more effectively find refuge and safety in third 
countries. Cf. Rajah v. Mukasey, 544 F.3d 427, 437-38 (2d Cir. 2008) 
(``[R]elations with other countries might be impaired if the government 
were to conduct and resolve a public debate over why some citizens of 
particular countries were a potential danger to our security.'').
    In addition, the longer that the effective date of the interim rule 
is delayed, the greater the number of people who will pass through 
third countries where they may have otherwise received refuge and reach 
the U.S. border, which has little present capacity to provide 
assistance. Cf. East Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump, 909 F.3d 1219, 
1252 (9th Cir. 2018) (``Hindering the President's ability to implement 
a new policy in response to a current foreign affairs crisis is the 
type of `definitely undesirable international consequence' that 
warrants invocation of the foreign affairs exception.''). Addressing 
this crisis will be more effective and less disruptive to long-term 
U.S. relations with Mexico and the Northern Triangle countries the 
sooner that this interim final rule is in place to help address the 
enormous flow of aliens through these countries to the southern U.S. 
border. Cf. Am. Ass'n of Exps. & Imps.-Textile & Apparel Grp., 751 F.2d 
at 1249 (``The timing of an announcement of new consultations or quotas 
may be linked intimately with the Government's overall political agenda 
concerning relations with another country.''); Rajah, 544 F.3d at 438 
(finding that the notice-and-comment process can be ``slow and 
cumbersome,'' which can negatively impact efforts to secure U.S. 
national interests, thereby justifying application of the foreign 
affairs exemption); East Bay Sanctuary Covenant, 909 F.3d at 1252-53 
(9th Cir. 2018) (suggesting that reliance on the exemption is justified 
where the Government ``explain[s] how immediate publication of the 
Rule, instead of announcement of a proposed rule followed by a thirty-
day period of notice and comment'' is necessary in light of the 
Government's foreign affairs efforts).
    The United States and Mexico have been engaged in ongoing 
discussions regarding both regional and bilateral approaches to asylum. 
This interim final rule will strengthen the ability of the United 
States to address the crisis at the southern border and therefore 
facilitate the likelihood of success in future negotiations. This rule 
thus supports the President's foreign policy with respect to Mexico and 
the Northern Triangle countries in this area and is exempt from the 
notice-and-comment and delayed-effective-date requirements in 5 U.S.C. 
553. See Am. Ass'n of Exps. & Imps.-Textile & Apparel Grp., 751 F.2d at 
1249 (noting that the foreign affairs exception covers agency actions 
``linked intimately with the Government's overall political agenda 
concerning relations with another country''); Yassini v. Crosland, 618 
F.2d 1356, 1361 (9th Cir. 1980) (because an immigration directive ``was 
implementing the President's foreign policy,'' the action ``fell within 
the foreign affairs function and good cause exceptions to the notice 
and comment requirements of the APA'').
    Invoking the APA's foreign affairs exception is also consistent 
with past rulemakings. In 2016, for example, in response to diplomatic 
developments between the United States and Cuba, DHS changed its 
regulations concerning flights to and from the island via an 
immediately effective interim final rule. Flights to and From Cuba, 81 
FR 14948, 14952 (Mar. 21, 2016). In a similar vein, DHS and the State 
Department recently provided notice that they were eliminating an 
exception to expedited removal for certain Cuban nationals. The notice 
explained that the change in policy was consistent with the foreign 
affairs exception for rules subject to notice-and-comment requirements 
because the change was central to ongoing negotiations between the two 
countries. Eliminating Exception To Expedited Removal Authority for 
Cuban Nationals Encountered in the United States or Arriving by Sea, 82 
FR 4902, 4904-05 (Jan. 17, 2017).

B. Regulatory Flexibility Act

    The Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. 601 et seq., as amended by 
the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, 
requires an agency to prepare and make available to the public a 
regulatory flexibility analysis that describes the effect of the rule 
on small entities (i.e., small businesses, small organizations, and 
small governmental jurisdictions). A regulatory flexibility analysis is 
not required when a rule is exempt from notice-and-comment rulemaking.

C. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995

    This interim final rule will not result in the expenditure by 
state, local, and tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by the 
private sector, of $100 million or more in any one year, and it will 
not significantly or uniquely affect small governments. Therefore, no 
actions were deemed necessary under the provisions of the Unfunded 
Mandates Reform Act of 1995.

D. Congressional Review Act

    This interim final rule is not a major rule as defined by section 
804 of the Congressional Review Act. 5 U.S.C. 804. This rule will not 
result in an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more; a 
major increase in costs or prices; or significant adverse effects on 
competition, employment, investment, productivity, innovation, or on 
the ability of United States-based companies to compete with foreign-

[[Page 33843]]

based companies in domestic and export markets.

E. Executive Order 12866, Executive Order 13563, and Executive Order 
13771 (Regulatory Planning and Review)

    This rule is not subject to Executive Order 12866 as it implicates 
a foreign affairs function of the United States related to ongoing 
discussions with potential impact on a set of specified international 
relationships. As this is not a regulatory action under Executive Order 
12866, it is not subject to Executive Order 13771.

F. Executive Order 13132 (Federalism)

    This rule will not have substantial direct effects on the States, 
on the relationship between the national government and the States, or 
on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various 
levels of government. Therefore, in accordance with section 6 of 
Executive Order 13132, it is determined that this rule does not have 
sufficient federalism implications to warrant the preparation of a 
federalism summary impact statement.

G. Executive Order 12988 (Civil Justice Reform)

    This rule meets the applicable standards set forth in sections 3(a) 
and 3(b)(2) of Executive Order 12988.

H. Paperwork Reduction Act

    This rule does not propose new, or revisions to existing, 
``collection[s] of information'' as that term is defined under the 
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, Public Law 104-13, 44 U.S.C. chapter 
35, and its implementing regulations, 5 CFR part 1320.

List of Subjects

8 CFR Part 208

    Administrative practice and procedure, Aliens, Immigration, 
Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.

8 CFR Part 1003

    Administrative practice and procedure, Aliens, Immigration, Legal 
services, Organization and functions (Government agencies).

8 CFR Part 1208

    Administrative practice and procedure, Aliens, Immigration, 
Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.

Regulatory Amendments

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

    Accordingly, for the reasons set forth in the preamble, the 
Secretary of Homeland Security amends 8 CFR part 208 as follows:

PART 208--PROCEDURES FOR ASYLUM AND WITHHOLDING OF REMOVAL

0
1. The authority citation for part 208 continues to read as follows:

    Authority:  8 U.S.C. 1101, 1103, 1158, 1226, 1252, 1282; Title 
VII of Public Law 110-229; 8 CFR part 2.


0
2. Section 208.13 is amended by adding paragraphs (c)(4) and (5) to 
read as follows:


Sec.  208.13   Establishing asylum eligibility.

* * * * *
    (c) * * *
    (4) Additional limitation on eligibility for asylum. 
Notwithstanding the provisions of Sec.  208.15, any alien who enters, 
attempts to enter, or arrives in the United States across the southern 
land border on or after July 16, 2019, after transiting through at 
least one country outside the alien's country of citizenship, 
nationality, or last lawful habitual residence en route to the United 
States, shall be found ineligible for asylum unless:
    (i) The alien demonstrates that he or she applied for protection 
from persecution or torture in at least one country outside the alien's 
country of citizenship, nationality, or last lawful habitual residence 
through which the alien transited en route to the United States, and 
the alien received a final judgment denying the alien protection in 
such country;
    (ii) The alien demonstrates that he or she satisfies the definition 
of ``victim of a severe form of trafficking in persons'' provided in 8 
CFR 214.11; or
    (iii) The only countries through which the alien transited en route 
to the United States were, at the time of the transit, not parties to 
the 1951 United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, 
the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, or the United 
Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment.
    (5) Non-binding determinations. Determinations made with respect to 
paragraph (c)(4)(ii) of this section are not binding on Federal 
departments or agencies in subsequent determinations of eligibility for 
T or U nonimmigrant status under section 101(a)(15)(T) or (U) of the 
INA or for benefits or services under 22 U.S.C. 7105 or 8 U.S.C. 
1641(c)(4).

0
3. In Sec.  [thinsp]208.30, revise the section heading, the first 
sentence of paragraph (e)(2), and paragraphs (e)(3) and (5) to read as 
follows:


Sec.  [thinsp]208.30   Credible fear determinations involving stowaways 
and applicants for admission who are found inadmissible pursuant to 
section 212(a)(6)(C) or 212(a)(7) of the Act, whose entry is limited or 
suspended under section 212(f) or 215(a)(1) of the Act, or who failed 
to apply for protection from persecution in a third country where 
potential relief is available while en route to the United States.

* * * * *
    (e) * * *
    (2) Subject to paragraph (e)(5) of this section, an alien will be 
found to have a credible fear of persecution if there is a significant 
possibility, taking into account the credibility of the statements made 
by the alien in support of the alien's claim and such other facts as 
are known to the officer, the alien can establish eligibility for 
asylum under section 208 of the Act or for withholding of removal under 
section 241(b)(3) of the Act. * * *
    (3) Subject to paragraph (e)(5) of this section, an alien will be 
found to have a credible fear of torture if the alien shows that there 
is a significant possibility that he or she is eligible for withholding 
of removal or deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture, 
pursuant to Sec.  208.16 or Sec.  208.17.
* * * * *
    (5)(i) Except as provided in this paragraph (e)(5)(i) or paragraph 
(e)(6) of this section, if an alien is able to establish a credible 
fear of persecution but appears to be subject to one or more of the 
mandatory bars to applying for, or being granted, asylum contained in 
section 208(a)(2) and 208(b)(2) of the Act, or to withholding of 
removal contained in section 241(b)(3)(B) of the Act, the Department of 
Homeland Security shall nonetheless place the alien in proceedings 
under section 240 of the Act for full consideration of the alien's 
claim, if the alien is not a stowaway. If the alien is a stowaway, the 
Department shall place the alien in proceedings for consideration of 
the alien's claim pursuant to Sec.  208.2(c)(3).
    (ii) If the alien is found to be an alien described in Sec.  
208.13(c)(3), then the asylum officer shall enter a negative credible 
fear determination with respect to the alien's intention to apply for 
asylum. The Department shall nonetheless place the alien in proceedings 
under section 240 of the Act for full consideration of the alien's

[[Page 33844]]

claim for withholding of removal under section 241(b)(3) of the Act, or 
for withholding or deferral of removal under the Convention Against 
Torture, if the alien establishes, respectively, a reasonable fear of 
persecution or torture. However, if an alien fails to establish, during 
the interview with the asylum officer, a reasonable fear of either 
persecution or torture, the asylum officer will provide the alien with 
a written notice of decision, which will be subject to immigration 
judge review consistent with paragraph (g) of this section, except that 
the immigration judge will review the reasonable fear findings under 
the reasonable fear standard instead of the credible fear standard 
described in paragraph (g) and in 8 CFR 1208.30(g).
    (iii) If the alien is found to be an alien described as ineligible 
for asylum in Sec.  208.13(c)(4), then the asylum officer shall enter a 
negative credible fear determination with respect to the alien's 
application for asylum. The Department shall nonetheless place the 
alien in proceedings under section 240 of the Act for consideration of 
the alien's claim for withholding of removal under section 241(b)(3) of 
the Act, or for withholding or deferral of removal under the Convention 
Against Torture, if the alien establishes, respectively, a reasonable 
fear of persecution or torture. The scope of review shall be limited to 
a determination of whether the alien is eligible for withholding or 
deferral of removal, accordingly. However, if an alien fails to 
establish, during the interview with the asylum officer, a reasonable 
fear of either persecution or torture, the asylum officer will provide 
the alien with a written notice of decision, which will be subject to 
immigration judge review consistent with paragraph (g) of this section, 
except that the immigration judge will review the reasonable fear 
findings under the reasonable fear standard instead of the credible 
fear standard described in paragraph (g) and in 8 CFR 1208.30(g).
* * * * *

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

    Accordingly, for the reasons set forth in the preamble, the 
Attorney General amends 8 CFR parts 1003 and 1208 as follows:

PART 1003--EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW

0
4. The authority citation for part 1003 continues to read as follows:

    Authority:  5 U.S.C. 301; 6 U.S.C 521; 8 U.S.C. 1101, 1103, 
1154, 1155, 1158, 1182, 1226, 1229, 1229a, 1229b, 1229c, 1231, 
1254a, 1255, 1324d, 1330, 1361, 1362; 28 U.S.C. 509, 510, 1746; sec. 
2 Reorg. Plan No. 2 of 1950; 3 CFR, 1949-1953 Comp., p. 1002; 
section 203 of Pub. L. 105-100, 111 Stat. 2196-200; sections 1506 
and 1510 of Pub. L. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1527-29, 1531-32; section 
1505 of Pub. L. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763A-326 to -328.

0
5. In Sec.  [thinsp]1003.42, revise paragraph (d) to read as follows:


Sec.  [thinsp]1003.42  Review of credible fear determination.

* * * * *
    (d) Standard of review. (1) The immigration judge shall make a de 
novo determination as to whether there is a significant possibility, 
taking into account the credibility of the statements made by the alien 
in support of the alien's claim and such other facts as are known to 
the immigration judge, that the alien could establish eligibility for 
asylum under section 208 of the Act or withholding under section 
241(b)(3) of the Act or withholding or deferral of removal under the 
United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment.
    (2) If the alien is determined to be an alien described in 8 CFR 
208.13(c)(3) or 1208.13(c)(3) and is determined to lack a reasonable 
fear under 8 CFR 208.30(e)(5)(ii), the immigration judge shall first 
review de novo the determination that the alien is described in 8 CFR 
208.13(c)(3) or 1208.13(c)(3) prior to any further review of the asylum 
officer's negative determination.
    (3) If the alien is determined to be an alien described as 
ineligible for asylum in 8 CFR 208.13(c)(4) or 1208.13(c)(4) and is 
determined to lack a reasonable fear under 8 CFR 208.30(e)(5)(iii), the 
immigration judge shall first review de novo the determination that the 
alien is described as ineligible for asylum in 8 CFR 208.13(c)(4) or 
1208.13(c)(4) prior to any further review of the asylum officer's 
negative determination.
* * * * *

PART 1208--PROCEDURES FOR ASYLUM AND WITHHOLDING OF REMOVAL

0
6. The authority citation for part 1208 continues to read as follows:

    Authority:  8 U.S.C. 1101, 1103, 1158, 1226, 1252, 1282; Title 
VII of Public Law 110-229.

0
7. In Sec.  1208.13, add paragraphs (c)(4) and (5) to read as follows:


Sec.  1208.13   Establishing asylum eligibility.

* * * * *
    (c) * * *
    (4) Additional limitation on eligibility for asylum. 
Notwithstanding the provisions of 8 CFR 208.15, any alien who enters, 
attempts to enter, or arrives in the United States across the southern 
land border on or after July 16, 2019, after transiting through at 
least one country outside the alien's country of citizenship, 
nationality, or last lawful habitual residence en route to the United 
States, shall be found ineligible for asylum unless:
    (i) The alien demonstrates that he or she applied for protection 
from persecution or torture in at least one country outside the alien's 
country of citizenship, nationality, or last lawful habitual residence 
through which the alien transited en route to the United States and the 
alien received a final judgment denying the alien protection in such 
country;
    (ii) The alien demonstrates that he or she satisfies the definition 
of ``victim of a severe form of trafficking in persons'' provided in 8 
CFR 214.11; or
    (iii) The only country or countries through which the alien 
transited en route to the United States were, at the time of the 
transit, not parties to the 1951 United Nations Convention relating to 
the Status of Refugees, the 1967 Protocol, or the United Nations 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment.
    (5) Non-binding determinations. Determinations made with respect to 
paragraph (c)(4)(ii) of this section are not binding on Federal 
departments or agencies in subsequent determinations of eligibility for 
T or U nonimmigrant status under section 101(a)(15)(T) or (U) of the 
Act or for benefits or services under 22 U.S.C. 7105 or 8 U.S.C. 
1641(c)(4).

0
8. In Sec.  [thinsp]1208.30, revise the section heading and paragraph 
(g)(1) to read as follows:


Sec.  [thinsp]1208.30  Credible fear determinations involving stowaways 
and applicants for admission who are found inadmissible pursuant to 
section 212(a)(6)(C) or 212(a)(7) of the Act, whose entry is limited or 
suspended under section 212(f) or 215(a)(1) of the Act, or who failed 
to apply for protection from persecution in a third country where 
potential relief is available while en route to the United States.

* * * * *
    (g) * * *
    (1) Review by immigration judge of a mandatory bar finding. (i) If 
the alien is determined to be an alien described in 8 CFR 208.13(c)(3) 
or 1208.13(c)(3) and is determined to lack a reasonable fear under 8 
CFR 208.30(e)(5), the immigration judge shall first review de novo the 
determination that the alien is described in 8 CFR 208.13(c)(3) or 
1208.13(c)(3). If the immigration judge

[[Page 33845]]

finds that the alien is not described in 8 CFR 208.13(c)(3) or 
1208.13(c)(3), then the immigration judge shall vacate the order of the 
asylum officer, and DHS may commence removal proceedings under section 
240 of the Act. If the immigration judge concurs with the credible fear 
determination that the alien is an alien described in 8 CFR 
208.13(c)(3) or 1208.13(c)(3), the immigration judge will then review 
the asylum officer's negative decision regarding reasonable fear made 
under 8 CFR 208.30(e)(5) consistent with paragraph (g)(2) of this 
section, except that the immigration judge will review the findings 
under the reasonable fear standard instead of the credible fear 
standard described in paragraph (g)(2).
    (ii) If the alien is determined to be an alien described as 
ineligible for asylum in 8 CFR 208.13(c)(4) or 1208.13(c)(4) and is 
determined to lack a reasonable fear under 8 CFR 208.30(e)(5), the 
immigration judge shall first review de novo the determination that the 
alien is described as ineligible for asylum in 8 CFR 208.13(c)(4) or 
1208.13(c)(4). If the immigration judge finds that the alien is not 
described as ineligible for asylum in 8 CFR 208.13(c)(4) or 
1208.13(c)(4), then the immigration judge shall vacate the order of the 
asylum officer, and DHS may commence removal proceedings under section 
240 of the Act. If the immigration judge concurs with the credible fear 
determination that the alien is an alien described as ineligible for 
asylum in 8 CFR 208.13(c)(4) or 1208.13(c)(4), the immigration judge 
will then review the asylum officer's negative decision regarding 
reasonable fear made under 8 CFR 208.30(e)(5) consistent with paragraph 
(g)(2) of this section, except that the immigration judge will review 
the findings under the reasonable fear standard instead of the credible 
fear standard described in paragraph (g)(2).
* * * * *

    Approved:

    Dated: July 12, 2019.
Kevin K. McAleenan,
Acting Secretary of Homeland Security.
    Approved:

    Dated: July 12, 2019.
William P. Barr,
Attorney General.
[FR Doc. 2019-15246 Filed 7-15-19; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410-30-P; 9111-97-P