[Federal Register Volume 84, Number 136 (Tuesday, July 16, 2019)]
[Notices]
[Pages 33913-33915]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2019-15055]


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DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

Bureau of Industry and Security

[Docket Number: 18-BIS-0001]


In the Matter of: Pouran Aazad, a.k.a. Pouran Azad, a.k.a. 
Pourandokt Aazad, a.k.a Pourandokt Azad, 27333 Ursula Lane, Los Altos 
Hills, CA 94022; Sadr Emad-Vaez, a.k.a. Seid Sadredin Emad Vaez 27333 
Ursula Lane, Los Altos Hills, CA 94022; Ghareh Sabz Co., a.k.a. Ghare 
Sabz Co., a.k.a. GHS Technology, No. 446 Farjam St., Resalat Square, 
Tehran, Iran and No. 25, East Farjam Ave., Resalat Square, Tehran, 
Iran, Respondents; Order Relating to Pouran Aazad, Sadr Emad-Vaez and 
Ghareh Sabz Co.

    The Bureau of Industry and Security, U.S. Department of Commerce 
(``BIS''), has notified Pouran Aazad, a.k.a. Pouran Azad, a.k.a. 
Pourandokt Aazad, a.k.a. Pourandokt Azad (``Aazad''), Sadr Emad-Vaez, 
a.k.a. Seid Sadredin Emad Vaez (``Emad-Vaez''), and Ghareh Sabz Co., 
a.k.a. Ghare Sabz Co., a.k.a. GHS Technology (``Ghareh Sabz Co.'') 
(collectively ``Respondents'') that it has initiated an administrative 
proceeding against them pursuant to Section 766.3 of the Export 
Administration Regulations (the ``Regulations''),\1\ through the 
issuance of a Charging Letter to Respondents that alleges that 
Respondents have violated the Regulations.\2\ Aazad and Emad-Vaez are 
Iranian nationals and naturalized citizens of the United States, with 
last known addresses in Los Altos Hills, California; Ghareh Sabz Co. is 
an Iranian company, with last known addresses in Tehran, Iran. 
Specifically, the charge is:
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    \1\ The Regulations originally issued under the Export 
Administration Act of 1979, as amended, 50 U.S.C. 4601-4623 (Supp. 
III 2015) (``the EAA''), which lapsed on August 21, 2001. The 
President, through Executive Order 13,222 of August 17, 2001 (3 CFR, 
2001 Comp. 783 (2002)), which has been extended by successive 
Presidential Notices, the most recent being that of August 8, 2018 
(83 FR 39,871 (Aug. 13, 2018)), continued the Regulations in full 
force and effect under the International Emergency Economic Powers 
Act, 50 U.S.C. 1701, et seq. (2012) (``IEEPA''). On August 13, 2018, 
the President signed into law the John S. McCain National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, which includes the Export 
Control Reform Act of 2018, Title XVII, Subtitle B of Public Law 
115-232, 132 Stat. 2208 (``ECRA''). While Section 1766 of ECRA 
repeals the provisions of the EAA (except for three sections which 
are inapplicable here), Section 1768 of ECRA provides, in pertinent 
part, that all rules, regulations, orders, and other forms of 
administrative action that were made or issued under the EAA, 
including as continued in effect pursuant to IEEPA, and were in 
effect as of ECRA's date of enactment (August 13, 2018), shall 
continue in effect according to their terms until modified, 
superseded, set aside, or revoked through action undertaken pursuant 
to the authority provided under ECRA.
    \2\ The Regulations are currently codified in the Code of 
Federal Regulations at 15 CFR parts 730-774 (2019). The charged 
violation occurred in 2012 through 2013. The Regulations governing 
the violation at issue are found in the 2012 through 2013 versions 
of the Code of Federal Regulations (15 CFR parts 730-774 (2012-
2013)). The 2019 Regulations set forth the procedures that apply to 
this matter.
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Charge 1 15 CFR 764.2(d)--Conspiracy To Export an Item From the United 
States to Iran Without the Required U.S. Government Authorization

    1. Beginning as early as in or around November 2012, and continuing 
at least until on or about April 26, 2013, Aazad, Emad-Vaez, and Ghareh 
Sabz Co. conspired and acted in concert with others, known and unknown, 
to violate the Regulations and to bring about an act or acts that 
constitute a violation of the Regulations. The purpose of the 
conspiracy was to evade the long-standing and well-known U.S. embargo 
against Iran by purchasing a U.S.-origin micro-drill press for export 
to Iran and causing the export of this item to Iran, via transshipment 
through the United Arab Emirates (``UAE''), without the required U.S. 
Government authorization.
    2. Based upon information and belief, Aazad and Emad-Vaez were at 
all times pertinent hereto Iranian nationals and naturalized citizens 
of the United States who lived variously in both Tehran, Iran and 
Northern California. Aazad held herself out as the Chief Financial 
Officer of Ghareh Sabz Co., while Emad-Vaez described himself as the 
company's founder and Chief Executive Officer.
    3. The conspiracy led to the unauthorized attempted export of a 
highly-accurate micro drill press with a video edge finder, process 
inspection camera, and spray mister system from the United States to 
Iran, via transshipment through the UAE. The micro drill press is 
subject to the Regulations, designated as EAR99,\3\ and valued at 
$15,199. This item also is subject to the Iranian Transactions and 
Sanctions Regulations (``ITSR''), administered by the U.S. Department 
of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (``OFAC'').\4\
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    \3\ EAR99 is a designation for items subject to the Regulations 
but not listed on the Commerce Control List. 15 CFR 734.3(c) (2012-
2013).
    \4\ See 31 CFR 560 (2012-2013). The ITSR were known as the 
Iranian Transactions Regulations (``ITR'') until October 22, 2012. 
By final rule published and effective on that date, OFAC changed the 
heading of 31 CFR part 560 from the ``Iranian Transactions 
Regulations'' to the ``Iranian Transactions and Sanctions 
Regulations,'' amended the renamed ITSR, and reissued them in their 
entirety. See 77 FR 64,664 (Oct. 22, 2012). 31 CFR part 560 remained 
(and remains) the same in pertinent part.
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    4. Section 746.7 of the Regulations has long provided, including at 
all times pertinent hereto, that no person may engage in the export or 
reexport of any item subject to both the Regulations and the ITSR 
without authorization from OFAC. 15 CFR 746.7 (2012-2013, 2018). 
Section 560.204 of the ITR in turn has long prohibited, including at 
all times pertinent hereto, the unauthorized export, reexport, sale or 
supply, directly or indirectly, of any item from the United States to 
Iran. This broad prohibition includes the export, reexport, sale, or 
supply of any item from the United States to a third country, such as 
the UAE, undertaken with knowledge or reason to know that the item was 
intended for supply, transshipment, or reexportation, directly or 
indirectly, to Iran. 31 CFR 560.204 (2012-2013).\5\
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    \5\ See note 4, supra.
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    5. As further detailed below, Respondents sought out a U.S.-origin 
drill press for purchase and export to Iran. On or about November 12, 
2012, in response to a request from Ghareh Sabz Co., the U.S. 
manufacturer of the micro drill press sent Ghareh Sabz Co. a price 
quote for the micro drill press and its parts and components. That same 
day, the Ghareh Sabz Co. employee forwarded the quote and 
specifications to another Ghareh Sabz Co. employee and to Aazad and 
Emad-Vaez, with the message that ``The forwarded documents include a 
quotation for Micro-Drill Machine!''
    6. On or about November 17, 2012, a purchasing agent at Ghareh Sabz 
Co. sent the U.S. manufacturer instructions for the order along with 
requests for a price discount and promises to send a purchase order. 
The same purchasing agent later sent the U.S. manufacturer a purchase 
order, dated February 12, 2013, on Ghareh Sabz Co. letterhead. The 
purchase order listed the drill press

[[Page 33914]]

and related parts and components being acquired, listed the U.S. 
manufacturer as the supplier, and listed Ghareh Sabz. Co. as the 
consignee. The purchase order was approved and signed by Aazad.
    7. In furtherance of the conspiracy and in an effort to avoid 
detection by law enforcement, a Ghareh Sabz Co. purchasing agent sent 
an email to the U.S. manufacturer, on or about March 2, 2013, stating: 
``Since we are not able to receive the cargo directly, please arrange 
to send it to Dubai.'' The purchasing agent also provided the U.S. 
manufacturer the address and contact information for a shipping and 
forwarding company in Dubai, UAE, and added that this UAE shipping and 
forwarding company should be listed as the buyer ``in all the documents 
(invoice, packing list, certificate of origin, Bill of lading)[.]'' 
(Parenthetical in original). On or about March 18, 2013, the Ghareh 
Sabz Co. purchasing agent sent the U.S. manufacturer a similar email, 
stating: ``Since we can not receive the cargo in Iran please send it to 
Dubai . . . [p]lease note that [the UAE] shipping and forwarding Co. is 
the buyer in all the documents (invoice, packing list, certificate of 
origin & billing of lading) & you should send complete documents to 
them so they will be able to import the machine in Dubai. Then they 
will export it to Iran.'' (Parenthetical in original). On or about that 
same date, Aazad and Emad-Vaez received an email confirming a wire 
transfer on behalf of Ghareh Sabz Co. to the U.S. manufacturer in the 
amount of $15,199.
    8. On or about April 22, 2013, in furtherance of the scheme to 
unlawfully export the item to Iran through the UAE, Ghareh Sabz Co. 
directed the U.S. manufacturer to change shipping documentation in 
order to list a UAE general trading company as the consignee so that 
the export could proceed.
    9. On or about April 26, 2013, BIS, upon learning of the planned 
export, ordered the item detained at a warehouse outside San Francisco 
International Airport. No authorization to export the item had been 
sought or obtained from OFAC.
    10. In so doing, Respondents violated Section 764.2(d) of the 
Regulations, for which they are jointly and severally liable.
    Whereas, BIS and Respondents have entered into a Settlement 
Agreement pursuant to Section 766.18(b) of the Regulations, whereby 
they agreed to settle this matter in accordance with the terms and 
conditions set forth therein;
    Whereas, I have approved of the terms of such Settlement Agreement; 
and
    Whereas, in doing so, I have taken into consideration the plea 
agreements that Respondents have entered into with the United States 
Attorney's Office for the Northern District of California (the ``plea 
agreements'').
    It is therefore ordered:
    First, Respondents shall be assessed a civil penalty in the amount 
of $300,000, the payment of which shall be made to the U.S. Department 
of Commerce within 30 days of the date of this Order. Respondents are 
jointly and severally liable for the payment of this civil penalty. 
Respondents' compliance in full with all of the provisions of the 
Settlement Agreement and this Order, including full and timely payment 
of this civil penalty, and their compliance in full with their plea 
agreements and any sentences imposed against them following or upon 
their guilty pleas and convictions, are hereby made conditions to any 
license, license exception, permission, or privilege that may otherwise 
be granted or be available to Respondents under the Regulations 
following expiration of the denial of export privileges set forth 
below.
    Second, that, pursuant to the Debt Collection Act of 1982, as 
amended (31 U.S.C. 3701-3720E (2012)), the civil penalty owed under 
this Order accrues interest as more fully described in the attached 
Notice, and if payment is not made by the due date specified herein, 
Respondents will be assessed, in addition to the full amount of the 
civil penalty and interest, a penalty charge and an administrative 
charge, as more fully described in the attached Notice.
    Third, for a period of ten (10) years from the date of this Order, 
Pouran Aazad, a.k.a. Pouran Azad, a.k.a. Pourandokt Aazad, a.k.a. 
Pourandokt Azad, with a last known address of 27333 Ursula Lane, Los 
Altos Hills, CA 94022; Sadr Emad-Vaez, a.k.a. Seid Sadredin Emad Vaez, 
with a last known address of 27333 Ursula Lane, Los Altos Hills, CA 
94022; and Ghareh Sabz Co., a.k.a. Ghare Sabz Co., a.k.a. GHS 
Technology, with last known addresses of No. 446 Farjam St., Resalat 
Square, Tehran, Iran and No. 25 Farjam Ave., Resalat Square, Tehran, 
Iran, and when acting for or on their behalf, their successors, 
assigns, directors, officers, employees, representatives, and agents 
(each a ``Denied Person'' and collectively the ``Denied Persons''), may 
not, directly or indirectly, participate in any way in any transaction 
involving any commodity, software or technology (hereinafter 
collectively referred to as ``item'') exported or to be exported from 
the United States that is subject to the Regulations, or in any other 
activity subject to the Regulations, including, but not limited to:
    A. Applying for, obtaining, or using any license, license 
exception, or export control document;
    B. Carrying on negotiations concerning, or ordering, buying, 
receiving, using, selling, delivering, storing, disposing of, 
forwarding, transporting, financing, or otherwise servicing in any way, 
any transaction involving any item exported or to be exported from the 
United States that is subject to the Regulations, or engaging in any 
other activity subject to the Regulations; or
    C. Benefitting in any way from any transaction involving any item 
exported or to be exported from the United States that is subject to 
the Regulations, or from any other activity subject to the Regulations.
    Fourth, no person may, directly or indirectly, do any of the 
following:
    A. Export or reexport to or on behalf of a Denied Person any item 
subject to the Regulations;
    B. Take any action that facilitates the acquisition or attempted 
acquisition by a Denied Person of the ownership, possession, or control 
of any item subject to the Regulations that has been or will be 
exported from the United States, including financing or other support 
activities related to a transaction whereby a Denied Person acquires or 
attempts to acquire such ownership, possession or control;
    C. Take any action to acquire from or to facilitate the acquisition 
or attempted acquisition from a Denied Person of any item subject to 
the Regulations that has been exported from the United States;
    D. Obtain from a Denied Person in the United States any item 
subject to the Regulations with knowledge or reason to know that the 
item will be, or is intended to be, exported from the United States; or
    E. Engage in any transaction to service any item subject to the 
Regulations that has been or will be exported from the United States 
and which is owned, possessed or controlled by a Denied Person, or 
service any item, of whatever origin, that is owned, possessed or 
controlled by a Denied Person if such service involves the use of any 
item subject to the Regulations that has been or will be exported from 
the United States. For purposes of this paragraph, servicing means 
installation, maintenance, repair, modification or testing.
    Fifth, after notice and opportunity for comment as provided in 
Section 766.23 of the Regulations, any person, firm, corporation, or 
business organization

[[Page 33915]]

related to a Denied Person by ownership, control, position of 
responsibility, affiliation, or other connection in the conduct of 
trade or business may also be made subject to the provisions of this 
Order.
    Sixth, Respondents shall not take any action or make or permit to 
be made any public statement, directly or indirectly, denying the 
allegations in the Charging Letter or this Order.
    Seventh, the Charging Letter, the Settlement Agreement, and this 
Order shall be made available to the public.
    Eighth, this Order shall be served on Respondents, and shall be 
published in the Federal Register.
    This Order, which constitutes the final agency action in this 
matter, is effective immediately.

    Issued this 8th day of July 2019.
Douglas R. Hassebrock,
Director, Office of Export Enforcement, performing the non-exclusive 
functions and duties of the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export 
Enforcement.
[FR Doc. 2019-15055 Filed 7-15-19; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510-33-P