[Federal Register Volume 84, Number 136 (Tuesday, July 16, 2019)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 33861-33864]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2019-15008]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
10 CFR Parts 50, 52, and 73
[Docket No. NRC-2017-0227]
RIN 3150-AK19
Physical Security for Advanced Reactors
AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
ACTION: Regulatory basis; public meeting, and request for comment.
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SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is requesting
comment on a regulatory basis to support a rulemaking that would amend
the NRC's regulations to develop specific physical security
requirements for advanced reactors, which refers to light-water small
modular reactors and non-light-water reactors. The NRC is proposing a
limited-scope rulemaking that would provide a clear set of alternative,
performance-based requirements and guidance for advanced reactor
physical security that would reduce the need for exemptions to current
physical security requirements when applicants request permits and
licenses. This rulemaking would provide additional benefits for
advanced reactor applicants by establishing greater regulatory
stability,
[[Page 33862]]
predictability, and clarity in the licensing process. The NRC plans to
hold a public meeting to discuss the regulatory basis and facilitate
public participation.
DATES: Submit comments by August 15, 2019. Comments received after this
date will be considered if it is practical to do so, but the NRC is
able to ensure consideration only for comments received on or before
this date.
ADDRESSES: You may submit comments by any of the following methods:
Federal Rulemaking Website: Go to http://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2017-0227. Address
questions about NRC dockets to Carol Gallagher; telephone: 301-415-
3463; email: [email protected]. For technical questions, contact
the individuals listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section
of this document.
Email comments to: [email protected]. If you do
not receive an automatic email reply confirming receipt, then contact
us at 301-415-1677.
Fax comments to: Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission at 301-415-1101.
Mail comments to: Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, ATTN: Rulemakings and
Adjudications Staff.
Hand deliver comments to: 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville,
MD 20852, between 7:30 a.m. and 4:15 p.m. (Eastern Time) Federal
workdays; telephone: 301-415-1677.
For additional direction on obtaining information and submitting
comments, see ``Obtaining Information and Submitting Comments'' in the
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section of this document.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Ilka T. Berrios, Office of Nuclear
Material Safety and Safeguards; telephone: 301-415-2404; email:
[email protected]; or William Reckley, Office of New Reactors;
telephone: 301-415-7490; email: [email protected]. Both are staff
of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Table of Contents
I. Obtaining Information and Submitting Comments
II. Discussion
III. Specific Requests for Comment
IV. Cumulative Effects of Regulation
V. Plain Writing
VI. Public Meeting
I. Obtaining Information and Submitting Comments
A. Obtaining Information
Please refer to Docket ID NRC-2017-0227 when contacting the NRC
about the availability of information for this action. You may obtain
publicly-available information related to this action by any of the
following methods:
Federal Rulemaking Website: Go to http://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2017-0227.
NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System
(ADAMS): You may obtain publicly-available documents online in the
ADAMS Public Documents collection at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To begin the search, select ``Begin Web-based ADAMS
Search.'' For problems with ADAMS, please contact the NRC's Public
Document Room (PDR) reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737, or
by email to [email protected]. The regulatory basis document is
available in ADAMS under Accession No. ML19099A017.
NRC's PDR: You may examine and purchase copies of public
documents at the NRC's PDR, Room O1-F21, One White Flint North, 11555
Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852.
B. Submitting Comments
Please include Docket ID NRC-2017-0227 in your comment submission.
The NRC cautions you not to include identifying or contact
information that you do not want to be publicly disclosed in your
comment submission. The NRC will post all comment submissions at http://www.regulations.gov as well as enter the comment submissions into
ADAMS. The NRC does not routinely edit comment submissions to remove
identifying or contact information.
If you are requesting or aggregating comments from other persons
for submission to the NRC, then you should inform those persons not to
include identifying or contact information that they do not want to be
publicly disclosed in their comment submission. Your request should
state that the NRC does not routinely edit comment submissions to
remove such information before making the comment submissions available
to the public or entering the comment into ADAMS.
Please note that the NRC will not provide formal written responses
to each of the comments received on the regulatory basis. However, the
NRC will consider all comments received in the development of the
proposed rule.
II. Discussion
In 2018, the staff submitted SECY-18-0076, ``Options and
Recommendation for Physical Security for Advanced Reactors,'' dated
August 1, 2018, (ADAMS Accession No. ML18170A051), presenting
alternatives and a recommendation to the Commission on possible changes
to the regulations and guidance related to physical security for
advanced reactors (light-water small modular reactors and non-light-
water reactors). The staff evaluated the advantages and disadvantages
of each alternative and recommended a limited-scope rulemaking to
further assess and, if appropriate, revise a limited set of NRC
regulations. The staff also recommended developing necessary guidance
to address performance criteria for which the alternative requirements
may be applied for advanced reactor license applicants. In the Staff
Requirements Memorandum (SRM)--SECY-18-0076, dated November 19, 2018,
(ADAMS Accession No. ML18324A478), the Commission approved the staff's
recommendation to initiate a limited-scope rulemaking.
As a result, the NRC is considering rulemaking for advanced
reactors that could be licensed under part 50 of title 10 of the Code
of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), ``Domestic Licensing of Production and
Utilization Facilities,'' or 10 CFR part 52, ``Licenses,
Certifications, and Approvals for Nuclear Power Plants.'' This limited-
scope rulemaking would apply the insights from advances in designs and
safety research; retain the NRC's overall security regulations
framework; and provide alternatives and guidance related to specific
physical security requirements. For the purposes of this limited-scope
rulemaking, the term advanced reactors will refer only to light-water
small modular reactors and non-light-water reactors.
The NRC's current physical security regulations for nuclear power
plants were developed to address the risk of radiological consequences
from radiological sabotage of a nuclear power plant that uses special
nuclear material and the theft or diversion of special nuclear material
from these facilities. This rulemaking will focus on the threats from
radiological sabotage. Potential threats related to theft and diversion
of special nuclear material are outside the scope of this limited-scope
rulemaking, but may be considered in future projects.\1\ Given that the
current
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fleet of nuclear power plants consists of large light-water reactors,
NRC regulations were developed in the context of security challenges
related to large light-water reactors. These regulations do not take
into account advances in designs and engineered safety features, and
their applications to advanced reactors.
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\1\ Many non-light-water reactor designs are expected to use
higher assay low-enriched uranium (i.e., between 5- and 20-percent
enrichments) and fuel forms other than the traditional uranium
dioxide pellets used for light-water reactors. Different fuel forms
introduce the possible need to develop new approaches to material
control and accounting practices and protections against theft and
diversion throughout the fuel cycle, including at reactor
facilities. Future interactions between the staff and stakeholders
will cover these and other issues related to higher assay low-
enriched uranium and the nuclear fuel cycle.
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The regulatory basis summarizes the current physical security
framework for large light-water reactors against radiological sabotage,
describes regulatory issues that have motivated the NRC to pursue
rulemaking, evaluates various alternatives to address physical security
for advanced reactors, and identifies the background documents related
to these issues. In the regulatory basis, the term advanced reactors
refers to light-water small modular reactors and non-light-water
reactors. As defined in Sec. 170.3, the term Small modular reactors
refers to a nuclear reactor (or module) designed to produce heat energy
up to 1,000 megawatts thermal or electrical energy up to approximately
300 megawatts electric per module that the Commission licensed under
the authority granted by Section 103 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,
as amended, and pursuant to the provisions of Sec. 50.22, ``Class 103
licenses; for commercial and industrial facilities.''
The NRC is requesting comment on the regulatory basis to support
consideration of a rulemaking that would provide alternatives and
guidance related to specific physical security requirements for
advanced reactors. The NRC will consider the comments received on the
regulatory basis as it develops this proposed rule.
This limited-scope rulemaking aims to retain the current overall
security requirements framework in Sec. 73.55, ``Requirements for
physical protection of licensed activities in nuclear power reactors
against radiological sabotage,'' to protect against radiological
sabotage, while providing alternatives for advanced reactors to
specific physical security-related regulations.
The physical security measures established under current NRC
regulations are technology-inclusive. Under this limited-scope
rulemaking, the NRC would apply a similar, technology-inclusive
approach for advanced reactors to accommodate a variety of facility
designs, systems, and purposes. The technical basis for offering an
alternative for the physical security requirements for advanced
reactors is the combination of inherent reactor characteristics and
demonstration of security incorporated into the advanced reactor
designs that reduces reliance on human actions to mitigate attempted
acts of radiological sabotage.
The limited-scope rulemaking would target the identified
requirements that rely on human actions for interdiction and post-
attack command and control. Specifically, the limited-scope rulemaking
would focus on establishing a performance-based approach and associated
criteria to assess advanced reactor attributes, as described in the
Policy Statement on the Regulation of Advanced Reactors, published in
the Federal Register (FR) on October 14, 2008 (73 FR 60612), to
determine whether alternatives to the prescribed minimum number of
armed responders currently defined in Sec. 73.55(k)(5)(ii) and the
prescriptive requirements defined in Sec. 73.55(i)(4)(iii) for an
onsite secondary alarm station are applicable. The NRC is aware of the
safety improvements expected to be generally found in advanced reactors
due to their incorporation of simplified, inherent, and passive
features. These features may result in smaller and slower fission
product releases following a loss of safety functions from malfunctions
and from many malicious acts.
The advantages of pursuing a limited-scope rulemaking related to
advanced reactor physical security include:
Promote regulatory stability, predictability, and clarity.
Reduce the need for future applicants to propose
alternatives or request exemptions from physical security requirements.
Recognize technology advancements and design features
associated with the NRC-recommended attributes of advanced reactors.
Replace prescriptive regulations with risk-informed,
performance-based requirements.
III. Specific Request for Comment
The NRC is seeking comments and supporting rationale from the
public on the following questions:
(1) Is it feasible to define performance criteria related to
offsite consequences for advanced reactors with attributes as defined
in the Policy Statement on the Regulation of Advanced Reactors, that
could be used to determine the applicability of alternative,
performance-based physical security requirements while maintaining
adequate protection of plant equipment and personnel by the overall
physical security program?
(2) If feasible to define performance criteria to determine the
applicability of alternative, performance-based requirements for a
limited scope of physical security regulations, are the possible
criteria, as proposed in Section 4.5 of the regulatory basis,
reasonable and sufficient to ensure that the resultant physical
security programs provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection
of public health and safety or would other criteria be more
appropriate? (Respondents should describe suggested alternatives.)
(3) It is anticipated that engineered safety features may result in
a slow accident progression that could allow for reliance on offsite
licensee response to support the prevention of offsite consequences for
advanced reactors with attributes as defined in the Policy Statement.
The staff expects that future discussions will involve evaluating the
feasibility of reliance on these resources for security response and to
help recover facilities and mitigate events. What types of engineering,
administrative, and programmatic controls should be considered in any
future evaluations of this approach?
IV. Cumulative Effects of Regulation
The cumulative effects of regulation (CER) describes the challenges
that licensees or other impacted entities (such as State agency
partners, Tribal and local governments) may face while implementing new
regulatory positions, programs, and requirements (e.g., rules, generic
letters, backfits, inspections). The CER is an organizational challenge
that results from a licensee or impacted entity implementing a number
of complex positions, programs, or requirements within a limited
implementation period and with available resources (which may include
limited available expertise to address a specific issue). The NRC has
implemented CER enhancements to the rulemaking process to facilitate
public involvement throughout the rulemaking process. Therefore, the
NRC is specifically requesting comments on the cumulative effects that
may result from this proposed rulemaking. In developing comments on the
regulatory basis, consider and provide comments on the following
questions:
1. In light of any current or projected CER challenges, what should
be a reasonable effective date, compliance date, or submittal date(s)
from the time the final rule is published to the actual implementation
of any proposed
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requirements, including changes to programs, procedures, and the
facility?
2. If CER challenges currently exist or are expected, what should
be done to address them? For example, if more time is required for
subsequent implementation of the new requirements, what period of time
is sufficient?
3. Do other (NRC or other agency) regulatory actions (e.g., orders,
generic communications, license amendment requests, and inspection
findings of a generic nature) influence the subsequent implementation
of the proposed rule's requirements?
4. Are there unintended consequences? Does the regulatory basis
create conditions that would be contrary to the regulatory basis'
purpose and objectives? If so, what are the unintended consequences,
and how should they be addressed?
V. Plain Writing
The Plain Writing Act of 2010 (Pub. L. 111-274) requires Federal
agencies to write documents in a clear, concise, and well-organized
manner. The NRC has written this document to be consistent with the
Plain Writing Act as well as the Presidential Memorandum, ``Plain
Language in Government Writing,'' published June 10, 1998 (63 FR
31883). The NRC requests comment on this document with respect to the
clarity and effectiveness of the language used.
VI. Public Meeting
The NRC plans to hold a public meeting during the public comment
period for this document. The public meeting will provide a forum for
the NRC to discuss the issues and questions with external stakeholders
regarding the regulatory basis to support a proposed rulemaking that
would provide alternatives and guidance related to specific physical
security requirements for advanced reactors. The NRC does not intend to
provide detailed responses to comments or other information submitted
during the public meeting.
The public meeting will be noticed on the NRC's public meeting
website at least 10 calendar days before the meeting. Stakeholders
should monitor the NRC's Public Meeting Schedule web page for
additional information about the public meeting at http://meetings.nrc.gov/pmns/mtg.
The NRC will post a notice for the public meeting and may post
additional material related to this action to the Federal Rulemaking
website at http://www.regulations.gov under Docket ID NRC-2017-0227.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 10th day of July 2019.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Patricia K. Holahan,
Director, Division of Rulemaking, Office of Nuclear Materials Safety
and Safeguards.
[FR Doc. 2019-15008 Filed 7-15-19; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P