[Federal Register Volume 84, Number 117 (Tuesday, June 18, 2019)]
[Notices]
[Pages 28352-28357]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2019-12803]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50-219; NRC-2019-0096]


Exelon Generation Company LLC; Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating 
Station

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Exemption; issuance.

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SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has reissued 
exemptions originally approved on October 16, 2018, exempting Exelon 
Generation Company, LLC (Exelon or the licensee) from certain emergency 
planning (EP) requirements. The NRC is reissuing these exemptions to 
change the effective date of the exemptions from date would change from 
365 days to 285 days after the permanent cessation of power operations. 
The reissued exemptions eliminated the requirements to maintain an 
offsite radiological emergency preparedness plan and reduce the scope 
of onsite EP activities at the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station 
(Oyster Creek), based on the reduced risks of accidents that could 
result in an offsite radiological release at a decommissioning nuclear 
power reactor.

DATES: The exemptions were reissued on June 11, 2019.

ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID NRC-2019-0096 when contacting the 
NRC about the availability of information regarding this document. You 
may obtain publicly-available information related to this document 
using any of the following methods:
     Federal Rulemaking Website: Go to http://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2019-0096. Address 
questions about NRC docket IDs in Regulations.gov to Jennifer Borges; 
telephone: 301-287-9127; email: [email protected]. For technical 
questions, contact the individual listed

[[Page 28353]]

in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section of this document.
     NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System 
(ADAMS): You may obtain publicly-available documents online in the 
ADAMS Public Documents collection at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To begin the search, select ``Begin Web-based ADAMS 
Search.'' For problems with ADAMS, please contact the NRC's Public 
Document Room (PDR) reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737, or 
by email to [email protected]. The ADAMS accession number for each 
document referenced (if it is available in ADAMS) is provided the first 
time that it is mentioned in this document. In addition, for the 
convenience of the reader, the ADAMS accession numbers are provided in 
a table in the ``Availability of Documents'' section of this document.
     NRC's PDR: You may examine and purchase copies of public 
documents at the NRC's PDR, Room O1-F21, One White Flint North, 11555 
Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Amy M. Snyder, Office of Nuclear 
Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
Washington, DC 20555-0001; telephone: 301-415-6822; email: 
[email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Background

    The Commission has determined that, pursuant to section 50.12 of 
title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Exelon's request for 
exemptions from certain EP requirements in 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 
50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR part 50, appendix E, section IV, and as 
summarized in Enclosure 2 to SECY-18-0062, are authorized by law, will 
not present an undue risk to the public health and safety, and are 
consistent with the common defense and security. Also, special 
circumstances are present. Therefore, the Commission hereby grants 
Exelon's exemptions from certain EP requirements in 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 
CFR 50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR part 50, appendix E, section IV, as 
discussed and evaluated in detail in the NRC staff's safety evaluation 
associated with this exemption. The exemptions are effective as of 285 
days after permanent cessation of power operations.

II. Availability of Documents

    The documents identified in the following table are available for 
public inspection through ADAMS, a public web page, or by using one of 
the methods discussed in the ADDRESSES section of this document.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
          Document title                            Date                  ADAMS accession No. or public web page
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Exelon Generation Company, LLC,     February 14, 2018...................  ML18045A084.
 letter to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
 Commission, ``Certification of
 Permanent Cessation of Power
 Operations for Oyster Creek
 Nuclear Generating Station.''.
Exelon Generation Company, LLC,     September 25, 2018..................  ML18268A258.
 letter to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
 Commission, ``Certification of
 Permanent Removal of Fuel from
 the Reactor Vessel for Oyster
 Creek Nuclear Generating
 Station.''.
Exelon Generation Company, LLC,     October 22, 2018....................  ML18295A384.
 letter to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
 Commission, ``License Amendment
 Request--Proposed Change of
 Effective and Implementation
 Dates of License Amendment No.
 294, Oyster Creek Emergency Plan
 for Permanently Defueled
 Emergency Plan and Emergency
 Action Level Scheme.''.
Exelon Generation Company, LLC,     November 6, 2018....................  ML18310A306.
 letter to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
 Commission, ``License Amendment
 Request Supplement--Proposed
 Change of Effective and
 Implementation Dates of License
 Amendment No. 294, Oyster Creek
 Emergency Plan for Permanently
 Defueled Emergency Plan and
 Emergency Action Level Scheme.''.
Exelon Generation Company, LLC,     February 13, 2019...................  ML19044A643.
 letter to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
 Commission, ``Response to Request
 for Additional Information (RAI)
 and Supplemental Information
 Regarding Request for Changing
 Emergency Preparedness License
 Amendment No. 294 Effective
 Date''.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory             August 1997.........................  ML082260098.
 Commission, NUREG/CR-6451, ``A
 Safety and Regulatory Assessment
 of Generic BWR and PWR
 Permanently Shutdown Nuclear
 Power Plants.''.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory             February 2001.......................  ML010430066.
 Commission, NUREG-1738,
 ``Technical Study of Spent Fuel
 Pool Accident Risk at
 Decommissioning Nuclear Power
 Plants.''.
Federal Emergency Management        November 2010.......................  http://www.fema.gov/pdf/about/
 Agency Comprehensive Preparedness                                         divisions/npd/CPG_101_V2.pdf.
 Guide 101, ``Developing and
 Maintaining Emergency Operations
 Plans,'' Version 2.0.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory             September 2014......................  ML14255A365.
 Commission, NUREG-2161,
 ``Consequence Study of a Beyond
 Design-Basis Earthquake Affecting
 the Spent Fuel Pool for a U.S.
 Mark I Boiling Water Reactor.''.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory             November 12, 2013...................  ML13329A918
 Commission, COMSECY-13-0030,                                             (Package)
 ``Staff Evaluation and
 Recommendation for Japan Lessons-
 Learned Tier 3 Issue on Expedited
 Transfer of Spent Fuel.''.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory             May 31, 2018........................  ML18030B340 (Package).
 Commission, SECY-18-0062,
 ``Request by the Exelon
 Generation Company, LLC for
 Exemptions from Certain Emergency
 Planning Requirements for the
 Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating
 Station.''.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory             July 17, 2018.......................  ML18198A449.
 Commission, ``Staff Requirements--
 SECY-18-0062, Request by the
 Exelon Generation Company, LLC
 for Exemptions from Certain
 Emergency Planning Requirements
 for the Oyster Creek Nuclear
 Generating Station.''.
Exelon Generation Company, LLC,     March 8, 2018.......................  ML18067A087.
 letter to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
 Commission, ``Supplement to
 Request for Exemption from
 Portions of 10 CFR 50.47 and 10
 CFR 50 part 50, Appendix E.''.
Exelon Generation Company, LLC,     March 19, 2018......................  ML18078A146.
 letter to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
 Commission, ``Response to Request
 for Additional Information (RAI)
 Related to Exemption Request from
 Portions of 10 CFR 50.47 and 10
 CFR 50 part 50, Appendix E.''.

[[Page 28354]]

 
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory             October 16, 2018....................  ML18220A980.
 Commission, letter to Exelon
 Generation Company, LLC ``Oyster
 Creek Nuclear Generating Station--
 Exemptions from Certain Emergency
 Planning Requirements and Related
 Safety Evaluation.''.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The text of the exemption is attached.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, on June 13, 2019.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Bruce A. Watson,
Chief, Reactor Decommissioning Branch, Division of Decommissioning, 
Uranium Recovery, and Waste Programs, Office of Nuclear Material Safety 
and Safeguards.

Attachment-Exemption

Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Docket No. 50-219

Exelon Generation Company, LLC

Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station

Exemption

I. Background

    Exelon Generation Company, LLC (Exelon or the licensee) is the 
holder of Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-16 for Oyster 
Creek Nuclear Generating Station (Oyster Creek). The license provides, 
among other things, that the facility is subject to all rules, 
regulations, and orders of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) 
now or hereafter in effect. The facility is located in Ocean County, 
New Jersey.
    By letter dated February 14, 2018 (Agencywide Documents Access and 
Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML18045A084), Exelon submitted 
a certification to the NRC that it would permanently cease power 
operations at Oyster Creek no later than October 31, 2018. On September 
17, 2018, Exelon permanently ceased power operations at Oyster Creek. 
By letter dated September 25, 2018 (ADAMS Accession No. ML18268A258), 
Exelon certified the permanent removal of fuel from the Oyster Creek 
reactor vessel.
    In accordance with Section 50.82(a)(2) of Title 10 of the Code of 
Federal Regulations (10 CFR), the license for a power reactor facility 
no longer authorizes operation of the reactor or emplacement or 
retention of fuel into the reactor vessel upon the docketing of the 
certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent 
removal of fuel from the reactor vessel. The facility is still 
authorized to possess and store irradiated (i.e., spent) nuclear fuel. 
Spent fuel is currently stored onsite in the Oyster Creek spent fuel 
pool (SFP) and a dry cask independent spent fuel storage installation 
(ISFSI) at the Oyster Creek facility.
    Many of the accident scenarios postulated in the updated final 
safety analysis reports (UFSARs) for operating power reactors involve 
failures or malfunctions of systems, which could affect the fuel in the 
reactor core and, in the most severe postulated accidents, would 
involve the release of large quantities of fission products. With the 
permanent cessation of operations at Oyster Creek and the permanent 
removal of the fuel from the reactor vessel, such accidents are no 
longer possible. The reactor, reactor coolant system, and supporting 
systems are no longer in operation and have no function related to the 
storage of the spent fuel. Therefore, emergency planning (EP) 
provisions for postulated accidents involving failure or malfunction of 
the reactor, reactor coolant system, or supporting systems are no 
longer applicable.
    The EP requirements of 10 CFR 50.47, ``Emergency plans,'' and 
Appendix E to 10 CFR part 50, ``Emergency Planning and Preparedness for 
Production and Utilization Facilities,'' continue to apply to nuclear 
power reactors that have permanently ceased operation and have 
permanently removed all fuel from the reactor vessel. There are no 
explicit regulatory provisions distinguishing EP requirements for a 
power reactor that is permanently shutdown and defueled from those for 
a reactor that is authorized to operate. To reduce or eliminate EP 
requirements that are no longer necessary due to the decommissioning 
status of the facility, Exelon must obtain exemptions from those EP 
regulations.
    On October 16, 2018, the NRC exempted Exelon from certain EP 
requirements for Oyster Creek (ADAMS Accession No. ML18220A980). These 
exemptions eliminated the requirements to maintain an offsite 
radiological emergency preparedness plan and reduce the scope of onsite 
EP activities at Oyster Creek, based on the reduced risks of accidents 
that could result in an offsite radiological release at a 
decommissioning nuclear power reactor. The October 16, 2018, exemptions 
were to become effective no earlier than 12 months (365 days) after 
permanent cessation of power operations at Oyster Creek.

II. Request/Action

    By letter dated November 6, 2018 (ADAMS Accession No. ML18310A306), 
as supplemented by letter dated February 13, 2019 (ADAMS Accession No. 
ML19044A643), Exelon requested to modify the effective date of the 
October 16, 2018, exemptions from 12 months (365 days) to 9.38 months 
(285 days) after permanent cessation of power operations. Oyster Creek 
permanently ceased power operations on September 17, 2018. Therefore, 
the revised effective date of the exemptions would be June 29, 2019. To 
provide a complete record of the NRC staff's review, the NRC is 
reissuing the October 16, 2018, exemptions to reflect the revised 
effective date. These reissued exemptions supersede the exemptions 
issued on October 16, 2018.

III. Discussion

    In accordance with 10 CFR 50.12, ``Specific exemptions,'' the 
Commission may, upon application by any interested person or upon its 
own initiative, grant exemptions from the requirements of 10 CFR part 
50 when: (1) The exemptions are authorized by law, will not present an 
undue risk to public health and safety, and are consistent with the 
common defense and security; and (2) any of the special circumstances 
listed in 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2) are present. These special circumstances 
include, among other things, that the application of the regulation in 
the particular circumstances would not serve the underlying purpose of 
the rule or is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the 
rule.
    As noted previously, the EP regulations contained in 10 CFR 
50.47(b) and Appendix E to 10 CFR part 50 apply to both operating and 
shutdown power reactors. The NRC has consistently acknowledged that the 
risk of an offsite radiological release at a power reactor that has 
permanently ceased operations and permanently removed fuel from the 
reactor vessel is significantly lower, and the types of possible 
accidents are significantly fewer, than at an operating power reactor. 
However, the EP regulations do not recognize that once a power reactor 
permanently ceases operation, the risk of a large radiological release 
from credible emergency accident scenarios

[[Page 28355]]

is significantly reduced. The reduced risk for any significant offsite 
radiological release is based on two factors. One factor is the 
elimination of accidents applicable only to an operating power reactor, 
resulting in fewer credible accident scenarios. The second factor is 
the reduced short-lived radionuclide inventory and decay heat 
production due to radioactive decay. Due to the permanently defueled 
status of the reactor, no new spent fuel will be added to the SFP and 
the radionuclides in the current spent fuel will continue to decay as 
the spent fuel ages. The irradiated fuel will produce less heat due to 
radioactive decay, increasing the available time to mitigate a loss of 
water inventory from the SFP. The NRC's NUREG/CR-6451, ``A Safety and 
Regulatory Assessment of Generic BWR [Boiling Water Reactor] and PWR 
[Pressurized Water Reactor] Permanently Shutdown Nuclear Power 
Plants,'' dated August 1997 (ADAMS Accession No. ML082260098), and the 
NRC's NUREG-1738, ``Technical Study of Spent Fuel Pool Accident Risk at 
Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants,'' dated February 2001 (ADAMS 
Accession No. ML010430066), confirmed that for permanently shutdown and 
defueled power reactors that are bounded by the assumptions and 
conditions in the reports, the risk of offsite radiological release is 
significantly less than for an operating power reactor.
    The EP exemptions previously approved for Oyster Creek were based 
on the licensee's demonstration that: (1) The radiological consequences 
of design-basis accidents would not exceed the limits of the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) early phase Protective Action 
Guides (PAGs) of one roentgen equivalent man (rem) at the exclusion 
area boundary; and (2) in the highly unlikely event of a beyond-design-
basis accident resulting in a loss of all modes of heat transfer from 
the fuel stored in the SFP, there is sufficient time to initiate 
appropriate mitigating actions, and if needed, for offsite authorities 
to implement offsite protective actions using a Comprehensive Emergency 
Management Program, or ``all-hazards,'' approach to protect the health 
and safety of the public.
    With respect to design-basis accidents at Oyster Creek, the 
licensee demonstrated that, as of 33 days after the permanent cessation 
of operations, the radiological consequences of the only remaining 
design-basis accident with potential for offsite radiological release 
(the fuel handling accident (FHA) in the Auxiliary Building, where the 
SFP is located) will not exceed the limits of the EPA early phase PAGs 
to the public beyond the exclusion area boundary. Exelon stated that 
this analysis remains unchanged. Because the requested effective date 
of the exemptions is 285 days following permanent cessation of power 
operations, the 33-day decay period necessary for the FHA dose to 
decrease within the EPA PAGs remains bounded.
    With respect to beyond-design-basis accidents at Oyster Creek, the 
licensee analyzed a drain down of the SFP water that would effectively 
impede any decay heat removal. The analysis demonstrates that at 285 
days after permanent cessation of power operations, there would be 10 
hours after the assemblies have been uncovered with all cooling lost 
until the limiting fuel assembly (for decay heat and adiabatic heatup 
analysis) reaches 900 degrees Celsius ([deg]C), the temperature used to 
assess the potential onset of fission product release. The analysis 
conservatively assumes that the heat up time starts when the SFP has 
been completely drained with all cooling lost, although it is likely 
that site personnel will start to respond to an incident when drain 
down starts. The analysis also does not consider the period of time 
from the initiating event causing loss of SFP water inventory until 
cooling is lost.
    The NRC reviewed the licensee's justification for the exemptions, 
including the modified effective date, against the criteria in 10 CFR 
50.12(a) and determined, as described below, that the criteria in 10 
CFR 50.12(a) will be met, and that the exemptions should be granted 285 
days after the permanent cessation of power operations. As discussed 
above, in October 2018, the NRC staff previously granted Exelon 
exemptions from the relevant EP requirements, with an effective date of 
these exemptions being 365 days after the permanent cessation of 
operations. Subsequently, in November 2018, Exelon requested to change 
the effective date of these exemptions from 365 days to 285 days. 
Consequently, the NRC is reissuing the October 2018 exemptions with a 
revised effective date of 285 days after Oyster Creek has permanently 
ceased operations.
    An assessment of the Exelon EP exemptions originally issued on 
October 16, 2018, is described in SECY-18-0062, ``Request by the Exelon 
Generation Company, LLC for Exemptions from Certain Emergency Planning 
Requirements for the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station,'' dated 
May 31, 2018 (ADAMS Accession No. ML18030B340). The Commission approved 
the NRC staff's recommendation to grant the exemptions in the staff 
requirements memorandum to SECY-18-0062, dated July 17, 2018 (ADAMS 
Accession No. ML18198A449).
    The NRC staff's detailed review and technical basis for the 
approval of the specific EP exemptions are provided in the NRC staff's 
safety evaluation associated with the October 16, 2018 exemptions 
(ADAMS Accession No. ML18220A980). That safety evaluation remains valid 
as to all aspects of the exemptions other than the revised effective 
date. The NRC staff's detailed review and technical basis for the 
modification of the effective date of the exemptions is provided in a 
separate safety evaluation dated June 11, 2019 (ADAMS Accession No. 
ML19095A873).
    In sum, the NRC reviewed the licensee's justification for the 
requested exemptions, including the modified effective date, against 
the criteria in 10 CFR 50.12(a) and determined, as described below, 
that the criteria in 10 CFR 50.12(a) will be met, and that the 
exemptions should be granted 285 days after the permanent cessation of 
power operations. To provide a complete record of the NRC staff's 
analysis, the NRC is reissuing the specific EP exemptions with the 
revised effective date of 285 days after the permanent cessation of 
power operations.

A. The Exemptions are Authorized by Law

    The licensee has proposed exemptions from certain EP requirements 
in 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, 
Section IV, that would allow Exelon to revise the Oyster Creek 
Emergency Plan to reflect the permanently shutdown and defueled 
condition of the facility. The licensee has also requested to modify 
the effective date for the implementation of the previously approved 
exemptions from 12 months to 9.38 months (285 days) after permanent 
cessation of power operations. As stated above, in accordance with 10 
CFR 50.12, the Commission may, upon application by any interested 
person or upon its own initiative, grant exemptions from the 
requirements of 10 CFR part 50. The NRC staff has determined that 
reissuing the licensee's proposed exemptions, with the modified 
effective date, will not result in a violation of the Atomic Energy Act 
of 1954, as amended, or the NRC's regulations. Therefore, the 
exemptions are authorized by law.

[[Page 28356]]

B. The Exemption Presents No Undue Risk to Public Health and Safety

    As stated previously, Exelon provided an analysis showing that the 
radiological consequences of design-basis accidents will not exceed the 
limits of the EPA early phase PAGs at the exclusion area boundary. 
Therefore, based on the reduced risk of radiological consequences from 
design-basis accidents still possible at Oyster Creek 285 days after 
the plant has permanently ceased power operations, formal offsite 
radiological emergency preparedness plans required under 10 CFR part 50 
will no longer be needed for protection of the public beyond the 
exclusion area boundary.
    Exelon provided an analysis showing that, as of 33 days after 
permanent cessation of power operations, the radiological consequences 
of the only remaining design-basis accident with potential for offsite 
radiological release (FHA in the Auxiliary Building) will not exceed 
the limits of the EPA early phase PAGs to the public beyond the 
exclusion area boundary. Because the requested effective date of the 
exemption is 285 days following permanent cessation of power 
operations, the 33-day decay necessary for the FHA dose to decrease 
within the EPA PAGs remains bounded. Oyster Creek permanently ceased 
power operations on September 17, 2018.
    In addition, the licensee analyzed beyond-design-basis accidents at 
Oyster Creek, which would result in a drain down of the SFP water that 
would effectively impede any decay heat removal. The analysis 
demonstrates that at 285 days after permanent cessation of power 
operations, there would be 10 hours after the assemblies have been 
uncovered until the limiting fuel assembly (for decay heat and 
adiabatic heatup analysis) reaches 900 [deg]C, the temperature used to 
assess the potential onset of fission product release.
    Exelon has demonstrated that sufficient time continues to exist to 
implement prompt SFP mitigative action, and if warranted, for offsite 
governmental officials to implement measures to protect the public 
using a CEMP, or ``all-hazards,'' approach. As such, the determination 
that formal offsite radiological emergency preparedness plans required 
under 10 CFR part 50 will no longer be needed for protection of the 
public beyond the exclusion area boundary remains valid.
    Further, NUREG-1738 confirms that the risk of beyond-design-basis 
accidents is greatly reduced at permanently shutdown and defueled 
reactors. The NRC staff's analyses in NUREG-1738 conclude that the 
event sequences important to risk at permanently shutdown and defueled 
power reactors are limited to large earthquakes and cask drop events. 
For EP assessments, this is an important difference relative to 
operating power reactors, where typically a large number of different 
sequences make significant contributions to risk. As described in 
NUREG-1738, relaxation of offsite EP requirements in 10 CFR part 50 
beyond a few months after shutdown resulted in only a small change in 
risk. The report further concludes that the change in risk due to 
relaxation of offsite EP requirements is small because the overall risk 
is low and because even under current EP requirements for operating 
power reactors, EP was judged to have marginal impact on evacuation 
effectiveness for the severe earthquakes that dominate SFP risk. All 
other sequences including cask drops (for which offsite radiological 
emergency preparedness plans are expected to be more effective) are too 
low in likelihood to have a significant impact on risk.
    Therefore, reissuing the previously approved exemptions with a 
modified effective date of 9.28 months (285 days) after permanent 
cessation of power operations will not present an undue risk to the 
public health and safety.

C. The Exemptions are Consistent With the Common Defense and Security

    The reissued exemptions involve EP requirements under 10 CFR part 
50 and will allow Exelon to revise the Oyster Creek Emergency Plan to 
reflect the permanently shutdown and defueled condition of the 
facility. Physical security measures at Oyster Creek are not affected 
by the reissued EP exemptions with the revised effective date. The 
discontinuation of formal offsite radiological emergency preparedness 
plans and the reduction in scope of the onsite EP activities at Oyster 
Creek will not adversely affect Exelon's ability to physically secure 
the site or protect special nuclear material. Therefore, the reissued 
exemptions are consistent with common defense and security.

D. Special Circumstances

    Special circumstances, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii), 
are present whenever application of the regulation in the particular 
circumstances is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the 
rule. The underlying purpose of 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2), 
and 10 CFR part 50, Appendix E, Section IV, is to provide reasonable 
assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in 
the event of a radiological emergency, to establish plume exposure and 
ingestion pathway emergency planning zones for nuclear power plants, 
and to ensure that licensees maintain effective offsite and onsite 
radiological emergency preparedness plans. The standards and 
requirements in these regulations were developed by considering the 
risks associated with operation of a power reactor at its licensed 
full-power level. These risks include the potential for a reactor 
accident with offsite radiological dose consequences.
    As previously discussed, because Oyster Creek is permanently shut 
down and defueled, there is no longer a risk of a significant offsite 
radiological release from a design-basis accident exceeding EPA early 
phase PAGs at the exclusion area boundary and the risk of a significant 
offsite radiological release from a beyond-design-basis accident is 
greatly reduced when compared to an operating power reactor. The NRC 
staff has confirmed the reduced risks at Oyster Creek by comparing the 
generic risk assumptions in the analyses in NUREG-1738 to site-specific 
conditions at Oyster Creek and determined that the risk values in 
NUREG-1738 bound the risks presented at Oyster Creek. As indicated by 
the results of the research conducted for NUREG-1738, and more recently 
for NUREG-2161, ``Consequence Study of a Beyond-Design-Basis Earthquake 
Affecting the Spent Fuel Pool for a U.S. Mark I Boiling Water 
Reactor,'' dated September 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14255A365), 
while other consequences can be extensive, accidents from SFPs with 
significant decay time have little potential to cause offsite early 
fatalities, even if the formal offsite radiological EP requirements 
were relaxed. The licensee's analysis of a beyond-design-basis accident 
involving a complete loss of SFP water inventory, based on an adiabatic 
heatup analysis of the limiting fuel assembly for decay heat, shows 
that within 285 days after permanent cessation of power operations, the 
time for the limiting fuel assembly to reach 900 [deg]C is at least 10 
hours after the assemblies have been uncovered assuming a loss of all 
cooling means.
    The only analyzed beyond-design-basis accident scenario that 
progresses to a condition where a significant offsite release might 
occur involves the highly unlikely event where the SFP drains in such a 
way that all modes of cooling or heat transfer are assumed to be 
unavailable, which is referred to as an adiabatic heatup of the spent 
fuel. The licensee's analysis of this beyond-

[[Page 28357]]

design-basis accident shows that within 285 days after permanent 
cessation of power operations, at least 10 hours would be available 
between the time that all cooling means are lost to the fuel (at which 
time adiabatic heatup is conservatively assumed to begin), until the 
fuel cladding reaches a temperature of 900 [deg]C, which is the 
temperature associated with rapid cladding oxidation and the potential 
for a significant radiological release. This analysis conservatively 
does not include the period of time from the initiating event causing a 
loss of SFP water inventory until all cooling means are lost.
    The NRC staff has verified Exelon's analyses and its calculations. 
The analyses provide reasonable assurance that in reissuing the 
requested exemptions to Exelon, there is no design-basis accident that 
will result in an offsite radiological release exceeding the EPA early 
phase PAGs at the exclusion area boundary. In the highly unlikely event 
of a beyond-design-basis accident affecting the SFP that results in a 
complete loss of heat removal via all modes of heat transfer, there 
will be over 10 hours available before an offsite release might occur 
and, therefore, at least 10 hours to initiate appropriate mitigating 
actions to restore a means of heat removal to the spent fuel. If a 
radiological release were projected to occur under this highly unlikely 
scenario, a minimum of 10 hours is considered sufficient time for 
offsite authorities to implement protective actions using a CEMP, or 
``all-hazards,'' approach to protect the health and safety of the 
public.
    Exemptions from the offsite EP requirements in 10 CFR part 50 have 
previously been approved by the NRC when the site-specific analyses 
show that at least 10 hours is available following a loss of SFP 
coolant inventory accident with no air cooling (or other methods of 
removing decay heat) until cladding of the hottest fuel assembly 
reaches the rapid oxidation temperature. The NRC staff concluded in its 
previously granted exemptions, as it does with Exelon's requested EP 
exemptions, that if a minimum of 10 hours is available to initiate 
mitigative actions consistent with plant conditions or, if needed, for 
offsite authorities to implement protective actions using a CEMP 
approach, then formal offsite radiological emergency preparedness 
plans, required under 10 CFR part 50, are not necessary at permanently 
shutdown and defueled facilities.
    Additionally, Oyster Creek committed to maintaining SFP makeup 
strategies in its letters to the NRC dated March 8 and 19, 2018 (ADAMS 
Accession Nos. ML18067A087 and ML18078A146, respectively). The multiple 
strategies for providing makeup to the SFP include: Using existing 
plant systems for inventory makeup; an internal strategy that relies on 
the fire protection system with redundant pumps (one diesel-driven and 
one electric motor-driven); and onsite diesel fire truck that can take 
suction from the Barnegat Bay. These strategies will continue to be 
required as condition 2.C.(8), ``Mitigation Strategy License 
Condition,'' of renewed facility operating license DPR-16 for Oyster 
Creek. Considering the very low probability of beyond-design-basis 
accidents affecting the SFP, these diverse strategies provide multiple 
methods to obtain additional makeup or spray to the SFP before the 
onset of any postulated offsite radiological release.
    For all of the reasons stated above, the NRC staff finds that the 
licensee's requested exemptions, including the modified effective date, 
meet the underlying purpose of all of the standards in 10 CFR 50.47(b), 
and requirements in 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2) and 10 CFR part 50, Appendix E, 
and satisfy the special circumstances provision in 10 CFR 
50.12(a)(2)(ii) in view of the greatly reduced risk of offsite 
radiological consequences associated with the permanently shutdown and 
defueled state of the Oyster Creek facility 285 days after permanent 
cessation of power operations.
    The NRC staff has concluded that the exemptions being granted by 
this action will maintain an acceptable level of emergency preparedness 
at Oyster Creek and, if needed, that there is reasonable assurance that 
adequate offsite protective measures can and will be taken by State and 
local government agencies using a CEMP, or ``all-hazards,'' approach in 
the unlikely event of a radiological emergency at Oyster Creek. Because 
the underlying purposes of the rules, as exempted, would continue to be 
achieved, even with the elimination of the requirements under 10 CFR 
part 50 to maintain formal offsite radiological emergency preparedness 
plans and the reduction in the scope of the onsite emergency planning 
activities at Oyster Creek, the special circumstances required by 10 
CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii) exist.

E. Environmental Considerations

    In accordance with 10 CFR 51.31(a), the Commission has determined 
that the reissuing the EP exemptions with a revised effective date will 
not have a significant effect on the quality of the human environment. 
The NRC staff previously analyzed the October 16, 2018, EP exemptions 
in a Finding of No Significant Impact and associated Environmental 
Assessment published in the Federal Register on August 13, 2018 (83 FR 
40092). That evaluation remains valid as to all aspects of the EP 
exemptions other than the revised effective date. The NRC staff 
analyzed the environmental impacts of the revised effective date in a 
separate Finding of No Significant Impact and associated Environmental 
Assessment published in the Federal Register on May 1, 2019 (84 FR 
18586).

IV. Conclusions

    Accordingly, the Commission has determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR 
50.12, reissuing the specific EP exemptions originally granted on 
October 16, 2018, with the revised effective date of 285 days after 
permanent cessation of operations will not present an undue risk to the 
public health and safety and is consistent with the common defense and 
security. Also, special circumstances are present. Therefore, the 
Commission hereby reissues Exelon's exemption from certain EP 
requirements in 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR part 
50, Appendix E, as discussed and evaluated in detail in the NRC staff's 
safety evaluation associated with these exemptions. Oyster Creek 
permanently ceased power operations on September 17, 2018. Therefore, 
the revised effective date of the reissued exemptions is June 29, 2019.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 11th day of June, 2019.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

/RA/

John R. Tappert,
Director, Division of Decommissioning, Uranium Recovery and Waste 
Processing.

[FR Doc. 2019-12803 Filed 6-17-19; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P