[Federal Register Volume 84, Number 116 (Monday, June 17, 2019)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 27907-27930]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2019-12307]



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 Rules and Regulations
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  Federal Register / Vol. 84, No. 116 / Monday, June 17, 2019 / Rules 
and Regulations  

[[Page 27907]]



BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION

12 CFR Part 1041

[Docket No. CFPB-2019-0007]
RIN 3170-AA95


Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans; 
Delay of Compliance Date; Correcting Amendments

AGENCY: Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection.

ACTION: Final rule; delay of compliance date; correcting amendments.

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SUMMARY: The Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection (Bureau) is 
issuing this final rule to delay the August 19, 2019 compliance date 
for the mandatory underwriting provisions of the regulation promulgated 
by the Bureau in November 2017 governing Payday, Vehicle Title, and 
Certain High-Cost Installment Loans (2017 Final Rule or Rule). 
Compliance with these provisions of the Rule is delayed by 15 months, 
to November 19, 2020. The Bureau is also making certain conforming 
changes and corrections to address several clerical and non-substantive 
errors it has identified in the Rule.

DATES: 
    Effective date: The amendments in this final rule are effective on 
August 16, 2019.
    Compliance dates: The compliance date for Sec. Sec.  1041.4 through 
1041.6, 1041.10, and 1041.12(b)(1) through (3) in the final rule 
published on November 17, 2017 (82 FR 54472), as amended by this final 
rule, is delayed from August 19, 2019 to November 19, 2020. The 
compliance date for Sec. Sec.  1041.2, 1041.3, 1041.7 through 1041.9, 
1041.12(a), (b) introductory text, and (b)(4) and (5), and 1041.13 
remains August 19, 2019.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Lawrence Lee or Adam Mayle, Counsels; 
or Kristine M. Andreassen, Senior Counsel, Office of Regulations, at 
202-435-7700. If you require this document in an alternative electronic 
format, please contact [email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

I. Summary of the Final Rule

    On October 5, 2017, the Bureau issued the 2017 Final Rule 
establishing regulations for payday loans, vehicle title loans, and 
certain high-cost installment loans, relying on authorities under Title 
X of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
(Dodd-Frank Act).\1\ The Rule was published in the Federal Register on 
November 17, 2017.\2\ The 2017 Final Rule addressed two discrete 
topics. First, the Rule contained a set of provisions with respect to 
the underwriting of covered short-term loans and longer-term balloon-
payment loans, including payday and vehicle title loans, and related 
reporting and recordkeeping requirements.\3\ These provisions are 
referred to herein as the ``Mandatory Underwriting Provisions'' of the 
2017 Final Rule. Second, the Rule contained a set of provisions, 
applicable to the same set of loans and also to certain high-cost 
installment loans, establishing certain requirements and limitations 
with respect to attempts to withdraw payments from consumers' checking 
or other accounts, and related recordkeeping requirements.\4\ These are 
referred to herein as the ``Payment Provisions'' of the 2017 Final 
Rule.
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    \1\ Public Law 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
    \2\ 82 FR 54472 (Nov. 17, 2017). The Bureau released its 
proposal regarding payday, vehicle title, and certain high-cost 
installment loans for public comment on June 2, 2016 (2016 
Proposal). 81 FR 47864 (July 22, 2016).
    \3\ 12 CFR 1041.4 through 1041.6, 1041.10, 1041.11, and portions 
of 1041.12.
    \4\ 12 CFR 1041.7 through 1041.9, and portions of 1041.12.
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    The 2017 Final Rule became effective on January 16, 2018, although 
most provisions[thinsp](12 CFR 1041.2 through 1041.10, 1041.12, and 
1041.13) had a compliance date of August 19, 2019.\5\
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    \5\ 82 FR 54472, 54814. On January 16, 2018, the Bureau issued a 
statement announcing its intention to engage in rulemaking to 
reconsider the 2017 Final Rule. Bureau of Consumer Fin. Prot., 
Statement on Payday Rule (Jan. 16, 2018), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-statement-payday-rule/. On October 26, 2018, the Bureau issued a subsequent statement 
announcing it expected to issue notices of proposed rulemaking 
(NPRMs) to reconsider certain provisions of the 2017 Final Rule and 
to address the Rule's compliance date. Bureau of Consumer Fin. 
Prot., Public Statement Regarding Payday Rule Reconsideration and 
Delay of Compliance Date (Oct. 26, 2018), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/public-statement-regarding-payday-rule-reconsideration-and-delay-compliance-date/. A 
legal challenge to the Rule was filed on April 9, 2018 and is 
pending in the United States District Court for the Western District 
of Texas. Cmty. Fin. Serv. Ass'n of Am. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. 
Bureau, No. 1:18-cv-295 (W.D. Tex.). On November 6, 2018, the Court 
issued an order staying the August 19, 2019 compliance date of the 
rule pending further order of the Court. See id., ECF No. 53. The 
litigation is currently stayed. See id., ECF No. 29.
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    On February 6, 2019, the Bureau issued proposals seeking comment on 
whether the Bureau should rescind the Mandatory Underwriting Provisions 
of the 2017 Final Rule (Reconsideration NPRM) \6\ and on whether it 
should delay the compliance date for those provisions (Delay NPRM).\7\ 
In the Delay NPRM, the Bureau proposed to delay the August 19, 2019 
compliance date for the 2017 Final Rule's Mandatory Underwriting 
Provisions--specifically, Sec. Sec.  1041.4 through 1041.6, 1041.10, 
1041.11, and 1041.12(b)(1)(i) through (iii) and (b)(2) and (3)--to 
November 19, 2020.\8\ These proposals did not include reconsideration 
or delay of the Payment Provisions.
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    \6\ 84 FR 4252 (Feb. 14, 2019).
    \7\ 84 FR 4298 (Feb. 14, 2019).
    \8\ The list of provisions for which the Bureau proposed to 
delay the August 19, 2019 compliance date in the Delay NPRM 
corresponded to the list of provisions that the Bureau proposed to 
rescind in the Reconsideration NPRM. As discussed below, although 
Sec.  1041.11 is part of the Mandatory Underwriting Provisions of 
the Rule, its operative date was January 16, 2018, which the Bureau 
is not changing. In the Reconsideration NPRM, the Bureau proposed to 
modify the introductory text of Sec.  1041.12(b)(1) for clarity as 
to its application to loan agreements for all covered loans, and 
thus it was not listed with the provisions that the Bureau proposed 
to rescind. Since the Bureau is not modifying the introductory text 
of Sec.  1041.12(b)(1) in this final rule, it is included in the 
list of provisions for which the compliance date is delayed.
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    For the reasons discussed below and based on comments received, the 
Bureau is issuing this final rule to delay the August 19, 2019 
compliance date for the Mandatory Underwriting Provisions, to November 
19, 2020, in order to permit an orderly conclusion to its separate 
rulemaking process to reconsider the Mandatory Underwriting Provisions. 
In short, after reviewing the comments received on the Delay NPRM, the 
Bureau concludes that (1) it has strong reasons to revisit the 
Mandatory Underwriting Provisions on the grounds set out in the 
Reconsideration NPRM; and (2) if the Mandatory Underwriting

[[Page 27908]]

Provisions went into effect while the Bureau was in the process of 
reconsidering these provisions, as described below, consequences would 
likely follow--some of which may be irreversible even if the Mandatory 
Underwriting Provisions were later rescinded--that the Bureau believes 
may prove unwarranted and may undermine effective reconsideration of 
the 2017 Final Rule. In light of these considerations, the Bureau 
concludes that it is appropriate to delay compliance with the Mandatory 
Underwriting Provisions for 15 months to allow time for the 
Reconsideration NPRM rulemaking process to be completed.
    The Bureau is also making conforming amendments to certain 
regulatory text and commentary adopted in the 2017 Final Rule to 
reflect the compliance date delay as well as including an additional 
section to the Rule setting forth the compliance dates in detail.
    The Bureau is also making certain corrections to address several 
clerical and non-substantive errors it has identified in the 2017 Final 
Rule. No substantive change is intended by these corrections.

II. Background

A. The 2017 Final Rule

    In the 2017 Final Rule, the Bureau established regulations for 
payday loans, vehicle title loans, and certain high-cost installment 
loans. The Rule was published in the Federal Register on November 17, 
2017. It became effective on January 16, 2018, although most provisions 
(Sec. Sec.  1041.2 through 1041.10, 1041.12, and 1041.13) have a 
compliance date of August 19, 2019.
    As mentioned above, the 2017 Final Rule addressed two discrete 
topics: The Mandatory Underwriting Provisions and the Payment 
Provisions.\9\ The Mandatory Underwriting Provisions identified as an 
unfair and abusive practice the making of certain short-term and 
longer-term balloon-payment loans without reasonably determining that 
consumers will have the ability to repay the loans according to their 
terms. The Mandatory Underwriting Provisions include two methods that 
permit providers to offer covered short-term and longer-term balloon-
payment loans. Under one method, lenders making covered short-term and 
longer-term balloon-payment loans are required to, among other things, 
make a reasonable determination that the consumer would be able to make 
the payments on the loan and be able to meet the consumer's basic 
living expenses and other major financial obligations without needing 
to re-borrow over the ensuing 30 days; the Rule sets forth a number of 
specific requirements that a lender must satisfy in this regard.\10\ 
Under the other method, lenders are allowed to make certain covered 
short-term loans without meeting all the specific underwriting criteria 
as long as the loan satisfies certain prescribed terms, the lender 
confirms that the consumer meets specified borrowing history 
conditions, and the lender provides required disclosures to the 
consumer.\11\
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    \9\ The Payment Provisions apply to a broader group of covered 
loans, which include covered short-term and longer-term balloon-
payment loans as well as certain high-cost installment loans, 
establishing certain requirements and limitations with respect to 
attempts to withdraw payments from consumers' checking or other 
accounts. The Rule identifies as an unfair and abusive practice 
lenders' attempts to withdraw payment on these loans from consumers' 
accounts after two consecutive payment attempts have failed, unless 
the consumer provides a new and specific authorization to do so. The 
Rule also prescribes notices lenders must provide to consumers 
before attempting to withdraw payments from their accounts.
    In addition, the Rule includes other generally applicable 
provisions such as definitions, exemptions, and requirements for 
compliance programs and record retention (with portions specific to 
the Mandatory Underwriting Provisions and to the Payment 
Provisions).
    \10\ 12 CFR 1041.5.
    \11\ 12 CFR 1041.6.
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    In general, under either method, a lender is to obtain and consider 
a consumer report from an information system registered or 
provisionally registered with the Bureau (referred to herein a as a 
``registered information system'' or an RIS) before making a covered 
short-term or longer-term balloon-payment loan.\12\ In addition, other 
portions of the Rule require lenders to furnish to RISes \13\ certain 
information concerning covered short-term and longer-term balloon-
payment loans at loan consummation, during the period that the loan is 
an outstanding loan, and when the loan ceases to be an outstanding 
loan.\14\
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    \12\ 12 CFR 1041.5(c)(2)(ii)(B) and (d)(1), and 1041.6(a). Only 
the latter approach, however, requires the consumer report from an 
information system that has been registered with the Bureau for 180 
days or more pursuant to Sec.  1041.11(c)(2) or is registered with 
the Bureau pursuant to Sec.  1041.11(d)(2). See Sec.  1041.6(a). 
Under Sec.  1041.5, a national consumer report (as defined in Sec.  
1041.5(a)(4)) is required, subject to limited exceptions, as is a 
consumer report from an RIS if available.
    \13\ The 2017 Final Rule bifurcated the process for registering 
information systems: The first phase for entities seeking 
preliminary registration prior to the August 19, 2019 compliance 
date; and the second phase for entities seeking provisional 
registration on or after the August 19, 2019 compliance date. An 
entity seeking preliminary registration under the first phase was 
required to submit to the Bureau an initial application for 
preliminary approval for registration by April 16, 2018. After 
receiving preliminary approval from the Bureau, the entity must 
submit its application for registration within 120 days from the 
date preliminary approval was granted. See 12 CFR 1041.11(c).
    \14\ See 12 CFR 1041.10(c).
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B. Subsequent Actions

    As noted above, on January 16, 2018, the Bureau issued a statement 
announcing its intention to engage in rulemaking to reconsider the 2017 
Final Rule. In addition, the statement notified entities seeking to 
become RISes that the Bureau would entertain requests to waive 
entities' preliminary approval application deadline.\15\ Since that 
time, the Bureau has issued several waivers and published copies of 
those waivers on its website.\16\ On October 26, 2018, the Bureau 
issued a subsequent statement announcing that it expected to issue 
NPRMs to reconsider certain provisions of the 2017 Final Rule and to 
address the Rule's compliance date.\17\
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    \15\ Bureau of Consumer Fin. Prot., Statement on Payday Rule 
(Jan. 16, 2018), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-statement-payday-rule/.
    \16\ See Bureau of Consumer Fin. Prot., Payday, Vehicle Title, 
and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans Registered Information 
Systems registration program--Waiver requests and Bureau 
determinations, https://www.consumerfinance.gov/policy-compliance/guidance/payday-loans-registered-information-systems-registration-program/registered-information-systems/#waivers. As of June 5, 2019, 
there are no information systems registered with the Bureau.
    \17\ Bureau of Consumer Fin. Prot., Public Statement Regarding 
Payday Rule Reconsideration and Delay of Compliance Date (Oct. 26, 
2018), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/public-statement-regarding-payday-rule-reconsideration-and-delay-compliance-date/.
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    On April 9, 2018, a legal challenge to the 2017 Final Rule was 
filed in the United States District Court for the Western District of 
Texas.\18\ On June 12, 2018, the court issued an order staying the 
litigation.\19\ On November 6, 2018, the court stayed the August 19, 
2019 compliance date of the 2017 Final Rule until further order of the 
court.\20\
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    \18\ Cmty. Fin. Serv. Ass'n of Am. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. 
Bureau, No. 1:18-cv-295 (W.D. Tex.).
    \19\ See id., ECF No. 29.
    \20\ See id., ECF No. 53.
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C. Compliance Date Delay Proposal

    As noted above, on February 6, 2019, the Bureau issued the 
Reconsideration NPRM seeking comment on the Bureau's proposal to 
rescind the Mandatory Underwriting Provisions of the 2017 Final Rule 
and the Delay NPRM seeking comment on the Bureau's proposal to delay 
the compliance date for those provisions. The Bureau stated in its 
Delay NPRM that it preliminarily believed it had set forth strong 
reasons for proposing to rescind the Mandatory Underwriting Provisions 
of the Rule, as detailed in the

[[Page 27909]]

Reconsideration NPRM. The Bureau was concerned that mandating 
compliance by August 19, 2019 with portions of the Rule that the Bureau 
had good reasons to believe should be rescinded would impose 
significant and potentially unwarranted costs on industry participants, 
create substantial revenue disruptions that could impact the ability of 
some market participants to stay in business, and restrict access to 
consumer credit. The Bureau preliminarily believed, based on its 
experience developing the 2017 Final Rule and other similar 
rulemakings, that a compliance date of November 19, 2020 would allow 
the Bureau adequate opportunity to review comments on its 
Reconsideration NPRM regarding the Mandatory Underwriting Provisions 
and to make any changes to those provisions before affected entities 
incurred significant costs that would impair their ability to remain in 
business and before consumers experienced a restriction in their 
ability to choose the credit they prefer.

D. Compliance Date Delay Final Rule

    For the reasons set forth herein and based on comments received, 
the Bureau is issuing this final rule to delay the August 19, 2019 
compliance date for the Mandatory Underwriting Provisions of the 2017 
Final Rule--specifically, Sec. Sec.  1041.4 through 1041.6, 1041.10, 
and 1041.12(b)(1) through (3) \21\--to November 19, 2020, to permit an 
orderly conclusion to its separate rulemaking process to reconsider the 
Mandatory Underwriting Provisions of the 2017 Final Rule.\22\ The 
Bureau is making conforming amendments to certain regulatory text and 
commentary adopted in the 2017 Final Rule to reflect the compliance 
date delay as well as supplementing the Rule with an additional section 
(Sec.  1041.15) setting forth in detail its effective and compliance 
dates.
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    \21\ As discussed below, although Sec.  1041.11 is part of the 
Mandatory Underwriting Provisions of the Rule, its operative date 
was January 16, 2018, which the Bureau is not changing.
    \22\ In addition, as described in the Delay NPRM, outreach to 
affected entities since the finalization of the 2017 Final Rule had 
brought to light certain potential obstacles to compliance that were 
not anticipated when the original compliance date was set; these 
concerns were echoed by some commenters on the Delay NPRM. However, 
as discussed in more detail below, the Bureau is not finalizing this 
compliance date delay on those grounds.
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    The Bureau is also making certain corrections to address several 
clerical and non-substantive errors it has identified in the 2017 Final 
Rule in Sec. Sec.  1041.2(a)(9), 1041.3(e)(2), 1041.9(c)(3)(viii), and 
appendix A. No substantive change is intended by these corrections.

III. Summary of the Rulemaking Process, Comments Received, and the 
Final Rule

    As noted above, the Bureau proposed to delay the compliance date 
for the 2017 Final Rule's Mandatory Underwriting Provisions for several 
reasons. As explained in more detail below, the Bureau now concludes 
that it is appropriate to delay the August 19, 2019 compliance date for 
the Mandatory Underwriting Provisions of the 2017 Final Rule--
specifically, Sec. Sec.  1041.4 through 1041.6, 1041.10, and 
1041.12(b)(1) through (3)--to November 19, 2020.
    In short, after reviewing all comments received on the Delay NPRM, 
the Bureau has determined that finalizing the proposed delay is 
appropriate because there are strong reasons for rescinding the 
Mandatory Underwriting Provisions of the 2017 Final Rule and because 
significant and potentially unwarranted consequences to covered 
entities, consumers, and the market would occur if compliance with 
those aspects of the Rule was required by August 19, 2019. In addition, 
the Bureau has concluded that 15 months is an adequate amount of time 
to allow the Bureau to complete its reconsideration rulemaking. First, 
there are strong reasons to reconsider the evidentiary and legal bases 
for the unfairness and abusiveness findings underlying the Mandatory 
Underwriting Provisions of the 2017 Final Rule. The Bureau has 
initiated the process for reconsidering those provisions by issuing the 
Reconsideration NPRM, which sets forth in detail the Bureau's reasons 
for proposing to rescind the Mandatory Underwriting Provisions. After 
considering all the comments received on the Delay NPRM and with an 
open mind on all issues to be decided in the Reconsideration NPRM, the 
Bureau concludes that for purposes of this final rule there are strong 
reasons to rescind the Mandatory Underwriting Provisions.
    Second, the Bureau concludes that if compliance were to become 
mandatory while the reconsideration rulemaking is ongoing, several 
significant and potentially unwarranted consequences would likely 
result, including significant compliance costs, the potential exit of 
some smaller providers, and restricted access to consumer credit. Those 
consequences would risk undermining effective reconsideration of the 
Rule by imposing potentially market-altering effects, some of which may 
be irreversible if the Bureau required compliance with the Mandatory 
Underwriting Provisions and then later rescinded them. The Bureau is 
particularly concerned that some smaller providers may permanently exit 
the market if they are required to comply with the Mandatory 
Underwriting Provisions while reconsideration is ongoing.
    In light of these considerations, the Bureau concludes that it is 
appropriate to delay the compliance date for 15 months to allow time 
for the Reconsideration NPRM rulemaking process that the Bureau has 
initiated--and through which the Bureau has received approximately 
190,000 comments--to be completed.

A. Comments Received, Generally

    The comment period on the Delay NPRM closed on March 18, 2019. The 
Bureau received approximately 150 comment letters from individuals, 
consumer advocacy groups, a group of State attorneys general, 
depository and non-depository lenders, tribal governments, national and 
regional trade associations, service providers, the Small Business 
Administration's Office of Advocacy (SBA OA), legislative and executive 
branch State government officials, and others.\23\
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    \23\ These comment letters, as well as summaries of any ex parte 
presentations regarding this rulemaking, are available on the public 
docket for the rulemaking at https://www.regulations.gov/docket?D=CFPB-2019-0007.
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    Commenters writing in support of the proposed delay included 
lenders, trade associations, tribal governments, the SBA OA, individual 
commenters, and others. Some of these commenters also expressed their 
support for rescission of the Mandatory Underwriting Provisions as 
proposed in the Reconsideration NPRM. Commenters writing in opposition 
to the proposed delay included a number of consumer advocacy groups, a 
group of State attorneys general, legislative and executive branch 
State government officials, individual commenters, and others. Some of 
these commenters also expressed their opposition to the rescission of 
the Mandatory Underwriting Provisions as proposed in the 
Reconsideration NPRM.
    These comments are discussed in more detail below. At a high level, 
comments in support of the proposed delay generally spoke to harms to 
industry and to consumers that the commenters asserted would occur if 
the August 19, 2019 compliance date for the Mandatory Underwriting 
Provisions stayed in place and that would be postponed if those 
provisions were delayed. These comments also argued that a delay was 
appropriate to give the

[[Page 27910]]

Bureau time to complete its process of reconsidering the Mandatory 
Underwriting Provisions. Comments focusing on the merits of the 
Mandatory Underwriting Provisions themselves more generally also 
claimed that there were flaws in the Rule, the data underlying the 
Rule, or the rulemaking process. Some comments also discussed 
individual consumers' positive experiences with payday or vehicle title 
loans.
    Commenters opposing the proposed delay generally spoke to the 
consumer harms that they asserted occur with loans covered by those 
provisions. These commenters also focused on the bad practices in which 
they alleged lenders engage. Commenters in addition raised issues such 
as requirements under the Administrative Procedure Act for compliance 
date delays and the Bureau's authority to delay the compliance date of 
the Rule. Commenters focusing on the merits of the Mandatory 
Underwriting Provisions also more generally referenced, for example, 
the Bureau's prior research and evidence in this area, and discussed 
the interaction of Federal protections with those offered by the 
States.
    Commenters, both supporting and opposing the delay, addressed the 
Bureau's proposed rationales for delaying the compliance date of the 
Mandatory Underwriting Provisions. Specifically, the comments offered 
views on the Bureau's preliminary conclusion that there are strong 
reasons for rescinding the Mandatory Underwriting Provisions. They also 
offered views on the unanticipated obstacles to compliance that came to 
light after publication of the 2017 Final Rule, as discussed in the 
Delay NPRM. Commenters also responded to the Bureau's specific 
solicitations for comment, which included seeking comment on: (1) What 
challenges industry would face in complying with the Mandatory 
Underwriting Provisions by August 19, 2019; (2) whether delaying the 
Mandatory Underwriting Provisions would have any crossover effects on 
implementation of the Payment Provisions; (3) whether delaying the 
compliance date for the Mandatory Underwriting Provisions would be 
better than not delaying the date for purposes of facilitating an 
orderly implementation period for the Rule; (4) the consequences of not 
delaying the Mandatory Underwriting Provisions; and (5) the impact of 
the proposed delay on consumers who use payday loans, vehicle title 
loans, and high-cost installment loans covered by the 2017 Final Rule.
    Commenters also raised a number of issues that were outside the 
scope of the Delay NPRM. These comments are summarized in part III.D.6 
below.

B. Grounds for Finalizing the Compliance Date Delay

1. Strong Reasons Support Reconsideration of the Mandatory Underwriting 
Provisions
    A key predicate for the proposed compliance date delay was, as 
noted above, that the Bureau preliminarily believed that the Mandatory 
Underwriting Provisions of the 2017 Final Rule should be rescinded and 
had separately issued the Reconsideration NPRM seeking comment on 
whether it should rescind those provisions. As explained in the Delay 
NPRM, delaying the August 19, 2019 compliance date for the Mandatory 
Underwriting Provisions will give the Bureau the opportunity to review 
comments on the Reconsideration NPRM and to make any changes to those 
provisions before compliance with the Mandatory Underwriting Provisions 
causes a series of potentially market-altering effects, some of which 
may be irreversible for the smaller storefront lenders that permanently 
exit the market, that the Bureau has strong reasons to believe may 
prove unwarranted.
    After reviewing the comments received, the Bureau concludes that 
there are strong reasons, on multiple grounds, to revisit the 
unfairness and abusiveness findings set out in the Mandatory 
Underwriting Provisions in the 2017 Final Rule. The Bureau initiated 
the process for reconsidering these specific unfairness and abusiveness 
findings by issuing the Reconsideration NPRM, which set forth in detail 
the Bureau's reasons for proposing to rescind the Mandatory 
Underwriting Provisions.
    The Reconsideration NPRM proposed multiple independent grounds for 
rescinding the Mandatory Underwriting Provisions. First, the 
Reconsideration NPRM identified specific concerns with the adequacy of 
the evidence underpinning the reasonable avoidability element of the 
unfairness finding, and the lack of understanding and inability to 
protect elements of the abusiveness finding of the Mandatory 
Underwriting Provisions.\24\ The Reconsideration NPRM identified 
limitations to certain pieces of evidence, especially a key study by 
Professor Ronald Mann, that the 2017 Final Rule relied upon in 
determining that injury associated with short-term and longer-term 
balloon-payment loans issued without the lenders having reasonably 
determined a borrower's ability to repay was not reasonably avoidable 
and evinced a lack of consumer understanding.\25\ The Reconsideration 
NPRM also identified a number of concerns with the weight the 2017 
Final Rule placed on a key study by the Pew Charitable Trusts in 
finding an inability of consumers to protect themselves from covered 
short-term and longer-term balloon-payment loans issued without the 
lenders having reasonably determined a borrower's ability to repay.\26\ 
The Bureau noted in the Reconsideration NPRM that it is prudent as a 
policy matter to require a more robust and reliable evidentiary basis 
to support key findings in a rule that would significantly diminish the 
market for covered short-term and longer-term balloon-payment loans and 
that would likely cause some smaller providers to exit the marketplace, 
resulting in a decrease in consumers' ability to choose the credit they 
prefer.\27\
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    \24\ 84 FR 4252, 4264-68.
    \25\ Id. at 4265-66.
    \26\ Id. at 4267-68.
    \27\ Id. at 4264.
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    Second, the Reconsideration NPRM identified concerns with the legal 
analysis in the Mandatory Underwriting Provisions of the 2017 Final 
Rule, specifically the application of statutory standards regarding two 
elements of unfairness, reasonable avoidability and countervailing 
benefits, and two elements of abusiveness, lack of understanding and 
unreasonable advantage-taking.\28\ The Reconsideration NPRM 
preliminarily found that, even assuming that the factual findings in 
the 2017 Final Rule were correct and sufficiently supported, those 
findings did not establish that consumers could not reasonably avoid 
harm under a better interpretation of the unfairness standard in 
section 1031(c)(1) of the Dodd-Frank Act, informed by relevant 
longstanding precedent on reasonable avoidability under section 5 of 
the Federal Trade Commission Act. In particular, the Reconsideration 
NPRM preliminarily concluded that the 2017 Final Rule imposed what the 
Bureau now preliminarily believes was a problematic standard that 
required consumers to have a specific understanding of their 
individualized risk as determined by their ability to predict how long 
they will be in debt after taking out a covered short-term or longer-
term balloon-payment loan. The Reconsideration NPRM also made similar 
preliminary conclusions as to

[[Page 27911]]

the way the 2017 Final Rule interpreted lack of understanding under 
section 1031(d)(2)(A) of the Dodd-Frank Act.\29\ The Reconsideration 
NPRM further preliminarily concluded that the 2017 Final Rule's 
application of the countervailing benefits element of the unfairness 
standard in section 1031(c)(1) of the Dodd-Frank Act did not consider 
the full countervailing benefits of the practice at issue; rather, the 
2017 Final Rule discounted those benefits by taking into account the 
additional credit that would be available under the 2017 Final Rule's 
principle step-down exemption. The Bureau preliminarily found that, 
when fully accounted for, the countervailing benefits of the identified 
practice outweighed any relevant injury to consumers.\30\ Finally, the 
Reconsideration NPRM preliminarily concluded that the 2017 Final Rule 
did not have a sufficient basis to conclude that by making covered 
short-term or longer-term balloon-payment loans without assessing 
consumers' ability to repay lenders take unreasonable advantage of 
consumers under the abusiveness provision of the Dodd-Frank Act.\31\
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    \28\ Id. at 4268-76.
    \29\ Id. at 4274-75.
    \30\ Id. at 4272-74.
    \31\ Id. at 4275-76.
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    Commenters, as set out in detail below, took issue with some of the 
proposed grounds for rescinding the Mandatory Underwriting Provision of 
the 2017 Final Rule, or generally praised or criticized the approach 
the Bureau took in making unfairness and abusiveness findings in the 
2017 Final Rule. Commenters opposed to the compliance date delay 
offered some generalized criticisms of the Bureau's proposed legal 
conclusions, asserting that they were problematic, without offering 
detailed explanations of statutory text or specific issues with the 
approach to interpreting unfairness and abusiveness in the 
Reconsideration NPRM. These commenters offered more details in their 
criticism of the Reconsideration NPRM's reassessment of the evidentiary 
support for the 2017 Final Rule's factual findings, although still not 
with great specificity.
    Some commenters asserted generally that the Bureau did not offer a 
compelling basis for repealing the Mandatory Underwriting Provisions. 
Consumer advocacy groups and a group of State attorneys general 
asserted that the compliance date should remain unchanged because the 
2017 Final Rule came to the correct legal and factual conclusions 
regarding the Mandatory Underwriting Provisions, which should be 
implemented without further delay. These State attorneys general and 
consumer advocacy groups also commented that the Bureau did not offer 
strong reasons in the Reconsideration NPRM or the Delay NPRM for 
proposing to rescind those provisions.
    Consumer advocacy groups asserted that the Bureau failed to provide 
a reasoned explanation for its new position in the Reconsideration NPRM 
by neglecting large amounts of evidence concerning the serious impact 
on vulnerable consumers that underlay the 2017 Final Rule. Another 
consumer advocacy group claimed that the Bureau's rationale for 
reconsidering the Mandatory Underwriting Provisions contradicted years 
of original Bureau research, data, consumer complaints, secondary 
research, and other sources of evidence demonstrating consumer harm and 
impacts, and that the Bureau failed to provide a reasoned explanation 
for dismissing such evidence. A consumer advocacy group argued that the 
Reconsideration NPRM downplays much of this information to focus on 
critiquing two studies, and that in doing so the Bureau was attempting 
to rationalize a policy result that it had already chosen.
    Trade associations, lenders, and service providers commented that 
the Mandatory Underwriting Provisions were based on flawed data and 
one-sided studies, which resulted in faulty conclusions. A service 
provider agreed with the concerns set out in the Bureau's 
Reconsideration NPRM as to the flaws in the rulemaking process for the 
2017 Final Rule. A trade association and a tribal government agreed 
with the Bureau that the 2017 Final Rule was not supported by 
sufficiently robust and reliable evidence.
    One consumer advocacy group commented that the Delay NPRM does not 
provide compelling factual reasons to cast serious doubt on the 
Mandatory Underwriting Provisions of the 2017 Final Rule, which, it 
claimed, were thoroughly vetted when finalized. Specifically, the 
consumer advocacy group asserted that the Bureau in the Reconsideration 
NPRM questioned the validity of just two studies, taken from a vast 
body of material underlying the 2017 Final Rule, offered a new 
interpretation of this existing evidence, and conceded that new, 
additional evidence could support the older findings from the 2017 
Final Rule. The commenter argued that it was arbitrary and capricious 
for the Bureau to assert that the 2017 Final Rule must be rescinded, as 
it did in the Reconsideration NPRM, when it could conduct further 
research and analysis to resolve evidentiary gaps.
    A group of State attorneys general and consumer advocacy groups 
generally commented that the Bureau correctly analyzed and applied the 
unfairness and abusiveness standards in promulgating the Mandatory 
Underwriting Provisions of the 2017 Final Rule. These groups emphasized 
the extensive rulemaking record of the 2017 Final Rule, spanning many 
years, 1.4 million comments, and input from many stakeholders. These 
groups further asserted that the rulemaking record in the 2017 Final 
Rule detailed serious harm to consumers that would occur absent the 
Mandatory Underwriting Provisions. A consumer advocacy group asserted 
that the Mandatory Underwriting Provisions were precisely the type of 
measure that Congress designed the Bureau to create, and that in the 
Dodd-Frank Act, Congress identified protecting consumers from unfair, 
deceptive, and abusive acts and practices as a core objective of the 
Bureau. Further, the commenter noted that Congress singled out payday 
loans for special attention, providing the Bureau exclusive authority 
to conduct supervisory examinations of any provider that ``offers or 
provides to a consumer a payday loan.'' \32\ Other consumer advocacy 
groups asserted in general terms that the Reconsideration NPRM 
mischaracterized the legal analysis of unfairness and abusiveness in 
the 2017 Final Rule, and that the legal analysis in the Reconsideration 
NPRM of unfairness and abusiveness was inconsistent with Federal Trade 
Commission precedent, Federal Reserve Board precedent, and 
Congressional intent.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \32\ Section 1024(a)(1)(E) of the Dodd-Frank Act.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Consumer advocacy groups and the group of State attorneys general 
emphasized the previous findings of consumer harm set out in the 
analyses of the 2017 Final Rule, quoting from the 2017 Final Rule and 
other contemporaneous research. One consumer advocacy group provided 
case studies of individuals and families whom payday and title loans 
had affected.
    Lenders, trade associations, and an attorney to lenders commented 
that in the 2017 Final Rule, the Bureau misapplied its unfairness and 
abusiveness authority. These commenters asserted that, rather than 
identifying and prohibiting specific practices that the Bureau found to 
be unfair and abusive, the Bureau in the 2017 Final Rule had instead 
prescribed a single set of mandatory practices under the theory that 
any other

[[Page 27912]]

approach was unfair and abusive. Further, a number of trade 
associations noted that the requirements of the Mandatory Underwriting 
Provisions are overly burdensome, adding manual processes and 
verification of data that consumer loans do not ordinarily require. One 
trade association claimed that the Bureau exceeded its unfairness and 
abusiveness authority in the 2017 Final Rule because it offered no 
evidence to support the sweeping legal conclusion that all alternative 
underwriting approaches other than the one set out in Sec.  1041.5 
would be unfair or abusive. Lenders and trade associations commented 
that the Bureau, in developing the Mandatory Underwriting Provisions, 
failed to consider alternative and less burdensome State law approaches 
to regulating short-term and longer-term balloon-payment loans.
    Overall, the Bureau does not agree with the comments that the 
Bureau did not offer strong reasons, or reasoned explanations, for 
proposing to rescind the Mandatory Underwriting Provisions. The Bureau 
identified multiple, independent, and specific evidentiary and legal 
grounds addressing specific elements of unfairness and abusiveness that 
would, if finalized, result in the rescission of the unfairness and 
abusiveness findings in Sec.  1041.4 of the 2017 Final Rule and, as a 
result, would also require the rescission of the Mandatory Underwriting 
Provisions predicated on Sec.  1041.4.
    The Bureau further disagrees with the commenters who asserted that 
the Delay NPRM or the Reconsideration NPRM ignored a large body of 
evidence considered in conjunction with the 2017 Final Rule. The 
Reconsideration NPRM challenged the sufficiency and weight given to 
certain linchpin pieces of evidence, without which the Bureau 
preliminarily believes that the factual findings on which the Mandatory 
Underwriting Provisions are based cannot stand. The Delay NPRM, in 
turn, relied on the strong reasons for rescinding the 2017 Final Rule 
set out in the Reconsideration NPRM. The Bureau's preliminary 
conclusions in the Reconsideration NPRM and its assessment of the 
Reconsideration NPRM here for purposes of this delay final rule are 
based on both the existence of the complete body of evidence included 
in the 2017 Final Rule and its preliminary belief that certain linchpin 
evidence is not sufficiently robust and representative.
    The Bureau recognizes that the comments of the consumer advocacy 
groups reflect strong disagreement with the substance of the 
Reconsideration NPRM, but the Bureau believes that, whatever the 
ultimate merit of those arguments is found to be, those arguments do 
not negate the fact that the Bureau has articulated strong reasons for 
revisiting the Mandatory Underwriting Provisions. Commenters did not 
offer specific reasons why the analyses of the limitations of a study 
by Professor Ronald Mann (Mann Study) \33\ and a survey of payday 
borrowers conducted by the Pew Charitable Trusts (Pew Study),\34\ as 
set out in the Reconsideration NPRM, were flawed, nor did they 
otherwise present concrete arguments that change the Bureau's 
assessment of the strength of the concerns expressed in the 
Reconsideration NPRM regarding that evidence. The Bureau does not agree 
with the comment that it was arbitrary and capricious of the Bureau not 
to conduct further research and analysis to resolve any evidentiary 
gaps. The Bureau noted in the Reconsideration NPRM that resolving the 
issues raised in that proposal pertaining to reasonable avoidability 
and to the inability of consumers to protect their interests would take 
significant resources and could not be accomplished in a timely and 
cost-effective manner. The Bureau does not foreclose the possibility of 
conducting additional research farther in the future.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \33\ Ronald Mann, Assessing the Optimism of Payday Loan 
Borrowers, 21 Supreme Court Econ. Rev. 105 (2013).
    \34\ Pew Charitable Trusts, How Borrowers Choose and Repay 
Payday Loans (2013), https://www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/assets/2013/02/20/pew_choosing_borrowing_payday_feb2013-(1).pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Bureau notes that the comments that defended the reasoning of 
the 2017 Final Rule did not call into question the precise grounds on 
which the Bureau based its Delay NPRM--that is, its preliminary 
determination that it had strong reasons for believing that the 
evidence underlying the identification of the unfair and abusive 
practice in the Mandatory Underwriting Provisions of the 2017 Final 
Rule was not sufficiently robust and reliable, and that its approach to 
unfairness and abusiveness should be revisited. Commenters did not 
identify new or other research not previously considered by the Bureau 
that undermine the preliminary determinations the Bureau made in the 
Reconsideration NPRM that, in turn, were the basis for the Bureau's 
Delay NPRM. Nor did commenters challenge the Bureau's preliminary 
policy decision, whatever the merits of the linchpin evidence, to 
require more robust and reliable evidence in the face of a regulation 
likely to cause widespread disruption in the payday market, including 
the exit of some lenders and a reduction in consumers' ability to 
choose the credit they prefer. The Bureau also notes that, contrary to 
the views of some commenters, it did, in fact, consider alternative 
State law approaches in its 2017 Final Rule, and the Bureau does not 
agree that the Final Rule was devoid of evidence to support the 
Mandatory Underwriting Provisions; but, as explained above, the Bureau 
is reconsidering those provisions because it is concerned that the 
evidence was not sufficiently robust and reliable in light of the 
significant effects that would be caused by the Mandatory Underwriting 
Provisions.
    The commenters' criticisms of the legal grounds the Bureau set out 
in the Reconsideration NPRM for proposing to rescind the Mandatory 
Underwriting Provisions have not convinced the Bureau that it was 
mistaken in its preliminary view that the grounds for rescinding the 
Mandatory Underwriting Provisions are strong. The State attorneys 
general and consumer advocacy groups did not present detailed comments 
on the specific legal analyses of the elements of unfairness and 
abusiveness that the Reconsideration NPRM addressed--reasonable 
avoidability and countervailing benefits in analyzing unfairness, and 
lack of understanding and unreasonable advantage-taking in analyzing 
abusiveness--and the general criticisms offered have not changed the 
Bureau's preliminary assessment of the strength of its Reconsideration 
NPRM for purposes of delay.
    To finalize the Delay NPRM the Bureau does not, and need not, 
finalize its determination as to its proposed reconsideration of the 
unfairness and abusiveness conclusions set out in the 2017 Final Rule. 
The Bureau here concludes only that, in light of the consequences that 
would result if the compliance date became mandatory as discussed 
below, the Reconsideration NPRM raised sufficiently strong reasons to 
justify finalizing the Bureau's proposal to delay the compliance date 
for the Mandatory Underwriting provisions--enough time to consider the 
approximately 190,000 comments that have been received in that 
proceeding and decide how to respond to them. The Bureau remains open 
to the possibility that those comments may reveal other data, research, 
or arguments to confirm or refute the Bureau's proposed reconsideration 
of the unfairness and abusiveness findings of the Mandatory 
Underwriting Provisions in the 2017 Final Rule. The Bureau, however, 
will make that determination in the context of the Reconsideration 
NPRM.

[[Page 27913]]

2. Disruption to Short-Term and Longer-Term Balloon-Payment Lending
    In the 2017 Final Rule, the Bureau had estimated that the Mandatory 
Underwriting Provisions would result in an annual loss of revenue for 
payday lenders of between $3.4 billion and $3.6 billion and an annual 
loss of between $3.9 billion and $4.1 billion for vehicle title 
lenders.\35\ This represents between 62 percent and 68 percent of 
payday loan revenue during this period and virtually all of the revenue 
of short-term vehicle title lenders. Based on this finding, the Delay 
NPRM estimated that a 15-month delay of the compliance date for the 
Mandatory Underwriting Provisions would avert losses in revenues for 
the payday industry of between $4.25 billion and $4.5 billion, and 
losses in revenues for the title lending industry of $4.9 billion and 
$5.1 billion, compared to the baseline of the provisions going into 
effect in August 2019.\36\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \35\ See 84 FR 4252, 4287.
    \36\ 84 FR 4298, 4303. As explained in the analysis of costs and 
benefits in part VII below, the estimate of revenue loss for payday 
lenders assumes that lenders would be able to make loans under the 
principal step-down exception set forth in Sec.  1041.6. If that was 
not true during the 15 months at issue here, the revenue impacts 
would be even greater.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Delay NPRM stated that revenue losses of this magnitude could 
cause some smaller providers to exit the market and lead larger 
participants to consolidate their operations or make other fundamental 
changes to their businesses. The Delay NPRM further stated that these 
disruptions could have negative impacts on consumers, including 
restricting consumers' ability to choose the credit they prefer. The 
Bureau explained that it preliminarily believed that it was appropriate 
to avoid these potentially market-altering effects that would be 
associated with preparing for and complying with the Mandatory 
Underwriting Provisions in light of what the Bureau believed were 
strong reasons for revisiting the unfairness and abusiveness 
determinations underlying those provisions.\37\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \37\ Id. at 4300.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Commenters for the most part did not dispute that the Mandatory 
Underwriting Provisions, once in force, would have the effects on 
lenders described in the 2017 Final Rule. Some commenters, as set out 
below, suggested that the Bureau's 2017 Final Rule understated the 
impact on industry of the Mandatory Underwriting Provisions.
    Lenders and trade associations expressed their agreement with the 
rationale for the proposed delay in the Delay NPRM. Lenders, a trade 
association, a business advocacy group, and an attorney for lenders 
stated that if compliance with the Mandatory Underwriting Provisions 
was required in August 2019, many lenders would go out of business and 
would likely not return to operating even if those provisions were 
later rescinded. Lenders, a trade association, and a credit reporting 
agency indicated that lenders would suffer unrecoverable losses and 
long-term consequences even if compliance with the Mandatory 
Underwriting Provisions were only required from August 2019 until the 
provisions were rescinded. A trade association asserted that it would 
be arbitrary and capricious to require temporary compliance with the 
Mandatory Underwriting Provisions if the provisions were fundamentally 
flawed at the outset.
    A trade association and a law firm commented that lenders should 
not be required to comply with a rule that is likely to be rescinded. A 
lender and trade association further noted that if lenders were forced 
to switch underwriting practices back and forth over a short period of 
time because compliance with the Mandatory Underwriting Provisions was 
required and then those provisions were rescinded, lenders would face 
unnecessary costs and that consumers would be significantly confused 
regarding whether they and the lenders are able to enter into 
transactions that both think are in their interest. The trade 
association also noted that the Mandatory Underwriting Provisions would 
have a negative impact on competition among payday lenders.
    Lenders, trade associations, and a tribal government commented that 
to the extent that lenders did not go out of business, the Mandatory 
Underwriting Provisions would significantly reduce revenues from 
lending operations, and that the proposed delay would protect 
businesses from revenue disruption. Lenders stated that to the extent 
that they did not go out of business, many of them would be forced to 
consolidate their operations or make other fundamental changes as a 
result of the Mandatory Underwriting Provisions. A credit reporting 
agency noted that any increase in costs to lenders as a result of 
efforts to comply with the Mandatory Underwriting Provisions would 
simply be passed on to consumers.
    Lenders and trade associations noted that if finalized, the Delay 
NPRM would help lenders avoid injuries from any temporary disruptions 
as the Bureau contemplates revising the 2017 Final Rule. Lenders 
asserted that significant costs and work hours would go into complying 
with the Mandatory Underwriting Provisions by August 19, 2019, but that 
these costs and hours would not be recouped if the Bureau later 
rescinded these provisions. Lenders stated that the Delay NPRM was a 
reasonable and practical approach to avoid requiring small businesses 
to incur large and potentially unnecessary costs while the Bureau 
reconsiders the Mandatory Underwriting Provisions.
    A tribal government noted that the Mandatory Underwriting 
Provisions would cause providers to close, resulting in unemployment, 
lost payroll, and property taxes.
    Industry commenters, trade associations, a business advocacy group, 
a consumer advocacy group, and an attorney for lenders also asserted 
that if compliance with the Mandatory Underwriting Provisions of the 
2017 Final Rule was required, millions of consumers would be harmed 
because they would be denied access to credit and would be forced into 
inferior and more costly alternatives, including defaulting on other 
debts and turning to less responsible lenders on less favorable terms. 
One business advocacy group and a trade association commented that 
access to small-dollar credit critically supports consumers facing 
immediate and pressing financial challenges. One trade association 
noted that in some areas, in particular rural communities, consumers 
are not served by traditional banks and access to short-term and 
longer-term balloon-payment products is vital and would be cut off if 
the compliance date for the 2017 Final Rule were not delayed. One 
lender claimed that consumers would be forced to turn to expensive, 
credit-damaging alternatives absent access to short-term and longer-
term balloon-payment loans. One trade association asserted that the 
Bureau should not assign the weight that the 2017 Final Rule did to the 
interest of protecting consumers as soon as possible.
    Consumer advocacy groups, on the other hand, generally commented 
that injury to industry from not delaying the Mandatory Underwriting 
Provisions did not outweigh injury to consumers from delaying these 
provisions. One consumer advocacy group claimed that in the Delay NPRM 
the Bureau prioritized industry profits over consumer protection and 
that the protection of industry is not one of the factors the Dodd-
Frank Act requires the Bureau to consider in its rulemakings. The same 
group claimed that the Bureau could not frame its concern over industry 
profits at the expense of consumers as an attempt to preserve 
competition because the 2017 Final Rule explained how the Mandatory

[[Page 27914]]

Underwriting Provisions were consistent with preserving competition. 
One consumer advocacy group asserted that the Delay NPRM was based on 
purely anecdotal input on vaguely defined compliance costs and revenue 
losses. Another consumer advocacy group argued that maintaining the 
original compliance date for the Mandatory Underwriting Provisions was 
consistent with maintaining an orderly implementation period.
    A coalition of consumer advocacy groups, civil rights groups, 
religious groups, and community reinvestment groups commented that the 
Delay NPRM would prolong for 15 months the various harms suffered by 
consumers receiving loans that would not comply with the Mandatory 
Underwriting Provisions. These groups asserted that delay would cause a 
variety of impacts on consumers, including foregoing basic living 
expenses, vehicle repossession, aggressive debt collection by lenders, 
health effects (including the physical consequences of emotional 
distress), and reborrowing costing billions of dollars a year. In 
asserting the frequency of some of these harms, these commenters cited 
the Bureau's findings in the 2017 Final Rule. Consumer advocacy groups 
claimed that the delay of the compliance date for the Mandatory 
Underwriting Provisions would inflict the above harms particularly on 
communities of color, older Americans, and those on fixed incomes. 
Consumer advocacy groups commented that payday and vehicle title loans 
are debt traps by design, and that the business model for these 
products is not about providing access to productive credit or bridging 
short-term financial shortfalls. Consumer advocacy groups commented 
that the data show that the economic benefits from unaffordable loans 
are outweighed by the harms caused by the cycle of debt.
    A consumer advocacy group commented that, according to the findings 
in the 2017 Final Rule, the Mandatory Underwriting Provisions would 
provide substantial benefits to consumers, reducing the harms, 
identified above, that consumers would otherwise suffer. An individual 
commenter argued that the Delay NPRM was arbitrary and capricious 
because it only took into account the costs to industry of complying 
with the 2017 Final Rule and completely ignored the benefits to 
consumers that would result from compliance.
    Consumer advocacy groups asserted that delay of the Mandatory 
Underwriting Provisions would cause severe, irreparable harm to 
consumers, and that consumers cannot afford to wait an additional 15 
months for the relief that the Mandatory Underwriting Provisions would 
provide. These harms, according to the commenters, would be 
significantly curbed by the Mandatory Underwriting Provisions, but 
would continue during the 15 months of the proposed delay, causing many 
individuals and families to experience long-lasting and spiraling 
harms.
    Consumer advocacy groups noted the Delay NPRM illustrates the 
magnitude of harm to consumers through its estimate of the benefits of 
delay to lenders. According to these groups, the Delay NPRM never 
acknowledges that its estimate of impact on industry is the inverse of 
its impact on consumers--that is, revenue that the delay would preserve 
for lenders is an additional expense to consumers. The commenters 
asserted that a corresponding increase in expenses to consumers is just 
a single component of the harms caused by unaffordable payday and 
vehicle title loans, including the risk of falling into debt traps, 
delinquency and default of loans, bank account closures, repossession 
of vehicles, and other long-term injuries suffered by consumers. One 
consumer advocacy group commented that, during the 15 month delay, 
title lenders would repossess an estimated 425,000 vehicles.
    A consumer advocacy group commented that the Bureau's estimates in 
the Reconsideration NPRM that the Mandatory Underwriting Provisions of 
the 2017 Final Rule would reduce access to credit were unsubstantiated, 
and that the Bureau's analysis in the Delay NPRM did not recognize that 
the majority of consumers would still have access to loans with terms 
longer than 45 days because of the availability of small installment 
loans or lines of credit with terms longer than 45 days. Another 
consumer advocacy group asserted that access to short-term or longer-
term balloon-payment loans was not really access to new credit to the 
borrower or the broader economy, but was really one original 
unaffordable loan churned over and over again.
    The Bureau concludes that delaying the August 19, 2019 compliance 
date for the Mandatory Underwriting Provisions would prevent industry 
participants from incurring substantial compliance and implementation 
costs and would avoid the Mandatory Underwriting Provisions' 
potentially market-altering effects, some of which may be irreversible, 
while the Bureau conducts its reconsideration rulemaking. In 
particular, the Bureau is concerned that some smaller storefront 
lenders may permanently exit the market if they are required to comply 
with the 2017 Final Rule, even if the Rule is later rescinded after the 
compliance date.\38\ The Bureau agrees that if compliance with the 
Mandatory Underwriting Provisions was required in August 2019 lenders 
would suffer a large and potentially unrecoverable loss of revenue. The 
cost to industry, according to the estimates set forth in the 2017 
Final Rule, would be billions of dollars in lost revenues. If 
compliance with the Mandatory Underwriting Provisions is required, some 
smaller lenders would go out of business, to the extent they cannot 
earn sufficient revenues and profits from other products or could not 
otherwise timely adapt, which would result in fewer payday storefronts 
as a result. The 2017 Final Rule itself acknowledges that one 
anticipated impact of Mandatory Underwriting Provisions would be a 
large contraction in the number of payday storefronts consistent with 
the predicted 62 to 68 percent decline in loan revenue.\39\ These 
disruptions would likely result at least in the short-term in a 
significant contraction of the market for payday loans and the near 
elimination of the market for vehicle title loans before the Bureau had 
an opportunity to complete its reconsideration of the 2017 Final Rule. 
Further, given high fixed costs in the vehicle title lending market, 
some participants may not return to offering vehicle title loans if the 
Mandatory Underwriting Provisions were rescinded. If the Bureau does 
not delay the August 2019 compliance date and ultimately rescinds the 
Mandatory Underwriting Provisions after that date, there is a risk that 
the affected markets would not return to the status quo. There may be 
fewer competitors and less competition in the affected markets after a 
short period of required

[[Page 27915]]

compliance with the Mandatory Underwriting Provisions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \38\ The Bureau acknowledges that storefront lenders are already 
experiencing competitive pressures from online lending and multi-pay 
products. See, e.g., John Hecht, State of the Industry: Innovating 
and Adapting Amongst a Complex Backdrop (Jefferies Group LLC slide 
presentation, Mar. 20, 2019) (on file); Press Release, TransUnion, 
Lenders Extending More Loans to Subprime Consumers as Credit Market 
Continues to Exhibit Signs of Strength: Q3 2018 TransUnion Industry 
Insights Report features latest consumer credit trends (Nov. 15, 
2018), https://newsroom.transunion.com/lenders-extending-more-loans-to-subprime-consumers--as-credit-market-continues-to-exhibit-signs-of-strength/.
    \39\ 82 FR 54472, 54835 (``To the extent that lenders cannot 
replace reductions in revenue by adapting their products and 
practices, Bureau research suggests that the ultimate net reduction 
in revenue will likely lead to contractions of storefronts of a 
similar magnitude, at least for stores that do not have substantial 
revenue from other lines of business, such as check cashing and 
selling money orders.''); id. at 54827.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Lenders that survived the impact of the Mandatory Underwriting 
Provisions of the 2017 Final Rule would incur, as predicted by the Rule 
itself, a number of operational costs from the large number of specific 
requirements set out by the provisions of Sec.  1041.5, including 
building systems to verify income, estimate a borrower's living 
expenses, and project a potential borrower's residual income or debt-
to-income ratio. If lenders had the option instead to make loans under 
Sec.  1041.6, they still would need to establish systems for obtaining 
reports from a national consumer reporting agency and systems for 
furnishing to, and obtaining reports from, an RIS.\40\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \40\ See 84 FR 4252, 4286.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The immediate contraction of the market that would likely result if 
compliance with the Rule became mandatory would, in turn, result in a 
reduction in access to credit for consumers. The Bureau notes, for 
example, that the 2017 Final Rule found that the Mandatory Underwriting 
Provisions would prevent some consumers from obtaining a payday loan 
(i.e., those consumers who exhausted their ability to obtain principal 
step-down loans and could not qualify for an ability-to-repay loan) and 
would prevent substantially all consumers from obtaining vehicle title 
loans, which are typically for larger amounts than payday loans and 
available to consumers who do not have a checking account. At a 
minimum, those consumers would be forced to choose a different form of 
credit regardless of their preference.\41\ The 2017 Final Rule further 
found that the Mandatory Underwriting Provisions would disrupt to some 
extent access to payday loans in certain geographical areas, especially 
in rural areas. The Rule also found that the Mandatory Underwriting 
Provisions would impact consumers who prefer to repay a payday loan 
over more than three pay periods from making that choice. Delaying the 
compliance date will delay all of the consequences described above 
until the Bureau is able to resolve the question of whether there are 
evidentiary or legal grounds for rescinding the Mandatory Underwriting 
Provisions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \41\ Contrary to the assertion of one commenter, the 
Reconsideration NPRM noted that information from the 2017 Final Rule 
did acknowledge the possibility that other lender offerings existed 
and could evolve further in response to the Mandatory Underwriting 
Provisions. Id. at 4285 & n.329.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Bureau disagrees with commenters who argued that the Delay 
NPRM's predictions regarding access to credit were ``unsubstantiated.'' 
As established above, the Delay NPRM's estimates of changes in access 
to credit attributable to the proposed delay were based on information 
from the 2017 Final Rule as analyzed by the Reconsideration NPRM.\42\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \42\ 84 FR 4298, 4302-03.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    At the same time, the Bureau acknowledges that for some consumers 
there could be adverse and potentially long-lasting consequences from 
delaying the compliance date for the Mandatory Underwriting Provisions. 
Specifically, the 2017 Final Rule found that the act or practice of 
making covered short-term and balloon-payment loans without assessing 
the consumers' ability to repay causes or is likely to cause 
substantial injury to consumers--principally in the form of 
unanticipated and repeated reborrowing--and that the Mandatory 
Underwriting Provisions would have the effect of preventing that 
injury.\43\ The Reconsideration and Delay NPRMs accepted that finding, 
but emphasized that the finding does not reflect the Bureau's concerns 
that such injury may not constitute an unfair or abusive practice under 
applicable law because consumers could reasonably avoid it and 
understood the material risks of such harm.\44\ The Reconsideration and 
Delay NPRMs likewise took as a given that the 2017 Final Rule had 
concluded that ``the overall impacts of the decreased loan volume 
resulting from the 2017 Final Rule's Mandatory Underwriting Provisions 
on consumers would be positive,'' and therefore it follows that 
``inverse effects would ensue, relative to the chosen baseline, from 
this proposal to rescind the 2017 Final Rule.'' \45\ The Bureau, 
however, also specifically emphasized that ``the 2017 Final Rule's 
conclusion as to these effects was dependent upon the evidence that 
consumers who experienced long durations of indebtedness generally did 
not anticipate these outcomes and . . . the agency now believes that 
this evidence is not sufficiently robust and representative to support 
the findings necessary to determine that the identified practice is 
unfair and abusive.'' \46\ Contrary to the suggestion of commenters, 
the Bureau is not ignoring the referenced findings of the 2017 Final 
Rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \43\ Lenders and trade associations commented that the 2017 
Final Rule failed to provide evidence of consumer harm or 
substantial injury based on existing offerings of short-term and 
longer-term balloon-payment loans. A trade association noted that, 
contrary to the assumptions advanced in the 2017 Final Rule, payday 
loans and loan sequences benefit consumers; the trade association 
also noted that the high costs of such loans, without more, do not 
speak to consumer harm. The trade association further commented that 
the Bureau had failed to attempt to perform a consumer-focused 
analysis to determine what value borrowers receive from payday loan 
sequences. The Bureau is not reconsidering the finding of the 2017 
Final Rule with respect to substantial injury for purposes of this 
rulemaking, but rather is questioning whether that injury is the 
result of unfair or abusive practices that justify Bureau 
intervention that would disrupt the market and displace consumer 
choice.
    \44\ 84 FR 4252, 4269-71, 4275.
    \45\ Id. at 4285.
    \46\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    However, for the reasons explained above, the Bureau has concluded 
that it has strong reasons to believe that those consequences are not 
the result of unfair or abusive practices that justify Bureau 
intervention that would disrupt the market and displace consumer 
choice. Regardless of whether the Bureau ultimately decides to rescind 
the Mandatory Underwriting Provisions, the Bureau now concludes that 
the proposed delay is appropriate based on the Bureau's present 
assessment of the strength of the Reconsideration NPRM and the nature 
and magnitude of the consequences that would follow if compliance 
became mandatory before the Bureau had an opportunity to conclude the 
reconsideration rulemaking. The Bureau believes that the Delay NPRM 
should be finalized to give the Bureau time to consider fully whether 
it should rescind provisions that may cause potentially market-altering 
effects, some of which may be irreversible, before those effects occur. 
Absent such delay, the Bureau's ability to reconsider the Mandatory 
Underwriting Provisions could, as a practical matter, be compromised.
    The Bureau disagrees with the comment suggesting that its analysis 
of competition was a pretext for its concern over industry profits. The 
Bureau is concerned about effects on industry revenue and profits only 
to the extent that they, in turn, have an effect on competition among 
lenders and on consumers' ability to access credit of the type and on 
the terms they prefer. The Bureau also disagrees with the comment that 
the Delay NPRM only vaguely or anecdotally defined the impact of the 
2017 Final Rule on compliance costs and revenue losses. The 2017 Final 
Rule described in detail the multi-billion dollar impact of the 
Mandatory Underwriting Provisions on loan volumes and revenues, and the 
Delay NPRM was based on those findings.
    The Bureau also disagrees with the comment that the Delay NPRM 
should have acknowledged that its estimates of the proposed delay's 
impact on industry were the inverse of its impact on consumers. The 
payday lender revenues at issue are the finance charge the

[[Page 27916]]

lender charges the consumer for the use of the lender's money. The 
finance charges lenders would forego if compliance became mandatory are 
amounts that consumers would have paid to lenders. However, the 
consequences that the Bureau is concerned with here are the potentially 
market-altering effects, some of which may be irreversible, that would 
result from disrupting these payments and the resulting effects on 
consumers' access to credit and ability to make their own choices. 
Given the Bureau's strong reasons for questioning the factual and legal 
predicates for the Mandatory Underwriting Provisions, the Bureau 
concludes that it is appropriate to delay those consequences to allow 
the Bureau to reconsider the Mandatory Underwriting Provisions.
3. Reconsideration Is a Valid Basis for Delay
    A number of comments opined on whether reconsideration of a 
substantive regulation was a valid ground for delaying the compliance 
date of that regulation. A lender and a consumer advocacy group 
commented that reconsideration of an existing regulation is an 
equitable, fair, and sensible reason to delay a compliance date, as the 
Bureau has proposed to do.
    A group of State attorneys general, consumer advocacy groups, and 
an individual commenter asserted that reconsideration of a rule is not 
an adequate basis for delay. In making this argument, the consumer 
advocacy groups cited cases in which courts vacated rules that delayed 
compliance dates for existing regulations that had not yet gone into 
effect.
    A group of State attorneys general and consumer advocacy groups 
commented that the Administrative Procedure Act imposes a number of 
specific procedural requirements on an agency seeking to change its 
regulation, that an agency must provide reasoned analysis for its 
decision to change a regulation, and that the required reasoned 
analysis cannot be avoided by staying the implementation of a final 
rule. The group of State attorneys general and consumer advocacy groups 
cited case law for the proposition that a delay of a substantive 
regulation could not be justified with a less stringent or thorough 
review than other rulemakings under the Administrative Procedure Act. 
Finally, the group of State attorneys general asserted that the Bureau 
cannot use the purported proposed future revision, which has yet to be 
passed, as a justification for the delay of a regulation, and that a 
delay must be justified on its own merits. A consumer advocacy group 
commented that while agencies regularly reconsider rules, the authority 
to reconsider rules does not in itself convey to the agency the 
authority to delay an existing rule. According to the group of State 
attorneys general, consumer advocacy groups, and an individual, the 
Delay NPRM fails to satisfy Administrative Procedure Act requirements.
    Consumer advocacy groups commented that delaying the Mandatory 
Underwriting Provisions of the 2017 Final Rule would be tantamount to 
early adoption of the rescission proposed by the Bureau in its 
Reconsideration NPRM, and that the Bureau can only rescind the 
Mandatory Underwriting Provisions by seeking and considering comments 
on the merits of the reconsideration. A consumer advocacy group 
asserted that the Delay NPRM assumed the validity and ultimate 
implementation of the Reconsideration NPRM and that the Bureau was not 
entitled to assume that the Mandatory Underwriting Provisions would be 
repealed such that industry compliance with them would be unnecessary, 
given the flaws in the Reconsideration NPRM. Further, the consumer 
advocacy group asserted that acting based on flawed assumptions is a 
cardinal example of arbitrary and capricious rulemaking.
    The Bureau believes that if an agency has offered a strong and 
reasoned basis for reconsideration, and seeks delay to provide for an 
opportunity for notice and comment on the reconsideration of the 
underlying regulation before significant costs associated with 
compliance are incurred, such reconsideration of an existing regulation 
is an appropriate grounds to delay a compliance date--at least where, 
as here, there would be potentially market-altering effects, some of 
which may be irreversible, absent a delay. The Bureau also believes 
that such a reconsideration of an existing regulation can be an 
adequate basis for delay and that it has complied with the 
Administrative Procedure Act requirements for delaying the compliance 
date of a regulation.
    The Bureau understands that agencies must engage in reasoned 
analysis to support proposed delays. The Bureau has done so here. As 
set out in the sections above, the Delay NPRM relied on the Bureau's 
clearly identified rationales for proposing to rescind the Mandatory 
Underwriting Provisions of the 2017 Final Rule without concluding that 
it would rescind those provisions. The Delay NPRM further articulated 
the Bureau's reasons for proposing to postpone the compliance date 
while the reconsideration rulemaking is moving forward. While many 
commenters dispute the rationales set out in the Reconsideration NPRM, 
the Bureau has articulated them clearly enough that commenters were 
able to understand the Bureau's preliminary grounds for proposing 
rescission of the Mandatory Underwriting Provisions and submit 
responsive comments to help the Bureau decide whether to go forward 
with the Reconsideration NPRM. The Delay NPRM, in turn, relied upon 
those preliminary grounds in proposing a limited delay of the 
compliance date for the Mandatory Underwriting Provisions for purposes 
of avoiding disruptive and potentially market-altering effects, some of 
which may be irreversible, while the Bureau reviews comments on the 
rationales set forth in the Reconsideration NPRM.
    The Bureau believes that the compliance date delay is appropriate 
to allow for meaningful reconsideration of the 2017 Final Rule. Absent 
such a delay, the Bureau is concerned that the Mandatory Underwriting 
Provisions could have disruptive and potentially market-altering 
effects, some of which may be irreversible.\47\ The risk of this 
outcome is confirmed by the comments received, as set out in part 
III.B.2, from lenders and trade associations who indicated that they or 
their members would go out of business permanently if compliance with 
the Mandatory Underwriting Provisions was required on August 19, 2019. 
Therefore, the Bureau believes that a delay of the compliance date is 
important to complete a meaningful reconsideration.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \47\ The Bureau noted its concern in the Delay NPRM that the 
proposed delay would ``allow industry participants to avoid 
irreparable injury from the compliance and implementation costs and 
the market effects associated with preparing for and complying with 
portions of the Rule that the Bureau is proposing to rescind.'' 84 
FR 4298, 4300.
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    The Bureau disagrees with the assertion that finalization of the 
Delay NPRM is tantamount to early adoption of the Reconsideration NPRM. 
The Bureau has proposed a limited delay to the compliance date of 15 
months to consider comments on the Reconsideration NPRM. This delay is 
not indefinite--compliance with the Mandatory Underwriting Provisions 
will be required as of the new compliance date unless the Bureau 
decides rescind those provisions via the reconsideration rulemaking.
4. Length of the Proposed Delay
    Several commenters opposing the proposed delay noted that the 2016 
Proposal, which was later finalized as the 2017 Final Rule, had a 15-
month compliance period, and that the Bureau subsequently extended the 
period by an

[[Page 27917]]

additional six months in the 2017 Final Rule. One commenter noted that 
the Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 
2009 (CARD Act) gave credit card issuers nine months to comply with 
major new consumer protections, including an ability-to-repay 
requirement,\48\ and that changes to State laws with a more substantial 
impact on the payday and title lending industries typically provide 
only three to nine months for full implementation. These commenters 
argued that industry participants' renewed requests for more time do 
not justify further extension of what they consider an already lengthy 
implementation period, or that even if compliance challenges posed as a 
reason for delay (with the commenters also asserted that here they do 
not), they certainly cannot justify a delay of an additional 15 months. 
Relatedly, they argued that the industry complaints cited by the Bureau 
bear no relationship to the proposed 15-month delay, asserting that the 
Bureau's focus on these issues appears to be an attempt to support a 
result the agency has already determined.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \48\ Public Law 111-8, sections 3 and 109, 123 Stat. 1734 
(2009), codified at 15 U.S.C. 1665e.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A group of State attorneys general claimed that the Bureau offered, 
in the 2017 Final Rule, a legitimate and appropriate analysis 
justifying the amount of time the rule provided industry to comply with 
the Mandatory Underwriting Provisions, and that the reasons the Delay 
NPRM offered contradicted its own prior analysis. One consumer advocacy 
group claimed that the length of the delay the Bureau proposed does not 
square with the reason the Bureau suggests for such delay, i.e., that 
the delay proposed by the Bureau for considering and potentially 
finalizing the Reconsideration NPRM was more time than the Bureau took 
to finalize the 2017 Final Rule, which the group argued was a more 
complex and difficult rulemaking. Commenters supportive of the Bureau's 
proposal largely agreed that 15 months was an appropriate length of 
time for the delay. Several commenters, however, suggested that the 
Bureau delay for a longer period (such as 21 or 22 months, or until 
December 31, 2021) or that the extension of the compliance date should 
not begin until something else occurs (such as the completion of the 
reconsideration rulemaking or the lifting of the stay in the pending 
litigation challenging the Rule). One commenter asserted that a delay 
shorter than 22 months would threaten serious and irreparable harm to 
both payday and title lenders as well as the consumers who rely on them 
for credit, and further asserted that such an extension would suffice 
only if one assumes (incorrectly, in the view of this commenter) that 
the original compliance period was adequate.
    One commenter asserted that the Bureau did not explain how it 
arrived at a decision to propose a 15-month delay, while simultaneously 
quoting the Bureau's explanation that the Bureau was proposing a 15-
month delay in order to permit an orderly conclusion to its separate 
rulemaking process to reconsider the Mandatory Underwriting Provisions 
of the 2017 Final Rule.\49\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \49\ See 84 FR 4298, 4299. The Bureau also explained in the 
Delay NPRM that it preliminarily believed, based on its experience 
writing the 2017 Final Rule and with other similar rulemakings, that 
the proposed compliance date of November 19, 2020 would allow the 
Bureau adequate opportunity to review comments on its 
Reconsideration NPRM regarding the Mandatory Underwriting Provisions 
of the 2017 Final Rule and to make any changes to those provisions 
before affected entities bear additional costs associated with 
implementing and complying with the 2017 Final Rule, and related 
market effects. Id. at 4301.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Bureau continues to believe that 15 months is an appropriate 
length of time to delay the August 19, 2019 compliance date for the 
Mandatory Underwriting Provisions of the Rule, in order to permit an 
orderly conclusion to the reconsideration rulemaking process. In 
addition, the Bureau believes that providing a date certain for the 
delay will provide more certainty and clarity to all relevant 
stakeholders in this context.
    The comment period for the Reconsideration NPRM closed on May 15, 
2019, and the Bureau received approximately 190,000 comments. The 
Bureau believes that the 15-month delay will give the Bureau sufficient 
time to review the comments received, make a determination as to how to 
proceed in that rulemaking, and to prepare, issue, and publish in the 
Federal Register a final rule sufficiently in advance of the November 
19, 2020 compliance date to allow the final rule to take effect by that 
date (if the Bureau elects to rescind the Mandatory Underwriting 
Provisions).\50\ This timeframe is not inconsistent with the Bureau's 
timing for issuing final rules where the proposal garnered a 
significant volume of comments. For example, the Bureau's rule 
governing prepaid accounts under Regulations E (12 CFR part 1005) and Z 
(12 CFR part 1026), which received approximately 65,000 comments, took 
approximately 20 months from the close of the comment period to 
publication, with an effective date approximately one year later 
(although the overall effective date was ultimately extended an 
additional 1.5 years, to April 1, 2019).\51\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \50\ Under the Congressional Review Act, before a rule can take 
effect, an agency must submit the rule to both Houses of Congress 
and the Comptroller General. 5 U.S.C. 801(a). Prior to this 
submission, an agency must obtain a determination from the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) as to whether the rule is a ``major 
rule'' under 5 U.S.C. 804(2). If OMB so determines, the rule 
generally cannot take effect until the later of 60 days after 
Congress receives the rule or the rule is published in the Federal 
Register.
    \51\ See 81 FR 83934 (Nov. 22, 2016), 82 FR 18975 (Apr. 25, 
2017), 83 FR 6364 (Feb. 13, 2018).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

C. Other Aspects of the Delay NPRM

1. Unanticipated Potential Obstacles to Compliance
    As discussed in the Delay NPRM, the Bureau's second reason for 
proposing to delay the compliance date of the Mandatory Underwriting 
Provisions was that the Bureau had discussed implementation efforts 
with a number of industry participants since publication of the 2017 
Final Rule. Through these conversations, the Bureau had received 
reports of various unanticipated potential obstacles to compliance with 
the Mandatory Underwriting Provisions by the August 19, 2019 compliance 
date. The Bureau sought to better understand these reported obstacles 
and how they might bear on whether the Bureau should delay the August 
19, 2019 compliance date for the Mandatory Underwriting Provisions 
while it considers whether to rescind those portions of the 2017 Final 
Rule. In the Delay NPRM, the Bureau specifically discussed recent 
changes to State laws and systems or vendor-related issues as examples 
of potential obstacles to compliance.
    Commenters, including lenders, trade associations, consumer 
advocacy groups, a group of State attorneys general, the SBA OA, and 
others, spoke to potential obstacles to compliance generally, changes 
to State laws enacted after the 2017 Final Rule was issued, and systems 
or vendor-related issues, including such issues specifically related to 
RISes. Some lenders, trade associations, and an attorney to lenders 
asserted that the proposed delay is necessary even if the Bureau 
decides not to rescind the Mandatory Underwriting Provisions. Lenders 
and trade associations asserted that they would not be ready to comply 
with the Mandatory Underwriting Provisions by August 2019 and were 
deterred from making the significant investment in compliance by 
uncertainty about the compliance date. However, commenters provided 
little, if any, data or other

[[Page 27918]]

specific information to support the existence or magnitude of these or 
other obstacles to compliance.\52\ In light of the absence of such data 
or information in the rulemaking record, the Bureau is not basing its 
final rule to delay the compliance date on the presence or effect of 
obstacles to compliance, but rather is basing it on the need to conduct 
an orderly rulemaking with regard to the Reconsideration NPRM.\53\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \52\ Some commenters noted that lenders had expected to be able 
to comply with the Mandatory Underwriting Provisions through the use 
of third-party vendor and software services but stated that those 
are not currently available in the marketplace. The lenders, 
however, did not provide specific information as to the costs they 
would be likely to incur were they to comply with the Mandatory 
Underwriting Provisions in the absence of such third-party services.
    \53\ Some commenters also asserted that compliance with the 
Mandatory Underwriting Provisions would be impossible in the absence 
of RISes. The general standard for making an ability-to-repay 
determination under Sec.  1041.5, however, does not require that 
lenders obtain a consumer report from an RIS if such a report is not 
available.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Crossover Effects
    The Bureau received a number of comments that addressed crossover 
effects of the proposed delay of the Mandatory Underwriting Provisions 
on the implementation of the Payment Provisions.
    A comment from a group of State attorneys general expressed some 
confusion about the request for comment on crossover effects. 
Nevertheless, the comment stated that the compliance date for the 
Payment Provisions should not be delayed and those provisions should go 
into effect as scheduled on August 19, 2019. They asserted that they 
were unaware of any circumstance where a high-cost lender does not act 
in an unfair and abusive manner by making more than two consecutive 
failed efforts to withdraw payments from a consumer's account without 
first obtaining new consumer authorization.
    On the other hand, trade association and industry commenters 
contended that crossover effects existed and were reasons to delay or 
reconsider the compliance date for the Payment Provisions. Industry 
commenters stated that the 2017 Final Rule established a complex and 
interconnected set of provisions that covers various categories of 
covered loans. Given these interconnections, a number of commenters 
stated that the proposed delay of the Mandatory Underwriting Provisions 
potentially could impact the Payment Provisions, leading to confusion 
and unintended consequences for consumers and industry. Commenters 
stated that because of the complicated distinctions and overlapping 
definitions of covered loans, reconsideration of the Mandatory 
Underwriting Provisions could result in potential complications for 
industry with respect to compliance obligations and operations. 
Commenters asserted that such complications would be particularly 
likely if the Reconsideration NPRM resulted in modifications to the 
definitions or exemptions of covered loans.
    A trade association stated that Payment Provisions cover a wider 
range of covered loans than the Mandatory Underwriting Provisions and 
therefore will impact more consumers and industry participants. Given 
this consequence for consumers and industry, the trade association 
urged the Bureau to delay and reconsider the Payment Provisions.
    The Bureau has reviewed and analyzed these comments and has 
determined that they do not identify crossover effects on 
implementation of the Payment Provisions such that the Bureau should 
delay parts of the Rule other than the Mandatory Underwriting 
Provisions.
    The Bureau disagrees with the comments asserting that finalizing 
the Delay NPRM would have crossover effects on the implementation of 
the Payment Provisions. The commenters in general did not identify 
specific or definite examples of crossover effects. Further, commenters 
generally did not identify with specificity negative or unintended 
consequences to consumers or industry that would arise from any such 
effects.
    As to comments that said that changes to the 2017 Final Rule's 
covered loan definition could have potential crossover effects, the 
Bureau acknowledges that the Payment Provisions apply to a broader 
group of covered loans than do the Mandatory Underwriting Provisions, 
and if the Bureau undertook changes to narrow the 2017 Final Rule's 
coverage those changes could impact implementation. However, neither 
the Delay NPRM nor the Reconsideration NPRM proposed changes to the 
scope of the 2017 Final Rule's coverage. Additionally, the Delay NPRM 
did not propose delaying provisions that generally implement the 
covered loan definition. Further, commenters did not explain how the 
proposed rescission of the Mandatory Underwriting Provisions would in 
practice affect the covered loan definition in the Rule.
    Having considered these comments, the Bureau concludes that 
delaying the Mandatory Underwriting Provisions will not result in 
significant crossover effects on implementation of the Payment 
Provisions.
    Regarding comments about industry burden directly resulting from 
the Payment Provisions, which include comments about those provisions' 
compliance costs and market impacts, the Bureau considers these 
comments outside the scope of the proposal. The Bureau did not propose 
in the Delay NPRM to delay the compliance date for the Payment 
Provisions.\54\ Rather, the Bureau specifically solicited comment about 
whether and to what extent delaying the compliance date of the 
Mandatory Underwriting Provisions would impact implementation of the 
Payment Provisions.\55\ Comments about the Payment Provisions' industry 
burden in general are not responsive to this request for comment. 
However, as noted in both NPRMs, the Bureau has also received formal 
and informal feedback regarding the Payment Provisions.\56\ As 
indicated in those NPRMs, the Bureau intends to examine issues raised 
by this feedback and determine whether further action is warranted.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \54\ See 84 FR 4298, 4301.
    \55\ See id.
    \56\ See id. See also 84 FR 4252, 4253, 4260.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

D. Other Issues Raised by Commenters

1. Bureau Statements Regarding the Rule and the Litigation Stay
    Commenters argued that a compliance date delay is needed because a 
``cloud of uncertainty'' has hung over the rule since it was published 
in 2017 and that as a result most lenders have deferred taking 
necessary steps to implement the Mandatory Underwriting Provisions. 
Commenters cited, variously, statements made by the Bureau or the then-
Acting Director, the filing of the lawsuit challenging the Rule in 
April 2018, and the court's stay of the Rule's compliance date in 
November 2018. One commenter asserted that this uncertainty has 
prevented banks from being able to adequately design compliance 
programs.
    One commenter noted that the court's stay of the compliance date 
remains in force, but could be lifted at any time, arguing that because 
of this uncertainty, the stay does not ameliorate concerns about the 
August 19, 2019 compliance date. Another commenter asserted that at 
this stage it would be inequitable for lenders to be required to 
commence implementation of costly compliance systems and undertake 
other measures required to become compliant, especially if the stay of 
the Rule is lifted by the court, and that the likely result

[[Page 27919]]

would be that smaller storefront lenders would exit the business.
    A consumer advocacy group commented that the Bureau failed to 
explain related decisions by the agency that could inform commenters' 
reaction to the Delay NPRM, noting that the Bureau did not explain that 
it had itself asked the court to stay the Rule's compliance date or 
explain the Bureau's assumptions about the relationship between that 
litigation and the Delay NPRM.
    The Bureau acknowledges that its statements and pending litigation 
have created greater uncertainty for industry and consumers. However, 
the Bureau did not propose these issues as possible grounds for 
delaying the compliance date, and is not relying on them here to 
finalize the compliance date delay.
2. Decreased Consumer Complaints
    In the Reconsideration NPRM, the Bureau noted that changes to 
State-level regulation may have contributed to the decline in payday 
lending complaints that the Bureau handled through its Office of 
Consumer Response.\57\ Several commenters suggested in their comments 
on the Delay NPRM that the Bureau should delay the compliance date of 
the Mandatory Underwriting Provisions to see if the downward trend in 
consumer complaints continues and whether State regulation is adequate 
to protect consumers without limiting access to credit. The Bureau will 
continue to monitor complaint volumes, but is not basing its decision 
to delay on these grounds.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \57\ 84 FR 4252, 4254-55. As cited in the 2017 Final Rule, in 
2016 the Bureau handled approximately 4,400 complaints in which 
consumers reported ``payday loan'' as the complaint product. 82 FR 
54472, 54483, citing Bureau of Consumer Fin. Prot., Consumer 
Response Annual Report, Jan. 1-Dec. 31, 2016, at 33 (March 2017), 
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/documents/3368/201703_cfpb_Consumer-Response-Annual-Report-2016.PDF.
    In contrast, the Bureau received approximately 2,900 payday loan 
complaints in 2017, and approximately 2,300 in 2018. In each of 
these reporting years, it appears that consumers complained most 
frequently about unexpected fees associated with payday loans, while 
consumers complaining about receiving a loan for which payday 
lenders had not determined their ability to repay loans were less 
frequent. Bureau of Consumer Fin. Prot., Consumer Response Annual 
Report, Jan. 1-Dec. 31, 2017, at 34 (March 2018), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/documents/6406/cfpb_consumer-response-annual-report_2017.pdf; Bureau of Consumer Fin. Prot. Consumer 
Response Database. To provide a sense of the number of complaints 
for payday loans relative to the number of complaints for other 
product categories, from October 1, 2017 through September 30, 2018, 
approximately 0.7 percent of all consumer complaints the Bureau 
received were about payday loans, and 0.2 percent were about vehicle 
title loans. Bureau of Consumer Fin. Prot., Semi-Annual Report of 
the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection, at 19 tbl. 3 (Fall 
2018), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/documents/7266/cfpb_semi-annual-report-to-congress_fall-2018.pdf. The Bureau notes that there 
is some overlap across product categories. For example, a consumer 
complaining about the conduct of a debt collector seeking to recover 
on a payday loan would frequently be in the debt collection product 
category rather than the payday loan product category.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. UDAAP Rulemaking Generally
    One commenter suggested that the Bureau should adopt definitive 
UDAAP standards through a standalone notice-and-comment rulemaking 
process before promulgating and implementing specific rules relying on 
what the commenter referred to as shifting and unsettled 
interpretations of unfairness and abusiveness. The commenter also 
asserted that applying new or revised UDAAP interpretations on an ad 
hoc basis is arbitrary and capricious as well as an inappropriate way 
to make regulatory policy.
    The Bureau indicated in its fall 2018 semiannual regulatory agenda 
that it is considering whether rulemaking or other activities may be 
helpful to further clarify the meaning of ``abusiveness'' under the 
section 1031 of the Dodd-Frank Act.\58\ This issue remains on the 
Bureau's list of long-term actions.\59\ The Bureau also recently 
announced that the first in an upcoming series of symposia that the 
Bureau is hosting will focus on clarifying the meaning of abusive acts 
or practices under section 1031 of the Dodd-Frank Act.\60\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \58\ 83 FR 58118, 58120 (Nov. 16, 2018).
    \59\ See https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eAgendaViewRule?pubId=201904&RIN=3170-AA88.
    \60\ See Bureau of Consumer Fin. Prot., Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau Announces Symposia Series (Apr. 18, 2019), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/bureau-announces-symposia-series/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    At this time, the Bureau has not yet decided whether it will take 
measures to address the general meaning of abusiveness. The Bureau 
believes that its Reconsideration NPRM proposes an interpretation of 
unfairness and abusiveness that is focused on the unique 
characteristics of the markets for the loans at issue. The Bureau does 
not consider this comment relevant to the specific issue presented in 
the rulemaking, which is whether the compliance date of the Mandatory 
Underwriting Provisions should be delayed. The Bureau already issued 
the Mandatory Underwriting Provisions as part of the 2017 Final Rule 
without the standalone rulemaking process desired by the commenter, and 
it is delaying the compliance date in order to reconsider those 
provisions.
4. Tribal Consultations and Interagency Coordination
    Several commenters requested additional tribal government 
consultations regarding the Rule, both NPRMs, and/or tribal lending 
generally. Several other commenters requested that the Bureau 
coordinate with the prudential regulators to create a unified framework 
for regulating the small-dollar credit market. The Bureau will continue 
to coordinate and consult with tribal governments and with the 
prudential regulators as required by sections 1015 and 1022(b)(2)(B) of 
the Dodd-Frank Act and in accordance with the Bureau's frameworks on 
tribal government and interagency consultations.
5. Prejudgment of the Outcome of This Rulemaking and Stakeholder 
Influence on Rulemaking
    Several commenters opposing the delay suggested that the Bureau 
might have prejudged the outcome of the Delay NPRM, arguing that the 
Bureau's actions (including the Bureau's statements regarding the rule, 
lack of an approved Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Control 
Number under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (PRA), and posture in 
the pending litigation) suggests that the Bureau decided to delay the 
Mandatory Underwriting Provisions before it issued the Delay NPRM. 
Commenters also asserted that the Reconsideration NPRM lacks support 
and rests on what one referred to as biased and contaminated input due 
to meetings that they asserted occurred prior to issuance of the NPRMs. 
They also noted recent media reports regarding the influence of the 
payday lending industry on academic studies and thereby purportedly on 
the Bureau's rulemaking. One commenter noted the difficulty in 
determining such industry influence on academic work and the rulemaking 
process, and suggested that the Bureau conduct a thorough investigation 
of all pro-industry studies reviewed or relied upon in connection with 
both NPRMs to ascertain whether there has been any industry influence 
on such purportedly independent work.
    The Bureau issued NPRMs seeking comment on whether it should delay 
the compliance date of the Mandatory Underwriting Provisions as well as 
whether it should rescind those provisions. The Bureau's Director has 
stated multiple times that she has an open mind about the outcome of 
both

[[Page 27920]]

rulemakings.\61\ The Bureau regularly meets with representatives of 
industry, consumer advocacy groups, and other interested stakeholders 
at various points throughout the rulemaking process.\62\ The Bureau 
summarized in the Delay NPRM the information on which it was relying 
that it had received from industry regarding the possible need for a 
delay of the compliance date for the Mandatory Underwriting Provisions, 
thus making that information part of the record and inviting public 
comment on it. As discussed elsewhere in this document, the public has 
used this opportunity to provide the Bureau with extensive and useful 
comments concerning the issues raised in the Delay NPRM.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \61\ See, e.g., Bureau of Consumer Fin. Prot., Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau Releases Notices of Proposed Rulemaking 
on Payday Lending (Feb. 6, 2019), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/consumer-financial-protection-bureau-releases-notices-proposed-rulemaking-payday-lending/ (`` `The Bureau will 
evaluate the comments, weigh the evidence, and then make its 
decision,' said Kathy Kraninger, Director of the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau.'').
    \62\ When these meetings occur while a rulemaking is pending, it 
is the Bureau's policy to disclose the existence and content of such 
meetings that impart information or argument directed to the merits 
or outcome of the rulemaking, consistent with its written policy. 
See Bureau of Consumer Fin. Prot., Policy on Ex Parte Presentations 
in Rulemaking Proceedings, 82 FR 18687 (April 21, 2017).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In its rulemaking proceedings, including those relating to the 2017 
Final Rule and the ongoing reconsideration of the Mandatory 
Underwriting Provisions in that Rule, the Bureau considers a broad 
range of information. Many stakeholders, including members of industry, 
trade associations, consumer advocacy groups, government agencies, and 
others, fund studies bearing on issues relevant to Bureau rulemakings. 
The Bureau conducts its own evaluation and analysis of the data 
presented in these studies, and draws its own conclusions about them. 
The Bureau does not believe that any information (including in media 
reports) it has received or reviewed since the issuance of the 
Reconsideration and Delay NPRMs undercuts the Bureau's preliminary 
determination to reconsider the weight it gave to certain studies (such 
as the Mann Study and Pew Study).
6. Comments Outside the Scope of the Proposal
    As the Bureau indicated in the Delay NPRM, the purpose of that 
document was to seek comment on whether the Bureau should delay the 
August 19, 2019 compliance date for the Mandatory Underwriting 
Provisions. The Bureau did not propose to delay the compliance date for 
the other provisions of the 2017 Final Rule, including the Payment 
Provisions.\63\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \63\ In the Delay NPRM, the Bureau noted that, through its 
efforts to monitor and support industry implementation of the 2017 
Final Rule, it had heard concerns from some stakeholders regarding 
the Rule that were outside of the scope of the proposal. For 
example, the Bureau noted that it had received a rulemaking petition 
to exempt debit card payments from the Rule's Payment Provisions. 
The Bureau has also received informal requests related to various 
aspects of the Payment Provisions or the Rule as a whole, including 
requests to exempt certain types of lenders or loan products from 
the Rule's coverage and to delay the compliance date for the Payment 
Provisions. See 84 FR 4298, 4301.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Nonetheless, many commenters addressed issues related to payments 
or the scope of the Rule more generally in their comment letters. A 
number of commenters, including lenders, trade associations, tribal 
governments, the SBA OA, and others, requested that the Bureau: (1) 
Delay the compliance date for the Payment Provisions or for the Rule as 
a whole; (2) make modifications to the Payment Provisions or revise the 
scope of covered loans or entities to which the Rule applies; and/or 
(3) rescind the entire Rule. In addition, several commenters suggested 
that the Payment Provisions should be reassessed in light of the 
Reconsideration NPRM's proposed approach to unfairness and abusiveness, 
asserting that the Payment Provisions are predicated on the 2017 Final 
Rule's approach to unfairness and abusiveness, which the 
Reconsideration NPRM preliminarily deemed problematic.
    As the Bureau noted in the Delay NPRM, the Bureau intends to 
separately examine these issues and the Bureau will determine whether 
further action is warranted (which may include issuing a request for 
information or an advance notice of proposed rulemaking relating to 
these issues). These comments are outside the scope of this final rule, 
and thus the Bureau is not delaying the compliance date for the Payment 
Provisions or making any of the other requested modifications to the 
Rule.

IV. Legal Authority

    The legal authority for the 2017 Final Rule is described in detail 
in part IV of the SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION accompanying the 2017 Final 
Rule.\64\ That discussion may be referred to for more information about 
the legal authority for this final rule.
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    \64\ 82 FR 54472, 54519-24.
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    The Bureau adopted the Mandatory Underwriting Provisions of the 
2017 Final Rule in principal reliance on the Bureau's authority under 
section 1031(b) of the Dodd-Frank Act to identify and prohibit unfair 
and abusive practices.\65\ Accordingly, in finalizing this rule, the 
Bureau is exercising its authority under Dodd-Frank Act section 1031(b) 
to prescribe rules under Title X of the Dodd-Frank Act.
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    \65\ 12 U.S.C. 5531(b).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition to section 1031 of the Dodd-Frank Act, the Bureau 
relied on other legal authorities for certain aspects of the Mandatory 
Underwriting Provisions in the 2017 Final Rule.\66\ Section 
1022(b)(3)(A) of the Dodd-Frank Act authorizes the Bureau, by rule, to 
conditionally or unconditionally exempt any class of covered persons, 
service providers, or consumer financial products or services from any 
rule issued under Title X, which includes a rule issued under section 
1031, as the Bureau determines is necessary or appropriate to carry out 
the purposes and objectives of Title X.\67\ The Bureau also relied, in 
adopting certain provisions, on its authority under section 1022(b)(1) 
of the Dodd-Frank Act to prescribe rules as may be necessary or 
appropriate to enable the Bureau to administer and carry out the 
purposes and objectives of the Federal consumer financial laws.\68\ The 
term Federal consumer financial law includes rules prescribed under 
Title X of the Dodd-Frank Act, including those prescribed under section 
1031.\69\ Additionally, in the 2017 Final Rule, the Bureau relied, for 
certain provisions, on other authorities, including those in sections 
1021(c)(3), 1022(c)(7), 1024(b)(7), and 1032 of the Dodd-Frank Act.\70\
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    \66\ See 82 FR 54472, 54522.
    \67\ 12 U.S.C. 5512(b)(3)(A).
    \68\ 12 U.S.C. 5512(b)(1). The Bureau also interprets section 
1022(b)(1) of the Dodd-Frank Act as authorizing it to rescind or 
amend a previously issued rule if it determines such rule is not 
necessary or appropriate to enable the Bureau to administer and 
carry out the purposes and objectives of the Federal consumer 
financial laws, including a rule issued to identify and prevent 
unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts or practices.
    \69\ 12 U.S.C. 5481(14).
    \70\ 12 U.S.C. 5511(c)(3), 12 U.S.C. 5512(c)(7), 12 U.S.C. 
5514(b)(7), and 12 U.S.C. 5532.
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    Section 1031 of the Dodd-Frank Act and each of the other legal 
authorities that the Bureau relied upon in the 2017 Final Rule provide 
the Bureau with discretion to issue rules and therefore discretion in 
setting compliance dates for those rules. In the 2017 Final Rule, the 
Bureau stated that the Rule's compliance date was ``structured to 
facilitate an orderly implementation process.'' \71\ In particular, the 
Bureau sought ``to balance giving enough time for an orderly 
implementation period against the interest of enacting protections for 
consumers as soon as

[[Page 27921]]

possible.'' \72\ As discussed above and in the Reconsideration NPRM, 
the Bureau believes that there are strong reasons for rescinding the 
Mandatory Underwriting Provisions of the Rule on the grounds, inter 
alia, that a more robust and reliable evidentiary record is needed to 
support a rule that would have such dramatic impacts on the market, and 
that the findings of an unfair and abusive practice as set out in Sec.  
1041.4 of the 2017 Final Rule rested on applications of the relevant 
standards that the Bureau should no longer use. Thus, the Bureau 
believes that delaying the compliance date would be consistent with the 
``orderly implementation period,'' given that the Bureau has strong 
reasons to rescind the Mandatory Underwriting Provisions.
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    \71\ 82 FR 54472, 54474.
    \72\ Id. at 54814.
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    Moreover, the Bureau concludes, for purposes of this final rule, 
that it should not assign the weight that it did in the 2017 Final Rule 
to ``the interest of enacting protections for consumers as soon as 
possible.'' This is because the Bureau has strong reasons to believe 
that the 2017 Final Rule was not the best application of the statutory 
scheme in section 1031 of the Dodd-Frank Act that is designed to 
protect that interest.
    A trade association commented that the Bureau's authority to delay 
the implementation of the 2017 Final Rule is firmly grounded in section 
1031(b) of the Dodd-Frank Act. The trade association asserted that 
because section 1031(b) provided that the Bureau ``may prescribe 
rules'' identifying unfair, deceptive or abusive acts or practices, 
Congress intended to give the Bureau the discretionary authority to 
decide when such rules should be implemented and when the Bureau should 
enforce compliance with such rules. Further, the commenter claimed that 
the Bureau was right to take the view that it should not assign the 
weight that it did in the 2017 Final Rule to the interest of enacting 
protections for consumers as soon as possible given its preliminary 
findings about the Mandatory Underwriting Provisions of the 2017 Final 
Rule.
    An individual commenter and consumer advocacy groups asserted that 
the Bureau did not have the authority to delay the 2017 Final Rule. An 
individual commenter claimed that the Bureau could not use its 
``discretion'' under section 1031 or other statutory sources as a legal 
authority to delay the compliance date. The individual commenter 
further claimed that the Bureau failed to identify specific legal 
authorities conferred by Congress that would permit the Bureau to delay 
the 2017 Final Rule, absent which the Bureau's proposed delay would be 
arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act. The 
individual commenter claimed that there was no history prior to 2017 
for compliance date delays, other than one identified by the commenter 
that was issued in 2003 by the Office of the Comptroller of Currency, 
which the Bureau did not cite. The individual commenter also asserted 
that the Delay NPRM was arbitrary and capricious because section 705 of 
the Administrative Procedure Act only permits a stay of an existing 
rule pending judicial review if justice so requires, but the litigation 
over the 2017 Final Rule in the Federal district court in Texas did not 
justify such a stay because that case has already been stayed by the 
court. A consumer advocacy group asserted that, by way of analogy, the 
Bureau could not demonstrate under the standard established by section 
705 of the Administrative Procedure Act a likelihood of success on the 
merits if the Reconsideration NPRM were finalized and subject to 
judicial review.
    The Bureau concludes, contrary to the views of some commenters, 
that it has the discretionary authority to delay the 2017 Final Rule. 
Accordingly, the Bureau also agrees with the commenters who argued that 
section 1031(b) of the Dodd-Frank Act confers upon the Bureau the 
authority to reconsider or delay rules that the agency has issued based 
on findings of unfair, deceptive or abusive acts and practices. The 
Bureau further concludes that it properly identified in the Delay NPRM 
the specific legal authorities that it relied on to delay the 2017 
Final Rule; those authorities were identified in the Legal Authorities 
section of the Delay NPRM and are set forth above. Finally, the Bureau 
does not rely on section 705 of the Administrative Procedure Act in 
issuing this rule, and that section is not otherwise relevant to this 
rulemaking.

V. Section-by-Section Analysis

    As discussed above, the 2017 Final Rule became effective on January 
16, 2018, but had a compliance date of August 19, 2019 for Sec. Sec.  
1041.2 through 1041.10, 1041.12, and 1041.13. The Bureau proposed to 
delay the August 19, 2019 compliance date to November 19, 2020 for 
Sec. Sec.  1041.4 through 1041.6, 1041.10, 1041.11, and 
1041.12(b)(1)(i) through (iii) and (b)(2) and (3). Sections 1041.4 
through 1041.6 govern underwriting, with Sec.  1041.4 identifying an 
unfair and abusive practice, Sec.  1041.5 governing the ability-to-
repay determination, and Sec.  1041.6 providing a conditional exemption 
from Sec. Sec.  1041.4 and 1041.5 for certain covered short-term loans. 
Section 1041.10 governs information furnishing requirements and Sec.  
1041.11 addresses RISes.\73\ Section 1041.12 sets forth compliance 
program and record retention requirements, with Sec.  1041.12(b)(1) 
through (3) detailing record retention requirements that are specific 
to the Rule's Mandatory Underwriting Provisions.\74\
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    \73\ The Bureau is not delaying the compliance date for Sec.  
1041.11, as discussed below, because the 2017 Final Rule did not 
provide for an August 19, 2019 compliance date for that section; its 
operative date was January 16, 2018. However, the Bureau is revising 
certain dates that appear in the regulatory text of Sec.  1041.11 to 
reflect the delayed compliance date for the Mandatory Underwriting 
Provisions.
    \74\ In the Reconsideration NPRM, the Bureau proposed to modify 
the introductory text of Sec.  1041.12(b)(1) for clarity as to its 
application to loan agreements for all covered loans, and thus it 
was not listed with the provisions that the Bureau proposed to 
rescind. Since the Bureau is not modifying the introductory text of 
Sec.  1041.12(b)(1) in this final rule, it is included in the list 
of provisions for which the compliance date is delayed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In the Delay NPRM, the Bureau sought comment on whether it had 
identified the appropriate provisions of the 2017 Final Rule as 
constituting the Mandatory Underwriting Provisions for purposes of the 
proposed delay, as well as whether it should amend the Rule's 
regulatory text or commentary to expressly state the delayed compliance 
date for the Mandatory Underwriting Provisions and/or the unchanged 
date for the Payment Provisions.
    Several commenters agreed that the Bureau had identified the 
correct provisions to delay. One commenter requested that the Bureau 
amend the Rule itself to expressly state the delayed compliance date. 
Another commenter, however, argued that there was no reason to change 
the compliance date for Sec.  1041.11, noting that unlike the rest of 
the rule, this section was set to be fully effective and implemented as 
of January 16, 2018 and that it does not impose any mandatory 
implementation costs. The commenter further stated that the Bureau has 
provided no reason it should shutter its own system for processing RIS 
applications, and that if the Bureau stalled the RIS application it 
would suggest the Bureau has prejudged the outcome to the 
Reconsideration NPRM.
    The long-passed January 16, 2018 date for Sec.  1041.11 should not 
be, and is not being, altered. As discussed above, the Bureau proposed 
to delay the August 19, 2019 compliance date for the Mandatory 
Underwriting Provisions; it did not propose to alter any other dates 
associated with those provisions. To avoid any potential confusion, 
however,

[[Page 27922]]

the Bureau is not including Sec.  1041.11 in the various lists that 
appear throughout this document of the sections for which it is 
delaying the compliance date (other than those reiterating language 
used in the Delay NPRM).
    In this final rule, the Bureau is delaying the August 19, 2019 
compliance date to November 19, 2020 for Sec. Sec.  1041.4 through 
1041.6, 1041.10, and 1041.12(b)(1) through (3).\75\ To implement this 
compliance date delay, the Bureau is revising the few instances in the 
regulatory text and commentary where the August 19, 2019 compliance 
date appears. The Bureau is also adding new Sec.  1041.15 to expressly 
state the Rule's effective and compliance dates. In addition, as noted 
above, the Bureau is also making certain corrections to address several 
clerical and non-substantive errors it has identified in the 2017 Final 
Rule, in Sec. Sec.  1041.2(a)(9), 1041.3(e)(2), 1041.9(c)(3)(viii), and 
appendix A.\76\ No substantive change is intended by these corrections.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \75\ The Bureau is not delaying the compliance date for Sec.  
1041.11, as discussed above, because the 2017 Final Rule did not 
provide for an August 19, 2019 compliance date for that section; its 
operative date was January 16, 2018. However, as discussed below, 
the Bureau is revising certain dates that appear in the regulatory 
text of Sec.  1041.11 to reflect the delayed compliance date for the 
Mandatory Underwriting Provisions.
    \76\ Under the Administrative Procedure Act, notice and 
opportunity for public comment are not required if the Bureau for 
good cause finds that notice and public comment are impracticable, 
unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest. 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(B). 
The Bureau is finalizing corrections in Sec. Sec.  1041.2(a)(9), 
1041.3(e)(2), 1041.9(c)(3)(viii), and appendix A without notice and 
public comment because it finds for good cause that seeking public 
comment on them is unnecessary. The corrections are technical in 
nature and have no intended substantive effect. Therefore, these 
amendments are adopted in final form.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Each of these revisions and additions is discussed in turn in the 
section-by-section analyses that follow.

Subpart A--General

Sec.  1041.2 Definitions
    Section 1041.2 provides definitions for the Rule. The term 
``covered person'' is defined in Sec.  1041.2(a)(9). However, that term 
is not used anywhere in the regulatory text or commentary of the Rule. 
The Bureau is thus removing that definition and reserving Sec.  
1041.2(a)(9). No substantive change is intended by this correction.
Sec.  1041.3 Scope of Coverage; Exclusions; Exemptions
    Section 1041.3 addresses the Rule's scope of coverage, as well as 
certain exclusions and exemptions. Section 1041.3(e) provides a 
conditional exemption for alternative loans; Sec.  1041.3(e)(2) 
addresses the borrowing history condition, which is one of several 
conditions and requirements a covered loan must satisfy to qualify as 
an alternative loan. Section 1041.3(e)(2) states that the lender must 
determine from its records that the loan would not result in the 
consumer being indebted on more than three outstanding loans made 
``under this section'' from the lender with a period of 180 days. 
However, that section (Sec.  1041.3) includes exclusions and exemptions 
for a number of other types of loans that are not relevant to the 
conditional exemption for alternative loans. The commentary 
accompanying Sec.  1041.3(e)(2) refers to paragraph (e) rather than the 
entirety of Sec.  1041.3 when discussing the requirements of the 
conditional exemption. The Bureau is thus correcting ``this section'' 
to ``this paragraph (e)(2)'' in the regulatory text of Sec.  
1041.3(e)(2). No substantive change is intended by this correction.

Subpart C--Payments

Sec.  1041.9 Disclosure of Payment Transfer Attempts
    Section 1041.9 requires certain disclosures with respect to payment 
transfer attempts, with Sec.  1041.9(c) addressing the timing, content, 
and electronic delivery requirements for the consumer rights notice 
that a lender must provide after it initiates two consecutive failed 
payment transfers as described in Sec.  1041.8(b). Section 1041.9(c)(3) 
lists the information and statements that the notice must contain, and 
states that the language used must be substantially similar to the 
language set forth in Model Form A-5. Section 1041.9(c)(3)(viii) 
requires a statement that the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 
created this notice, a statement that the CFPB is a Federal government 
agency, and the URL to www.consumerfinance.gov/payday-rule. Model Form 
A-5, however, lists the URL as www.cfpb.gov/payday. To avoid any 
potential confusion as to which URL should be used, the Bureau is 
revising the URL in the regulatory text of Sec.  1041.9(c)(3)(viii) to 
match the URL used in Model Form A-5. No substantive change is intended 
by this correction.

Subpart D--Information Furnishing, Recordkeeping, Anti-Evasion, 
Severability, and Dates

    As discussed below, the Bureau is adding new Sec.  1041.15 to 
explicitly set forth the effective and compliance dates in the Rule 
itself. To reflect that change, the Bureau is adding ``Dates'' to the 
heading for subpart D of the Rule.
Sec.  1041.10 Furnishing Information to Registered Information Systems
    Comment 10(b)-1 addresses provisional registration and registration 
of information systems while a loan is outstanding, and provides an 
example of when a lender is and is not required to furnish information 
to a provisionally-registered information system. That example used 
dates in the year 2020. The Bureau is revising the example to instead 
use dates in 2021, to avoid any potential confusion as to whether and 
when lenders are required to furnish such information given this final 
rule's delay of the compliance date for that requirement.
Sec.  1041.11 Registered Information Systems
    As discussed above, the 2017 Final Rule became effective on January 
16, 2018, though most provisions had a compliance date of August 19, 
2019. The Bureau is not delaying the compliance date for Sec.  1041.11, 
which sets forth requirements regarding RISes, because the 2017 Final 
Rule did not provide for an August 19, 2019 compliance date for that 
section; it became fully effective as of January 16, 2018. However, the 
Bureau is revising the regulatory text and headings in Sec.  1041.11(c) 
introductory text, (c)(1) and (2), (d) introductory text, and 
(d)(1),\77\ and related commentary, to replace August 19, 2019, where 
it appears, with the delayed compliance date of November 19, 2020, as 
those provisions address how registration of information systems is to 
occur before and after compliance with the Mandatory Underwriting 
Provisions of the Rule more generally is required.
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    \77\ Section 1041.11(c)(1) allows the Bureau to preliminarily 
approve an entity as an information system before the compliance 
date. Section 1041.11(c)(2) allows the Bureau to approve the 
application from a preliminarily approved entity to become an RIS 
prior to the compliance date.
    The Bureau is not, however, changing the April 16, 2018 date in 
Sec.  1041.11(c)(3), which was the deadline to submit an application 
for preliminary approval for registration. As noted above, Sec.  
1041.11(c)(3)(iii) permits the Bureau to waive the application 
deadline on a case-by-case basis, and therefore the Bureau does not 
need to modify the existing April 16, 2018 preliminary approval 
date.
    Section 1041.11(d)(1) sets forth the Bureau's process for 
approving and registering entities as information systems on or 
after the compliance date.
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Sec.  1041.15 Effective and Compliance Dates
    The Bureau is adding new Sec.  1041.15 to expressly state the 
effective and compliance dates for various aspects of the Rule. Section 
1041.15(a) provides that the effective date of the Rule is January 16, 
2018, as was stated in the

[[Page 27923]]

Dates section of the 2017 Final Rule.\78\ Section 1041.15(b) provides 
that the deadline to submit an application for preliminary approval for 
registration pursuant to Sec.  1041.11(c)(1) was April 16, 2018; this 
was also stated in the Dates section of the 2017 Final Rule. Section 
1041.15(c) and (d) list the sections that remain with an August 19, 
2019 compliance date and those that are delayed until November 19, 2020 
by this final rule; together, these paragraphs address all the sections 
that were listed in the Dates section of the 2017 Final Rule with an 
August 19, 2019 compliance date. Specifically, Sec.  1041.15(c) 
provides that the compliance date for Sec. Sec.  1041.2, 1041.3, 1041.7 
through 1041.9, 1041.12(a), (b) introductory text, and (b)(4) and (5), 
and 1041.13 is August 19, 2019. Section 1041.15(d) provides that the 
compliance date for Sec. Sec.  1041.4 through 1041.6, 1041.10, and 
1041.12(b)(1) through (3) is November 19, 2020.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \78\ 82 FR 54472.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Appendix A to Part 1041--Model Forms

    The 2017 Final Rule was published, and added to the Code of Federal 
Regulations, without text headings for the model forms and clauses 
contained in appendix A. The Bureau is adding these headings now, using 
the text that appears in the images of the forms and clauses 
themselves. No substantive change is intended by this correction.

VI. Effective and Compliance Dates

    For the reasons set forth herein, the Bureau believes it is 
appropriate to delay the August 19, 2019 compliance date for the 
Mandatory Underwriting Provisions of the 2017 Final Rule--specifically, 
Sec. Sec.  1041.4 through 1041.6, 1041.10, and 1041.12(b)(1) through 
(3)--to November 19, 2020.\79\ This final rule adopting the compliance 
date delay, along with several clarifying corrections to the Rule, will 
become effective 60 days after publication in the Federal Register, 
prior to the previous August 19, 2019 compliance date for the Mandatory 
Underwriting Provisions of the Rule, and consistent with section 553(d) 
of the Administrative Procedure Act \80\ and with section 801(a)(3) of 
the Congressional Review Act.\81\
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    \79\ As discussed above, the Bureau is not changing the 
operative date of January 16, 2018 for Sec.  1041.11.
    \80\ 5 U.S.C. 553(d).
    \81\ 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(3).
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    In the Delay NPRM, the Bureau stated that after considering 
comments received on that proposal, the Bureau intended to publish a 
final rule with respect to the delayed compliance date for the 
Mandatory Underwriting Provisions of the 2017 Final Rule, if warranted. 
The Bureau also stated that any final rule to delay the Rule's 
compliance date for the Mandatory Underwriting Provisions would be 
published and become effective prior to August 19, 2019.
    In response to the Bureau's request for comments on this aspect of 
the Delay NPRM, one commenter agreed that the final rule to delay the 
compliance date should be published and become effective prior to 
August 19, 2019, in order to provide clarity to industry, markets, and 
consumers and to avoid the possibility of piecemeal enforcement or the 
inference that the Bureau has determined not to enforce an existing 
rule. The commenter also stated that it would provide certainty beyond 
the pending litigation's current compliance date stay.
    Another commenter stated that the Bureau should not assume that it 
can finalize a rule in time for it to be published and effective prior 
to August 19, 2019. The commenter argued that the Bureau's review of 
and response to comments should encompass the comments received on the 
Reconsideration NPRM because the Delay NPRM's impact analysis rests on 
the similar analysis in the Reconsideration NPRM. The commenter 
repeated an argument, addressed elsewhere in the preamble to this final 
rule, that the fact that the Reconsideration NPRM is pending does not 
justify a delay, but asserted that if the Bureau seeks to rely on that 
proposal it should address commenters' concerns about it.
    The Bureau believes it was not incorrect to assume that it would be 
able to finalize and publish a compliance date delay final rule in time 
for it to be effective prior to August 19, 2019, as evidenced by the 
fact that it is doing so via this document. The Bureau was aware that 
it would not be able to finalize the Reconsideration NPRM itself by 
that date, however, which is why it proposed the delay and 
reconsideration concurrently in separate documents. As explained above, 
as well as in the Delay NPRM, the purpose of this compliance date delay 
is to permit an orderly conclusion to the Bureau's separate rulemaking 
process to reconsider the Mandatory Underwriting Provisions of the 2017 
Final Rule.

VII. Dodd-Frank Act Section 1022(b)(2) Analysis

A. Overview

    As discussed above, this final rule delays the August 19, 2019 
compliance date for the Mandatory Underwriting Provisions of the 2017 
Final Rule to November 19, 2020. In the Reconsideration NPRM, the 
Bureau considered the impacts of rescinding the Mandatory Underwriting 
Provisions of the 2017 Final Rule. The analysis of the benefits and 
costs to consumers and covered persons required by section 
1022(b)(2)(A) of the Dodd-Frank Act (also referred to as the ``section 
1022(b)(2) analysis'') in part VIII of the Reconsideration NPRM 
outlines the one-time and ongoing benefits and costs of rescinding the 
2017 Final Rule's Mandatory Underwriting Provisions.\82\ As this delay 
of the August 19, 2019 compliance date constitutes a 15-month delay of 
the 2017 Final Rule's compliance date for the Mandatory Underwriting 
Provisions, its impacts are effectively 1.25 years of the annualized, 
ongoing impacts described in the Reconsideration NPRM.\83\ The impacts 
on the one-time costs described in the 2017 Final Rule primarily 
include a delay before covered entities must bear these costs, until no 
later than the new compliance date. As some covered entities may have 
already started to incur some of these one-time costs and others may 
incur the costs in advance of the delayed compliance date, the Bureau 
believes the monetary impact of a delay of the Mandatory Underwriting 
Provisions will have minimal impacts on the eventual costs incurred by 
lenders if the Bureau decides to retain the Mandatory Underwriting 
Provisions.
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    \82\ 84 FR 4252, 4281-95.
    \83\ See 84 FR 4298, 4302.
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    In developing this rule, the Bureau has considered the potential 
benefits, costs, and impacts as required by section 1022(b)(2)(A) of 
the Dodd-Frank Act.\84\ Specifically, section 1022(b)(2)(A) of the 
Dodd-Frank Act calls for the Bureau to consider the potential benefits 
and costs of a regulation to consumers and covered persons, including 
the potential reduction of access by consumers to consumer financial 
products or services, the impact on depository institutions and credit 
unions with $10 billion or less in total assets as described in section 
1026 of the Dodd-Frank Act, and the impact on consumers in rural areas.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \84\ 12 U.S.C. 5512(b)(2)(A).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In the Delay NPRM, the Bureau set forth a preliminary analysis of 
these effects and requested comments that could inform the Bureau's 
analysis of the benefits, costs, and impacts of the proposal. The 
Bureau specifically requested comment on the Delay NPRM's section 
1022(b)(2) analysis as well as submission of additional information 
that could inform the

[[Page 27924]]

Bureau's consideration of the potential benefits, costs, and impacts of 
this rule to delay the August 19, 2019 compliance date of the Mandatory 
Underwriting Provisions of the 2017 Final Rule. In response, the Bureau 
received a number of comments on the topic. The Bureau has consulted 
with the prudential regulators and the Federal Trade Commission, 
including consultation regarding consistency with any prudential, 
market, or systemic objectives administered by such agencies.
1. Description of the Baseline
    In considering the potential benefits, costs, and impacts of this 
rule the Bureau takes the 2017 Final Rule as the baseline, and 
considers economic attributes of the relevant markets as they are 
projected to exist under the 2017 Final Rule with its original August 
19, 2019 compliance date and the existing legal and regulatory 
structures (i.e., those that have been adopted or enacted, even if 
compliance is not currently required) applicable to providers.\85\ This 
is the same baseline used in the Reconsideration NPRM. See part 
VIII.A.4 of the Reconsideration NPRM for a more complete description of 
the baseline.\86\
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    \85\ In addition to the compliance date delay, the Bureau is 
making certain clerical and non-substantive corrections to correct 
several errors it has identified in the 2017 Final Rule in 
Sec. Sec.  1041.2(a)(9), 1041.3(e)(2), 1041.9(c)(3)(viii), and 
appendix A. No substantive change is intended by the corrections 
herein; since these corrections will have no impact on providers or 
consumers, they are not discussed further in this section 1022(b)(2) 
analysis.
    \86\ 84 FR 4252, 4282-84.
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2. Appropriateness of Federal Regulation
    The appropriateness of regulation in this case--i.e., for a delay 
of the compliance date--is discussed in more detail above. In summary, 
first, the Bureau's Reconsideration NPRM, published on February 14, 
2019 in the Federal Register, set forth the Bureau's reasons for 
preliminarily concluding that the Mandatory Underwriting Provisions of 
the 2017 Final Rule should be rescinded. The Bureau is concerned that 
if the August 19, 2019 compliance date for the Mandatory Underwriting 
Provisions is not delayed, firms will expend significant resources and 
incur significant costs to comply with portions of the 2017 Final Rule 
that ultimately may be--and which the Bureau has proposed should be--
rescinded.\87\ The Bureau is likewise concerned that once the August 
19, 2019 compliance date has passed, firms could experience substantial 
revenue disruptions that could impact their ability to stay in business 
while the Bureau is deciding whether to issue a final rule rescinding 
the Mandatory Underwriting Provisions of the 2017 Final Rule. The 
Bureau notes above that some of these impacts, notably, the exit of 
smaller market participants, may be irreversible. A consumer advocacy 
group commented that the Bureau should not rescind an existing rule 
based on lack of evidence to justify that rule, without first making an 
attempt to collect said evidence. The Bureau notes that the 
Reconsideration NPRM sets forth both factual and legal grounds for 
reconsideration, both with respect to the unfairness determination and 
the abusiveness determination, and thus does not rely solely on the 
absence of evidence. Furthermore, the Bureau also notes that ongoing 
market monitoring is part of the Bureau's activities, but that to 
postpone finalizing this compliance date delay in order to collect 
additional evidence, and in so doing allowing compliance with the 2017 
Final Rule's Mandatory Underwriting Provisions to become mandatory, 
would cause substantial revenue and market disruptions.
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    \87\ See 84 FR 4298, 4299, 4303.
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B. Potential Benefits and Costs to Covered Persons and Consumers

    The annualized quantifiable benefits and costs of rescinding the 
Mandatory Underwriting Provisions of the 2017 Final Rule are detailed 
in the section 1022(b)(2) analysis in part VIII.B through D of the 
Reconsideration NPRM. Under this rule to delay the August 19, 2019 
compliance date for the Mandatory Underwriting Provisions, these 
annualized benefits and costs will be realized for a period of 15 
months (1.25 years). Additional, unquantified benefits and costs are 
also described in the Reconsideration NPRM's section 1022(b)(2) 
analysis. Under this rule, these costs and benefits will be realized 
for 15 months (1.25 years).
1. Benefits to Covered Persons and Consumers
    This rule to delay the August 19, 2019 compliance date for the 
Mandatory Underwriting Provisions will delay by 15 months the 
implementation of the underwriting provisions and thus any restrictions 
on consumers' ability to choose to take out covered loans (including 
payday and vehicle title loans) that would be prohibited in the 
baseline. Several commenters, including trade associations and lenders, 
agreed with this characterization of maintained access, argued that 
choice in the market is a benefit for consumers, claimed that available 
alternatives are worse for consumers, and characterized those 
alternatives as more expensive or less regulated. A trade association 
further asserted it would be more costly for consumers to default on 
more traditional credit products. Many consumer advocacy and public 
interest groups, meanwhile, argued this was not a benefit to consumers 
of the delay as access would be maintained for most consumers under the 
2017 Final Rule, alternative products are already offered by banks and 
credit unions, and several small-dollar lenders have begun to offer (or 
have discussed offering) alternative products that would not be covered 
by the Mandatory Underwriting Provisions of the 2017 Final Rule (e.g., 
non-covered installment loans).
    The Bureau notes that it discussed these payday loan alternatives 
and their relative costs in the 2017 Final Rule, and has taken them 
into account in reaching its findings here.\88\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \88\ 82 FR 54472, 54842-46.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Several consumer advocacy groups also commented that extended loan 
sequences should not be considered credit access as they do not 
represent new credit, but the extension of existing loans, and asserted 
that the Bureau did not acknowledge this in the proposal. The Bureau 
disagrees that it fails to account for this; the analysis here, as well 
as in the Reconsideration NPRM and in the 2017 Final Rule, focuses on 
sequence lengths that treat reborrowing as part of a dynamic 
decision.\89\ The Bureau agrees that most consumers would maintain 
access to payday loans in the absence of the delay; however, as 
outlined in the 2017 Final Rule, the Bureau's simulations suggest that 
5.9 to 6.2 percent of borrowers would be unable to initiate a loan 
sequence they would choose without the delay.\90\ Additionally, the 
Bureau noted that a larger share of vehicle title borrowers would be 
unable to initiate a loan under the 2017 Final Rule relative to payday 
borrowers, and that some of these consumers would be unable to obtain a 
payday loan as a substitute.\91\ A few consumer advocacy groups also 
argued that the Bureau contradicted itself by finding that the 2017 
Final Rule would result in reduced access but still concluding that the 
rule would be a net benefit for consumers, while it now treats access 
as a benefit to consumers. Access to credit itself is treated as a 
benefit in both the 2017 Final Rule and

[[Page 27925]]

here, and the Bureau discusses the resulting costs from prolonged use 
of this credit separately in the section that follows.\92\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \89\ The Rule defines a loan as being part of a sequence if it 
is taken out within 30 days of a prior loan being paid off. 12 CFR 
1041.2(a)(14).
    \90\ 82 FR 54472, 54839.
    \91\ Id. at 54840.
    \92\ Id. at 54817-18, 54839-43.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    This rule will also delay the decrease in the revenues of payday 
lenders anticipated in the 2017 Final Rule (62 to 68 percent) by 15 
months, resulting in an estimated increase in revenues of between $4.25 
billion and $4.5 billion (based on the annual rate of $3.4 billion and 
$3.6 billion) relative to the baseline. A similar delay in the 
reduction in the revenues of vehicle title lenders will result in an 
estimated increase in revenues relative to the baseline of between $4.9 
billion and $5.1 billion (based on the annual rate of $3.9 billion to 
$4.1 billion).\93\ The rule will also cause a small but potentially 
quantifiable delay in the additional transportation costs borrowers 
would incur to get to lenders after the storefront closures expected in 
response to the 2017 Final Rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \93\ These values are not discounted, as they would begin being 
realized immediately, and annualized discounting over such a small 
horizon would have a minimal impact.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Bureau notes that these estimates are based on simulations that 
assume at least one RIS will exist in the market, allowing payday 
lenders to issue loans under the principal step-down approach.\94\ The 
Bureau still believes this is the most likely case in the steady-state 
equilibrium. However, in the case where there would not be an RIS in 
place at the 2017 Final Rule's compliance date, and the principal step-
down approach would not be available on the compliance date, then the 
estimated decrease in payday loans and revenues under the Mandatory 
Underwriting Provisions would be more severe. For example, the 2017 
Final Rule estimates a decrease in payday loan volumes of 92 to 93 
percent in a regime where all loans are subject to the prescribed 
ability-to-repay underwriting of Sec.  1041.5.\95\ If no RIS will exist 
on the 2017 Final Rule's compliance date this rule will at least 
delay--and to the extent it allows at least one RIS to enter the 
market, avoid--substantially larger decreases in revenues for payday 
lenders, while preserving substantially greater access to this type of 
credit for consumers.\96\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \94\ 82 FR 54472, 54826.
    \95\ Id. at 54826.
    \96\ It is also possible that this increased access would be on 
average more beneficial to consumers, compared to the access this 
rule would preserve if the principal step-down approach would be 
available on the compliance date. This is because the evidence 
suggests short-term use of loans, and or loans taken in response to 
discrete needs may be welfare enhancing for consumers on average. 
The principal step-down approach largely ensured access to such 
loans in the 2017 Final Rule. However, this rule would better ensure 
access to such loans if the principal step-down approach were 
somehow infeasible.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Multiple consumer advocacy groups commented that benefits to payday 
lenders are overstated because the Bureau's cost estimates from the 
2017 Final Rule did not account for lenders making changes to the terms 
of their loans to better fit the regulatory structure, or offering 
other products. The Bureau notes that this would fall under ``changes 
to the profitability and industry structure that would have occurred in 
response to the 2017 Final Rule'' discussed in part VII.B.3 below. One 
payday lender commented that the benefits of delay to payday lenders 
are understated, because the estimates from the 2017 Final Rule did not 
account for business closures resulting in complete revenue loss. The 
Bureau disagrees because the estimated revenue reductions cited are for 
the industry as a whole and the Bureau noted in the 2017 Final Rule 
that some lenders would likely exit as a result of decreased 
revenues.\97\ Additionally, the Bureau's estimates are consistent with 
two industry comments citing three separate studies, as discussed in 
the 2017 Final Rule.\98\ Similarly, a trade association claimed the 
revenue reduction would be higher than estimated in the 2017 Final Rule 
because the analysis did not account for consumers with the ability to 
repay being unable to demonstrate their ability under the mandated 
requirements, but the trade association did not cite any evidence or 
give further detail explaining this assertion. In the 2017 Final Rule, 
the Bureau allowed for reasonable steps to establish the ability to 
repay (including using estimates and lenders' prior experience with 
other customers) while also noting that the estimated share of 
borrowers who would qualify under the ability-to-repay provisions was 
``necessarily imprecise'' given the available data.\99\ At the same 
time, the Bureau notes its estimates were in line with estimates using 
information provided by industry in comments to the 2016 Proposal.\100\ 
If the commenters were correct in asserting that the Bureau's estimates 
of these impacts are low, that would strengthen the Bureau's reasoning 
for postponing the compliance date. However, the Bureau does not 
believe this is the case, and is not relying on the assertions in those 
comments for its determination.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \97\ Further, the cited revenue decreases were for the 
simulation with no step-down approach loans. The Bureau estimated 
that with step-down approach loans included the effect of the 2017 
Final Rule would most likely result in revenue decreases of 37 to 48 
percent.
    \98\ 82 FR 54472, 54826-27.
    \99\ Id. at 54824-25.
    \100\ Id. at 54831-33.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Costs to Covered Persons and Consumers
    The Reconsideration NPRM's section 1022(b)(2) analysis also 
discusses the ongoing costs facing consumers that result from extended 
payday loan sequences at part VIII.B through D. The available evidence 
suggests that, relative to the baseline in which compliance became 
mandatory, the Rule would impose potential costs on consumers by 
increasing the risks of: Experiencing costs associated with extended 
unanticipated sequences of payday loans and single-payment vehicle 
title loans, experiencing the costs (pecuniary and non-pecuniary) of 
delinquency and default on these loans, defaulting on other major 
financial obligations, and/or being unable to cover basic living 
expenses in order to pay off covered short-term and longer-term 
balloon-payment loans.\101\ Relative to the baseline where the 2017 
Final Rule's compliance date is unaltered, these costs will be 
maintained for 15 additional months under this rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \101\ As mentioned in the Reconsideration NPRM's section 
1022(b)(2) analysis, the effects associated with longer-term 
balloon-payment loans are likely to be small relative to the effects 
associated with short-term payday and vehicle title loans. This is 
because longer-term balloon-payment loans are uncommon in the 
baseline against which costs are measured. 84 FR 4252, 4290 n.351.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Several consumer advocacy groups commented that certain of these 
costs would continue for more than 15 months and the effects may be 
long-lasting for some consumers. The Bureau recognizes that some costs 
resulting from loan sequences begun during the 15-month delay may occur 
after November 19, 2020. The Bureau notes these costs are already 
included, and accounted for, in the baseline. Specifically, there would 
have been similar costs associated with loans originated prior to the 
2017 Final Rule's compliance date that extended beyond that date, and 
that rule's section 1022(b)(2) analysis accounted for these extended 
costs. These same extended costs will result after this rule's delayed 
compliance date, and are thus accounted for in the baseline, and do not 
represent an additional impact on the market by this delay final rule. 
The Bureau also notes that there are costs resulting from loan 
sequences that began prior to the 15-month delay that occur during the 
15-month period of time, and that these costs are included in this 
estimate. This is consistent with

[[Page 27926]]

the approach used throughout this section 1022(b)(2) analysis, which 
symmetrically assesses the costs and benefits resulting directly from 
the 15-month delay only (and does not account for costs and benefits 
already present in the baseline). A number of consumer advocacy groups 
argued the revenue that lenders would receive under the delay would 
come from fees paid by consumers and would simply represent a transfer 
from consumers to lenders and should, therefore, be treated as a cost 
to consumers. As in the section 1022(b)(2) analysis of the 2017 Final 
Rule, the Bureau does not double-count such transfers; lenders will 
receive additional revenue as a result of the delay and consumers will 
pay additional fees in exchange for the use of payday loans. A trade 
association commented that the Bureau's estimated costs to consumers 
are too high because the Bureau never established that consumers are 
harmed by extended loan sequences, did not consider the benefits of 
these loan sequences for consumers, and ignored the set of alternatives 
consumers would have in the absence of payday loans. They further 
argued that consumers use these loans strategically and cite the Mann 
Study as evidence that borrowers know what they are getting into with 
an extended loan sequence.\102\ The Bureau notes that in the context of 
the 2017 Final Rule it discussed the benefits to consumers from 
extended loan sequences and commenters provided no new or additional 
evidence of such benefits.\103\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \102\ See Ronald Mann, Assessing the Optimism of Payday Loan 
Borrowers, 21 Supreme Court Econ. Rev. 105, at 123 (2013).
    \103\ 82 FR 54472, 54841-42.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Other Benefits and Costs
    Other benefits and costs that the Bureau did not quantify are 
discussed in the Reconsideration NPRM's section 1022(b)(2) analysis in 
part VIII.E. These include (but are not limited to): The consumer 
welfare impacts associated with increased access to vehicle title 
loans; intrinsic utility (``warm glow'') from access to loans that are 
not used (and that would not be available under the 2017 Final Rule); 
innovative regulatory approaches by States that would have been 
discouraged by the 2017 Final Rule; public and private health costs 
that may or may not result from payday loan use; changes to the 
profitability and industry structure that would have occurred in 
response to the 2017 Final Rule (e.g., industry consolidation that may 
create scale efficiencies, movement to installment product offerings); 
concerns about regulatory uncertainty and/or inconsistent regulatory 
regimes across markets; benefits or costs to outside parties associated 
with the change in access to payday loans; indirect costs arising from 
increased repossessions of vehicles in response to non-payment of 
vehicle title loans; non-pecuniary costs associated with financial 
stress that may be alleviated or exacerbated by increased access to/use 
of payday loans; and any impacts of fraud perpetrated on lenders and 
opacity as to borrower behavior and history related to a lack of 
industry-wide RISes (e.g., borrowers circumventing lender policies 
against taking multiple concurrent payday loans, lenders having more 
difficulty identifying chronic defaulters, etc.). Each of these 
potential impacts is discussed in the section 1022(b)(2) analysis for 
the 2017 Final Rule and the section 1022(b)(2) analysis of the 
Reconsideration NPRM. To the extent that these impacts actually exist, 
they would continue under this rule for the 15-month delay of the 
compliance date for the 2017 Final Rule's Mandatory Underwriting 
Provisions.
    A consumer advocacy group claimed the Bureau offered vague, 
``unquantified effects'' in the Delay NPRM with little information on 
the importance of these effects in considering the impact. To the 
extent that data are available, the Bureau attempted to quantify these 
effects but notes that there is limited research on most of these 
effects other than what it discussed in the 2017 Final Rule. An 
independent research and advocacy group argued the delay will reduce 
the effect of regulatory uncertainty (e.g., by reducing investment) 
because many lenders will not implement changes to comply with the 2017 
Final Rule given that it may be changed. While the Bureau agrees this 
delay will have some impact on regulatory uncertainty, it does not have 
evidence of what the effects will be, especially given the pending 
status of the Reconsideration NPRM, which may ultimately decrease, 
increase, or have no effect on the compliance costs lenders will face. 
A trade association claimed the Bureau failed to consider the cost to 
consumer privacy. The Bureau notes that any risks to consumer privacy 
are delayed but otherwise are unaffected by this delay final rule. The 
Bureau also notes that it did discuss privacy concerns relating to 
consumers providing lenders with additional financial information to 
comply with the 2017 Final Rule (though the Bureau knows of no 
available data that can be used to directly estimate the cost to 
consumers of providing this information). Multiple consumer advocacy 
groups argued the estimated costs of the delay are higher since the 
Bureau ignored the cost of increased auto repossession under the delay. 
The Bureau notes that vehicle repossession was explicitly considered in 
the potential costs to consumers of the delay above and in the section 
1022(b)(2) analysis of the 2017 Final Rule.\104\ Some commenters 
asserted that the Bureau failed to consider emotional or psychological 
harms to consumers due to the delay of the rule. While consumers might 
face such non-pecuniary harms from this rule, most of these harms have 
not been causally linked to the use of payday or title loans, let alone 
ones issued without ability-to-repay-based underwriting, so there does 
not appear to be compelling evidence that the delay of the rule will 
cause such harms.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \104\ 82 FR 54472, 54839.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Bureau does not believe the one-time benefits and costs 
described in the Reconsideration NPRM will be substantially affected by 
this rule to delay the August 19, 2019 compliance date for the 
Mandatory Underwriting Provisions. In effect, this rule will provide 
institutions greater flexibility in when and how to deal with the 
burdens of the 2017 Final Rule's Mandatory Underwriting Provisions if 
the Bureau retains those provisions in the reconsideration rulemaking. 
Some firms may have already undertaken some of the compliance costs, 
meaning this rule delaying the compliance date will not allow lenders 
to recoup these sunk costs. With the delayed compliance date for the 
Mandatory Underwriting Provisions, others may use the additional time 
to install the necessary systems and processes to comply with the 2017 
Final Rule in a more efficient manner. Quantifying the value of this 
more flexible timeline is impossible, as it depends on, among other 
things, each firm's idiosyncratic capacities and opportunity costs. 
However, it is likely that this flexibility will be of relatively 
greater benefit to smaller entities with more limited resources. A 
trade association offered its support for the Bureau's claim that the 
delay will primarily shift compliance costs for lenders and suggested 
that some lenders may further reduce their costs if they use the 
additional time to flexibly implement changes. An independent research 
and advocacy group likewise supported the delay to reduce compliance 
costs, but further argued that these costs would be passed on to 
consumers. As the Bureau discussed in the 2017 Final Rule, standard 
economic

[[Page 27927]]

theory does predict such costs would be shared with or passed on to 
consumers; however, ``many covered loans are being made at prices equal 
to caps that are set by State law or State regulation'' so lenders 
would have been unable to pass on such costs in a number of 
States.\105\ As a result, while this rule will delay when lenders incur 
these compliance costs, it should not cause prices already at State 
caps to fall below those caps as those caps were unchanged by the 2017 
Final Rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \105\ 82 FR 54472, 54834-35.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Bureau expects, however, that with the delayed compliance date 
for the Mandatory Underwriting Provisions, most firms will simply delay 
incurring some or all of the costs of coming into compliance. The delay 
of 15 months will effectively reduce the one-time benefits and costs by 
1.25 years of their discount rate.\106\ While these firms will 
experience potentially quantifiable benefits, the Bureau cannot know 
what proportion of the firms will adopt any of the strategies described 
above, let alone the discounting values or strategies unique to each 
firm. For a 15-month delay, the discounting of the one-time benefits 
and costs is likely to be less than 3 percent of the value of those 
benefits and costs.\107\ As such, the Bureau believes the one-time 
benefits and costs of this rule are minimal, relative to the other 
benefits and costs described above.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \106\ Over and above this inflationary discounting, it is also 
possible that the finalized delay will result in a decrease in the 
nominal technology costs associated with compliance, as technology 
costs are generally declining. However, given the relatively short 
horizon and relatively mature technology required for compliance 
(e.g., electronic storage, database management software, etc.), this 
decrease in nominal costs is expected to be minimal.
    \107\ The 3 percent value assumes a discounting of 2.38 percent 
(the Effective Federal Funds rate as of June 4, 2019) for 1.25 
years. This implicitly assumes all firms would undertake the 
necessary actions immediately in the absence of this rule, and would 
delay those actions for the full 15 months once the rule is adopted. 
The true value will likely be substantially less than this, as many 
firms will not delay by the full duration, and/or have already 
undertaken the actions that will result in the benefits or costs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

C. Potential Impact on Depository Creditors With $10 Billion or Less in 
Total Assets

    The Bureau believes that depository institutions and credit unions 
with less than $10 billion in assets were minimally constrained by the 
2017 Final Rule's Mandatory Underwriting Provisions. To the limited 
extent depository institutions and credit unions do make loans in this 
market, many of those loans are conditionally exempt from the 2017 
Final Rule under Sec.  1041.3(e) or (f) as alternative or accommodation 
loans. As such, this rule will likewise have minimal impact on these 
institutions.
    The Reconsideration NPRM notes that it is possible that a 
revocation of the 2017 Final Rule's Mandatory Underwriting Provisions 
would allow depository institutions and credit unions with less than 
$10 billion in assets to develop products that would not be viable 
under the 2017 Final Rule (subject to applicable Federal and State laws 
and under the supervision of their prudential regulators). Given that 
development of these products has been underway, and takes a 
significant amount of time, and that this rule's delay does not affect 
such products' longer-term viability, this rule will have minimal 
effect on these products and institutions.

D. Potential Impact on Consumers in Rural Areas

    The Bureau concludes that delaying the compliance date will not 
reduce consumer access to consumer financial products and services, and 
it may increase all consumers' access by delaying the point at which 
covered firms implement changes to comply with the 2017 Final Rule's 
Mandatory Underwriting Provisions. Under the rule, consumers in rural 
areas will have a greater increase in the availability of covered 
short-term and longer-term balloon-payment loans originated through 
storefronts relative to consumers living in non-rural areas. As 
described in more detail in the Reconsideration NPRM's section 
1022(b)(2) analysis, the Bureau estimates that removing the 
restrictions in the 2017 Final Rule on making these loans would likely 
lead to a substantial increase in the markets for storefront payday 
lenders and storefront single-payment vehicle title loans. By delaying 
the August 19, 2019 compliance date for the Mandatory Underwriting 
Provisions, the Bureau similarly anticipates a substantial increase in 
those markets relative to the baseline for the duration of the delay. A 
trade association suggested the Bureau did not fully consider the 
impact for consumers in rural areas. The Bureau disagrees as it 
discussed differential impacts for rural consumers especially in regard 
to costs from changes in geographic availability of payday loans in the 
2017 Final Rule and as referenced above.

VIII. Regulatory Flexibility Act

    The Regulatory Flexibility Act \108\ as amended by the Small 
Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996 \109\ (RFA) 
requires each agency to consider the potential impact of its 
regulations on small entities, including small businesses, small 
governmental units, and small not-for-profit organizations.\110\ The 
RFA defines a ``small business'' as a business that meets the size 
standard developed by the Small Business Administration (SBA) pursuant 
to the Small Business Act.\111\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \108\ Public Law 96-354, 94 Stat. 1164 (1980).
    \109\ Public Law 104-21, section 241, 110 Stat. 847, 864-65 
(1996).
    \110\ 5 U.S.C. 601 through 612. The term `` `small organization' 
means any not-for-profit enterprise which is independently owned and 
operated and is not dominant in its field, unless an agency 
establishes [an alternative definition under notice and comment].'' 
5 U.S.C. 601(4). The term `` `small governmental jurisdiction' means 
governments of cities, counties, towns, townships, villages, school 
districts, or special districts, with a population of less than 
fifty thousand, unless an agency establishes [an alternative 
definition after notice and comment].'' 5 U.S.C. 601(5).
    \111\ 5 U.S.C. 601(3). The Bureau may establish an alternative 
definition after consulting with the SBA and providing an 
opportunity for public comment. Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The RFA generally requires an agency to conduct an initial 
regulatory flexibility analysis (IRFA) and a final regulatory 
flexibility analysis (FRFA) of any rule subject to notice-and-comment 
rulemaking requirements, unless the agency certifies that the rule 
would not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of 
small entities.\112\ The Bureau also is subject to certain additional 
procedures under the RFA involving the convening of a panel to consult 
with small entity representatives prior to proposing a rule for which 
an IRFA is required.\113\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \112\ 5 U.S.C. 601 through 612.
    \113\ 5 U.S.C. 609.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Bureau certified that the Delay NPRM would not have a 
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities 
and that therefore neither an IRFA nor a small business review panel 
was required.\114\ Upon considering relevant comments, the Bureau 
concludes that this rule will not have a significant economic impact on 
a substantial number of small entities. Therefore, a FRFA is not 
required.\115\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \114\ 84 FR 4298, 4305.
    \115\ See 5 U.S.C. 605(b).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In the Delay NPRM, the Bureau explained that the proposed 
compliance date delay would benefit small entities by providing 
additional flexibility with respect to the timing of the 2017 Final 
Rule's Mandatory Underwriting Provisions' implementation. In addition 
to generally providing increased flexibility, the delay in the 
compliance date would permit small entities to delay the commencement 
of any

[[Page 27928]]

ongoing costs that result from complying with the Mandatory 
Underwriting Provisions of the 2017 Final Rule. The Bureau also 
explained that because small entities would retain the option of coming 
into compliance with the Mandatory Underwriting Provisions on the 
original August 19, 2019 compliance date, the proposed delay of the 
compliance date would not increase costs incurred by small entities 
relative to the baseline established by the 2017 Final Rule. Based on 
these considerations, the Bureau concluded that the Delay NPRM would 
not have a significant economic impact on any small entities.
    A trade association commenter stated that it agreed with the Bureau 
that the proposed compliance date delay would not have a significant 
economic impact on small entities, but rather would significantly 
benefit them, reiterating the argument that the Mandatory Underwriting 
Provisions, if implemented, will have a devastating impact on the 
industry, particularly on smaller entities. The commenter also agreed 
that because small entities retain the option of coming into compliance 
with the Mandatory Underwriting Provisions on the original August 19, 
2019 compliance date, a compliance date delay would not increase the 
costs incurred by small entities.
    Other commenters criticized the Bureau's RFA certification on the 
grounds that various benefits to small entities from delay were 
described elsewhere in the Delay NPRM, and these commenters viewed such 
benefits as qualifying as a significant economic impact on a 
substantial number of small entities. Specifically, one commenter noted 
that the Bureau had explained elsewhere in the Delay NPRM that some 
small lenders believe the Mandatory Underwriting Provisions will 
significantly reduce their lending revenue, causing some to exit the 
market, and that some smaller industry participants had indicated that 
they do not have the resources to comply with new State and Federal 
requirements at the same time.\116\ Another commenter perceived the 
Delay NPRM's RFA certification as asserting that the benefit to small 
entities was primarily a timing change, while earlier portions of the 
NPRM estimate that a delay would result in concrete revenue gains for 
lenders. This commenter also perceived the RFA certification as relying 
upon a prediction that small entities would voluntarily adopt the 
Mandatory Underwriting Provisions, which the commenter viewed as 
contradicted by the rest of the Delay NPRM.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \116\ As discussed above, the Bureau is not finalizing the 
compliance date delay on the grounds of unanticipated potential 
obstacles to compliance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Bureau does not agree that the benefits to small entities of 
this rule are capable of qualifying as a ``significant economic 
impact'' on a substantial number of small entities such that an IRFA 
and FRFA are required under the RFA.\117\ That specific phrase is used 
several times in the RFA, and under accepted principles of statutory 
interpretation there is a presumption that a specific phrase bears the 
same meaning throughout a statutory text. Other uses of the phrase make 
clear that it refers to adverse effects on small entities, not 
benefits. For example, an IRFA must discuss alternatives considered by 
the agency that ``minimize any significant economic impact'' on small 
entities, and a FRFA must discuss steps taken by the agency to 
``minimize the significant economic impact'' on small entities.\118\ 
Congress could not have intended through the RFA to minimize benefits 
to small entities, and accordingly the Bureau does not believe that the 
benefits of this rule qualify as a significant economic impact. Further 
reinforcing this conclusion, the other required elements of an IRFA and 
FRFA generally focus on adverse effects on small entities, and none 
specifically focuses on benefits to small entities.\119\ Thus, 
performing an IRFA or FRFA for a rule (such as this compliance date 
delay rule) that has only benefits to small entities and no adverse 
effects on them would serve little purpose.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \117\ 5 U.S.C. 605(b).
    \118\ 5 U.S.C. 603(c), 604(a)(6). See also 5 U.S.C. 610(a) 
(Periodic review of rules); Public Law 96-354, section 2(a)(7), 94 
Stat. 1164 (1980) (Congressional findings).
    \119\ See 5 U.S.C. 603, 604.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Clerical and non-substantive corrections. In addition to the 
compliance date delay, the Bureau is making certain clerical and non-
substantive corrections to correct several errors it has identified in 
the 2017 Final Rule in Sec. Sec.  1041.2(a)(9), 1041.3(e)(2), 
1041.9(c)(3)(viii), and appendix A. No substantive change is intended 
by the corrections herein, and so these corrections will have no impact 
on small entities.
    Certification. Accordingly, the undersigned hereby certifies that 
this final rule will not have a significant economic impact on a 
substantial number of small entities.

IX. Paperwork Reduction Act

    Under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (PRA),\120\ Federal 
agencies are generally required to seek Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB) approval for information collection requirements prior to 
implementation. Under the PRA, the Bureau may not conduct or sponsor 
and, notwithstanding any other provision of law, a person is not 
required to respond to an information collection unless the information 
collection displays a valid control number assigned by OMB. The 
collections of information related to the 2017 Final Rule were 
previously submitted to OMB in accordance with the PRA and assigned OMB 
Control Number 3170-0065 for tracking purposes; however, this control 
number is not yet active as OMB has not approved this information 
collection request. In addition, given the Bureau's proposals to delay 
and reconsider the Mandatory Underwriting Provisions, pursuant to the 
requirements of the PRA and the applicable implementing 
regulations,\121\ OMB requested that the Bureau make an additional 
submission relating to just the Payment Provisions of the Rule; as of 
June 5, 2019, an OMB Control Number has not been assigned for this 
request.\122\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \120\ 44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.
    \121\ 44 U.S.C. 3504(h) and 5 CFR 1320.11.
    \122\ See https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/PRAViewICR?ref_nbr=201902-3170-002.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Bureau has determined that this final rule would not impose any 
new recordkeeping, reporting, or disclosure requirements on members of 
the public that would constitute collections of information requiring 
approval under the PRA.
    A consumer advocacy group commenter stated that the Delay NPRM did 
not explain the statement (also included herein, above) that the Bureau 
considers the OMB Control Number assigned to the 2017 Final Rule to be 
``not yet active'' because OMB has not approved the PRA request 
submitted with the Rule. The commenter noted that January 16, 2018 was 
the statutory deadline for OMB to decide on the PRA request associated 
with the 2017 Final Rule and asserted that the Director of OMB declined 
to make a decision about that PRA request, with no announcement about 
that decision, his reasoning, or its impact. The commenter also noted 
that OMB regulations allow agencies to proceed with PRA collections, 
based on inferred OMB approval, if OMB does not act upon the agency's 
submission within 60 days of a final rule being published in the 
Federal Register.\123\ The commenter suggested that the Bureau was 
using the lack of PRA approval and OMB's inaction as an alternative 
justification

[[Page 27929]]

for delaying the Mandatory Underwriting Provisions. The commenter noted 
that the lack of OMB approval under the PRA affects not only the 
Mandatory Underwriting Provisions but also the Payment Provisions, 
which have a compliance date of August 19, 2019. The commenter asserted 
that a clear explanation of the Bureau's approach with respect to these 
issues is needed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \123\ 5 CFR 1320.5(a)(2), 1320.12(e)(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Bureau is not relying on the lack of OMB approval under the PRA 
as a justification for this delay final rule; it was not cited in the 
Delay NPRM as such, nor is it cited herein. The Bureau does not have 
control over OMB's timing for approval of pending Information 
Collection Requests or issuance of OMB Control Numbers.

X. Congressional Review Act

    Pursuant to the Congressional Review Act,\124\ the Bureau will 
submit a report containing this rule and other required information to 
the U.S. Senate, the U.S. House of Representatives, and the Comptroller 
General of the United States at least 60 days prior to the rule's 
published effective date. The Office of Information and Regulatory 
Affairs has designated this rule as a ``major rule'' as defined by 5 
U.S.C. 804(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \124\ 5 U.S.C. 801 et seq.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

List of Subjects in 12 CFR Part 1041

    Banks, Banking, Consumer protection, Credit, Credit Unions, 
National banks, Registration, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, 
Savings associations, Trade practices.

Authority and Issuance

    For the reasons set forth above, the Bureau amends 12 CFR part 1041 
as set forth below:

PART 1041--PAYDAY, VEHICLE TITLE, AND CERTAIN HIGH-COST INSTALLMENT 
LOANS

0
1. The authority citation for part 1041 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 12 U.S.C. 5511, 5512, 5514(b), 5531(b), (c), and (d), 
5532.

Subpart A--General


Sec.  1041.2   [Amended]

0
2. Amend Sec.  1041.2 by removing and reserving paragraph (a)(9).


Sec.  1041.3   [Amended]

0
3. Amend Sec.  1041.3 by removing ``section'' and adding in its place 
``paragraph (e)'' in paragraph (e)(2).

Subpart C--Payments


Sec.  1041.9   [Amended]

0
4. Amend Sec.  1041.9 by removing ``www.consumerfinance.gov/payday-rule'' and adding in its place ``www.cfpb.gov/payday'' in paragraph 
(c)(3)(viii).

0
5. Revise the heading for subpart D to read as follows:

Subpart D--Information Furnishing, Recordkeeping, Anti-Evasion, 
Severability, and Dates


Sec.  1041.11   [Amended]

0
6. Amend Sec.  1041.11 by removing ``August 19, 2019'' everywhere it 
appears and adding in its place ``November 19, 2020'' in paragraphs (c) 
and (d).

0
7. Add Sec.  1041.15 as follows:


Sec.  1041.15   Effective and compliance dates.

    (a) Effective date. The effective date of this part is January 16, 
2018.
    (b) April 16, 2018 application deadline. The deadline to submit an 
application for preliminary approval for registration pursuant to Sec.  
1041.11(c)(1) is April 16, 2018.
    (c) August 19, 2019 compliance date. The compliance date for 
Sec. Sec.  1041.2, 1041.3, 1041.7 through 1041.9, 1041.12(a), (b) 
introductory text and (b)(4) and (5), and 1041.13 is August 19, 2019.
    (d) November 19, 2020 compliance date. The compliance date for 
Sec. Sec.  1041.4 through 1041.6, 1041.10, and 1041.12(b)(1) through 
(3) is November 19, 2020.

Appendix A to Part 1041--Model Forms

0
8. In appendix A to part 1041, add headings for Model Forms and Clauses 
A-1 through A-8 to read as follows:

A-1 Model Form for First Sec.  1041.6 Loan

* * * * *

A-2 Model Form for Third Sec.  1041.6 Loan

* * * * *

A-3 Model Form for First Payment Withdrawal Notice Under Sec.  
1041.9(b)(2)

* * * * *

A-4 Model Form for Unusual Withdrawal Notice Under Sec.  1041.9(b)(3)

* * * * *

A-5 Model Form for Consumer Rights Notice Under Sec.  1041.9(c)

* * * * *

A-6 Model Clause for First Payment Withdrawal Electronic Short Notice 
Under Sec.  1041.9(b)(4)

* * * * *

A-7 Model Clause for Unusual Withdrawal Electronic Short Notice Under 
Sec.  1041.9(c)(4)(ii)(B)

* * * * *

A-8 Model Clause for Consumer Rights Electronic Short Notice Under 
Sec.  1041.9(c)(4)

* * * * *

0
9. In supplement I to part 1041:
0
a. Under Section 1041.10--Furnishing Information to Registered 
Information Systems, revise 10(b) Information Systems to Which 
Information Must Be Furnished.
0
b. Under Section 1041.11--Registered Information Systems, revise the 
headings for subsections 11(c) and 11(d).
    The revisions and addition read as follows:

Supplement I to Part 1041--Official Interpretations

* * * * *

Section 1041.10--Furnishing Information to Registered Information 
Systems

* * * * *
10(b) Information Systems to Which Information Must Be Furnished
    1. Provisional registration and registration of information system 
while loan is outstanding. Pursuant to Sec.  1041.10(b)(1), a lender is 
only required to furnish information about a covered loan to an 
information system that, at the time the loan is consummated, has been 
registered pursuant to Sec.  1041.11(c)(2) for 180 days or more or has 
been provisionally registered pursuant to Sec.  1041.11(d)(1) for 180 
days or more or subsequently has become registered pursuant to Sec.  
1041.11(d)(2). For example, if an information system is provisionally 
registered on March 1, 2021, the obligation to furnish information to 
that system begins on August 28, 2021, 180 days from the date of 
provisional registration. A lender is not required to furnish 
information about a loan consummated on August 27, 2021 to an 
information system that became provisionally registered on March 1, 
2021.
    2. Preliminary approval. Section 1041.10(b) requires that lenders 
furnish information to information systems that are provisionally 
registered pursuant to Sec.  1041.11(d)(1) and information systems that 
are registered pursuant to Sec.  1041.11(c)(2) or (d)(2). Lenders are 
not

[[Page 27930]]

required to furnish information to entities that have received 
preliminary approval for registration pursuant to Sec.  1041.11(c)(1) 
but are not registered pursuant to Sec.  1041.11(c)(2).
* * * * *

Section 1041.11--Registered Information Systems

* * * * *
11(c) Registration of Information Systems Prior to November 19, 2020
* * * * *
11(d) Registration of Information Systems On or After November 19, 2020
* * * * *

    Dated: June 5, 2019.
Kathleen L. Kraninger,
Director, Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection.
[FR Doc. 2019-12307 Filed 6-14-19; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4810-AM-P