[Federal Register Volume 84, Number 113 (Wednesday, June 12, 2019)]
[Notices]
[Pages 27367-27372]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2019-12324]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50-412; NRC-2019-0122]


FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company; Beaver Valley Power 
Station, Unit 2

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Exemption; issuance.

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SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has issued an 
exemption from its regulations in response to a December 18, 2018, 
request from FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company regarding removal of 
Capsule Y from the Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit 2, reactor vessel 
and the associated testing and report submittal activities.

DATES: The exemption was issued on June 5, 2019.

ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID NRC-2019-0122 when contacting the 
NRC about the availability of information regarding this document. You 
may obtain publicly-available information related to this document 
using any of the following methods:
     Federal Rulemaking Website: Go to http://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2019-0122. Address 
questions about NRC docket IDs in Regulations.gov to Jennifer Borges; 
telephone: 301-287-9127; email: [email protected]. For technical 
questions, contact the individual listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION 
CONTACT section of this document.
     NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System 
(ADAMS): You may obtain publicly-available documents online in the 
ADAMS Public Documents collection at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To begin the search, select ``Begin Web-based ADAMS 
Search.'' For problems with ADAMS, please contact the NRC's Public 
Document Room (PDR) reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737, or 
by email to [email protected]. For the convenience of the reader, 
instructions about obtaining materials referenced in this document are 
provided in the ``Availability of Documents'' section.
     NRC's PDR: You may examine and purchase copies of public 
documents at the NRC's PDR, Room O1-F21, One White Flint North, 11555 
Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Carleen J. Parker, Office of Nuclear 
Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 
20555-0001; telephone: 301-415-1603, email: [email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The text of the exemption is attached.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 6th day of June 2019.


[[Page 27368]]


    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Carleen J. Parker,
Project Manager, Plant Licensing Branch 1, Division of Operating 
Reactor Licensing, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

ATTACHMENT--Exemption

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50-412]

FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company

Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit 2

Exemption

I. Background.

    FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC or the licensee) is 
the holder of Renewed Facility Operating License No. NPF-73, which 
authorizes operation of Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit 2 (Beaver 
Valley 2). The license provides, among other things, that Beaver Valley 
2 is subject to all rules, regulations, and orders of the U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC or the Commission) now or hereafter in 
effect. The facility consists of two pressurized-water reactors located 
in Shippingport, Pennsylvania; however, this exemption is applicable 
only to Beaver Valley 2.

II. Request/Action.

    Appendix H, ``Reactor Vessel Material Surveillance Program 
Requirements,'' to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 
CFR), Part 50, requires that licensees of commercial light-water 
nuclear power reactors with a peak neutron fluence exceeding 1x10\17\ 
neutrons per centimeter-squared (n/cm\2\) (with energy greater than 1 
million electron volts (E > 1 MeV)) at the end of the reactor vessel 
design life maintain a reactor vessel material surveillance program 
that tests irradiated material specimens that are located in 
surveillance capsules in the reactor vessel. Beaver Valley 2 is subject 
to these requirements, and therefore, maintains a reactor vessel 
surveillance program in accordance with Appendix H to 10 CFR part 50. 
Section IV.A of Appendix H to 10 CFR part 50 requires that each 
surveillance specimen capsule withdrawal and associated test results 
must be the subject of a summary technical report that is to be 
submitted to the NRC within 1 year of the date of the capsule 
withdrawal.
    By letter dated, December 18, 2018, FENOC requested an exemption to 
the requirements of Section IV.A of Appendix H to 10 CFR part 50 for 
Beaver Valley 2. Specifically, FENOC requested an exemption from the 
Appendix H testing and report submittal requirements for Capsule Y, 
which FENOC removed from the Beaver Valley 2 reactor vessel on October 
29, 2018. The licensee stated that Capsule Y will be disassembled, and 
the neutron dosimeters will be tested within 1 year after the capsule 
withdrawal to ensure that valid dosimetry measurements can be obtained 
prior to excessive radioactive decay of the dosimeters. The capsule 
contents will be inventoried and placed in storage so that they are 
retrievable for future testing if it becomes necessary. Mechanical 
testing of Capsule Y will not be performed.
    FENOC is requesting this exemption because Beaver Valley 2 will 
cease power operation by October 31, 2021. FENOC informed the NRC of 
this by letter dated April 25, 2018. While the Beaver Valley 2 Renewed 
Facility Operating License expires on May 27, 2047, the original 40-
year license was to expire on May 27, 2027. The previous capsule 
withdrawal testing and reports justify operation of the reactor vessel 
through the end of the original 40-year license. Capsule Y was required 
to justify operation to the end of the renewed 60-year license. If a 
decision is made to operate Beaver Valley 2 beyond October 31, 2021, 
FENOC stated that a revised capsule testing schedule would be submitted 
for NRC approval prior to October 31, 2021.

III. Discussion.

    Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12, the Commission may, upon application by 
any interested person or upon its own initiative, grant exemptions from 
the requirements of 10 CFR part 50, when (1) the exemptions are 
authorized by law, will not present an undue risk to public health or 
safety, and are consistent with the common defense and security; and 
(2) when special circumstances are present.

A. The Exemption is Authorized by Law.

    This exemption would exempt Beaver Valley 2 from the Section IV.A 
of Appendix H to 10 CFR part 50 required testing and the submittal of a 
summary technical report (regarding capsule withdrawal and capsule test 
results) for reactor vessel Capsule Y to the NRC within 1 year of the 
capsule withdrawal for Beaver Valley 2.
    As stated above, 10 CFR 50.12 allows the NRC to grant exemptions 
from the requirements of 10 CFR part 50. The NRC staff has determined 
that granting of the licensee's proposed exemption will not result in a 
violation of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, or the 
Commission's regulations. Therefore, the exemption is authorized by 
law.

B. The Exemption Presents No Undue Risk to Public Health and Safety.

    The underlying purpose of Appendix H to 10 CFR part 50 is to 
monitor changes in the fracture toughness properties of ferritic 
materials in the reactor vessel beltline region of light[dash]water 
nuclear power reactors which result from exposure of these materials to 
neutron irradiation and the thermal environment. This fracture 
toughness test data obtained from the material surveillance program is 
subsequently used to assess the integrity of the reactor vessel, as 
described in 10 CFR 50.61, ``Fracture Toughness Requirements for 
Protection Against Pressurized Thermal Shock Events,'' and Appendix G, 
``Fracture Toughness Requirements,'' to 10 CFR part 50. As such, the 
fracture toughness data obtained by the Appendix H material 
surveillance program serves the underlying purposes of 10 CFR 50.61 and 
Appendix G to 10 CFR part 50.
    The underlying purpose of 10 CFR 50.61 is to prevent potential 
failure of the reactor vessel as a result of postulated pressurized 
thermal shock (PTS) events (transients in pressurized[dash]water 
reactors causing severe overcooling concurrent with or followed by 
significant pressure in the reactor vessel). The underlying purpose of 
Appendix G to 10 CFR part 50 is to provide an acceptable margin of 
safety against brittle failure of the reactor coolant system (RCS) 
during any condition of normal operation to which the pressure boundary 
may be subjected over its service lifetime.

Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50

    Appendix H to 10 CFR part 50 requires, in part, that the design of 
the surveillance program and the withdrawal schedule meet the 
requirements of American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) E185, 
``Standard Recommended Practice for Conducting Surveillance Tests for 
Light-Water Cooled Reactor Vessels.'' Prior to receiving a renewed 
operating license on November 5, 2009, the Beaver Valley 2 operating 
license was scheduled to expire at midnight May 27, 2027 (i.e., the end 
of the original 40-year operating license). By letter dated April 25, 
2018, FENOC informed the NRC that Beaver Valley 2 plans to cease 
operation by October 31, 2021, which is prior to the expiration of the 
original 40-year operating license.
    As of January 2019, Beaver Valley 2 has withdrawn and tested a 
total of four surveillance capsules (i.e., Capsules U,

[[Page 27369]]

V, W, and X). The test results from the latest surveillance capsule 
(i.e., Capsule X) are documented in WCAP-16527-NP, Revision 0, 
``Analysis of Capsule X from FENOC Nuclear Operating Company Beaver 
Valley Unit 2 Reactor Vessel Radiation Surveillance Program.'' Per 
WCAP-16527-NP, Capsule X received a neutron fluence of 5.601 x 10\19\ 
n/cm\2\ after an irradiation time of 13.94 effective full power years 
(EFPY). The NRC staff notes that the calculated neutron fluence (E >1.0 
MeV) at the core mid-plane for the Beaver Valley 2 reactor vessel at 
the end of 40-years of plant operation (i.e., ~36 EFPY) is 4.113 x 
10\19\ n/cm\2\. Consistent with ASTM E185, the withdrawal of Capsule X 
for a 40-year license term was completed at not less than once or 
greater than twice the peak end-of-life vessel fluence (i.e., 4.113 x 
10\19\ n/cm\2\). Based on the review of the capsules that have already 
been withdrawn and tested for Beaver Valley 2, the NRC staff notes that 
no additional capsules are required to satisfy Appendix H to 10 CFR 
part 50 and ASTM E185 for the original 40-year license term.

Appendix G to 10 CFR Part 50--Upper Shelf Energy

    Appendix G to 10 CFR part 50 requires that for the reactor vessel 
beltline materials, including welds, plates and forgings, the values of 
RTNDT and Charpy upper-shelf energy must account for the 
effects of neutron radiation, including the results of the surveillance 
program of Appendix H to 10 CFR part 50. Specifically, Appendix G to 10 
CFR part 50 requires, in part, that reactor vessel beltline materials 
must maintain Charpy upper-shelf energy (USE) throughout the life of 
the vessel of no less than 50 feet/pounds (ft-lb) (68 J).
    As documented in WCAP-16527, Supplement 1, Revision 1, the licensee 
used the results of the surveillance Capsule X to determine the USE 
values for all of the vessel materials (i.e., all of the beltline or 
extended beltline material) and that at 54 EFPY (i.e., beyond the 
original 40-year operating license) the USE values for all of the 
vessel materials will be maintained at no less than 50 ft-lb. In NUREG-
1929, Volume 2, ``Safety Evaluation Report Related to the License 
Renewal of Beaver Valley Power Station, Units 1 and 2 (NUREG-1929, 
Volume 2),'' the NRC staff reviewed this assessment and concluded that 
the licensee correctly used applicable surveillance data for 
determining that the Beaver Valley 2 reactor vessel beltline materials 
will maintain Charpy USE values no less than 50 ft-lb (68 J) through 
the 54 EFPY in accordance with Appendix G to 10 CFR part 50. On October 
31, 2021, the date when the licensee certified that it expects to 
permanently cease power operations, Beaver Valley 2 will have operated 
about 29.4 EFPY (see WCAP-17790-NP). As such, the licensee has 
demonstrated that the reactor vessel beltline materials will maintain 
Charpy USE values of no less than 50 ft-lb (68 J) throughout the 
continued plant operation of Beaver Valley 2 through October 31, 2021.

Appendix G to 10 CFR Part 50--Pressure-Temperature Limits

    Appendix G to 10 CFR part 50 requires that for the reactor vessel 
beltline materials, including welds, plates and forgings, the values of 
RTNDT and Charpy upper-shelf energy must account for the 
effects of neutron radiation, including the results of the surveillance 
program of Appendix H to 10 CFR part 50. Specifically, Appendix G to 10 
CFR part 50 requires, in part, that pressure-temperature (P-T) limits 
be established for the reactor coolant pressure boundary during normal 
operating and hydrostatic or leak rate testing conditions.
    By letter dated July 15, 2003, the NRC staff issued Amendment No. 
138 and its accompanying safety evaluation for Beaver Valley 2 that 
permitted the licensee to relocate the P-T limits from the technical 
specifications to a licensee-controlled document called the P-T Limits 
Report (PTLR), consistent with the guidance in Generic Letter (GL) 96-
03, ``Relocation of the Pressure Temperature Limit Curves and Low 
Temperature Overpressure Protections System Limits.'' In addition, 
administrative controls via Technical Specification (TS) 6.9.6, 
``Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Pressure and Temperature Limits Report 
(PTLR)'' (currently numbered as TS 5.6.4), were established, which 
provide requirements for the control of future changes to the plant-
specific P-T limits and for submittal of PTLR revisions to the NRC.
    The latest revision of the Beaver Valley 2 PTLR indicates that 
after considering the results from Capsule X, the limiting vessel 
material for the P-T limits is the intermediate shell plate B9004-1 at 
30 EFPY. Based on the analysis in WCAP-17790-NP, Revision 1, Enclosure 
B, ``PWR Vessel Internals Program Plan for Aging Management of Reactor 
Internals at Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 2,'' in fall 2021, the 
time period in which licensee certified that it expects to permanently 
cease power operations, Beaver Valley 2 will have operated 29.4 EFPY. 
The staff previously found Beaver Valley 2's Aging Management program 
acceptable by letter dated October 7, 2016. Thus, the staff finds that 
the P-T limits in the licensee's PTLR will remain applicable (i.e., 
through 30 EFPY) beyond the expected plant operation of Beaver Valley 2 
(i.e., ~29.4 EFPY). However, if a change to the P-T limits is necessary 
before Beaver Valley 2 expects to permanently cease power operations, 
the NRC staff finds that TS 5.6.4 provides the necessary administrative 
controls to ensure changes will be implemented in accordance with 
methodology approved in the PTLR, such that the requirements for P-T 
limits in Appendix G to 10 CFR part 50 will continue to be satisfied.

10 CFR Part 50.61

    10 CFR 50.61 requires, in part, that for each pressurized-water 
nuclear power reactor, the licensee shall have projected values of 
RTPTS for each reactor vessel beltline material using the 
end-of-life fluence for that material. Specifically, 10 CFR 50.61 
establishes PTS screening criterion of 270 degrees Fahrenheit ([deg]F) 
for plates, forgings, and axial weld materials, and 300 [deg]F for 
circumferential weld materials. The regulations in 10 CFR 50.61 also 
require, in part, that licensees consider plant-specific information 
that could affect the level of embrittlement, which includes, but is 
not limited to, the reactor vessel operating temperature and any 
related surveillance program results.
    As documented in WCAP-16527, Supplement 1, Revision 1, the 
RTPTS values were generated for all beltline and extended 
beltline region materials of the Beaver Valley 2 reactor vessel for 
fluence values at 54 EFPY, and these values were based on plant-
specific surveillance program results and have been included in the PTS 
evaluation. The NRC staff also confirmed that the RTPTS 
values for all beltline and extended beltline region materials of the 
Beaver Valley 2 reactor vessel for fluence values at 54 EFPY were less 
than the applicable screening criterion established in 10 CFR 50.61. 
Further, the NRC staff previously reviewed this assessment and 
concluded that the licensee accurately calculated the RTPTS 
values for all reactor vessel beltline materials for 54 EFPY and has 
correctly used applicable surveillance data for determining that all 
Beaver Valley 2 reactor vessel beltline materials will remain in 
compliance 10 CFR 50.61 through 54 EFPY (see NUREG-1929, Volume 2). As 
such, the licensee has demonstrated that the RTPTS values 
for all beltline and extended beltline region materials of the Beaver 
Valley 2 reactor

[[Page 27370]]

vessel are less than the applicable screening criterion established in 
10 CFR 50.61 through the continued plant operation of Beaver Valley 2 
(October 31, 2021).

Conclusion

    Based on the above, no new accident precursors are created by the 
proposed exemption; thus, the probability of postulated accidents is 
not increased. Also, based on the above, the consequences of postulated 
accidents are not increased. No changes are being made in the types or 
amounts of effluents that may be released offsite. There is no 
significant increase in occupational or public radiation exposure. 
Therefore, there is no undue risk to public health and safety.

C. The Exemption is Consistent with the Common Defense and Security.

    The proposed exemption would exempt Beaver Valley 2 from the 
requirements of Section IV.A to Appendix H to 10 CFR part 50 for 
testing and the submittal of a summary technical report (regarding 
capsule withdrawal and capsule test results) for reactor vessel Capsule 
Y to the NRC within 1 year of the capsule withdrawal for Beaver Valley 
2, which occurred on October 29, 2018. This change to the testing and 
submittal of the summary technical report for Capsule Y at Beaver 
Valley 2 does not affect physical security measures at Beaver Valley 2 
and will not adversely affect the licensee's ability to physically 
secure the site or protect special nuclear material. Therefore, the 
common defense and security is not impacted by this exemption.

D. Special Circumstances.

    Special circumstances, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii), 
are present whenever application of the regulation in the particular 
circumstances would not serve the underlying purpose of the rule or is 
not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the rule. The 
following paragraphs discuss how the underlying purpose of Appendix H 
to 10 CFR part 50, 10 CFR 50.61, and Appendix G to 10 CFR part 50 will 
be met under the terms of the proposed exemption.

Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50

    The underlying purpose of Appendix H to 10 CFR part 50 is to 
require licensees to implement a reactor vessel materials surveillance 
program to monitor changes in the fracture toughness properties of 
reactor vessel materials adjacent to the reactor core. As such, 
Appendix H requires, in part, that the design of the surveillance 
program and the withdrawal schedule meet the requirements of ASTM E185. 
As stated above, Beaver Valley 2 has withdrawn and tested a total of 
four surveillance capsules (i.e., Capsules U, V, W, and X), with the 
test results from the latest surveillance capsule (i.e., Capsule X) 
documented in WCAP-16527-NP, Revision 0. Based on the review of the 
capsules that have already been withdrawn and tested for Beaver Valley 
2, the NRC staff notes that no additional capsules are required to 
satisfy Appendix H to 10 CFR part 50 and ASTM E185 for the original 40-
year license term.
    Since the licensee plans to permanently cease power operation of 
Beaver Valley 2 by October 31, 2021 (i.e., approximately 5.5 years 
prior to the end of the original 40-year operating license), the staff 
finds that the testing and submittal of the summary report for Capsule 
Y does not serve the underlying purpose to obtain fracture toughness 
test data to monitor changes in the ferritic materials in the reactor 
vessel beltline region for the continued plant operation of Beaver 
Valley 2 through October 31, 2021.

Appendix G to 10 CFR Part 50--Upper Shelf Energy

    The underlying purpose of Appendix G to 10 CFR part 50 is to 
provide an acceptable margin of safety against brittle failure of the 
RCS during any condition of normal operation to which the pressure 
boundary may be subjected over its service lifetime. Appendix G to 10 
CFR part 50 requires, in part, that reactor vessel beltline materials 
must maintain Charpy USE throughout the life of the vessel of no less 
than 50 ft-lb (68 J). As stated above, NRC staff confirmed that the 
results of surveillance Capsule X were used in the determination of the 
USE values for all of the reactor vessel materials (i.e., all of the 
beltline or extended beltline material) and that at 54 EFPY (i.e., 
beyond the original 40-year operating license), the USE values for all 
of the vessel materials will meet Appendix G to 10 CFR part 50 
requirements.
    Since the licensee plans to permanently cease power operation of 
Beaver Valley 2 by October 31, 2021 (i.e., approximately 5.5 years 
prior to the end of the original 40-year operating license), the NRC 
staff finds that the testing and submittal of the summary report for 
Capsule Y does not serve the underlying purpose to provide an 
acceptable margin of safety against brittle failure of the RCS during 
any condition of normal operation as it relates to Charpy USE for 
continued plant operation of Beaver Valley 2 through October 31, 2021.

Appendix G to 10 CFR Part 50--Pressure-Temperature Limits

    The underlying purpose of Appendix G to 10 CFR part 50 is to 
provide an acceptable margin of safety against brittle failure of the 
RCS during any condition of normal operation to which the pressure 
boundary may be subjected over its service lifetime. Appendix G to 10 
CFR part 50 requires, in part, that P-T limits be established for the 
reactor coolant pressure boundary during normal operating and 
hydrostatic or leak rate testing conditions. As stated above, the NRC 
staff finds that the P-T limits in the licensee's PTLR will remain 
applicable (i.e., through 30 EFPY) beyond the expected plant operation 
of Beaver Valley 2 (i.e., ~29.4 EFPY). However, if a change to the P-T 
limits is necessary prior to the expected date in which Beaver Valley 2 
ceases operation, the NRC staff identified that TS 5.6.4 provides the 
necessary administrative controls to ensure changes will be implemented 
in accordance with methodology approved in the PTLR such that the 
requirements for P-T limits in Appendix G to 10 CFR part 50 will 
continue to be satisfied.
    Since the licensee plans to permanently cease power operation of 
Beaver Valley 2 by October 31, 2021 (i.e., approximately 5.5 years 
prior to the end of the original 40-year operating license), the NRC 
staff finds that the testing and submittal of the summary report for 
Capsule Y do not serve the underlying purpose to provide an acceptable 
margin of safety against brittle failure of the RCS during any 
condition of normal operation as it relates to P-T limits for the 
continued plant operation of Beaver Valley 2 through October 31, 2021.

10 CFR Part 50.61

    The regulations in 10 CFR 50.61 require, in part, that for each 
pressurized-water nuclear power reactor, the licensee shall have 
projected values of RTPTS for each reactor vessel beltline 
material using the end-of-life fluence for that material. As stated 
above, the licensee has demonstrated that the RTPTS values 
for all beltline and extended beltline region materials of the Beaver 
Valley 2 reactor vessel are less than the applicable screening 
criterion established in 10 CFR 50.61 through the continued plant 
operation of Beaver Valley 2 (October 31, 2021).
    Since the licensee plans to permanently cease power operation of 
Beaver Valley 2 by October 31, 2021 (i.e., approximately 5.5 years 
prior to

[[Page 27371]]

the end of the original 40-year operating license), the NRC staff finds 
that the testing and submittal of the summary report for Capsule Y does 
not serve the underlying purpose to prevent potential failure of the 
reactor vessel as a result of postulated PTS events for the continued 
plant operation of Beaver Valley 2 through October 31, 2021.

Conclusion

    Based on the above, the NRC staff concludes that the underlying 
purpose of Appendix H to 10 CFR part 50 and its function to provide 
fracture toughness data for the evaluations required by Appendix G to 
10 CFR part 50 and 10 CFR 50.61 have been achieved for the original 40-
year license period of Beaver Valley 2, which will permanently cease 
operation by October 31, 2021 (i.e., prior to the end of the original 
40-year license period).

E. Environmental Considerations.

    The NRC staff has determined that the proposed exemption meets the 
eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 
51.22(c)(25). Therefore, in accordance with 10 CFR 51.22(b), no 
environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be 
prepared in connection with the proposed issuance of this exemption 
request. The basis for the NRC staff's determination is discussed below 
with an evaluation against each of the requirements in 10 CFR 
51.22(c)(25).

Requirements in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(25)(i)

    An evaluation of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, 
as provided by the licensee, is presented below:

    1. Does the proposed exemption involve a significant increase in 
the probability or consequence of an accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No
    The proposed exemption has no effect on facility structures, 
systems, and components (SSCs), the capability of any facility SSC 
to perform its design function, or plant operations, and, therefore, 
would not increase the likelihood of a malfunction of any facility 
SSC or increase the consequences of previously evaluated accidents. 
The proposed exemption does not alter any assumptions or methodology 
associated with the previously evaluated accidents in the BVPS 
[Beaver Valley Power Station] Updated Final Safety Analysis Report. 
The proposed exemption will not affect the probability of occurrence 
of any previously analyzed accident.
    Therefore, there is no increase in the probability or 
consequence of any previously evaluated accident.
    2. Does the proposed exemption create the possibility of a new 
or different kind of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated?
    Response: No
    The proposed exemption does not involve a physical alteration of 
the facility. No new or different type of equipment will be 
installed, and there are no physical modifications to existing 
equipment associated with the proposed exemption.
    Similarly, the proposed exemption would not physically alter any 
SSCs involved in the mitigation of any accidents. Thus, no new 
initiators or precursors of a new or different kind of accident are 
created. Furthermore, the proposed exemption does not create the 
possibility of a new accident as a result of new failure modes 
associated with any equipment or personnel failures. No changes are 
being made to the facilities' normal parameters or in protective or 
mitigative action setpoints, and no new failure modes are being 
introduced.
    Therefore, the proposed exemption does not create the 
possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident 
previously evaluated.
    3. Does the proposed exemption involve a significant reduction 
in a margin of safety?
    Response: No
    The proposed exemption does not alter the design basis or any 
safety limits for BVPS-2, nor does it impact station operation or 
any facility SSC that is relied upon for accident mitigation.
    Therefore, the proposed exemption does not involve a significant 
reduction in a margin of safety.

    The NRC staff evaluated the issue of no significant hazards 
consideration using the standards described in 10 CFR 50.92(c). Based 
on the above evaluation, the NRC staff has determined that the three 
standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff 
concludes that the proposed exemption involves no significant hazards 
consideration, and the requirements of 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9)(i) are met.

Requirements in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(25)(ii) through (v)

    The proposed exemption from testing and the associated report 
submittal activities for the Beaver Valley 2 reactor vessel Capsule Y 
does not involve any physical plant modifications and would not alter 
operation of any plant systems. As such, the NRC staff concludes that 
granting the proposed exemption: (1) would not result in a significant 
change in the types or significant increase in the amounts of any 
effluents that may be released offsite (i.e., satisfies the provisions 
of 10 CFR 51.22(c)(25)(ii)); (2) would not result in a significant 
increase in individual or cumulative public or occupational radiation 
exposure (i.e., satisfies the provisions of 10 CFR 51.22(c)(25)(iii)); 
(3) would have no significant construction impact (i.e., satisfies the 
provisions of 10 CFR 51.22(c)(25)(iv)); and (4) would not result in a 
significant increase in the potential for or consequences from a 
radiological accident (i.e., satisfies the provisions of 10 CFR 
51.22(c)(25)(v)).

Requirements in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(25)(i)

    The proposed exemption involves the testing and reporting 
requirements of the Beaver Valley 2 reactor vessel surveillance 
program. Performance of the scheduled capsule testing is a surveillance 
requirement, therefore satisfying the provisions of 10 CFR 
51.22(c)(25)(vi)(C).

Conclusion

    Based on the above, the NRC staff concludes that the proposed 
exemption meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set 
forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(25)(i) through (vi). Therefore, pursuant to 10 
CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental 
assessment is required to be prepared in connection with the proposed 
issuance of the exemption.

IV. Conclusion

    Accordingly, the Commission has determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR 
50.12, the exemption is authorized by law, will not present an undue 
risk to the public health and safety, and is consistent with the common 
defense and security. Also, special circumstances are present. 
Therefore, the Commission hereby grants FENOC a permanent exemption 
from Section IV.A of Appendix H to 10 CFR part 50 for testing and the 
submittal of a summary technical report (regarding capsule withdrawal 
and capsule test results) for reactor vessel Capsule Y to the NRC 
within 1 year of the capsule withdrawal for Beaver Valley 2.

V. Availability of Documents

    The documents identified in the following table are available to 
interested persons through the NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and 
Management System (ADAMS).

[[Page 27372]]



------------------------------------------------------------------------
            Title                   Date          ADAMS accession No.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
FENOC letter to the NRC,           12/18/2018  ML18352A684
 Request for Exemption from
 Specific Provisions in
 Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50.
FENOC letter to the NRC,            4/25/2018  ML18115A007
 Certification of Permanent
 Cessation of Power
 Operations for Beaver Valley
 Power Station, Unit Nos. 1
 and 2; Davis-Besse Nuclear
 Power Station, Unit No.1;
 and Perry Nuclear Power
 Plant, Unit No. 1.
NRC letter to FENOC, Issuance       11/5/2009  ML092920015 *
 of Renewed Facility
 Operating License No. NPF-73
 for the Beaver Valley Power
 Station, Unit 2 (TAC No.
 MD6593).
WCAP-16527-NP, Revision 0,             3/2006  ML061020406
 Analysis of Capsule X from
 FENOC Nuclear Operating
 Company Beaver Valley Unit 2
 Reactor Vessel Radiation
 Surveillance Program.
WCAP-16527-NP, Supplement 1,           9/2011  ML13151A060
 Revision 1, Enclosure C,
 Analysis of Capsule X from
 FENOC Nuclear Operating
 Company Beaver Valley Unit 2
 Reactor Vessel Radiation
 Surveillance Program.
NUREG-1929, Volume 2, Safety          10/2009  ML093000278
 Evaluation Report Related to
 the License Renewal of
 Beaver Valley Power Station,
 Units 1 and 2.
NRC letter to FENOC, Beaver         7/15/2003  ML031960399
 Valley Power Station, Unit
 Nos. 1 and 2--Issuance of
 Amendment Re: Creation of
 Pressure-Temperature Limits
 Report (TAC Nos. MB3319 and
 MB3320).
FENOC letter to the NRC,            5/12/2014  ML14133A107
 Beaver Valley Power Station,
 Unit Nos. 1 and 22--Pressure
 and Temperature Limits
 Reports and Unit 2, Cycle
 18, Core Operating Limits
 Report.
WCAP-17790-NP, Revision 1,          1/27/2014  ML14030A135
 Enclosure B, PWR Vessel
 Internals Program Plan for
 Aging Management of Reactor
 Internals at Beaver Valley
 Power Station Unit 2.
NRC letter to FENOC, Beaver         10/7/2016  ML15363A383
 Valley Power Station, Unit
 Nos. 1 and 2--Staff
 Assessment of the Reactor
 Vessel Internals Aging
 Management Program Plans
 (CAC Nos. MF3416 and MF3417).
------------------------------------------------------------------------
* (Package).

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 5th day of June 2019.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

/RA/

Craig G. Erlanger,

Director, Division of Operating Reactor Licensing, Office of Nuclear 
Reactor Regulation.

[FR Doc. 2019-12324 Filed 6-11-19; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 7590-01-P