[Federal Register Volume 84, Number 113 (Wednesday, June 12, 2019)]
[Notices]
[Pages 27367-27372]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2019-12324]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket No. 50-412; NRC-2019-0122]
FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company; Beaver Valley Power
Station, Unit 2
AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
ACTION: Exemption; issuance.
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SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has issued an
exemption from its regulations in response to a December 18, 2018,
request from FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company regarding removal of
Capsule Y from the Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit 2, reactor vessel
and the associated testing and report submittal activities.
DATES: The exemption was issued on June 5, 2019.
ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID NRC-2019-0122 when contacting the
NRC about the availability of information regarding this document. You
may obtain publicly-available information related to this document
using any of the following methods:
Federal Rulemaking Website: Go to http://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2019-0122. Address
questions about NRC docket IDs in Regulations.gov to Jennifer Borges;
telephone: 301-287-9127; email: [email protected]. For technical
questions, contact the individual listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION
CONTACT section of this document.
NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System
(ADAMS): You may obtain publicly-available documents online in the
ADAMS Public Documents collection at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To begin the search, select ``Begin Web-based ADAMS
Search.'' For problems with ADAMS, please contact the NRC's Public
Document Room (PDR) reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737, or
by email to [email protected]. For the convenience of the reader,
instructions about obtaining materials referenced in this document are
provided in the ``Availability of Documents'' section.
NRC's PDR: You may examine and purchase copies of public
documents at the NRC's PDR, Room O1-F21, One White Flint North, 11555
Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Carleen J. Parker, Office of Nuclear
Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC
20555-0001; telephone: 301-415-1603, email: [email protected].
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The text of the exemption is attached.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 6th day of June 2019.
[[Page 27368]]
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Carleen J. Parker,
Project Manager, Plant Licensing Branch 1, Division of Operating
Reactor Licensing, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
ATTACHMENT--Exemption
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket No. 50-412]
FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company
Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit 2
Exemption
I. Background.
FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC or the licensee) is
the holder of Renewed Facility Operating License No. NPF-73, which
authorizes operation of Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit 2 (Beaver
Valley 2). The license provides, among other things, that Beaver Valley
2 is subject to all rules, regulations, and orders of the U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC or the Commission) now or hereafter in
effect. The facility consists of two pressurized-water reactors located
in Shippingport, Pennsylvania; however, this exemption is applicable
only to Beaver Valley 2.
II. Request/Action.
Appendix H, ``Reactor Vessel Material Surveillance Program
Requirements,'' to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10
CFR), Part 50, requires that licensees of commercial light-water
nuclear power reactors with a peak neutron fluence exceeding 1x10\17\
neutrons per centimeter-squared (n/cm\2\) (with energy greater than 1
million electron volts (E > 1 MeV)) at the end of the reactor vessel
design life maintain a reactor vessel material surveillance program
that tests irradiated material specimens that are located in
surveillance capsules in the reactor vessel. Beaver Valley 2 is subject
to these requirements, and therefore, maintains a reactor vessel
surveillance program in accordance with Appendix H to 10 CFR part 50.
Section IV.A of Appendix H to 10 CFR part 50 requires that each
surveillance specimen capsule withdrawal and associated test results
must be the subject of a summary technical report that is to be
submitted to the NRC within 1 year of the date of the capsule
withdrawal.
By letter dated, December 18, 2018, FENOC requested an exemption to
the requirements of Section IV.A of Appendix H to 10 CFR part 50 for
Beaver Valley 2. Specifically, FENOC requested an exemption from the
Appendix H testing and report submittal requirements for Capsule Y,
which FENOC removed from the Beaver Valley 2 reactor vessel on October
29, 2018. The licensee stated that Capsule Y will be disassembled, and
the neutron dosimeters will be tested within 1 year after the capsule
withdrawal to ensure that valid dosimetry measurements can be obtained
prior to excessive radioactive decay of the dosimeters. The capsule
contents will be inventoried and placed in storage so that they are
retrievable for future testing if it becomes necessary. Mechanical
testing of Capsule Y will not be performed.
FENOC is requesting this exemption because Beaver Valley 2 will
cease power operation by October 31, 2021. FENOC informed the NRC of
this by letter dated April 25, 2018. While the Beaver Valley 2 Renewed
Facility Operating License expires on May 27, 2047, the original 40-
year license was to expire on May 27, 2027. The previous capsule
withdrawal testing and reports justify operation of the reactor vessel
through the end of the original 40-year license. Capsule Y was required
to justify operation to the end of the renewed 60-year license. If a
decision is made to operate Beaver Valley 2 beyond October 31, 2021,
FENOC stated that a revised capsule testing schedule would be submitted
for NRC approval prior to October 31, 2021.
III. Discussion.
Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12, the Commission may, upon application by
any interested person or upon its own initiative, grant exemptions from
the requirements of 10 CFR part 50, when (1) the exemptions are
authorized by law, will not present an undue risk to public health or
safety, and are consistent with the common defense and security; and
(2) when special circumstances are present.
A. The Exemption is Authorized by Law.
This exemption would exempt Beaver Valley 2 from the Section IV.A
of Appendix H to 10 CFR part 50 required testing and the submittal of a
summary technical report (regarding capsule withdrawal and capsule test
results) for reactor vessel Capsule Y to the NRC within 1 year of the
capsule withdrawal for Beaver Valley 2.
As stated above, 10 CFR 50.12 allows the NRC to grant exemptions
from the requirements of 10 CFR part 50. The NRC staff has determined
that granting of the licensee's proposed exemption will not result in a
violation of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, or the
Commission's regulations. Therefore, the exemption is authorized by
law.
B. The Exemption Presents No Undue Risk to Public Health and Safety.
The underlying purpose of Appendix H to 10 CFR part 50 is to
monitor changes in the fracture toughness properties of ferritic
materials in the reactor vessel beltline region of light[dash]water
nuclear power reactors which result from exposure of these materials to
neutron irradiation and the thermal environment. This fracture
toughness test data obtained from the material surveillance program is
subsequently used to assess the integrity of the reactor vessel, as
described in 10 CFR 50.61, ``Fracture Toughness Requirements for
Protection Against Pressurized Thermal Shock Events,'' and Appendix G,
``Fracture Toughness Requirements,'' to 10 CFR part 50. As such, the
fracture toughness data obtained by the Appendix H material
surveillance program serves the underlying purposes of 10 CFR 50.61 and
Appendix G to 10 CFR part 50.
The underlying purpose of 10 CFR 50.61 is to prevent potential
failure of the reactor vessel as a result of postulated pressurized
thermal shock (PTS) events (transients in pressurized[dash]water
reactors causing severe overcooling concurrent with or followed by
significant pressure in the reactor vessel). The underlying purpose of
Appendix G to 10 CFR part 50 is to provide an acceptable margin of
safety against brittle failure of the reactor coolant system (RCS)
during any condition of normal operation to which the pressure boundary
may be subjected over its service lifetime.
Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50
Appendix H to 10 CFR part 50 requires, in part, that the design of
the surveillance program and the withdrawal schedule meet the
requirements of American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) E185,
``Standard Recommended Practice for Conducting Surveillance Tests for
Light-Water Cooled Reactor Vessels.'' Prior to receiving a renewed
operating license on November 5, 2009, the Beaver Valley 2 operating
license was scheduled to expire at midnight May 27, 2027 (i.e., the end
of the original 40-year operating license). By letter dated April 25,
2018, FENOC informed the NRC that Beaver Valley 2 plans to cease
operation by October 31, 2021, which is prior to the expiration of the
original 40-year operating license.
As of January 2019, Beaver Valley 2 has withdrawn and tested a
total of four surveillance capsules (i.e., Capsules U,
[[Page 27369]]
V, W, and X). The test results from the latest surveillance capsule
(i.e., Capsule X) are documented in WCAP-16527-NP, Revision 0,
``Analysis of Capsule X from FENOC Nuclear Operating Company Beaver
Valley Unit 2 Reactor Vessel Radiation Surveillance Program.'' Per
WCAP-16527-NP, Capsule X received a neutron fluence of 5.601 x 10\19\
n/cm\2\ after an irradiation time of 13.94 effective full power years
(EFPY). The NRC staff notes that the calculated neutron fluence (E >1.0
MeV) at the core mid-plane for the Beaver Valley 2 reactor vessel at
the end of 40-years of plant operation (i.e., ~36 EFPY) is 4.113 x
10\19\ n/cm\2\. Consistent with ASTM E185, the withdrawal of Capsule X
for a 40-year license term was completed at not less than once or
greater than twice the peak end-of-life vessel fluence (i.e., 4.113 x
10\19\ n/cm\2\). Based on the review of the capsules that have already
been withdrawn and tested for Beaver Valley 2, the NRC staff notes that
no additional capsules are required to satisfy Appendix H to 10 CFR
part 50 and ASTM E185 for the original 40-year license term.
Appendix G to 10 CFR Part 50--Upper Shelf Energy
Appendix G to 10 CFR part 50 requires that for the reactor vessel
beltline materials, including welds, plates and forgings, the values of
RTNDT and Charpy upper-shelf energy must account for the
effects of neutron radiation, including the results of the surveillance
program of Appendix H to 10 CFR part 50. Specifically, Appendix G to 10
CFR part 50 requires, in part, that reactor vessel beltline materials
must maintain Charpy upper-shelf energy (USE) throughout the life of
the vessel of no less than 50 feet/pounds (ft-lb) (68 J).
As documented in WCAP-16527, Supplement 1, Revision 1, the licensee
used the results of the surveillance Capsule X to determine the USE
values for all of the vessel materials (i.e., all of the beltline or
extended beltline material) and that at 54 EFPY (i.e., beyond the
original 40-year operating license) the USE values for all of the
vessel materials will be maintained at no less than 50 ft-lb. In NUREG-
1929, Volume 2, ``Safety Evaluation Report Related to the License
Renewal of Beaver Valley Power Station, Units 1 and 2 (NUREG-1929,
Volume 2),'' the NRC staff reviewed this assessment and concluded that
the licensee correctly used applicable surveillance data for
determining that the Beaver Valley 2 reactor vessel beltline materials
will maintain Charpy USE values no less than 50 ft-lb (68 J) through
the 54 EFPY in accordance with Appendix G to 10 CFR part 50. On October
31, 2021, the date when the licensee certified that it expects to
permanently cease power operations, Beaver Valley 2 will have operated
about 29.4 EFPY (see WCAP-17790-NP). As such, the licensee has
demonstrated that the reactor vessel beltline materials will maintain
Charpy USE values of no less than 50 ft-lb (68 J) throughout the
continued plant operation of Beaver Valley 2 through October 31, 2021.
Appendix G to 10 CFR Part 50--Pressure-Temperature Limits
Appendix G to 10 CFR part 50 requires that for the reactor vessel
beltline materials, including welds, plates and forgings, the values of
RTNDT and Charpy upper-shelf energy must account for the
effects of neutron radiation, including the results of the surveillance
program of Appendix H to 10 CFR part 50. Specifically, Appendix G to 10
CFR part 50 requires, in part, that pressure-temperature (P-T) limits
be established for the reactor coolant pressure boundary during normal
operating and hydrostatic or leak rate testing conditions.
By letter dated July 15, 2003, the NRC staff issued Amendment No.
138 and its accompanying safety evaluation for Beaver Valley 2 that
permitted the licensee to relocate the P-T limits from the technical
specifications to a licensee-controlled document called the P-T Limits
Report (PTLR), consistent with the guidance in Generic Letter (GL) 96-
03, ``Relocation of the Pressure Temperature Limit Curves and Low
Temperature Overpressure Protections System Limits.'' In addition,
administrative controls via Technical Specification (TS) 6.9.6,
``Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Pressure and Temperature Limits Report
(PTLR)'' (currently numbered as TS 5.6.4), were established, which
provide requirements for the control of future changes to the plant-
specific P-T limits and for submittal of PTLR revisions to the NRC.
The latest revision of the Beaver Valley 2 PTLR indicates that
after considering the results from Capsule X, the limiting vessel
material for the P-T limits is the intermediate shell plate B9004-1 at
30 EFPY. Based on the analysis in WCAP-17790-NP, Revision 1, Enclosure
B, ``PWR Vessel Internals Program Plan for Aging Management of Reactor
Internals at Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 2,'' in fall 2021, the
time period in which licensee certified that it expects to permanently
cease power operations, Beaver Valley 2 will have operated 29.4 EFPY.
The staff previously found Beaver Valley 2's Aging Management program
acceptable by letter dated October 7, 2016. Thus, the staff finds that
the P-T limits in the licensee's PTLR will remain applicable (i.e.,
through 30 EFPY) beyond the expected plant operation of Beaver Valley 2
(i.e., ~29.4 EFPY). However, if a change to the P-T limits is necessary
before Beaver Valley 2 expects to permanently cease power operations,
the NRC staff finds that TS 5.6.4 provides the necessary administrative
controls to ensure changes will be implemented in accordance with
methodology approved in the PTLR, such that the requirements for P-T
limits in Appendix G to 10 CFR part 50 will continue to be satisfied.
10 CFR Part 50.61
10 CFR 50.61 requires, in part, that for each pressurized-water
nuclear power reactor, the licensee shall have projected values of
RTPTS for each reactor vessel beltline material using the
end-of-life fluence for that material. Specifically, 10 CFR 50.61
establishes PTS screening criterion of 270 degrees Fahrenheit ([deg]F)
for plates, forgings, and axial weld materials, and 300 [deg]F for
circumferential weld materials. The regulations in 10 CFR 50.61 also
require, in part, that licensees consider plant-specific information
that could affect the level of embrittlement, which includes, but is
not limited to, the reactor vessel operating temperature and any
related surveillance program results.
As documented in WCAP-16527, Supplement 1, Revision 1, the
RTPTS values were generated for all beltline and extended
beltline region materials of the Beaver Valley 2 reactor vessel for
fluence values at 54 EFPY, and these values were based on plant-
specific surveillance program results and have been included in the PTS
evaluation. The NRC staff also confirmed that the RTPTS
values for all beltline and extended beltline region materials of the
Beaver Valley 2 reactor vessel for fluence values at 54 EFPY were less
than the applicable screening criterion established in 10 CFR 50.61.
Further, the NRC staff previously reviewed this assessment and
concluded that the licensee accurately calculated the RTPTS
values for all reactor vessel beltline materials for 54 EFPY and has
correctly used applicable surveillance data for determining that all
Beaver Valley 2 reactor vessel beltline materials will remain in
compliance 10 CFR 50.61 through 54 EFPY (see NUREG-1929, Volume 2). As
such, the licensee has demonstrated that the RTPTS values
for all beltline and extended beltline region materials of the Beaver
Valley 2 reactor
[[Page 27370]]
vessel are less than the applicable screening criterion established in
10 CFR 50.61 through the continued plant operation of Beaver Valley 2
(October 31, 2021).
Conclusion
Based on the above, no new accident precursors are created by the
proposed exemption; thus, the probability of postulated accidents is
not increased. Also, based on the above, the consequences of postulated
accidents are not increased. No changes are being made in the types or
amounts of effluents that may be released offsite. There is no
significant increase in occupational or public radiation exposure.
Therefore, there is no undue risk to public health and safety.
C. The Exemption is Consistent with the Common Defense and Security.
The proposed exemption would exempt Beaver Valley 2 from the
requirements of Section IV.A to Appendix H to 10 CFR part 50 for
testing and the submittal of a summary technical report (regarding
capsule withdrawal and capsule test results) for reactor vessel Capsule
Y to the NRC within 1 year of the capsule withdrawal for Beaver Valley
2, which occurred on October 29, 2018. This change to the testing and
submittal of the summary technical report for Capsule Y at Beaver
Valley 2 does not affect physical security measures at Beaver Valley 2
and will not adversely affect the licensee's ability to physically
secure the site or protect special nuclear material. Therefore, the
common defense and security is not impacted by this exemption.
D. Special Circumstances.
Special circumstances, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii),
are present whenever application of the regulation in the particular
circumstances would not serve the underlying purpose of the rule or is
not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the rule. The
following paragraphs discuss how the underlying purpose of Appendix H
to 10 CFR part 50, 10 CFR 50.61, and Appendix G to 10 CFR part 50 will
be met under the terms of the proposed exemption.
Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50
The underlying purpose of Appendix H to 10 CFR part 50 is to
require licensees to implement a reactor vessel materials surveillance
program to monitor changes in the fracture toughness properties of
reactor vessel materials adjacent to the reactor core. As such,
Appendix H requires, in part, that the design of the surveillance
program and the withdrawal schedule meet the requirements of ASTM E185.
As stated above, Beaver Valley 2 has withdrawn and tested a total of
four surveillance capsules (i.e., Capsules U, V, W, and X), with the
test results from the latest surveillance capsule (i.e., Capsule X)
documented in WCAP-16527-NP, Revision 0. Based on the review of the
capsules that have already been withdrawn and tested for Beaver Valley
2, the NRC staff notes that no additional capsules are required to
satisfy Appendix H to 10 CFR part 50 and ASTM E185 for the original 40-
year license term.
Since the licensee plans to permanently cease power operation of
Beaver Valley 2 by October 31, 2021 (i.e., approximately 5.5 years
prior to the end of the original 40-year operating license), the staff
finds that the testing and submittal of the summary report for Capsule
Y does not serve the underlying purpose to obtain fracture toughness
test data to monitor changes in the ferritic materials in the reactor
vessel beltline region for the continued plant operation of Beaver
Valley 2 through October 31, 2021.
Appendix G to 10 CFR Part 50--Upper Shelf Energy
The underlying purpose of Appendix G to 10 CFR part 50 is to
provide an acceptable margin of safety against brittle failure of the
RCS during any condition of normal operation to which the pressure
boundary may be subjected over its service lifetime. Appendix G to 10
CFR part 50 requires, in part, that reactor vessel beltline materials
must maintain Charpy USE throughout the life of the vessel of no less
than 50 ft-lb (68 J). As stated above, NRC staff confirmed that the
results of surveillance Capsule X were used in the determination of the
USE values for all of the reactor vessel materials (i.e., all of the
beltline or extended beltline material) and that at 54 EFPY (i.e.,
beyond the original 40-year operating license), the USE values for all
of the vessel materials will meet Appendix G to 10 CFR part 50
requirements.
Since the licensee plans to permanently cease power operation of
Beaver Valley 2 by October 31, 2021 (i.e., approximately 5.5 years
prior to the end of the original 40-year operating license), the NRC
staff finds that the testing and submittal of the summary report for
Capsule Y does not serve the underlying purpose to provide an
acceptable margin of safety against brittle failure of the RCS during
any condition of normal operation as it relates to Charpy USE for
continued plant operation of Beaver Valley 2 through October 31, 2021.
Appendix G to 10 CFR Part 50--Pressure-Temperature Limits
The underlying purpose of Appendix G to 10 CFR part 50 is to
provide an acceptable margin of safety against brittle failure of the
RCS during any condition of normal operation to which the pressure
boundary may be subjected over its service lifetime. Appendix G to 10
CFR part 50 requires, in part, that P-T limits be established for the
reactor coolant pressure boundary during normal operating and
hydrostatic or leak rate testing conditions. As stated above, the NRC
staff finds that the P-T limits in the licensee's PTLR will remain
applicable (i.e., through 30 EFPY) beyond the expected plant operation
of Beaver Valley 2 (i.e., ~29.4 EFPY). However, if a change to the P-T
limits is necessary prior to the expected date in which Beaver Valley 2
ceases operation, the NRC staff identified that TS 5.6.4 provides the
necessary administrative controls to ensure changes will be implemented
in accordance with methodology approved in the PTLR such that the
requirements for P-T limits in Appendix G to 10 CFR part 50 will
continue to be satisfied.
Since the licensee plans to permanently cease power operation of
Beaver Valley 2 by October 31, 2021 (i.e., approximately 5.5 years
prior to the end of the original 40-year operating license), the NRC
staff finds that the testing and submittal of the summary report for
Capsule Y do not serve the underlying purpose to provide an acceptable
margin of safety against brittle failure of the RCS during any
condition of normal operation as it relates to P-T limits for the
continued plant operation of Beaver Valley 2 through October 31, 2021.
10 CFR Part 50.61
The regulations in 10 CFR 50.61 require, in part, that for each
pressurized-water nuclear power reactor, the licensee shall have
projected values of RTPTS for each reactor vessel beltline
material using the end-of-life fluence for that material. As stated
above, the licensee has demonstrated that the RTPTS values
for all beltline and extended beltline region materials of the Beaver
Valley 2 reactor vessel are less than the applicable screening
criterion established in 10 CFR 50.61 through the continued plant
operation of Beaver Valley 2 (October 31, 2021).
Since the licensee plans to permanently cease power operation of
Beaver Valley 2 by October 31, 2021 (i.e., approximately 5.5 years
prior to
[[Page 27371]]
the end of the original 40-year operating license), the NRC staff finds
that the testing and submittal of the summary report for Capsule Y does
not serve the underlying purpose to prevent potential failure of the
reactor vessel as a result of postulated PTS events for the continued
plant operation of Beaver Valley 2 through October 31, 2021.
Conclusion
Based on the above, the NRC staff concludes that the underlying
purpose of Appendix H to 10 CFR part 50 and its function to provide
fracture toughness data for the evaluations required by Appendix G to
10 CFR part 50 and 10 CFR 50.61 have been achieved for the original 40-
year license period of Beaver Valley 2, which will permanently cease
operation by October 31, 2021 (i.e., prior to the end of the original
40-year license period).
E. Environmental Considerations.
The NRC staff has determined that the proposed exemption meets the
eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR
51.22(c)(25). Therefore, in accordance with 10 CFR 51.22(b), no
environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be
prepared in connection with the proposed issuance of this exemption
request. The basis for the NRC staff's determination is discussed below
with an evaluation against each of the requirements in 10 CFR
51.22(c)(25).
Requirements in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(25)(i)
An evaluation of the issue of no significant hazards consideration,
as provided by the licensee, is presented below:
1. Does the proposed exemption involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequence of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No
The proposed exemption has no effect on facility structures,
systems, and components (SSCs), the capability of any facility SSC
to perform its design function, or plant operations, and, therefore,
would not increase the likelihood of a malfunction of any facility
SSC or increase the consequences of previously evaluated accidents.
The proposed exemption does not alter any assumptions or methodology
associated with the previously evaluated accidents in the BVPS
[Beaver Valley Power Station] Updated Final Safety Analysis Report.
The proposed exemption will not affect the probability of occurrence
of any previously analyzed accident.
Therefore, there is no increase in the probability or
consequence of any previously evaluated accident.
2. Does the proposed exemption create the possibility of a new
or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated?
Response: No
The proposed exemption does not involve a physical alteration of
the facility. No new or different type of equipment will be
installed, and there are no physical modifications to existing
equipment associated with the proposed exemption.
Similarly, the proposed exemption would not physically alter any
SSCs involved in the mitigation of any accidents. Thus, no new
initiators or precursors of a new or different kind of accident are
created. Furthermore, the proposed exemption does not create the
possibility of a new accident as a result of new failure modes
associated with any equipment or personnel failures. No changes are
being made to the facilities' normal parameters or in protective or
mitigative action setpoints, and no new failure modes are being
introduced.
Therefore, the proposed exemption does not create the
possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident
previously evaluated.
3. Does the proposed exemption involve a significant reduction
in a margin of safety?
Response: No
The proposed exemption does not alter the design basis or any
safety limits for BVPS-2, nor does it impact station operation or
any facility SSC that is relied upon for accident mitigation.
Therefore, the proposed exemption does not involve a significant
reduction in a margin of safety.
The NRC staff evaluated the issue of no significant hazards
consideration using the standards described in 10 CFR 50.92(c). Based
on the above evaluation, the NRC staff has determined that the three
standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff
concludes that the proposed exemption involves no significant hazards
consideration, and the requirements of 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9)(i) are met.
Requirements in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(25)(ii) through (v)
The proposed exemption from testing and the associated report
submittal activities for the Beaver Valley 2 reactor vessel Capsule Y
does not involve any physical plant modifications and would not alter
operation of any plant systems. As such, the NRC staff concludes that
granting the proposed exemption: (1) would not result in a significant
change in the types or significant increase in the amounts of any
effluents that may be released offsite (i.e., satisfies the provisions
of 10 CFR 51.22(c)(25)(ii)); (2) would not result in a significant
increase in individual or cumulative public or occupational radiation
exposure (i.e., satisfies the provisions of 10 CFR 51.22(c)(25)(iii));
(3) would have no significant construction impact (i.e., satisfies the
provisions of 10 CFR 51.22(c)(25)(iv)); and (4) would not result in a
significant increase in the potential for or consequences from a
radiological accident (i.e., satisfies the provisions of 10 CFR
51.22(c)(25)(v)).
Requirements in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(25)(i)
The proposed exemption involves the testing and reporting
requirements of the Beaver Valley 2 reactor vessel surveillance
program. Performance of the scheduled capsule testing is a surveillance
requirement, therefore satisfying the provisions of 10 CFR
51.22(c)(25)(vi)(C).
Conclusion
Based on the above, the NRC staff concludes that the proposed
exemption meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set
forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(25)(i) through (vi). Therefore, pursuant to 10
CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental
assessment is required to be prepared in connection with the proposed
issuance of the exemption.
IV. Conclusion
Accordingly, the Commission has determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR
50.12, the exemption is authorized by law, will not present an undue
risk to the public health and safety, and is consistent with the common
defense and security. Also, special circumstances are present.
Therefore, the Commission hereby grants FENOC a permanent exemption
from Section IV.A of Appendix H to 10 CFR part 50 for testing and the
submittal of a summary technical report (regarding capsule withdrawal
and capsule test results) for reactor vessel Capsule Y to the NRC
within 1 year of the capsule withdrawal for Beaver Valley 2.
V. Availability of Documents
The documents identified in the following table are available to
interested persons through the NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and
Management System (ADAMS).
[[Page 27372]]
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Title Date ADAMS accession No.
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FENOC letter to the NRC, 12/18/2018 ML18352A684
Request for Exemption from
Specific Provisions in
Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50.
FENOC letter to the NRC, 4/25/2018 ML18115A007
Certification of Permanent
Cessation of Power
Operations for Beaver Valley
Power Station, Unit Nos. 1
and 2; Davis-Besse Nuclear
Power Station, Unit No.1;
and Perry Nuclear Power
Plant, Unit No. 1.
NRC letter to FENOC, Issuance 11/5/2009 ML092920015 *
of Renewed Facility
Operating License No. NPF-73
for the Beaver Valley Power
Station, Unit 2 (TAC No.
MD6593).
WCAP-16527-NP, Revision 0, 3/2006 ML061020406
Analysis of Capsule X from
FENOC Nuclear Operating
Company Beaver Valley Unit 2
Reactor Vessel Radiation
Surveillance Program.
WCAP-16527-NP, Supplement 1, 9/2011 ML13151A060
Revision 1, Enclosure C,
Analysis of Capsule X from
FENOC Nuclear Operating
Company Beaver Valley Unit 2
Reactor Vessel Radiation
Surveillance Program.
NUREG-1929, Volume 2, Safety 10/2009 ML093000278
Evaluation Report Related to
the License Renewal of
Beaver Valley Power Station,
Units 1 and 2.
NRC letter to FENOC, Beaver 7/15/2003 ML031960399
Valley Power Station, Unit
Nos. 1 and 2--Issuance of
Amendment Re: Creation of
Pressure-Temperature Limits
Report (TAC Nos. MB3319 and
MB3320).
FENOC letter to the NRC, 5/12/2014 ML14133A107
Beaver Valley Power Station,
Unit Nos. 1 and 22--Pressure
and Temperature Limits
Reports and Unit 2, Cycle
18, Core Operating Limits
Report.
WCAP-17790-NP, Revision 1, 1/27/2014 ML14030A135
Enclosure B, PWR Vessel
Internals Program Plan for
Aging Management of Reactor
Internals at Beaver Valley
Power Station Unit 2.
NRC letter to FENOC, Beaver 10/7/2016 ML15363A383
Valley Power Station, Unit
Nos. 1 and 2--Staff
Assessment of the Reactor
Vessel Internals Aging
Management Program Plans
(CAC Nos. MF3416 and MF3417).
------------------------------------------------------------------------
* (Package).
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 5th day of June 2019.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
/RA/
Craig G. Erlanger,
Director, Division of Operating Reactor Licensing, Office of Nuclear
Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 2019-12324 Filed 6-11-19; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P