[Federal Register Volume 84, Number 72 (Monday, April 15, 2019)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 15296-15444]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2019-05972]
[[Page 15295]]
Vol. 84
Monday,
No. 72
April 15, 2019
Part II
Department of Transportation
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Federal Aviation Administration
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14 CFR Parts 401, 404, 413, et al.
Streamlined Launch and Reentry Licensing Requirements; Proposed Rule
Federal Register / Vol. 84 , No. 72 / Monday, April 15, 2019 /
Proposed Rules
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Parts 401, 404, 413, 414, 415, 417, 420, 431, 433, 435, 437,
440, and 450
[Docket No.: FAA-2019-0229; Notice No. 19-01]
RIN 2120-AL17
Streamlined Launch and Reentry Licensing Requirements
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).
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SUMMARY: This rulemaking would streamline and increase flexibility in
the FAA's commercial space launch and reentry regulations, and remove
obsolete requirements. This action would consolidate and revise
multiple regulatory parts and apply a single set of licensing and
safety regulations across several types of operations and vehicles. The
proposed rule would describe the requirements to obtain a vehicle
operator license, the safety requirements, and the terms and conditions
of a vehicle operator license.
DATES: Send comments on or before June 14, 2019.
ADDRESSES: Send comments identified by docket number FAA-2019-0229
using any of the following methods:
Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to http://www.regulations.gov and
follow the online instructions for sending your comments
electronically.
Mail: Send comments to Docket Operations, M-30; U.S. Department of
Transportation (DOT), 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Room W12-140, West
Building Ground Floor, Washington, DC 20590-0001.
Hand Delivery or Courier: Take comments to Docket Operations in
Room W12-140 of the West Building Ground Floor at 1200 New Jersey
Avenue SE, Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through
Friday, except Federal holidays.
Fax: Fax comments to Docket Operations at 202-493-2251.
Privacy: In accordance with 5 U.S.C. 553(c), DOT solicits comments
from the public to better inform its rulemaking process. DOT posts
these comments, without edit, including any personal information the
commenter provides, to www.regulations.gov, as described in the system
of records notice (DOT/ALL-14 FDMS), which can be reviewed at
www.dot.gov/privacy.
Docket: Background documents or comments received may be read at
http://www.regulations.gov at any time. Follow the online instructions
for accessing the docket or go to the Docket Operations in Room W12-140
of the West Building Ground Floor at 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE,
Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday,
except Federal holidays.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For questions concerning this action,
contact Randy Repcheck, Office of Commercial Space Transportation,
Federal Aviation Administration, 800 Independence Avenue SW,
Washington, DC 205914; telephone (202) 267-8760; email
[email protected].
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Authority for This Rulemaking
The Commercial Space Launch Act of 1984, as amended and codified at
51 U.S.C. 50901-50923 (the Act), authorizes the Department of
Transportation, and the FAA through delegation, to oversee, license,
and regulate commercial launch and reentry activities, and the
operation of launch and reentry sites as carried out by U.S. citizens
or within the United States. Section 50905 directs the FAA to exercise
this responsibility consistent with public health and safety, safety of
property, and the national security and foreign policy interests of the
United States. In addition, section 50903 requires the FAA encourage,
facilitate, and promote commercial space launches and reentries by the
private sector.
If adopted as proposed, this rulemaking would consolidate and
revise multiple regulatory parts to apply a single set of licensing and
safety regulations across several types of operations and vehicles. It
would also streamline the commercial space regulations by, among other
things, replacing many prescriptive regulations with performance-based
rules, giving industry greater flexibility to develop means of
compliance that maximize their business objectives while maintaining
public safety. Because this rulemaking would amend the FAA's launch and
reentry requirements, it falls under the authority delegated by the
Act.
List of Abbreviations and Acronyms Frequently Used in This Document
AC--Advisory Circular
CEC--Conditional expected casualty
EC--Expected casualty
ELOS determination--Equivalent-level-of-safety determination
ELV--Expendable launch vehicle
FSA--Flight safety analysis
FSS--Flight safety system
PC--Probability of casualty
PI--Probability of impact
RLV--Reusable launch vehicle
Table of Contents
I. Overview of Proposed Rule
II. Background
A. History
B. Licensing Process
C. National Space Council
D. Streamlined Launch and Reentry Licensing Requirements
Aviation Rulemaking Committee
III. Discussion of the Proposal
A. The FAA's Approach To Updating and Streamlining Launch and
Reentry Regulations
B. Single Vehicle Operator License
C. Performance-Based Requirements and Means of Compliance
D. Launch From a Federal Launch Range
E. Safety Framework
Flight Safety
A. Public Safety Criteria
1. Neighboring Operations Personnel
2. Property Protection (Critical Assets)
3. Consequence Protection Criteria for Flight Abort and Flight
Safety System
B. System Safety Program
1. Safety Organization
2. Procedures
3. Configuration Management and Control
4. Post-Flight Data Review
C. Preliminary Safety Assessment for Flight
D. Hazard Control Strategy
E. Flight Abort
1. Flight Safety Limits and Uncontrolled Areas
2. Flight Abort Rules
3. Flight Safety System
F. Flight Hazard Analysis
G. Computing Systems and Software Overview
H. Hybrid Launch Vehicles
I. Flight Safety Analysis Overview
J. Safety-Critical Systems
1. Safety-Critical Systems Design, Test, and Documentation
2. Flight Safety System
K. Other Prescribed Hazard Controls
1. Agreements
2. Safety-Critical Personnel Qualifications
3. Work Shift and Rest Requirements
4. Radio Frequency Management
5. Readiness: Reviews and Rehearsals
6. Communications
7. Preflight Procedures
8. Surveillance and Publication of Hazard Areas
9. Lightning Hazard Mitigation
10. Flight Safety Rules
11. Tracking
12. Launch and Reentry Collision Avoidance Analysis Requirements
13. Safety at End of Launch
14. Mishaps: Definition, Plan, Reporting, Response,
Investigation, Test-Induced Damage
L. Pre- and Post-Flight Reporting
1. Preflight Reporting
2. Post-Flight Reporting
Ground Safety
A. Definition and Scope of Launch
B. Ground Safety Requirements
Process Improvements
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A. Safety Element Approval
B. Incremental Review of a License Application
C. Time Frames
D. Continuing Accuracy of License Application and Modification
of License
Other Changes
A. Pre-Application Consultation
B. Policy Review and Approval
C. Payload Review and Determination
D. Safety Review and Approval
E. Environmental Review
F. Additional License Terms and Conditions, Transfer of a
Vehicle Operator License, Rights Not Conferred by a Vehicle Operator
License
G. Unique Safety Policies, Requirements, and Practices
H. Compliance Monitoring
I. Registration of Space Objects
J. Public Safety Responsibility, Compliance With License,
Records, Financial Responsibility, and Human Spaceflight
Requirements
K. Applicability
L. Equivalent Level of Safety
Additional Technical Justification and Rationale
A. Flight Safety Analyses
1. Scope and Applicability
2. Flight Safety Analysis Methods
3. Trajectory Analysis for Normal Flight
4. Trajectory Analysis for Malfunction Flight
5. Debris Analysis
6. Flight Safety Limits Analysis
7. Gate Analysis
8. Data Loss Flight Time and Planned Safe Flight State Analyses
9. Time Delay Analysis
10. Probability of Failure
11. Flight Hazard Areas
12. Debris Risk Analysis
13. Far-Field Overpressure Blast Effects
14. Toxic Hazards for Flight
15. Wind Weighting for the Flight of an Unguided Suborbital
Launch Vehicle
B. Software
C. Changes to Parts 401, 413, 414, 420, 437, 440
1. Part 401--Definitions
2. Part 413--Application Procedures
3. Part 414--Safety Element Approvals
4. Part 420--License To Operate a Launch Site
6. Part 437--Experimental Permits
7. Part 440--Financial Responsibility
IV. Regulatory Notices and Analyses
A. Regulatory Evaluation
B. Regulatory Flexibility Determination
C. International Trade Impact Assessment
D. Unfunded Mandates Assessment
E. Paperwork Reduction Act
F. International Compatibility
G. Environmental Analysis
V. Executive Order Determinations
A. Executive Order 13132, Federalism
B. Executive Order 13211, Regulations That Significantly Affect
Energy Supply, Distribution, or Use
C. Executive Order 13609, International Cooperation
D. Executive Order 13771, Reducing Regulation and Controlling
Regulatory Costs
VI. Additional Information
A. Comments Invited
B. Availability of Rulemaking Documents
The Proposed Amendment
I. Overview of Proposed Rule
The FAA commercial space transportation regulations protect public
health and safety and the safety of property from the hazards of launch
and reentry. In addition, the regulations address national security and
foreign policy interests of the United States, financial
responsibility, environmental impacts, informed consent for crew and
space flight participants, and, to a limited extent, authorization of
payloads not otherwise regulated or owned by the U.S. Government. The
FAA is proposing this deregulatory action consistent with President
Donald J. Trump's Space Policy Directive--2 (SPD-2) ``Streamlining
Regulations on Commercial Use of Space.'' \1\ The directive charged the
Department of Transportation with revising regulations to require a
single license for all types of commercial space flight operations and
replace prescriptive requirements with performance-based criteria.
Streamlining these regulations would lower administrative burden and
regulatory compliance costs and bolster the U.S. space commercial
sector and industrial base.
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\1\ Space Policy Directive--2, Streamlining Regulations on
Commercial Use of Space; May 24, 2018 (https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/space-policy-directive-2-streamlining-regulations-commercial-use-space/).
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Additionally, this proposed rule incorporates industry input and
recommendations provided primarily by the Streamlined Launch and
Reentry Licensing Requirements Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC). The
subject proposed rule would implement the applicable section of SPD-2
and address industry. The recommendation report is provided in the
docket for this rulemaking.
Current regulations setting forth application procedures and
requirements for commercial space transportation licensing were based
largely on the distinction between expendable and reusable launch
vehicles. Specifically, title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (14
CFR) parts 415 and 417 address the launch of expendable launch vehicles
(ELVs) and are based on the Federal launch range standards developed in
the 1990s. Part 431 addresses the launch and reentry of reusable launch
vehicles (RLVs), and part 435 addresses the reentry of reentry vehicles
other than RLVs. Parts 431 and 435 are primarily process-based, relying
on a license applicant to derive safety requirements through a ``system
safety'' process. That being said, the FAA has used the more detailed
part 417 requirements to inform parts 431 and 435. While these separate
regulatory parts and requirements satisfied the need of the commercial
space transportation industry at the time they were issued,\2\ the
industry has changed and continues to evolve.
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\2\ The current 14 CFR parts 415, 417, 431, and 435 regulatory
text can be found at https://www.ecfr.gov/ under their respective
links. The eCFR contains Federal Register citations for each time a
regulation is modified by rulemaking.
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The FAA proposes to consolidate, update, and streamline all launch
and reentry regulations into a single performance-based part to better
fit today's fast-evolving commercial space transportation industry.
Proposed part 450 would include regulations applicable to all launch
and reentry vehicles, whether they have reusable components or not. The
FAA looked to balance the regulatory certainty but rigidity of current
ELV regulations with the flexibility but vagueness of current RLV
regulations. As a result, these proposed regulations are flexible and
scalable to accommodate innovative safety approaches while also
protecting public health and safety, safety of property, and the
national security and foreign policy interests of the United States.
The FAA proposes to continue reviewing licenses in five component
parts: Policy review, payload review, safety review, maximum probable
loss determination, and environmental review. However, after consulting
with the FAA, applicants would have the option of submitting portions
of applications for incremental review and approval by the FAA. In
terms of the applications themselves, the FAA has streamlined and
better defined application requirements.
In terms of safety requirements, the FAA would maintain a high
level of safety. Neighboring operations requirements would result in a
minimal risk increase compared to current regulations, offset by
operational benefits. The FAA would anchor the proposed requirements on
public safety criteria. The FAA would continue to use the current
collective and individual risk criteria. However, this proposal would
implement risk criteria for neighboring operations personnel, critical
asset protection, and conditional risk to protect from an unlikely but
catastrophic event.\3\ In particular, the
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conditional risk would be used to determine the need for a flight
safety system \4\ and the reliability of that system. To meet these
public safety criteria, most operators would have the option of using
traditional hazard controls or to derive alternate controls through a
system safety approach. These rules would also revise quantitative
flight safety analyses to better define their applicability and to
reduce the level of prescriptiveness. In terms of ground safety, the
FAA has scoped its oversight to better fit the safety risks and to
increase operator flexibility.
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\3\ As will be discussed later, ``neighboring operations
personnel'' would be defined as those members of the public located
within a launch or reentry site, or an adjacent launch or reentry
site, who are not associated with a specific hazardous licensed or
permitted operation currently being conducted but are required to
perform safety, security, or critical tasks at the site and are
notified of the operation. ``Critical asset'' means an asset that is
essential to the national interests of the United States. Critical
assets include property, facilities, or infrastructure necessary to
maintain national defense, or assured access to space for national
priority missions. For ``conditional risk,'' the FAA would require
that operators quantify the consequence of a catastrophic event, by
calculating the conditional risk as conditional expected casualties
for any one-second period of flight. Unlike collective risk that
determines the expected casualties factoring in the probability that
a dangerous event will occur, conditional risk determines the
expected casualties assuming the dangerous event will occur.
\4\ The FAA proposes to revise the definition in Sec. 401.5 of
``flight safety system'' to mean a system used to implement flight
abort. A human can be a part of a flight safety system. The proposed
definition is discussed later in this preamble.
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To satisfy the proposed performance-based regulations, operators
would be able to use a means of compliance that has already been
accepted by the FAA or propose an alternate approach. To retain the
maximum flexibility to adjust to dynamic industry changes, the FAA
would continue to offer operators the choice to request waivers of
regulations and equivalent level of safety determinations.
The proposed rule is a deregulatory action under Executive Order
13771.\5\ This deregulatory action would consolidate and revise
multiple commercial space regulatory parts to apply a single set of
licensing and safety regulations across several types of operations and
vehicles. It would also replace many prescriptive regulations with
performance-based regulations, giving industry greater flexibility to
develop a means of compliance that maximizes their business objectives.
This proposed rule would result in net cost savings for industry and
enable future innovation in U.S. commercial space transportation.
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\5\ Executive Order 13771, Reducing Regulation and Controlling
Regulatory Costs, January 30, 2017, (https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/presidential-executive-order-reducing-regulation-controlling-regulatory-costs/).
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At the time of writing, the FAA estimates this proposed rule would
affect 12 operators that have an active license or permit to conduct
launch or reentry operations. In addition, the FAA estimates this
proposed rule would affect approximately 276 launches over the next 5
years (2019 through 2023). The FAA anticipates this proposed rule would
reduce the costs of current and future launch operations by removing
prescriptive requirements that are burdensome to meet or require a
waiver. The FAA expects these changes would lead to more efficient
launch operations and have a positive effect on expanding the number of
future launch and reentry operations.
Based on the preliminary analysis, the FAA estimates industry
stands to gain about $19 million in discounted present value net
savings over 5 years or about $5 million in annualized net savings
(using a discount rate of 7 percent). In addition, the FAA will save
about $1 million in the same time period. The FAA expects industry will
gain additional unquantified savings and benefits as the proposed rule
is implemented, since it would provide flexibility and scalability
through performance-based requirements that would reduce the future
cost of innovation and improve the efficiency and productivity of U.S.
commercial space transportation.\6\
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\6\ 51 U.S.C. 50904 grants the FAA authority to oversee,
license, and regulate commercial launch and reentry activities, and
the operation of launch and reentry sites as carried out by U.S.
citizens or within the United States.
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Throughout this document, the FAA uses scientific notation to
indicate probabilities. For example, 1 x 10-\2\ means one in
a hundred and 1 x 10-\6\ means one in a million.
II. Background
A. History
As noted earlier, the Act authorizes the Secretary of
Transportation to oversee, license, and regulate commercial launch and
reentry activities and the operation of launch and reentry sites as
carried out by U.S. citizens or within the United States. The Act
directs the Secretary to exercise this responsibility consistent with
public health and safety, safety of property, and the national security
and foreign policy interests of the United States, and to encourage,
facilitate, and promote commercial space launches by the private
sector. The FAA carries out the Secretary's responsibilities under the
Act.
In the past 30 years, the Department of Transportation (DOT)
regulations addressing launch and reentry have gone through a number of
iterations intended to be responsive to an emerging industry while at
the same time ensuring public safety. A review of this history is
provided to put this rulemaking in perspective.
1. First Licensing Regulations in 1988
DOT's first licensing regulations for commercial launch activities
became effective over 30 years ago, on April 4, 1988. The regulations
replaced previous guidance and constituted the procedural framework for
reviewing and authorizing all proposals to conduct non-Federal launch
activities, including the launching of launch vehicles, operation of
launch sites, and payload activities that were not licensed by other
federal agencies. They included general administrative procedures and a
revised compilation of DOT's information requirements.
No licensed launches had yet taken place when DOT initially issued
these regulations. Accordingly, DOT established a flexible regime
intended to be responsive to an emerging industry while at the same
time ensuring public safety. This approach worked well because all
commercial launches at the time took place from Federal launch ranges
where safety practices were well established and had proven effective
in protecting public safety. In 1991, when the industry reached about
ten launches a year, DOT took further steps designed to simplify the
licensing process for launch operators with established safety records
by instituting a launch operator license, which allowed one license to
cover a series of launches where the same safety resources support
identical or similar missions.
2. Licensing Changes in 1999
On June 21, 1999,\7\ the FAA amended its commercial space
transportation licensing regulations to clarify its license application
process generally, and for launches from Federal launch ranges
specifically. The FAA intended the regulations to provide an applicant
or an operator with greater specificity and clarity regarding the scope
of a license and to codify and amend licensing requirements and
criteria. Notable changes were dividing launch into preflight and
flight activities; defining launch to begin with the arrival of the
launch vehicle or its major components at a U.S. launch site;
separating what had been a safety and mission review into a safety,
policy, and
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payload review; and the addition of a specific requirement to
``passivate'' any vehicle stage left on orbit to avoid the potential of
creating orbital debris through a subsequent explosion.
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\7\ Commercial Space Transportation Licensing Regulations, Final
Rule. 64 FR 19586 (April 21, 1999).
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3. Reusable Launch Vehicle Regulations in 2000
In the mid-1990s, prospective RLV operators identified the absence
of adequate regulatory oversight over RLV operations, particularly
their reentry, as an impediment to technology development. The need for
a stable and predictable regulatory environment in which RLVs could
operate was considered critical to the capability of the emerging RLV
industry to obtain the capital investment necessary for research and
development and ultimately vehicle operations. The Commercial Space Act
of 1998, Public Law 105-303, extended DOT's licensing authority to the
reentry of reentry vehicles and the operation of reentry sites by non-
Federal entities. In September 2000, the FAA amended the commercial
space transportation licensing regulations by establishing requirements
for the launch of an RLV, the reentry of a reentry vehicle, and the
operation of launch and reentry sites.\8\
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\8\ Commercial Space Transportation Reusable Launch Vehicle and
Reentry Licensing Regulations, Final Rule. 65 FR 56617 (September
19, 2000).
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At the time, the FAA believed that the differences between ELVs and
RLVs justified a different regulatory approach. There was a long
history of successful ELV launches from Federal launch ranges using
detailed prescriptive regulations, encouraging the FAA to follow suit.
Also, ELVs and RLVs used different means of terminating flight. ELV
launches typically relied on flight safety systems (FSS) that
terminated flight to ensure flight safety by preventing a vehicle from
traveling beyond approved limits. Unlike an ELV, the FAA contemplated
that an RLV might rely upon other means of ending vehicle flight, such
as returning to the launch site or using an alternative landing site,
in case the vehicle might not be able to safely conclude a mission as
planned. Importantly, other than NASA's Space Shuttle, there was little
experience with RLVs. For these reasons, the FAA decided to enact
flexible process-based regulations for RLVs and other reentry vehicles.
These regulations reside in 14 CFR parts 431 and 435.
4. Further Regulatory Changes in 2006
The last major change to FAA launch regulations occurred in
2006.\9\ The FAA believed that it would be advantageous for its ELV
regulations to be consistent with Federal launch range requirements and
worked with the United States Air Force (Air Force) and the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) to codify safety practices
for ELVs. Those regulations reside in 14 CFR parts 415 and 417. The
2006 rule also codified safety responsibilities and requirements that
applied to any licensed launch, regardless of whether the launch occurs
from a Federal launch range or a non-Federal launch site.
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\9\ Licensing and Safety Requirements for Launch, Final Rule. 71
FR 50508 (August 25, 2006).
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In developing the technical requirements, the FAA built on the
safety success of Federal launch ranges and sought to achieve their
same high level of safety by using Federal launch range practices as a
basis for FAA regulations consistent with its authority. The
regulations specified detailed processes, procedures, analyses, and
general safety system design requirements. For safety-critical hardware
and software, where necessary, the rule provided design and detailed
test requirements. The FAA attempted to provide flexibility by allowing
a launch operator the opportunity to demonstrate an alternative means
of achieving an equivalent level of safety.
5. Evolution of Launch Vehicles and the Need for Updated and
Streamlined Regulations
Since 2006, the differences between ELVs and RLVs have blurred.
Vehicles that utilize traditional flight safety systems now are
partially reusable. For example, the Falcon 9 first stage, launched by
Space Exploration Technologies Corporation (SpaceX), routinely returns
to the launch site or lands on a barge, and other operators are
developing launch vehicles with similar return and reuse capabilities.
Although the reuse of safety critical systems or components can have
public safety implications, labeling a launch vehicle as expendable or
reusable has not impacted the primary approach necessary to protect
public safety, certainly not to the extent suggested in the differences
between part 431 and parts 415 and 417.
Moreover, the regulations for ELV launches in parts 415 and 417
have proven to be too prescriptive and one-size-fits-all, and the
significant detail has caused the regulations to become obsolete in
many instances. For example, part 417 requires all launch operators to
have at least 11 plans that define how launch processing and flight of
a launch vehicle will be conducted, each with detailed requirements.
This can lead an operator to produce documents that are not necessary
to conduct safe launch operations. In contrast, the regulations for RLV
launches have proven to be too general, lacking regulatory clarity. For
example, part 431 does not contain specificity regarding the
qualification of flight safety systems, acceptable methods for flight
safety analyses, and ground safety requirements. This lack of clarity
can cause delays in the application process to allow for discussions
between the FAA and the applicant. Operators frequently rely upon the
requirements in part 417 to demonstrate compliance.
Since 2015, the launch rate has only increased, from 9 licensed
launches a year to 33 licensed launches in 2018. Beginning in 2016, the
FAA developed a comprehensive strategy to consolidate and streamline
the regulatory parts associated with commercial space launch and
reentry operations and licensing of space vehicles. Actions by the
National Space Council confirmed and accelerated FAA rulemaking plans
regarding launch and reentry licenses.
B. Licensing Process
When it issues a license, the Act requires the FAA to do so
consistent with public health and safety, safety of property, and
national security and foreign policy interests of the United
States.\10\ The FAA currently conducts its licensing application review
in five component parts: Policy Review, Payload Review, Safety Review,
Maximum Probable Loss Determination, and Environmental Review. The
license application review is depicted in figure 1. A policy review, in
consultation with other government agencies, determines whether the
launch or reentry would jeopardize U.S. national security or foreign
policy interests, or international obligations of the United States. A
payload review, also in consultation with other government agencies,
determines whether the launch or reentry of a payload would jeopardize
public health and safety, safety of property, U.S. national security or
the foreign policy interests, or international obligations of the
United States. A safety review examines whether the launch or reentry
would jeopardize public health and safety and safety of property, and
typically is the most extensive part of FAA's review. The Act also
requires the FAA to determine financial responsibility of the licensee
for third party liability and losses to U.S. Government property based
on the maximum probable loss. Lastly, the National Environmental Policy
Act requires the FAA to consider and
[[Page 15300]]
document the potential environmental effects associated with issuing a
launch or reentry license.
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\10\ 51 U.S.C. 50905(a).
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP15AP19.000
This proposal would not alter this 5-pronged approach to licensing.
Although the FAA usually evaluates components concurrently, as noted
later in this preamble, the FAA may make separate determinations after
considering the interrelationship between the components. For instance,
this proposal would allow an applicant to apply for a Safety Review
component in an incremental manner. This preamble will discuss the
proposed incremental review process in further detail later.
C. National Space Council
The National Space Council was established by President George H.W.
Bush on April 20, 1989 by Executive Order 12675 to have oversight of
U.S. national space policy and its implementation. Chaired by Vice
President Dan Quayle until its disbanding in 1993, the first National
Space Council consisted of the Secretaries of State, Treasury, Defense,
Commerce, Transportation, Energy, the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget, the Chief of Staff to the President, the
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the Assistant
to the President for Science and Technology, the Director of Central
Intelligence, and the NASA Administrator.
On June 30, 2017, President Donald J. Trump signed Executive Order
13803, which reestablished the National Space Council to provide a
coordinated process for developing and monitoring the implementation of
national space policy and strategy. The newly-reinstituted body met for
the first time on October 5, 2017. As Chair of the Council, the Vice
President directed the Secretaries of Transportation and Commerce, and
the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, to conduct a
review of the U.S. regulatory framework for commercial space activities
and report back within 45 days with a plan to remove barriers to
commercial space enterprises. The assigned reports and recommendations
for regulatory streamlining were presented at the second convening of
the National Space Council on February 21, 2018. The Council approved
four recommendations, including DOT's recommendation that the launch
and reentry regulations should be reformed into a consolidated,
performance-based licensing regime.
On May 24, 2018, the Council memorialized its recommendations in
SPD-2. SPD-2 instructed the Secretary of Transportation to publish for
notice and comment proposed rules rescinding or revising the launch and
reentry licensing regulations, no later than February 1, 2019. SPD-2
charged the Department with revising the regulations such that they
would require a single license for all types of commercial space flight
operations and replace prescriptive requirements with performance-based
criteria. SPD-2 further commended the Secretary to coordinate with the
members of the National Space Council, especially the Secretary of
Defense and the NASA Administrator, to minimize requirements associated
with commercial space flight launch and reentry operations from Federal
launch ranges as appropriate.
D. Streamlined Launch and Reentry Licensing Requirements Aviation
Rulemaking Committee
On March 8, 2018, the FAA chartered the Streamlined Launch and
Reentry Licensing Requirements Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC) to
provide a forum to discuss regulations to set forth procedures and
requirements for commercial space transportation launch and reentry
licensing. The FAA tasked the ARC to develop recommendations for a
performance-based regulatory approach in which the
[[Page 15301]]
regulations set forth the safety objectives to be achieved while
providing the applicant with the flexibility to produce tailored and
innovative means of compliance.
The ARC's membership represented a broad range of stakeholder
perspectives, including members from aviation and space communities.
The ARC was supported by the FAA and other federal agency subject
matter experts. The following table identifies ARC participants from
the private sector:
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Aerospace industries association.
Airlines for America.
Alaska Aerospace Corporation.
Astra Space.
Blue Origin.
Boeing.
Coalition for Deep Space Exploration.
Commercial Spaceflight Federation.
Exos Aerospace Systems & Technologies, Inc.
Generation Orbit.
Lockheed Martin Corporation.
MLA Space, LLC.
Mojave air and spaceport.
Orbital ATK.
RocketLab.
Sierra Nevada Corp.
Spaceport America.
SpaceX.
Space Florida.
Stratolaunch.
United Launch Alliance.
Vector Launch, Inc.
Virgin Galactic/Virgin Orbit.
World View Enterprises.
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On April 30, 2018, the ARC produced its final recommendation
report, which has been placed in the docket to this rulemaking.\11\ The
ARC recommended that the proposed regulations should--
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\11\ Streamlined Launch and Reentry Licensing Requirements ARC,
Recommendations Final Report (April 30, 2008). The ARC Report is
available for reference in the docket for this proposed rule.
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1. Be performance-based, primarily based upon the ability of the
applicant to comply with expected casualty limits.
2. Be flexible.
i. Adopt a single license structure to accommodate a variety of
vehicle types and operations and launch or reentry sites.
ii. Allow for coordinated determination of applicable regulations
prior to the application submission.
iii. Develop regulations that can be met without waivers.
iv. Use guidance documents to facilitate frequent updates.
3. Reform the pre-application consultation process and
requirements.
i. Use ``complete enough'' as the real criterion for entering
application evaluation and remove the requirement for pre-application
consultation.
ii. Use a level-of-rigor approach to scope an applicant-requested
pre-application consultation process as the basis for a ``complete
enough'' determination, considering both an applicant's prior
experience and whether the subject vehicle is known or unknown.
4. Contain defined review timelines.
i. Support significantly-reduced timelines and more efficient
review.
ii. Increase predictability for industry.
iii. Create reduced review timelines for both new and continuing
accuracy submissions.
5. Contain continuing accuracy requirements. Continuing accuracy
submissions should be based upon impact to public safety as measured by
the Expected Casualty (EC).
6. Limit FAA jurisdiction.
i. Limit FAA jurisdiction to activities so publicly hazardous as to
warrant FAA-oversight.
ii. Identify well-defined inspection criteria.
7. Eliminate duplicative jurisdiction on Federal launch ranges.
The FAA will address these recommendations in more detail
throughout the remainder of this document.
During the course of the ARC, volunteer industry members formed a
Task Group to provide draft regulatory text reflecting proposed
revisions to the commercial space transportation regulations. The
volunteer industry members of the Task Group were Blue Origin, Sierra
Nevada Corporation, Space Florida, and SpaceX. The majority of the ARC
opposed the formation of this Task Group and disagreed with including
the proposed regulatory text into the ARC's recommendation report. The
FAA will not specifically address the proposed regulatory text in this
document because it did not receive broad consensus within the ARC.
III. Discussion of the Proposal
A. The FAA's Approach To Updating and Streamlining Launch and Reentry
Regulations
The FAA's approach to meeting SPD-2's mandate is to consolidate,
update, and streamline all launch and reentry regulations into a single
performance-based part. Pursuant to SPD-2, and in the interest of
updating the FAA's regulations to reflect the current commercial space
industry, the FAA proposes to consolidate requirements for the launch
and reentry of ELVs, RLVs, and reentry vehicles other than an RLV.\12\
The FAA would also update a number of safety provisions, including
areas such as software safety and flight safety analyses (FSA), to
reflect recent advancements. Finally, the FAA proposes to streamline
its regulations by designing them to be flexible and scalable, to
reduce timelines, to remove or minimize duplicative jurisdiction, and
to limit FAA jurisdiction over ground safety to operations that are
hazardous to the public. This streamlining was the focus of the ARC.
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\12\ These requirements currently appear in parts 415, 417, 431,
and 435.
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The FAA proposal would follow the ARC recommendations to enable
greater regulatory flexibility. First, the proposed rule would be
primarily performance-based, codifying performance standards and
relying on FAA guidance or other standards to provide acceptable means
of compliance. This would allow the regulations to better adapt to
advancements in the industry. Second, the FAA proposes to change the
structure of its launch and reentry license to be more flexible in the
number and types of launches and reentries one license can accommodate.
Third, as the ARC suggested, system safety principles would be
prominent. All applicants would need to comply with core system safety
management principles and conduct a preliminary safety assessment. Some
applicants may also be required to use a flight hazard analysis to
derive hazard controls particular to their operation. Lastly, for any
particular requirement, the FAA would maintain the ability for an
applicant or operator to propose an alternative approach for
compliance, and then clearly demonstrate that the alternative approach
would provide an equivalent level of safety to the requirement.
The ARC recommended that the level of rigor of an applicant's
safety demonstration vary based on vehicle history, company history,
and the relative risk of the launch or reentry. It also recommended
that the FAA not always require a flight safety system. The FAA
recognizes that different operations require different levels of rigor,
and is proposing a more scalable regulatory regime. Given performance-
based regulations are inherently scalable, the FAA proposal is
consistent with the ARC recommendation, even though it does not
explicitly account for vehicle or operator history as a means of
scaling requirements. In addition to performance-based requirements,
this proposal would implement a specific level-of-rigor approach to
ensure safety requirements are proportionate to the public safety risk
in the need for a flight safety system and its required
[[Page 15302]]
reliability, in flight safety analysis,\13\ and in software safety.
These are all discussed in greater detail later in this preamble.
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\13\ For flight safety analyses, various levels of rigor would
be outlined in ACs.
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Because the rulemaking process is time-consuming and labor
intensive, the FAA seeks to minimize the need for regulatory updates to
proposed part 450 through the proposed performance-based regulations
which would allow for a variety of FAA-approved means of compliance.
Approving new means of compliance creates flexibility for operators
without reducing safety. Additionally, approving new means of
compliance is easier to accomplish than updating regulatory standards
through the rulemaking process. Thus, the proposed regulatory scheme
would be more adaptable to the fast-evolving commercial space industry.
The ARC recommended that the FAA should design a modular approach
to application submittal and evaluation and significantly reduce FAA
review timelines. This proposal would allow an applicant to apply for a
license in an incremental manner,\14\ to be developed on a case-by-case
basis during pre-application consultation. Most timelines in the
proposal would have a default value, followed by an option for the FAA
to agree to a different time frame, taking into account the complexity
of the request and whether it would allow sufficient time for the FAA
to conduct its review and make its requisite findings. Lastly, the FAA
proposes to make it easier for a launch or reentry operator to obtain a
safety element approval, which would reduce the time and effort of an
experienced operator in a future license application. Although these
provisions should reduce the time for experienced operators, the FAA
does not propose to reduce by regulation the statutory review period of
180 days to make a decision on a license application.
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\14\ In this rulemaking, the term ``incremental'' would be
synonymous with the ARC's proposed term of ``modular.''
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It might be useful to provide some perspective concerning the time
the FAA actually takes to make license determinations. The average of
the last ten new license determinations through calendar year 2018 was
141 days; the median was 167 days. The FAA strives to expedite
determinations when possible to accommodate launch schedules. In three
of these ten, the FAA made determinations in 54, 73, and 77 days, all
without tolling. Three determinations were tolled for 73, 77, and 171
days. The lengthy tolling was the result of a software issue concerning
a flight safety system that the applicant needed to resolve. To our
knowledge, a launch has never been delayed as a result of the time it
took the FAA to make a license determinations.
The ARC recommended that the FAA propose rules that eliminate
duplicative U.S. Government requirements when an operator conducts
operations at a Federal launch range. The FAA's proposal would allow
for varying levels of Federal launch range involvement, including a
single FAA authorization. It would also minimize duplicative work by a
launch or reentry operator. This issue is discussed in more detail
later in this preamble.
Also, the ARC recommended that the FAA limit its jurisdiction over
ground operations to activities so publicly hazardous as to warrant the
FAA's oversight. This proposal would scope ground activities overseen
by FAA to each operation. It would also permit neighboring operations
personnel to be present during launch activities in certain
circumstances.
The ARC also recommended that the FAA require the pre-application
process only for new operators or new vehicle programs, and that pre-
application occur at the operator's discretion for all other
operations.\15\ The FAA proposes to retain the requirement for pre-
application consultation because of the various flexibilities proposed
in this rule. These include incremental review, timelines, and the
performance-based nature of many of the regulatory requirements. Pre-
application consultation would assist operators with the licensing
process and accommodate all operators, including those that choose to
avail themselves of the flexibilities provided in this proposal. The
FAA acknowledges, however, that pre-application consultation can be
minimal for operators experienced with FAA requirements. In such cases,
consultation may consist of a telephone conversation.
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\15\ ARC Report at p. 23.
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B. Single Vehicle Operator License
As part of its streamlining effort, the FAA proposes in Sec. 450.3
(Scope of Vehicle Operator License) to establish one license, a vehicle
operator license, for commercial launch and reentry activity. A vehicle
operator license would authorize a licensee to conduct one or more
launches or reentries using the same vehicle or family of vehicles and
would specify whether it covers launch, reentry, or launch and reentry.
The FAA would eliminate the current limitation in Sec. 415.3
specifying a launch license covers only one launch site, and would
eliminate the designations of launch-specific license and launch
operator license, mission-specific license and operator license, and
reentry-specific license and reentry-operator license. The proposal
would also allow the FAA to scope the duration of the license to the
operation.
Although the FAA has not defined a ``family of vehicles,'' launch
operators often do so themselves. Usually, the vehicles share a common
core, i.e., the booster and upper stage. Sometimes multiple boosters
are attached together to form a larger booster. Historically, solid
rocket motors have been attached to core boosters to enhance
capability. There has never been an issue concerning what operators and
the FAA consider to be members of the same family. It is merely a
convenient way to structure licenses.
SPD-2 directed the DOT to revise the current launch and reentry
licensing regulations with special consideration to requiring a single
license for all types of commercial launch and reentry operations.
Similarly, the ARC recommended that the FAA adopt a single license
structure to accommodate a variety of vehicle types, operations, and
launch and reentry sites. In accordance with these recommendations, the
FAA proposes a single vehicle operator license that could be scoped to
the operation. In order to accommodate the increasingly similar
characteristics of some ELVs and RLVs, as well as future concepts,
these proposed regulations would no longer distinguish between ELVs and
RLVs. Rather, this proposal would consolidate the licensing
requirements for all commercial launch and reentry activities under one
part, and applicants would apply for the same type of license.
In addition to accommodating different vehicles and types of
operations, this proposal would allow launches or reentries under a
single vehicle operator license from or to multiple sites. Under the
current regulations, in order for an operator to benefit from using
multiple sites for launches authorized by a part 415 license, the
operator must apply for a new license.\16\ This process is
unnecessarily burdensome. This
[[Page 15303]]
proposed change would facilitate the application process because an
operator would no longer be required to apply for a separate license to
launch or reenter from a launch site other than that specified by the
license.
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\16\ For example, in 2018, a launch operator held a launch
license under part 415 that authorized it to launch from Kennedy
Space Center (KSC) in Florida; however, the operator contemplated
launching from a nearby launch site, Cape Canaveral Air Force
Station (CCAFS). Under current part 415, in order to launch from
CCAFS instead of KSC, the operator has to file a separate
application for a license to launch from CCAFS.
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In order to apply for a license that includes multiple sites, an
applicant would need to provide the FAA with application materials that
would allow the FAA to conduct separate reviews for each site to
determine, for example: Maximum probable loss required by part 440;
public risk to populated areas, aircraft, and waterborne vessels; and
the environmental impacts associated with proposed launches or
reentries. The FAA foresees that a license that authorizes launches or
reentries at more than one site would make it administratively easier
for an operator to change sites for a particular operation. For
example, an operator could move a launch from one site to another due
to launch facility availability. A launch might move from CCAFS to KSC.
Additionally, FAA foresees multiple sites will be utilized by operators
of hybrid vehicles at launch sites with runways as well as vehicles
supporting operationally responsive space missions such as DARPA Launch
Challenge. Under this proposed licensing regime, an applicant should be
prepared to discuss its intent to conduct activity from multiple sites
during pre-application consultation. This discussion would give both
the applicant and the agency an opportunity to scope the application
and identify any potential issues early on when changes to the
application or proposed licensed activities would be less likely to
cause additional issues or significant delays. The launch operator
would not need to specify the specific launches that would be planned
for each site. The FAA would continue its current practice for operator
licenses of requiring a demonstration that a proposed range of
activities, not every trajectory variation within that range, can be
safely conducted in order to scope the license. The license would not
need to be modified unless the proposed operation fell outside the
authorized range.
The FAA further notes that under Sec. 413.11, after an initial
screening the FAA determines whether an application is complete enough
to begin its review. If an application that includes multiple launch
sites is complete enough for the FAA to accept it and begin its review,
the 180-day review period under Sec. 413.15(a) would begin. However,
if during the FAA's initial review it determines that an application is
sufficiently complete to make a license determination for at least one
launch site but not all launch sites included in the application, the
FAA would have the option to toll the review period, as provided in
Sec. 413.15(b). Alternatively, the FAA could continue its review of
the part of the application with complete enough information and toll
the portion involving any launch site with insufficient information to
make a licensing determination. In either case, the FAA would notify
the applicant as required by Sec. 413.15(c).
Finally, the FAA proposes a more flexible approach to the duration
of a vehicle operator license under Sec. 450.7 (Duration of a Vehicle
Operator License). Specifically, the FAA would determine, based on
information received from an applicant, the appropriate duration of the
license, not to exceed five years. In making this determination, the
FAA would continue its current practice of setting the duration of a
license for specified launches to be approximately one year after the
expected date of the activity. Currently, a launch-specific license
expires upon completion of all launches authorized by the license or
the expiration date stated in the license, whichever occurs first. An
operator license remains in effect for two years for an RLV and five
years for an ELV from the date of issuance. The FAA considered setting
all license durations to five years, but rejected this option to allow
an applicant to obtain a license for a limited specific activity rather
than for a more general range of activities. An applicant may prefer a
shorter license duration for a specific activity because a licensee has
obligations under an FAA license, such as the requirements to
demonstrate financial responsibility and allow access to FAA safety
inspectors, and a shorter license duration would relieve an applicant
of compliance with these requirements after the activity has ended.
Unless an operator requests an operator license, currently good for
either two or five years, the operator does not typically request a
license duration. The FAA initially sets the duration to encompass the
authorized activity. The FAA plans to continue its current practice of
extending licenses through renewals or modifications to accommodate
delays in authorized launches or reentries.
C. Performance-Based Requirements and Means of Compliance
SPD-2 directs the FAA to consider replacing prescriptive
requirements in the commercial space flight launch and reentry
licensing process with performance-based criteria. The ARC echoed the
SPD-2 recommendation for performance-based requirements that allowed
varying means of compliance proposed by the operator.\17\ In response
to SPD-2 and the ARC recommendations, the FAA is proposing to replace
many of the prescriptive licensing requirements with performance-based
requirements. These performance-based requirements would provide
flexibility, scalability, and adaptability as discussed in the
introduction. An operator would be able to use an acceptable means of
compliance to demonstrate compliance with the requirements.
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\17\ ARC Report, at p. 7.
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Currently, the FAA uses both prescriptive and performance-based
requirements for launches and reentries respectively.\18\ Parts 415 and
417 provide detailed prescriptive requirements for ELVs. Although these
requirements provide regulatory certainty, they have proven inflexible.
As the industry grows and innovates, ELV operators have identified
alternate ways of operating safely that do not comply with the
regulations as written. This has forced operators to request waivers or
equivalent-level-of safety-determinations (ELOS determinations), often
close to scheduled launch dates. On the other hand, the performance-
based regulations in parts 431 and 435 lack the detail to efficiently
guide operators through the FAA's regulatory regime. Indeed, the FAA
often fills these regulatory gaps by adopting part 417 requirements in
practice. The process of adding regulatory certainty to these
performance-based regulations by adopting part 417 requirements has
been frustrating and contentious for both operators and the FAA.
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\18\ Parts 415 and 417, and their associated appendices, provide
primarily prescriptive requirements for licensing and launch of an
ELV. Part 431 provides primarily performance- and process-based
requirements for a launch and reentry of a reusable launch vehicle.
Part 435 provides similar requirements to part 431 for the reentry
of a reentry vehicle other than a reusable launch vehicle. Parts 431
and 435 rely on a system safety process performed by an operator in
order to demonstrate adequate safety of the operation.
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Adopting performance-based requirements that allow operators to use
an acceptable means of compliance would decrease the need for waivers
or ELOS determinations to address new technology advancements. An
acceptable means of compliance is one means, but not the only means, by
which a requirement could be met. The FAA would set the safety standard
in regulations and identify any acceptable means of compliance
currently available. The FAA would provide public notice of each means
of compliance that the Administrator has accepted by publishing the
acceptance
[[Page 15304]]
on its website, for example. This notification would communicate to the
public and the industry that the FAA has accepted a means of compliance
or any revision to an existing means of compliance. A consensus
standards body, any individual, or any organization would be able to
submit means of compliance documentation to the FAA for consideration
and potential acceptance.
An operator could also develop its own means of compliance to
demonstrate it met the safety standard. Once the Administrator has
accepted a means of compliance for that operator, the operator could
use it in future license applications. The FAA would not provide public
notice of individual operator-developed means of compliance. If any
information submitted to the FAA as part of a means of compliance for
acceptance is proprietary, it would be afforded the same protections as
are applied today to license applications submitted under Sec. 413.9.
For five of the proposed requirements, an operator would have to
demonstrate compliance using a means of compliance that has been
approved by the FAA before an operator could use it in a license
application. These five requirements are flight safety systems
(proposed Sec. 450.145), FSA methods (proposed Sec. 450.115),
lightning flight commit criteria (proposed Sec. 450.163(a)), and
airborne toxic concentration and duration thresholds (proposed
Sec. Sec. 450.139 and 450.187). The FAA has developed Advisory
Circulars (ACs) or identified government standards that discuss an
acceptable means of compliance for each of these requirements, and has
placed these documents in the docket for the public's review and
comment. If an operator wishes to use a means of compliance not
previously accepted by the FAA to demonstrate compliance with one of
the five requirements, the FAA would have to review and accept it prior
to an operator using that means of compliance to satisfy a licensing
requirement.
If an operator is interested in applying for the acceptance of a
unique means of compliance, it should submit any data or documentation
to the FAA necessary to demonstrate that the means of compliance
satisfies the safety requirements established in the regulation. An
operator should note that the FAA will take into account such factors
as complexity of the means of compliance; whether the means of
compliance is an industry, government, or voluntary consensus standard;
and whether the means of compliance has been peer-reviewed during its
review and determination. These factors may affect how quickly the FAA
is able to review and make a determination. The time could range from a
few days to many weeks.
Although applying for the acceptance of a new means of compliance
may take time, once an operator's unique means of compliance is
accepted by the FAA, the operator can use it in future license
applications. The FAA also anticipates that this process will result in
flexibility for industry and will encourage innovation as industry and
consensus standards bodies \19\ develop multiple ways for an operator
to meet the requisite safety standards. The FAA believes this is the
best approach to enabling new ways of achieving acceptable levels of
safety through industry innovation, and seeks public comment on whether
this approach may induce additional innovation through industry-
developed consensus standards.
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\19\ The FAA intends to rely increasingly on voluntary consensus
standards as means of compliance. Section 12(d) of the National
Technology Advancement Act (Pub. L. 104-113; 15 U.S.C. 3701, et
seq.) directs federal agencies to use voluntary consensus standards
in lieu of government-unique standards except where inconsistent
with law or otherwise impractical. Because voluntary consensus
bodies are made up of a wide selection of industry participants, and
often also include FAA participation, the FAA expects its review of
a means of compliance developed by a voluntary consensus standards
body would be more expeditious than a custom means of compliance.
Unlike means of compliance developed by a voluntary consensus
standards body, a custom means of compliance would not be subject to
peer review or independent review of the viability of the technical
approach.
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D. Launch From a Federal Launch Range
Both industry and the National Space Council have urged government
agencies involved in the launch and reentry of vehicles by commercial
operators to work towards common standards and to remove duplicative
oversight. The ARC recommended an end goal of either exclusive FAA
jurisdiction over commercial launches at a range, or a range adopting
the same flight safety regulations used by the FAA. SPD-2 directed the
Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Transportation, and the NASA
Administrator to coordinate to examine all existing U.S. Government
requirements, standards, and policies associated with commercial space
flight launch and reentry operations from Federal launch ranges and
minimize those requirements, except those necessary to protect public
safety and national security, that would conflict with the efforts of
the Secretary of Transportation in implementing the Secretary's
responsibilities to review and revise its launch and reentry
regulations.\20\ Most recently, the John S. McCain National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 includes a provision stating
that the Secretary of Defense may not impose any requirement on a
licensee or transferee that is duplicative of, or overlaps in intent
with, any requirement imposed by the Secretary of Transportation under
51 U.S.C. chapter 509, unless imposing such a requirement is necessary
to avoid negative consequences for the national security space
program.\21\
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\20\ SPD-2; May 24, 2018 (https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/space-policy-directive-2-streamlining-regulations-commercial-use-space).
\21\ Section 1606(2)(A), John S. McCain National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, Public Law 115-232 (amending
51 U.S.C. 50918 note).
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Currently, the FAA issues a safety approval to a license applicant
proposing to launch from a Federal launch range if the applicant
satisfies the requirements of part 415, subpart C, and has contracted
with the range for the provision of safety-related launch services and
property, as long as an FAA Launch Site Safety Assessment (LSSA) \22\
shows that the range's launch services and launch property satisfy part
417. The FAA assesses each range and determines if the range meets FAA
safety requirements. If the FAA assessed a range, through its LSSA, and
found that an applicable range safety-related launch service or
property satisfies FAA requirements, then the FAA treats the range's
launch service or property as that of a launch operator's, and there is
no need for further demonstration of compliance to the FAA. The FAA
reassesses a range's practices only when the range chooses to change
its practice.
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\22\ LSSA is an FAA evaluation of Federal range services and
launch property.
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The ARC recommended that ranges and the FAA have common flight
safety regulations and guidance documents. To address this
recommendation, the FAA proposes performance-based requirements for
both ground and flight safety that an operator could meet using Air
Force and NASA practices as a means of compliance. The FAA expects that
there will be few, if any, instances where Air Force or NASA practices
do not satisfy the proposed performance-based requirements.
Additionally, the proposed requirements should provide enough
flexibility to accommodate changes in Air Force and NASA practices in
the future. The FAA expects that range services that a range applies to
U.S. Government launches and
[[Page 15305]]
reentries will almost invariably satisfy the FAA's proposed
requirements. The FAA currently accepts flight safety analyses
performed by Air Force on behalf of an operator without additional
analysis and anticipates that it would give similar deference to other
analyses by federal agencies once it established that they meet FAA
requirements.
The FAA developed this approach to reduce operator burden to the
largest extent possible. The FAA is bound to execute its statutory
mandates and may do so only to the extent authorized by those statutes.
Although federal entities often have complimentary mandates and
statutory authorities, they are rarely identical. That is, each federal
department or agency has been given separate mission. Federal entities
establish interagency processes to manage closely related functions in
as smoothly and least burdensome manner possible. Coordinating FAA
requirements, range practices, and those practices implemented at other
Federal facilities is largely an interagency issue, this proposal does
not include language to eliminate duplicative approvals. Instead, the
FAA will continue to work with the appropriate agencies to streamline
commercial launch and reentry requirements at ranges and Federal
facilities by leveraging the Common Standards Working Group (CSWG).\23\
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\23\ The CSWG consists of range safety personnel from the Air
Force and NASA, and was chartered in the early 2000's to develop and
maintain common launch safety standards among agencies.
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E. Safety Framework
In addition to proposing a single vehicle operator license and
replacing prescriptive requirements with performance-based
requirements, this rule would rely on a safety framework that provides
the flexibility needed to accommodate current and future operations and
the regulatory certainty lacking in some of the current regulations.
This proposal would consolidate the launch and reentry safety
requirements in subpart C. Figure 2 depicts the safety framework on
which the FAA relied in developing its proposed safety requirements. In
developing this framework, the FAA considered following the approach
taken in parts 431 and 435 and relying almost exclusively on a robust
systems safety approach. As noted earlier, experience has shown that
part 431 does not offer enough specificity and, as a result, it has
been unclear to operators what safety measures the FAA requires to
achieve an acceptable level of safety. In particular, there are no
explicit requirements for ground safety, flight safety analysis, or
flight safety systems. On the other hand, part 417 is too prescriptive,
particularly regarding design and detailed procedural requirements for
ground safety, detailed design and test requirements for flight safety
systems, and numerous plans that placed needless burden on operators
and impeded innovation. Thus, the framework described below is designed
to strike a balance between these two parts. The proposed regulations
clearly lay out FAA expectations, but should provide a launch or
reentry operator with flexibility on how it achieves acceptable public
safety. The framework also seeks to allow operators that wish to
conduct operations using proven hazard control strategies to do so.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP15AP19.001
System Safety Program. All operators would be required to have a
system safety program that would establish system safety management
principles for both ground and flight safety throughout the operational
lifecycle of a launch or reentry system. The system safety program
would include a safety organization, procedures, configuration control,
and post-flight data review.
Preliminary Flight Safety Assessment. For flight safety, an
operator would conduct a preliminary flight safety assessment to
identify public hazards and determine the appropriate hazard control
strategy for a phase of flight or an entire flight. An operator could
use traditional hazard controls such as physical containment, wind
weighting, or flight abort to mitigate hazards. Physical containment is
when a launch vehicle does not have sufficient energy for any hazards
associated with its flight to reach the public or critical assets.
[[Page 15306]]
Wind weighting is when the operator of an unguided suborbital launch
vehicle adjusts launcher azimuth and elevation settings to correct for
the effects of wind conditions at the time of flight to provide a safe
impact location for the launch vehicle or its components. Flight Abort
is the process to limit or restrict the hazards to public health and
safety and the safety of property presented by a launch vehicle or
reentry vehicle, including any payload, while in flight by initiating
and accomplishing a controlled ending to vehicle flight. Flight abort
as a hazard control strategy would be required for a phase of flight
that is shown by a consequence analysis to potentially have significant
public safety impacts. Otherwise, an operator would be able to bypass
these traditional hazard control strategies and conduct a flight hazard
analysis.
Flight Hazard Analysis. As an alternative to traditional hazard
control measures, an operator would be able to conduct a flight hazard
analysis to derive hazard controls. Hazard analysis is a proven
engineering discipline that, when applied during system development and
throughout the system's lifecycle, identifies and mitigates hazards
and, in so doing, eliminates or reduces the risk of potential mishaps
and accidents. In addition, a separate hazard analysis methodology is
outlined for computing systems and software.
Flight Safety Analysis. Regardless of the hazard control strategy
chosen or mandated, an operator would be required to conduct a number
of flight safety analyses. At a minimum, these analyses would
quantitatively demonstrate that a launch or reentry meets the public
safety criteria for debris, far-field overpressure, and toxic hazards.
Other analyses support flight abort and wind weighting hazard control
strategies and determine flight hazard areas.\24\ For a detailed
discussion, please see the ``Additional Technical Justification and
Rationale'' discussion later in the preamble.
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\24\ Note that flight hazard analysis and flight safety analysis
are interdependent in that each can help inform the other. Flight
safety analysis quantifies the risks posed by hazards, which are
typically identified and mitigated during the flight hazard
analysis, by using physics to model how the vehicle will respond to
specific failure modes. The FSA is also useful to define when
operational restrictions are necessary to meet quantitative risk
requirements.
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Derived Hazard Controls. An operator would derive a number of
hazard controls through its conduct of a flight hazard analysis and
flight safety analyses.
Prescribed Hazard Controls. Regardless of the hazard controls
derived from a flight hazard analysis and flight safety analyses, the
FAA would require a number of other hazard controls that have
historically been necessary to achieve acceptable public safety. These
include requirements for flight safety and other safety critical
systems, agreements, safety-critical personnel qualifications, crew
rest, radio frequency management, readiness, communications, preflight
procedures, surveillance and publication of hazard areas, lightning
hazard mitigation, flight safety rules, tracking, collision avoidance,
safety at the end of launch, and mishap planning.
Acceptable Flight Safety. All elements of the safety framework
combine to provide acceptable public safety during flight. In proposed
Sec. 450.101 (Public Safety Criteria), the FAA would outline specific
public safety criteria to clearly define how safe is safe enough.
Section 450.101 is discussed in detail later in this preamble.
Ground Safety. With respect to ground safety, an operator would
conduct a ground hazard analysis to derive ground hazard controls.
Those, along with prescribed hazard controls, would provide acceptable
public safety during ground operations.
Flight Safety
A. Public Safety Criteria
Proposed Sec. 450.101 would consolidate all public safety criteria
for flight into one section. It would contain the core performance-
based safety requirements to protect people and property on land, at
sea, in the air, and in space. All other flight safety requirements in
proposed part 450 subpart C would support the achievement of these
criteria. The Sec. 450.101 requirements would define how safe is safe
enough for the flight of a commercial launch or reentry vehicle.
Proposed Sec. 450.101(a) contains launch risk criteria, or the
risk thresholds an operator may not exceed during flight. An operator
would be permitted to initiate the flight of a launch vehicle only if
the collective, individual, aircraft, and critical asset risk satisfy
the proposed criteria. The criteria would apply to every launch from
liftoff through orbital insertion for an orbital launch, and through
final impact or landing for a suborbital launch, which is the same
scope used for current launch risk criteria in parts 417 and 431. Each
measure of risk serves a different purpose. Collective risk addresses
the risk to a population as a whole, whereas individual risk addresses
the risk to each person within a population. The measure of aircraft
risk is unique, due to the difficulty of modeling collective and
individual risk for aircraft in flight. Lastly, critical asset risk
addresses the loss of functionality of an asset that is essential to
the national interests of the United States. Critical assets include
property, facilities, or infrastructure necessary to maintain national
defense, or assured access to space for national priority missions.
Proposed Sec. 450.101(a)(1) would establish the collective risk
criteria for flight, measured by expected casualties (EC).
The proposal would define EC as the mean number of
casualties predicted to occur per flight operation if the operation
were repeated many times. The term casualties refers to serious
injuries or worse, including fatalities. It would require the risk to
all members of the public, excluding persons in aircraft and
neighboring operations personnel, to not exceed an expected number of 1
x 10-\4\ casualties, posed by impacting inert and explosive
debris, toxic release, and far field blast overpressure.\25\ With two
exceptions, this is the same criteria currently used in Sec. Sec.
417.107(b)(1) and 431.35(b)(1)(i). The first exception applies to
people on waterborne vessels, who would now be included in the
collective risk criteria to all members of the public. The second
exception applies to neighboring operations personnel. This proposal
would require the risk to all neighboring operations personnel not
exceed an expected number of 2 x 10-\4\ casualties. Both of
these topics are discussed separately later in this preamble.
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\25\ Far field blast overpressure is a phenomenon resulting from
the air blast effects of large explosions that may be focused by
certain conditions in the atmosphere through which the blast waves
propagate. Population may be at risk from broken window glass
shards.
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Proposed Sec. 450.101(a)(2) would establish the individual risk
criteria for flight, measured by probability of casualty
(PC). The proposal would define PC as the
likelihood that a person will suffer a serious injury or worse,
including a fatal injury, due to all hazards from an operation at a
specific location. It would require the risk to any individual member
of the public, excluding neighboring operations personnel, to not
exceed a PC of 1 x 10-\6\ per launch, posed by
impacting inert and explosive debris, toxic release, and far field
blast overpressure. With one exception, this is the same criteria
currently in Sec. Sec. 417.107(b)(2) and 431.35(b)(1)(iii). The
exception is neighboring operations personnel would have separate
individual risk criteria, which is discussed later in this preamble.
Proposed Sec. 450.101(a)(3) would set aircraft risk criteria for
flight. It would
[[Page 15307]]
require a launch operator to establish any aircraft hazard areas
necessary to ensure the probability of impact with debris capable of
causing a casualty for aircraft does not exceed 1 x 10-6.
This is the same requirement as current Sec. 417.107(b)(4). Part 431
does not have aircraft risk criteria, although the FAA's current
practice is to use the part 417 criteria for launches licensed under
part 431. With this proposal, the FAA would expressly apply this
criterion to all launches. The FAA does not propose any other changes
for the protection of aircraft at this time. The FAA has an ongoing
Airspace Access ARC, composed of commercial space transportation and
aviation industry representatives, whose recommendations may inform a
future rulemaking on protection of aircraft.
Proposed Sec. 450.101(a)(4) would set the launch risk criteria for
critical assets. It would require the probability of loss of
functionality for each critical asset to not exceed 1 x
10-\3\, or some other more stringent probability if deemed
necessary to protect the national security interests of the United
States. This would be a new requirement and is discussed separately
later in this preamble.
Proposed Sec. 450.101(b) would define risk criteria for reentry.
These would be the same as the risk criteria for launch, except that
the proposed criteria would apply to each reentry, from the final
health check prior to the deorbit burn through final impact or landing.
The same discussion earlier regarding collective risk, individual risk,
aircraft risk, and risk to critical assets would apply to the reentry
risk criteria.
Proposed Sec. 450.101(c) would set the flight abort criteria for
both launch and reentry. It represents the most significant change to
public safety criteria in this proposed rule. It would require that an
operator use flight abort as a hazard control strategy if the
consequence of any reasonably foreseeable vehicle response mode,\26\ in
any one-second period of flight, is greater than 1 x 10-3
conditional expected casualties (CEC) for uncontrolled
areas.\27\ CEC is the consequence, measured in terms of
EC, without regard to the probability of failure, and will
be discussed in the Consequence Protection Criteria for Flight Abort
and Flight Safety System section. Flight abort with the use of an FSS
and applying the CEC criteria in proposed part 450 is
discussed later in this preamble. Proposed Sec. 450.101(c) would apply
to all phases of flight, unless otherwise agreed to by the FAA based on
the demonstrated reliability of the launch or reentry vehicle during
that phase of flight. The flight of a certificated aircraft that is
carrying a rocket to a drop point is an example of when the use of an
FSS would likely not be necessary even though the CEC could
be above the threshold, because the aircraft would have a demonstrated
high reliability.
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\26\ Vehicle response mode means a mutually exclusive scenario
that characterizes foreseeable combinations of vehicle trajectory
and debris generation.
\27\ Uncontrolled Area is an area of land not controlled by a
launch or reentry operator, a launch or reentry site operator, an
adjacent site operator, or other entity by agreement.
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Proposed Sec. 450.101(d) would establish disposal \28\ safety
criteria. It would require that an operator conducting a disposal of a
vehicle stage or component from Earth orbit either meet the criteria of
Sec. 450.101(b)(1), (2), and (3), or target a broad ocean area.
Because a launch vehicle stage or component will not survive a disposal
substantially intact, disposal is not considered a reentry.\29\
Disposal is an effective method of orbital debris prevention because it
eliminates the vehicle stage or component as a piece of orbital debris
and as a risk for future debris creation through collision. The FAA is
not proposing to require that a launch operator dispose of any upper
stage or component in this rulemaking. The current proposal would only
apply if a launch operator chooses to dispose of its upper stage or
other launch vehicle component. Although an operator could choose to
demonstrate that the proposed collective and individual risk criteria
are met for a disposal, the FAA expects most, if not all, disposals to
target a broad ocean area.\30\ This is consistent with current practice
and NASA Technical Standards.\31\ Because the broad ocean area has such
a low density of people that are exposed almost exclusively in large
waterborne vessels, objects that survive reentry to impact in these
areas produce an insignificant PC. Therefore, operators
disposing a vehicle stage or component into a broad ocean area would
not need to demonstrate compliance with the collective, individual, or
aircraft risk criteria. For purposes of this proposal, the FAA
considers ``broad ocean'' as an area 200 nautical miles (nm) from land.
Two hundred nm is also the recognized limit of exclusive economic zones
(EEZ), which are zones prescribed by the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea \32\ over which the owning state has exclusive
exploitation rights over all natural resources. Disposal beyond an EEZ
further reduces the chance of disrupting economic operations such as
commercial fishing.
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\28\ The FAA proposes to define ``disposal'' in Sec. 401.5 to
mean the return or attempt to return, purposefully, a launch vehicle
stage or component, not including a reentry vehicle, from Earth
orbit to Earth, in a controlled manner. The proposed definition is
discussed later in this preamble.
\29\ A ``reentry'' is defined in 51 U.S.C. 50902, as ``to return
or attempt to return, purposefully, a reentry vehicle and its
payload or human beings, if any, from Earth orbit or from outer
space to Earth.'' A ``reentry vehicle'' is defined as ``a vehicle
designed to return from Earth orbit or outer space to Earth, or a
reusable launch vehicle designed to return from Earth orbit or outer
space to Earth, substantially intact.''
\30\ A disposal that ``targets a broad ocean area'' would wholly
contain the disposal hazard area within a broad ocean area.
\31\ NASA-STD-8715.14A, paragraph 4.7.2.1.b, states, ``For
controlled reentry, the selected trajectory shall ensure that no
surviving debris impact with a kinetic energy greater than 15 joules
is closer than 370 km from foreign landmasses, or is within 50 km
from the continental U.S., territories of the U.S., and the
permanent ice pack of Antarctica.''
\32\ United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10,
1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397. Although the United States has not ratified
UNCLOS, its comprehensive legal framework codifies customary
international law governing uses of the ocean.
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Proposed Sec. 450.101(e) would address the protection of people
and property on-orbit, through collision avoidance requirements during
launch or reentry and through requirements aimed at preventing
explosions of launch vehicle stages or components on-orbit.
Specifically, proposed Sec. 450.101(e)(1) would require a launch or
reentry operator to prevent the collision between a launch or reentry
vehicle stage or component, and people or property on-orbit, in
accordance with the requirements in proposed Sec. 450.169(a) (Launch
and Reentry Collision Avoidance Analysis Requirements). Proposed Sec.
450.101(e)(2) would require that a launch operator prevent the creation
of debris through the conversion of energy sources into energy that
fragments the stage or component, in accordance with the requirements
in proposed Sec. 450.171 (Safety at End of Launch). Proposed Sec.
450.171 would contain the same requirements as in Sec. Sec. 417.129
and 431.43(c)(3). Both Sec. Sec. 450.169(a) and 450.171 are addressed
in greater detail later in the preamble.
Proposed Sec. 450.101(f) would require that an operator for any
launch, reentry, or disposal notify the public of any region of land,
sea, or air that contains, with 97 percent probability of containment,
all debris resulting from normal flight events capable of causing a
casualty. The requirement to notify the public of planned impacts is
currently in Sec. Sec. 417.111(i)(5) and 431.75(b). The calculation of
such hazard areas is discussed later in this preamble in the
[[Page 15308]]
discussion of proposed Sec. 450.133 (Flight Hazard Areas).
Notification of planned impacts would be included in proposed Sec.
450.101 because it is not tied to risk and is therefore not covered by
the other public safety criteria of proposed Sec. 450.101.
In proposed Sec. 450.101(g), the FAA would establish performance
level requirements for the validity of analysis methods. Specifically,
consistent with the existing language in Sec. 417.203(c) and current
practice for launch and reentry assessments, an operator's analysis
method would have to use accurate data and scientific principles and be
statistically valid. ``Accurate data'' would continue to refer to
completeness, exactness, and fidelity to the maximum extent
practicable. In this context, ``scientific principles'' would continue
to refer to knowledge based on the scientific method, such as that
established in the fields of physics, chemistry, and engineering. An
analysis based on non-scientific principles, such as astrology, would
not be consistent with this standard. A ``statistically valid''
analysis would be the result of a sound application of mathematics and
would account for the uncertainty in any statistical inference due to
sample size limits, the degree of applicability of data to a particular
system, and the degree of homogeneity of the data.
1. Neighboring Operations Personnel
Two of the proposed requirements in Sec. 450.101 that do not exist
in the current regulations carve out separate individual and collective
risk criteria for neighboring operations personnel. With the increase
in operations and launch rate, the Air Force, NASA, and the industry
have expressed concerns about the FAA's public risk criteria because in
certain circumstances they force an operator to clear or evacuate any
other launch operator and its personnel not involved with a specific
FAA-licensed operation from a hazard area or safety clear zone during
certain licensed activities.\33\ The clearing or evacuation of other
launch operator personnel, which can range from a handful of workers to
over a thousand for a significant portion of a day, results in
potential schedule impacts and lost productivity costs to other range
users. These impacts will increase as the launch tempo increases and
similar operations are conducted at other sites.
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\33\ To illustrate the problematic nature of the current risk
requirements as they are applied to the public, flybacks and
landings of reusable boosters at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station
conducted under an FAA license are causing operational impacts to
other range users due to FAA requirements to clear the public,
including range users not involved with the launch, to meet public
safety criteria.
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The Air Force, NASA, and industry have recommended that the FAA
treat certain personnel of other launch operators, referred to in this
proposed rulemaking as ``neighboring operations personnel,''
differently than the rest of the public who are typically visitors,
tourists, or people who are located outside a launch site and are not
aware of the hazards nor trained and prepared to respond to them.
Specifically, they recommend that the FAA characterize neighboring
operations personnel who work at a launch site as either non-public or
subject to a higher level of risk than the rest of the public, to
minimize the need to evacuate them during certain licensed
operations.\34\
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\34\ The Air Force requested that the FAA propose an approach
that allows certain neighboring operations personnel during an FAA-
licensed launch to be assessed at the Air Force's higher launch
essential risk criteria of 10 x 10-6 individual
probability of casualty. Also, Air Force and NASA members of the
CSWG have asked for increased flexibility with the collective risk
EC for flight to accommodate neighboring operations
personnel. As one of its recommendations to the National Space
Council in November 2017, NASA suggested a change to operational
requirements to clear employees from hazard areas during commercial
operations under an FAA license.
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The ARC recommended: (1) Excluding permanently badged personnel and
neighboring launch operations from the definition of ``public''; (2)
revising the definition of ``public safety'' because the current
definition is overly broad, ambiguous, and inconsistent with other
federal agencies, including the Air Force; (3) distinguishing between
``public'' (i.e., those uninvolved individuals located outside the
controlled-access boundaries of a launch or reentry site or clustered
sites within a defined Federal or private spaceport) and people who
work regularly within the controlled-access boundaries of a Federal or
private spaceport or an operator's dedicated launch or reentry site;
\35\ and (4) employing mitigation measures for uninvolved neighboring
operations personnel when a hazardous operation or launch is
scheduled.\36\
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\35\ According to the ARC, these individuals who work regularly
within the boundaries of a federal range or private spaceport are
industry workers who know and accept the risks associated with the
hazardous environment in which they work.
\36\ These mitigations might include: facility separation
distances (e.g., separation between launch points on a multi-user
spaceport) that anticipate and allow for safe concurrent operations;
terms in site and use agreements with the Federal or non-Federal
property owner that indemnify and hold harmless the government or
other landlord; and potential reciprocal waivers (not required by
regulation) that may be entered into among neighboring operations to
share risks of hazards to each other's property and personnel.
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i. FAA Proposed Definitions of Public and Neighboring Operations
Personnel in Sec. 401.5
To address these concerns, the FAA proposes to add two definitions
to Sec. 401.5. The first is ``public,'' which the FAA would define in
Sec. 401.5, for a particular licensed or permitted launch or reentry,
as people and property that are not involved in supporting the launch
or reentry. This would include those people and property that may be
located within the launch or reentry site, such as visitors,
individuals providing goods or services not related to launch or
reentry processing or flight, and any other operator and its personnel.
This language is similar to the current definition of ``public safety''
in Sec. 401.5, which the FAA proposes to delete, except that the FAA
has included reentry and permitted activities in the definition.\37\
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\37\ The FAA would also delete the definition of ``public'' in
Sec. 420.5 for launch sites, which means people and property that
are not involved in supporting a licensed or permitted launch. The
new definition of public in Sec. 401.5 will apply to all parts,
including part 420.
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The second is the definition of ``neighboring operations
personnel,'' which the FAA would define in Sec. 401.5 as those members
of the public located within a launch or reentry site, as determined by
the Federal or licensed launch or reentry site operator,\38\ or an
adjacent launch or reentry site, who are not associated with a specific
hazardous licensed or permitted operation currently being conducted but
are required to perform safety, security, or critical tasks at the site
and are notified of the hazardous operation. While neighboring
operations personnel would still fall under the proposed definition of
public, this proposal would apply different individual and collective
risk criteria to them. The FAA seeks comment on this approach.
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\38\ Since neighboring operations personnel, as defined in this
proposal, work at a launch or reentry site, the FAA expects that the
site operator (i.e., an operator of a Federal site or FAA-licensed
launch or reentry site), not the launch operator, would identify
these personnel.
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In developing its proposal, the FAA looked to NASA and Air Force
requirements, which treat a portion of the public differently than the
FAA regulations by allowing some other launch operators and their
personnel, referred to as ``neighboring operations personnel'' by the
Air Force \39\ and
[[Page 15309]]
``critical operations personnel'' by NASA,\40\ to be subjected to a
higher level of risk than the rest of the public. This approach lessens
the impact to multiple users and enables concurrent operations at a
site. The FAA's proposed definition more closely aligns with the
definitions of neighboring operations personnel and critical operations
personnel adopted by the Air Force and NASA, respectively, because it
distinguishes neighboring operations personnel as personnel required to
perform safety, security, or critical tasks and who are notified of
neighboring hazardous operations. Critical tasks may include
maintaining the security of a site or facility or performing critical
launch processing tasks such as monitoring pressure vessels or testing
safety critical systems of a launch vehicle for an upcoming mission.
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\39\ The Air Force has two sub-categories of public: Neighboring
operations personnel and the general public. For a specific launch,
the general public includes all visitors, media, and other non-
essential personnel at the launch site, as well as persons located
outside the boundaries of the launch site. For the Air Force,
neighboring operations personnel are individuals, not associated
with the specific operation or launch currently being conducted,
required to perform safety, security, or critical tasks at the
launch base, and who are notified of a neighboring hazardous
operation and are either trained in mitigation techniques or
accompanied by a properly trained escort. In accordance with
guidance information in AFSPCMAN 91-710V1, neighboring operations
personnel may include individuals performing launch processing tasks
for another launch, but do not include individuals in training for
any job or individuals performing routine activities such as
administrative, maintenance, support, or janitorial. AFSPCMAN 91-
710V1 can be found at https://static.e-publishing.af.mil/production/1/afspc/publication/afspcman91-710v1/afspcman91-710v1.pdf. The Air
Force may allow neighboring operations personnel to be within safety
clearance zones and hazardous launch areas, and neighboring
operations personnel would not be evacuated with the general public.
The Air Force includes neighboring operations personnel in the same
risk category as launch-essential personnel. The allowable
collective aggregated risk for launch essential personnel is 300 x
10-6 and the allowable individual risk for launch
essential personnel is 10 x 10-6.
\40\ NASA, for the purposes of range safety risk management,
defines public as visitors and personnel inside and outside NASA-
controlled locations who are not critical operations personnel or
mission essential personnel and who may be on land, on waterborne
vessels, or in aircraft. Similar to the Air Force's definition of
neighboring operations personnel, NASA considers critical operations
personnel to include persons not essential to the specific operation
(launch, reentry, flight) being conducted, but who are required to
perform safety, security, or other critical tasks at the launch,
landing, or flight facility; are notified of the hazardous operation
and either trained in mitigation techniques or accompanied by a
properly trained escort; are not in training for any job or
individuals performing routine activities such as administrative,
maintenance, or janitorial activities; and may occupy safety
clearance zones and hazardous areas, and are not evacuated with the
public. NASA includes critical operations personnel in the same risk
category as mission essential personnel. For flight, the allowable
collective aggregated risk for the combination of mission essential
personnel and critical operations personnel is 300 x 10-6
and the allowable individual risk for mission essential or critical
operations personnel is 10 x 10-6.
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Because of these specific duties, neighboring operations personnel
are more likely than the rest of the public to be specially trained and
prepared to respond to hazards present at a launch or reentry site.
Those hazards include exposure to debris, overpressure, toxics, and
fire. The Air Force and NASA definitions specify that these personnel
are either trained in mitigation techniques or accompanied by a
properly trained escort. Note, however, that the FAA would not require
that neighboring operations personnel be trained or accompanied by a
trained escort. It would be burdensome to require a licensee to ensure
neighboring operations personnel are trained, and training is not
necessary to justify the slight increase in risk allowed for workers
performing safety, security, or critical tasks.
The FAA proposal would not include all permanently badged personnel
on a launch or reentry site as neighboring operations personnel. While
neighboring operations personnel are permanently-badged personnel,
including all permanently-badged personnel as neighboring operations
personnel could then include individuals performing routine activities
such as administrative, maintenance, or janitorial duties. These
individuals are not necessary for critical tasks. Unlike for
neighboring operations personnel, the disruption to routine activities
does not sufficiently justify allowing these individuals to remain on
site during hazardous operations.
ii. Individual Risk Level for Neighboring Operations Personnel
Currently, for ELVs, the individual risk criterion for the public
in Sec. 417.107(b)(2) allows a launch operator to initiate flight only
if the risk to any individual member of the public does not exceed 1 x
10-6 per launch for each hazard. Part 431 is similar for an
RLV mission. Thus, any person not involved in supporting a launch or
reentry, whether within or outside the bounds of the launch or reentry
site, are required to have a risk of casualty no higher than 1 x
10-6 per launch or reentry for each hazard.
The FAA proposes in Sec. 450.101(a)(2) a higher individual risk
criterion of 1 x 10-5 for neighboring operations personnel
compared to 1 x 10-6 for the rest of the public for launch
and reentry. Although neighboring operations personnel would still fall
under the FAA's definition of public, this proposal would establish a
higher risk threshold for neighboring operations personnel as compared
to other members of the public. This proposal would permit neighboring
operations personnel to remain on site because--unlike other members of
the public such as visitors or tourists--the presence of these
personnel at a launch or reentry site is necessary for security or to
avoid the disruption of launch or reentry activities at neighboring
sites. In addition, the proposed increased risk to which these
personnel would be exposed is minimal.
iii. Collective Risk Level for Neighboring Operations Personnel
Sections 417.107(b)(1) and 431.35(b)(1)(i) and (ii) currently
require that for each proposed launch or reentry, the risk level to the
collective members of the public, which would include neighboring
operations personnel but exclude persons in water-borne vessels and
aircraft, must not exceed an expected number of 1 x 10-4
casualties from impacting inert and explosive debris and toxic release
associated with the launch or reentry.
Similar to individual risk, the FAA proposes a separate collective
risk criterion for neighboring operations personnel in Sec.
450.101(a)(1). This proposal would permit a launch operator to initiate
the flight of a launch vehicle only if the total risk associated with
the launch to all members of the public, excluding neighboring
operations personnel and persons in aircraft, does not exceed an
expected number of 1 x 10-4 casualties. Additionally, a
launch operator would be permitted to initiate the flight of a launch
vehicle only if the total risk associated with the launch to
neighboring operations personnel did not exceed an expected number of 2
x 10-4 casualties. These risk criteria would also apply to
reentry.
These proposed requirements would enable neighboring operations
personnel to remain within safety clear zones and hazardous launch
areas during flight. Additionally, neighboring operations personnel
would not be required to evacuate with the rest of the public as long
as their collective risk does not exceed 2 x 10-4. The
rationale is the same as that for individual risk. While the FAA
proposal would add a separate collective risk limit for neighboring
operations personnel, the collective risk limit for the public other
than neighboring operations personnel would not be able to exceed 1 x
10-4 for flight.
iv. Maximum Probably Loss (MPL) Thresholds for Neighboring Operations
Personnel
Under a license, an operator must obtain liability insurance or
demonstrate financial responsibility to compensate for the maximum
probable loss from claims by a third party for
[[Page 15310]]
death, bodily injury, or property damage or loss.\41\ For financial
responsibility purposes under 14 CFR part 440, neighboring operations
personnel qualify as third parties.\42\ Thus, allowing neighboring
operations personnel to remain within hazard areas has the potential to
increase the maximum probable loss, and therefore the amount of third
party liability insurance that a licensee would be required to obtain.
However, this would be fully or partially mitigated by changing the
threshold value used to determine MPL for neighboring operations
personnel.
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\41\ An operator must also obtain liability insurance or
demonstrate financial responsibility to compensate the U.S.
Government for damage or loss to government property, but this is
not affected by the neighboring operations personnel proposal.
\42\ Title 51 U.S.C. 50902 defines third party as a person
except the U.S. Government or its contractors or subcontractors
involved in the launch or reentry services; a licensee or transferee
under Chapter 509 and its contractors, subcontractors or customers
involved in launch or reentry services; the customer's contractors
or subcontractors involved in launch or reentry services; or crew,
government astronauts, or space fight participants. Section 440.3
incorporates this definition into the regulations.
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The MPL is the greatest dollar amount of loss that is reasonably
expected to result from a launch or reentry. Current regulations define
what is reasonable by establishing probability thresholds:
Losses to third parties that are reasonably expected to
result from a licensed or permitted activity are those that have a
probability of occurrence of no less than one in ten million.
Losses to government property and government personnel
involved in licensed or permitted activities that are reasonably
expected to result from licensed or permitted activities are those that
have a probability of occurrence of no less than one in one hundred
thousand.
Therefore, for any launch or reentry, there should only be a 1 in
10,000,000 (1 x 10-\7\) chance that claims from third
parties would exceed the MPL value, and a 1 in 100,000 (1 x
10-\5\) chance that claims from the government for
government property loss would exceed the MPL value. Because it is much
less likely that claims from third parties would exceed the MPL value,
the FAA's calculation of MPL takes into account a larger number of rare
events that could result in a third party claim than could result in a
government property claim. And, because the MPL calculation for third
party liability involves consideration of more events related to non-
government personnel third party losses than events related to
government personnel losses, non-government third party losses are more
likely to influence the MPL calculation. The difference in thresholds
reflects the government's acceptance of greater risk in supporting
launch and reentry activities than that accepted by the uninvolved
public.\43\
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\43\ Subject to congressional appropriation, the Federal
Government indemnifies a launch or reentry operator for claims above
the insured amount up to $1.5 billion, adjusted for inflation from
January 1989 (approximately $3 billion as of 2016). The lower the
threshold used for calculating MPL, the greater chance that the
Federal Government may need to indemnify a licensee.
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The FAA proposes, for the purpose of determining MPL, that the
threshold for neighboring operations personnel be the same as the
threshold for losses to government property and involved government
personnel, such that losses to neighboring operations personnel would
have a probability of occurrence of no less than 1 x 10-\5\.
This approach would be appropriate because unlike other third parties,
except for involved government personnel, the presence of neighboring
operations personnel at a launch or reentry site is necessary for
security or to avoid the disruption of launch or reentry activities at
neighboring sites. The presence of neighboring operations personnel
during licensed activities would not influence the MPL value for third-
party liability in most cases because, as discussed above, the 1 x
10-\5\ threshold would capture fewer events and therefore
have less of an influence on MPL. The FAA seeks comment on this
approach.
v. Ground Operations Pertinent to Neighboring Operations Personnel
For ground operations, the FAA currently does not have, nor is it
proposing at this time, quantitative public risk criteria for
neighboring operations personnel or the rest of the public. As will be
discussed in greater detail later, an operator would conduct a ground
hazard analysis to derive ground hazard controls. This analysis would
be a qualitative, not quantitative. Thus, there would be no
quantitative criteria to treat neighboring operations personnel
differently than other members of the public during ground operations.
An operator would be expected to use hazard controls to contain hazards
within defined areas and to control public access to those areas. An
operator may use industry or government standards to determine proper
mitigations to protect the public, including neighboring operations
personnel, from hazards. The impact on neighboring operations personnel
during ground activities should be minimal.
Additionally and as discussed later, the FAA is proposing that
launch would begin at the start of preflight ground operations that
pose a threat to the public, which could be when a launch vehicle or
its major components arrive at a U.S. launch site, or at a later point
as agreed to by the Administrator.\44\ Scoping preflight ground
operations to only those that require FAA oversight would alleviate
many of the previously-discussed issues associated with neighboring
operations personnel.
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\44\ The clause ``as agreed to by the Administrator'' is used
throughout the proposed regulations, particularly in relation to
timeframes discussed in detail later in this preamble. Where the
clause is used, it means that an operator may submit an alternative
to the proposed requirement to the FAA for review. The FAA must
agree to the operator's proposal in order for the operator to use
the alternative. By whatever means the FAA's agreement to an
alternative is communicated to the operator, the agreement means
that the alternative does not jeopardize public health and safety
and the FAA has no objection to the submitted alternative. Unless
the context of the situation clearly provides otherwise, ``as agreed
to by the Administrator'' does not simply mean receipt by the FAA
(i.e., that the item was given to a representative of the FAA and
that person received it on behalf of the FAA).
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2. Property Protection (Critical Assets)
Another proposed requirement in Sec. 450.101 that does not exist
in the current regulations is the proposal to adopt a critical asset
protection criterion in proposed Sec. 450.101. To better inform this
proposed requirement, the FAA would also amend Sec. 401.5 to add a
definition of critical asset. Specifically, the probability of loss of
functionality for each critical asset would not be able to exceed 1 x
10-\3\, or a more stringent probability if the FAA
determines, in consultation with relevant federal agencies, it is
necessary to protect the national security interests of the United
States. This requirement is necessary to ensure a high probability of
the continuing functionality of critical assets. A critical asset would
be defined as an asset that is essential to the national interests of
the United States, as determined in consultation with relevant federal
agencies. Critical assets would include property, facilities, or
infrastructure necessary to maintain national defense, or assured
access to space for national priority missions. Critical assets would
also include certain military, intelligence, and civil payloads,
including essential infrastructure when directly supporting the payload
at the launch site. Under this proposal, the FAA anticipates that it
would work with relevant authorities, including a launch or reentry
site operator or Federal property owner, to identify each ``critical
asset'' and its potential vulnerability to launch and reentry hazards.
[[Page 15311]]
The FAA's existing risk criteria, currently found in Sec. Sec.
417.107(b) and 431.35(b), do not explicitly set any limit on the
probability of loss of functionality for any assets on the surface of
the Earth due to launch or reentry operations. An example of loss of
functionality would be if a launch vehicle crashed on a nearby launch
complex and resulted in damage that prevented the use of the launch
complex until repaired. Currently, FAA requirements provide some
protection for the safety of property during launch or reentry by
limiting individual and collective risks because people are generally
co-located with property. However, no protection is afforded for assets
within areas that are evacuated.
The proposed property protection criteria would be consistent with
current practice at Federal launch ranges. Launch operations from NASA-
operated ranges are subject to requirements that limit the probability
of debris impact to less than or equal to 1 x 10-\3\ for
designated assets. While the Air Force does not have a formal
requirement, in practice, launch operations from Air Force-operated
ranges have adopted the NASA standard. In the past, Federal launch
ranges have, on occasion, applied a more stringent requirement limiting
the probability of debris impact caused by launch or reentry hazards to
less than or equal to 1 x 10-\4\ for national security
payloads, including essential infrastructure when directly supporting
the payload at the launch site. The FAA is looking to extend the
protection of critical assets to non-Federal launch or reentry sites.
The Pacific Spaceport (located on Kodiak Island, Alaska) is an example
of a non-Federal launch or reentry site that is a dual-use commercial
and military spaceport (meaning that commercial missions have been
conducted there, as well as missions for the Department of Defense),
which has no regulatory assurance of protection from loss of
functionality of critical assets.
For these reasons, the FAA has determined that a requirement to
maintain a high probability of continuing functionality of critical
assets at a launch site is necessary to ensure the safety of property
and national security interests of the United States. Launch and
reentry infrastructure used for commercial operations are increasingly
in close proximity to critical assets, such as infrastructure used to
support the national interests of the United States. The national
interests of the U.S. relevant to this proposal go beyond national
security interests, and include infrastructure used to serve high
priority NASA missions as well. For example, the FAA considers launch
and reentry services to deliver cargo to and from the International
Space Station as national priority missions. As another example, the
launch infrastructure used by SpaceX to launch the Falcon 9 from
Kennedy Space Center is within 2 nm of the launch infrastructure used
by ULA to launch the Atlas V, which are both used to support commercial
operations and operations that serve the national interests of the
United States. The FAA coordinated the development of this proposed
critical asset protection requirement with NASA, the Department of
Defense, and the Intelligence Community.
Furthermore, the proposed property protection requirement would
also help achieve the goal of common standards for launches from any
U.S. launch site, Federal or non-Federal. Common standards are public
safety related requirements and practices that are consistently
employed by the Air Force, the FAA, and NASA during launch and reentry
activities. Common standards would provide launch and reentry operators
certainty in planning and enable a body of expertise to support those
standards.
Finally, the proposed property protection standards would apply to
all FAA-licensed launches, whether to or from a Federal launch range or
a non-Federal launch or reentry site. Applying the provision to non-
Federal sites would ensure continuity in the protection of critical
assets and that the probability of loss of functionality of critical
assets is the same for all commercial launch and reentry operations.
The FAA sees no reason for imposing different standards of safety for
critical assets based on whether a launch takes place from a non-
Federal launch site or from a Federal launch range, especially in light
of the fact that some non-Federal sites are dual use, supporting both
commercial and military operations.
During the interagency review process, the Department of Defense
requested and the FAA considered specifying a more stringent criterion
for certain critical assets of utmost importance. This subcategory of
critical assets would be known as critical payloads. Specifically, the
FAA considered requiring the probability of loss of functionality for
critical payloads, including essential infrastructure when directly
supporting the payload at the launch site, not exceed 1 x
10-\4\. The FAA considered defining a critical payload as a
critical asset that (1) is so costly or unique that it cannot be
readily replaced, or (2) the time frame for its replacement would
adversely affect the national interests of the United States. Critical
payloads may include vital national security payloads, and high-
priority NASA and NOAA payloads. For example, a payload such as NASA's
Curiosity rover would likely be afforded this protection. The higher
protection criterion would have safeguarded those payloads of utmost
importance to the United States meriting a greater degree of protection
than other critical assets. The specific 1 x 10-\4\
criterion would apply to those national priority payloads at a launch
or reentry site, including essential infrastructure when directly
supporting the payload. A federal agency would identify payloads
meeting the definition of ``critical payload'' as warranting protection
at the 1 x 10-\4\ level. These may include commercial
payloads that meet the national interest described above.
The FAA opted to not include this higher protection criterion due
to uncertainty about its impact on future launch or reentry operations.
Therefore, in order to properly analyze this request, the FAA requests
comment on the following:
(1) If the FAA adopted the more-stringent 1 x 10-\4\
criterion for critical payloads, what impacts would it have on your
operation?
(2) Should FAA consider applying this more-stringent criterion to
any commercial payload? Please provide specific examples and rationale.
(3) If this criterion is applied to commercial space launch and
reentry operations, what would be the additional, incremental costs and
benefits on your current and future operations compared to the proposed
1 x 10-\3\ criterion? Specifically, the FAA requests
information and data to quantify additional costs and benefits of this
criterion compared to the proposed 1 x 10-\3\ criterion.
Please provide sources for information and data provided.
3. Consequence Protection Criteria for Flight Abort and Flight Safety
System
This proposal would expand the FAA's use of consequence criteria to
protect the public from an unlikely but catastrophic event. Proposed
Sec. 450.101(c) would require that operators quantify the consequence
of a catastrophic event by calculating CEC for any one-
second period of flight. Unlike EC that determines the
expected casualties factoring in the probability that a dangerous event
will occur, CEC determines the expected casualties assuming
the dangerous event will occur. In essence, it represents the
[[Page 15312]]
consequence of the worst foreseeable events during a launch or reentry.
The FAA proposes to use CEC to determine the need for flight
abort with a reliable FSS as a hazard control strategy, to set
reliability standards for any required FSS, and to determine when to
initiate a flight abort. In other words, the more severe the potential
consequences from an unplanned event, the more stringent the flight
abort requirements.
The current ELV flight abort regulations are essentially a one-
size-fits-all approach. In practice, the current requirement in Sec.
417.107(a) requires an FSS for any orbital launch vehicle to prevent
hazards from reaching protected areas at all times during flight.
Regardless of the individual and collective risks, or the consequences
in the case of a catastrophic event, all FSSs must satisfy part 417,
subparts D and E, requirements.\45\ These include reliability
requirements (0.999 reliable at 95 percent confidence) \46\ and
extensive testing requirements. Besides requiring a potentially
expensive FSS, the part 417 hazard control approach also has the
potential to limit vehicle flight paths unnecessarily, even when those
flight paths would produce low public risks and consequences. This
preamble will discuss these areas in further detail later.
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\45\ Part 417 sets specific FSS requirements covering general
command control system requirements, command control system testing,
FSS support systems, FSS analysis, and flight safety crew roles and
qualifications.
\46\ Section 417.309 requires that each onboard flight
termination system and each command control system must have a
predicted reliability of 0.999 at the 95 percent confidence level
when operating, as well as predicted reliability of 0.999 at the 95
percent confidence for multiple component systems such as the
ordnance train to propagate a charge, any safe-and-arm device, and
ordinance interrupters and initiators. As these component systems
define the reliability of the FSS and approximate the design
reliability of the entire flight safety system, for the purpose of
the preamble the current requirements are discussed as requiring an
FSS to have predicted reliability of 0.999 at a 95 percent
confidence level. This will be discussed later in the preamble in
further detail.
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The FAA also recognizes shortcomings in its current part 431 hazard
control approach. Part 431 does not expressly require the use of an FSS
to manage hazards. Rather, Sec. 431.35(c) requires a system safety
process to identify hazards and assess the risk to public health and
safety and the safety of property. The system safety approach has
consistently resulted in the use of an FSS as a hazard control
strategy. In practice, the FAA has applied part 417 FSS requirements to
part 431 to ensure proper reliability and flight abort rules.
Part 417 FSS requirements have proven difficult to scale to
different operations. Indeed, the FAA has had to issue numerous waivers
to these requirements to accommodate the fast-evolving commercial space
industry. The need for waivers has been partially driven by changes to
Air Force requirements, which diverged from FAA regulations beginning
in 2013.\47\ For example, the FAA has repeatedly waived its requirement
to activate an FSS to ensure no debris greater than 3 pounds per square
foot (psf) ballistic coefficient \48\ reaches protected areas.\49\ In
granting these waivers, the FAA has adopted the conditional risk
management approach, noting that the predicted consequence was below a
threshold of 1 x 10-\2\ CEC. The FAA has
concluded that measuring the consequence from reasonably foreseeable,
albeit unlikely, failures is an appropriate metric to assess prudent
mitigations of risks to public health and safety and the safety of
property.\50\
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\47\ The FAA regulations and Air Force requirements regarding
flight abort were virtually identical from the time part 417 was
promulgated in 2006 until 2013 when the Air Force provided permanent
relief from the requirement for impact limit lines to bound where
debris with a ballistic coefficient greater than 3 pounds per square
foot can impact if the FSS works properly. The Air Force cited an
ELOS determination when it issued the permanent relief, stating that
the public risk criteria would still apply.
\48\ Ballistic coefficient is a measure of an object's ability
to overcome air resistance, and it is defined as the gross weight in
pounds divided by the frontal area of the vehicle (in square feet)
times the coefficient of drag.
\49\ Waiver of Debris Containment Requirements for Launch. 81 FR
1470, 1470-1472 (January 12, 2016).
\50\ Using consequence as safety criteria in FAA commercial
space regulations is not without precedent. Section 431.43(d) sets a
limit for foreseeable public consequences in terms of
CEC, but only for an unproven RLV. Section 431.43(d)
provides that an unproven RLV may only be operated so that during
any portion of flight, the expected number of casualties does not
exceed 1 x 10-\4\ given assuming a vehicle failure will
occur at any time the instantaneous impact point is over a populated
area.
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The ARC also made recommendations with respect to flight abort and
FSS requirements. It recommended the FAA tier the level of rigor for
FSSs into three risk categories. In relevant part, ARC members proposed
that the lowest risk category not require an FSS, that the medium risk
category require streamlined FSS test requirements (e.g., reduce from
three to one qualification units) and not require configuration and
risk management, and the highest risk category require a Range
Commanders Council (RCC) \51\ 319-compliant FSS. It also suggested the
highest risk category could use another operational or design approach
proven to address concerns of low probability/high consequence event.
The ARC only identified risk as a means of scaling FSS requirements and
did not recommend specific risk thresholds.\52\
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\51\ The Range Commanders Council addresses the common concerns
and needs of operational ranges within the United States. It works
with other government departments and agencies to establish various
technical standards to assist range users.
\52\ ARC Report at p. 12.
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In light of the shortcomings identified by the FAA and ARC
recommendations, the FAA agrees that the FAA's FSS requirements should
be scaled. For that reason, the FAA proposes to use consequence to
determine the need for an FSS, the required FSS reliability, and when
to activate an FSS.
To determine whether or not an FSS is needed, an operator would be
required to calculate CEC in any one second period of
flight. The calculation of CEC can range from a
straightforward product of the effective casualty area and the
population density to a high fidelity analysis.\53\ Proposed Sec.
450.101(c) would require, at a minimum, that an operator compute the
effective casualty area and identify the population density that would
be impacted for each reasonably foreseeable vehicle response mode in
any one-second period of flight in terms of CEC. The
casualty area, population density, and predicted consequence for each
vehicle response mode are intermediate quantities that are necessary to
demonstrate compliance with the individual and collective risk criteria
currently, thus these new requirements would not necessarily impart
significant additional burden on operators.
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\53\ The FAA referenced the need to prevent a high consequence
event in its evaluation of a 2016 waiver request, which enabled the
first Return to Launch Site (RTLS) mission (Orbcomm-2).
Specifically, the FAA noted that the 3 psf ballistic coefficient
requirement of Sec. 417.213(d) was intended to (1) capture the
current practice of the U.S. Air Force, (2) provide a clear and
consistent basis to establish impact limit lines to determine the
occurrence of an accident as defined by Sec. 401.5, and (3) help
prevent a high consequence to the public given FSS activation. As
part of the waiver rationale, the FAA cited the longstanding
governing principle applied to launch safety: ``to provide for the
public safety, the Ranges, using a Range Safety Program, shall
ensure that the launch and flight of launch vehicles and payloads
present no greater risk to the general public than that imposed by
the over-flight of conventional aircraft.'' (Eastern and Western
Range 127-1, Range Safety Requirements, Oct. 31, 1997) The waiver
rationale also cited an analysis of 30 years of empirical evidence
provided by the NTSB that showed that the public safety consequence
associated with general aviation accidents is 1 x 10-\2\
expected fatalities. The FAA's analysis demonstrated that the
consequence of events that could produce debris outside of the
impact limit lines was consistent with the threshold of 1 x
10-\2\ CEC, even with input data corresponding
to the worst-case weather conditions. Thus, the FAA concluded that
the waiver would not jeopardize public health and safety or the
safety of property.
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The FAA is proposing to rely on CEC rather than
EC to determine whether or
[[Page 15313]]
not an FSS is needed because FAA believes it is the best approach to
implement the ARC's recommendation that the FAA treat high consequence
events differently than lower consequence events. As noted earlier, the
ARC recommended a three tiered approach--high risk would require a
highly reliable FSS, medium risk would require an FSS with more
streamlined requirements, and low risk would require no FSS. The FAA's
approach of using a consequence analysis instead of a risk analysis
would use the same factors as used in a risk analysis, such as casualty
area, population density, and predicted consequence for each vehicle
response.
Proposed Sec. 450.145 (Flight Safety System), in paragraph (a),
would require an operator to employ an FSS with design reliability of
0.999 at 95 percent confidence and commensurate design, analysis, and
testing if the consequence of any vehicle response mode is 1 x
10-\2\ CEC or greater, consistent with the
current FSS requirements in part 417.\54\ If the consequence of any
vehicle response mode is between 1 x 10-\2\ and 1 x
10-\3\ CEC, the required design reliability would
be relaxed to no lower than 0.975 at 95 percent confidence \55\ with
commensurate design, analysis, and testing requirements necessary to
support this reliability. If the CEC is less than 1 x
10-\3\, and the individual and collective risk criteria are
met, an operator would not be required to have an FSS. The FAA
coordinated with NASA and the Department of Defense in the Common
Standards Working Group to arrive at this proposal.
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\54\ Sections 417.303 and 417.309.
\55\ In statistics, a confidence interval is the range of values
that includes the true value at a specified confidence level. A
confidence level of 95% is commonly used which means that there is a
95% chance that the true value is encompassed in the interval.
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An RCC 319-compliant FSS would only be required for any phase of
flight in which the CEC exceeds 1 x 10-\2\. This
threshold is consistent with past precedent, FAA waivers, and U.S.
Government consensus standards. Other government entities use a
consequence threshold of 1 x 10-\2\ to protect against
explosive hazards.\56\ This threshold is also rooted in the
longstanding and often cited principle that launch and reentry should
present no greater risk to the public than that imposed by the over-
flight of conventional aircraft. The Air Force, the RCC, and an
American National Standard (ANSI/AIAA S-061-1998) 57 58 have
identified the public risks posed by conventional aircraft as an
important benchmark for the acceptable risks posed by launch vehicles.
Like commercial space operations, civil aviation poses an involuntary
hazard to the public on the ground. Therefore, the FAA looked to this
risk to the public on the ground to derive consequence limits for
commercial space activities. The FAA analyzed National Transportation
Safety Board (NTSB) aviation accident data and determined that the
average consequences on the ground from all fatal civil aviation
accidents are 0.06 casualties and 0.02 fatalities. The average ground
fatality of an airline crash is 1, and of a general aviation crash is
0.01.\59\ The proposed threshold appears reasonable given this range of
aviation related accident consequences.
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\56\ The Department of Defense, NASA, and the FAA use quantity-
distance limits originally designed to limit conditional individual
risk of fatality to 1 x 10-\2\ from inert debris fragment
impacts. They define minimum separation distances between potential
sources of high speed fragments (propelled by accidental explosions)
and areas with exposed personnel to ensure no more than one
hazardous fragment impact per 600 sqft, with the assumption that any
exposed person has a vulnerable area of 6 sqft. NASA only permits
inhabited buildings at closer distances if proved sufficient to
limit hazardous debris to 1/600 sqft, and thus enforces a
consequence limit of no more than 1 x 10-\2\ conditional
expected fatalities (NASA-STD-8719.12A--2018-05-23, p. 63).
\57\ Waiver of Debris Containment Requirements for Launch. 81 FR
1470 (January 12, 2016), at 1470-1472.
\58\ According to ANSI/AIAA S-061-1998, ``during the launch and
flight phase of commercial space vehicle operations, the safety risk
for the general public should be no more hazardous than that caused
by other hazardous human activities (e.g., general aviation over
flight).''
\59\ The FAA looked at NTSB data on injuries and fatalities of
people on the ground from fatal civil aviation accidents (where an
occupant of the aircraft died) for the 30-year period between 1984
and 2013.
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The FAA proposes a threshold of 1 x 10-\3\
CEC as a metric for determining the need for any FSS. This
is an order of magnitude less than the threshold that determines the
need for a highly-reliable FSS, and which is scaled to the reliability
of the required FSS. Combined with the individual risk and cumulative
risk thresholds, the FAA believes that this proposed threshold would
ensure public safety.
The use of a consequence metric is consistent with the ARC
comments. The ARC suggested that an FSS with a reliability of 0.999 at
95 percent confidence is appropriate for high consequence, low
probability events and a lower reliability could be acceptable under
the right circumstances. The FAA notes that the ARC did not identify
any threshold values to define ``high consequence''; however, the
proposal does identify specific quantitative consequence thresholds in
terms of CEC. The FAA invites comments on this approach in
general, as well as the specific thresholds proposed.
Lastly, proposed Sec. 450.125 (Gate Analysis), in paragraph (c),
would limit the predicted average consequence from flight abort
resulting from a failure in any one-second period of flight to 1 x
10-\2\ CEC. Flight abort will be discussed in
more detail later in the preamble.
B. System Safety Program
Proposed Sec. 450.103 (System Safety Program) would require an
operator to implement and document a system safety program throughout
the lifecycle of a launch or reentry system that includes at least the
following: (1) Safety organization, including a mission director and
safety official; (2) procedures to evaluate the operational lifecycle
of the launch or reentry system to maintain current preliminary safety
assessments and any flight hazard analyses; (3) configuration
management and control; and (4) post-flight data review. Due to the
complexity and variety of vehicle concepts and operations, a system
safety program would be necessary to ensure that an operator considers
and addresses all risks to public safety.
Currently, parts 415 and 417 have a more prescriptive philosophy of
flight safety hazard mitigation. While the requirements ensure safety,
they neither provide the flexibility needed to address the diverse and
dynamic nature of today's commercial space transportation industry nor
address the unique aspects of non-traditional launch and reentry
vehicles. For example, except for unguided suborbital launch vehicles,
it is virtually impossible for operations that can reach populated
areas but that do not use an FSS to comply with parts 415 and 417.
Regulations applicable to reentry and RLVs in part 431 expressly
established system safety requirements as a flexible approach to
approving a safety process that encompasses design and operation.
Section 431.33 sets the requirements for the maintenance and
documentation of a safety organization. Specifically, it requires: (1)
The identification of lines of communication and approval authority for
all mission decisions possibly affecting public safety including
internal and external lines of communication with the launch or reentry
site to ensure compliance with required plans and procedures; (2) the
designation of a person responsible for conducting all licensed RLV
mission activities; and (3) designation of a qualified safety official
by name, title, and qualifications.
[[Page 15314]]
Section 431.35(c) specifically requires the use of a system safety
process to identify hazards and assess the risks to public health and
safety and the safety of property and to demonstrate compliance with
the acceptable risk criteria.\60\ It also incorporates core components
of a hazard analysis.
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\60\ Section 431.35(c) also fails to provide a detailed
description of the composition of a compliant system safety process.
This lack of detail has often led to the submission of deficient
applications because the applicant failed to demonstrate that the
system safety process was adequate to meet public safety
requirements and therefore the FAA did not find the application to
be complete enough for acceptance. The ARC noted the confusion
around the FAA's evaluation of an application's system safety
submission and recommended changing the regulation to increase
regulatory certainty.
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Section 431.35(d) requires several deliverables to demonstrate
compliance with acceptable risk criteria and a compliant system safety
process. Despite the explicit deliverables, the structure of the
regulation has proved to be confusing for applicants. For instance,
some system safety analysis element requirements are intermixed with
vehicle design element requirements. Similarly, general information
requirements such as the identification of hazardous material can be
found listed with unrelated requirements such as the description of the
RLV. The inclusion of these elements in the section governing system
safety has led applicants to produce application deliverables that were
scattered and not easily understood by the FAA. Also, some less
experienced applicants did not understand that the regulation required
a system safety analysis and provided general information and an
informal assessment of how that general information may have affected
public safety.
The ARC made specific suggestions on the role of system safety in
the FAA's safety regulatory scheme. It recommended the FAA use a system
safety process at the core of its safety requirements to identify
hazards and develop hazard control strategies that are verified by
means of an FSA, relevant operational constraints, and means of meeting
those constraints. It noted the FAA could provide better detail on its
safety requirements. For instance, Sec. 431.35(c) could be expanded to
include risk-informed decision making and continuous risk management
requirements. It further suggested the FAA incorporate varying levels
of rigor that would scale required verification requirements, like test
plans and performance results, by vehicle, operator category, and
relative risk as a means of scoping requirements to vehicle hazards and
potential population exposure. The FAA agrees that the system safety
process should form the core of its safety requirements as a means of
making the safety requirements more flexible for novel operations and
processes.
Proposed Sec. 450.103 lists the minimum components all operators
would be required to have in their system safety programs to protect
public health and safety and the safety of property. Part 431
established a process-based requirement for a system safety program but
did not define its components or a safety standard. This lack of
definition has led to many operators establishing system safety
programs that are missing components necessary for public safety. This
lengthened some applicants' pre-application consultation and the
license application evaluation process. The FAA intends to further
define the system safety program to lessen the potential for
misunderstandings between applicants and the FAA. This proposal should
allow potential operators to design system safety programs that better
address public safety concerns prior to license application submittal.
1. Safety Organization
Proposed Sec. 450.103(a) would require an operator to maintain and
document a safety organization with clearly defined lines of
communication and approval authority for all public safety decisions.
This safety organization would include at least two positions, referred
to as a mission director and a safety official. The mission director
would be responsible for the safe conduct of all licensed activities
and authorized to provide final approval to proceed with licensed
activities. The safety official \61\ would be required to communicate
potential safety and non-compliance matters to the mission director
during flight and ground operations. The safety official would also be
authorized to examine all aspects of an operator's ground safety and
flight safety operations. It is common practice in any safety
organization, including those within the commercial space industry, to
establish who will be responsible for ensuring safety and to have clear
processes for communicating safety concerns effectively throughout the
organization.
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\61\ In 1999, the FAA added the requirement for a safety
official possessing authority to examine launch safety operations
and to monitor independently personnel compliance with safety
policies and procedures. The FAA stated in the preamble to the final
rule that the person responsible for safety should have the ability
to perform independently of those parts of the applicant's
organization responsible for mission assurance. 64 FR 19604 (April
21, 1999).
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This proposal would allow for one person, or several, to perform
the safety official's functions. Unlike current regulations, an
operator would not have to name a specific safety official in its
license application. Instead, an operator would be required to
designate a position to accomplish the necessary tasks of a safety
official. The FAA seeks comment on this approach, and whether it
provides an appropriate level of flexibility to industry.
Many operators have complained about the burden of naming a
specific safety official in a license application. One challenge is
that, in many cases, an operator applies for a license before selecting
a safety official. As such, many operators must submit a modification
of their application once they have chosen a safety official. Another
issue is that operators that conduct activities at a frequent rate must
employ several persons that serve as safety officials to keep pace with
their operations. These persons may serve as safety officials on
several different types of operations on multiple licenses. Therefore,
the operator must frequently submit license application modifications
every time it selects a new person to serve in that capacity. An
operator is further burdened when safety officials leave the launch
operator's organization or assume a new role within the organization
that would prohibit them from serving as a safety official. The FAA
believes a safety organization that includes a safety official is
essential to public safety; however, identifying that individual by
name is not necessary.
Under the proposal, the operator would still be required to
designate a safety official for any licensed activity prior to the
start of that activity. The FAA has previously noted that licensed
ground operations have commenced without designating a safety official.
Many applicants mistakenly assumed the safety official was only
necessary for flight operations. These operators conducted preflight
ground operations in advance of flight without a safety official
monitoring the operation. This proposal would require a safety official
for all licensed operations to independently monitor licensed activity
to ensure compliance with the operator's safety policies. Additionally,
the safety official would report directly to the mission director. The
absence of a safety official could result in a lack of independent
safety oversight and a potential for a break down in communications of
important safety-related information. The FAA would continue to inspect
licensed operations
[[Page 15315]]
to ensure that a safety official is in place throughout the course of
the licensed activity.
2. Procedures
Proposed Sec. 450.103(b) would require that an operator establish
procedures to evaluate hazards throughout the complete operational
lifecycle of a program. This is important because design and
operational changes to a system can have an impact on public safety.
This proposed requirement was implied in Sec. 431.35(c) but was not
explicitly stated. Specifically, Sec. 450.103(b) would require the
operator to implement a process to update the preliminary safety
assessment and any flight hazard analysis to reflect the knowledge
gained during the lifecycle of the system. To accomplish this, an
operator would be required to establish methods to review and assess
the validity of the preliminary safety assessment and any flight hazard
analysis throughout the operational lifecycle of the launch or reentry
system. An operator would also need to have methods for updating the
assessment or analysis, and to communicate the updates throughout its
organization. For any flight hazard analysis, an operator would also
have to have a process for tracking hazards, risks, mitigation and
hazard control measures, and verification activities.
3. Configuration Management and Control
Proposed Sec. 450.103(c) would lay out configuration management
and control requirements. The FAA has chosen to consolidate
configuration management and control requirements within the system
safety program requirements. Requirements addressing configuration
control were previously scattered throughout the regulations, including
in Sec. Sec. 417.111(e), 417.123(e)(2), 417.303(e), and 417.407(c).
Operators frequently make changes to their vehicles, such as new
manufacturing techniques for a component or changes to the materials on
key structures. Operators may also make operational changes such as new
analysis techniques, automating processes that were previously
conducted by personnel, or changing the surveillance techniques in
hazard areas. These types of changes can have significant impacts on
public safety.
This proposal would require an operator to track configurations of
all safety-critical systems and documentation, ensure the correct and
appropriate versions of the systems and documentation are used, and
maintain records of system configurations and versions used for each
licensed activity. The FAA expects that an operator would design
configuration management and control into its operations. The FAA also
expects that an operator would provide the capability to both alert
responsible individuals when key documentation must be updated and
ensure that all stakeholders--internal and external to the launch
operator's organization--are using current and accurate information.
4. Post-Flight Data Review
Proposed Sec. 450.103(d) would require that an applicant conduct a
post-flight data review. The proposed requirements in Sec. 450.103(d)
are not explicitly contained in part 415, 417 or 431. However, it is
industry practice to review post-flight data to address vehicle
reliability and mission success, so any added burden from proposed
Sec. 450.103(d) would be minimal. Operator review of post-flight data
provides valuable safety information on future operations, particularly
the identification of anomalies. At a minimum, proposed Sec.
450.103(d)(1) would require that an operator employ a process for
evaluating post-flight data to ensure consistency between the
assumptions used for the preliminary safety assessment, any flight
hazard or flight safety analysis, and associated mitigation and hazard
control measures.
Proposed Sec. 450.103(d)(2) would require that an operator resolve
any inconsistencies identified in proposed Sec. 450.103(d)(1) prior to
the next flight of the vehicle. The FAA expects that the operator would
address any inconsistencies by updating analyses using the best
available data for the upcoming mission, or documenting the rationale
explaining how changes to the data inputs would not have an impact on
the results of the analysis for a proposed mission. The FAA would add
this requirement to ensure that the operator makes all appropriate
updates to the analysis identifying all public safety impacts in order
to avoid inconsistencies in future missions that could jeopardize
public safety.
Proposed Sec. 450.103(d)(3) would require that an operator
identify any anomaly that may impact the flight hazard analysis, flight
safety analysis, safety critical system, or is otherwise material to
public safety and safety of property. An examination and understanding
of launch or reentry vehicle system and subsystem anomalies throughout
the lifecycle of the vehicle system can alert an operator of an
impending mishap. An operator should review post-flight data to
identify unexpected issues or critical systems that are operating
outside of predicted limits. Flight safety systems are examples of
safety-critical systems that could jeopardize public safety if they do
not perform nominally.
Proposed Sec. 450.103(d)(4) would require an operator to address
any anomaly identified in proposed Sec. 450.103(d)(3). Prior to the
next flight, an operator would be required to address each anomaly by,
at a minimum, updating any flight hazard analysis, flight safety
analysis, or safety critical system.
The FAA seeks comment on whether proposed Sec. 450.103(d) would
change an operator's approach to reviewing post-flight data.
5. Application Requirements
Proposed Sec. 450.103(e) would set the system safety program
application requirements. An applicant would be required to provide a
summary of how it plans to satisfy the system safety program
requirements. It is currently common practice for applicants to provide
the FAA with a system safety program plan or documents containing the
necessary information to determine compliance with the system safety
program requirements in Sec. 431.35(c). A system safety program plan
that covers the elements in Sec. 450.103(e) would satisfy the proposed
application requirements. The FAA also recommends an applicant consult
with the FAA during the development of its system safety program prior
to implementation.
With respect to the safety organization, an applicant would be
required to describe the applicant's safety organization, identifying
the applicant's lines of communication and approval authority, both
internally and externally, for all public safety decisions and the
provision of public safety services. In the past, many applicants have
chosen to provide an organization chart depicting the safety
organization. The FAA encourages the continuation of this practice.
However, the applicant would be required to provide a sufficient
narrative describing the organization, particularly the lines of
communication. For example, if an engineer in the safety organization
becomes aware of a hazard, the applicant should describe how that
engineer would communicate that hazard to the safety official.
An applicant would also be required to provide a summary of the
processes and products identified in the system safety program
requirements. The FAA expects that processes would be scalable based on
the size of the operation or the potential public safety impacts of the
proposed operation. For example, an
[[Page 15316]]
applicant with a dozen employees and a relatively small launch or
reentry vehicle may use meetings or less formal ways to develop its
preliminary hazard list. However, an applicant with a larger vehicle
operating from multiple sites and hundreds of employees would need a
more formal means of tracking information and developing the required
analyses.
C. Preliminary Safety Assessment for Flight
Under proposed Sec. 450.105 (Preliminary Safety Assessment for
Flight), every operator would be required to conduct and document a
preliminary safety assessment (PSA) for the flight of a launch or
reentry vehicle. The PSA would identify operation-specific information
relevant to public safety and would help the operator scope the
analyses that must be conducted to ensure that the operation satisfies
the public safety criteria in proposed Sec. 450.101. An operator could
use the knowledge obtained from the PSA to identify the effect of
design and operational decisions on public safety and thus determine
potential hazard control strategies. The products of the PSA are
consistent with products that are currently produced for preliminary
flight safety analyses and preliminary system safety analyses. The PSA
will allow operators to quickly identify and demonstrate the hazard
control strategy appropriate for their proposed operation.
The FAA intends the PSA to be a top-level assessment of the
potential public safety impacts identifiable early in the design
process. This assessment should be broad enough that minor changes in
vehicle design or operations would not have a significant impact on, or
invalidate the products produced by, the PSA. At the same time, the PSA
should be detailed enough to identify the public safety and hazard
control implications associated with key design trade studies. The FAA
recommends that an operator perform an initial PSA at the outset of the
design phase of a proposed operation. Thereafter, the operator should
update the assessment as needed in accordance with the launch
operator's established procedures to evaluate the complete operational
lifecycle of a launch or reentry system. The results of the PSA would
provide the operator with an appropriate hazard control strategy for
its proposed operation.\62\
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\62\ As mentioned previously and discussed in greater detail in
the next section, traditional hazard controls include physical
containment, wind weighting, or flight abort.
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Under proposed Sec. 450.105(a), an acceptable PSA would identify
at least the following key elements: (1) The vehicle response modes;
(2) the types of hazards associated with the vehicle response modes;
(3) the geographical area where the public may be exposed to a hazard;
(4) the population of the public exposed to the hazard; (5) the
CEC; (6) a preliminary hazard list which documents all
causes of vehicle response modes that, excluding mitigation, have the
capability to create a hazard to the public; (7) safety-critical
systems; and (8) the timeline identifying all safety critical events.
The FAA expects that an operator would use many of these PSA elements
in subsequent analyses. For instance, population data, vehicle response
modes, and the associated effects are part of a valid quantitative risk
analysis. These items could also be useful for a flight hazard
analysis.
A vehicle response mode is a mutually exclusive scenario that
characterizes foreseeable combinations of vehicle trajectory and debris
generation. Examples include on-trajectory explosion, on-trajectory
loss of thrust, and tumble turns. The types of hazards associated with
any vehicle response mode can include inert and explosive debris,
overpressure, and toxics. By understanding the potential vehicle
response modes and the hazards associated with those vehicle response
modes, an operator can then determine the geographical areas where the
public may be exposed to a hazard. This information, along with the
population of the public exposed to the hazard, would allow an operator
to begin to characterize the potential risk during any particular phase
of flight. Calculating CEC as discussed earlier, is
important to understand the need for an FSS and its required
reliability. All of these elements, which comprise Sec. 450.105(a)(1)
through (5), are important to develop hazard control strategies.
Proposed Sec. 450.105(a)(6) would require an operator to produce a
preliminary hazard list. The operator would be required to review the
operation to determine what hazards exist in order to generate the
preliminary hazard list. This assessment is different from the
quantitative risk analysis and is meant to give an operator an
understanding of how public safety is affected at the subsystem or
component level of the operation. An operator should use common system
safety tools such as Fault Trees, Failure Modes and Effects Analyses
(FMEA), safety panels, and engineering judgement to develop the
preliminary hazard list.
An operator should describe hazards in terms that identify each
potential source of harm, the mechanism by which the harm may be
caused, and the potential outcome if the harm were to remain
unaddressed.\63\ The operator should ensure that the hazard is
described in enough detail so that the safety critical personnel within
the operator's organization would be able to review the hazard and
easily ascertain the source, mechanism, and the public safety-related
outcome of the hazard. In developing the preliminary hazard list, an
operator would not be required to assess the risk associated with each
hazard or potential mitigation measures. These items would be
determined in the flight hazard analysis, if required, as discussed in
the ``Flight Hazard Analysis'' section of this preamble.
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\63\ For example, a potential source of harm could be a leak in
a rocket engine fuel system line caused by a manufacturing defect,
overpressure, or improper installation. The mechanism for harm could
be a fire resulting from that leak. The outcome could be loss of the
vehicle with impact on population.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
When developing the preliminary hazard list, the operator would
also be required to address items that are not specific to the vehicle
hardware but necessary for the launch or reentry system. These items
would include things like human factors, training, and other
operational concerns.
The FAA believes the preliminary hazard list is critical as the
regulatory approach changes from narrowly prescribed methods to
performance-based standards that focus on the applicant demonstrating
safety through system safety management and engineering. As the
industry moves toward to a more performance-based regime, there is a
growing need for operators to produce the analyses specific to their
unique operations in order to ensure public safety and detail the
appropriate hazard mitigation strategies for their proposed operation.
Additionally, an operator that makes changes to its operation could
potentially move from a regulatory pathway that does not require a
hazard analysis to one that does. The existence of a preliminary hazard
list should alleviate some of the existing burdens on operators by
requiring only those analyses necessary to ensure the safety of a
particular operation.
It would also more quickly facilitate analyses demonstrating public
safety, thus creating the potential for operational changes closer to
flight of the vehicle. For example, consider an operation where a
flight hazard analysis
[[Page 15317]]
was unnecessary because of the use of an FSS under proposed Sec.
450.145(a)(1). In that case, a change in FSS design, testing or
qualification, or disabling the abort system during some phases of
flight, could result in the need for a flight hazard analysis. Because
the operator would be required to generate a preliminary hazard list,
it would already have the initial step of the flight hazard analysis
completed, excluding any impacts of the change. The operator would then
be required to complete the final steps of the hazard analysis to
complete its safety documentation.
Proposed Sec. 450.105(a)(7) would require an operator to identify
safety-critical systems. A safety critical system would be a system
that is essential to safe performance or operation. A safety-critical
system, subsystem, component, condition, event, operation, process, or
item, is one whose proper recognition, control, performance, or
tolerance, is essential to ensuring public safety. It is important for
an operator to clearly identify safety critical systems because many
requirements in proposed part 450 relate to these systems.
Proposed Sec. 450.105(a)(8) would require an operator to identify
a timeline identifying all safety critical events. This timeline is
important to identify the potential public safety consequences during
any particular phase of flight.
Proposed Sec. 450.105(b) would set the PSA application
requirements. The applicant would be required to provide the results of
the preliminary safety assessment in its application. The applicant
would be required to provide information for every requirement listed
under Sec. 450.105(a). These application requirements are consistent
with those currently in part 431. Although these specific system safety
requirements would be new for ELV operators, the FAA does not expect
they would add a substantial burden given that part 417 operators were
performing similar work, albeit not under the system management
umbrella. ELV operators must already identify vehicle failure modes;
debris, toxics, distant-focusing overpressure, and other hazards;
geographical containment and overflight trajectories; consequences that
determine flight limits; and all safety critical systems and events.
The PSA codifies these concerns as primary to safety and the
development of hazard control strategies and requires all vehicle
operators to document such considerations.
Development of the PSA would allow the operator to determine
whether they must perform a flight hazard analysis. The operator would
be required to assess each phase of flight to determine how public
safety hazards are mitigated. If there is a phase of flight where all
identified public safety hazards are not mitigated using physical
containment, wind weighting, or flight abort, the operator would be
required to perform a flight hazard analysis, discussed later in this
preamble, for that particular phase of flight.
D. Hazard Control Strategy
Proposed Sec. 450.107 (Hazard Control Strategies) would provide
options for hazard control strategies that an operator could use to
meet the public safety criteria in proposed Sec. 450.101 for each
phase of a launch or reentry vehicle's flight. An operator could use
physical containment, wind weighting, or flight abort and would not be
required to conduct a flight hazard analysis. Alternatively, an
operator could conduct a flight hazard analysis to derive hazard
controls. As part of its application, an operator would be required to
identify the selected hazard control strategy for each phase of flight.
The use of a flight hazard analysis to derive hazard controls
provides the most flexibility of any of the hazard control strategies.
The ARC recommended this approach and stated that the system safety
process should be used to identify hazards and develop control
strategies, which would then be verified by means of flight safety
analysis and relevant operational constraints and means of meeting
those constraints.\64\ In certain circumstances, however, historical
methods may also provide an acceptable level of safety. If the public
safety hazards identified in the preliminary safety assessment can be
mitigated adequately to meet the public safety requirements of proposed
Sec. 450.101 using physical containment, wind weighting, or flight
abort with a highly reliable FSS, an operator would not need to conduct
a flight hazard analysis for that phase of flight. This proposal is
different than current regulations, where the option of conducting a
hazard analysis to derive hazard controls is only available to reusable
launch vehicles. Under proposed part 450, the option to use a flight
hazard analysis would not rest on whether a vehicle is expendable or
reusable.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\64\ ARC Report at p. 10.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Under proposed Sec. 450.107(b), an operator could use physical
containment to satisfy the public safety requirements of proposed Sec.
450.101 when an operator's launch vehicle does not have sufficient
energy for any hazards associated with its flight to reach an area
where it exposes the public or critical assets to a hazard. These
launches can take place from any launch site, depending on the size of
the launch vehicle, the expected trajectory, and other factors. The
more remote a launch site is, the greater its capacity to accommodate a
launch using physical containment.
This approach is consistent with current practice because the FAA
has always accepted a demonstration of physical containment as a means
of satisfying risk requirements. The use of physical containment as a
hazard control strategy is the easiest way to meet the public safety
requirements of proposed Sec. 450.101 and may, in a remote location,
involve a simple showing that the maximum distance vehicle hazards can
reach defines an area that is unpopulated and does not contain any
critical assets. Because physical containment precludes the need for an
FSS, an operator would not be required to meet any requirements
relevant to an FSS. If an operator shows its vehicle does not have
sufficient energy for any of its associated hazards to reach outside
the flight hazard area, the operator would not have to perform a flight
hazard analysis. Further, many other requirements would be either not
applicable or easily met. Because physical containment may also involve
visitor control, wind constraints, real-time toxic analysis, and other
mitigation measures, the FAA would require an operator to apply other
mitigation measures to ensure no public exposure to hazards, as agreed
to by the Administrator on a case-by-case basis.
Under proposed Sec. 450.107(c), an operator could use wind
weighting to satisfy the public safety requirements of proposed Sec.
450.101 when an operator uses launcher elevation and azimuth settings
to correct for wind effects that an unguided suborbital launch vehicle,
typically called a sounding rocket, would experience during flight. Due
to its relative simplicity and effectiveness, wind weighting has
historically been used by NASA, the Department of Defense, and
commercial operators as the primary method to ensure public safety for
the launch of a sounding rocket. This approach is currently codified in
part 417. Under part 431, an operator can use wind weighting as an
acceptable hazard mitigation measure determined through the system
safety process. Under proposed part 450, an operator launching a
sounding rocket could use wind weighting or it could propose other
hazard controls in its application through a flight hazard analysis.
The specific wind weighting requirements are discussed in the
[[Page 15318]]
``Additional Technical Justification and Rationale'' section.
Under proposed Sec. 450.107(d), an operator could use flight abort
to satisfy the public safety requirements of proposed Sec. 450.101
when an operator limits or restricts the hazards to the public or
critical assets presented by a launch vehicle or reentry vehicle,
including any payload, while in flight by initiating and accomplishing
a controlled ending to vehicle flight, when necessary. This is
discussed in more detail in the ``Flight Abort'' section.
If the public safety hazards identified in the preliminary safety
assessment cannot be mitigated adequately to meet the public risk
criteria of proposed Sec. 450.101 using physical containment, wind
weighting, or flight abort, an operator would be required to conduct a
flight hazard analysis in accordance with proposed Sec. 450.109
(Flight Hazard Analysis) to derive hazard controls for that phase of
flight. The use of a flight hazard analysis to derive hazard controls
is the primary approach used in current parts 431, 435, and 437. The
FAA has previously required the use of a flight hazard analysis for
reentry, for the captive carry portion of an air-launched vehicle, and
for piloted suborbital vehicles. A detailed discussion of flight hazard
analysis is included later in this preamble.
In its application, an applicant would be required to describe its
hazard control strategy for each phase of flight. An applicant may
elect to use different hazard control strategies for different phases
of flight, depending on risks associated with those phases. For
example, an applicant using an air-launched system might use a flight
hazard analysis during the captive carry phase of flight, and flight
abort during the rocket-powered phase of flight. Additionally, if using
physical containment as a hazard control strategy, an applicant would
be required to demonstrate that the launch vehicle does not have
sufficient energy for any hazards associated with its flight to reach
outside the flight hazard area. The applicant would also be required to
describe the methods used to ensure that flight hazard areas are
cleared of the public and critical assets.
E. Flight Abort
As discussed earlier, flight abort is a hazard control strategy to
limit or restrict the hazards to the public or critical assets
presented by a launch vehicle or reentry vehicle, including any
payload, while in flight. Flight abort is a controlled ending to
vehicle flight and is initiated by an operator when ending flight poses
less risk to public safety and the safety of property than continued
flight without a safety intervention. Flight abort is the primary
hazard control strategy used today for orbital expendable launch
vehicles under part 417, and under Air Force and NASA launch range
requirements.
The FAA proposes to require this approach, with a reliable FSS,
only when certain conditional risks are present. Specifically, proposed
Sec. 450.101(c) would require an operator to use flight abort with an
FSS that meets the requirements of Sec. 450.145 as a hazard control
strategy if the consequence of any reasonably foreseeable vehicle
response mode, in any one-second period of flight, is greater than 1 x
10-3 conditional expected casualties for uncontrolled
areas.\65\ The basis for this number is discussed in the ``Consequence
Protection Criteria for Flight Abort and Flight Safety System''
section. Under this test, a typical orbital launch from the Air Force
Eastern and Western ranges would require an FSS capable of initiating
flight abort. Small orbital launch vehicles launched from more remote
locations, however, would not normally be required to use flight abort
as a hazard control strategy. The FAA seeks comment on this approach.
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\65\ The proposed requirement to use flight abort as a hazard
control strategy is less restrictive than Sec. 417.107(a), which
requires a launch operator to use an FSS in the vicinity of the
launch site if any hazard from a launch vehicle, vehicle component,
or payload can reach any protected area at any time during flight,
or if a failure of the launch vehicle would have a high consequence
to the public.
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To implement flight abort as a hazard control strategy, an operator
would establish flight safety limits and gates in accordance with
proposed Sec. Sec. 450.123 (Flight Safety Limits Analysis) and
450.125, establish flight abort rules in accordance with Sec. 450.165
(Flight Safety Rules), and employ an FSS in accordance with Sec.
450.145 and software in accordance with Sec. 450.111.
Flight abort as a hazard control strategy can be used by an
operator, even if it is not required under Sec. 450.101(c), as a
hazard mitigation measure derived from the flight hazard analysis. For
example, a piloted vehicle with low conditional expected casualty
during powered flight may use an FSS in combination with other
measures, such as propellant dumping, to keep vehicle hazards from
reaching a populated area.
1. Flight Safety Limits and Uncontrolled Areas
An operator would have to identify the location of uncontrolled
areas and establish flight safety limits that define when an operator
must initiate flight abort to:
Prevent debris capable of causing a casualty from
impacting in uncontrolled areas if the vehicle is outside the limits of
a useful mission, and
Ensure compliance with the public safety criteria of Sec.
450.101.
The FAA would define debris capable of causing a casualty with
kinetic energy or other thresholds as will be discussed later. The
public safety criteria that would go into determining flight safety
limits would be collective risk, individual risk, risk to critical
assets, and conditional risk. An uncontrolled area would be an area of
land not controlled by a launch or reentry operator, a launch or
reentry site operator, an adjacent site operator, or other entity by
agreement. Under current regulations, these areas are referred to as
``protected areas.'' Importantly, as discussed earlier, the conditional
risk criteria would not apply to controlled areas, which are areas that
are controlled by any of the entities listed earlier, because by
exercising control over these areas the entity would have a greater
ability to ensure that catastrophic risk is mitigated by other means.
In addition to establishing flight safety limits, an operator would
establish gates, if the vehicle would need to overfly a landmass during
its flight. A gate is an opening in a flight safety limit through which
a vehicle may fly, provided the vehicle meets certain pre-defined
conditions such that the vehicle performance indicates an ability to
continue safe flight. If the vehicle fails to meet the required
conditions to pass a gate, then flight abort would occur at the flight
safety limit. In other words, the gate would be closed.
Flight safety limits and gates are discussed in greater detail
later in this preamble.
2. Flight Abort Rules
An operator would identify the conditions under which the FSS,
including the functions of any flight abort crew, must abort the flight
to ensure compliance with Sec. 450.101. An operator would be required
to abort a flight if a flight safety limit is violated, or if some
condition exists that could lead to a violation, such as a compromised
FSS or loss of data.
Flight abort rules are discussed in greater detail later in this
preamble.
3. Flight Safety System
To enable flight abort, an operator must use an FSS. An FSS is an
integral
[[Page 15319]]
part of positive control of a launch or reentry vehicle because it
allows an operator to destroy the vehicle, terminate thrust, or
otherwise achieve flight abort to limit or restrict the hazards to
public health and safety and the safety of property presented by a
vehicle while in flight. Traditional FSSs are comprised of an onboard
flight termination system, a ground-based command and control system,
and tracking and telemetry systems. Historically, the flight safety
crew monitoring the course of a vehicle would send a command to the
vehicle to terminate flight if the vehicle violated a flight abort
rule. Recently, operators are favoring autonomous FSSs, negating the
need for a ground-based command and control system or flight abort
crew.
As discussed earlier, the CEC would establish whether an
FSS is required, and if so, its reliability.
If the consequence of any vehicle response mode is 1 x
10-2 conditional expected casualties or greater for
uncontrolled areas, an operator would be required to employ an FSS with
design reliability of 0.999 at 95 percent confidence and commensurate
design, analysis, and testing; or
If the consequence of any vehicle response mode is between
1 x 10-2 and 1 x 10-3, an operator would be
required to employ an FSS with a design reliability of 0.975 at 95
percent confidence and commensurate design, analysis, and testing.
Note that if the consequence of any vehicle response mode is less
than 1 x 10-3, the FAA would not require an FSS or mandate
its reliability if an operator chooses to use one.
Unlike part 417, the FAA would not propose specific design or
testing requirements for an FSS. Instead, the FAA would accept
specified government or industry standards as meeting the FSS
reliability requirements. At this time, only one government standard
would meet the requirement for a design reliability of 0.999 at 95
percent confidence and commensurate design, analysis, and testing, and
that is RCC 319.\66\
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\66\ RCC 319 can be found at http://www.wsmr.army.mil/RCCsite/Documents/319-14_Flight_Termination_Systems_Commonality_Standard/RCC_319-14_FTS_Commonality.pdf.
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The FSS requirements codified in part 417, including component
performance requirements and acceptance and qualification testing, were
originally written to align FAA launch licensing requirements with the
Federal launch range standards in RCC 319. Like part 417, RCC 319
requires qualification tests to demonstrate reliable operation in
environments exceeding the expected operating environment for the
system components, acceptance tests to demonstrate that the selected
batch of components meets the requirements of the design
specifications, and other preflight testing at the system or subsystem
level to demonstrate functionality after installation.
In the short term, the FAA expects individual applicants to create
their own FSS requirements based on RCC 319 and have them approved as
an accepted means of compliance by the FAA prior to application
submittal. This would be akin to ``tailoring'' RCC 319, which is
current practice at the Federal launch ranges. In the long run, the FAA
expects the industry to develop voluntary consensus standards for FSSs,
particularly for those FSSs that are only required to have a design
reliability of 0.975 at 95 percent confidence. By removing detailed
design and testing requirements from FAA regulations and relying on
standards to meet reliability thresholds, the FAA would encourage
innovation in flight abort. The FAA seeks comment on whether this
approach would encourage innovation and more rapid evolution of FSS
designs.
F. Flight Hazard Analysis
Proposed Sec. 450.109 would require that an operator conduct and
document a flight hazard analysis and continue to maintain the flight
hazard analysis throughout the lifecycle of the launch or reentry
system unless an operator uses proven hazard control strategies such as
physical containment, wind weighting, or flight abort. At its most
basic, a flight hazard analysis identifies all reasonably foreseeable
hazards and the necessary measures to eliminate or mitigate that risk.
A flight hazard analysis would be required only for those phases of
flight for which the operator does not employ a traditional hazard
control (e.g., physical containment). As noted earlier, the use of a
flight hazard analysis to derive hazard controls would provide
flexibility that does not currently exist under the prescriptive
requirements in part 417 \67\ and is broadly consistent with the
practice in parts 431 and 435.\68\
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\67\ The current ELV regulatory scheme in parts 415 and 417
mitigates flight hazards for all launches by requiring a reliable
FSS and prescriptive flight abort requirements.
\68\ Current RLV and reentry vehicle regulations in parts 431
and 435 do not specifically require a flight hazard analysis.
However, Sec. 431.35(c) and (d) require a system safety process to
identify hazards, assess the risks, and the elimination or
mitigation of the risk. In practice, the FAA has interpreted this
broad section to require a flight hazard analysis.
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Proposed Sec. 450.109(a) would require that an operator further
refine the flight hazard list developed during the earlier PSA,
including verifying the list of items identified in Sec. 450.109 and
any new hazards identified since completing the PSA. A hazard is a real
or potential condition that could lead to an unplanned event or series
of events resulting in death, serious injury, or damage to or loss of
equipment or property. The list of items in proposed Sec.
450.109(a)(1) is a list of hazard categories that exist in all
commercial space operations and must therefore be eliminated or
mitigated to acceptable levels.
After identifying and describing hazards, proposed Sec.
450.109(a)(2) would require that an operator assess each hazard's
likelihood and severity. This assessment would be used to establish
mitigation priorities. The operator would then determine the severity
of the specific potential hazardous condition with respect to public
safety. An operator should determine the severity for a specific hazard
by identifying the worst credible event that may result from the
hazard. For example, if an operator identifies a hazard such as
incorrect vehicle position data due to inertial measurement unit (IMU)
drift leading to an off nominal trajectory, the operator would
determine the public impact using the greatest off nominal vehicle
trajectory and the worst credible public safety outcome. Meaning, if
the vehicle would break up aerodynamically due to an off nominal
trajectory caused by IMU drift, the operator should base its severity
assessment on the debris event generated by the break up taking into
account the population in the area. If the vehicle operates in a remote
area the severity may be low; however, if the operation occurs within
the reach of the population, the severity would be catastrophic.
After severity and likelihood are assessed, proposed Sec.
450.109(a)(3) would require that an operator ensure that any hazard
that may cause a casualty is extremely remote, and any hazard that can
cause major damage to public property or critical assets is remote. If
a particular hazard source has been observed in a similar operation
under similar conditions, it will be difficult to justify that the
likelihood of the reoccurrence of the event will qualify as remote or
extremely remote. This requirement is substantively the same as current
practice under Sec. 431.35(c) and is specifically called out in Sec.
437.55(a)(3) for experimental permits. Examples of suggested likelihood
categories for remote and extremely remote are provided in FAA's
Advisory Circular (AC) 437.55-1
[[Page 15320]]
``Hazard Analyses for the Launch or Reentry of a Reusable Suborbital
Rocket Under an Experimental Permit'' as 1 x 10-5 and 1 x
10-6, respectively.
The operator would then need to identify and describe risk
elimination and mitigation measures as required by proposed Sec.
450.109(a)(4). The operator should always consider whether the risk
mitigation measures introduce new hazards. This proposed section
codifies current practice under the Sec. 431.35(c) broad system safety
analysis requirement. Although not required, system safety standards
and advisory material such as MIL-STD-882E, AC 437.55-1, and AC 431.35-
2A ``Reusable Launch and Reentry Vehicle System Safety Process''
recommend that operators develop risk elimination or mitigation
approaches in the following order:
1. Design for minimum risk. The first priority should be to
eliminate hazards through appropriate design or operational
choices.\69\ If an operator cannot eliminate a risk, it should minimize
it through design or operational choices.
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\69\ An example of designing out risk to the public would be to
operate in an unpopulated area.
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2. Incorporate safety devices. If an operator cannot eliminate
hazards through design or operation selection, then an operator should
reduce risks through the use of active or passive safety devices.\70\
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\70\ An example of an active safety device would be a computing
system that automatically shuts down the rocket engine when a sensor
detects high thrust chamber temperatures. A passive safety device
might be a firewall to prevent a fire from reaching a pilot.
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3. Provide warning devices. When neither design nor safety devices
can eliminate or adequately reduce identified risks, the operator
should use a device to detect and warn of the hazardous condition to
minimize the likelihood of inappropriate human reaction and
response.\71\
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\71\ An example of a warning device would be an abort indicator
such as a flashing light or a message on a cockpit instrument panel.
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4. Implement procedures and training. When it is impractical to
eliminate risks through design or safety and warning devices, the
operator should develop and implement procedures and training that
mitigate the risks.\72\
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\72\ An example of risk mitigation procedures and training are
abort procedures and rehearsals of those procedures.
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Proposed Sec. 450.109(a)(5) would require that the risk
elimination and mitigation measures achieve the proposed risk levels in
Sec. 450.109(a)(3) through verification and validation. Verification
ensures the measures themselves are properly developed and implemented
while validation ensures the measures will actually achieve the desired
outcome. Verification takes place while developing the measures and
validation after development and implementation. This requirement is
substantively the same as current practice under Sec. 431.35(c). The
acceptable methods of verifying safety measures are:
1. Analysis: Technical or mathematical evaluation, mathematical
models, simulations, algorithms, and circuit diagrams.
2. Test: Actual operation to evaluate performance of system
elements during ambient conditions or in operational environments at or
above expected levels. These tests include functional tests and
environmental tests.
3. Demonstration: Actual operation of the system or subsystem under
specified scenarios, often used to verify reliability,
transportability, maintainability, serviceability, and human
engineering factors.
4. Inspection: Examination of hardware, software, or documentation
to verify compliance of the feature with predetermined criteria.
An operator could use methods separately or combine them depending
on the feasibility of the methods and the maturity of the vehicle and
operation.
Proposed Sec. 450.109(b) would require that an applicant establish
and document the criteria and techniques for identifying new hazards
throughout the launch or reentry system lifecycle. Development,
implementation, and continued operation of any system requires that
changes be made throughout the lifecycle. Changes to the vehicle,
especially to safety-critical systems and operations, can have
significant impacts on public safety and will result in changes to the
hazard analysis. Anomalies and failures can also identify unknown
hazards. This requirement is substantively the same as the FAA's
current practice under Sec. 431.35(c). Parts 415 and 417 do not have a
flight hazard analysis requirement.
Proposed Sec. 450.109(c) would require that the flight hazard
analysis be updated and complete for every launch or reentry. In other
words, the analysis must be applicable to the specific mission. A
hazard analysis for a previous mission may be used only if the vehicle
and operational details of the mission do not impact the validity of
any aspect of the hazard analysis. The FAA has not prescribed the
methodology that an operator must follow to ensure the accuracy of a
flight hazard analyses. However, this item is key to ensuring that the
operator is aware of the hazards in the proposed operation.
Proposed Sec. 450.109(d) requires that an operator continually
update the flight hazard analysis throughout the operational lifecycle
of the launch or reentry system. This requirement is substantively the
same as current FAA practice under Sec. 431.35(c).
Proposed Sec. 450.109(e) establishes the flight hazard analysis
application requirements. An applicant would be required to submit a
flight hazard analysis in its application to provide the FAA with
sufficient detail to evaluate the applicant's flight hazard analyses
and its criteria and techniques for identifying new hazards throughout
the lifecycle of the launch or reentry system. The FAA recommends that
the applicant provide at a minimum a hazard table that provides a
description of each hazard identified, associated severity and
likelihood of each hazard, the mitigation measures identified for each
hazard, and a summary of the validation and verification of each
hazard. For hazards that require mitigation, the applicant would also
be required to provide the data showing the verification of those
mitigations measures. The FAA expects the results of any testing or
analysis associated with the verification to be in a format that is
easily understood by an experienced technical evaluator. For items
verified by analysis, the applicant should provide the assumptions and
methodology used to conduct the analyses if it is not easily understood
by evaluating the results. These application requirements would not
require more than the current practices under Sec. 431.35(c) and (d).
G. Computing Systems and Software Overview
The FAA is proposing to address hazards associated with computing
systems and software separate from flight hazard analysis. The FAA
would consolidate all software safety requirements applicable to launch
or reentry operations in a single section, in proposed Sec. 450.111
(Computing Systems and Software).\73\ These proposed regulations
address both software and how the software operates on the intended
hardware and computing systems.\74\ While the FAA discusses
[[Page 15321]]
hardware requirements elsewhere under the safety-critical systems
requirements, it is important to recognize that software safety cannot
be evaluated outside of the computing system in which it operates.\75\
A computing system is a complete system made up of the central
processing unit, memory, related electronics, and peripheral devices.
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\73\ For the purpose of this discussion, the phrase ``software
safety requirements'' refers to software safety regulations and
``software requirements'' refers to the specifications that define a
software component's intended functionality.
\74\ The FAA understands software to mean a combination of
computer instructions and computer data that enables a computer to
perform computational and control functions.
\75\ Hardware is the collection of physical parts of a computer
system, including memory storage devices, power sources, and
processors that execute software.
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These proposed software safety requirements would streamline the
software safety evaluation process by adding detail to the performance-
based requirements in the existing rules. The software safety
requirements in the proposed rule are levied in proportion to the
potential software hazards and the degree of control over those
hazards.\76\ In other words, software safety requirements would
increase in rigor with the rise in potential safety risks and degree of
autonomy. Conversely, software safety requirements would decrease in
rigor with reductions in the potential safety risk or degree of
autonomy.\77\ This approach would codify existing FAA practice of
modulating the stringency of review commensurate with the level of
public risk. The FAA would also add more clarity to the software scaled
requirements to guide applicants to appropriate and predictable
engineering judgments when determining the proper depth and breadth of
software development, analysis, and verification activities. The FAA
expects these changes would enable innovation by setting predictable
safety requirements based on knowable characteristics of new software
systems and in proportion to the risks involved with the innovation.
For a detailed discussion, please see the Additional Technical
Justification and Rationale discussion later in the preamble.
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\76\ For the purpose of this rulemaking, software hazards are
those hazardous conditions created by the execution of software, or
for which software is used as a mitigation or control.
\77\ The FAA uses the phrase ``level of rigor'' to describe the
amount of precision and effort applied by an applicant to address
the severity of a hazard and associated software autonomy.
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H. Hybrid Launch Vehicles
Hybrid vehicles are vehicles that have some characteristics of
aircraft and other characteristics of traditional launch or reentry
vehicles. This proposal would allow an operator to forego the use of
flight abort as a hazard control strategy during certain phases of
flight if the hybrid launch or reentry vehicle has a high demonstrated
reliability during those phases of flight. The FAA would make these
determinations on a case-by-case basis based on a vehicle's
demonstrated reliability.
The FAA may regulate hybrid vehicles under either the commercial
space transportation or the civil aircraft regulations, depending on
the operation. For a flight of a hybrid vehicle where a carrier
aircraft has been modified to carry a rocket and the operator intends
to ignite the rocket, the FAA considers the aircraft a component of the
launch vehicle.\78\ The combination launch vehicle system is authorized
solely by a vehicle operator license or experimental permit under Title
51. The FAA currently authorizes the operation of hybrid vehicles using
a license or permit for the entire mission from preflight ground
activities through taxi, take off, flight, landing, wheel stop, and
post-flight safing for all components of the combined launch vehicle
system. The FAA has granted a license to hybrid vehicles such as the
Stargazer/Pegasus, WhiteKnightOne/SpaceShipOne, WhiteKnightTwo/
SpaceShipTwo, and Cosmic Girl/LauncherOne combinations. In addition to
carrier aircraft models, hybrid vehicles may also include future
concepts such as a single vehicle with both air-breathing and rocket
engines, winged launch or reentry vehicles, balloon-launched rockets,
and other concepts that may have characteristics of both aviation and
traditional launch or reentry vehicles.\79\ The FAA will work with
applicants using hybrid vehicles during pre-application to identify the
appropriate regulatory path. To date, the FAA has issued guidance in
two legal interpretations on the process for determining whether
flights or portions of flights of hybrid vehicles are regulated under
title 49 or Title 51.\80\ As new hybrid concepts are unveiled, the FAA
anticipates issuing additional guidance to assist operators.
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\78\ ``Chapter 509 applies when [a hybrid] system operates as a
launch vehicle from the flight of the carrier aircraft, through
ignition of the rocket, to the return and landing of the carrier
aircraft and the suborbital rocket. For a mission that does not
entail ignition of the rocket, the FAA's aviation statute and
regulations apply.'' See Legal Interpretation to Pamela L. Meredith
from Mark W. Bury (September 26, 2013).
\79\ An example of a hybrid vehicle that does not use a carrier
aircraft is the World View capsule. This capsule is not a rocket,
but it meets the definition of a launch vehicle because it operates
at an altitude where it needs to be designed, built, and tested to
operate in outer space. See Legal Interpretation to Pamela L.
Meredith from Mark W. Bury, September 26, 2013; (https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/agc/practice_areas/regulations/interpretations/data/interps/2013/meredith-zuckertscoutt&rasenberger%20-%20(2013)%20legal%20interpretation.pdf). Similar to other hybrid
vehicles, when not operating as a launch vehicle, World View will
operate under the appropriate aviation provisions of title 49.
\80\ Legal Interpretation to Kelvin B. Coleman from Lorelei
Peter, July 23, 2018; (https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/agc/practice_areas/regulations/interpretations/data/interps/2018/coleman-ast-1%20-%20(2018)%20legal%20interpretation.pdf); Legal Interpretation to
Pamela L. Meredith from Mark W. Bury, Sept. 26, 2013; (https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/agc/practice_areas/regulations/interpretations/data/interps/2013/meredith-zuckertscoutt&rasenberger%20-%20(2013)%20legal%20interpretation.pdf).
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The FAA has worked with and received input from industry on how to
regulate hybrid vehicles. For instance, in 2017 and 2018, the FAA
convened a Safety Risk Management (SRM) panel consisting of FAA and
industry representatives to review and assess hazards associated with
captive carry operations.\81\ The panel recommended dispensing with any
aircraft hazard area requirement during the captive carry phase of
flight for previously licensed hybrid vehicles with fixed-wing carrier
aircraft. The ARC also recommended that the FAA set a different
standard for hybrid vehicles, specifically that the FAA not require an
FSA for operations where the agency has already considered impacts to
public safety during the airworthiness certification process.
Additionally, the ARC recommended that an operator only be required to
conduct an FSA for those portions of flight when the hazardous
configuration of the hybrid system differs from that approved under an
experimental airworthiness certificate or equivalent authorization.
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\81\ The SRM panel members included FAA representatives from the
Air Traffic Organization, Aviation Safety, and the Office of
Commercial Space Transportation. The panel also included civil
aviation and commercial space participants such as the Air Line
Pilots Association, the National Air Traffic Controllers
Association, Orbital ATK, Virgin Galactic, Virgin Orbit, and Mojave
Air and Space Port.
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As discussed earlier, the FAA proposes to provide flexibility for
certain phases of flight with respect to FSA (proposed Sec.
450.113(a)(5)) and FSS (proposed Sec. 450.101(c)) requirements. This
is consistent with the ARC's recommendation. The FAA recognizes that
airworthiness certificates and licenses, when developed collaboratively
between the Aviation Safety and Commercial Space Transportation lines
of business, sufficiently protect the public. In these cases, the FAA
would include a license term and condition for a current airworthiness
certificate. Specifically, the license would impose terms and
conditions such as compliance with certain part 91 (General Operating
and
[[Page 15322]]
Flight Rules) requirements and airworthiness operating limitations, not
including any restrictions on compensation or hire. This blended
approach of combining airworthiness with part 450's system safety
requirements would ensure public safety without the need for an FSA.
This proposal would reduce FSA, CEC, and FSS
requirements for phases of flight such as the captive carry phase, the
carrier-vehicle-alone phase, and any rocket component glide back. The
captive carry phase of flight starts when the carrier vehicle takes off
carrying the rocket aloft and transports it to the rocket release
location. The carrier-vehicle-alone phase starts when the carrier
vehicle releases the rocket, and includes all flight activities in
support of the mission until the carrier vehicle lands and is safed.
During the carrier-vehicle-alone phase, the rocket component is
conducting its rocket-powered and coast phases. The rocket coast phase
occurs immediately after the rocket engine shuts down, and is not
considered an aviation-like glide phase because the pilot does not have
significant control authority over the instantaneous impact point (the
predicted impact point following thrust termination of a vehicle). For
returning rockets, there may be a glide phase which begins at a point
to be determined on a case-by-case basis after the vehicle completes
any reconfiguration necessary and demonstrates non-rocket powered
control authority and ends when the vehicle lands.
The FAA would work with hybrid vehicle applicants during pre-
application consultation to determine the applicability of FSA,
CEC, and FSS requirements. For example, the FAA might
determine the quantitative FSA requirement for those portions of a
mission where the vehicle operates as a civil aviation aircraft
governed by civil aviation regulations (as incorporated into the
license) is unnecessary because the vehicle has demonstrated
reliability during that phase as indicated by the issuance of an
airworthiness certificate. Thus, an applicant would not have to conduct
the quantitative FSA for the aircraft-like controllable phases of
flight, such as the captive carry phase or for phases with non-rocket
powered or glide phases previously authorized under an airworthiness
certificate. This would not normally be the case during the rocket-
powered, coast, reentry, or glide back phases of flight that are unique
to space flight. All other regulatory requirements, including system
safety requirements, would apply to the entire mission. Due to the
unknown operating characteristics of future hybrid vehicles, the FAA is
not proposing to provide a blanket FSA exemption for all hybrid
systems.
I. Flight Safety Analysis Overview
For purposes of this proposed rule, a flight safety analysis
consists of a set of quantitative analyses used to determine flight
commit criteria, flight abort rules, flight hazard areas, and other
mitigation measures, and to verify compliance with the public safety
criteria in proposed Sec. 450.101. The FAA proposes 15 sections for
flight safety analysis. The analyses are described here briefly because
of their overall importance to the regulation and are discussed in
greater detail in the ``Additional Technical Justification and
Rationale'' section. Furthermore, the FAA plans to publish updated ACs
and guidelines to describe acceptable means to conduct these analyses.
The first two sections for FSA would outline the scope,
applicability, and methods for conducting FSAs:
1. Flight Safety Analysis Requirements--Scope and Applicability
(Sec. 450.113). This section would establish the portions of flight
for which an operator would be required to perform and document an FSA
and would identify the analyses required for each type of operation.
2. Flight Safety Analysis Methods (Sec. 450.115). This section
would set methodology requirements for FSAs, including level of
fidelity.
Three sections would require fundamental flight safety analyses:
1. Trajectory Analysis for Normal Flight (Sec. 450.117). All the
FSAs depend on some form of analysis of the trajectory under normal
conditions, referred to as a normal trajectory.
2. Trajectory Analysis for Malfunction Flight (Sec. 450.119). A
malfunction trajectory analysis is necessary to determine how far a
vehicle can deviate from its normal flight path in case of a
malfunction. This analysis helps determine impact points in case of a
malfunction and is therefore a vital input for the analyses needed to
demonstrate compliance with risk criteria.
3. Debris Analysis (Sec. 450.121). A debris analysis is necessary
to characterize the debris generated in various failure scenarios,
including those that could produce an intact vehicle impact.
Four analyses would produce information necessary to implement
flight abort as a hazard control strategy:
1. Flight Safety Limits Analysis (Sec. 450.123). A flight safety
limit analysis is necessary to identify uncontrolled areas and
establish flight safety limits that define when an operator must
initiate flight abort to (1) ensure compliance with the public safety
criteria of proposed Sec. 450.101, and (2) prevent debris capable of
causing a casualty from impacting in uncontrolled areas if the vehicle
is outside the limits of a useful mission.
2. Gate Analysis (Sec. 450.125). A gate analysis is necessary to
determine necessary openings in a flight safety limit through which a
vehicle may fly, provided the vehicle meets certain pre-defined
conditions indicating an ability to continue safe flight.
3. Data Loss Flight Time and Planned Safe Flight State Analyses
(Sec. 450.127). A data loss flight time analysis is necessary to
establish when an operator must abort a flight following the loss of
vehicle tracking information. A planned safe flight state analysis is
necessary to determine when an FSS is no longer necessary.
4. Time Delay Analysis (Sec. 450.129). A time delay analysis is
necessary to establish the mean elapsed time between the violation of a
flight abort rule and the time when the flight safety system is capable
of aborting flight for use in establishing flight safety limits.
One section addresses probability of failure analysis:
1. Probability of Failure Analysis (Sec. 450.131). During any
particular flight or phase of flight, an estimated probability of
failure, and how that probability is allocated across flight time and
vehicle response mode, is necessary to support the determination of
hazard areas and risk.
One section addresses the determination of flight hazard areas:
1. Flight Hazard Area Analysis (Sec. 450.133). This analysis is
necessary to determine any region of land, sea, or air that must be
surveyed, publicized, controlled, or evacuated in order to protect the
public health and safety, and safety of property.
Three sections would be necessary to determine whether risk
criteria are met for different types of hazards:
1. Debris Risk Analysis (Sec. 450.135). A debris risk analysis is
necessary to determine whether the individual and collective risks of
public casualties, due to inert and explosive debris hazards meets
public safety criteria.
2. Far-field Overpressure Blast Effects Analysis (Sec. 450.137).
This analysis is necessary to determine whether the potential public
hazard from broken windows as a result of impacting explosive debris,
including impact of an intact launch vehicle, meets public safety
criteria.
[[Page 15323]]
3. Toxic Hazards for Flight (Sec. 450.139). This analysis is
necessary to determine whether hazards associated with toxic release
meet public safety criteria.
Lastly, one section is necessary for the launch of an unguided
suborbital launch vehicle using wind weighting as a hazard control
strategy. A launch vehicle using other mitigations would not be
required to conduct this analysis:
1. Wind Weighting for the Flight of an Unguided Suborbital Launch
Vehicle (Sec. 450.141). This section would outline a wind weighting
analysis that is required to ensure that the launch of an unguided
suborbital launch vehicle using wind weighting as a hazard control
strategy meets public safety criteria.
J. Safety-Critical Systems
1. Safety-Critical Systems Design, Test, and Documentation
The FAA proposes to consolidate the design, test, and documentation
requirements for safety-critical components in proposed Sec. 450.143
(Safety-Critical System Design, Test, and Documentation). A common set
of requirements is needed for clarity and consistency.
Safety-critical systems or components include those systems or
components whose performance is essential to ensuring public safety.
Historically, the FAA has considered the FSS to be the only safety-
critical system on an ELV. For RLVs and reentry vehicles, the use of a
systematic, logical, and disciplined system safety process is meant to
identify safety-critical systems and the extent of prudent operational
controls.\82\ If a system failure would cause any hazards and those
hazards could reach a populated area, then the system is likely a
safety-critical system. Generally, RLV operators incorporate FSSs,
although they may also incorporate other safety-critical elements of
risk mitigation and hazard control. Non-RLV reentry vehicles also
require a thorough system safety process to identify safety-critical
hardware.
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\82\ Some of the more commonly used methodologies include
Preliminary Hazard Lists (PHL), Preliminary Hazard Analyses (PHA),
Event Tree Analyses (ETA), Fault Tree Analyses (FTA), FMEAs, and
FMECAs. Generally, these methodologies help operators determine
whether a system failure could cause a loss of vehicle control, a
vehicle breakup or other creation of uncontrolled debris, a
discharge of hazardous material, or would prevent safe landing.
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The current rules for ELV, RLV, and reentry vehicle safety-critical
systems are quite different. However, in practice, the evaluation of
the safety of such systems is very similar. Parts 415 and 417 require
ELVs to have very reliable hazard-constraining FSSs that ensure public
safety. These FSSs are subject to design requirements, extensive design
qualification testing, and acceptance testing of all components. RLVs
and reentry vehicles are required to undergo a comprehensive system
safety engineering process that, in part, identifies and eliminates
hazards to reduce the associated risk to acceptable levels by defining
safety-critical systems and identifying associated hazards and risks.
Under system safety, an operator develops design-level safety
requirements and provides evidence for verification and validation of
safety-critical systems and requirements. For safety-critical systems
this serves the purpose of design qualification and acceptance. Given
that RLVs are built to experience multiple flights, the lifecycle \83\
of safety-critical systems must also be considered as part of the
design, testing, and documentation.
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\83\ Many operators seek to refurbish or otherwise reuse safety-
critical systems for multiple flights. Operators must design, test,
and document safety-critical systems to demonstrate their safety-
critical systems can continue to operate reliably throughout the
component life in all predicted operating environments.
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i. Current Qualification and Acceptance Testing Requirements
Qualification testing is an assessment of a prototype or other
structural article to verify the structural integrity of a design.
Generally, qualification testing involves testing the design under a
number of different environmental factors to stress the design, with a
multiplying factor applied to the expected environmental testing limit.
This qualification testing is conducted for temperatures, tensile
loads, handling shocks, and other expected environmental stressors.
Unlike qualification testing that is performed on qualification
units, acceptance testing is performance testing conducted on the
actual hardware to be used on a vehicle after the completion of the
manufacturing process. Generally, acceptance tests are performed on
each article of the safety-critical flight hardware to verify that it
is free of defects, free of integration and workmanship errors, and
ready for operational use. Acceptance testing includes testing for
defects, along with environmental testing similar to the qualification
testing described earlier.
For ELVs, qualification and acceptance testing are important
verification of the reliability of all FSSs at the subsystem and
component level, and ensures the safe operability of the only safety-
critical system on any given ELV. For ELVs, current qualification and
acceptance testing requirements and procedures for FSS subsystems and
components are listed in Sec. Sec. 417.305, 417.307, and appendix E of
part 417 (E417). As FSSs are the only safety-critical systems on
traditional ELVs, the component-level testing requirements in part 417
describe the testing of specific possible components in great detail,
going so far as to differentiate testing requirements for silver-zinc
batteries in E417.21 from nickel-cadmium batteries in E417.22. While
the FAA has approved alternative FSSs, the prescription level of the
current requirements discourages significant innovation.
The same emphasis on validation of design and verification of
hardware tolerances applies to components that have been identified as
safety-critical during a system safety process. For RLVs and reentry
vehicles, a system safety process is required by Sec. 431.35(c).\84\
Under the system safety process, a vehicle designer must assess nominal
and non-nominal flight scenarios of the vehicle and must account for
any possible safety-critical system failures during flight that could
result in a casualty to the public. Those vehicle operators are
required, by Sec. 431.35(d)(3), to identify all safety-critical
systems and are required by Sec. 431.35(d)(7) to demonstrate the risk
elimination in relation to those safety-critical systems. While not
explicitly called out in the current part 431 or 435, qualification and
acceptance testing are the widely accepted standards for demonstrating
that safety-critical systems, subsystems, and components are not at
risk of failing during flight.
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\84\ Section 431.35(c) is required for reentry vehicles by Sec.
435.33.
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Current regulations are undefined with respect to the applicability
of qualification and testing of safety-critical components that are not
listed in Sec. Sec. 417.301(b), 417.305 and 417.307, or appendix E of
part 417. The regulations are similarly ambiguous if the vehicle does
not have a traditional FSS but still has components that are considered
safety-critical, like many vehicles licensed under part 431. This
ambiguity has led to regulatory uncertainty, which in turn has resulted
in lengthy exchanges between the FAA and license applicants about what
components and systems needed to be tested, what testing would be
acceptable to the FAA, and why that testing was necessary to be
compliant. Testing is currently generally required for safety-critical
systems across all vehicle types, either explicitly or as verification
and validation in the
[[Page 15324]]
system safety process, but this is often not well-reflected in the
current regulations. As a result, applicants often are confused by
qualification testing requirements asserted by the FAA for RLVs when
there are no explicit qualification testing requirements in part 431.
ii. Current Fault Tolerance Requirements
Fault-tolerance is the idea that a system must be designed so that
it is able to perform its function in the event of a failure of one or
more of its components. In a fault-tolerant design of a safety-critical
system, no single credible fault should be capable of increasing the
risk to public safety beyond that of a nominal operation. Typically, a
fault-tolerant design applies redundancy or a system of safety barriers
to ensure the system can function, though perhaps with reduced
performance. An example of a fault-tolerant design is an aircraft with
multiple engines that can continue flying even if one of the engines
fails.
The current part 417 regulations cover fault-tolerant design of FSS
components as a set of explicit prescriptive requirements. For
instance, Sec. 417.303(d) specifically lists fault-tolerance as a
requirement of an FSS command control system design, requiring that no
single failure point be able to inhibit the system's function or
inadvertently transmit a flight termination command. An operator must
demonstrate that the command system, in accordance with Sec.
417.309(c), is fault tolerant through analysis, identification of
possible failure modes, implementation of redundant systems or other
mitigation measures, and verification that the mitigation measures will
not fail simultaneously. Appendix D of part 417 (section D417.5)
further details single fault tolerance and prescribes redundancy of
command strings that are structurally, electrically, and mechanically
separated to ensure that any failure that would damage, destroy, or
otherwise inhibit the operation of one redundant component would not
inhibit the operation of the other redundant component.
The current ELV regulations are prescriptive and often dictate
specific implementations of fault-tolerance where other forms may be
adequate. For instance, a fail-safe approach has been used in the
rationale of past applicants that use thrust termination systems to
protect public safety. A fail-safe design is a system that can fail in
a controlled way, such that the failure will still ensure public
safety, like elevator brakes held open by the tension of the elevator
cable such that if the cable snaps the brakes engage and stop the
elevator from falling. The FAA has granted waivers to the redundancy
requirement of section D417.5(c) for fail-safe safety-critical systems
that have been integrated in such a way that a loss of power to that
system would result in direct thrust termination of the launch vehicle
though deactivation of normally-closed valves. Also, ELOS
determinations have been issued for flight termination receivers that
have fail-safe commands that are issued on signal loss because the
failure of the system automatically results in termination of the
flight and the constraint of flight hazards. Less prescriptive fault-
tolerant design regulations could enable such designs instead of
requiring waivers or ELOS determinations.
Operations licensed under parts 431 and 435 may not have
traditional FSSs, but the need for fault-tolerance is implicitly
derived from the system safety process of Sec. 431.35(c) and (d), as
it is often a necessary control for an identified hazard. The FAA views
fault-tolerance as a necessary characteristic of any reliable system.
The current fault tolerance provisions lack clarity in the scope of
their applicability to RLVs and reentry vehicles because they are
implicit in the system safety processes of hazard identification and
mitigation. As with the testing requirements, a lack of regulatory
clarity is detrimental to both applicants and the FAA, leading to
confusion, a drawn-out application acceptance process, and lengthy
discussions to arrive at a clear understanding of how fault tolerance
is applicable to a proposed operation.
iii. Current Reuse Requirements
Safety-critical FSSs of ELVs generally undergo a single flight.
Therefore, very little life-cycle planning is required for them unless
an operator seeks to reuse certain safety-critical components. However,
ELV operators must still account for environments that the FSS is
expected to encounter throughout the lifecycle of the system, including
storage, transportation, installation, and flight, which generally are
built into qualification and acceptance testing levels. Lifecycle
planning is a more significant concern for reusable safety-critical
systems because near-total reuse is an expected part of their
operation.
Current parts 415 and 417 contain requirements for the reuse of ELV
FSS components. To be a licensed ELV operator, an applicant must submit
to the FAA any reuse qualification testing, refurbishment, and
acceptance testing plans, in accordance with Sec. 415.129(f). Those
test plans must show that any FSS component is still capable of
performing as required when subjected to the qualification test
environmental levels plus the total number of exposures to the maximum
expected environmental levels for each of the flights to be flown.
Previously flown FSSs must also abide by Sec. E417.13(a)(3), and the
components must undergo one or more reuse acceptance tests before each
flight to demonstrate that the component still satisfies all its
performance specifications when subjected to each maximum predicted
environment. Additionally, tests for reuse must compare performance
measurements to all previous tests to ensure no trends emerge that
indicate performance degradation in the component that could prevent
the component from satisfying all its performance specifications during
flight. As the lines have blurred between ELVs with significantly
reusable safety-critical systems and RLVs, these requirements still
contain good safety policy, but they are constrained by their limited
coverage of only traditional FSSs.
While operations licensed under part 431 are focused on RLVs,
neither part 431 nor part 435 contain any explicit requirements placed
on reuse. Like all other aspects of safety-critical system
requirements, reuse under these parts is governed by the system safety
process of Sec. 431.35. Safety-critical systems that do not account
for expected lifecycle, refurbishment, and reuse do not adequately meet
the hazard identification and risk mitigation of the system safety
requirements. Implicit in the system safety requirements, commensurate
testing is required to demonstrate that the planned lifecycle
performance remains accurate. Reuse of safety-critical components is a
potential hazard that needs to be mitigated.
Reuse induces stress on components and systems that can degrade
operational performance if not accounted for in design and testing.
Additionally, ``reuse'' implies multiple uses of a component after its
initial intended lifetime or outside of its initial intended operating
environments. Based on industry best practices, intended use and
lifetime should be designed into components initially; qualification
and acceptance testing should be based on predicted operating
environments that encompass the entire lifetime of a system; and
lifecycle management practices should be used to refine initial
predictions. The current lack of a clear, unified, and simple
requirement that explicitly covers reuse for all safety-critical
systems leads to prescriptive
[[Page 15325]]
constraints on ELV operators and regulatory confusion for RLV and
reentry operators who are unfamiliar with the implicit requirements of
a system safety process.
iv. Consolidation of Design, Test and Documentation Requirements
The FAA proposes to consolidate the design, test and documentation
requirements for safety-critical systems and components, both
identified by a system safety process and as part of an FSS, currently
found in parts 415 and 417, 431, and 435. Specifically, the FAA
proposes to provide performance-based requirements for safety-critical
systems, including fault tolerant design, design qualification testing,
hardware acceptance testing, and the verification of flight
environments to assess the life-cycle of safety-critical systems for
reuse purposes.
Under proposed Sec. 450.143, all safety-critical systems would be
required to meet these requirements, including a FSS that also would be
required to meet the additional requirements of proposed Sec. 450.145.
By having a consistent set of overarching requirements regulating the
design, testing, and documentation of safety-critical systems and
hardware, the FAA anticipates that applicants would be enabled to
implement new risk-mitigating design strategies under a clear and
consolidated regulatory regime. New technologies that emerge would be
covered by the general requirements without causing regulatory delays
due to confusion, increasing paperwork burdens required for requesting
waivers, or waiting for future rulemaking changes necessary to allow
emerging technologies. These criteria would be the standards for
demonstrating that such systems can survive and perform to an adequate
level of safety in all operating environments.
The ARC recommended that better standards need to be developed
regarding safety-critical systems. The ARC pointed out that there is no
single process or procedure that documents an acceptable way to go
through a system design and determine safety-criticality, and it asked
for better guidance on safety-criticality, given that usually industry
views criticality more from a mission assurance point of view. More
generally, the ARC requested a more performance-based regulatory
regime, with a clearer focus on safety and greater flexibility for
novel operations. In regards to reuse and maintenance, the ARC
suggested that requirements should be focused on maintaining
reliability of inputs. The ARC specifically called out the section
E417.13 requirement to remove and recomplete acceptance testing prior
to reuse of flight safety system components between each flight as an
untenable burden both in terms of cost and time. Furthermore, the ARC
also noted that continued acceptance testing of flight hardware to
predict environmental levels plus margins puts undue strain on flight
systems and can significantly reduce their lifespan.
To remedy the confusion resulting from a current lack of regulatory
clarity for RLVs and reentry vehicles, proposed Sec. 450.143(c) and
(d) would explicitly require qualification testing of the design and
acceptance testing of the safety-critical flight hardware. To remedy
the implied design constraints of current detailed requirements for
ELVs, proposed Sec. 450.143(c) and (d) would be general, high-level
requirements for demonstrating the performance of safety-critical
system design, and that the system is operational and free from defects
and errors.
Specifically, proposed Sec. 450.143(c) would require an operator
to functionally demonstrate \85\ the design of a vehicle's safety-
critical systems at conditions beyond its predicted operating
environment. The design qualification tests should include enough
margin beyond predicted operating environments to demonstrate that the
system design can tolerate manufacturing variance or environmental
uncertainties without performance degradation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\85\ Functional demonstration is generally achieved through
testing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Proposed Sec. 450.143(d)(1) would require operators to perform a
functional demonstration of any safety-critical systems by exposing
them to their predicted operating environment with margin. The
performance of the flight hardware during the test would be required to
demonstrate that the flight units are free of defects, integration or
workmanship errors, and are ready for operational use. Alternatively,
an applicant would be able to comply with proposed Sec. 450.143(d)(2)
instead of proposed Sec. 450.143(d)(1). If an applicant chooses to
comply with proposed Sec. 450.143(d)(2), it would be required to
ensure functional capability and that the flight hardware remains free
from error and defect during its service life through a combination of
in-process controls and a quality assurance process. This flexible
approach to acceptance testing would relieve some of the burdens of a
traditional acceptance testing regime and would add clarity that these
demonstrations are required for all safety-critical flight hardware.
Proposed Sec. 450.143 would clearly state the requirements for all
safety-critical system components and eliminate the ambiguity that
exists in the current regulations regarding required testing of safety-
critical system components that are not a part of an FSS. While FSSs
are safety-critical systems, their criticality requires additional
requirements beyond proposed Sec. 450.143. The consolidated
performance requirements for FSS components are detailed in proposed
Sec. 450.145, and are discussed in the ``Flight Safety System''
section of this preamble.
As the proposed rule seeks to make the safety requirements of Sec.
450.143 applicable to all commercial space launch and reentry vehicles,
there should be better clarity across the industry and the government
regarding what is required of safety-critical systems for both design
qualification testing and flight hardware acceptance testing. Also, as
recommended by the ARC, the FAA's proposal would allow for the
possibility of other forms of acceptance testing methodologies and
quality controls, subject to approval of the FAA, for safety-critical
components that are not directly covered by the flight safety system
requirements. This option should enable new business practices but
maintain the safety verification necessary to ensure public safety.
The ARC did not speak specifically to fault tolerant design but did
indicate that vehicle reliability and architecture should be
considerations in the FAA's evaluation of novel systems. Proposed Sec.
450.143(b) would require an applicant's safety-critical system to be
designed so that no single credible fault would impact public safety.
This proposal would provide clarity to the scope of the requirement of
fault-tolerance by defining it as an explicit design performance
requirement. It would replace many specific prescriptive requirements
in part 417's subpart D and appendices D and E with a single general
performance requirement and clarify the scope of applicability for RLV
and reentry vehicle applicants. Additionally, by requiring only that
the safety-critical systems be designed to be fault tolerant so that no
single credible fault can lead to increased risk to public safety, the
proposed regulations would allow flexibility as to the method an
operator uses to comply with the requirements. For example, the FAA
anticipates that an operator might choose to comply with proposed Sec.
450.143(b) with a design that provides for redundancy for systems that
can be duplicated or
[[Page 15326]]
through damage-tolerant design for those safety-critical systems (like
primary structures) that cannot be redundant. It is expected that this
flexibility would accommodate technical innovation. Additionally, an
operator would be able to satisfy the fault-tolerance requirement by
fail-safe designs that have traditionally been approved through ELOS
determinations, eliminating the need for applicants to apply for
additional FAA review and evaluation.
The ARC advised the FAA to focus on verifying the veracity of
maintenance processes for reuse, combined with alternatives to
acceptance testing on per flight basis. The FAA believes it has
addressed the testing alternatives in this NPRM and agrees that the
processes and procedures to ensure safety-critical systems are safe for
reuse are an important part of lifecycle validation. Given safety-
critical systems are essential to public safety, the FAA proposes that
an operator would be required to validate predicted operating
environments against actual operating environments and assess component
life throughout the lifecycle of the safety-critical unit. This
validation can be done through an initial fatigue life assessment and
continual accounting of remaining components life or through a
comprehensive inspection and maintenance program that accounts for
damage accumulation and fault detection.
Proposed Sec. 450.143(e) would require that predicted operating
environments be based on conditions expected to be encountered in all
phases of flight, recovery, preparation, and transportation. It would
also require an operator to monitor the environments experienced by
safety-critical systems in order to validate the predicated operating
environment and assess the actual component life left or to adjust
inspection periods. While the system safety and FSS approaches to reuse
can further define specific requirements, the FAA proposes more general
requirements on the operator to account for the complete lifecycle of
each safety-critical system, considering the design, testing, and use
of safety-critical components. Allowing operators to determine a
proposed lifecycle for a safety-critical system, to demonstrate
operational capabilities and environmental endurance through testing,
to devise processes for monitoring the lifecycle of the safety-critical
system, and setting criteria and procedures for refurbishment or
replacement allows operators flexibility in their business plans.
Having this flexibility would allow applicants to demonstrate to the
FAA how they would ensure reused safety-critical components will not
degrade in performance. The FAA anticipates that such a demonstration
would include elements such as qualification of the design for its
intended lifetime; acceptance testing to screen components; monitoring
of environmental levels during use; and monitoring component health
through inspections for either disposal or refurbishment.
While the lifecycle management requirement would give the applicant
flexibility on implementation, the proposed rule would require
applicants to consider the implementation details such as maintenance,
inspection, and consumable replacement. With the flexibility of the
top-level requirement, applicants could continue to employ rigorous,
per flight acceptance testing of safety-critical components, or with
enough flight data they may be able to employ a system more similar to
commercial aviation where flown components can be assessed in light of
the actual operating environment and planned component reuse does not
require component testing on a per flight basis. Monitoring of
environments and assessment of safety-critical hardware for reuse is
expected to affect the probability of failure that would feed back into
FSAs as a check that risk to public safety is not increased. These
flexible, top-level requirements for safety-critical systems would make
explicit the currently implicit reuse requirements of parts 431 and
435's system safety process, improving regulatory clarity and
operational flexibility, while still requiring the important planning,
monitoring, and assessments necessary to ensure public safety.
To demonstrate compliance with the proposed performance
requirements, the FAA proposes clear application requirements in Sec.
450.143(f). As in the current Sec. 431.35(d)(3) and (5), an applicant
would have to describe and diagram all safety-critical systems in its
application. Similar requirements exist for ELV flight safety systems
of part Sec. 415.127(b) and (c). Section 450.143(f)(3) also would
require a summary of the analysis detailing how applicants arrived at
the predicted operating environment and duration for all qualification
and acceptance testing. This is current practice, and proposed Sec.
450.143(e) makes this requirement explicit for RLVs and reentry
vehicles. The proposed requirements are also more generalized and
adaptable than the current component-level requirements for ELVs. Under
proposed Sec. 450.143(f)(4) and (5), applicants would be required to
detail their plans for lifecycle monitoring by describing any
instrumentation or inspection processes used to assess reused safety-
critical systems, and the criteria and procedures for any service life
extension proposed for those system components. Much like the rest of
the FAA's proposal, applicants of any vehicle type are already expected
to provide this information, but the requirements have been distilled
into high-level, generalized requirements to allow for maximum
operational flexibility while still identifying the inputs the FAA
needs to verify compliance with the safe performance and operation
requirements. While FSSs are additionally subject to the requirements
of proposed Sec. 450.145, the proposed requirements for safety-
critical systems would clarify existing practice and enable novel
concepts of safety and safety-critical design.
2. Flight Safety System
An FSS is an integral tool to protect public health and safety and
the safety of property from hazards presented by a vehicle in flight.
An FSS allows an operator to exercise positive control of a launch or
reentry vehicle, allowing an operator to destroy the vehicle, terminate
thrust, or otherwise achieve flight abort. An extremely reliable FSS
that controls the ending of vehicle flight according to properly
established rules nearly ensures containment of hazards within
acceptable limits. For that reason, the FAA considers an FSS a safety-
critical system. The FAA currently requires an FSS for ELVs. Most
RLVs--aside from unguided suborbital vehicles utilizing a wind
weighting system or certain vehicles where the vehicle's operation is
contained by physics--derive from the system safety process the need
for some FSS to mitigate flight hazards.
Traditional FSSs for ELVs are comprised of an onboard flight
termination system (FTS), a ground-based command and control system,
and tracking and telemetry systems. Historically, the flight safety
crew monitoring the course of a vehicle would send a command to self-
destruct if the vehicle crossed flight safety limit lines and in doing
so threatened a protected area. Redundant transceivers in the launch
vehicle would receive the destruct command from the ground, set off
charges in the vehicle to destroy the vehicle and disperse the
propellants so that an errant vehicle's hazards would not impact
populated areas. While this method of flight abort through ordnance is
conventional, the FAA currently does
[[Page 15327]]
not require an FSS to be destructive, as made explicit in the
definitions of FSS in both Sec. Sec. 401.5 and 417.3.
There has been some innovation in FSSs--thrust termination systems
are used frequently and most RLVs can demonstrate regulatory compliance
with part 431 with a safety system that achieves a controlled landing
in the event of an aborted flight. As the commercial space
transportation industry has matured, operators have proposed FSS
alternatives. These alternative approaches include fail-safe single
string systems that trade off mission assurance and redundancy, other
fail-safe consequence mitigation systems, and dual purpose systems such
as FSSs that reuse the output of safety-critical GPS components for
primary navigation avionics. These alternative approaches are not well
governed by the existing regulations.
i. Current Regulatory Framework for FSS
The present ELV licensing requirements in parts 415 \86\ and 417
include lengthy and detailed requirements for the performance of an FSS
and its components, as well as detailed testing and reporting
requirements. These requirements were originally adopted to match
current practices at Federal ranges. Section 417.107(a) identifies the
need for an FSS while subpart D (Sec. Sec. 417.301-417.311) identifies
the performance requirements of an FSS and its component systems.
Appendices D \87\ and E \88\ include prescriptive FSS design,
performance, testing, and analysis requirements. Under part 417, an FSS
must consist of an FTS, a command and control system,\89\ support
systems (like tracking and telemetry),\90\ and identification of the
functions of any personnel who operate FSS hardware or software.\91\
Together, these requirements allow for a very limited range of FSS
concepts because they are primarily focused on containment of hazards
by destruction of the vehicle or stage.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\86\ Part 415 contains the application requirements to
demonstrate compliance with part 417 and the test report
requirements to demonstrate compliance with the relevant appendices
of part 417. Specifically, Sec. 415.127 requires detailed
descriptions and diagrams of the FSS and subsystems, a list of all
system components that have a critical storage or service life,
detailed descriptions of controls and displays, the system analyses
of Sec. 417.309, demonstration of compliance with the performance
requirements, installation procedures, and tracking and monitoring
validation procedures. Applicants must file all preliminary design
data no later than 18 months before bringing any launch vehicle to a
proposed launch site.
\87\ Appendix D lists very detailed performance requirements and
design reliability requirements including fault tolerance and
redundancy, environment survivability requirements, radio command
destruct parameters, remote and redundant safing mechanisms,
positively controlled arming mechanisms, installation procedures,
and system health monitoring. It also requires vehicles to have an
automatic or inadvertent separation destruct system for any stage
that does not possess a complete command destruct system but is
capable of reaching a protected area before the planned safe flight
state.
\88\ Appendix E to part 417 contains the tests and analysis
requirements to verify the performance requirements of FTSs and
their components. It contains detailed component level charts for
acceptance and qualification performance testing, including the
number of samples (or percentage of the lot) that must undergo each
test type. The testing plans must detail the environment, equipment,
pass/fail criteria, measurements, other testing parameters, and any
analyses planned in lieu of testing.
\89\ A command control system transmits a command signal that
has the radio frequency characteristics and power needed for receipt
of the signal by the flight termination system onboard the launch
vehicle. The command control system must include equipment to ensure
that an onboard flight termination system will receive a transmitted
command signal and must meet specific performance requirements in
Sec. 417.303.
\90\ Currently, under Sec. 417.307 an FSS must include two
independent tracking sources and provide the launch vehicle position
and status to the flight safety crew from liftoff until the vehicle
reaches its planned safe flight state. Additionally, data
processing, display, and recording systems must display, and record,
raw input and processed data at no less than 0.1 second intervals.
\91\ As part of the current requirements for an FSS, Sec.
417.311(a) requires human intervention capability for flight
termination to be initiated by flight safety crew. Therefore, Sec.
417.307 requires design, test, and functional requirements for
systems that support the functions of a flight safety crew,
including any vehicle tracking system.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Section 417.301(b) permits applicants to propose alternative FSSs,
which do not need to satisfy one or more of the prescriptive
requirements of subpart D of part 417. This provision is intended to
enable greater flexibility for innovation without negatively impacting
safety. The FAA approves an alternative FSS if an operator establishes
through a clear and convincing demonstration that a launch would
achieve an equivalent level of safety to an operation that satisfies
all of the existing FSS requirements. Alternative FSS, like traditional
FSS, must still undergo rigorous analysis and testing to demonstrate
the system's reliability to perform each intended function.
Unlike ELVs, RLVs are not explicitly required to have an FSS, but
the requirement for an FSS and its reliability requirement is derived
as an essential hazard mitigation from a robust system safety process
under part 431. This requirement falls under the Sec. 431.35(c)
requirement for applicants to use a system safety process to identify
the hazards and mitigate risks to public health and safety under non-
nominal flight of the vehicle and payload. An acceptable system safety
analysis identifies and assesses the probability and consequences of
any reasonably foreseeable hazardous event and safety-critical system
failures during launch flight that could result in a casualty to the
public. Based on current practice, most RLVs must have some method to
reliably achieve flight abort to fully mitigate flight risks and
consequences, either in the form of a pilot that can safely abort
flight using system controls, a more traditional FSS that is designed
and tested in the same manner as is required for ELVs, or a system that
can meet the requirements for an alternative FSS under Sec.
417.301(b). The lack of an explicit requirement for an FSS in part 431
often leads to confusion regarding what is expected for applicants
mitigating hazards through flight abort.
Reentry vehicles under part 435 are also subject to a system safety
process to identify hazards and mitigate risks to public health and
safety under non-nominal flight of the reentry vehicle and any payload.
Because Sec. 435.33 points to part 431, an acceptable system safety
analysis for reentry also assesses the probability and consequences of
any reasonably foreseeable hazardous events during the reentry flight
that could result in a casualty to the public. Unlike part 431, most
part 435 reentries do not require an FSS because it is generally
accepted that, if controlled reentries become uncontrolled, the vehicle
is unlikely to substantially survive reentry. Due to the nature of the
hazards associated with reentry, and since breakup is expected for non-
nominal reentries, an FSS often cannot significantly ameliorate a
reentry flight's risk or consequence. A reentry applicant must still
account for the possibility of a random reentry in its risk analysis
after attempting a reentry burn.
ii. Autonomous Systems
Current regulations do not allow an operator to rely solely on an
autonomous system to terminate a flight. At the time of their
publication, human control capability was considered critical to safety
because neither software nor hardware had been proven reliable to make
flight termination decisions. Since that time, the FAA has approved the
use of autonomous FSSs for ELVs by finding that they can meet the
requirements of an alternative FSS under Sec. 417.301(b). Applicants
were able to demonstrate that the autonomous FSS achieved an equivalent
level of safety to a launch with a human-in-the-loop as the risk to
public safety was extremely low and the autonomous system had been
flight tested in shadow mode. In past
[[Page 15328]]
rulemakings, the FAA has made clear that, in requiring human
intervention capability for activation of an FSS, the FAA did not
intend to foreclose development or use of autonomous systems. However,
despite those assurances and the FAA findings of equivalent safety,
current FAA regulations still expressly require that a capability exist
for a person to intervene and make decisions for FSS activation.
The FAA is proposing to update the regulations to match the current
practice of allowing autonomous FSSs. By removing the outdated
requirements for a human in-the-loop, the FAA believes that it would
encourage further innovation without negatively impacting safety. The
consequence analysis and reliability thresholds would continue to hold
any potential autonomous FSS to the rigorous standards previously
required of a human-initiated FSS, and the software as part of the
autonomous FSS must be demonstrated to meet reliability requirements.
With the recent advancements of the requisite technology and the
performance constraints of the FSS, the FAA is confident that it is
beneficial both to the commercial space transportation industry and
public safety to explicitly allow flight abort to be governed by
capable autonomous systems.
iii. Current Requirement for Reliability of a FSS
Each FTS and command and control system must satisfy the predicted
reliability requirement of 0.999 at the 95 percent confidence level.
For FSSs on both ELVs and RLVs, there are effectively only two methods
of currently demonstrating that a system meets reliability standards.
The first method is to test 2,995 units at expected operating
environment levels with 0 failures to demonstrate a 0.999 design
reliability at a 95 percent confidence level. Given the cost of FSS
components, the cost of testing, and the time required to conduct such
tests, this is not practicable.
The second method arises out of RCC 319. The FSS requirements
codified in part 417, including component performance requirements, and
acceptance and qualification testing, were originally written to align
FAA launch licensing requirements with the Federal launch range
standards in RCC 319. Like part 417, RCC 319 requires qualification
tests to demonstrate reliable operation in environments exceeding the
expected operating environment for the system components, acceptance
tests to demonstrate that the selected batch of components meets the
requirements of the design specifications, and other preflight testing
at the system or subsystem level to demonstrate functionality after
installation.
The benefit of the part 417 and RCC 319 method is that for
qualification tests, generally only three test units are required.
Three units are required instead of many more because the units are
tested with margin above their predicted operating environment. Testing
three units with the margin specified achieves the required reliability
and confidence levels of 0.999 design reliability at 95 percent
confidence level, rather than having to test 2,995 units at the
predicted operating environment with no margin.
iv. Proposed Reliability Standards for FSS
Given the FAA anticipates that most commercial space vehicles will
continue to control flight hazards through the use of FSSs, the FAA
proposes in Sec. 450.145 to continue to require a very reliable FSS in
most instances. Under the current regulations, FSS not only enable an
operation to meet the collective and individual risk criteria during
flight but also protect against low-probability but high-consequence
events near the launch site or when flying over populated areas. As
previously discussed, the FAA's proposal to quantify these low-
probability but high-consequence events as CEC in proposed
Sec. 450.101(c) would clearly delineate which operations are required
to use an FSS to control for risks and consequences.\92\ The
CEC calculation is the consequence, measured in terms of
EC, without regard to the probability of failure.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\92\ As noted earlier, only operations that have a predicted
consequence of 1 x 10-3 CEC or above for
uncontrolled areas for each reasonably foreseeable vehicle response
mode in any one-second period of flight would be required to
implement an FSS to abort flight as a hazard control strategy. An
FSS would not be required for operations that can be shown to have a
predicted consequence of less than 1 x 10-3
CEC; however, a hazard analysis would be required for any
operations without a FSS or demonstrable physical containment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The underlying intent of the current prescriptive requirements was
to have an FSS that could reliably perform flight abort to restrict
hazards from reaching populated or otherwise protected areas. The FAA
also recognizes that vehicles operating in remote areas are less likely
to have significant consequences in the case of a flight failure. For
operations where the consequence of a flight failure is less, the FAA
has determined that, while still being highly reliable, the FSS may not
need to be as highly reliable as an FSS for a vehicle operating in an
area where the consequence of a flight failure is higher. Generally,
this proposed relaxation of the FSS reliability requirement--based on
reduced potential consequence--is expected to be applicable to
operations launching or reentering in remote locations or for stages
that do not overfly population centers. In order to achieve these
scalable, performance-based requirements, proposed Sec. 450.145(a)
would contain two reliability standards for an FSS.
Proposed Sec. 450.145(a)(1) would require any operator with a
consequence of 1 x 10-2 CEC or greater in any
uncontrolled area for any vehicle response mode to employ an FSS with
the standard design reliability of 0.999 at 95 percent confidence and
commensurate design, analysis, and testing. This reliability standard
would be consistent with various sections of part 417, in particular
Sec. 417.309(b)(2), that require major FSS component systems, such as
onboard flight termination systems and ground-based command control
systems, to be tested to demonstrate 0.999 design reliability at 95
percent confidence. This reliability threshold would have to be
demonstrated for the operation of the entire system, including any
systems located on-board the launch or reentry vehicle, any ground-
based systems, and any other component or support systems.
Alternatively, in order to make regulations adaptable to innovative
operations while maintaining appropriate levels of safety, operations
with lower potential consequences would require an FSS with less
demonstrated design reliability at the same confidence. Proposed Sec.
450.145(a)(2) would require any operator with a consequence of between
1 x 10-2 and 1 x 10-3 CEC in any
uncontrolled area for any vehicle response mode to only employ an FSS
with design reliability of at least 0.975 at 95 percent confidence and
commensurate testing. The FAA considered simply setting the proposed
Sec. 450.145(a)(2) threshold an order of magnitude lower, at 0.99
design reliability with a 95 percent confidence, to reflect the order
of magnitude less CEC from the consequence analysis. Absent
other standards to demonstrate compliance with the reliability
threshold, that would mean testing 299 units with 0 failures, instead
of testing 2,995 units with 0 failures. However, in consultation with
NASA and Air Force representatives in the CSWG, the FAA has elected to
propose that the reduced reliability threshold should be set at
[[Page 15329]]
0.975 design reliability with a 95 percent confidence for lower
consequence vehicles.
While there are no established standards to demonstrate the 0.975
reliability number, that threshold is consistent with reliability
parameters in RCC 324 and represents existing single string flight
reliability requirements. The FAA is confident that industry
associations will develop consensus standards regarding design and
testing that sufficiently demonstrate that a novel FSS design meets
this reliability threshold. Until such time as an industry standard is
established, proposed Sec. 450.145(a)(2) in practice may result in
single string or equivalent FSSs being approved for operations in
remote areas or for phases of flight that do not overfly populated
areas. Similar to FSS that must meet the more reliable threshold, all
means of compliance would be required to be accepted by the FAA in
accordance with proposed Sec. Sec. 450.145(b) and 450.35.
These proposed reliability requirements would replace the existing
launch and reentry FSS licensing requirements on all commercial space
transportation missions. However, the FAA anticipates that, with the
consequence analysis driving the requirement to have an FSS, most
reentry operations would continue to not require an FSS as is the
current case under part 435. For launch operators, applicants would
still be required to demonstrate the reliability by submitting to
review of their design, testing, and analysis. Operators would still be
required to monitor the flight environments actually experienced by
their FSSs in accordance with proposed Sec. 450.145(c) to corroborate
the qualification test data submitted to the FAA.
Proposed part 450 would consolidate and clarify the performance
requirements for future FSSs. In doing so, the FAA anticipates that
some operations will be relieved of the burden of unnecessarily
stringent FSS reliability requirements and that some operations will be
able to utilize innovative concepts to achieve flight abort. By
appropriately scaling FSS reliability to consequence analysis, the FAA
expects to see the emergence of new industry standards, increased use
of autonomous FSSs, and no measurable adverse impact to public health
and safety or the safety of property. There is expected to be no
measurable adverse impact to public health and safety or the safety of
property because the lowered reliability threshold will only apply to
launches and reentries which would not create significant consequences,
given a flight failure. Furthermore, while rigorous tests and analysis
should still be expected for most FSSs, FAA regulations would no longer
prescribe a particular form of FSS. The proposed performance measure of
reliability to achieve safe flight abort to meet collective and
individual risk limits and to mitigate the possibility of low
probability but high consequence events is the best method for
maintaining safety while scoping FAA regulations to govern only the
function, not the form, of FSSs.
v. FSS Design, Testing, and Documentation Requirements
Applicants using a FSS of any reliability threshold would be
required to meet the proposed Sec. 450.143 safety-critical system
design, test, and documentation requirements discussed previously. As
an FSS will always be considered a safety critical system, any operator
utilizing an FSS must comply with the requirements to design their
system as fault tolerant, conduct qualification and acceptance testing,
and provide evidence to validate predicted operating environments and
component life.
Proposed Sec. 450.145(d) would include the application
requirements for an FSS. Similar to the current part 415 requirements,
proposed Sec. 450.145 would require applicants to describe the FSS,
including its proposed operation, and diagram the FSS in detail. The
FAA's intent is to make these requirements less prescriptive than
current regulations and also to allow more flexible time frames.
Proposed Sec. 450.145(d) would require applicants to submit any
analyses reports and acceptance, qualification, and preflight test
plans used to demonstrate that the reliability and confidence levels
are met. Any test plans or documentation would be required to detail
the planned test procedures and the test environments. Further, an
applicant would have to submit procedures for validating the accuracy
of any vehicle tracking data utilized by the flight safety crew or the
FSS to make the decision to abort flight. While proposed Sec.
450.145(d) consolidates these application requirements and removes
prescriptive component-level design requirements, the proposed
regulations would not require substantially different information than
the FAA requires today to demonstrate that FSSs meet performance
standards and will undergo the required testing prior to flight.
vi. Reporting Requirements
Under the preflight reporting requirements in proposed Sec.
450.213(d), operators would be required to submit, or to provide the
FAA access to, any test reports associated with the flight safety
system test plans approved during the application process. These
reports must be submitted or made available no less than 30 days before
flight unless the Administrator agrees to a different time frame under
Sec. 404.15. In the reports, licensees would have to clearly show that
the testing results demonstrate compliance with the reliability
requirements in proposed Sec. 450.145(a). This is current practice
under Sec. 417.17(c)(1) and (4) through (6).
To show the FSS is in compliance and can support the mission as
intended, FSS reports would continue to be required to include testing
reports that detail the results of the approved subsystem and
component-level testing, including any failures, any actions necessary
to correct for any failures, actual testing environment showing
sufficient margin to predicted operating environments, and a comparison
matrix of the actual qualification and acceptance test levels used for
each component compared against the predicted flight levels for each
environment. Proposed Sec. 450.213(d)(4) would require licensees to
report any components qualified by similarity analysis or some
combination of analysis and testing. Preflight reporting is necessary
to demonstrate compliance with the test plans approved in the
application and to demonstrate that the FSS meets the reliability
threshold prior to flight.
Proposed Sec. 450.215 (Post-Flight Reporting) would continue to
require licensees to submit a post-flight report no later than 90 days
after an operation if there were any anomalies in the flight
environment material to public health and safety and the safety of
property, including those experienced by any FSS components; a practice
currently required by Sec. 417.25(c). RLV operators licensed under
part 431 are not currently required to submit a post-flight report
identifying anomalies that are material to public safety and corrective
actions, but the added burden is expected to be minimal. To accurately
report any such anomalies so that they may be corrected in future
flights, operators would also be required to monitor the FSS during
each flight, in accordance with proposed Sec. 450.145(c). Any
anomalies experienced by the FSS would be considered material to public
health and safety and the safety of property and, therefore, would need
to be included in post-flight reporting.
[[Page 15330]]
vii. ARC Recommendations
The ARC suggested that, in a performance-based licensing scheme,
the regulations should be flexible with regard to FSSs and allow an
operator to propose a means of achieving the performance metric without
dictating a specific hardware approach. For example, the ARC
recommended that an operator should be able to propose an alternative
to having a destruct flight termination system. While, the FAA believes
that the current regulations allow for non-destructive FSSs, it
acknowledges that the preponderance of the existing prescriptive
requirements address FSSs that terminate flight through destructive
means. The ARC recommended the current prescriptive requirements be
moved to a guidance document. As discussed previously, the FAA intends
to recognize RCC 319 as the accepted means of compliance in
demonstrating that a FSS has a design reliability of 0.999 at 95
percent confidence. The RCC 319 document would maintain the common
standards between all Federal launch and reentry safety authorities but
also would be updated periodically to address the evolving space
transportation industry. Industry could also develop new means of
compliance in the future, as discussed below.
The ARC also recommended that an FSS should not be required,
proposing instead that an operator should only be required to meet risk
calculations in the FSA and may do so by utilizing a FSS. The FAA
disagrees that an FSS should not be required, as there are other safety
factors to be considered beyond simple individual or collective risk,
namely, the consequence of a failure as discussed earlier. However, the
FAA has attempted to propose more flexible regulations that would allow
some operations to be licensed without an FSS, or with novel concepts
of FSS, or an FSS that may require less extensive demonstration of
reliability. In quantifying the low probability but high consequence
events that necessitate an FSS beyond collective and individual risk
limits, the FAA intends to more clearly delineate when it would be
appropriate for an operation to forego an extremely reliable FSS or an
FSS completely. If an FSS is not required, the applicant would be
required to demonstrate that hazards are contained or mitigated through
a hazard analysis and system safety principles. In addition to
proposing the acceptability of FSSs with a design reliability of 0.975
at 95 percent confidence, under certain situations, the FAA proposes to
indicate more clearly that FSS concept and design is flexible and open
to innovation as long as the reliability thresholds for flight abort
are met.
The ARC also discussed a number of concepts that industry believes
should be considered in scaling an FSS's necessary reliability as
determined through the FSA. The ARC pointed specifically to population
density, the realm of reasonably foreseeable failures, trajectory,
size, and explosive capabilities of the vehicle. The FAA proposes that
these factors would be contemplated as a part of the consequence
analysis required in the public safety criteria of proposed Sec.
450.101(c), alongside traditional measures of risk. In identifying FSS
reliability thresholds pegged to potential consequence, or
CEC, the reliability of FSSs is determined through analysis
that accounts for factors such as what population centers a vehicle or
debris can reach and potential failure modes. The FAA anticipates that
this would address the ARC's recommendation that vehicles with low risk
to the public, especially vehicles operating in remote and sparsely
populated areas, may require a lower demonstrated reliability.
To the question of how an applicant might demonstrate the
reliability of an FSS with a less than extremely reliable design that
does not otherwise meet current common standards like RCC 319, such as
the FAA proposed threshold of 0.975 at 95 percent confidence, the ARC
advised that several approaches may already exist. As previously
discussed, the less reliable FSS can be demonstrated by testing several
hundred units under expected environments, instead of the 2,995 tests
required to demonstrate design reliability of 0.999 at 95 percent--but
it is still likely that neither is practical or viable for most
operators. In their place, alternative standards are necessary to
approximate the demonstration of the reliability threshold through less
burdensome means. The ARC report pointed to the Air Force Space
Command's Space and Missile Systems Center Standard SMC-S-016, ``Test
Requirements For Launch, Upper-Stage and Space Vehicles,'' as an
example of a standard that allows for one unit of qualification
testing, instead of the standard three units required by RCC-319.\93\
The ARC noted that standard may be useful for heritage systems that are
already considered reliable. The FAA maintains that for 0.999 design
reliability at 95 percent, the qualification testing of three or more
units may be required to reduce the likelihood of either anomalous test
passes or failures. The FAA seeks comment on this approach. The FAA
also seeks comment on how SMC-S-016 could be incorporated as an
accepted means of compliance for reliability demonstration of the lower
reliability criteria.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\93\ As one company pointed out in the ARC report, SMC-S-016 and
similar standards are for general vehicle testing and do not
consider the higher reliability required for FSS, whereas RCC 319
and AFSPCMAN91-710 require additional margins and certainty. The
company believes that testing a single unit is not sufficient,
unless there was a tradeoff that increased the required test margin.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In discussions with Federal launch range personnel, it has been
suggested that testing and analysis requirements in RCC 324 may be a
more appropriate basis for evaluating a FSS meeting the lower
reliability threshold. The FAA remains interested in identifying
standards that are applicable or could be drawn upon to develop means
of compliance to the proposed regulations.
The FAA is also not foreclosing the idea that vehicles can
demonstrate the reliability of the FSS or vehicle through flight
history. The ARC pointed out in their report that certain aspects of
FSSs can be tested in flight--for example using an autonomous FSS in
``shadow mode'' on-board a vehicle and testing the system's function
with no ordnance or other active destruct capabilities. The FAA
ultimately decided to not propose any explicit requirements pertaining
to acceptable flight testing as a means of allowing industry applicants
and the FAA to develop new accepted means of compliance in the
demonstration of reliability. While the FAA wishes to encourage the
innovation and development of novel reliability demonstration
standards, the FAA also recognizes that such standards are not
currently developed and would require extensive evaluation before they
could be accepted as demonstrating fidelity and safety. Because the FSS
is so critical to flight safety in the instances where it is required,
new reliability and compliance demonstration strategies must be
accepted by the FAA prior to application acceptance.
In discussing the scalability of FSS requirements, the ARC proposed
that the FAA delineate categories of operators and vehicles. The
suggested categories included a new vehicle by a new operator, a proven
vehicle by an experienced operator, a derived vehicle by an experienced
operator, and considerations for vehicle hazard class and population
density in operating areas. The FAA considered operator and vehicle
categories as a means of scaling FSS reliability requirements as an
alternative to consequence analysis, but determined that the relevant
measure of public protection indicating the need for
[[Page 15331]]
an FSS is not experience, but risk and possible consequence. While less
experienced operators will likely pose a higher risk, as accounted for
in the probability of failure, experience does not account for the
potential consequences of a vehicle failure. Experienced operators with
experienced vehicle designs can propose operations that still pose a
high risk to the public, or an operation with low risk but high
potential consequences in the event of a failure. The FAA seeks comment
on the proposal to use consequence, not operator experience, as a
factor in level-of-rigor.
K. Other Prescribed Hazard Controls
1. Agreements
The FAA proposes to streamline the existing agreement requirements
by removing specific requirements for a variety of agreements and
procedures and allowing an operator to determine what agreements would
be needed for its particular operation. In Sec. 450.147 (Agreements),
a vehicle operator would be required to have written agreements with
any entity that provides a service or use of property to meet a
requirement in part 450.
Current Sec. 417.13 requires a launch operator to enter into an
agreement with a Federal launch range to have access to and the use of
U.S. Government property and services required to support a licensed
launch from the facility and for public-safety related operations and
support before conducting a licensed launch from a Federal launch
range. The Federal launch range arranges for the issuances of
notifications to mariners and airmen.
Currently, for launches from a non-Federal launch site in the
United States, a launch operator must ensure that launch processing at
the launch site satisfies the requirements of part 417. For a launch
from a launch site licensed under part 420, a launch operator must
conduct its operations in accordance with any agreements that the
launch site operator has entered into with any Federal and local
authorities. These include agreements with the local U.S. Coast Guard
district to establish procedures for the issuance of a Notice to
Mariners (NTM) prior to a launch and with the FAA air traffic control
(ATC) facility having jurisdiction over the airspace through which the
launch will take place to establish procedures for the issuance of a
Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) prior to the launch and for the closing of air
routes during the launch window. For a launch from an exclusive-use
site, where there is no licensed launch site operator, a launch
operator must satisfy the requirements of part 420. In addition, a
launch operator must: (1) Describe its procedures for informing local
authorities of each designated hazard area near the launch site
associated with a launch vehicle's planned trajectory and any planned
impacts of launch vehicle components and debris; (2) provide any hazard
area information to the local U. S. Coast Guard, or equivalent local
authority, for the issuance of NTMs and to the FAA ATC office, or
equivalent local authority, that have jurisdiction over the airspace
through which the launch will take place for the issuance of NOTAMs;
and (3) coordinate with any other local agency that supports the
launch, such as local law enforcement agencies, emergency response
agencies, fire departments, the National Park Service, and the Mineral
Management Service.
For launches of RLVs under part 431 and reentries under part 435,
an operator must enter into launch and reentry site use agreements with
a Federal launch range or a licensed launch or reentry site operator
that provide for access to and the use of property and services
required to support a licensed RLV mission or reentry and public
safety-related operations and support. Additionally, an operator must
enter into agreements with the U.S. Coast Guard and the FAA regional
office that has jurisdiction over the airspace through which a launch
and reentry will take place to establish procedures for the issuance of
NTMs and NOTAMs.
As discussed earlier, there are currently similar requirements
under parts 417 and 431 and, by reference, part 435, for agreements to
ensure that NTMs and NOTAMs are implemented. Part 417 references part
420, which also contains requirements for these notices and requires
operators to describe procedures to ensure that these and other
notifications are accomplished. Part 417 requires an operator to
execute agreements with multiple entities. None of the current
requirements adequately addresses NTMs and NOTAMs when the U.S. Coast
Guard or the FAA does not have jurisdiction, such as with launches or
reentries from or to foreign or international territories. Currently,
these agreements must be in place before a license is issued. However,
in practice, the FAA sometimes accepts draft agreements or makes the
submission of the executed agreements a condition of the license.
Under proposed Sec. 450.147, a vehicle operator would be required
to enter into a written agreement with any entity that provides a
service or property that meets a requirement in part 450. Such entities
would include a Federal launch range operator, a licensed launch or
reentry site operator, any party that provides access to or use of
property and services required to support a safe launch or reentry
under part 450, the U.S. Coast Guard, and the FAA. Other entities that
provide a service or property could also include local, state, or
federal agencies, or private parties. For instance, a local fire
department might provide a standby service to control a possible fire,
a state agency could provide any number of services such as road
closures, and NASA might provide telemetry capability. Although
agreements with local agencies, for example, may be necessary to ensure
public safety, the FAA believes that it is overly prescriptive to list
in regulation the specific entities with which each operator must enter
into an agreement.
This proposal would require an operator to enter into only those
agreements necessary for its particular operation. If an operator works
with multiple entities to satisfy requirements in proposed part 450, it
would need multiple agreements. However, if agreements required under
this proposed section are already addressed in agreements executed by
the site operator, an operator would only need to enter into agreements
with either the Federal launch range or other site operator and any
entity with which the site operator does not perform the necessary
coordination. In particular, Federal launch ranges almost always
arrange for the issuance of NTMs and NOTAMs for launches.\94\
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\94\ Typically, Federal ranges do not arrange for the issuance
of NTMs and NOTAMs for the disposal of a launch vehicle from orbit
or the reentry of a reusable launch or reentry vehicle.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The proposal also contemplates agreements between a maritime or
aviation authority other than the U.S. Coast Guard or the FAA. Unless
otherwise addressed in agreements with the site operator, the proposed
rule would require an operator to enter into such agreements for a
launch or reentry that crosses airspace or impacts water not under the
jurisdiction or authority of the U.S. Coast Guard or the FAA.
Section 450.147(b) would require all agreements to clearly
delineate the roles and responsibilities of each party in order to
avoid confusion concerning responsibility for executing safety-related
activities. Section 450.147(c) would require all agreements to be in
effect before a license can be issued. However, as noted earlier, the
FAA recognizes that agreements might not be finalized by the time the
FAA is
[[Page 15332]]
prepared to make a licensing determination. Therefore, the regulation
would allow an operator to request a later effective date, contingent
upon the Administrator's approval. An operator could do this by
providing the FAA the status of the negotiations involving the
agreement including any significant issues that require resolution and
the expected date for its execution.
Under proposed Sec. 450.147(d), an applicant would be required to
describe each agreement in its vehicle operator license application. An
applicant should clearly delineate the roles and responsibilities of
each party to the agreement to support a safe launch or reentry. The
applicant would also need to provide a copy of any agreement, or
portion thereof, to the FAA upon request. The FAA recognizes that some
portions of agreements may contain business-related provisions that do
not pertain to FAA requirements. Those portions would not be required.
The FAA seeks comment on its proposed approach to agreements.
2. Safety-Critical Personnel Qualifications
The FAA proposes to remove the certification requirements found in
Sec. Sec. 417.105, 417.311, and 415.113 and replace them with
performance-based requirements in Sec. 450.149 (Safety-Critical
Personnel Qualifications). Section 450.149 would require qualified
personnel to perform safety-critical tasks for launch and reentry
operations. The FAA also proposes to expand personnel qualification
requirements to ensure that safety-critical personnel are qualified to
perform their assigned safety tasks.
An operator must qualify and train its safety-critical personnel in
performing their safety-critical tasks for all vehicle and license
types because training mitigates the potential for human error during
safety-critical operations. Currently, the FAA requires a personnel
certification program in part 417 for personnel that perform safety-
related tasks. Specifically, Sec. 417.105 requires that a launch
operator employ a personnel certification program that documents the
qualifications, including education, experience and training, for each
member of the launch crew. The launch operator's certification program
must include annual reviews and revocation of certifications for
negligence or failure to satisfy certification requirements. Section
415.113 requires an operator to submit a safety review document that
describes how the applicant will satisfy the personnel certification
program requirements of Sec. 417.105 and identify by position
individuals who implement the program. The document must also
demonstrate how the launch operator implements the program, contain a
table listing each hazardous operation or safety critical task
certified personnel must perform, and include the position of the
individual who reviews personnel qualifications and certifies the
personnel performing the task. In Sec. 417.105(b), an operator is
required to review personnel qualifications and issue individual
certifications. The intent behind this requirement was to ensure that
qualified people perform the required safety tasks.
Neither part 431 nor part 435 have a personnel certification
program requirement or any personnel training requirement; however, the
need for personnel qualifications is a natural outcome of the system
safety process.
The FAA recognizes that the current regulations in part 417 are
inflexible and that using a certification program is not the only
method to ensure qualified personnel perform safety-critical tasks.
Operators may use other methods to verify all training and experience
required for personnel to perform a task is current. For example, an
operator may maintain training records to document internal training
and currency requirements or completion standards for its safety
critical personnel. An operator's issuance of individual certifications
does not itself enhance public safety. If the personnel are qualified
through training and experience for each safety task performed,
additional certification is unnecessary because no additional training
is required for an individual to be issued a certification. Removing
the certification requirement would also reduce cost to the industry by
removing the two-step process to allow qualified personnel to perform
safety-related tasks.
Additionally, the flight safety crew roles and qualifications
requirements in Sec. 417.311, are prescriptive. Section 417.311(a)
requires a flight safety crew to document each position description and
maintain documentation of individual crew qualifications, including
education, experience, and training, as part of the personnel
certification program of Sec. 417.105. Section 417.311(b) describes
the roles of the flight safety crew and explicitly states subjects and
tasks that the crew must be trained in and references the certification
program. Finally, Sec. 417.311(c) requires the flight safety crew
members to complete a training and certification program to ensure
familiarization with launch site, launch vehicle, and FSS functions,
equipment, and procedures related to a launch prior to being called on
to support a launch. It also requires a preflight readiness training
and certification program be completed and prescribes the content that
must be included in such training. The current regulations are a burden
to operators because they focus on FSSs and do not account for evolving
technologies, including autonomous FSSs. Removing the prescriptive
requirements in Sec. 417.311 and replacing them with performance-based
requirements would alleviate this burden.
The ARC recommends that the proposed regulation ensure that the
applicant has a structure in place to protect public safety, and that
the FAA use current requirements as guidelines for evaluation and
approval when necessary. The FAA agrees that the regulations should
ensure that personnel performing tasks that impact public safety are
qualified to perform those tasks. As the industry grows and operations
become more frequent and varied, operators need greater flexibility in
operational practices. Employing a qualification program to ensure
personnel performing safety-critical tasks are trained is one factor in
protecting safety of public and public property.
Therefore, the FAA proposes to remove the requirements for a
certification program described in Sec. Sec. 415.113 and 417.105 and
replace the prescriptive requirements of Sec. 417.311 with
performance-based requirements that capture the intent of the current
regulations--to ensure that an operator's safety-critical personnel are
trained, qualified, and capable of performing their safety critical
tasks, and that their training is current. Under proposed Sec.
450.149, an applicant would be required to identify in its application
the safety-critical tasks that require qualified personnel and provide
its internal training and currency requirements, completion standards,
or any other means of demonstrating compliance with proposed Sec.
450.149(a).
The proposed performance-based requirements would allow each
operator to identify the safety-critical operations and personnel
needed for the operation. It would also allow an operator to determine
what training, experience, and qualification should be required for
each safety-critical task. The FAA would consider any task that may
have an effect on public safety and meets the definition of safety-
critical found in Sec. 401.5 subject to the requirements of Sec.
450.149. These tasks would include, but are not limited to, operating
and installing flight safety system hardware,
[[Page 15333]]
operating safety support systems, monitoring vehicle performance,
performing flight safety analysis, conducting launch operations,
controlling public access, surveillance, and emergency response. With
the many different kinds of operations currently underway, an operator
is in the best position to identify the operations, personnel, and
training needed for its operation.
The FAA would also require that an operator ensure personnel are
qualified, and that those qualifications are current, without requiring
certification. The regulation would require proper training of
personnel and verification that each person performing safety critical
tasks is qualified. Under Sec. 450.149, an applicant would be required
to document all safety-critical tasks and internal requirements or
standards for personnel to meet prior to performing the identified
tasks during the application phase. The applicant would be required to
provide internal training and currency requirements, completion
standards, or any other means of demonstrating compliance with the
requirements of Sec. 450.149 in its application. The applicant would
also be required to describe the process for tracking training
currency. In the event that a person's qualification was not current,
either because their qualification does not meet the training currency
requirements detailed in the application or because a new process or
procedure has been instituted that has made the training inaccurate or
incomplete, the individual would not be qualified to perform safety-
related tasks specific to the expired qualification.
Lastly, part 460 contains training and qualification requirements
for flight crew. Compliance with these requirements would meet the
training and qualification requirements in proposed Sec. 450.149 for
flight crew.
3. Work Shift and Rest Requirements
The FAA proposes to combine the rest requirements of Sec. Sec.
417.113(f) and 431.43(c)(4)(i) through (iv) into proposed Sec. 450.151
(Work Shift and Rest Requirements) which would require an applicant to
document and implement rest requirements that ensure personnel are
physically and mentally capable of performing tasks assigned. An
applicant would be required to submit its rest rules during the
application phase.
Personnel involved in the launch or reentry of expendable and
reusable vehicles need to be physically and mentally capable of
performing their duties, especially those people making decisions or
performing operations that affect public safety. Fatigue can degrade a
person's ability to function and make the necessary decisions to
conduct a safe launch or reentry operation. Since the FAA started
requiring rest rules, there have been no incidents resulting from
fatigue during a licensed launch or reentry. To maintain this level of
safety, the FAA proposes to continue requiring rest rules in order to
prevent fatigue and ensure operator personnel can perform their duties
safely.
A 1993 NTSB investigation of an anomaly that occurred during a
commercial launch from a Federal launch range found a high probability
that fatigue and lack of rest prior to launch operations contributed to
mistakes that resulted in the vehicle initiating flight while the range
was in a no-go condition.\95\ Launching in a no-go condition increases
risk to the public because the vehicle operates outside of established
boundaries and analysis. The NTSB found that the person who decided to
proceed with the launch was not given enough time to rest after working
extra hours the previous day. In addition, the launch was scheduled for
early in the morning so the on-console time was around 2:00 a.m. The
NTSB report recommended instituting rest rules that allow for
sufficient rest before the launch operation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\95\ Special Investigation Report: Commercial Space Launch
Incident, Launch Procedure Anomaly Orbital Sciences Corporation,
Pegasus/SCD-1, 80 Nautical Miles East of Cape Canaveral, Florida,
February 9, 1993. Report PB 93-917003/NTSB/SIR93-02, July 23, 1993;
(https://www.ntsb.gov/safety/safety-studies/Documents/SIR9302.pdf).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As a result of the 1993 NTSB report, the FAA issued rest rules in
its 1999 final rule. The 1999 final rule required an applicant to
ensure that its flight safety personnel adhere to Federal launch range
rest rules. In its 2000 final rule for RLVs, the FAA required rest
rules, in Sec. 431.43(c)(4), similar to the Air Force work and rest
standards for launches and the FAA's ELV requirements.\96\ The specific
and detailed requirements set forth in Sec. 431.43(c)(4) fail to
account for the various factors that can affect crew rest such as the
time of day of an operation, length of preflight operations, and travel
to and from the launch or reentry site.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\96\ Section 431.43(c)(4) contains requirements that are
detailed and prescriptive. It requires vehicle safety operations
personnel to adhere to specific work and rest standards. These
requirements prescribe the maximum length of workshift and the
minimum rest period after such work shift preceding initiation of an
RLV reentry mission or during the conduct of the mission. It also
prescribes the maximum hours permitted to be worked in the 7 days
preceding initiation of an RLV mission, the maximum number of
consecutive work days, and the minimum rest period after 5
consecutive days of 12-hour shifts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The 2006 final rule adopted the current Sec. 417.113(f), which is
more performance-based than Sec. 431.43(c)(4). Section 417.113(f)
requires that for any operation that has the potential to have an
adverse effect on public safety, the launch rules must ensure that the
launch crew is physically and mentally capable of performing all
assigned tasks. It also requires those rules to govern the length,
number, and frequency of work shifts, and the rest afforded to launch
crew between shifts.
The ARC recommended the FAA use the Sec. 417.113(f) approach as a
basis for the proposed rest rules. The ARC recommended that the
regulations should require each license applicant and operator to
establish crew rest requirements applicable to their individual
operation and suggested that the FAA consider each operator's rules
through the application review and approval process. The FAA agrees
with this approach. Additionally, the ARC suggested that the rest rules
apply to specific personnel with direct control of the vehicle or
launch or reentry decision making. While the FAA agrees with the intent
of requiring all safety critical personnel to adhere to rest rules, it
does not want to limit safety critical personnel to the roles the ARC
identified because it is prescriptive and does not allow for
operational flexibility.
The FAA also agrees with the ARC that it is up to the company to
monitor compliance with its rest rules. The FAA does not have an
explicit requirement for an operator to monitor its employees, only
that it documents and implements rest requirements. The FAA seeks
comment on whether a specific requirement for operator monitoring would
be necessary. Regardless, the FAA would monitor compliance on occasion
with its inspection program, as it does today with current crew rest
rules.
The FAA recognizes that launch and reentry operations are varied.
The FAA considered using prescriptive requirements like those in Sec.
431.43(c)(4) to address rest rules. However, there are many factors
that can affect crew rest that make a prescriptive regulation
impracticably complex and inflexible for allowing alternate methods of
compliance that take into account mitigations and unique circumstances.
Section 450.151 would retain the current performance-based
requirements of Sec. 417.113(f) with modifications to include launch
and reentry operations. The proposed requirements would cover
operations of expendable, reusable, and reentry vehicles and allow an
operator flexibility to employ rest rules that fit
[[Page 15334]]
the particular operations. Current Sec. 417.113(f) requires that crew
rest rules govern the length, number, and frequency of work shifts,
including the rest afforded the launch crew between shifts. Similarly,
proposed Sec. 450.151(a) would require an operator to document and
implement rest requirements that ensure safety-critical personnel are
physically and mentally capable of performing all assigned tasks.
Proposed Sec. 450.151(b) would provide additional requirements
regarding the aspects of work shifts and rest periods critical to
public safety, and would add a process for extending work shifts.
Proposed Sec. 450.151(b)(1) would require an operator's rest rules
to include the duration of each work shift and the process for
extending this shift; including the maximum allowable length of any
extension. This requirement would provide each operator with the
flexibility to identify the duration of each work shift most suited to
the operation such that safety-critical personnel are physically and
mentally capable of performing all assigned tasks. It would also
require a process for extending a work shift. Work shift length is
important because performance decreases and fatigue increases as the
length of the work shift increases. An operator should determine the
optimum length for a work shift that ensures personnel are capable of
performing their assigned tasks. Unforeseen circumstances can require
personnel to work beyond the established work shift length. In such
cases, under this proposal, the operator would be required to have a
process for extending the work shift length up to a limit where
personnel are no longer considered capable of performing their duties.
Proposed Sec. 450.151(b)(2) would require an operator's rest rules
to include the number of consecutive work shift days allowed before
rest is required. This requirement would provide each operator with the
flexibility to identify the number of consecutive work shift days
safety-critical personnel may work such that they remain physically and
mentally capable of performing all assigned tasks. Proposed Sec.
450.151(b)(3) would require an operator's rest rules to include the
minimum rest period required between each work shift, including the
period of rest required immediately before the flight countdown work
shift. An operator would also be required to identify the minimum rest
period required after the maximum number of work shift days allowed.
Having enough rest between work shifts is important to ensure personnel
are able to perform critical tasks. The rest period before a countdown
is particularly important because it can be affected by time of launch,
reviews, and work needed to get a vehicle ready for operation.
The FAA also proposes to remove the term ``crew'' from the rest
requirements. The use of ``crew'' can be misleading and limiting.
Operators could interpret crew to be flight crew only, whereas the rest
rules are intended to apply to any position affecting public safety.
Under this proposal, an applicant would be required to submit rest
rules to the FAA that demonstrate compliance with proposed Sec.
450.151. The FAA would evaluate an operator's rest rules in the same
way as it currently does under Sec. 417.113(f) to ensure that
personnel affecting public safety are mentally and physically capable
of performing their duties during launch or reentry operations, and
that the rest rules satisfy the requirements of proposed Sec. 450.151.
While an operator would be able to create its own rest rules under
proposed Sec. 450.151, an applicant would also be able to use current
rest rules. That is, Sec. 431.43(c)(4) would be an acceptable means of
compliance to proposed Sec. 450.151. The FAA would evaluate other rest
rules against this benchmark and relevant standards.
4. Radio Frequency Management
The FAA proposes to maintain the current substantive requirements
of Sec. 417.111(f) for radio frequency management and to expand the
applicability of these requirements to RLVs and reentry vehicles in
proposed Sec. 450.153 (Radio Frequency Management). The FAA also would
remove the current requirements to implement a frequency management
plan and to identify agreements for coordination of use of radio
frequencies with any launch site operator and local and federal
authorities.
Under Sec. 415.119 and appendix B of part 415, an applicant for a
launch license is required to include a frequency management plan \97\
in its application, and that plan must satisfy the requirements of
Sec. 417.111(f). Specifically, current Sec. 417.111(f) requires an
operator to implement a frequency management plan that identifies each
frequency, all allowable frequency tolerances, and each frequency's
intended use, operating power, and source. The plan must also provide
for the monitoring of frequency usage and enforcement of frequency
allocations and identify agreements and procedures for coordinating use
of radio frequencies with any launch site operator and any local and
Federal authorities, including the FCC.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\97\ A radio frequency management plan describes how an operator
manages radio frequencies to meet termination or tracking
requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While parts 431 and 435 do not contain explicit frequency
management requirements, an operator is required to identify and
mitigate hazards, including hazards associated with frequency
management as part of the system safety process in Sec. 431.35(c) and
(d). Section 431.35(c) requires operators to perform a hazard analysis
and identify, implement, and verify mitigations are in place.\98\
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\98\ One such hazard is radio interference that could disable a
commanded FSS. An operator might mitigate such a hazard by ensuring
that the power level of the command transmitter is sufficient to
ensure termination with high reliability (i.e., 0.999 at 95
percent). For reentry vehicles, radio frequencies for tracking are
coordinated to ensure there is coverage where needed as well as
communication with the vehicle.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Section 450.153 would replace the current requirement in Sec.
417.111(f) to implement a frequency management plan. In proposed Sec.
450.153(a), the FAA proposes to make these radio frequency management
requirements applicable to any radio frequency used. This proposed
requirement would include radio frequencies used not only in launch
vehicles, but also in RLVs and reentry vehicles. Because radio
frequency requirements are a mitigation for hazards associated with
frequency management, the proposed requirements would not necessarily
be new requirements for RLVs or reentry vehicles but would codify the
need for radio frequency management for RLVs and reentry vehicles.
The FAA also proposes to maintain the substantive radio frequency
requirements of current Sec. 417.111(f) in proposed Sec. 450.153(a).
Although the increased use of autonomous termination systems makes
frequency management less critical for flight termination, there are
still many operators that use command termination systems. Moreover,
these requirements remain applicable to autonomous termination systems
because operators still need to allocate radio frequencies to telemetry
and tracking. There are also other hazards, such as electromagnetic
interference and induced currents, that can result from radio frequency
interference and that require mitigation. Therefore, an operator would
continue to be required to: (1) Identify each frequency, all allowable
frequency tolerances and each frequency's intended use, operating power
and source; (2) provide for monitoring of frequency usage and
enforcement of frequency allocations; and (3)
[[Page 15335]]
coordinate the use of radio frequencies with any site operator and any
local and Federal authorities.
While no substantive changes are proposed to the radio frequency
requirements, this proposal would remove the current requirement that
an operator's frequency management plan identify agreements and
procedures for coordinating the use of radio frequencies with any
launch site operator and any local or federal authorities. Many of the
agreements necessary for radio frequency management would be covered in
proposed Sec. 450.147.
In proposed Sec. 450.153(b), an applicant would be required to
submit procedures or other means to demonstrate compliance with the
requirements of Sec. 450.153(a) as part of its application. This
requirement would provide an applicant flexibility in the manner of
demonstrating compliance, such as using checklists or continuing to use
a frequency management plan.
5. Readiness: Reviews and Rehearsals
The FAA proposes to revise and consolidate the readiness
requirements of parts 417 and 431 into a performance-based regulation
that would require an operator to document and implement procedures to
assess readiness to proceed with the flight of a launch or reentry
vehicle. The FAA currently requires an operator to be ready to perform
launch or reentry operations. Readiness, which is currently addressed
through readiness reviews and rehearsals, has three components--
readiness of the vehicle, of the personnel, and of the equipment. In
consolidating these parts, the FAA proposes to remove the current
requirements to conduct rehearsals, to poll the FAA at the launch
readiness review, and to provide a signed written decision to proceed.
The FAA also proposes to eliminate the specific review requirements of
Sec. Sec. 417.117 and 431.37.
Launch rates have increased substantially since the adoption of
parts 417 and 431. In 2007, an operator might only launch one to three
times a year. Currently, there are operators that have launch rates
exceeding 20 launches per year. Readiness requirements have become
overly burdensome as operators spend time on rehearsals and reviews
that were meant to ensure readiness. Timing requirements have resulted
in additional reviews or non-compliances. Operators in a high launch
rate environment may not benefit much from rehearsals and added
reviews.
Currently, Sec. 417.117 requires that a launch operator (1) review
the status of operations, systems, equipment and personnel required by
part 417, (2) maintain and implement documented criteria for successful
completion of each review, (3) track and document corrective actions or
issues identified during the review, and (4) ensure that launch
operator personnel overseeing the review attest to successful
completion of the reviews criteria in writing. Section 417.117(b)(3)
requires an operator to conduct a launch readiness review for flight
within 48 hours of flight. The decision to proceed with launch must be
in writing and signed by the launch director and any launch site
operator or Federal launch range. The launch operator must also poll
the FAA to verify that the FAA has not identified any issues related to
the launch operator's license.
For RLV operations, Sec. 431.37 requires an applicant to submit
procedures that ensure readiness of the vehicle, personnel, and
equipment as part of the application process. These procedures must
involve the vehicle safety operations personnel and the launch site and
reentry site personnel involved in the mission. The procedures must
include a mission readiness review and specify that the individual
responsible for the conduct of the licensed activities is provided
specific information upon which he or she can make a judgement as to
mission readiness.
Additionally, as part of the readiness requirements, Sec. 417.119
requires an operator to rehearse its launch crew and systems to
identify corrective actions necessary to ensure public safety that
cover the countdown, communications, and emergency procedures, and it
specifically directs the launch operator in how to conduct its
rehearsals. Section 431.33(c)(1) similarly requires an applicant to
monitor and evaluate operational dress rehearsals to ensure they are
conducted in accordance with procedures required by Sec. 431.37 to
ensure the readiness of vehicle safety operations personnel.
The requirements of both parts 417 and 431 are prescriptive and do
not provide an operator with much flexibility as to compliance. The
lack of flexibility is evidenced by the issuance of waivers and
documentation of non-compliances. This requirement has created a burden
on operators because they must spend extra resources requesting waivers
and responding to enforcement actions. Processing waivers and
conducting additional reviews costs time and money for the FAA, as
well. For example, Sec. 417.117(b)(3) requires a flight operator to
hold a launch readiness review no earlier than 48 hours before flight.
Since 2007, the FAA has processed over 20 waivers to the 48-hour
requirement. In situations where ELV operators have not requested a
waiver to the timing requirement, they have held additional reviews
just to meet the timing requirement of the flight readiness review.
Additionally, the FAA has issued at least three enforcement letters
because operators did not meet the timing requirement.
The ARC recommended that the FAA distill reviews down to intent,
list the minimum items the FAA reviews, and let the operator inform the
FAA in the license application where those items are and how they would
be reported. The FAA agrees that specific reviews are not required and
proposes a list of items required to address readiness. The FAA also
agrees that specific rehearsals are not required because there are a
variety of methods by which an operator could meet readiness
requirements. As discussed later, the FAA proposes to remove the
specific requirement for rehearsals.
The FAA proposes to revise and consolidate the readiness
requirements of parts 417 and part 431 into proposed Sec. 450.155,
which would require an operator to document and implement procedures to
assess readiness to proceed with the flight of a launch or reentry
vehicle. The FAA anticipates that under this proposal an operator would
be able to achieve readiness by various methods including, but not
limited to, readiness meetings, tests, rehearsals, static fire tests,
wet dress rehearsals,\99\ training, and experience.
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\99\ A wet dress rehearsal includes at least a partial fueling
of a vehicle with a liquid propellant.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While current regulations require specific readiness reviews,
proposed Sec. 450.155 (Readiness) would remove the requirement for
flight readiness reviews, including the requirements for a launch
readiness review no earlier than 15 days before flight and the flight
readiness review no earlier than 48 hours before flight. The FAA
proposes to remove these requirements because it has found that
multiple readiness reviews may not be necessary to demonstrate
readiness. For instance, readiness can be determined by a single
meeting close enough in time to the launch or reenty to ensure there
have been no material changes to readiness, such as failure of a radar
or telemetry system. Under the proposed rule, it would be up to the
operator to propose how it would ensure readiness, and whether such
procedures would include one or more readiness reviews, testing, or
some other means. By eliminating the timing requirements, operators
with high launch rates could propose how they
[[Page 15336]]
will ensure they are ready for launch and whether that involves one or
more readiness reviews held close enough in time to the launch to
ensure no significant changes occur between the review and the launch.
Removing the specific requirements for reviews and tests would not
relieve the operator from having to perform a test or hold a review
that is necessary for determining readiness, rather it would provide
the operator with flexibility to develop and propose those tests and
reviews most suitable for the operation in order to ensure readiness.
The FAA would evaluate and make a determination on the adequacy of the
proposed procedures during the licensing process. The FAA plans to
publish a draft means-of-compliance guide with the publication of the
proposed rule, which should include acceptable approaches. In the long
term, the FAA plans to refer to an AC or standard for every
performance-based requirement.
Instead of requiring specific readiness reviews, proposed Sec.
450.155 would require that an operator document and implement
procedures to assess readiness to proceed with the flight of a launch
or reentry vehicle. As part of the application requirements, the
operator would be required to demonstrate compliance with the
requirements of proposed Sec. 450.155 through procedures that may
include a readiness meeting close in time to flight. Unlike Sec. Sec.
417.117 and 431.37, proposed Sec. 450.155 would not specify
particulars of what the procedures must contain. However, the operator
would be required to document and implement procedures that at a
minimum address: (1) Readiness of vehicle and launch, reentry, or
landing site, including any contingency abort location; (2) readiness
of safety-critical personnel, systems, software, procedures, equipment,
property and services; and (3) readiness to implement a mishap plan.
The FAA proposes to require that the procedures address these
particular areas because the FAA has determined that a safe launch or
reentry, at a minimum, requires the vehicle, site, and safety personnel
to be ready and all safety systems and safety support equipment to be
working properly. Additionally, being prepared to implement a mishap
plan would ensure that public safety is maintained during a mishap
because personnel would be familiar with their roles and ready to
perform their duties in order to return the vehicle and site to a safe
condition after the mishap.
The FAA also proposes to remove the requirement that an operator
poll the FAA at the launch readiness review and provide a signed
certificate of the decision to proceed contained in Sec. 417.117. This
polling is unnecessary because the FAA will always inform the operator
of any licensing issues as soon as the FAA becomes aware of them. The
FAA also proposes to remove the requirement that an operator provide a
signed certificate of the decision to proceed with launch or reentry
operations because the FAA has not used any signed certificate required
under Sec. 417.117 for any launch or reentry. All the certificates
have been filed and have not served any purpose other than to comply
with the requirement under Sec. 417.117. The FAA believes that
removing the requirements to poll the FAA and to have a signed
certificate to proceed would not affect public safety and would relieve
burdens to comply with those requirements from the operator and the
FAA.
The FAA proposes to remove the requirements in Sec. 417.119
because rehearsals are not always needed to achieve readiness. It is
important that the launch team be familiar with operations. Rehearsals
are a good way to ensure proficiency with procedures, exercise
communications and critical safety positions as a team, and identify
areas where the operator needs to improve. However, the FAA
acknowledges that rehearsals are not the only way to ensure the
readiness performance requirement is met. This proposal would allow an
operator to determine what methods would be best suited to ensure
readiness for its operation. Operators that have high launch rates may
not need to rehearse personnel that were involved in a similar launch
days or weeks earlier. However, licensees that have not launched for a
long time or that are launching for the first time may need rehearsals
to meet some of the readiness requirements. Operators with high launch
rates could demonstrate readiness with a readiness review and would not
have to hold rehearsals, and training could fill gaps where actual
operations do not provide familiarity with certain aspects of
operations. For example, if no anomalies are experienced during actual
operations, the operator could hold a rehearsal or provide additional
training to exercise the anomaly resolution process.
Current Sec. 417.117(b)(3)(xi) requires an operator to review
launch failure initial response actions and investigation roles and
responsibilities and Sec. 417.119(c) requires an operator to have a
mishap plan rehearsal; current Sec. 431.45 contains the requirements
for a mishap plan for RLVs. Section 450.155(a)(3) would require an
operator to document and implement procedures to ensure readiness to
implement a mishap plan in the event of a mishap. The proposal would
allow flexibility to meet the readiness requirement for implementing a
mishap plan by allowing an operator to propose a procedure acceptable
to the FAA. Thus, an operator would have the ability to develop
procedures to ensure readiness through training, rehearsals, or other
means that might be more applicable to its vehicle and mission. The FAA
would still expect an operator to review any lesson learned, corrective
action, or changes to procedures resulting from any mishap plan
rehearsals or mishap investigations.
Under Sec. 450.155(b), an applicant would need to demonstrate
compliance with the requirements through procedures that may include a
readiness meeting close in time to flight and describe the criteria for
establishing readiness to proceed with the flight of a launch or
reentry vehicle.
6. Communications
Currently, the FAA requires operators to implement communications
plans to ensure that clear lines of authority and situational awareness
are maintained during countdown operations. The communications plan was
the result of a 1993 NTSB investigation discussed earlier. One of the
contributing factors identified in the investigation was the lack of
clear communications between different ranges and the operator. The FAA
requirements for communications plans are currently found in Sec. Sec.
417.111(k) and 431.41 and are nearly identical. Currently, Sec. Sec.
417.111(k) and 431.41 require an operator to implement a communications
plan. Part 435 requires a reentry vehicle operator to comply with the
safety requirements of part 431, including Sec. 431.41. Both
Sec. Sec. 417.111(k) and 431.41 require an operator's communications
plan to define the authority of personnel, by individual or position
title, to issue ``hold/resume,'' ``go/no-go,'' and abort commands;
assign communication networks so that personnel have direct access to
real-time safety-critical information required to issue ``hold/
resume,'' ``go/no-go,'' and any abort decisions and commands; ensure
personnel monitor common intercom channels during countdown and flight;
and implement a protocol for using defined radio telephone
communications terminology.
Additionally, Sec. 431.41(b) requires that the applicant submit
procedures to ensure that the licensee and reentry site personnel
receive copies of the communications plan, and that the reentry site
operator concurs with the plan. For launches from a Federal
[[Page 15337]]
launch range, Sec. 417.111(k) also requires the Federal launch range
to concur with the communications plan.
Operators launching from Federal launch ranges comply with Sec.
417.111(k). Operators submit a communications plan during the
application process and coordinate with the Air Force. The
communications plan includes lines of authority, identification of who
has access to which channels, protocols for communication and
procedures for decision processes. Often, the communication plan is not
fully developed at the time the operator applies for a license, so
operators often submit a representative plan during the application
process and then provide a final plan prior to the first launch under a
license.
The FAA proposes to retain the substantive communications
requirements in Sec. Sec. 417.111(k) and 431.41 in Sec. 450.157
(Communications), in paragraph (a), and remove the specific requirement
to implement a communications plan. Section 450.157(b) would also
require an operator to ensure currency of the communication procedures,
similar to the current requirement in Sec. 417.111(e). The FAA would
preserve these requirements because all key participants must work from
the same communications procedures in order to avoid miscommunication
that could lead to a mishap.\100\
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\100\ NTSB Special Investigation Report: Commercial Space Launch
Incident, Launch Procedure Anomaly Orbital Science Corporation,
Pegasus/SCD-1, 80 Nautical Miles East of Cape Canaveral, Florida
(February 9, 1993); at p. 53.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Section 450.157(c) would require an operator during each countdown
to record all safety-critical communications network channels that are
used for voice, video, or data transmissions to support safety-critical
systems. This is substantially the same requirement as in Sec. Sec.
417.111(l)(5)(vii) and 431.41. The FAA would retain this requirement
because communications recording is often critical to mishap
investigations.
Lastly, the FAA would not require operators to submit communication
procedures during the application process because generally such
procedures are not mature at the time of application, and hence are
unlikely to be the ones used during the actual countdown. Under the
proposal, the FAA would not approve the communications procedures prior
to licensing and would rely instead on an inspection process that
ensures the operator is following the requirements for communications
procedures. These inspections would be consistent with current
practice, where FAA inspectors often review the operator's final
communications procedures. Given that the FAA would no longer require
demonstrations of compliance at the application stage for
communications and preflight procedures, operators may be required to
make revisions to those procedures to resolve issues identified during
compliance monitoring.
7. Preflight Procedures
Under Sec. 417.111(l), an operator is required to develop and
implement a countdown plan that verifies each launch safety rule and
launch commit criterion is satisfied, personnel can communicate during
the countdown, the communication is available after the flight, and a
launch operator will be able to recover from a launch abort or delay.
This countdown plan must cover the period of time when any launch
support personnel are required to be at their designated stations
through initiation of flight. It also must include procedures for
handling anomalies that occur during countdown and any constraints to
initiation of flight, for delaying or holding a launch when necessary,
and for resolving issues. It must identify each person by position who
approves the corrective actions, and each person by position who
performs each operation or specific action. It also must include a
written countdown checklist that must include, among other items,
verification that all launch safety rules and launch commit criteria
have been satisfied. In case of a launch abort or delay, the countdown
plan must identify each condition that must exist in order attempt
another launch, including a schedule depicting the flow of tasks and
events in relation to when the abort or delay occurred and the new
planned launch time, and identify each interface and entity needed to
support recovery operations. Currently Sec. 415.37(a)(2) requires that
the applicant file procedures that ensure mission constraints, rules
and abort procedures are listed and consolidated in a safety directive
or notebook. Similarly, the mission readiness requirements of Sec.
431.37(a)(2) require that procedures that ensure mission constraints,
rules, and abort plans are listed and consolidated in a safety
directive notebook.
Currently some operators have paper notebooks containing all the
checklists and countdown plans. These notebooks are updated frequently,
even up to the day before a launch with change pages by every member of
the launch team. This process can sometimes lead to confusion and
configuration issues. Other operators have electronic systems that
contain all the checklists and countdown procedures. There are many
advantages to electronic records, such as ease of dissemination and
configuration control. As electronic file use becomes more common, the
need for a physical notebook becomes unnecessary. What is critical for
safety is that all launch personnel have the same set of procedures.
Due to the dynamic nature of countdown procedures, operators provide
checklists and procedures used in prior launches to meet the
application requirements. The FAA evaluates these checklists and
procedures during the license evaluation. However, because the
checklists and procedures being evaluated are not final, operators must
submit all updates to these documents as part of the continuing
accuracy of the license requirements. FAA inspectors ensure the
checklists and procedures are the most current, and that configuration
control is maintained.
The FAA proposes to streamline the current countdown procedures and
requirements in Sec. Sec. 415.37(a)(2), 417.111(l), and 431.39(a)(2)
and replace them in Sec. 450.159 (Preflight Procedures). In doing so,
the FAA proposes to remove the requirements for safety directives or
safety notebooks and for a countdown plan, and the requirement to file
such plans because there are many methods of documenting the preflight
procedures that do not involve a plan or notebook. Although the
proposed preflight procedures would not be required to be submitted as
part of the license application process, FAA inspectors would still
ensure that such preflight procedures are implemented.
Unlike the current regulations, the FAA proposes a performance-
based requirement where an operator would need to implement preflight
procedures would verify that all flight commit criteria are satisfied
before flight and that ensure the operator is capable of returning the
vehicle to a safe state after a countdown abort or delay.\101\ This
aligns with the intent of current regulations while permitting
flexibility on how the safety goal is achieved. As a result, there
would be no impact on safety resulting from the removal of the current
prescriptive requirements.
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\101\ A countdown abort includes launch scrubs, recycle
operations, hang-fires, or any instance in which the launch vehicle
does not lift-off after a command to initiate flight has been sent.
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Additionally, proposed Sec. 450.159(b) would require an operator
to ensure the currency of the preflight procedures, and that all
personnel are working with the approved version of the preflight
[[Page 15338]]
procedures, similar to the current requirement in Sec. Sec.
415.37(a)(3) and 431.39(c). The FAA would preserve these requirements
because all key participants must work from the same preflight
procedures in order to avoid a mishap.
The FAA anticipates that the current requirements of Sec.
417.111(l)(1) through (6) would be a means of compliance under the
proposal, but not the only means of compliance. By allowing alternative
means of compliance, the proposed regulations would provide greater
operational flexibility and procedure streamlining across all operation
types.
8. Surveillance and Publication of Hazard Areas
The FAA proposes to adopt surveillance of a flight hazard area
regulations based on recent granted waivers and to better align with
current practices at the Federal launch ranges, where most commercial
launches take place, and to codify current practice that eliminates
unnecessary launch delays while maintaining public safety. This
proposal would only alter the substantive requirements applicable to
the surveillance of ship (waterborne vessel) hazard areas not the
surveillance of land or aircraft hazard areas. Therefore, this
discussion will focus primarily on the proposal's effect on the
surveillance of waterborne vessel hazard areas. The specific
requirements for conducting a flight hazard area analysis are discussed
later in the preamble.
Current regulations on establishing and surveilling hazard areas,
including ship hazard areas, for ELVs are found in Sec. Sec. 417.205
\102\ and 417.223 \103\ and part 417, appendix B.\104\ Part 431 does
not set explicit requirements for the surveillance of waterborne vessel
hazard areas, and the FAA has not yet issued a license under part 431
over water. However, both Sec. Sec. 417.107(b)(2) and 431.35(b)(1)(ii)
require that an operator ensure all members of the public are cleared
of all regions, whether land, sea, or air, where any individual would
be exposed to more than 1 x 10-6 PC. Although not
explicit, the current regulations for ELV and RLV operations
effectively require surveillance and evacuation of all regions where
the individual risk criterion would be violated by the presence of any
member of the public.
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\102\ Section 417.205 requires the flight safety analysis to
employ risk assessment, hazard isolation, or a combination of risk
assessment and partial isolation of the hazards to demonstrate
control of risk to the public.
\103\ Section 417.223 requires, in part, that an FSA include a
flight hazard area analysis that identifies any regions of land,
sea, or air that must be surveyed, publicized, controlled, or
evacuated in order to control the risk to the public from debris
impact hazards.
\104\ Section B417.5(a) of appendix B to part 417 states that a
launch operator must perform a launch site hazard area analysis that
protects the public, aircraft, and ships from the hazardous
activities in the vicinity of the launch site.
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The net effects of the current ELV regulations are: (1) An operator
must establish a ship hazard area sufficient to ensure the
PI for any ship does not exceed 1 x 10-5 for any
debris that could cause a casualty, (2) an operator must monitor the
ship hazard area prior to initiating the flight operation, and (3) if a
large enough ship enters the waterborne vessel hazard area to exceed
the 1 x 10-5 PI criterion, then the launch must
be scrubbed or delayed until the ship exits the hazard area. Appendix B
to part 417 directs a launch operator to evacuate and monitor each
launch site hazard area to ensure compliance with the risk criteria in
Sec. 417.107(b)(2) and (3) and provide an adequate methodology to
achieve this end. The FAA designed this methodology to be consistent
with Air Force range safety requirements in 2006 and to ensure that the
cumulative PI to any ships would not exceed 1 x
10-5 for any debris expected to exceed the kinetic energy or
overpressure thresholds established by Sec. 417.107(c).
Current Sec. 417.223(b) requires public notices for flight hazard
areas. A flight hazard area analysis must establish the ship hazard
areas for notices to mariners that encompass the three-sigma impact
dispersion area for each planned debris impact.\105\ Section 417.121(e)
contains procedural requirements for issuing notices to mariners (and
airmen). Furthermore, Sec. 417.111(j) requires a launch operator to
implement a plan that defines the process for ensuring that any
unauthorized persons, ships, trains, aircraft or other vehicles are not
within any hazard areas identified by the FSA or the ground safety
analysis. In the plan, the launch operator must list each hazard area
that requires surveillance to meet Sec. Sec. 417.107 and 417.223, as
well as describe how the launch operator will provide for day-of-flight
surveillance of the flight hazard area to ensure that the presence of
any member of the public in or near a flight hazard area is consistent
with flight commit criteria developed for each launch. In practice,
these regulations have been comprehensive enough to ensure public
safety, but at times overly prescriptive and unduly conservative.
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\105\ In addition, a flight hazard area analysis must establish
the aircraft hazard areas for notices to airmen that encompass the
3-sigma impact dispersion volume for each planned debris impact.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The FAA has waived several waterborne vessel protection
requirements \106\ in light of advanced ship monitoring technology and
risk calculation models. The FAA's first waiver of the Sec.
417.107(b)(3) requirement illustrates the need for this proposed
change.\107\ In approving the first waiver and numerous subsequent
waivers to enable the proposed option, the FAA assessed the
technological advances previously discussed. In this assessment, the
FAA reviewed the Federal launch range input data and probabilistic
casualty models that the Air Force at the 45th Space Wing uses to
quantify individual and collective risks to people on waterborne
vessels during the launch countdown for space launch missions. The FAA
found that the 45th Space Wing's public risk analyses use accurate data
and scientific methods that are mathematically valid, with reasonably
conservative assumptions applied in areas where significant uncertainty
exists. In that instance, the FAA performed independent analyses using
alternative methods to estimate the casualty risks for multiple
foreseeable scenarios involving debris impacts on various types of
waterborne vessels and found that large passenger vessels anywhere
between the launch point and the first stage disposal zone can
contribute significantly to the estimated EC from a launch.
The FAA also found that small boats (too small to have Automatic
Identification System (AIS) required \108\) located close to the launch
point should not produce significant individual risks. However, no past
waivers involved changes in the areas where surveillance was mandatory
in current practice, only where ships were allowed to be present in
order for the launch to proceed.
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\106\ For example, see Waivers of Ship Protection Probability of
Impact Requirement, 81 FR 28930 (May 10, 2016).
\107\ 81 FR 28930 (May 10, 2016).
\108\ AIS is required on commercial vessels 65 feet in length or
more, towing vessels 26 feet in length or more, and other self-
propelled vessels certified to carry more than 150 passengers or
carrying dangerous cargo.
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Section 450.161 (Surveillance and Publication of Hazard Areas)
would require an operator to publicize, survey, and evacuate each
flight hazard area before initiating flight or reentry, to the extent
necessary to ensure compliance with proposed Sec. 450.101. Proposed
Sec. 450.161(a) does not change the need for surveillance relative to
the current requirements in parts 417 or 431 for people on land or
aircraft because the proposal would continue to require that
[[Page 15339]]
an operator ensure all regions where any individual member of the
public would be exposed to more than 1 x 10-6 PC
are evacuated. However, the proposal would remove the requirement to
evacuate and monitor areas where a waterborne vessel would be exposed
to greater than 1 x 10-5 PI currently required by
Appendix B to part 417, paragraph 417.5(a).
The FAA proposal to include people on ships in the collective risk
computation (see proposed Sec. 450.101(a)(1) and (b)(1)) would
explicitly allow the application of risk management principles to
protect people on waterborne vessels. For example, an applicant could
apply conservative estimates of the ship traffic and vulnerability to
demonstrate acceptable public risks. In proposed Sec. 450.161(a),
surveillance would only be required to the extent necessary to ensure
compliance with the public safety criteria, including individual and
collective risks as well as notification of planned impacts from normal
flight events capable of causing a casualty. For instance, an operator
would not need to perform surveillance of areas where the risk to any
individual would be no more than 1 x 10-6 PC,
unless surveillance was necessary to ensure acceptable collective
risks.
The proposal would generally allow operators the option to use the
current approach in part 417, where surveillance is required to ensure
no ship is exposed to more than 1 x 10-5 PI,
because that would generally be sufficient to ensure compliance with
proposed Sec. 450.101. In addition, the proposal would also provide
the option for launch and reentry operators to use the new technology,
including modern surveillance techniques, and include people in
waterborne vessels as part of the collective risk calculation as
approved by previous waivers.\109\ Current practice is to issue waivers
to operators as an alternative to scrubbing or delaying a launch or
reentry due to waterborne vessels in an area where the PI
exceeds 1 x 10-5. Thus, the proposal would curtail the need
for waivers.
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\109\ 81 FR 28930 (May 10, 2016).
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While the proposal would relax the current part 417 requirement to
ensure that no ship is exposed to more the 1 x 10-5 PI, the
FAA notes that the requirement to ensure no ships are present in areas
where the individual risk exceeds 1 x 10-6 PC is
consistent with international guidelines. The International Maritime
Organization (IMO) is the United Nations organization for safety and
environmental protection regulations for maritime activities. The IMO
has developed a risk-based approach to safety and environmental
protection regulations, which identifies a key threshold of one in a
million (1 x 10-6) probability of fatality per year for
individual crewmembers, passengers, and members of the public ashore
(considered third parties by the IMO). The IMO guidelines equate
individual risks at the 1 x 10-6 probability of fatality per
year as broadly acceptable for maritime activities, and specifically
state that individual risks below this level are negligible and no risk
reduction required. The proposed Sec. 450.101(a)(2) and (b)(2)
requirements would ensure that no person will be present on ships where
the individual risk exceeds 1 x 10-6 PC . This
requirement is consistent, and reasonably conservative, with respect to
the IMO guidelines as explained in the RCC 321-07 Supplement.\110\
Thus, the FAA proposes to codify requirements for the development and
surveillance of ship hazard area that are reasonably consistent with
IMO guidelines for formal safety assessments.
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\110\ Range Commanders Council Risk Committee of the Range
Safety Group, Common Risk Criteria for National Test Ranges:
Supplement. RCC 321-07 Supplement, White Sands Missile Range, New
Mexico, 2007, p. 5-50.
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As previously discussed, there were important advances in ship
surveillance techniques in recent years. In the past, observation
techniques posed significant risks to launch operators. For example,
the only known deaths related to launch operations at Cape Canaveral
were five occupants of a helicopter that crashed at sea shortly after 2
a.m. on April 7, 1984, while flying surface surveillance for the
scheduled launch of a Trident 1 missile from the USS Georgia.\111\ In
many cases, the proposal would relieve the requirement for the type of
surveillance that posed significant risks to launch operators in the
past.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\111\ Air Force News Print Today (Apr. 8, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Section 450.161(b) would require surveillance sufficient to verify
or update the assumptions, input data, and results of the flight safety
analyses. Given there are numerous assumptions and input data that are
critical to the validity of the flight safety analyses, this
requirement could have a variety of surveillance implications beyond
the surveillance necessary to ensure the public exposure at the time of
the operation is consistent with the assumptions and input data for the
flight safety analyses. For example, an FSA could assume that a
jettisoned stage remains intact to impact or breaks up into numerous
pieces that are all capable of causing casualties to people in a class
of aircraft (e.g., business jets). An operator would be required to
employ some type of surveillance (e.g., telemetry data, or remote
sensors such as a camera or radar) to verify that the jettisoned stage
behaves as assumed by the FSA if that behavior is germane to the size
of the aircraft hazard area.
Additionally, Sec. 450.161(c) would require an applicant to
publicize warnings for each flight hazard area, except for regions of
land, sea, or air under the control of the vehicle or site operator or
other entity by agreement. If the operator relies on another entity to
publicize these warnings, the proposal requires the operator to verify
that the warnings have been issued. The FAA notes that some operators
already follow this practice. The proposed requirements would allow
warnings that are consistent with current practice but would also allow
more flexibility for warnings to mariners in accordance with proposed
Sec. 450.133(b). Notably, Sec. 450.133(b)(1) would be consistent with
current practice at the Federal launch ranges based on input from the
CSWG, and Sec. 450.133(b)(2) and (3) are based on current U.S.
Government consensus standards).\112\ Proposed Sec. 450.161(d) would
also require an applicant to describe how it will provide for day-of-
flight surveillance of flight hazard areas, if necessary, to ensure
that the presence of any member of the public in or near a flight
hazard area is consistent with flight commit criteria developed for
each launch or reentry.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\112\ RCC 321-17 Standard.
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This proposal is consistent with the executive branch policy to
replace prescriptive requirements with performance-based criteria.\113\
Specifically, the FAA proposes to replace the ``one-size-fits-all''
approach to ship protection that effectively prevents launch or reentry
operations to proceed if ships are in identified hazard areas
irrespective of the estimated risks posed to people on those vessels.
For example, during the launch of the Falcon 9 from CCAFS to deliver
the SES-9 payload to orbit, SpaceX was delayed by the presence of a tug
boat towing a large barge inside the ship hazard area in compliance
with the FAA's requirement in Sec. 417.107(b) to limit the
PI for waterborne vessels to 1 x 10-5.\114\ Under
the proposal, delays such as this would be avoided without the need for
waivers. The FAA proposes to replace the ``one-size-fits-all'' approach
with the performance-based criteria of the collective and individual
[[Page 15340]]
risk limits in proposed Sec. 450.101, and in doing so would require an
operational delay only when necessary to ensure acceptable individual
and collective risks. This approach was safely and successfully used,
by waiver, for all Falcon 9 launches from the CCAFS and KSC starting in
2016. The FAA seeks comment on the proposed approach.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\113\ SPD-2 (May 24, 2018), at Section 2b.
\114\ 81 FR 28930 (May 10, 2016).
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Application of public risk management for the protection of people
in waterborne vessels has the potential for reducing launch costs by
reducing the number of operational delays and scrubs due to ships in
areas where the individual and collective risks are nevertheless
acceptable. Because it is a major procurer of launch services, reduced
launch costs would be of direct benefit to the U.S. Government. It
would also help to make the U.S. launch industry more competitive
internationally by reducing launch delays and scrubs.
9. Lightning Hazard Mitigation
The FAA proposes to remove appendix G to part 417 and replace it
with the performance-based requirements of Sec. 450.163 (Lightning
Hazard Mitigation). The current requirements in appendix G to part 417
are outdated, inflexible, overly conservative, and not explicitly
applicable to many RLVs and reentry vehicles.
Lightning is an atmospheric discharge of electricity, and can
either occur naturally or be ``triggered.'' Triggered lightning can be
initiated as a result of a launch vehicle and its electrically-
conductive exhaust plume passing through a strong pre-existing electric
field.\115\ However, the triggering phenomenon is unpredictable because
there are many conditions that must occur in order for the breakdown of
the electric field resulting in a lightning strike to occur. One
condition is the enhancement factor of the launch or reentry vehicle
that acts as a conductor. The extremities of the vehicle, such as the
nose radius of curvature coupled with the effective length of the
vehicle (taking into account the plume length) will establish the
viability of a lightning strike. Furthermore, a launch vehicle's
propellants will have different conductivity characteristics, leading
to varying lengths; \116\ as a result, not every vehicle will trigger a
lightning strike under the same environmental conditions. This
unpredictability is exacerbated further by the fact that a triggered
lightning strike can occur even when the vehicle is penetrating a
benign cloud, or is outside a cloud that is not producing lightning.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\115\ Roeder, William P. and Todd M. McNamara, A Survey Of The
Lightning Launch Commit Criteria, American Meteorological Society,
Aviation Range and Meteorology Conference.
\116\ E. P. Krider, M. C. Noogle, M. A. Uman, and R. E. Orville.
``Lightning and the Apollo 17/Saturn V Exhaust Plume,'' Journal of
Spacecraft and Rockets, Vol. 11, No. 2 (1974), p. 72-75.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Lightning can and has caused or necessitated the destruction of
launch and reentry vehicles in flight. This destruction may occur both
by physical damage (direct effect) to structural or electronic
components from lightning attachment to the vehicle and by damage or
upset to electronic systems from a nearby discharge (indirect effect).
The direct and indirect effects of a lightning discharge pose hazards
to the safety critical systems of launch and reentry vehicles, such as
the FSS. If damage to the vehicle's safety critical components renders
it inoperable or causes safety-critical systems to malfunction, there
may be no way to stop the vehicle from reaching the public. For
example, the damage may cause the command signal that instructs the
vehicle to stop thrusting, or to abort the mission, to not be received.
Two such triggered lightning events occurred in 1969 and 1987,
during ascent. In 1969, when a manned Apollo XII \117\ vehicle lost
power to its Command Module, the launch was seconds away from beginning
initiation of its abort command. In 1987, an unmanned ELV lost its
guidance, navigation and control \118\ and began careening towards the
range safety impact limit lines. The range safety officer had to
terminate its flight.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\117\ Merceret et al., ed., A History of the Lightning Launch
Commit Criteria and the Lightning Advisory Panel for America's Space
Program. NASA/TP-2010-216283, 10, Section 2.3 (August 2010).
\118\ Merceret et al., ed., A History of the Lightning Launch
Commit Criteria and the Lightning Advisory Panel for America's Space
Program. NASA/TP-2010-216283, 31, Section 4.3.2 (August 2010).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
These two incidents led to the establishment of the present-day
lightning launch commit criteria (LLCC), which the Air Force and NASA
adhere to for all launches from a Federal launch range. The Lightning
Advisory Panel (LAP),\119\ an advisory body to the Air Force and NASA,
is responsible for reviewing and proposing modifications to the LLCC.
Adherence to the LLCC has resulted in zero lightning-caused launch
incidents for over thirty years.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\119\ The LAP's expertise range from in-depth knowledge of the
physics of lightning, electric fields, and clouds, to lightning
impacts on launch vehicles and statistics of electric field strength
in specific environmental conditions. Its membership is primarily
academia, although the Air Force and NASA fund this organization.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The FAA codified the LLCC into Appendix G to part 417 to address
concerns that the direct and indirect effects of a natural or triggered
lightning strike may disable a vehicle's FSS such that the launch
operator could not stop the vehicle if it veered outside the impact
limit lines (i.e., due to degraded signal). The FAA renamed these
requirements to ``Lightning Flight Commit Criteria'' (LFCC).
The LFCC in appendix G to part 417 consist of 10 natural and
triggered lightning avoidance rules that provide criteria to minimize
the risk of a launch vehicle being struck by lightning or triggering
lightning. One rule contains criteria for avoiding natural lightning,
the remaining nine contain avoidance criteria for triggering or
initiating lightning when flying through, or near, specific cloud types
or phenomena known to produce natural or triggered lightning. Taking
into account the electrification process and the properties of electric
fields within clouds, the triggered lightning rules establish time and
distance requirements for distinct cloud types (e.g., cumulus cloud,
attached or detached anvil cloud, thick clouds) believed to contain the
necessary environmental conditions to produce elevated electric fields.
These time and distance criteria help mitigate the threat of triggering
lightning by increasing the probability that the electric field, at a
given distance or after a length of time, will be below the threshold
needed to produce lightning. Other rules contain prescriptive
requirements and thresholds for not launching if there are high-surface
electric fields as measured by a ground-based field mill, or if there
is a threat of a vehicle becoming charged if it penetrates a cloud that
contains frozen precipitation.\120\
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\120\ Triboelectrification is a phenomenon that can occur when a
launch vehicle flies through a region in a cloud that contains
frozen precipitation. Under the right conditions, frozen
precipitation can deposit a charge on the vehicle. If the launch
vehicle is not treated, an electrostatic discharge could result.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Unfortunately, codifying the LLCC into appendix G of part 417 has
led to two major challenges. First, because the science behind
triggering lightning is not fully known, the criteria were developed
with a margin of safety for large ELVs, such as the Titan IV. As a
consequence, the criteria may be overly conservative for certain types
of vehicles. While the LAP has updated the LLCC to keep pace with the
advances in science and technology, the FAA rulemaking process is
lengthy, and does not permit appendix G to be updated with the
frequency necessary to keep up with the changes to the LLCCs. Revisions
to appendix G are likely to be
[[Page 15341]]
out-of-date by the time they are finalized and published. As a result,
appendix G preserves much of the original LLCCs outdated standards,
which leaves a discrepancy between the LLCC and appendix G.
In an effort to address this issue, the FAA made four ELOS
determinations. The first ELOS determination permitted the use of a new
maximum radar reflectivity method \121\ to determine whether the radar
reflectivity values were below the risk threshold for triggering
lightning in the cloud. Because this new measurement technique was not
in appendix G, the launch operator could not benefit from this
improvement unless it requested and received approval to use this
technique rather than follow the criteria currently in appendix G. The
ELOS determination relieved the burden on the operator to seek approval
to use a different radar reflectivity measurement process; therefore,
allowing more opportunity for the launch operator to take advantage of
the improvement rather than wait until a final rulemaking incorporated
the change.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\121\ This radar reflectivity method allowed measurement of a
hydrometeor by a radar with a wavelength of less than 5 centimeters
but greater than 3 centimeters if: (1) The surface of the radome of
the radar was hydrophobic and the precipitation rate at the radar
site was less than 15 mm/hr (0.59 in/hr) rainfall equivalent, and
(2) For each point that was measured, the horizontal extent of
composite radar reflectivity greater than lOdBZ along the line of
sight between the radar and the point did not exceed the
reflectivity extent in kilometers for a 3 cm radar due to radar beam
attenuation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
When the LAP updated the LLCCs again, the FAA issued a second ELOS
determination reducing the distance requirement for the flight path of
the launch vehicle in relation to a thick cloud, if the radar
reflectivity thresholds were satisfied.\122\ The issuance of this ELOS
determination was necessary to enable operators to use the most recent
thick cloud rule without needing to seek individual ELOS determinations
from the FAA or waiting for the FAA to update appendix G through a
rulemaking.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\122\ The Launch operator can launch within 5nm of a thick cloud
layer if the radar reflectivity is below 0 dBZ.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The third ELOS determination also resulted from an update to the
LLCCs and allowed for use of a shorter radar wavelength to measure
radar reflectivity if the criteria for attenuation due to rainfall and
beam spreading were met. This modification allowed a launch operator to
make use of weather radars that have wavelengths between 3 and 5 cm, in
addition to radars with wavelengths of 5 cm or greater. Similar to the
other ELOS determinations, this relieved the burden from the operator
to seek approval from the FAA, and allowed the operator to immediately
use different radar wavelengths or wait until the FAA updated appendix
G.
The fourth ELOS determination informed the launch operator that
satisfying NASA-STD-4010 would meet the requirements of appendix G to
part 417.\123\ This ELOS determination enabled an operator to use the
more up-to-date LLCC in place of the outdated LFCC in appendix G. It
also recognized that the NASA-STD-4010 contained the most current LLCCs
and removed the burden from the FAA to issue an ELOS determination for
every new update to the LLCC.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\123\ The NASA-STD-4010 has been adopted by both NASA and the
Air Force. When NASA published the LLCCs in a NASA Standard document
it provided uniform engineering and technical requirements in one
location lessening confusion to which version of the LLCCs were
currently being applied.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The FAA only codified the LFCCs into part 417, and not parts 431
and 435. While the LFCCs are not explicitly included in part 431 or
435, Sec. 431.35(c) requires an applicant to employ a system safety
process to identify and mitigate hazards, including lightning.
Additionally, while not all launch and reentry vehicles have the same
threshold to trigger lightning, they do have the potential to incur
direct or indirect effects that may impact their safety critical
systems. Therefore, in order to protect public health and safety, the
LFCCs are an appropriate mitigation strategy for suborbital RLVs and
reentry vehicles that can induce lightning that could affect public
safety. In 2006, the FAA sponsored a study to conduct a triggered
lightning risk assessment for five different concept suborbital RLVs,
from two different launch sites, to gain an understanding of the
potential risk of triggering lightning for these new categories of
vehicles.\124\ The study took into account the vehicle design, mission
profile, and propellants, as well as the lightning climatology of a
given launch site. In 2010,\125\ a follow-on study was performed for
four concept vehicles at a total of four different launch sites.\126\
The study showed that all concept vehicles had a much higher triggering
threshold (i.e., it was harder to initiate lightning) than that of a
Titan IV ELV and that they each had different triggering thresholds
within each concept vehicle and phase of mission. For instance, the
glide phase was shown to have a higher triggering threshold than a
powered phase. On the other hand, the study noted that many
uncertainties remain with understanding the triggering conditions.
Therefore, the results of the study recommended that until more
accurate triggering thresholds for the differing vehicle concepts can
be quantified, the avoidance criteria should be followed. The FAA
requests comments on this proposal.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\124\ Krider, Phil, E. et al., Triggered Lightning Risk
Assessment for Reusable Launch Vehicles at the Southwest Regional
and Oklahoma Spaceports, Report No: ATR-2006(5195)-1, Jan 30, 2006
(https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/ast/reports_studies/media/ATR-2006(5195)-1.pdf).
\125\ Krider, Phil, E., et al., Triggered Lightning Risk
Assessment for Reusable Launch Vehicles at Four Regional Spaceports,
Report No: ATR-2010(4387)-1, Apr 30, 2010. (https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/ast/reports_studies/media/ATR-2010%20(5387)-1.pdf).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The ARC recommended the intent or performance goal of the current
LFCC be captured into performance-based requirements that allow for the
consideration of each launcher's mission profile, general vehicle and
flight safety system components, and other factors that may reduce the
currently-required 30-minute wait.\127\ The ARC also recommended that
the prescriptive requirements in Appendix G be placed in a guidance
document that provides acceptable means of meeting the performance-
based requirements. Finally, the ARC estimated that launch and site
operators could save hundreds of thousands of dollars, or more, for
each avoidance of launch scrubs and no-go calls due to unnecessarily
conservative weather restrictions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\127\ The ARC stated, ``intent or performance goal, of the
stated requirements.'' The FAA has interpreted the phrase ``of the
stated requirements'' to mean of the current LFCC found in appendix
G to part 417.
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The FAA generally agrees with the ARC's recommendation and proposes
to replace the detailed prescriptive LFCC in appendix G with
performance-based requirements in proposed Sec. 450.163. It would also
provide an AC that contains an accepted means of compliance with the
proposed Sec. 450.163(a)(1), including reference to NASA-STD-4010
\128\ and would also include other relevant standards for the design of
a vehicle to withstand the direct and indirect effects of a lightning
discharge. The FAA seeks comment on this approach.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\128\ NASA-STD-4010 is the current lighting launch commit
criteria employed by NASA and the Air Force. The FAA uses this
standard as its basis for the requirements in Appendix G and has
issued a broad-based ELOS determination allowing an operator to
comply with the current NASA-STD-4010 instead of the existing
Appendix G which is outdated.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The FAA anticipates that a performance-based regulation,
accompanied by an associated AC and government standards, would resolve
[[Page 15342]]
many of the issues with the current Appendix G. While a thorough
understanding of whether a given launch vehicle and its mission profile
will trigger lightning is far from being understood, a performance-
based requirement for mitigating natural and triggered lightning
strikes or encountering a nearby lightning discharge would allow an
operator to use up-to-date lightning avoidance criteria without having
to wait for the regulation to be updated, or for the FAA to issue an
ELOS determination or a waiver.
The intent of the current requirements found in Appendix G to part
417 is to avoid and mitigate natural and triggered lightning. Under the
proposed regulations, the FAA would require operators to avoid and
mitigate the potential for intercepting or initiating lightning strike
or encountering discharge through implementation of flight commit
criteria. Alternatively, an operator would be able to use a vehicle
designed to continue safe flight if struck by lightning or encountering
a nearby discharge. Finally, an operator would be able to comply with
the proposed regulation by ensuring that compliance with public safety
criteria would be met in the event of a lightning strike on the
vehicle.
Proposed Sec. 450.163(a)(1), would require an operator to mitigate
the potential for a vehicle to intercept or initiate a lightning strike
or encounter a nearby discharge through flight commit criteria using a
means of compliance accepted by the Administrator. Currently, the FAA
is only aware of one standard, NASA-STD-4010, that is currently
acceptable and would satisfy the requirements of proposed Sec.
450.163(a)(1). While FAA anticipates that industry might develop new
standards as technology advances, such standards would be required to
be submitted as alternative means of compliance under Sec. 450.35
(Accepted Means of Compliance) paragraph (c) and accepted by the
Administrator prior to use. If an operator were to submit an
alternative means of compliance to NASA-STD-4010, the proposed
lightning standard would need to be evaluated and accepted by the FAA,
including any consultation with outside expert, prior to being used in
any license application using the new standard.
The FAA anticipates that this revision would provide more
flexibility to an operator than the current appendix G, which
prescribes the specific lightning flight commit criteria that an
operator must use. While the only method currently accepted by the
Administrator is NASA-STD-4010, operators would have the flexibility to
propose lightning flight commit criteria based on a certain vehicle's
mission profile (e.g., whether it is a piloted RLV launching a payload
to low Earth orbit, or a piloted suborbital reusable launch vehicle
with spaceflight participants on board).\129\ However, as previously
discussed, such a proposed means of compliance would need to be
accepted prior to being used in a license application to satisfy
proposed Sec. 450.165(a)(1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\129\ The piloted vehicles can control and maneuver the vehicle
leading up the release point or area thus limiting the exposure of
the vehicle to elevated electric fields upon its launch.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
An operator may choose instead to mitigate lightning strikes and
the initiation of lighting by using a vehicle designed to continue safe
flight in the event of a lightning strike, in accordance with proposed
Sec. 450.163(a)(2). To accomplish this, an operator would need to
demonstrate that the vehicle design adheres to design standards for
lightning protection of the vehicle and its safety critical systems.
The FAA is currently evaluating current aircraft lightning protection
standards, such as AC 20-136B and AC20-107B, to determine whether a
launch or reentry vehicle designed to those standards would allow for
the continued safe flight of the vehicle.\130\ The FAA anticipates that
it would accept other industry standards for lightning protection or
certification standards during vehicle design, such as SAE Aerospace
Recommended Practices, or European Organization for Civil Aviation
Equipment, as an acceptable means of compliance to proposed Sec.
450.163(a)(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\130\ AC 20-136B, Aircraft Electrical and Electronic Lightning
System Lightning Protection, provides information and guidance on
the protection of aircraft electrical and electronic systems from
the effects of lightning. AC 20-107B, provides information and
guidance on composite aircraft structure.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Finally, an operator would be able to choose to comply with
proposed Sec. 450.163(c) by ensuring that it would be in compliance
with the public safety criteria of proposed Sec. 450.101 should it
encounter discharge or take a direct lightning strike. The use of
physical containment as a hazard control strategy would be a prime
example, but other scenarios may also apply.
Section 450.163 would apply to all launch and reentry vehicles,
including ELVs, RLVs, hybrids, and reentry vehicles. Because the
proposed requirement is performance based, each operator would be able
to provide lightning mitigation methods designed for a specific
vehicle's mission profile. Under Sec. 450.163, the FAA anticipates
that an operator would be able to apply new research findings or
methodologies in a more timely manner than under appendix G. Further,
the FAA would be able to update guidance materials in a timely manner
to include those means of compliance that result from advances in
science, information, or technology. Additionally, the FAA believes
that, by providing an operator with the flexibility to mitigate natural
and triggered lightning strikes through standards and best practices,
the operators could avoid costly delays resulting from compliance with
the requirements in the current appendix G.
Section 450.163(b) would establish application requirements. To
comply with proposed Sec. 450.163(a)(1), an applicant would be
required to submit lightning flight commit criteria that mitigate the
potential for a launch or reentry vehicle intercepting or initiating a
lightning strike, or encountering a nearby discharge using a means of
compliance accepted by the Administrator. As previously discussed, the
only current method to comply with Sec. 450.165(a)(1) would be to use
NASA-STD-4010. If an applicant chooses instead to comply with Sec.
450.163(a)(2), it would be required to provide documentation
demonstrating that the vehicle is designed to protect safety critical
systems, such as electrical and electronic systems, or FSSs. The FAA
anticipates that this documentation would include proof and validation
that the vehicle has followed lightning protections standards that
would protect the vehicle's safety critical systems from a direct or
indirect lightning discharge. If an applicant chooses to comply with
Sec. 450.163(a)(3), it would be required to provide documentation
demonstrating compliance with Sec. 450.101 in the event of a lightning
discharge. As previously discussed, the FAA expects that this would be
demonstrated through any number of analyses that validate that the
vehicle is able to control individual and collective risk to the
public,
The FAA considered using direct measurement of the electric field
within a cloud as an option for a launch operator to comply with
proposed Sec. 450.163. However, it is the FAA's understanding that
there is currently no consensus among the scientific community on the
electric field value threshold to initiate lightning. Without a
definite threshold value, the FAA would not be able to make a safety
determination if an operator were to take direct measurements of the
electric field. In addition, further research and data is required to
establish procedures for measuring within the cloud, for how many
measurements to make within a
[[Page 15343]]
period of time or distance from the cloud, and such other
considerations. Nevertheless, given the performance-based nature of
Sec. 450.163, it is possible that in the future, an accepted means for
obtaining real time electric field readings along the flight profile
could lead to less restrictive criteria.
10. Flight Safety Rules
In proposed Sec. 450.165, an operator would be required to
establish and observe flight safety rules that govern the conduct of
each launch or reentry. These would include flight commit criteria and
flight abort rules.
i. Flight Commit Criteria
The FAA proposes to consolidate the flight-commit criteria
requirements currently contained in parts 417, 431, and 435. Flight-
commit criteria are conditions necessary prior to the flight of a
launch vehicle or the reentry of a reentry vehicle to ensure that the
launch or reentry does not exceed the public safety criteria in
proposed Sec. 450.101. Although this proposal restates flight-commit
requirements differently than the current regulations, the changes
would not alter substantive requirements, and are intended solely for
clarification purposes.
The ELV launch requirements for flight readiness are contained in
Sec. Sec. 415.37 and 417.113. Section 415.37 requires an applicant to
file procedures for verifying readiness for safe flight, which result
in flight-commit criteria. Section 417.113(c) requires that the launch
safety rules include flight-commit criteria that identify each
condition that must be met in order to initiate flight. The flight-
commit criteria must implement the FSA; for a launch that uses an FSS,
must ensure that the FSS is ready for flight; and for each launch, must
document the actual conditions used for the flight-commit criteria at
the time of lift-off and verify whether the flight-commit criteria are
satisfied.
Flight-commit criteria for launch and reentry of a reusable launch
vehicle are contained in Sec. Sec. 431.37 and 431.39, and by extension
in Sec. 435.33 for the reentry of a reentry vehicle other than a RLV.
Unlike part 417, the parts 431 and 435 requirements are performance-
based and required as part of the system safety analysis requirements.
Flight-commit criteria-related requirements appear throughout
proposed part 450. The main requirements would be found in Sec. Sec.
450.155, 450.159, and 450.165. Section 450.155 would require an
operator to document and implement procedures to assess readiness to
proceed with the flight of a launch or reentry vehicle. Proposed Sec.
450.159 would require an operator to implement preflight procedures to
verify that each flight-commit criterion has been met before initiating
flight.
Proposed Sec. 450.165 would mandate that an operator's flight
safety rules include flight-commit criteria identifying each condition
necessary prior to initiating flight to satisfy proposed Sec. 450.101.
These commit criteria would include surveillance, monitoring of
meteorological conditions, implementing window closures for the purpose
of collision avoidance, monitoring the status of any flight safety
system, and any other hazard controls derived from system safety,
software safety, or flight safety analyses. Also, for any reentry
vehicle, the commit criteria would include monitoring the status of
safety-critical systems before enabling reentry flight.
Part 450 also includes requirements to develop flight-commit
criteria based on the results of various analysis. For instance, Sec.
450.135 (Debris Risk Analysis) would require operators to demonstrate
compliance with public safety criteria in proposed Sec. 450.101. In
Sec. 450.137, the far-field overpressure blast effect analysis would
have to demonstrate compliance with public safety criteria in proposed
Sec. 450.101. Sections 450.139 (Toxic Hazards for Flight) and 450.187
(Toxic Hazards Mitigation for Ground Operations) would require an
operator to derive flight-commit criteria based on the results of its
toxic release hazard analysis, containment analysis, or toxic risk
assessment to ensure any necessary evacuation of the public from any
toxic hazard area prior to flight. Proposed Sec. 450.141 (Wind
Weighting for the Flight of an Unguided Suborbital Launch Vehicle)
would require an operator to establish flight-commit criteria that
control the risk to the public from potential adverse effects from
normal and malfunctioning flight. Proposed Sec. 450.161 would require
an applicant to describe how it will provide for day-of-flight
surveillance of flight hazard areas, if necessary, to ensure that the
presence of any member of the public in or near a flight hazard area is
consistent with flight-commit criteria. Section 450.163 would require
an operator to derive flight-commit criteria that mitigate the
potential for a launch or reentry vehicle intercepting or initiating a
lightning strike, or encountering a nearby discharge. Finally, Sec.
450.169 (Launch and Reentry Collision Avoidance Analysis) would require
an operator use the results of the collision avoidance analysis to
develop flight-commit criteria for collision avoidance.
ii. Flight Abort Rules
The FAA proposes to include flight abort rules as part of proposed
flight safety rules in Sec. 450.165. Flight abort rules apply to a
vehicle that uses an FSS and are the conditions under which an FSS must
abort the flight to ensure compliance with flight safety criteria.
Current regulations in parts 417 and 431 address flight abort rules.
Section 417.113(d) sets flight termination rules for ELVs. It
requires operators to identify the conditions under which the FSS,
including the functions of the flight safety system crew, must
terminate flight to ensure public safety. The flight termination rules
must implement the FSA, and specifically requires operators to
terminate flight in the following six scenarios:
1. When real-time data indicate a flight safety limit has been
reached.
2. At the straight-up time if the vehicle flies straight up.
3. If the vehicle becomes erratic and may endanger protected areas,
while potentially losing control of the flight safety system.
4. No later than at the expiration of the data loss flight time if
tracking data is lost.
5. If a vehicle is performing erratically prior to entering an
overflight gate, or if the vehicle is not flying parallel to or
converging to the nominal trajectory prior to entering a gate.
6. If a vehicle is performing erratically prior to entering a hold
gate, or if the vehicle is not flying parallel to or converging to the
nominal trajectory prior to entering a hold gate.
Some of these current requirements may be overly prescriptive. For
example, flight abort at the straight-up time is only one method of
mitigating risk to the launch area in the event of a vehicle that fails
to program and flies straight up. Although other methods may mitigate
risk to an acceptable level, under the current requirements, an
operator would be forced to abort flight at the straight up time. Also,
the rules for allowing vehicles to enter gates are too subjective and
not easily tied to specific hazards.
Part 431, applicable to RLVs, does not impose specific flight abort
rules. However, Sec. 431.39(a) requires an applicant to submit mission
rules and contingency abort plans that ensure safe conduct of mission
operations during nominal and non-nominal vehicle flight. These would
encompass flight abort rules because Sec. 401.5 defines contingency
abort as the cessation of
[[Page 15344]]
vehicle flight during ascent or descent in a manner that does not
jeopardize public health and safety and the safety of property, in
accordance with mission rules and procedures. Part 431 requires flight
abort when needed to mitigate risk and a set of rules to that end, yet
does so without following part 417's more detailed and prescriptive
approach. In practice, orbital rockets licensed under part 431 have
used an AFSS with flight abort rules that are conservatively consistent
with the six scenarios identified in 417.113(d), when applicable (e.g.,
no straight-up time for a horizontal launch).
Section 450.165(c) lays out the proposed consolidation and
clarification of flight abort rules. Although the FAA would maintain
much of Sec. 417.113(d)'s structure and requirements, the FAA looked
for opportunities to replace prescriptive requirements with outcome
objectives. The FAA would require operators to develop flight abort
rules to comply with the public safety criteria of Sec. 450.101, as
well as to prevent debris capable of causing a casualty from impacting
in uncontrolled areas if the vehicle is outside the limits of a useful
mission. Operators would also need to identify the functions of any
flight abort crew, as specifically required in part 417. This is also
consistent with the FAA's practice in implementing part 431. Although
not specifically stated in Sec. 431.39(a), the FAA has required
operators to identify crew functions. The FAA proposes to eliminate the
straight-up rule, as it is not reasonable to include the rule at the
exclusion of other existing mitigation options. Also, the FAA proposes
to simplify the current requirements for gate passage to allow a
vehicle to pass through a gate if it can achieve a useful mission. This
would allow the operator to specify which vehicle parameters are the
most useful for determining whether a vehicle should be allowed to
enter a gate. For orbital launches, vehicles unable to achieve orbit
cannot achieve a useful mission and should be terminated. The FAA would
delete separate requirements for hold-and-resume gates, as analysis
should show which types of gates are most effective for the proposed
flight, and those should be implemented.
These proposed rules, which would be similar to those from part
417, were chosen over the generic requirement for mission rules from
part 431 because they correspond to other sections in the proposed rule
describing flight safety limits, gates, and other requirements. This is
consistent with the ARC's recommendation to change part 431 to better
capture the intent of the flight abort rules. An operator should
balance potentially competing objectives as necessary to minimize risk
when writing specific flight abort rules. For example, if there is a
rule to destruct a vehicle to prevent an intact impact in order to
reduce distant focused overpressure risk, the operator should also
consider the resulting risk to aircraft when establishing the timing of
the destruct action.
Proposed Sec. 450.165(d) lays out the application requirements for
flight safety rules. For flight commit criteria, the FAA would require
an applicant to provide a list of all flight commit criteria. These
would include any criteria related to surveillance, monitoring of
meteorological conditions, implementation of launch or reentry windows
closures for the purpose of collision avoidance, confirmation that any
safety-critical system is ready for flight, monitoring of safety-
critical systems prior to enabling re-entry flight, and any other
hazard controls. For flight abort rules, the FAA would require an
applicant to provide a description of each rule, and the parameters
that will be used to evaluate each rule, as well as a list that
identifies the rules necessary for compliance with each requirement in
Sec. 450.101. All conditions in which flight abort action would be
taken must be described, as well as rules and conditions allowing
flight to continue past a gate. Lastly, the FAA would require an
applicant to provide a description of the vehicle data that will be
available to evaluate flight abort rules across the range of normal and
malfunctioning flight. This information is necessary to ensure that
compliance with the flight abort rules is achievable.
11. Tracking
The FAA proposes to adopt vehicle tracking requirements.
Specifically, proposed Sec. 450.167 (Tracking) would require an
operator to measure and record in real time the position and velocity
of the vehicle. The system used to track the vehicle would be required
to provide data to determine the actual impact locations of all stages
and components, and to obtain vehicle performance data for comparison
with the preflight performance predictions. The proposed requirements
would be consistent with current practice for a wide variety of
vehicles, including the widespread use of telemetry data, and various
requirements of parts 417, 431, and 437.
Current regulations for ELVs require a vehicle tracking system as
part of the FSS. For example, in Sec. 417.113(c), as part of the
flight commit criteria for a launch that uses an FSS, readiness for
flight includes that the launch vehicle tracking system has no less
than two tracking sources prior to lift-off. Also, the launch vehicle
tracking system must have no less than one verified tracking source at
all times from lift-off to orbit insertion for an orbital launch, to
the end of powered flight for a suborbital launch. Of course, the need
for tracking is implicit in other requirements for launch of a vehicle
with an FSS, including the requirements regarding data loss flight
times in Sec. 417.219.
Section Sec. 417.125 also requires an operator of an unguided
suborbital launch vehicle to track the flight of its vehicle.
Specifically, Sec. 417.125(f) requires an operator to provide data to
determine the actual impact locations of all stages and components, to
verify the effectiveness of a launch operator's wind weighting safety
system, and to obtain rocket performance data for comparison with the
preflight performance predictions.
Part 431 has no explicit requirements related to tracking. However,
currently every operation licensed under part 431 is required to employ
a telemetry system that provides, among other safety critical
information, data on the position and velocity of the vehicle in real-
time. In addition, the one orbital RLV operation licensed to date
employed an FSS and established data loss flight times. The use of data
loss flight times is an explicit recognition that a vehicle without
tracking poses a potential hazard to the public.
Tracking is also required under Experimental Permit regulations.
Under Sec. 437.67, an operator must, during permitted flight, measure
in real-time the position and velocity of its reusable suborbital
rocket. The requirements for an operator to measure in real time the
position and velocity of its rocket, coupled with the requirement to
communicate with ATC during all phases of flight, are intended (among
other things) to provide ATC with enough information to protect the
public if the vehicle flies outside its planned trajectory envelope.
Tracking data sufficient to identify the location of any vehicle
impacts following an unplanned event are necessary to ensure a proper
response to an emergency. Specifically, a launch operator must
implement its mishap response plan if an unplanned event occurring
during the flight of a launch vehicle results in the impact of a launch
vehicle, its payload or any component thereof outside designated impact
limit lines for an expendable launch vehicle; and, for an RLV, outside
a designated landing site. More generally, vehicle-
[[Page 15345]]
tracking data provide a level of awareness that enables an appropriate
response to an off-nominal situation, such as knowing where to apply
fire suppression resources or where to evacuate the public to protect
against predicted toxic plumes. More specifically, tracking data are an
important element of current U.S. Government consensus standards, in
accordance with RCC 321, to ensure the safety of people in aircraft.
Specifically, since 2007, RCC 321 has included a requirement (in
paragraph 3.3.4) to coordinate with the FAA to ensure timely
notification of any expected air traffic hazard associated with range
activities. In the event of a mishap, RCC 321 requires that the
operator must immediately inform the FAA of the volume and duration of
airspace where an aircraft hazard is predicted.\131\
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\131\ Range Commanders Council, Common Risk Criteria for
National Test Ranges, RCC 321-07, White Sands Missile Range, New
Mexico, 2007.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Tracking data are also necessary to evaluate vehicle safety
performance, even for normal flight. For example, Sec. 417.125(g)(3)
requires a launch operator of an unguided suborbital launch vehicle to
compare the actual and predicted nominal performance (i.e., trajectory)
of the vehicle. Accurate data to describe the vehicle normal trajectory
envelope are necessary for valid quantitative public risk assessments.
Current practice demonstrates that tracking data will help
facilitate safe and efficient integration of launch and reentry
operations into the NAS. The increasingly congested and constrained NAS
creates a need to transition from segregation, to full integration of
space vehicles. The FAA has several efforts underway to ensure the safe
and efficient transition of launch and reentry vehicles through the
NAS, while minimizing the effects of these operations on other users of
the NAS. The FAA has contemplated the need to obtain real time data
tracking data, including vehicle state vectors, reports of mission
events, and indications of vehicle status, to help accomplish this.
However, the FAA is deferring that discussion until after the Airspace
Access Priorities ARC.\132\
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\132\ Information regarding the Airspace Access Priorities ARC
is available at https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/rulemaking/committees/documents/index.cfm/document/information/documentID/3443.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Proposed Sec. 450.167(a) would require an operator to measure and
record in real time the position and velocity of the vehicle. The
system used to track the vehicle would need to provide data to
determine the actual impact locations of all stages and components, and
to obtain vehicle performance data for comparison with the preflight
performance predictions. The proposed requirements are consistent with
current practice for a wide variety of vehicles, including the
widespread use of telemetry data, and various requirements levied under
parts 417, 431, and 437.
Proposed Sec. 450.167(a) would consolidate and standardize the
current regulatory requirements for vehicle tracking-related
information. Vehicle-tracking data facilitate appropriate emergency
responses, and an ability to determine the actual vehicle impact
locations due to an unplanned event is critical to evaluate the class
of mishap. Comparison of the actual vehicle safety performance, such as
the trajectory, with preflight predictions helps ensure the continued
accuracy of the FSA input, and thus the validity of the public risk
assessments and hazard areas. A comparison of the actual vehicle safety
performance data to predict performance provides the FAA with a means
to evaluate an operator's understanding of its safety margins, which is
a measure of maturity of the operation and thus a potential factor in
the probability of failure analysis.
Proposed Sec. 450.167(b) would require an applicant to identify
and describe each method or system used to meet the tracking
requirements of proposed Sec. 450.167(a) of this section. Because the
proposed requirements are consistent with current practice, and in some
cases less restrictive, the application requirements would not increase
burden on license applicants.
12. Launch and Reentry Collision Avoidance Analysis Requirements
The FAA proposes to modernize the launch and reentry collision
avoidance analysis criteria to match current common practice and
provide better protection for inhabitable and active orbiting objects.
It would also allow launch and reentry operators to obtain a launch
collision avoidance analysis from Federal entities identified by the
FAA. Previously, the FAA established identical rules for expendable
launches from Federal and non-Federal launch ranges, RLV operations,
and permitted launch operations. The proposed rule would consolidate
launch and reentry collision avoidance analysis requirements from these
three different parts into a single safety rule.
The FAA anticipates that proposed changes to the collision
avoidance analysis criteria would not significantly affect operators.
The changes would capture current practice, provide alternative means
of meeting existing requirements, and clarify the time period that the
analysis must address.
Launch and reentry collision avoidance measures are necessary
actions for responsible and safe launches and reentries. Under current
regulations, a launch collision avoidance analysis is performed prior
to each launch to protect against collision with only inhabitable
objects, including the International Space Station, as required
screening objects. It is important to avoid collisions during launches
because the energy released through an impact during launch would most
likely be catastrophic for the launch vehicle and the object it
impacted.
In addition to mission assurance, to ensure the successful launch
of an object, there are significant reasons to mitigate debris creation
through collision avoidance. Launch collision avoidance analysis occurs
prior to launch and entails the determination of times when a launch
should not be initiated. There is a balance between launch
opportunities and orbital safety that must be established to protect
both the launch vehicle and on-orbit objects. Reentry collision
avoidance analysis occurs prior to the initiation of a reentry maneuver
and provides for the review of the maneuver trajectory to establish
when reentry should not be initiated. Section 431.43(c)(1)(ii)
documents the requirement for reentry collision avoidance.
The creation of orbital debris is an expected result of a collision
during launch or reentry.\133\ As stated earlier, limiting orbital
debris is a vital part of protecting the space environment and is a
national objective. Therefore, the FAA believes it is paramount to
avoid all collisions during launch and reentry. The Department of
Defense created a tiered level of separation distance to avoid
collisions and still allow ample opportunity for launch. The FAA agrees
with the tiers, identified in the chart below. This chart excludes the
object launching or reentering, which would be damaged or destroyed in
all cases.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\133\ Orbital debris is all human-generated debris in Earth
orbit that is greater than 5 mm in any dimension. This includes, but
is not limited to, payloads that can no longer perform their
mission, rocket bodies and other hardware (e.g., bolt fragments and
covers) left in orbit as a result of normal launch and operational
activities, and fragmentation debris produced by failure or
collision. Gases and liquids in free state are not considered
orbital debris.
[[Page 15346]]
Figure 2--Launch Collision Avoidance Justifications and Tiers
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
U.S. national
Separation Protect public security or International Avoid debris
distance health and safety Safety of property foreign policy obligations generation
interests
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Inhabitable Objects............. 200 km............ Yes............... Yes............... Yes............... Yes............... Yes.
Active Satellites............... 25 km............. .................. Yes............... Yes............... Yes............... Yes.
Trackable Debris >10 cm\2\ (LEO) 2.5 km............ .................. .................. Yes, if it creates Yes, if it creates Yes.
significant significant
debris. debris.
Un-trackable Debris <10 cm \2\ Not applicable.... .................. .................. .................. .................. Protect with
(LEO). shielding &
design.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
With space becoming more congested every year, it is vitally
important for launch or reentry collision avoidance to extend beyond
inhabitable objects to include all active orbiting objects and
trackable orbital debris. Records from a recent Intelsat launch showed
that if the launch occurred 35 minutes into the 2-hour launch window,
the launch vehicle could have passed by a defunct but still orbiting
COSMOS navigation satellite by only 600 meters. The FAA believes not
proposing launch collision avoidance in this instance is unnecessarily
hazardous.
Sections 417.107(e), 417.231, and 437.65 require launch operators
to ensure that the launch vehicle does not pass closer than 200 km
(approximately 124 statute miles) to a manned or mannable orbital
object to avoid collisions during launch. A collision avoidance
analysis must be obtained through a Federal entity. The analysis must
be used to determine any launch holds to avoid potential collisions.
In Sec. 417.107(e), a launch operator must ensure that a launch
vehicle, any jettisoned component, and its payload do not pass closer
than 200 km to a manned or mannable orbital object throughout a sub-
orbital launch, and for an orbital launch, during ascent to initial
orbital insertion and through at least one complete orbit, and during
each subsequent orbital maneuver or burn from initial park orbit, or
direct ascent to a higher or interplanetary orbit, or until clear of
all manned or mannable objects, whichever occurs first. A launch
operator is also required under Sec. 417.107(e) to obtain a collision
avoidance analysis for each launch from United States Strategic Command
or from a Federal launch range having an approved launch site safety
assessment. The detailed requirements for obtaining a collision
avoidance analysis are found in Sec. 417.231 and section A417.31 of
appendix A to part 417. The results of the collision avoidance analysis
must be used to develop flight commit criteria for collision avoidance
as required by Sec. 417.113(c).
These requirements and processes for ascertaining launch collision
avoidance are unnecessarily complicated and are inconsistent with the
current practices executed at Federal launch ranges that provides an
equivalent level of safety. The current practice is to use a common
analysis time frame instead of a single orbit as identified in the
current regulations. The safety standard for the standoff distance of
200 km remains consistent throughout launch (and reentry) requirements
for launches of expendable and reusable launch vehicles and for
launches from both Federal launch ranges as well as non-Federal launch
sites.
Section 417.231 requires a launch operator to include in its flight
safety analysis a collision avoidance analysis that (1) establishes
each launch wait in a planned launch window during which a launch
operator must not initiate a flight in order to protect any manned or
mannable orbiting object, and (2) accounts for uncertainties associated
with launch vehicle performance and timing and ensures that any
calculated launch waits incorporate additional time periods associated
with such uncertainties. It also requires the launch operator to
implement any launch waits into its flight commit criteria under Sec.
417.113(c) to ensure that the operator's launch vehicle, any jettisoned
components, and its payload do not pass closer than 200 km to a manned
or mannable orbiting object during ascent to initial orbital insertion
through one complete orbit. Further, under Sec. 417.231 no collision
avoidance analysis is required if the maximum altitude attainable,
using an optimized trajectory, assuming 3-sigma maximum performance, by
a launch operator's unguided suborbital launch vehicle is less than the
altitude of the lowest manned or mannable orbiting object. Appendices
A, section A417.31, and C, section C417.11, of part 417 provide
constraints for performing the collision avoidance analysis as part of
the flight safety analysis required by Sec. 417.231. Section 437.65
establishes the minimum required altitude as 150 km, which is the
current standard practice.
Section 431.43(c)(1) and (3) also requires a collision avoidance
analysis for RLVs to be performed to maintain at least a 200 km
separation from any inhabitable orbiting object during launch and
reentry. It requires the analysis to address closures in a planned
launch window for ascent to outer space for an orbital RLV to initial
orbit through at least one complete orbit; for reentry, the reentry
trajectory; and expansions for the closure period. For reentry of
vehicles not part of a reusable system, Sec. 435.33 refers to part
431, subpart C, including Sec. 431.43(c)(1) as a requirement.
Appendix A to part 415 contains a worksheet for the data input for
launch. However, Appendix A to part 415 is a U.S. Space Command form
that is no longer in use.\134\ The current practice is to submit the
launch collision avoidance analysis data prior to launch in a form and
manner accepted by the Administrator, which is currently the R-15
launch plan worksheet. The data collected on the R-15 launch plan
worksheet are detailed in sections A417.31 and C417.11 and are used by
the agency performing the launch collision avoidance analysis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\134\ The U.S. Space Command was deactivated in 2002.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A number of issues are unclear or outdated under section A417.31.
In section A417.31(c)(8), the option to use an ellipsoidal screening
method does not identify the size of the ellipsoid required. Section
A417.31(b)(3) limits an operator to use collision avoidance analysis
(COLA) products to 12 hours from when ``manned'' objects were last
tracked. This information is not provided to launch or reentry
operators and therefore is not implemented in the current practices.
Section A417.31(b)(4) and (c)(7) also includes two expansions of window
closures. The first expansion is for every 90 minutes, a 15 second
buffer should be added before and after the provided window closures,
and the second is a 10-minute addition to the screening time. Neither
of these practices are currently implemented at Federal launch ranges
or non-Federal launch sites.
With proposed Sec. 450.169 and appendix A to part 450, the FAA
would align the collision avoidance analysis
[[Page 15347]]
criteria with current practice and provide better protection for
inhabitable and active orbiting objects. The FAA also proposes to allow
a launch operator to obtain a collision avoidance analysis from a
Federal entity identified by the FAA. The proposed changes balance
increased options and additional requirements and would allow more
flexibility and accuracy in avoiding collision with orbiting objects.
The FAA also proposes to remove appendix A to part 415 in its
entirety because the Launch Notification Form is no longer used by the
FAA or launch operators. The data is currently collected via the R-15
work sheet and associated trajectory files and is detailed in sections
A417.31 and C417.11. Sections A417.31 and C417.11 would be replaced
with appendix A to part 450, which would contain the Collision Analysis
Worksheet information requirements and captures current practice.
The FAA proposes a few format and editorial changes in the
collision avoidance requirements of proposed Sec. 450.169. First, the
proposal would refer to ``inhabitable'' rather than ``manned or
mannable'' objects for greater simplicity and ease of understanding.
Similarly, the proposal would refer to ``separation distances'' rather
than ``miss distances,'' as this terminology is more accurate and
better connotes the FAA's goal of maintaining a safe separation of
objects on orbit. Finally, the proposal would refer to ``window
closures'' for launch and reentry rather than ``waits'' in a launch or
reentry window to provide a more cogent and accurate description. These
updated terms would have the same meaning as the terms they
replace.\135\
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\135\ The FAA recognizes reentry windows as a number of discrete
or short duration windows during which a reentry may be commanded.
Past experience shows window closures are insignificant for reentry.
The safety requirements for launch or reentry window management are
intended to be equitable.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Substantively, the FAA proposes to consolidate the launch and
reentry collision avoidance analysis requirements into proposed Sec.
450.169. Proposed Sec. 450.169(a) would require, for orbital or
suborbital launch or reentry, an operator to establish any window
closures needed to ensure that the vehicle, any jettisoned components,
or payload meet the specified requirements of that section. When
performing a launch or reentry collision avoidance analysis for
inhabitable objects, under proposed Sec. 450.169(a)(1), an operator
would have two alternatives in addition to maintaining a spherical
separation distance. An operator would be able to stipulate an
ellipsoidal rather than a spherical separation distance between its
vehicle and an inhabitable object or satisfy a probability of collision
threshold rather than calculating a separation distance. The FAA also
would maintain the current requirement to maintain a spherical
separation distance as a third option. These proposed requirements are
discussed more fully later in this section.
The FAA also proposes to require that a collision avoidance
analysis address other orbiting objects, such as active spacecraft and
tracked debris. The uninhabitable active objects would be protected
with significantly less restrictive clearance distances than provided
to inhabitable objects. This would require no extra work from the
operators, including those from non-Federal launch sites. Additionally,
no launches have been scrubbed for COLA closures, and the FAA does not
anticipate any impact to future operations due to this requirement.
Proposed Sec. 450.169(b) would require an operator to ensure that
the requirements of proposed Sec. 450.169(a) are met for the durations
specified. Specifically, proposed Sec. 450.169(b)(1) would require
screening through the entire flight of a suborbital vehicle. Proposed
Sec. 450.169(b)(2) would standardize the time period of the launch
collision avoidance analysis for an orbital launch to ascent from a
minimum of 150 km to initial orbital insertion and for a minimum of 3
hours from liftoff. Proposed Sec. 450.169(b)(3) would identify the
screening time frame for reentry as the time frame from initial reentry
burn to an altitude of 150 km. Similarly, proposed Sec. 450.169(b)(4)
would cover a disposal reentry with the same altitude.
Proposed Sec. 450.169(c) would establish that planned rendezvous
operations that occur within the screening time frame are not
considered a violation of collision avoidance if the involved operators
have pre-coordinated the rendezvous or close approach.
Proposed Sec. 450.169(d) would establish the exclusion of
collision avoidance for launch vehicles that do not reach a maximum
altitude of 150 km. The FAA also proposes to change from a 3-sigma
maximum performance established in current Sec. C417.11 and replace it
with maximum performance within 99.7% confidence level, extended
through fuel exhaustion of each stage. The intention of the 3-sigma
rule was the use of a 99.7% confidence level. However, the 3-sigma rule
does not hold true (the same percentage confidence level) when the
analysis adds multiple dimensions. Therefore, the FAA proposes the
requirement with 99.7% confidence level instead of the 3-sigma rule in
the existing regulation.
In proposed Sec. 450.169(e) an operator would be required to
obtain a collision avoidance analysis for each launch or reentry from a
Federal entity identified by the FAA. An operator would be required to
use the results of the collision avoidance analysis to establish flight
commit criteria for collision avoidance, account for uncertainties
associated with launch or reentry vehicle performance and timing, and
ensure that each window closure incorporates all additional time
periods associated with such uncertainties. This latter proposed
requirement would remove outdated practices from the launch collision
avoidance requirements that are currently found in sections
A417.31(c)(7)(iv) and C417.11(d)(7)(iv), which require adding 10
minutes to the screen duration time, sections A417.31(b)(4) and
C417.11(c)(4) and Sec. 431.43(c)(1)(iii) which require adding 15-
second buffers to the launch window closures, and appendix A to part
415 which is a redundant form to the worksheet specified in sections
A417.31 and C417.11. The current practices no longer require a 10-
minute extra pad as the screening time is no longer a single orbit.
Also, the 15-second buffers are no longer required because the service
provider accounts for the accuracy of the result products and the 15-
second buffers were based upon the last time the orbital objects were
tracked. The launch operator is not responsible for tracking orbital
objects and is not provided data on when the orbital objects were last
tracked making the existing requirement difficult to apply. The launch
or reentry operator would only be required to account for uncertainties
associated with launch or reentry vehicle performance and timing in
accordance with proposed Sec. 450.169(e)(2). This is consistent with
the existing requirement in Sec. 417.231(a).
In proposed Sec. 450.169(f), the FAA would require an operator to
prepare a collision avoidance analysis worksheet for each launch or
reentry using a standardized format that contains the input data
required by appendix A to part 450. Proposed Sec. 450.169(f)(1) would
require an operator to file the input data with a Federal entity
identified by the FAA and the FAA at least 15 days before the first
attempt at the flight of a launch vehicle or the reentry of a reentry
vehicle or in a different time frame in accordance with proposed Sec.
404.15. The FAA anticipates that it initially would identify the Air
Force Space Command (AFSPC) as an entity
[[Page 15348]]
with whom to file the collision avoidance analysis inputs.
The FAA also proposes to maintain the current 15-day requirement of
sections A417.31(b)(1) and C417.11(c)(1) in proposed Sec.
450.169(f)(1). The 15-day requirement is necessary for federal agencies
to evaluate the content of the submission and ensure the trajectory
files and data provide acceptable data and can be processed
successfully. It would also allow federal agencies to determine early
potential conjunctions with national systems or human space flight
activities, and would provide adequate time for federal agencies to
develop a strategy for early orbit detection and tracking including
taskings to global sensors and expected trajectories for sensors to aid
in initial acquisition.
Proposed Sec. 450.169(f)(2) would require an operator to obtain a
collision avoidance analysis performed by a Federal entity identified
by the FAA 6 hours before the beginning of a launch or reentry window.
This is consistent with existing sections A417.31(b)(2) and
C417.11(c)(2).
Consistent with current sections A417.31(b)(3) and C417.11(c)(3),
proposed Sec. 450.169(f)(3) would require an operator that needs an
updated collision avoidance analysis due to a launch or reentry delay
to file the request with the Federal entity and the FAA at least 12
hours prior to the beginning of the new launch or reentry window.
Additionally, the current regulations, sections A417.31(b)(3) and
C417.11(c)(3), limit the use of products to 12 hours from the time U.S.
Strategic Command determines the state vectors of manned or mannable
objects. The FAA intends to remove this limitation, as launch or
reentry operators are not provided with the last time of observation of
inhabitable objects and therefore cannot determine a 12-hour expiration
time. The removal of this requirement would place the responsibility on
the service provider to provide the time frame that the analysis is
valid. For most cases, the analysis would be valid for the entire
launch or reentry window. However, an extremely long launch window or
sporadic reentry window may require additional analysis. The service
provider would identify to an operator when its analysis in no longer
valid, which is similar in intent to the original 12-hour expiration
time, but more flexible in its application.
i. Inhabitable Objects
Inhabitable objects are those that are or may be occupied by
persons. An inhabitable object need not be inhabited, and the FAA views
the term as encompassing any object that may be inhabited, regardless
of whether it is at the time of launch. One point that merits
clarification in light of inquiries the FAA has received--a launch
operator's own vehicle, if it is inhabitable, does not impose a
corresponding obligation on a space station to keep away from it. A
launch operator whose vehicle carries people should not construe the
requirement to mean that the operator must always keep the vehicle 200
km away from any other object. Current FAA regulations do not protect
persons on board a launch or reentry vehicle.
Vehicles deliberately approaching each other for rendezvous or
docking purposes will have to get within 200 km of each other. In these
instances, collision avoidance remains paramount for those orbital
objects other than the intended rendezvous spacecraft. Under proposed
Sec. 450.169(c), planned close approaches for rendezvous would not be
considered violations of collision avoidance if the involved operators
have previously coordinated the rendezvous. The proposed requirement to
perform collision avoidance would apply during launches that have a
rendezvous within the screening period and for licensed reentries that
originate from orbiting spacecraft or objects. For planned reentry,
coordinated close approaches and departures would not be considered
violations of collision avoidance requirements if the involved
operators have previously coordinated the operation.
ii. Probability of Collision
The FAA also proposes to amend the collision avoidance screening
methods to include new options for analysis. The current regulation
offers spherical or ellipsoidal screening, however, it fails to provide
distances for ellipsoidal screening and identifies a spherical distance
of 200 km as default. The FAA proposes an additional option of
collision probability screening using a covariance matrix. A covariance
matrix is a mathematical construct that describes the upper stage's
position and the uncertainty of that position in all dimensions.
In proposed Sec. 450.169(a)(1)(i), the FAA would permit a launch
operator to employ a probability of collision of 1 x 10-6,
consistent with current Air Force practice, rather than relying solely
on the spherical or ellipsoidal separation distance of 200 km currently
required by section A417.31(c)(8)(i) and (ii) and Sec. 431.43(c)(1).
The spherical separation-distance option is the most conservative
option and requires the least detail about the location of the launch
vehicle and therefore results in the largest window closures. If launch
operators have covariance--that is, uncertainty--information applicable
to their nominal trajectories, the option of limiting the probability
of collision allows for greater fidelity in avoiding a collision with
inhabitable objects.
For collision probability screening, proposed Sec.
450.169(a)(1)(i) would require a covariance information, typically
provided in a matrix, that identifies the uncertainty of the launch
vehicle trajectory. When an operator can provide sufficient covariance
(as identified in proposed appendix A to part 450, paragraph (d)(3)),
the probability of its collision with an inhabitable object can be
accurately calculated and launch window closures can be limited to only
those times where actual high risk exists. In essence, this fine-tuned
launch collision avoidance would provide assurance against collisions
while minimizing potential launch window closures.
The FAA proposes to allow the use of a probability of collision
because the 18th Space Control Squadron's (SPCS) use of the proposed
probability threshold has prevented collisions while still allowing for
maximum availability of launch windows. The FAA agrees that using
probability assessment adequately protects inhabitable spacecraft while
maximizing the time available for launch. Probability of collision is
also the preferred analysis method for reentry collision avoidance.
According to NASA,\136\ the Department of Defense's 18th SPCS
current practice for on-orbit debris regarding the ISS is to assess
potential conjunctions inside specific-sized boxes centered on the ISS.
Any object predicted to pass within this box is tracked with higher
priority. The 18th SPCS then uses the best available data set to
compute the probability of collision with the potentially-threatening
catalogued object. If that probability is greater than 1 x
10-4, the ISS performs a collision avoidance maneuver. If
that probability is greater than 1 x 10-5, then the ISS
would perform a collision avoidance maneuver when doing so would not
compromise its mission objectives. Additionally, the proposed
requirements in Sec. 450.169 for a launch and reentry collision
avoidance probability of collision criteria of 1 x 10-6
against inhabitable
[[Page 15349]]
objects is consistent with current NASA practices.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\136\ Operational Interface Procedures. Volume A, Report Number
SSP-50643-A, Section 7.16.2. Published June 28, 2003, and last
modified October 17, 2008.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
iii. Separation Distance Calculations by Sphere or Ellipsoid
Section 417.231 currently requires a launch operator to ensure a
separation distance of 200 km between its launch vehicle, any
jettisoned components, or its payload, and an inhabitable object.\137\
The regulation does not specify whether the separation distance must be
spherical or may be ellipsoidal. Section A417.31(c)(8) of Appendix A
does, however, permit a launch operator to use spherical or ellipsoidal
screening. In practice, the 18th SPCS provided ellipsoidal distances in
the standardized collision avoidance request form, and the FAA has
allowed the 18th SPCS methods as acceptable for launch screening
volumes. The FAA anticipates that identifying these options in proposed
Sec. 450.169(a) will reduce confusion and accurately capture the
requirements for ellipsoidal screening. Additionally, the FAA's
proposal would clarify that either method of calculation would be
acceptable.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\137\ 14 CFR 417.231(b).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Using ellipsoidal separation calculation would permit a launch
vehicle to come within a predicted 50 km from an inhabitable object in
the cross-track and radial directions. The in-track distance would be
maintained at 200 km. The result is an ellipse around the inhabitable
object that looks approximately like a pencil with the tip in the
direction of travel. In accordance with longstanding Federal range
standards, the 50-km separation distance in the cross-track and radial
directions would provide an equivalent level of safety compared to a
separation distance based on a sphere because the uncertainty in
orbital location is significantly less side-to-side than it is along
the velocity vector. Because the velocity vector is greatest in-track,
a small change in velocity results in a significant variation in
arrival time, and therefore requires the greatest compensation (200
km). However variations in orbital altitude are possible, but occur at
a significantly reduced rate, allowing the exclusion distance to be
reduced to 50 km radially. Variations laterally are also minimal and
require the smallest compensation, allowing the reduction to 50 km in
the cross-track directions. The FAA agrees with the Federal range
conclusions that the ellipsoidal calculation maintains an equivalent
level of safety as the 200-km spherical calculation.
iv. Collision Avoidance for Objects That Are Not Inhabitable
Sections A417.31(c)(8) and C417.11(d)(8) require that if a launch
operator requests launch collision avoidance analysis for unmanned or
unmannable objects, the analysis must use the spherical screening
method with a separation distance of 25 km (approximately 15.5 statute
miles). The screening was optional but, if used, the distance was
mandated. The FAA proposes to alter the collision avoidance
requirements for uninhabitable objects. Launches from federal ranges
require screening for uninhabitable objects to meet Air Force or NASA
requirements, therefore there most space launch operators are already
familiar with the process and requirements. The FAA proposal creates a
common standard for all commercial space launches.
In proposed Sec. 450.169(a)(2) and (3), the screening for
potential conjunctions would include avoidance of uninhabitable
objects, active objects, and trackable debris. The required minimum
separation distance would remain at 25 km, or a PC of 1 x
10-5, for active satellites. For those objects that are
tracked and not active, such as debris, defunct rocket bodies, and dead
or inactive satellites, for which the FAA currently has no requirement,
the FAA proposes a required minimum separation distance of 2.5 km
(approximately 1.6 statute miles), consistent with 18th SPCS screening
practice. This proposed separation distance would provide increased
safety for launches and reentries.
The proposed screening would coincide with the screening for
inhabitable objects and would cover the same time frames. This is
consistent with current 18th SPCS operational procedures.
Launch availability during the launch window is a concern of the
FAA because excessive launch window closures could limit launch
opportunities, increase the effects of prolonged airspace closures on
aviation, and increase launch operations costs. The FAA analyzed
previous U.S. launches--commercial, civil, and military--to determine
the consequence to the launch window availability of adding
uninhabitable objects as a mandatory launch collision avoidance
requirement. Of the worldwide launches between September 2011 and June
2012, the maximum impact was the closing of approximately 12% of the
launch window. The average impact was only 2% of each launch window
closed due to launch collision avoidance accounting for both
inhabitable and uninhabitable objects. This level of impact was
validated for launch closures for launches conducted in 2017. The
worst-case scenarios for launch collision avoidance are launches of low
inclination that pass through the densest part of the low earth orbit
(LEO) population, around 800 km (approximately 497 statute miles) in
altitude. The FAA believes implementing collision avoidance for
inhabitable objects, active satellites, and trackable debris would
adequately prevent collisions without placing excessive restrictions on
launch opportunities. The FAA seeks comment on the potential impact of
implementing these requirements.
v. Accounting for A Conjunction Up to 3 Hours After Launch
The current FAA requirement for screening time is one orbit (at
least 100 minutes) plus 10 minutes padding.\138\ The current Federal
screening practice at the 18th SPCS covers 3 hours. The FAA proposes to
adopt 18th SPCS's current practice as the minimum standard to ensure
the necessary level of safety to inhabitable and active space objects
and to avoid the generation of space debris. Under proposed Sec.
450.169(b), the collision avoidance analysis for orbital launches would
have to account for a conjunction that could occur up to 3 hours after
launch. This change would be in line with practices for Federal
launches. In actual practice, the 18th SPCS performs an analysis from
launch to about 3 hours against all objects and debris in the catalog.
However, commercial launchers currently can request screening through
only one orbit after launch.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\138\ 14 CFR 417.107(e)(1)(ii)(B).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pre-launch collision avoidance analysis ensures there are no
immediate conjunctions during orbital insertion and shortly thereafter
but is dependent on pre-launch estimated trajectories. Extending this
collision avoidance analysis to three hours post-launch provides
sufficient time for creation of the first orbital element set (ELSET),
at which point collision avoidance analysis begins being calculated
using real positioning information. To create an ELSET, the Department
of Defense uses multiple tracking information to establish the first
ELSET and reduce the position error significantly. Once an ELSET has
been created when the vehicle is on-orbit, an on-orbit collision
avoidance analysis is routinely run out to 72 hours. Pre-launch
collision avoidance analysis is the only possible method to prevent a
collision until that first ELSET is created.
[[Page 15350]]
There is a significant collision avoidance warning time gap between
the end of 18th SPCS's 3-hour launch screening time and when 18th SPCS
determines an ELSET. Pre-launch collision avoidance analysis beyond 3
hours is currently of limited utility. As positional errors based on
predicted trajectories grow, data validity becomes increasingly
suspect. Additionally, it is possible to create large launch window
closures or even close the launch window entirely. Therefore, without a
significant development in prediction calculation fidelity and
accuracy, the FAA proposes to extend pre-launch collision avoidance to
3 hours. The accuracy of pre-launch collision avoidance analysis would
be dependent on the accuracy of the trajectories provided.
This 3-hour extension is important to protect inhabitable objects
on-orbit. The ISS incurs collision risk from every launch. There is a
warning time gap between the end of the pre-launch collision avoidance
analysis and the start of on-orbit collision analysis done by the 18th
SPCS. Until the 18th SPCS can determine the ELSET, the location of
upper stages, payloads, and any released debris is unknown. During that
time, whether the ISS is at risk from a collision would also be
unknown. Extending the pre-launch collision avoidance requirement from
one orbit to 3 hours would codify current practice.
Additionally, although not required by FAA regulation, operators
should promptly provide the 18th SPCS positional updates after orbital
insertion until such time as the ELSET is established and on-orbit
collision avoidance analysis commences.
The FAA proposes to remove the requirements to expand the collision
avoidance analysis screening time by 10 minutes to ensure that the
entire first orbit of the launch vehicle is screened in sections
A417.31(c)(7)(iv) and C417.11(d)(7)(iv). The expanded screening time
required by those appendices would be unnecessary if the FAA extends
the screening to 3 hours as described in proposed Sec. 450.169(b).
vi. Submitting Collision Avoidance Inputs to the FAA
Proposed Sec. 450.169(f) would require a launch operator to submit
launch collision avoidance trajectory data to both AFSPC and the FAA.
The current regulations only requires an operator to submit the data to
the AFSPC. However, the AFSPC does not review launch operator data to
ensure it complies with FAA requirements. The proposal would ensure the
FAA receives and reviews the same data that is provided to AFSPC for
launch collision avoidance. As this data is generally submitted
electronically, sending the data to both the FAA and AFSPC is not
expected to increase cost or paperwork burden of the submission. Direct
submission to AFSPC and the FAA will facilitate a quicker response to
the operator than having the FAA act as a middleman between the
operator and AFSPC, and enables coordination throughout the process.
In the past, the FAA has found discrepancies between operator
trajectory data and operator requests to AFSPC for specific launch
collision avoidance analysis methods. On multiple occasions, operators
have misapplied existing launch collision avoidance regulations. To
ensure proper application of launch collision avoidance regulations the
FAA must be able to review the launch collision data. A specific
example of a discrepancy occurred when a launch operator directed the
exclusion of the ISS from launch collision avoidance analysis in a
request to AFSPC. The launch operator incorrectly assumed the
protections for the ISS, the ultimate destination for one of the
launched payloads, did not apply. In actuality, the planned rendezvous
with the station was days into the mission, and not all objects
launched were planned to rendezvous with the ISS. Collision avoidance
analysis should have been requested for all launched objects against
the catalog of space objects, including the ISS. FAA review of launch
collision avoidance trajectory data would have identified that
oversight.
vii. Appendix A to Part 450--Collision Analysis Worksheet
The FAA proposes to consolidate the data input requirements of
sections A417.31 and C417.11 and to clarify the data and process for
collision avoidance in appendix A to part 450. Existing sections
A417.31 and C417.11 provide nearly identical requirements for mission
information. However, some elements are no longer useful or require an
update to meet current practices. Specifically, proposed appendix A to
part 450, paragraph (a)(1) mission name and launch location, paragraph
(a)(2) launch or reentry window, paragraph (a)(3) epoch, time of
powered flight, and point of contact remain the same as existing
requirements. Proposed paragraph (a)(4) segment number has been updated
to change the requirement to provide vector at injection to instead
provide orbital parameters. The substantive requirement to identify how
the operator would receive analysis results in current sections
A417.31(c)(3) and C417.11(d)(3) also remains unchanged in proposed
paragraph (b); however, minor editorial revisions were made to the
examples of the transmission mediums provided to reflect modern
technology.
The proposed rule provides clarifications for some data elements.
Specifically, the FAA proposes to change the requirement to identify
orbital objects to evaluate contained in section A417.31(c)(9). As
written, section A417.31(c)(9) requires the operator to identify the
orbiting objects to be included in the analysis. In all cases the
analysis must include all objects. However, the current practice is to
identify the characteristics of the orbiting object, i.e., name,
length, width, depth, diameter, and mass. The FAA proposes to capture
current practice in proposed paragraph (a)(6). Also, the proposed
appendix would replace ``vector at injection'' in sections
A417.31(c)(5) and C417.11(d)(5), with orbital parameters at proposed
paragraph (a)(5). The proposed change would require an operator to
identify the orbital parameters for all objects achieving orbit
including the parameters for each segment after thrust end instead of
the vector at injection for each segment. This requirement would allow
accurate COLA calculations that consider changes in trajectory after
orbital insertion.
The FAA also proposes to clarify the trajectory file requirements
in proposed paragraph (d) of appendix A to part 450. Sections
A417.31(c)(5)(ii) and C417.11(d)(5)(ii) require that current operators
provide position and velocity for each launched object after burnout or
deployment. This requirement severely lacks in clarity and
completeness. Proposed paragraph (d) would provide a clearer
requirement in line with current practices. Launch and reentry
operators would be required to provide trajectory files with position
and velocity for each object through the entire screening process, not
exclusively after burnout. The current practice at Federal ranges is to
provide data through the entire screening process, therefore the FAA
proposal is in line with current practices. Additionally, radar cross
section and covariance (position and velocity) for probability of
collision analysis would be required by proposed paragraph (d). These
products are used in the analysis of potential collisions. Parts 431
and 437 require the same trajectory files for analysis, however the
current regulations do not provide guidance on how to provide the
products necessary to complete the analysis. Proposed Sec. 450.169 and
appendix A to part 450 would provide
[[Page 15351]]
the necessary guidance for all launch and reentry analysis.
Proposed (e) of appendix A to part 450 would provide the three
possible screening methodologies--spherical, ellipsoidal, or
probability of collision. These requirements were discussed previously
in this section.
13. Safety at End of Launch
Proposed Sec. 450.171 would include requirements aimed at
preventing the creation of orbital debris. Proposed Sec. 450.171(a) is
the same as Sec. 417.129 and substantively the same as Sec.
431.43(c)(3), which require certain measures to be taken by a launch
operator to prevent the creation of orbital debris. The FAA is not
proposing to update the substantive requirements for orbital debris
mitigation in this rulemaking because it plans to do so in a future
rulemaking.
Proposed Sec. 450.171(b) would require an applicant to demonstrate
compliance with the requirements in Sec. 450.171(a) in its
application. This requirement is the same as Sec. 415.133, which
applies to applications for the launch of an ELV from a non-Federal
launch site. Proposed Sec. 450.171(b) would broaden the applicability
of the application requirement to all launches. This is necessary
because the importance of orbital debris mitigation has no relation to
whether a launch takes place from a Federal or non-Federal launch site,
or whether the launch vehicle is expendable or reusable. The expansion
of the applicability of the application requirement is the only change
related to orbital debris mitigation. As noted earlier, the substantive
safety requirements remain the same.
14. Mishaps: Definition, Plan, Reporting, Response, Investigation,
Test-Induced Damage
As a part of its streamlining efforts, the FAA proposes four
mishap-related actions, including a revised definition of anomaly.
First, the FAA proposes to consolidate the many chapter III mishap-
related definitions into a mishap classification system. Second, this
proposal would consolidate existing chapter III requirements for
mishap, accident investigation, and emergency response plans, and
clarify and streamline reporting requirements. Third, the FAA proposes
to redefine the term ``anomaly'' and expand its application to include
licensed, and not just permitted, activities. Fourth, the FAA proposes
to exempt pre-coordinated test-induced damage to property involved with
the test from being a mishap.
The FAA proposes using an overarching mishap classification system
instead of separate terms for ``mishap,'' ``launch accident,''
``reentry accident,'' ``launch incident,'' ``reentry incident,''
``human space flight incident,'' and ``launch site accident.'' The
proposed mishap classification system would streamline and clarify the
current accident, incident, and mishap definitions to create four
mishap categories organized by severity, from most severe (Class 1) to
least severe (Class 4). This proposal would also eliminate the $25,000
monetary threshold from current ``mishap'' and accident terms. This
proposal would consolidate parts 417 (Accident investigation plan), 420
(Launch site accident investigation plan), 431 and 435 (Mishap
investigation plan and emergency response plan), and 437 (Mishap
response plan), into a single section applicable to all types of
licenses, permits, and vehicles.
Additionally, the FAA proposes to update the definition of the term
``anomaly'' and relocate it from part 437 to part 401, making it
applicable to licensed and permitted activities. Finally, the FAA
proposes to exclude pre-coordinated test activities, resulting in
damage to property owned by the operator and associated with test
activities, from mishap consideration. This test-induced damage
proposal provides permittees and licensees the freedom to conduct test
activities that may result in damage to associated property, and the
freedom to test without the need for a mishap investigation for
foreseeable test failures.
i. Mishap Definitions
The FAA currently uses a variety of terms to describe the
occurrence of an unplanned event during commercial launch, reentry, and
site activities. The term ``mishap'' is a broad term encompassing
several of these unplanned events. Mishap, as currently defined in
Sec. 401.5, means a launch or reentry accident, launch or reentry
incident, launch site accident, failure to complete a launch or reentry
as planned, or an unplanned event or series of events resulting in a
fatality or serious injury (as defined in 49 CFR 830.2), or resulting
in greater than $25,000 worth of damage to a payload, a launch or
reentry vehicle, a launch or reentry support facility, or government
property located on the launch or reentry site.\139\ As the definition
shows, the term ``mishap'' captures 15 specific kinds of unplanned
events,\140\ including five types of accidents and incidents. These are
launch accident, reentry accident, launch incident, reentry incident,
and launch site accident. These terms are defined separately in
Sec. Sec. 401.5 and 420.5. Mishap also includes unplanned events
resulting in failure to complete a mission as planned, a fatality or
serious injury, or damages greater than $25,000 to certain property
associated with the licensed or permitted activity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\139\ Section 401.5.
\140\ (1) Launch accident; (2) reentry accident; (3) launch
incident; (4) reentry incident; (5) launch site accident; (6)
failure to complete a launch as planned; (7) failure to complete a
reentry as planned; (8) an unplanned event resulting in a fatality;
(9) an unplanned event resulting in a serious injury; (10) an
unplanned event resulting in greater than $25,000 worth of damage to
a payload; (11) an unplanned event resulting in greater than $25,000
worth of damage to a launch vehicle; (12) an unplanned event
resulting in greater than $25,000 worth of damage to a reentry
vehicle; (13) an unplanned event resulting in greater than $25,000
worth of damage to a launch support facility; (14) an unplanned
event resulting in greater than $25,000 worth of damage to
government property located on the launch site; or (15) an unplanned
event resulting in greater than $25,000 worth of damage to a reentry
site.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The terms ``launch accident,'' ``reentry accident,'' and ``launch
site accident,'' which are encompassed by the mishap definition, all
include the occurrence of a fatality or serious injury to persons not
associated with the activity and damage to property not associated with
the activity exceeding $25,000. Unlike the term ``launch site
accident,'' launch and reentry accidents account for the occurrence of
a fatality or serious injury to a space flight participant or crew
member during FAA-regulated activities. Other factors may also satisfy
the various accident definitions. For instance, for launches involving
an ELV, impacts of a launch vehicle, its payload, or any component
thereof outside designated impact limit lines constitute an accident.
If, however, the launch involves an RLV, impacts outside the designated
landing site constitute an accident. In contrast, the definition for
reentry accident makes no distinction between expendable and reusable
vehicles. For reentry accidents, if the vehicle, its payload, or any
component thereof lands outside a designated reentry site, the FAA
deems it an accident.
Similarly, although launch incidents and reentry incidents are both
incidents, their definitions consist of different requirements. Launch
and reentry incidents occur due to the malfunction of a FSS or other
safety-critical system, or a failure of the operator's safety
organization, design or operations. The FAA proposes to consolidate
these
[[Page 15352]]
terms into a single mishap classification system eliminating the need
for multiple terms.
Current definitions of mishap and accident also include a $25,000
monetary threshold that is arbitrary and outdated. Experience has shown
that even minor damage that does not pose a threat to public safety can
easily exceed the $25,000 monetary threshold, triggering potentially
costly and burdensome notification, reporting, and investigation
requirements. For example, a relatively minor unplanned event following
a successful launch could result in damages to ground support equipment
or launch facilities exceeding $25,000. The ARC noted the amount is
outdated and does not necessarily reflect safety implications.
Additionally, the conditions listed under the current definitions do
not necessarily reflect the severity of consequences and associated
public safety risks. A better mishap classification system would
provide consistency of mishap thresholds and applicability to all types
of operations, mitigating potential confusion. Rather than adding more
definitions, the FAA would consolidate and replace the existing
accident, incident, and mishap definitions with a mishap classification
system that would be defined in Sec. 401.5 and would apply to all
licensed and permitted activities.
Under the proposed changes, ``mishap'' would mean any event, or
series of events associated with a licensed or permitted activity, that
meets the criteria of a Class 1, 2, 3 or 4 mishap. The FAA would use
this overarching definition to describe any mishap type occurring
during permitted or licensed activities regardless of classification or
consequence threshold. The FAA's proposal was informed by existing NASA
and Air Force mishap classification system definitions,\141\ and NTSB
definitions.\142\
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\141\ NPR 8621.1C, NASA Procedural Requirements for Mishap and
Close Call Reporting, Investigating, and Recordkeeping. Air Force
Instruction 91-204, Safety Investigation and Hazard Reporting.
\142\ As defined in 49 CFR 830.2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A ``Class 1 mishap'' would mean any event resulting in a fatality
or serious injury to any person who is not associated with the licensed
or permitted activity (e.g., members of the public) along with any
space flight participant, crew, or government astronaut. The FAA would
be adopting the definition of fatality or serious injury from 49 CFR
830.2. To constitute a Class 1 mishap, the fatality or injury must
result from licensed or permitted activity, including ground operations
at a launch or reentry site. A Class 1 mishap would be a mishap that
has the highest consequences and greatest impact on public safety. The
proposed Class 1 mishap definition would incorporate existing fatality
and serious injury criteria from current ``launch accident,'' ``reentry
accident'' and ``launch site accident'' definitions.
On November 25, 2015, the U.S Commercial Space Launch
Competitiveness Act was signed into law (Pub. L. 114-90). This law
amends 51 U.S.C. 50901(15) by inserting ``government astronauts'' after
``crew'' each place it appears. In accordance with this amendment, and
to ensure Class 1 mishap criteria applies equally to all persons on
board a launch or reentry vehicle, the FAA Class 1 mishap definition
includes government astronauts. The definition would only cover
fatalities or serious injuries to crew, Government astronauts,
spaceflight participants, or uninvolved public. The definition of Class
1 mishap would not cover other persons associated with the launch or
reentry, similar to the current accident definitions for which it
replaces. The proposed Class 1 Mishap also consolidates existing
accident definitions, which would include potential recovery site
accidents that were previously not defined. The FAA proposes to define
a ``Class 2 mishap'' as any unplanned event, other than a Class 1
mishap, resulting in a malfunction of a safety-critical system, a
failure of the safety organization or procedures, substantial damage to
property not associated with the operation, or a high risk of causing a
serious or fatal injury to any space flight participant, crew,
government astronaut, or member of the public. The Class 2 mishap
definition would encompass the current definitions of a ``launch
incident,'' ``reentry incident,'' and ``human space flight incident.''
The definition would use a substantial damage to uninvolved property
requirement instead of the $25,000 damage threshold.
Under this proposal, the FAA would make a case-by-case
determination whether the damage to public property is substantial.
This evaluation may be based on, but not limited to, direct replacement
cost, repair cost, and the property's intended use and functionality.
For example, structural damage to public property exceeding 50 percent
of its market value may be deemed as substantial damage. This approach
potentially reduces the burden on the commercial space industry and
Federal government by providing flexibility on the determination of
substantial damage and the scope of the resulting investigation. This
is consistent with the ARC feedback. Other criteria--such as events
posing a high risk of causing a serious or fatal injury to any space
flight participant, crew, government astronaut, or member of the
public--are based on the existing ``human space flight incident''
definition and expanded to include government astronauts and members of
the public. With this criterion, the FAA intends to cover events akin
to a near miss in the aviation industry and is consistent with the Air
Force and NASA practices. The addition of ``members of the public'' is
consistent with the FAA's public safety mission. The FAA's goal is to
evaluate the event type by impact to public safety.
The FAA proposes to define ``Class 3 mishap'' as any unplanned
event, other than a Class 1 or Class 2 mishap, resulting in permanent
loss of a vehicle during licensed activity or the impact of a vehicle,
its payload, or any component thereof outside the planned landing site
or impact area. This change would differentiate between licensed
launches and reentries and permitted launches and reentries. The FAA
believes this proposal captures the intent of the current mishap
definition that includes the failure to complete a launch or reentry as
planned criterion. At the same time, the separation of licensed and
permitted operations between Class 3 and 4 mishaps is also consistent
with ARC feedback.
The FAA would consider debris impacts outside of defined limits to
meet the Class 3 mishap definition, provided the event did not satisfy
the criteria of a Class 1 or 2 mishap. Impacts of launch vehicle debris
outside designated impact limit lines are currently considered a launch
accident.
The FAA proposes to define a ``Class 4 mishap'' as an unplanned
event, other than a Class 1, Class 2, or Class 3 mishap, resulting in
permanent loss of a vehicle during permitted activity, a failure to
achieve mission objectives, or substantial damage associated with
licensed or permitted activity. The FAA intends proposed ``Class 4
Mishap'' to capture other events with the potential for future public
safety implications without directly affecting public safety during
occurrence. For example, an operator may have complete loss of a
permitted vehicle in a remote and unpopulated area. Although the loss
may not have resulted in fatalities, serious injuries, or public
property damage on this occasion, it is important to find the root
cause of the mishap. Otherwise, if the operator does not identify and
address the underlying
[[Page 15353]]
cause, it may endanger public safety during a future launch in
different conditions.
ii. Anomaly Definition
The FAA proposes to change the definition of ``anomaly'' and to
move the definition to Sec. 401.5, where it would apply to all of
chapter III. Anomaly would mean any condition during a licensed or
permitted activity that deviates from what is standard, normal, or
expected, during the verification or operation of a system, subsystem,
process, facility, or support equipment. The inclusion of anomaly in
Sec. 401.5 would clearly define the expectation of post-operation
reporting for all licensed or permitted operations. It would also
capture off-nominal events that do not fall under the thresholds of
Class 1-4 mishaps as part of the required post-launch report.
The FAA currently defines anomaly only in part 437. Part 437
defines an anomaly as a problem that occurs during verification or
operation of a system, subsystem, process, facility, or support
equipment. Section 437.73 requires strict recording, reporting, and
implementation of corrective actions in the event of a public safety
related anomaly. Section 417.25(c)(1), applicable to ELVs, requires
operators to report an anomaly that occurred during launch countdown
and flight in the post-launch report but does not define anomaly.
Although part 431 does not have specific anomaly reporting
requirements, in practice, the FAA requires operators to report
anomalies. To ensure anomaly reporting, the FAA has begun adding a term
and condition to launch licenses requiring operators to report
anomalies prior to the next launch. The FAA uses anomaly reporting to
track vehicle-related issues and to ensure an operator mitigates those
issues prior to future flights. Given that not all anomalies are
identified during flight, the post-launch reporting requirement allows
the operator to review countdown and flight data for off-nominal
conditions and report any anomalous condition to the FAA as a part of
the post-launch report.
Although an anomaly is defined in Sec. 437.3, as ``a problem that
occurs during verification or operation of a system, subsystem,
process, facility, or support equipment,'' it is not defined in part
415, 417, 431, or 435, and hence, it is applicable only to experimental
permits. However, Sec. 417.25--Post launch report, requires an
operator to ``identify any discrepancy or anomaly that occurred during
the launch countdown or flight.'' The FAA is proposing to update the
existing definition of an anomaly to ``any condition during a licensed
or permitted activity that deviates from what is standard, normal, or
expected, during the verification or operation of a system, subsystem,
process, facility, or support equipment.'' The proposed definition
seeks only to clarify what a ``problem'' is by adding ``deviates from
what is standard, normal, or expected.''
iii. Mishaps--Reporting, Response, and Investigation Requirements
The FAA proposes to consolidate current chapter III mishap plan,
reporting, response and investigation requirements into proposed Sec.
450.173. The FAA seeks comment on its proposed approach, as discussed
below, to mishap requirements, including reporting.
Current title 14 CFR chapter III requirements for mishap and
accident reporting, response, and investigation requirements are
inconsistent and create confusion. For that reason, the FAA's proposed
changes would apply to mishap requirements for launch and reentry
licenses, experimental permits, and launch and reentry site licenses.
Proposed Sec. 450.173 would replace Sec. Sec. 417.111(h) (Accident
Investigation Plan), 417.415(c) (Post launch and post flight hazard
controls), and 431.45 (Mishap investigation plan and emergency response
plan). The proposed mishap plan changes to Sec. Sec. 420.59(a)
(Mishap) and 437.41 (Mishap plan) would require an operator to meet the
requirements of Sec. 450.173.
The inconsistencies in the FAA's current regulatory scheme,
including signature requirements for mishap plans, has led to much
confusion. For example, Sec. 417.111(h) requires an operator to
implement a plan containing the launch operator's procedures for
reporting and responding to launch accidents, launch incidents, or
other mishaps. It also requires two signatures, one from an individual
authorized to sign and certify the application, and another from the
designated safety official. Similarly, Sec. 420.59 requires that
licensed launch site operators develop and implement a launch site
accident investigation plan that contains the licensee's procedures for
reporting, responding to, and investigating launch site accidents and
for cooperating with Federal officials in case of a launch accident. It
also requires a signature from an individual authorized to sign and
certify the application, but not from the designated safety official
like Sec. 417.111(h). Current Sec. 431.45 requires an RLV operator to
submit a mishap investigation plan (MIP) containing the applicant's
procedures for reporting and responding to launch and reentry
accidents, launch and reentry incidents, or other mishaps that occur
during the conduct of an RLV mission. It also requires that an RLV
operator submit an emergency response plan (ERP) containing procedures
for informing the affected public of a planned RLV mission. The FAA
requires that an individual authorized to sign and certify the license
application, the person responsible for the conduct of all licensed RLV
mission activities, and the designated safety official, sign the MIP
and ERP. In contrast, Sec. 437.41 does not require any signatures. To
ensure consistency between all title 14 CFR chapter III requirements,
the FAA proposes to consolidate these requirements.
The ARC noted that reporting requirements for mishaps not involving
a fatality or serious injury are unclear and left up to the operator to
determine. The ARC said the FAA should define a minimum standard for a
reportable mishap, in addition to a minimum set of investigation and
reporting requirements, including information that should be provided
during initial notification.
Current notification requirements are generally consistent for a
launch, reentry, launch site accident, launch or reentry incident, or
mishap involving a fatality or serious injury. In those instances,
regulations throughout title 14 CFR chapter III require that operators
provide immediate notification to the FAA's Washington Operations
Center (WOC).\143\ This is not the case when a mishap does not involve
a fatality or serious injury.\144\ For example, part 417 requires
notification within 24 hours to the Associate Administrator for
Commercial Space Transportation or to the FAA WOC in the event of a
mishap that does not involve a fatality or serious injury. In contrast,
parts 431 and 437 only require 24-hour notification to the Associate
Administrator for Commercial Space Transportation, but not to the FAA
WOC for a mishap that does not involve a fatality or serious injury.
Current part 420 does not require a launch site operator to provide a
24-hour mishap notification. If a mishap occur during non-business
hours, this raises the possibility that a launch operator may be unable
to report it to the Associate Administrator for Commercial Space
Transportation, which would create the potential for a
[[Page 15354]]
non-compliance. To address these issues, the FAA proposes to provide a
single source for all initial mishap notifications. The single source
would be the FAA's WOC, a 24-hour, seven-day, operational facility.
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\143\ 14 CFR 417.111(h)(1)(i), 420.59(b)(1), 431.45(b)(1), and
437.75(a)(1).
\144\ 14 CFR 417.111(h)(1)(ii), 431.45(b)(2), and 437.75(a)(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Parts 417, 420, 431, and 437 all require an operator to submit a
written preliminary report within five days \145\ of either an accident
or incident to the FAA, Associate Administrator for Commercial Space
Transportation. The five-day report is a follow-up requirement designed
to supplement initial mishap notification once more detailed
information is known. Under the proposed mishap classification system
and mishap plan requirements, all mishaps would have similar reporting
requirements. The FAA believes the proposed mishap classification
system would save the operator time and resources during the initial
mishap response by eliminating the need to evaluate whether the event
is an accident, incident, or mishap. This streamlining of reporting
requirements reduces the burden of unclear reporting requirements noted
by the ARC.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\145\ 14 CFR 417.111(h)(1)(iii), 420.49(b)(2), 431.45(b)(3), and
437.75(a)(3).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Based on past examples, the five-day report is usually only one to
three pages in length, requiring minimal time to compose. The FAA will
use the information contained within the five-day report to ensure the
mishap has been properly classified and the proper level of
investigation and FAA oversight is being conducted. The FAA believes
the time required to complete the five-day report is minimal and that
by providing a clear expectation of required report contents in the
event of all mishap types will eliminate confusion and ultimately
result in time-savings.
Response plan requirements for containing and minimizing the
consequences of a mishap and for ensuring the preservation of data and
physical evidence are generally consistent throughout license types
with some exceptions. For instance, the regulations require that a
launch site operator's plan include procedures for reporting and
cooperating with FAA and NTSB investigations, and for designating one
or more points of contact. Additionally, licensees must identify and
adopt preventive measures for avoiding recurrence of the event.
Current investigation requirements are also generally consistent
across license types. The FAA currently requires that operators
investigate the cause of a launch, reentry, or launch site accident,
launch or reentry site incident, or mishap across license types.\146\
After the investigation, an operator must report investigation results
to the FAA and delineate responsibilities for personnel assigned to
conduct the investigation and for anyone retained by the operator to
participate in an investigation. Section 420.59(e)(1) also requires
that a launch site operator's investigation plan include procedures for
participating in an investigation of a launch accident for launches
launched from the launch site.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\146\ 14 CFR 417.111(h)(3), 420.59(d)(3), 431.45(d), and
437.75(c).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To ensure vehicle recovery can be conducted safely and effectively
and with minimal risk to the public, part 431 operators must submit an
ERP containing the operator's procedures for notifying local officials
of unplanned and offsite landings. In addition, these operators must
provide a plan for informing the public potentially affected of the
estimated date, time, and landing location for the reentry activity.
This information must be provided in layman's terms. These requirements
are unique to operations conducted under part 431.
Section 417.415(c)'s post-launch and post-flight-attempt hazard
controls require that an operator establish procedural controls for
hazards associated with an unsuccessful flight where the launch vehicle
has a land or water impact. These procedures ensure the evacuation and
rescue of members of the public, the dispersion and movement of toxic
plumes, identifying areas of risk, and communication with local
government authorities. Additionally, these procedures require that an
operator extinguish fires, secure impact areas, evacuate members of the
public, prevent unauthorized access, and preserve evidence. Lastly, the
operator must ensure public safety from hazardous debris and have plans
for the recovery, salvage, and safe disposal of debris and hazardous
materials.
For all FAA-licensed operations, proposed Sec. 450.173 would
require that an operator report, respond, and investigate class 1, 2,
3, and 4 mishaps, using a plan or other written means.\147\
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\147\ For purposes of the preamble discussion regarding proposed
Sec. 450.173, the term ``mishap plan document'' is used to
encompass a plan or other written means.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
An approved mishap plan document would be eligible for reuse with
other specific or similar vehicles, sites, and operations. This would
ease the burden on industry. For example, a permittee applying for a
license or a current licensee applying for a different type of license,
would be able to use the same written mishap plan document previously
developed because the requirements would be the same regardless of
license type. This mishap plan document would include notification to
local officials should a mishap cause the vehicle to land offsite, such
that a coordinated effort can be made to protect the public. Provided
emergency response requirements such as coordinated emergency response
agreements remain current, a permittee can submit a mishap response
plan developed for permitted operations to satisfy the mishap plan
document application requirements under a license. Additionally, the
FAA would not have to evaluate the same company differently depending
on the permit or license type. This would reduce time and cost for the
industry and the FAA while maintaining the same level of public safety.
iv. Discussion of the Mishap Plan--Reporting, Response, and
Investigation Proposed Requirements
Proposed Sec. 450.173 would eliminate all mishap plan signature
requirements. The requirement that the person certifying the accuracy
of the application also sign the mishap plan document is not necessary
because by signing the application, the operator is already certifying
that the components thereof, including the mishap plan document, are
accurate. Additional signatures (e.g., from the safety official or
mission director) are also unnecessary as the roles and
responsibilities for personnel implementing the mishap plan document
are contained in the plan itself. Eliminating the signature
requirements would provide operators with the flexibility to assign
personnel to implement a mishap plan document without having to
resubmit a signed document to the FAA.
Proposed Sec. 450.173(a) would require an operator to report,
respond, and investigate class 1, 2, 3, and 4 mishaps according to
paragraphs (b) through (h) of Sec. 450.173, using a plan or other
written means. Proposed Sec. 450.173(b)(1) would require that an
operator document the responsibilities for personnel assigned to
implement the requirements of proposed Sec. 450.173. Proposed Sec.
450.173(b)(2) would require an operator to document reporting
responsibilities for personnel assigned to conduct investigations and
for anyone retained by the licensee to conduct or participate in
investigations. Proposed Sec. 450.173(b)(3) would require an operator
to document the allocation of roles and responsibilities between the
launch operator and any site operator for reporting, responding to, and
[[Page 15355]]
investigating any mishap during ground activities at the site. Further,
proposed Sec. 450.173(c) would require an operator to report to, and
cooperate with, FAA and NTSB mishap investigations. Also, it would
require that the operator identify one or more points of contact for
the FAA and NTSB. This proposal does not substantively change current
requirements to report, cooperate, and designate points of contact. Any
changes from current regulations would be made merely for clarification
purposes. In the event of an FAA- or NTSB-led investigation, the FAA
would not require an operator to perform an independent internal
investigation because it would be a party to the investigation.
However, the operator would remain responsible for reporting
investigation results to the FAA, which would include any government-
generated or independent investigation reports as well as party
submissions. In the event of an operator-led investigation under FAA
oversight, the operator's investigation would be the primary
investigation, although the FAA may grant official observer status to
U.S. Government representatives (e.g., NASA, the Air Force). As
official observers, these representatives would be integrated into the
operator's investigation to the extent the FAA finds appropriate. These
U.S. Government entities may decide to conduct their own investigation
independent of FAA oversight, although the FAA and NTSB have primary
jurisdiction.
Proposed Sec. 450.173(d) would establish mishap reporting
requirements applicable to all operations, vehicles, or mishap types.
Proposed Sec. 450.173(d)(1) would require that an operator immediately
notify the FAA WOC in case of a mishap involving a fatality or serious
injury. Immediately would continue to mean notification without delay.
The immediate notification should not hamper emergency response
activities. Proposed Sec. 450.173(d)(2) would require that operators
report other mishaps not involving a fatality or serious injury to the
WOC within 24 hours. This would eliminate the current option to notify
the Associate Administrator for Commercial Space Transportation instead
of the WOC because the WOC, unlike the Administrator for Commercial
Space Transportation, is available 24-hours per day, 7 days per week.
Proposed Sec. 450.173(d)(3) would require operators to submit a
written preliminary report to the FAA Office of Commercial Space
Transportation within five days of any mishap. The report would need to
include the information listed in proposed Sec. 450.173(d)(3). This
list of information would include the operator's assessment on how the
cause of its mishap could potentially affect similar vehicles, systems,
or operations. Given some systems and components are common across
operators, this information could prevent mishaps due to similar
failures of a common system or component, including ground and range
systems. The reporting requirements in this paragraph are similar to
existing five-day reporting requirements. Under current regulations, a
five-day preliminary written report was only required in the event of
an accident or incident. Based on lessons learned from past mishaps,
the FAA is streamlining these reporting requirements to ensure
consistency between mishap classes and that information required to
properly classify a mishap and the level of investigation required are
reported. For example, mishaps involving a fatality or serious injury
are typically investigated at the Federal level, as such, the FAA is
aware of the information that may affect the safety of the public or
public property. The operator, in accordance with their mishap plan,
may investigate mishaps not involving a fatality or serious injury. In
such cases, it is possible that the FAA may not become aware of
information potentially affecting the public safety or public property
in a timely manner, or other facts that may require elevating the class
of mishap to a higher level.
Proposed Sec. 450.173(e) sets emergency response requirements.
Proposed Sec. 450.173(e)(1) would require that an operator activate
emergency response services following a mishap. This requirement is
consistent with the post-launch and post-flight attempt hazard controls
in current Sec. 417.415. Proposed Sec. 450.173(e)(2) would require
that an operator maintain existing hazard area surveillance and
clearance as necessary to protect public safety. These notices would
include NOTAM and NOTMAR. Proposed Sec. 450.173(e)(3) would require
that an operator contain and minimize the consequences of a mishap.
Proposed Sec. 450.173(e)(4) would provide for the preservation of data
and physical evidence, including debris, which the FAA considers to be
a physical record. In an effort to contain and minimize the
consequences of the mishap and maintain site integrity for
investigation, an operator would need to safe and secure the mishap
site in a timely manner. Proposed Sec. 450.173(e)(4) is consistent
with current requirements. Proposed Sec. 450.173(e)(5) would require
an operator to implement agreements with local government authorities
and emergency response services, as necessary. Emergency response
procedures should identify who is responsible for securing the mishap
site, and procedures for access to the mishap site. For example, the
procedures should identify who is responsible for educating persons on
the treatment of debris, and the disposal of hazardous materials. The
FAA recommends that prior to beginning operations, an operator
coordinate with Federal, state, and local authorities and emergency
first responders to familiarize them with permitted and licensed
operations and hazards associated with an operator's activities, such
as launch vehicle hazards. This pre-coordination is important to ensure
the safety of emergency personnel responding to the mishap. Vehicle and
operational hazards may include vehicle composites, propellants,
oxidizers, pressure vessels, unexploded ordnance, oxygen systems, and
batteries.
If implemented, proposed Sec. 450.173(f) would require an operator
to investigate the root causes of a mishap and report the results to
the FAA. Proposed Sec. 450.173(g) would require that an operator
identify and implement preventive measures prior to the next flight,
unless otherwise approved by the Administrator. The FAA is proposing
that preventive measures be implemented prior to the next flight in all
cases in order to codify current practice. The FAA would work with
operators on a case-by-case basis to determine whether its next
operation may proceed if it is unable to implement preventive measures
before the next flight. The requirement to implement corrective action
prior to next flight is consistent with existing requirements in Sec.
437.73(d) for anomaly recording, reporting, and implementation of
corrective actions.
Proposed Sec. 450.173(h) would require that an operator maintain
records associated with a mishap in accordance with proposed Sec.
450.219(d) (Records). The operator would make these records available
to Federal officials for inspection and copying. This requirement is
consistent with existing record keeping requirements.\148\ Records
would include debris, which the FAA considers a physical record. In all
mishap cases, disposal of any related debris would be required to be
coordinated with the FAA. Note that this proposal would allow for the
sharing of proposed Sec. 450.173
[[Page 15356]]
responsibilities between launch and reentry operators pursuant to an
agreement. For example, the site operator may report the mishap
occurrence to the FAA as required by proposed Sec. 450.173(d), while
the emergency response requirements of proposed Sec. 450.173(e) may be
shared by both the launch or reentry operator and site operator. An
operator would be required to retain all records until completion of
any Federal investigation and the FAA advises the operator that the
records need no longer be retained.
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\148\ Sections 417.15(b), 420.61(b), 431.77(b), and 437.87(b).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Finally, proposed Sec. 450.173(i) would set application
requirements. This section would require the submission of the mishap
plan document at the time of license or permit application.
v. Test-Induced Damage
The FAA proposes to introduce a test-induced damage exception to
the mishap definition in proposed Sec. 450.175 (Test-induced Damage).
This proposal would allow an operator to coordinate testing activities
with the FAA before the activities take place to prevent the FAA from
labeling failures as mishaps. Any test failure covered by this section
would be considered test-induced damage and not a mishap, so long as
the failure falls within the pre-coordinated and FAA-approved testing
profile. The test-induced damage concept is not currently within the
FAA's commercial space regulations. This proposal is due to the FAA's
recognition that current mishap regulations may deter the kind of
robust testing that may yield future safety benefits.
The FAA currently deems a failure to achieve test objectives as a
mishap (failure to complete a launch or reentry as planned). Similarly,
a test failure that results in over $25,000 in damage to associated
property would also be considered a mishap.\149\ In both cases, the
resulting mishap designation would require a mishap investigation to
identify root causes and preventive measures, which the operator would
need to implement before the next operation.
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\149\ ``[R]esulting in greater than $25,000 worth of damage . .
.'' in accordance with the mishap definition in Sec. 401.5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the recent past, the FAA accepted the possibility of a test-
induced damage approach by pre-coordinating with a launch operator
prior to conducting an in-flight abort test of a crew escape
system.\150\ The FAA found that this process worked well in pre-
defining the objectives of the test, test limits, expected outcomes,
and potential failure modes. It also allowed the operator and FAA to
reach a common understanding of what events would be categorized as a
test-induced damage or mishap. This approach would also be consistent
with ARC feedback that the existing mishap definition leads to
protracted mishap investigations because it does not recognize the
difference between operational missions and higher risk experimental or
test missions. The ARC and FAA believe this discourages robust testing
to push the limits of a vehicle and undercutting test programs
currently covered under experimental permits.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\150\ Given these events fell within the pre-coordinated
possible scenarios, the FAA did not consider them unplanned events
and therefore, did not consider the events mishaps.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As noted earlier, the ARC shared its concern that current mishap
reporting and investigation requirements discourage robust testing. The
FAA believes that the proposed test-induced damages paradigm addresses
this concern by providing an opportunity for license applicants and
existing license holders to pre-coordinate test activities and pre-
declare damages that the FAA would not consider a mishap. Under this
paradigm, failure to achieve identified test objectives and certain
pre-declared damages to property associated with the licensed activity,
including ground support equipment, ground support systems, and flight
hardware would not be reportable as an FAA-mishap provided the
requirements of this section are met. The FAA also proposes to replace
its existing mishap related definitions in favor of a mishap
classification system to further clarify the types of events that would
be considered a mishap.
Proposed Sec. 450.175(a) would lay out the specific conditions for
the test-induced damage approach. It would require an operator to
coordinate test activities with and obtain approval from the FAA before
the planned activity. The coordination should take place with
sufficient time for the FAA to evaluate the proposal during the
application process or as a license modification. A test activity would
need to be pre-coordinated with the FAA to be eligible for the test-
induced damage mishap exception. The FAA would conduct pre-coordination
activities during pre-application consultation. The test-induced damage
exception would be optional and an operator would not be required to
take this path. However, absent the test-induced damage exception, the
FAA would categorize an unplanned event as a mishap in accordance with
the proposed mishap classification system. Proposed Sec. 450.175(a)(2)
would preclude certain kinds of mishaps from the test-induced damage
alternative. Specifically, any mishap involving a serious injury or
fatality, damage to property not associated with the licensed activity,
or hazardous debris leaving the pre-defined hazard area would be
treated as a mishap and not test-induced damage. Finally, proposed
Sec. 450.175(a)(3) would require test-induced damage to fall within
the scope of activities coordinated with the FAA to be eligible for
this alternative. In other words, the FAA would consider the occurrence
of damages resulting from test activities that fall outside the scope
of approved activities (e.g., before scheduled test activities begin or
exceeding operation limits) as a mishap in accordance with the proposed
mishap classification system. The approved scope of the test would be
outlined in the information submitted by the permittee or licensee to
meet the application requirements of proposed Sec. 450.175(b).
Proposed Sec. 450.175(b) would set the test-induced damage
application requirements. The paragraph would list the information an
applicant would need to submit under the test-induced damage
alternative to mishap classification. The FAA does not intend the test-
induced damage exception to apply to the operation of an entire
vehicle, but rather the testing of specific components and systems. The
applicant should submit test objectives in a complete, clear, and
concise manner to help the FAA distinguish between nominal operations
and specific test objectives. It should also provide test limits such
as the expected environments, personnel, equipment, or environmental
limits. Also, the applicant would identify expected outcomes that the
FAA would later compare to actual outcomes. The FAA would also request
a list of potential risks, including the applicant's best understanding
of the uncertainties in environments, test limits, or system
performance. Applicable procedures or steps taken to execute the tests
and the expected time and duration of the test would also be required.
Finally, the FAA may request additional information such as
clarification information to ensure public safety, safety of property,
and to safeguard the national security and foreign policy interests of
the United States.
This proposal is similar to NASA's test-induced damages process, as
defined in NPR 8621.1C (NASA Procedural Requirements for Mishap and
Close Call Reporting, Investigating, and Recordkeeping). NASA developed
the test-induced damages paradigm in support of the December 2014
launch of Exploration Flight Test-1 and it has been in use supporting
NASA test
[[Page 15357]]
programs ever since. The test-induced damages process is a formal
process documenting the risk of damage and accepting that risk by
signature before the test. Similar to the commercial space industry,
NASA conducts tests to better understand and mitigate complex design,
manufacturing, or operational issues with the objective of providing
NASA with confidence that the system meets its technical and
programmatic requirements and can successfully and safely perform its
mission in the operational environment. As noted in NPR 8261.1C, some
tests are designed and intended to result in hardware damage (e.g., a
structural test-to-failure). Other tests are aggressive in nature, and
test-incurred damage often occurs; the knowledge gained is used to
improve designs. These statements hold true for the commercial space
transportation industry as well. The FAA's proposed test-induced
damages takes a NASA-proven process and tailors it to satisfy the FAA's
public safety mission.
L. Pre- and Post-Flight Reporting
1. Preflight Reporting
Under proposed Sec. 450.213, the FAA would continue to require a
licensee to provide the FAA with specified information prior to each
launch or reentry, consistent with current requirements. An operator
would send the information as an email attachment to
[email protected], or by some other method as agreed to by the
Administrator in the license. The FAA would require five categories of
information: mission-specific, flight safety analysis products, flight
safety system test data, data required by the FAA to conduct a
collision avoidance analysis, and a launch or reentry schedule.
The first category would be mission-specific information in
proposed Sec. 450.213(b). As currently required in Sec. Sec.
417.17(b)(2) and 431.79(a), an operator would be required to provide
this information to the FAA not less than 60 days before each mission
conducted under the license. The FAA may also agree to a different time
frame in accordance with Sec. 404.15. An operator would not have to
provide any information under this section if the mission-specific
information was already provided in the application. This would be the
case if an operator's license authorizes specific missions, as opposed
to unlimited launches or reentries within certain parameters.
Specifically, an operator would continue to have to provide payload
information in accordance with proposed Sec. 450.43(i), and flight
information, including the vehicle, launch site, planned flight path,
staging and impact locations, each payload delivery point, intended
reentry or landing sites including any contingency abort locations, and
the location of any disposed launch or reentry vehicle stage or
component that is deorbited. This section would combine the reporting
requirements of Sec. Sec. 417.17(b)(2) and 431.79(a), although
reporting the location of any disposed launch or reentry vehicle stage
or component that is deorbited would be a new requirement. The FAA
would add this information requirement because disposals are much more
common now than when parts 417 and 435 were issued, and notifications
to airmen and mariners would be necessary to protect the public from
vehicle stages or components reentering as part of a disposal. In
practice, licensees have arranged for the issuance of NOTAMs and NTMs
for vehicle stages purposefully deorbited.
The second category is flight safety analysis products in proposed
Sec. 450.213(c). An operator would need to submit to the FAA updated
flight safety analysis products, using previously-approved
methodologies, for each mission no less than 30 days before flight. The
FAA may also agree to a different time frame in accordance with
proposed Sec. 404.15. The flight safety analysis products are similar
to what is currently required under Sec. 417.17(c)(3). Part 431 does
not require similar flight safety analysis products to be submitted,
although current practice is to require similar information in license
orders.
An operator would not be required to submit flight safety analysis
products if the analysis submitted in the license application already
satisfies all the requirements of the section. This would be the case
if a licensee's license authorizes specific missions, as opposed to
unlimited launches within certain parameters. An operator would also
not be required to submit flight safety analysis products if the
operator demonstrated during the application process that the analysis
does not need to be updated to account for mission-specific factors.
This would be the case if an operator operates within certain
operational constraints proven to satisfy public safety criteria.
Otherwise, an operator would be required to submit flight safety
analysis products while accounting for vehicle and mission specific
input data and potential variations in input data that may affect any
analysis product within the final 30 days before flight. An operator
would also be required to submit the analysis products using the same
format and organization used in its license application. Lastly, an
operator would not be able to change an analysis product within the
final 30 days before flight, unless the operator has a process,
approved in the license, for making a change in that period as part of
the operator's flight safety analysis process.
The third category is flight safety system test data in proposed
Sec. 450.213(d). If an operator would be required to use an FSS to
protect public safety as required by proposed Sec. 450.101(c), it
would need to submit to the FAA, or provide access to, any test reports
in accordance with approved flight safety system test plans no less
than 30 days before flight. The FAA may also agree to a different time
frame in accordance with proposed Sec. 404.15. This reporting
requirement is discussed earlier in the section for flight safety
systems.
The fourth category would be data required by the FAA to conduct a
collision avoidance analysis in proposed Sec. 450.213(e). Not less
than 15 days before the flight of a launch vehicle or the reentry of a
reentry vehicle, an operator would need to submit the collision
avoidance information in proposed Appendix A to part 450 to a Federal
entity identified by the FAA, and the FAA. This reporting requirement
is discussed in the ``Launch and Reentry Collision Avoidance
Requirements'' section.
The fifth category, as proposed in Sec. 450.213(f), a launch or
reentry schedule that identifies each review, rehearsal, and safety-
critical operation. The schedule would be required to be filed and
updated in time to allow FAA personnel to participate in the reviews,
rehearsals, and safety-critical operations. This is similar to current
Sec. 417.17(b).
2. Post-Flight Reporting
Under proposed Sec. 450.215, the FAA would require an operator to
provide specified information no later than 90 days after a launch or
reentry. The FAA may also agree to a different time frame in accordance
with proposed Sec. 404.15. An operator would send the information as
an email attachment to [email protected], or other method as agreed
to by the Administrator in the license.
Specifically, as discussed earlier, an operator would need to
provide any anomaly that occurred during countdown or flight that is
material to public health and safety and the safety of property,\151\
and any corrective action
[[Page 15358]]
implemented or to be implemented after the flight due to an anomaly or
mishap. Section 417.25(b) and (c) requires similar information. Part
431 does not require post-flight information, although current practice
is to require similar information in license orders.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\151\ What is material to public health and safety and the
safety of property is discussed later in this preamble in reference
to proposed Sec. 450.211(a)(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition, an operator would need to provide the actual
trajectory flown by the vehicle, and, for an unguided suborbital launch
vehicle, the actual impact location of all impacting stages and
impacting components. The actual trajectory flown by the vehicle would
be a new requirement, while the actual impact locations for an unguided
suborbital launch vehicle is similar to the requirements in current
Sec. 417.25(b) and (c). The FAA would use the actual trajectory flown
by the vehicle to compare it to predicted trajectories. Because the FAA
may not need this information for all launches, this information would
only need to be reported if requested by the FAA.
Lastly, an operator would need to report the number of humans on
board the vehicle. This would be required because the FAA keeps a human
space flight database for use by launch and reentry operators for the
purposes of informed consent. Under Sec. 460.45(c), and pursuant to
statute, an operator must inform each space flight participant of the
safety record of all launch or reentry vehicles that have carried one
or more persons on board, including both U.S. government and private
sector vehicles, to include the total number of people who have died or
been seriously injured on these flights, the total number of launches
and reentries conducted with people on board, and the number of
catastrophic failures. To facilitate all operators accurately informing
space flight participants, the FAA maintains the human space flight
database and populates it using voluntarily provided information from
industry. As more launches and reentries are expected with humans on
board, the FAA will require this information to keep the human
spaceflight database up to date, and expects that this would not
significantly increase the burden to operators.
Ground Safety
A. Definition and Scope of Launch
As discussed in more detail in this section, the FAA proposes to
amend the definitions of ``launch'' and ``reentry'' in part 401 to
mirror the statutory definitions. The FAA would move the beginning and
end of launch to proposed Sec. 450.3, which defines the scope of a
vehicle operator's license. Proposed Sec. 450.3(b) would establish
that launch begins under a license with the start of hazardous
activities that pose a threat to the public, and it would amend the end
of launch language to remove any reference to ELVs and RLVs. Finally,
the FAA proposes to clarify that, absent the launch vehicle, the
arrival of a payload at the launch site would not trigger the beginning
of launch. Also, at a non-U.S. launch site, launch would begin at
ignition or take-off for a hybrid vehicle.
Title 51 U.S.C. 50902 defines launch as to place or try to place a
launch vehicle or reentry vehicle and any payload or human being from
Earth in a suborbital trajectory; in Earth orbit in outer space; or
otherwise in outer space, including activities involved in the
preparation of a launch vehicle or payload for launch, when those
activities take place at a launch site in the United States. The FAA
added the current regulatory definition of launch in the 1999 final
rule.\152\ The language in the regulatory definition differs slightly
from the current statutory language regarding activities in preparation
of the vehicle, and the regulatory definition does not include the
reference to human beings because that reference was added to the
statute after 1999.\153\ The regulatory definition also includes
language that is not set forth in the statute pertaining to pre- and
post-flight ground operations including language identifying the
beginning of launch and end of launch.
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\152\ 64 FR 19586 (April 21, 1999).
\153\ As currently defined in 14 CFR 401.5, launch means to
place or try to place a launch vehicle or reentry vehicle and any
payload from Earth in a suborbital trajectory, in Earth orbit in
outer space, or otherwise in outer space, and includes preparing a
launch vehicle for flight at a launch site in the United States. The
current definition also defines beginning and end of launch, which,
as discussed later in the preamble, the FAA proposes to amend and
move to proposed part 450 (Scope of a vehicle operator license).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The FAA and industry have identified a number of issues associated
with the current definition of launch in Sec. 401.5. The current
definition of launch is inflexible and has resulted in confusion
regarding launch from non-U.S. sites and whether the arrival of a
payload constitutes the beginning of launch.
The preamble discussion in the 1999 final rule stated that the
intent of the FAA's definition of ``launch'' is to require a license at
the start of those hazardous preflight activities that put public
safety at risk. The final rule stated that, in accordance with this
responsibility, the FAA will exercise regulatory oversight only if an
activity is so hazardous as to pose a threat to third parties.
Specifically, the FAA determined that launch begins when hazardous
activities related to the assembly and ultimate flight of the launch
vehicle commence.\154\ The preamble further elaborated that the moment
at which hazardous activities begin is when the major components of a
licensee's launch vehicle enter, for purposes of preparing for flight,
the gate of a U.S. launch site, regardless of whether the site is
situated on a Federal launch range and regardless of whether flight
occurs from that site.\155\ At the time, the FAA determined that the
arrival of the launch vehicle at a U.S. launch site would trigger the
beginning of launch for the following reasons: ease of administration,
consistent and broad interpretation, and change in the level of
risk.\156\ Additionally, the rule stated that shortly after vehicle
components arrive, hazardous activities related to the assembly and
ultimate flight of the launch vehicle begin and therefore the arrival
of the vehicle or its parts is a logical point at which the FAA should
ensure that a launch operator is exercising safe practices and is
financially responsible for any damage it may cause.\157\ In accordance
with the definition of launch, the FAA has required a launch license to
be in place before the arrival of major components of a launch vehicle
at a U.S. launch site that are intended for use on a specific FAA-
licensed launch.
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\154\ 64 FR 19586 (April 21, 1999), at 19591.
\155\ 64 FR 19586 (April 21, 1999).
\156\ 64 FR 19586 (April 21, 1999), at 19589.
\157\ 64 FR 19586 (April 21, 1999), at 19591.
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The lack of flexibility in the definition of beginning of launch
has led to multiple requests from the industry to waive the requirement
for a license to bring vehicle hardware on site and begin preflight
activity.\158\ The FAA has issued numerous waivers because it
determined that the proposed preflight activities associated with the
arrival of launch vehicles or their major components were not so
hazardous to the public as to require FAA oversight. In granting a
waiver, the FAA determines that the waiver is in the public interest
and will not jeopardize public health and safety, the safety of
property, or any national security or foreign policy interest of the
United States. In addition, by requesting a waiver to conduct preflight
activities, the operator agrees that it must forgo the opportunity to
seek indemnification for
[[Page 15359]]
any loss incurred under the waiver during the waived preflight
activities.
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\158\ As stated previously, the FAA is only able to waive
regulatory requirements, not definitions, and therefore has issued
waivers to the requirement to obtain a license, rather than to the
definition of launch.
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Further, the current definition does not account for the
significant technological advances the industry has experienced since
adoption of the 1999 rule. For example, in the current commercial space
transportation environment, launch operations often include vehicles or
vehicle stages that fly back to a U.S. launch site and remain at the
launch site. In cases where no license was in place to cover the
presence of flight hardware for possible reuse, consistent with 1999
rule preamble language, the FAA has deemed this to be storage and does
not require a license or waiver.\159\ As currently written, however,
the definition could imply that a license is required for RLV launches
during the period between end-of-launch and launch vehicle reuse, even
when the vehicle is in a safe and dormant state, and would not be a
threat to public safety.
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\159\ 64 FR 19586 (April 21, 1999), at 19593. ``On the other
hand, the FAA does not intend a launch license to encompass
components stored at a launch site for a considerable period of time
prior to flight.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Because the current definition states that launch begins under a
license with the arrival of a launch vehicle or payload at a U.S.
launch site, the term ``or payload'' has been interpreted to mean
arrival of a payload by itself could constitute beginning of launch.
However, the 1999 preamble explicitly states that the FAA does not
define launch to commence with the arrival of a payload absent the
launch vehicle at a launch site.\160\ Also, it states that the FAA does
not consider payload processing absent launch vehicle integration to
constitute part of licensed activities.\161\ In addition, the 1999 rule
preamble refers to launch beginning when the ``major components'' of a
launch vehicle arrive at the launch site. However, the regulatory
language remains unclear.
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\160\ 64 FR 19586 (April 21, 1999), at 19589.
\161\ 64 FR 19586 (April 21, 1999), at 19593.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Another point of current uncertainty is when launch begins from a
non-U.S. site. Title 51 U.S.C. chapter 509 gives the FAA authority to
issue a launch license to a U.S. citizen conducting a launch anywhere
in the world. However, the current definition of launch is silent as to
when launch begins from a non-U.S. site. This has resulted in operators
lacking clarity as to when launch begins. In recent years, the FAA has
licensed launches from international waters, Australia, the Marshall
Islands, New Zealand, and Spain. In licensing these launches, the FAA
has consistently interpreted that launch from outside of U.S. territory
to begin at ignition or at the first movement that initiates flight,
whichever occurs earlier.
The ARC commented about the definition of launch for licensed
launches from a U.S. launch site. The ARC report stated that launch
should be defined on a case-by-case basis for all operators. The ARC
recommended licensed activities on U.S. launch sites for all vehicles
include preflight ground operations, flight operations, and launch
operations phases as tailored by each launch operator. The ARC further
recommends the initiation and scope of launch activities, including
preflight ground operations and flight operation phases, be defined by
the impact of each activity on public safety and property. These
activities may include both hazardous and safety-critical operations,
the latter encompassing non-hazardous activities that may impact public
risk during other pre-launch and flight activities. A list of
performance-based criteria for licensed activities would be tailored
for each operator and the FAA based on their specific concept of
operations. This scope should only include hazardous operations unique
to activities as defined in the operator's license application
documents and not activities already regulated by another government
agency.
In light of the multiple waiver requests and ARC recommendations,
the FAA proposes to amend the regulatory definitions of launch and
reentry (discussed later in this section) to match the statutory
definitions. The FAA would also move the details in the definitions for
beginning and end of launch (discussed later in this section) and
reentry to the scope of a vehicle operator license requirements in
proposed Sec. 450.3. In addition, the FAA would revise ``beginning of
launch'' to be more performance-based and ``end of launch'' to remove
references to ELVs and RLVs. Finally, the FAA proposes to clarify that
launch from a non-U.S. site would begin at ignition, and that the
arrival of a payload to a launch site does not constitute beginning of
launch. The FAA believes the proposed revisions capture the primary
intent of the ARC's recommendation, which is to limit FAA oversight to
those launch operations that pose a hazard to public safety and the
safety of property.
The FAA would revise the definitions of launch and reentry in Sec.
401.5 to mirror the statutory definitions. Specifically, the FAA would
remove the beginning and end of launch language from the definition of
``launch,'' and add the term ``human being'' to align with the 2015
update to the Act. Similarly, the FAA would revise the definition of
``reenter/reentry'' in part 401 to mirror the statutory definition, and
would add the term ``human being'' to align with the 2015 update to the
Act.
The FAA would move the beginning and end of launch and reentry
language to proposed Sec. 450.3. The FAA proposes this change because
such detail in a definition makes the definition unwieldy and, unlike
regulatory requirements, definitions cannot be waived.
The FAA would amend beginning of launch such that launch begins
with the first hazardous activities related to the assembly and
ultimate flight of the launch vehicle at a U.S. launch site. Unless a
later point is agreed to by the Administrator, hazardous preflight
ground operations would be presumed to begin when the launch vehicle or
its major components arrive at the launch site. For operations where an
applicant identifies a later time when hazardous operations begin, the
applicant may propose the event that it believes should constitute the
beginning of launch during the pre-application process.\162\ As a
result, there would be no need to request a waiver.
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\162\ The FAA's proposal regarding how an operator would
determine what event constitutes the beginning of launch, and how to
obtain the Administrator's approval, is located in the Ground Safety
section under the Identifying First Hazardous Activity sub-heading
of this preamble.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This proposed change would also clarify that for launch vehicle
stages or when launch begins for an RLV that returns to a launch site
and remains there in a dormant state, FAA oversight is not necessary
since no hazardous activity that falls under the FAA's oversight
responsibilities are being performed.
This proposal would clarify that, absent vehicle hardware, the
arrival of payload does not constitute beginning of launch. Instead,
launch would begin with the arrival of a launch vehicle or its major
components at a U.S. launch site, or at a later point as agreed to by
the Administrator.
This proposal would also specify that launch from a non-U.S. site
begins at ignition, or at the first movement that initiates flight, of
the launch vehicle, whichever comes first. For hybrid vehicles, flight
commences at take-off. The current ``beginning of launch,'' as defined
in the definition of ``launch'' refers only to launches from a U.S.
launch site, and is silent with regard to launches from sites outside
the United States. Although the FAA issues launch licenses for launches
from non-U.S. launch sites if the operator is a citizen
[[Page 15360]]
of the U.S., the FAA considers it outside its authority to license
preflight activities that take place at a non-U.S. launch site in light
of the statutory definition of launch that explicitly refers to
``activities involved in the preparation of a launch vehicle . . . when
those activities take place at a launch site in the United States.''
The FAA also believes that this interpretation is necessary because of
issues of sovereignty and liability under international law. For these
non-U.S. launch sites, the FAA has historically licensed launches
beginning at ignition, or if there is no ignition, then at the first
movement that initiates flight. In order to provide clarity for launch
operators launching from non-U.S. sites, the FAA is proposing to codify
this approach in part 450.
In addition to addressing issues in the current definition of
``launch'' regarding when launch begins, the FAA proposes to clarify
when launch ends. First, the FAA would move the provisions in the
current definition of launch regarding end of launch to proposed Sec.
450.3. Second, the FAA would remove the distinction between ELVs and
RLVs, which is consistent with one of the overall goals of this
proposed rule. Overall, the substance of the current provisions related
to end of launch currently located in Sec. 401.5 would not change.
Specifically, launch ends:
1. For an orbital launch of an ELV, after the licensee's last
exercise of control over its vehicle whether on orbit or a vehicle
stage impacting on Earth;
2. For an orbital launch of an RLV, after deployment of all
payloads or if there is no payload, after the launch vehicle's first
steady state orbit; and
3. For a suborbital launch of either an ELV or RLV that includes
reentry, launch ends after reaching apogee; or for a suborbital launch
that does not include a reentry, launch ends after the vehicle or
vehicle component lands or impacts on Earth.
In all these cases, activities on the ground to return either the
launch site or the vehicle or vehicle component to a safe condition are
part of launch and could possibly extend the end of launch. In the
rare, yet to be seen, situation of a suborbital launch that does not
require an FAA launch license but does require a reentry license,
launch ends after the vehicle reaches apogee. In addition, the FAA
would move the provisions related to reentry readiness and returning
the vehicle to a safe state on the ground to proposed Sec. 450.3.
Including these reentry provisions in the scope of a vehicle operator
license would clarify an operator's responsibilities regarding post-
flight ground operations related to returning the vehicle to a safe
state on the ground.
Finally, the FAA proposes to modify the definition for reentry.
Title 51 U.S.C. 50902 defines reentry as: to return or attempt to
return, purposefully, a reentry vehicle and its payload or human
beings, if any, from Earth orbit or from outer space to Earth. In 2000,
the FAA codified the current regulatory definition of reentry in the
final rule, Commercial Space Transportation Reusable Launch Vehicle and
Reentry Licensing Regulations. Section 401.5 defines ``reenter;
reentry'' as: To return or attempt to return, purposefully, a reentry
vehicle and its payload, if any, from Earth orbit or from outer space
to Earth. The term ``reenter; reentry'' includes activities conducted
in Earth orbit or outer space to determine reentry readiness, and that
are critical to ensuring public health and safety and the safety of
property during reentry flight. The term ``reenter; reentry'' also
includes activities conducted on the ground after vehicle landing on
Earth to ensure the reentry vehicle does not pose a threat to public
health and safety or the safety of property. As noted earlier, the FAA
proposes to revise the definition to mirror the statute and move the
provisions related to reentry readiness and returning the vehicle to a
safe state on the ground to proposed Sec. 450.3.
B. Ground Safety Requirements
This proposal would revise current ground safety requirements to
make them more flexible, scalable, and adaptable to varying types of
launch and reentry operations. The proposal seeks to ensure that the
FAA's oversight of ground operations at U.S. launch sites would only
cover activities that are hazardous to the public and critical assets.
Specifically, as proposed in Sec. 450.179, an operator would be
required to protect the public from adverse effects of hazardous
operations and systems associated with preparing a launch vehicle for
flight, returning a launch or reentry vehicle to a safe condition after
landing, or after an aborted launch attempt, and returning a site to a
safe condition. An operator would be required to conduct a ground
hazard analysis (proposed Sec. 450.185) and comply with certain
prescribed hazard controls during those preflight activities that
constitute launch. In addition, an operator would be required to comply
with other ground safety and related application requirements in
proposed part 450.
The FAA proposed the part 417 ground safety regulations in the 2000
NPRM \163\ and codified it in the 2006 final rule. The 2006 final rule
adopted ground safety standards governing the preparation of a launch
vehicle for flight. The final rule specified that in order for a launch
operator to meet part 417 ground safety requirements, an operator must
conduct a ground hazard analysis to meet the requirements of subpart E,
part 417, as well as a toxic release hazard analysis to meet the
requirements of Sec. 417.227. For launches conducted from a Federal
launch range, a launch operator could rely on an LSSA as an alternative
means of demonstrating compliance with the FAA's part 417 ground safety
rules. Because most licensed ground operations were covered by the LSSA
approach, the FAA did not begin to exercise the ground safety
requirements in part 417 until 2016.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\163\ Licensing and Safety requirements for Launch, NPRM. 65 FR
63922 (October 25, 2000).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Beginning in 2016, the FAA received several applications for launch
licenses from non-Federal launch sites.\164\ Applicants were required
to demonstrate compliance with the ground safety regulations in part
417. During the FAA's evaluation, the agency found that many of its
ground safety requirements were overly burdensome, highly prescriptive,
and did not include criteria for determining public safety.
Furthermore, the FAA discovered the requirements were out-of-date with
commercial space transportation practices and operations, and in some
cases duplicated other state and Federal regulations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\164\ The FAA's first license application involving a launch
from a non-Federal launch range was from SpaceX for operations at
pad 39A in Cape Canaveral, Florida. The FAA completed its evaluation
and issued SpaceX the license on February 2017. Astra Space
originally applied for a launch license from a non-Federal launch
range in June 2017, and the FAA issued its license March 2018.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Part 431 does not include explicit ground safety requirements.
However, the scope of a launch license under part 431 includes
preparing a launch vehicle for flight at a launch site in the United
States. In conducting its safety review under Sec. 431.31, the FAA
must determine whether an applicant is capable of launching an RLV and
payload, if any, from a designated launch site without jeopardizing
public health and safety and the safety of property. The FAA evaluates
on an individual basis all public safety aspects of a proposed RLV
mission to ensure they are sufficient to support safe conduct of the
mission, including ground safety. In licenses issued under part 431,
the FAA has required operators to address reasonably
[[Page 15361]]
foreseeable hazards to ensure the safety of pre- and post-flight ground
operations. The lack of clarity in part 431 is problematic, and would
be fixed by the ground safety requirements in this proposal.
The ARC recommended that the FAA create ground safety regulations
that are flexible and streamlined, continue to protect the public, and
are not duplicative of other state or Federal authorities. The ARC
provided four primary recommendations for ground safety. First, the ARC
recommended the FAA allow operators to determine what activities and
operations would be covered under FAA regulations by performing an
analysis to define hazards. Second, the ARC recommended the FAA scale
the scope of what is considered licensed activities based on each
operator's unique operations. Third, the ARC recommended the FAA focus
its regulatory authority solely on those things that affect public
safety. Finally, the ARC recommended the FAA only regulate those things
that are not already overseen by other governmental authorities.
The FAA agrees with the ARC's recommendations that ground safety
regulations should be flexible, performance-based, and utilize a ground
hazard analysis that determines the best methods for protecting the
public. The proposed ground safety regulations would rely on a system
safety approach to allow flexibility by stripping away specific design
requirements, establishing more performance-based requirements, and
giving the operator flexibility in satisfying these requirements.
Specifically, an operator would conduct a ground hazard analysis
(proposed Sec. 450.185), and comply with prescribed hazard controls.
In addition to any mitigations identified in the ground hazard
analysis, the proposed regulations would require several prescribed
hazard controls, including an accounting of how the operator would
protect members of the public who enter areas under their control,
provisions on how the operator would mitigate hazards created by a
countdown abort, an explanation of the operator's plans for controlling
fires, and generic emergency procedures an operator would implement. As
will be discussed later, operators using toxic materials would have to
perform a toxic release hazard analysis (proposed Sec. 450.187), show
how it would contain the effects of a toxic release, or how the public
would be protected from those risks from toxic releases. Operators
would also be required to develop an explosive siting plan (proposed
Sec. 450.183) and to coordinate with licensed launch and reentry site
operators (proposed Sec. 450.181).
1. Ground Safety: Identifying First Hazardous Activity
In proposed Sec. 450.3, an operator would have the flexibility to
determine for its particular operation when the first preflight
activity that poses a hazard to the public begins in coordination with
the FAA. An operator could identify the arrival of the vehicle or its
major components at the launch site as the beginning of hazardous
operations, which is consistent with current practice. This option
would provide a clear demarcation of when launch begins that is easily
understood by both an operator and the FAA. The license would cover all
ground operations that may present a hazard to the public from the time
flight hardware first arrives at the launch or reentry site to the end
of launch or reentry.
Alternatively, an operator could identify some other action, after
the arrival of the vehicle or its major components at the launch site,
as the beginning of hazardous activities. As discussed earlier in the
scope of a vehicle operator license discussion, this option would be
available for those operations where the arrival of the launch vehicle
does not constitute the beginning of hazardous activities. It would
also provide flexibility to operators because the start of hazardous
launch operations is unique to each operator's circumstances. These
hazardous launch operations would include the pressurizing or loading
of propellants into the vehicle or launch system,\165\ operations
involving a fueled launch vehicle,\166\ or the transfer of energy
necessary to initiate flight.\167\
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\165\ This would include the loading of propellants or
pressurants, where there are potential hazards such as overpressure,
explosion, debris, deflagration, fire, and toxic material release.
The operations that are typically performed include wet dress
rehearsals, cold flow, returning the vehicle to a safe state
following a scrub, and tests that might be performed while the
vehicle is being fueled.
\166\ This would include static fire or tests with a fully-
fueled integrated vehicle.
\167\ This would include activities that involve placing the
launch vehicle into a state that would enable it to achieve
suborbital or orbital flight. Even if traditional propellants are
not used, the energy needed to escape Earth's gravity is significant
and the initiation of the action to launch a vehicle could
potentially have significant impact to public safety.
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While this option offers greater flexibility, it would require that
an applicant talk with the FAA during pre-application consultation to
identify which activity would be the beginning of hazardous launch
operations. This is necessary for the FAA to scope its requirements
accordingly, and so that the applicant knows what to include in its
application. Early interactions with the FAA would allow a potential
applicant to work with the FAA to determine which preflight operations
constitute launch and therefore must occur under a license. An
applicant that elects to identify an activity after the arrival of a
launch vehicle or associated major components at a launch site as the
beginning of launch should be prepared to discuss its operations with
the FAA so that the FAA can determine that operations occurring prior
to that point would not pose a threat to public safety. Note that under
this proposal, indemnification and reciprocal waiver of claims coverage
would start when launch begins as it does under current regulations. In
other words, financial responsibility requirements would apply from the
first hazardous operation until launch ends.
2. Ground Safety: Ground Hazard Analysis
Proposed Sec. 450.185 (Ground Hazard Analysis) would require an
operator to complete a ground hazard analysis which would include a
thorough assessment of the launch vehicle, the launch vehicle
integrated systems, ground support equipment, and other launch site
hardware. The analysis would include an identification of hazards, a
risk assessment, an identification and description of mitigations and
controls, and provisions for hazard control verification and
validation. Although the analysis might incorporate employee safety and
mission assurance, this proposal would only require an applicant to
identify the hazards that affect the public, and how an operator would
mitigate those hazards.
Proposed Sec. 450.185(a) would require an operator to identify
hazards. A hazard is a real or potential condition that could lead to
an unplanned event or series of events resulting in death, serious
injury, or damage to or loss of equipment or property. The FAA proposes
separating ground hazards into two primary categories: System and
operational hazards. System hazards would include, but would not be
limited to, vehicle over-pressurization, sudden energy release
including ordnance actuation, ionizing and non-ionizing radiation, fire
or deflagration, radioactive materials, toxic release, cryogens,
electrical discharge, and structural failure. Operational hazards would
be hazards introduced to the launch site through procedures and
processes that occur during vehicle processing. Operational hazards
would include propellant handling and
[[Page 15362]]
loading, transporting vehicles or components, vehicle system
activation, and related tests.
Once an operator has identified hazards, proposed Sec. 450.185(b)
would require an operator to conduct a risk assessment. In other words,
an operator would have to evaluate each hazard to determine the
likelihood and the severity of that hazard. This assessment should
identify the likelihood of each hazard causing a casualty. This
assessment should also account for the likelihood of each hazard
causing major damage to public property or critical assets. Public
property, in this case, means any property not associated with the
operation. Critical assets means an asset that is essential to the
national interests of the United States, and includes property,
facilities, or infrastructure necessary to maintain national defense,
or assured access to space for national priority missions.
Proposed Sec. 450.185(c) would require an operator to identify
mitigations or controls used to eliminate or mitigate the severity or
likelihood of identified hazards. An operator would be required to
demonstrate, as part of its ground hazard analysis, that the
mitigations or controls reduce the likelihood of each hazard that may
cause (1) death or serious injury to the public to an extremely remote
likelihood, and (2) major damage to public property or critical assets
to a remote likelihood. These qualitative thresholds are the same as
those in Sec. 437.55(a)(3) and proposed Sec. 450.109(a)(3). A hazard
control is a preventative or mitigation measure that reduces the
likelihood of the hazard or ameliorates its severity.
Proposed Sec. 450.185(d) would require an operator to identify and
describe the risk elimination and mitigation measures required to
satisfy the risk criteria in proposed Sec. 450.185(c). Under current
industry standards, these measures include one or more of the
following: Design for minimum risk, incorporate safety devices, provide
warning devices, or implement procedures and training, as previously
discussed in reference to the analogous flight hazard analysis
requirement in Sec. 450.109(a)(4).\168\
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\168\ MIL-STD-882E, section 4.3.4.
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Finally, proposed Sec. 450.185(e) would require an operator to
demonstrate through verification and validation that the risk
elimination measures meet the remote and extremely remote standards
discussed earlier. Verification is an evaluation to determine that
safety measures derived from the ground hazard analysis are effective
and have been properly implemented. Verification provides measurable
evidence that a safety measure reduces risk to acceptable levels.
Validation is an evaluation to determine that each safety measure
derived from the ground hazard analysis is correct, complete,
consistent, unambiguous, verifiable, and technically feasible.
Validation ensures that the right safety measure is implemented, and
that the safety measure is well understood.
While this proposal would require an operator to complete a full
ground hazard analysis as described previously, an operator would not
need to submit this analysis in its entirety as part of its vehicle
operator license application. Rather in proposed Sec. 450.185(f), the
FAA would require an applicant to provide a description of the ground
safety hazard analysis methodology, a list of the systems and
operations involving the vehicle or payload that may cause a hazard to
the public, and the results of the ground hazard analysis that affect
the public. Although the results of the ground hazard analysis would be
unique to each applicant's operations, the ground hazard analysis
application deliverables should have common elements. Specifically, the
ground hazard analysis should contain the hazards that have a high
likelihood or high severity of affecting the public. The analysis
should include controls for the hazards that mitigate the risk to the
public and all of the other requirements shown in Sec. 450.185. Common
hazards that affect public safety, which the FAA would expect to be
addressed in a ground hazard analysis, include propellant loading,
ordinance installation or actuation, proximity to pressurized systems
during operations, certain lifting operations (such as solid rocket
motors and payload integration), operations which could result in toxic
release, and RF testing. Fundamentally, if the operator identifies a
hazard that affects the public, it must be properly documented and
mitigated to reduce the risk to the public. It should be noted that any
part of the ground hazard analysis could be reviewed during inspection.
3. Ground Safety: Ground Safety Prescribed Hazard Controls
In addition to those mitigations an operator would implement as a
result of its ground hazard analysis, proposed Sec. 450.189 (Ground
Safety Prescribed Hazard Controls) would require an operator to
implement certain prescribed hazard controls during the ground
operations period of launch or reentry. These prescribed hazard
controls would require that an operator document how it would protect
members of the public who enter areas under the operator's control,
mitigate hazards created by a countdown abort. They would also require
the operator's plans for controlling fires and emergency procedures.
Specifically, proposed Sec. 450.189(b) would require an operator
to document a process for protecting members of the public who enter
any area under the operator's control. Although the public would be
protected from many hazards because they are excluded from safety clear
zones and prevented from entering the site during certain hazardous
operations, an operator should account for the protection of the public
when they are allowed to be on the site. The proposed rule would
require an operator to develop procedures to identify and track members
of the public while on site, and methods to protect the public from
hazards in accordance with the ground hazard analysis and the toxic
hazard analysis. For example, the operator could have plans in place to
control who enters its site, whether or not members of the public on
site will be escorted, how the public will be made aware of and
protected from hazards, and if members of the public will be required
to wear personal protective equipment.
This rule would also require an operator to establish, maintain,
and perform procedures for controlling certain hazards in the event of
a countdown abort or recycle operation. Current Sec. 417.415(b)
requires an operator to meet specific requirements for safing their
vehicle, maintaining control of their FSS, and controlling access to
the site until it is returned to a safe state. This rule would require
a more performance-based approach to ensuring the safety of the vehicle
and the site following a countdown abort or recycle operation in order
to accommodate many different types of flight safety systems and
operations.
Proposed Sec. 450.189(c) would require that an operator, following
a countdown abort or recycle operation, establish, maintain, and
perform procedures for controlling hazards related to the vehicle and
returning the vehicle, stages, or other flight hardware and site
facilities to a safe condition. In all of these instances, this
proposal would require an operator to have provisions in place to keep
the public safe while returning the launch vehicle or launch site back
to a safe condition. If a launch vehicle does not lift-off after a
command to initiate flight, an operator would be required to ensure
that the vehicle and any payload are in a safe configuration, prohibit
the public from entering into any identified hazard areas until the
site
[[Page 15363]]
is returned to a safe condition, and maintain and verify that any FSS
remains operation until certain that the launch vehicle does not
represent a risk of inadvertent flight. These more specific
requirements would be levied on an operator in the event of a failure
to lift-off after a command to initiate because a launch vehicle can be
in a particularly hazardous state.
This proposed requirement is similar to Sec. 417.415(b), which
requires a launch operator to establish procedures for controlling
hazards associated with a failed flight attempt where an engine start
command was sent, but the launch vehicle did not lift-off. These
procedures must include maintaining and verifying that each flight
termination system remains operational, assuring that the vehicle is in
a safe configuration, and prohibiting launch complex entry until the
launch pad area safing procedures are complete.
Proposed Sec. 450.189(d) would require an operator to have in
place reasonable precautions for reporting and controlling any fire
that occurs during launch and reentry activities in order to prevent
the occurrence of secondary hazards such as a brush fire caused by a
static fire test or some related ground launch activity. These
secondary hazards, if not controlled, could reach pressure vessels or
other related equipment causing more damage. An operator may choose to
meet industry standards or fire codes as a means of satisfying this
requirement.
Proposed Sec. 450.189(e) would require an operator to establish
general emergency procedures that address how emergencies would be
handled at the site. An emergency has the potential to directly affect
the public or create secondary hazards that may affect the public;
therefore, implementation of these procedures are critical for safety
of the public. An emergency would include any event that would require
an evacuation, or a response from emergency officials such as the fire
department or emergency medical technicians. Additionally, the
establishment of general emergency procedures would allow the operator
to have roles, responsibilities, and plans in place in advance of an
emergency to reduce the effects of any emergency on the public. Section
417.111(c)(15) currently requires an operator to have generic emergency
procedures in place for any emergency that may create a hazard to the
public, and this rule would replace those prescriptive requirements
with performance-based requirements.
Proposed Sec. 450.189(f) would require an applicant to submit its
process for protecting members of the public who enter any area under
the operator's control. This process would be submitted as part of an
applicant's vehicle operator license application.
4. Ground Safety: Coordination With a Licensed Launch or Reentry Site
Operator
Under proposed Sec. 450.181(a), for a launch or reentry conducted
from or to a Federal launch or reentry site or a site licensed under
part 420 or 433, an operator must coordinate with the site operator
because the two entities each have public safety responsibilities
during ground operations. Specifically, an operator must coordinate
with the site operator to ensure public access is controlled where and
when necessary to protect public safety, to ensure launch or reentry
operations are coordinated with other launch and reentry operators and
other affected parties to prevent unsafe interference, to ensure that
any ground hazard area does not unnecessarily interfere \169\ with
continued operation of the launch or reentry site, and to ensure prompt
and effective response in the event of a mishap that could impact
public safety. This is similar to Sec. 417.9(b)(2), which requires a
launch operator to coordinate with a launch site operator and provide
any information on its activities and potential hazards necessary for
the launch site operator to determine how to protect any other launch
operator, person, or property at the launch site. Part 431 requires an
agreement between a launch or reentry operator and any site operator in
Sec. 431.75. In addition, in the mission readiness review requirements
in Sec. 431.37(a), an operator must involve launch site and reentry
site personnel and verify their readiness to provide safety-related
launch property and launch services.
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\169\ The FAA has proposed minimum requirements for ground
hazard areas based on safety thresholds, either toxic hazard areas
or other hazard areas derived from the ground hazard analysis, but
has always allowed operators to propose to clear areas larger than
necessary to ensure greater safety. In consultation with NASA and
the Department of Defense, the FAA discovered that FAA approved
ground hazard areas were having adverse impacts on neighboring space
operations in easily avoidable ways. As such, the FAA has proposed
ground hazard areas be coordinated with the affected launch or
reentry site operators prior to licensing.
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For a launch or reentry conducted from or to a site licensed under
part 420 or 433, Sec. 450.181(b) would require an operator to also
coordinate with the site operator to establish roles and
responsibilities for reporting, responding to, and investigating any
mishap during ground activities at the site. The same mishap plan
requirements in proposed Sec. 450.173 would apply to a site operator
leaving open the assignment of roles and responsibilities between a
site and launch or reentry operator for reporting, responding to, and
investigating mishaps during ground operations. Proposed Sec.
450.181(b) is designed to ensure those roles and responsibilities are
established.
As part of its application, an applicant would be required to
describe how it is coordinating with a Federal or licensed launch or
reentry site operator in compliance with this section. As discussed
earlier, in reference to proposed Sec. 450.147, a vehicle operator
would be required to submit as part of its vehicle operator license
application references to any agreements with other entities utilized
to meet any requirements of this section. In this context, agreements
may include security, access control services, any lease agreements for
launch sites, services used for hazard controls or analysis, or any
agreement with local emergency or government services.
5. Ground Safety: Explosive Site Plan
Proposed Sec. 450.183 (Explosive Site Plan) would require an
applicant to include an explosive site plan as part of its vehicle
operator license application, if it proposes to conduct a launch or
reentry from or to a site exclusive to its own use. The explosive site
plan would have to demonstrate compliance with the explosive siting
requirements of Sec. Sec. 420.63, 420.65, 420.66, 420.67, 420.69, and
420.70. Currently for exclusive use sites, Sec. 417.9(c) requires a
launch operator to satisfy the requirements of the public safety
requirements of part 420. With proposed Sec. 450.183, the FAA is
clarifying that the only requirements from part 420 that need be
conducted by an exclusive use operator is the explosive safety
requirements.
6. Ground Safety: Toxic Hazards During Ground Operations
Proposed Sec. 450.187 contains requirements for toxic hazard
mitigation for ground operations. This is discussed later in the
``Additional Technical Justification and Rationale'' section, in the
subsection on toxic hazards for flight, due to the commonality of toxic
requirements for ground operations and flight.
Process Improvements
A. Safety Element Approval
This proposal would modify part 414 to enable applicants to request
a safety
[[Page 15364]]
element approval in conjunction with a license application as provided
in proposed part 450. Proposed Sec. 450.39 (Use of Safety Element
Approval) would allow an applicant to use any vehicle, safety system,
process, service, or personnel for which the FAA has issued a safety
element approval under part 414 without the FAA's reevaluation of that
safety element during a license application evaluation to the extent
its use is within its approved envelope. Finally, this proposal would
change the part 414 term from ``safety approval'' to ``safety element
approval'' to distinguish it from ``safety approval'' as used in parts
415, 431, and 435, and proposed part 450, because these terms, as
discussed later in this section, have entirely different meanings.
i. Part 414 and 415 Safety Approval Clarification
As defined in current Sec. 414.3, a safety approval is an FAA
document containing an FAA determination that one or more safety
elements, when used or employed within a defined envelope, parameter,
or situation, will not jeopardize public health and safety or safety of
property. As listed in the Act, safety elements include: (1) Launch
vehicle, reentry vehicle, safety system, process, service, or any
identified component thereof; or (2) qualified and trained personnel,
performing a process or function related to licensed launch activities
or vehicles. In contrast, parts 415, 431, and 435 reference ``safety
approval'' to mean an FAA determination that an applicant is capable of
launching a launch vehicle and its payload without jeopardizing public
health and safety, and safety of property. Other chapter III parts,
including parts 431 and 435, reference ``safety approval'' as described
in part 415.
The use of identical terms in parts 414, 415, 431, and 435 to
reference different meanings has caused confusion. Therefore, the FAA
proposes to distinguish these terms by changing the part 414 term to
``safety element approval.'' This proposed term more accurately
reflects the substance of a part 414 safety approval of a particular
element that may be used to support the application review for one or
more launch or reentry licenses. Other than the addition of ``element''
to the current term, the part 414 definition and related references in
parts 413 and 437 would remain the same. The FAA would make conforming
changes throughout parts 413, 414, and 437, where a part 414 safety
approval is referenced, to change those references to ``safety element
approval.'' The term ``safety approval'' would maintain the same
meaning as that in current 415, 431 and 435 where it appears in the
proposed rule.
ii. Part 414 Safety Element Approval \170\ Application Submitted in
Conjunction With a License Application
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\170\ For readability and ease of understanding, this section
refers to a current part 414 safety approval as a safety element
approval, regardless of whether the discussion is referencing the
current regulations or the proposed regulations. For direct
quotations, the FAA retains the previous term ``safety approval.''
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Part 414 enables a launch and reentry operator to use an approved
safety element within a specified scope without a re-examination of the
element's fitness and suitability for a particular launch or reentry
proposal. A safety element approval may be issued independent of a
license, and it does not confer any authority to conduct activities for
which a license is required under chapter III. A safety element
approval does not relieve its holder of the duty to comply with all
applicable requirements of law or regulation that may apply to the
holder's activities.
The ARC recommended that an applicant for a launch or reentry
license be able to identify one or more safety elements included in the
applicant's license application and to request review of those safety
elements for a safety element approval concurrent with the license
application review.\171\
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\171\ ARC Report, p. 24-25.
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The FAA agrees with the ARC's recommendation. The FAA notes that
its practice has always been to accept references to information
provided in a previous license application so long as the applicant can
demonstrate the relevance of that information to the current
application. The FAA also relies on previous evaluations where it
analyzed compliance with a particular requirement if the same operator
submits a more recent application using the same analysis. The proposed
changes would codify this approach for safety element approval
applications in proposed Sec. 450.39 \172\ and the relevant sections
in part 414.
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\172\ Proposed Sec. 450.39 is similar to Sec. 437.21(c) for
experimental permits, which states that if an applicant proposes to
use any reusable suborbital rocket, safety system, process, service,
or personnel for which the FAA has issued a safety approval under
part 414, the FAA will not reevaluate that safety element to the
extent its use is within its approved envelope. Parts 415 and 431 do
not have similar sections because they were developed before part
414 was issued.
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This proposal would allow an applicant to request a safety element
approval as part of its vehicle operator license application.
Specifically, this rule would provide a process in proposed Sec.
414.13 to apply for a safety element approval concurrently with a
license application. These safety element approval applications
submitted in conjunction with a license would largely use information
contained in a license application to satisfy part 414 requirements.
This would alleviate the need to provide separate applications for a
vehicle operator license and a safety element approval. The FAA
envisions safety element approvals in conjunction with a license
application to cover the same safety elements as delineated in Sec.
414.3.
Using similar processes as for part 414, the FAA would determine
whether a safety element is eligible for a safety element approval. The
FAA would base its determination on criteria in proposed part 450. The
applicant would be required to specify the sections of the license
application that support its application for a safety element approval.
The technical criteria for reviewing a safety approval submitted as
part of a vehicle operator license application would be limited to the
requirements of proposed part 450. This limitation would simplify the
safety element approval process by eliminating the need to provide a
Statement of Conformance letter, as required under current Sec.
414.1(c)(3) for a safety element approval separate from a vehicle
operator license application. To avoid this limitation to proposed part
450 criteria, an applicant could apply for a safety element approval
separate from a vehicle operator license. However, there is no
difference between a safety element approval issued through a separate
application or a vehicle operator license application.
Finally, the FAA proposes to remove the requirement stating that,
for each grant of a safety element approval, the FAA will publish in
the Federal Register a notice of the criteria that were used to
evaluate the safety element approval application, and a description of
the criteria. The FAA provided the rationale for this notification in
the preamble to a proposed rule.\173\ The FAA explained that the
purpose of this notification requirement was to make clear the criteria
and standards the FAA used to assess a safety element. However, the FAA
has found that this requirement is unnecessary, and has potentially
discouraged applications for safety element approvals due to concerns
that proprietary data may be disclosed. Going forward, a safety element
approval application submitted concurrently with a vehicle operator
license application would be evaluated
[[Page 15365]]
based only on criteria in proposed part 450. For other safety element
approvals, experience has shown that there is no need to publish the
criteria because the FAA's determinations were not based on any
uniquely-derived standard. In fact, all eight safety element approvals
granted by the FAA have been evaluated against regulations in 14 CFR
chapter III. Therefore, the FAA proposes to revise the requirement in
current Sec. 414.35 (re-designated as Sec. 414.39) such that safety
element approval evaluation criteria, whether related to an application
submitted concurrently with a license application or separately, would
not require publication.
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\173\ Safety Approvals, NPRM, 70 FR 32191, 32198 (June 1, 2005).
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Given the FAA's proposal to not require publication of evaluation
criteria, the confidentiality provision under current Sec. 414.13(d)
\174\ is no longer necessary. That provision notifies applicants that
if proposed criteria is secret, proprietary, or confidential, it may
not be used as a basis to issue a safety approval.
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\174\ Current Sec. 414.13 would be renumbered in this proposal
as Sec. 414.17 to maintain sequential section numbering.
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B. Incremental Review of a License Application
In response to the ARC recommendations, the FAA proposes to amend
part 413 and to include language in proposed part 450 to allow an
applicant the option for an incremental review of the safety approval
portion of its application.
Under 51 U.S.C. 50905(a)(1), the FAA is required by statute to
issue or deny a launch or reentry license not later than 180 days after
accepting an application. Under the same statute, the FAA must inform
the applicant of any pending issue and action required to resolve the
issue not later than 120 days after accepting an application. To ensure
that the FAA has sufficient time to complete a thorough review to
evaluate whether the applicant complies with the FAA's commercial space
transportation regulations in the prescribed time frame, Sec. 413.11
states the FAA screens the application to determine if it contains
sufficient information for it to begin its review. It also states that
if the application is so incomplete or indefinite that the FAA cannot
start to evaluate it, the FAA will notify the applicant accordingly. In
accordance with internal policy, the FAA aims to make this complete
enough determination within two calendar weeks after receiving the
application. When the FAA accepts an application, the 180-day review
period begins on the date that the FAA received the application. If the
FAA accepts an application as complete enough to review, the FAA works
with applicants to identify additional information and documentation
needed to demonstrate regulatory compliance, and advises applicants
when those materials are needed. If the additional materials are not
provided within an appropriate time frame, the FAA tolls the review
period, stopping the counting of time towards the 180-day deadline.
Once the FAA has completed its review, it issues a license, or informs
the applicant, in writing, that the license application is being denied
and states the reasons for denial.
Industry representatives have expressed frustration both with a
lack of clarity as to what is ``complete enough'' for the FAA to accept
an application and begin review and with the 180-day review period. The
FAA seeks comment on how the FAA can improve the clarity of ``complete
enough'' to address past frustrations. For an applicant that is in the
early stages of development, there are challenges with compiling all of
the documentation in parallel with their vehicle development. First-
time applicants regularly underestimate the amount of time needed for
licensing. For nearly all applicants, much of the vehicle and mission
information is only refined and finalized within the 180-day review
period, which may subject the application to tolling and business risk
to the applicant's timeline for launch operations. The timing of the
issuance of an FAA authorization has never caused a delay to a launch
or reentry operation, but the FAA is cognizant that there could be
impacts on an operator even absent an operation delay.
In part to address these issues, and bearing in mind that a written
application is the means by which the FAA determines whether a launch
or reentry operator can conduct a launch or reentry safely, the FAA
invited the ARC to describe how the FAA might modify its application
process to improve efficiency for both the FAA and applicants. The ARC
suggested in part that the FAA allow for an incremental or modular
application and review process. Specifically, the ARC recommended that
the application review process should be modified to allow for
incremental approvals of subsections to guide a focused review and
avoid tolling. The recommendation suggested further that, rather than
180 days for review of an entire application, the FAA should assign a
brief period for each subsection or module.
The current application process is already modular to an extent.
The FAA has issued payload determinations outside of a license,
primarily for payload developers seeking early assurances that their
payload would be permitted to be launched. The FAA has even conducted
preliminary policy reviews to provide similar assurances to future
applicants on a less formal basis. Despite these allowances, the vast
majority of FAA commercial space licensing evaluation time is spent on
evaluating the safety implications of a license application. Because
this proposed rule seeks to convert the prescriptive safety
requirements to performance-based criteria, the FAA believes that it
may be possible to develop a flexible safety review process that can
afford applicants early determinations, providing an applicant more
flexibility and control over the timing of the licensing process.
The ARC also recommended that the FAA reduce its application review
time. The ARC focused on differentiating between experienced and
inexperienced operators in order to decrease FAA review time of license
applications. While the FAA agrees that experienced operators may
require shorter application review times, it should be noted that this
would likely be due to familiarity with the application process, more
streamlined application materials that lend themselves to a more
efficient review, and established processes that have been through FAA
review previously (such as ground safety analyses). While the proposed
incremental review process would empower operators to better define
when certain portions of an application are reviewed and would allow an
operator that has satisfied certain requirements early to receive
credit for those portions of its application in advance, other
proposals in this rulemaking, such as safety element approvals
concurrent with a license application, flexible time frames, and
reduced application burdens, would probably serve to reduce review
times more effectively than an incremental application process.
Nevertheless, the modular nature of payload determinations, policy
approvals, environmental evaluations, and financial responsibility
requirements, and the more granular incremental review of compliance
with the safety approval requirements would allow an applicant to seek
partial approval of an application as soon as a portion is ready to be
evaluated. These approvals would allow an operator to better manage its
timeline and any potential timeline risk. The flexible nature of this
proposal would allow the FAA to further engage with industry and
establish new best practices and greater efficiencies for
[[Page 15366]]
both government evaluators and our commercial partners. The option of
using an incremental approach would provide more flexibility to
operators who are able to provide portions of their application in
advance.
In proposed Sec. 450.33 (Incremental Review and Determinations),
the FAA would revise the launch and reentry regulations to allow for an
incremental review application submission option for vehicle operator
license applicants. Because the current regulations already allow an
operator to submit the payload, policy, environmental, and financial
responsibility portions of its application independently, the FAA
proposes that the incremental review process apply specifically to the
safety approval portion of a license application. Given the large
variety of applicant experience, proposed operations, and company
timelines, the FAA recognizes a need for flexibility. Accordingly, the
FAA is proposing amendments to part 413 and regulatory language in
proposed part 450 to allow for incremental application submission and
determinations. This incremental review application process would not
replace the traditional review of a full, complete application
submitted at once--the incremental review would be an optional path to
obtaining an FAA license determination that allows an applicant to
choose an application submission process that suits their business
model and program needs.
The FAA is proposing in Sec. 450.33(a) that, prior to any
submission, an applicant would be required to identify to the FAA that
it plans to avail itself of the incremental review and determination
application process. During pre-application consultation, the FAA would
work with an applicant towards an incremental review process that is
aligned to both the development process for an applicant and the
necessities of the FAA's evaluation framework. The FAA proposes to
coordinate with applicants during pre-application consultation to
determine the following: (1) Appropriate portions of an operator's
application that could be submitted and reviewed independently; (2) the
application and review schedule with dates of key milestones; (3) the
applicant's planned approach to demonstrate compliance with each
applicable regulation, to include any foreseeable requests for waiver;
and (4) the scope of the proposed action being applied for, the
identification of any novel safety approaches or other potentially
complicating factors, and how those will be addressed during the
licensing process.
The details of an applicant's incremental application process would
have to be approved by the FAA in accordance with proposed Sec.
450.33(b) prior to application submission and the FAA could issue
determinations towards a safety approval resulting from those reviews,
in accordance with proposed Sec. 450.33(c). An applicant would be able
to propose sections of the safety approval portion of its application
that the FAA could review independently. This process would allow an
applicant to submit completed sections, for example the System Safety
Program, to the FAA early, rather than wait until the entire
application was complete enough. The FAA would also be able, where
appropriate, to review and make determinations on these increments
prior to a full licensing determination. It would also allow an
applicant to identify more challenging or lengthy portions of an
application that could be submitted earlier to avoid delays and tolling
closer to a launch date. The FAA believes this process would improve
predictability for applicants seeking assurances against business
risks. As the FAA gains more experience with the incremental
application process, the FAA may issue guidance for the process or an
example of a process that has been found to satisfy the intent of the
regulation.
The FAA considered the ARC's recommendations for predetermined
modules, but identified several concerns in attempting to model the
practice of such a process. The ARC provided a flow diagram that
partitioned the evaluation process into nine conceptual 30-day modules,
with the proposal that those modules could be reviewed in serial or in
parallel. As noted earlier, the FAA is statutorily limited to a 180-day
review process, so any review of modules in serial could not exceed 180
days. The ARC recommended that if the modules are submitted in parallel
for concurrent review, extra time should be provided for FAA review up
to 90 days to allow for dependent analyses. The ARC recommendation
asserted the importance that the modules are independent in terms of
content, when possible, but correctly acknowledged that some modules
will necessarily depend on others.\175\ The FAA seeks to provide as
much flexibility as practicable in the proposed process to enable
innovative business practices and schedules that contemplate frequent
launches and reentries, but many aspects of the safety evaluation are
interdependent, and the FAA requires certain material from one aspect
of a safety evaluation to inform and remain consistent with other
aspects. Furthermore, operators generally develop and define standards,
methodologies, processes, preliminary designs, and plans for an aspect
of their evaluation long before they are able to submit advanced
analysis products or testing results. The FAA seeks comment on how a
formal incremental review process would account for the statutory 180-
day review period, when application increments or modules are likely to
be submitted and reviewed at very different time periods.
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\175\ ARC Report, p. 61.
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To enable incremental application submission and review, the FAA is
proposing to amend Sec. 413.1 to broaden the term application to
encompass either a full application submitted for review or an
application portion submitted under the incremental review process. In
making this amendment, the FAA would be able to accommodate
applications submitted under either process. The FAA proposes to retain
the pre-application consultation requirement of Sec. 413.5, which is
streamlined by the proposed removal of Sec. 415.105 and its
duplicative requirement for a more prescriptive pre-application
consultation process. Under this proposal, an operator would be
required to identify whether it wants to enter into the incremental
application process during pre-application consultation. Should an
operator elect to submit its application incrementally, it would work
with the FAA to detail what is needed for each application portion to
begin review. In proposing an approach to incremental review, the FAA
expects that an applicant would consider the following:
1. Application increments submitted at different times should be
not be dependent on other increments to the extent practicable.
2. Application increments should be submitted in a workable
chronological order. In other words, an applicant should not submit an
application increment before a separate application increment on which
it is dependent. For example, the FAA would not expect to agree to
review a risk analysis before reviewing a debris analysis or
probability of failure analysis because the risk analysis is directly
dependent on the other two analyses.
3. An applicant should be able to clearly identify all the
regulations and associated application materials that would be required
for each application increment, and should be able to demonstrate to
the FAA that all the applicable regulations are covered by the
separately submitted portions.
[[Page 15367]]
4. Examples of application increments that may be suitable for
incremental review include: System Safety Program, Preliminary Safety
Assessment for Flight, Flight Safety Analysis Methods, and FSS Design.
The FAA seeks comment on the incremental approach generally. The
FAA further seeks comment on any other useful guidelines that an
applicant should consider when crafting an incremental approach.
Finally, the FAA also seeks comment on any other safety approval
sections of a license application that would be appropriate for
incremental review.
Finally, the FAA would amend Sec. 413.15 to provide that the time
frame for any incremental review and determinations would be
established with an applicant on a case-by-case basis during pre-
application consultation. The FAA would continue to work with
applicants during the pre-application phase to assist applicants in
navigating the FAA's regulations and identifying potential challenges.
C. Time Frames
Chapter III regulations include a number of prescriptive time frame
requirements that the FAA proposes to make more flexible. In 2016, the
FAA conducted a review of the time frames in chapter III and found that
many could be made more flexible without any discernable impact on
safety. During meetings with the Commercial Spaceflight Federation
(CSF) \176\ in 2017 and 2018, some members of industry expressed
concern about the FAA's restrictive time frame requirements. The ARC
also stated that the current regulatory time frames and requirements
for submission of changes is onerous and untenable for high flight
rates.\177\
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\176\ The Commercial Spaceflight Federation (CSF) states that
its mission is ``to promote the development of commercial human
spaceflight, pursue ever-higher levels of safety, and share best
practices and expertise throughout the industry.'' Its member
businesses and organizations include commercial spaceflight
developers, operators, spaceports, suppliers and service providers.
\177\ ARC Report, p. 48.
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In consideration of the industry's comments and the FAA's review of
chapter III time frames, the FAA proposes in Sec. 450.15 to increase
flexibility by allowing an operator the option to propose alternative
time frames that better suit its operations. The FAA would revise the
time frame requirements in parts 404, 413, 414, 415, 417, 420, 431,
437, and 440 that are overly burdensome and may result in waiver
requests. Further, the FAA would, after reviewing the operator's
request for an alternative time frame, provide the FAA's expected
review period to make its determination on the proposed alternative
time frame. The proposed revisions to parts 415, 417, and 431 would be
included in new proposed part 450. For ease of reference, the FAA would
list all revised chapter III time frames in proposed appendix A to part
404.
Proposed Sec. 450.15(b) would inform the operator to submit its
request for an alternative time frame in writing. The ``in writing''
provision could be in the form of a formal letter or email sent
electronically to the email address [email protected], with the
subject line ``Alternative Time Frame Request.'' If an operator would
like to send the request in hardcopy, it would mail the request to the
Federal Aviation Administration, Associate Administrator for Commercial
Space Transportation, Room 331, 800 Independence Avenue SW, Washington,
DC 20591; Attention: Alternative Time Frame Request. The FAA
anticipates that an operator would submit these requests during the
pre-application consultation or during the application process, and not
after a license has been issued. At a minimum, the operator would be
required to submit its request before the time frame specified in the
regulations. Note, the FAA would need time to process the request. For
example, if a requirement states that an operator must submit a
document 30 days before launch, the operator may not submit a request
for an alternative time frame 30 days before launch or later. Also,
under the proposal, the requested alternate time frame must be
specific. For example, an operator could request to submit a document
15 days before launch, but not ``as soon as possible.'' The FAA would
provide the operator its decision in writing.
Proposed Sec. 404.15(c) would provide the conditions under which
the Administrator would agree to an alternative time frame. That is,
the FAA would review and agree to an alternative time frame if the
proposed alternative time frame would allow time for the FAA to conduct
its review and make the requisite findings. For example, the default
time frame in proposed Sec. 450.213(b) for a licensee to submit to the
FAA certain payload information would be not less than 60 days before
each mission conducted under a license. The FAA uses the information to
verify that each payload fits within any approved class of payload
under the license, and to address any issues that may arise. The FAA
may only need a shorter time frame for this effort if the approved
payload classes are well defined and unlikely to generate payload-
specific issues. As another example, the default time frame in proposed
Sec. 450.213(d) for a licensee to submit to the FAA certain flight
safety system test data would be no later than 30 days before flight.
The FAA may agree to a shorter time frame for an experienced operator
that uses a proven flight safety system.
D. Continuing Accuracy of License Application and Modification of
License
The FAA proposes to consolidate continuing accuracy requirements
currently in Sec. Sec. 417.11 and 431.73 in proposed Sec. 450.211.
The proposed rule would preserve the standards in Sec. Sec. 417.11 and
431.73. In addition, it would allow an applicant to request approval of
an alternate method for requesting license modifications during the
application process. This option currently only exists in Sec. 437.85
for experimental permits.
Under the current regulations, an operator must ensure that any
representation contained in a license application is accurate for the
entire term of a license. After the FAA issues a launch license, an
operator must apply to the FAA for a license modification if any
representation that is material to public health and safety or safety
of property is no longer accurate (commonly referred to as ``material
change''). An application to modify a license must be prepared and
submitted in accordance with part 413. The licensee must indicate what
parts of its license application or license terms and conditions would
be affected by a proposed modification.
Although license applications are often updated during the
application process, the application, as fixed at the time of license
issuance, becomes part of the licensing record. After issuing the
license, the FAA deems any material change to a representation in the
application to be a modification to the license. However, changes may
occur after a license is issued, particularly among operators that are
developing new systems or incorporating innovative technology. The FAA
does not wish for the material change requirement to deter those
changes intended to improve operations. Although the FAA and operators
may not always agree on what constitutes a material change, the FAA
works with the operator to resolve any issues and reduce uncertainties.
Regarding compliance with an issued license, the ARC recommended
that information needed prior to each launch, as long as it is within
the approved flight envelope, should be minimized and a centralized,
automated
[[Page 15368]]
system for submitting preflight information should be established.
Continuing accuracy reviews should be limited to an assessment of the
risks created by the change. The ARC further recommended that if the
regulations continued to use the term ``material change,'' then that
term should be defined in the regulations, guidance, or pre-application
agreement.
The FAA agrees with the ARC's recommendations. While there already
exist avenues by which a licensee can minimize the need for license
modifications,\178\ this rule would adopt an approach from Sec. 437.85
where the FAA may identify the types of changes that a permittee may
make to a reusable suborbital rocket design without invalidating the
permit. In proposed Sec. 450.211, the FAA may approve an alternate
method for requesting license modifications if requested during the
application process. The FAA envisions that this approach would permit
an applicant during the application process to propose a method that is
responsive to its anticipated types of changes after a license is
issued.
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\178\ A license applicant may circumvent or lessen the need for
frequent license modification due to material change by providing in
its application a range of payloads, flight trajectories, hazard
areas, and orbital destinations, so as to encompass more flexibility
in actual licensed operations. A license applicant may also create
acceptable processes for making changes to safety critical systems
and their components, mission rules, hazard areas, and safety
organization, that limit the need for license modifications. Part of
these processes would include a mechanism for informing FAA of the
change.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Regarding the recommendation for the development of a centralized
automated system for submitting preflight information, while the FAA
has been flexible in accepting application material and license updates
submitted in electronic format, it recognizes that an improved system
is desirable. The FAA is exploring mechanisms to facilitate these
submissions.
Finally, the FAA agrees with the ARC recommendation that it should
develop guidance on what constitutes a ``material change'' and has
identified the following areas that often constitute a material change:
1. Safety-critical system or component changes (e.g., flight safety
system) that may affect public safety, including--
a. Substitution of an existing safety-critical component with a
component with a new part number or manufacturer (reflecting changed
dimensions, changed functional or performance specifications, or
changed manufacturing process).
b. Modifications to a safety critical component deemed necessary by
an anomaly investigation, and requiring re-verification by test or
inspection.
c. Rework or repair of a safety-critical component after
inspections or tests revealed fabrication or assembly imperfections.
d. Reuse, after an earlier launch or reentry, of safety-critical
systems or components, requiring refurbishment, re-qualification
testing, and re-acceptance testing.
2. Hazard analysis changes that may affect public safety such as
the validity of the hazard analysis, mitigation measure, or
verification of a safety critical system or component.
3. Flight safety rule changes that may affect public safety such as
flight commit criteria associated with public safety.
4. Hazard area changes that may affect public safety, including the
dimensions of the area.
5. Maximum Probable Loss (MPL) related changes that affect the
validity of the assumptions used to establish the MPL (e.g., change in
the number of personnel within a hazard area, change in trajectory
resulting in more overflight of people or property, increase in vehicle
size with more propellant, hazardous materials, or potential debris).
6. Environmental Assessment related changes that affect the
validity of an environmental assessment (e.g., changes to mitigation
measures outlined in a record of decision or environmental impact
statement).
7. Safety organization changes that may affect public safety such
as changes to the roles and responsibilities of the safety organization
or personnel, including changes in contractual safety services.\179\
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\179\ As discussed earlier in the preamble, the proposed rule
would eliminate the current requirement to name a specific
individual as the safety official. Instead, the NPRM would allow for
one person or several persons to perform the safety official
functions, and, the operator would be required to designate a
position, not a specific individual, to accomplish the safety
official functions. Therefore, under this proposal, if the operator
changes the specific individual performing the safety official
functions, that would not constitute a material change.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
8. Critical documents or processes that may affect public safety.
The FAA believes that this list provides guidance to help operators
better understand what constitutes a material change. As the industry
continues to develop and the FAA identifies material changes, it will
consider providing more detailed guidance.
Other Changes
A. Pre-Application Consultation
As discussed earlier, the ARC recommended that the FAA require the
pre-application process only for new operators or new vehicle programs.
For all other operations, the ARC recommended that pre-application
occur at the operator's discretion.\180\ The FAA does not agree that
pre-application should be discretionary for anyone. In light of the
various flexibilities proposed in this rule, pre-application
consultation would remain critical to assist operators with the
licensing process, especially those that choose to avail themselves of
the flexibilities provided in this proposal. These flexibilities
include incremental review, timelines, and the performance-based nature
of many of the regulatory requirements. Pre-application consultation
eases the burden on both the applicant and the FAA during the
application process by identifying and resolving issues that allow
applicants to submit application materials the agency can accept as
complete enough for review. That being said, pre-application
consultation with an experienced operator conducting an operation
substantively similar to one previously licensed would likely be an
abbreviated process.
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\180\ ARC Report, p. 23.
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In response to the ARCs request for defined review times, the FAA
considered an approach to pre-application consultation that would
culminate in a mutually agreeable ``compliance plan.'' Under this
approach, a compliance plan would be developed collaboratively between
the applicant and the FAA. Key milestones that could be established by
the compliance plan would include, but would not be limited to, the
planned dates of the formal application submittal, the FAA's licensing
determination, and the submission of any required information that is
unavailable at the time of formal application submittal. The FAA chose
not to propose this requirement because it could be overly burdensome,
possibly delay an application submittal, and the compliance plan could
require frequent updates. However, the FAA would be open to commenters'
views on how to best develop a voluntary pre-application product, such
as a compliance plan.
B. Policy Review and Approval
The FAA currently reviews a launch and reentry license application
to determine whether it presents any issues affecting national security
[[Page 15369]]
interests, foreign policy interests, or international obligations of
the United States. As part of its review and in accordance with section
50918 of the Act, the FAA consults with the Department of State,
Department of Defense, and other executive agencies, as appropriate.
The Department of Defense assesses the effect of the launch on U.S.
national security, and the Department of State assesses its effect on
foreign policy interests and international obligations of the United
States. For good practice, the FAA also consults with NASA, the
Department of Commerce's National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA), and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC),
for counsel on those U.S. interests related to the primary
responsibilities of each agency. As such, the FAA coordinates with the
FCC and NOAA over matters related to frequency licensing and Earth
imaging, respectively, and with NASA for matters particularly related
to its assets in space.
Section 415.25 currently contains application requirements for a
policy review of the launch of a vehicle other than an RLV, Sec.
431.25 for the launch and reentry of an RLV, and Sec. 435.23 for the
launch of a reentry vehicle other than an RLV.\181\ To date, these
informational requirements have served their purpose well. However, the
FAA believes that the current informational requirements should be
modified to relieve the applicant of unnecessary burden and to improve
the utility of the information requested for a policy review.
Currently, Sec. Sec. 415.25(b) and 431.25(b) both require an applicant
to identify structural, pneumatic, propellant, propulsion, electrical
and avionics systems. Section 431.25(b) also requires an applicant to
identify thermal and guidance systems used in the launch vehicle, and
all propellants. Although identifying the aforementioned systems is
important for a safety review, the FAA believes that this information
is not critical for a policy review, which addresses whether the launch
or reentry presents issues affecting national security interests,
foreign policy interests, or international obligations of the United
States.
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\181\ These sections require an applicant to provide basic
information about the launch or reentry vehicle, its ownership,
launch site, flight azimuths, trajectories, associated ground tracks
and instantaneous impact points, sequence of planned events or
maneuvers during flight, range of nominal impact areas for all spent
motors and other discarded mission hardware, and for each orbital
mission, the range of intermediate and final orbits of each vehicle
upper stage, and their estimated orbital lifetimes.
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The FAA proposes to consolidate the policy review requirements
contained in Sec. Sec. 415.25 and 431.25 under proposed Sec. 450.41
(Policy Review and Approval). In doing so, the FAA would retain the
substance of the current requirements while further tailoring the
informational requirements toward a policy review. Also, the FAA would
replace the launch or reentry vehicle description requirements with
vehicle description requirements that are more appropriate for a policy
review. Finally, the FAA would require the applicant to provide flight
azimuths, trajectories, and associated ground tracks and instantaneous
impact points, and contingency abort \182\ profiles, if any, for the
duration of the licensed activity.
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\182\ The FAA proposes to revise the definition in Sec. 401.5
of ``contingency abort'' to mean a flight abort with a landing at a
planned location that has been designated in advance of vehicle
flight. The proposed definition is discussed later in this preamble.
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Specifically, proposed Sec. 450.41(e)(2) would replace the current
requirement to identify structural, pneumatic, propulsion, electrical,
thermal, guidance and avionics systems with a requirement to describe
the launch or reentry vehicle and any stages, including their
dimensions, type and amounts of all propellants, and maximum thrust. As
previously mentioned, currently required information is not critical
for a policy review because policy determinations do not require the
same level of technical detail as a safety review and do not need to
delve into vehicle design specifics. Instead, the information required
by proposed Sec. 450.41(e)(2) would provide the FAA and its
interagency partners with the scope of the proposed activity that is
more pertinent to a policy review. Moreover, the FAA anticipates that
the proposed changes would be significantly less burdensome for an
applicant, as the information is readily available and requires minimal
effort to provide. In contrast, the currently required information,
while also readily available, might be extensive and require more
effort to compile.
Additionally, it is unclear that the requirements to supply flight
azimuths, trajectories, and associated ground tracks and instantaneous
impact points, currently found in Sec. Sec. 415.25(d)(2) and
431.25(d)(2), apply for the duration of the licensed activity (i.e.,
from lift-off to the end of licensed activities). For example,
applicants previously have interpreted the requirement to supply flight
azimuths and trajectories to end at orbital insertion because that is
when ground tracks and instantaneous impact points vanish. However,
during interagency coordination for policy reviews of orbital missions,
NASA and the Department of Defense have repeatedly, and specifically,
requested information from the FAA concerning the trajectories of upper
stages after orbital insertion in order to determine the potential for
the proposed mission to jeopardize the safety of government property in
outer space or national security.
Therefore, in addition to consolidating Sec. Sec. 415.25(d)(2) and
431.25(d)(2) into proposed Sec. 450.41(e)(4)(ii), the FAA would add
language to clarify that the requirement to supply flight azimuths,
trajectories, and associated ground tracks and instantaneous impact
points applies for the duration of the licensed activity (i.e., lift
off to the end of launch). This clarification would eliminate the need
for the FAA to request additional information from an applicant to
satisfy inquiries from NASA and the Department of Defense during policy
reviews and prevent any unnecessary delays to the policy review
process.
C. Payload Review and Determination
The FAA proposes to consolidate the payload review requirements.
The agency would also remove the requirement to identify the method of
securing the payload on an RLV, add application requirements to assist
the interagency review, such as the identification of approximate
transit time to final orbit and any encryption, clarify the FAA's
relationship with other federal agencies for payload reviews, and
modify the 60-day notification requirement currently found in
Sec. Sec. 415.55 and 431.53.
While speaking of payload reviews, it is important to keep in mind
the definitions of launch vehicle and payload as defined in FAA
regulations. The FAA is not proposing to amend these definitions. A
launch vehicle is a vehicle built to operate in, or place a payload in,
outer space or a suborbital rocket. A payload is an object that a
person undertakes to place in outer space by means of a launch vehicle,
including components of the vehicle specifically designed or adapted
for that object. Thus, a payload can become a reentry vehicle. For
example, the Dragon is a payload when it is launched on the Falcon 9
and a reentry vehicle when it reenters from Earth orbit. The FAA
believes that any component attached to, or part of, a launch or
reentry vehicle that has an intended use in space other than
transporting itself or a payload, is in fact a payload. For example,
the FAA has treated canisters of cremains attached to a stage left in
orbit as payloads.
[[Page 15370]]
Pursuant to Sec. 415.51, unless the payload is exempt from review
under Sec. 415.53, the FAA reviews a payload proposed for launch to
determine whether an applicant, payload owner, or operator has obtained
all the required licenses, authorization, and permits. The FAA further
determines whether a payload's launch would jeopardize public health
and safety, safety of property, U.S. national security or foreign
policy interests, or international obligations of the United States.
Similarly, both Sec. 431.51 for launch and reentry of an RLV and Sec.
435.41 for reentry of a reentry vehicle other than an RLV, require the
FAA to review a payload to examine the policy and safety issues related
to the proposed reentry of a payload.
Current Sec. Sec. 415.59 and 431.57 also require the applicant to
submit basic payload information to allow the FAA to conduct a payload
review. While the information requirements for payload review in
Sec. Sec. 415.59 and 431.57 are similar, they are not identical. Both
sections require that an applicant provide the payload's physical
dimensions and weight; owner and operator; orbital parameters for
parking, transfer, and final orbits; and hazardous materials, as
defined in Sec. 401.5, and radioactive materials, and the amounts of
each. However, Sec. 415.59 requires an applicant to provide the name
and class of the payload, the intended payload operations during the
life of the payload, and the delivery point in flight at which the
payload will no longer be under the licensee's control. Whereas, Sec.
431.57 requires an applicant to provide either the payload name or
payload class and function; the physical characteristics of the payload
in addition to the payload's dimensions and weight; the explosive
potential of payload materials, alone and in combination with other
materials found on the payload or RLV during reentry; and the method of
securing the payload on the reusable launch vehicle. It also replaces
delivery point with designated reentry site(s); and requires the
identification of intended payload operations during the life of the
payload. With respect to hazardous materials, Sec. 431.57 also
requires the applicant to identify the container of the hazardous
materials, in addition to the type and amount, because how the
hazardous materials are contained is important for reentry.
The FAA believes that the current payload review informational
requirements necessitate modification to improve the utility and
efficiency of payload review. During interagency review, other agencies
have requested information from the FAA for the amount of time a
payload will take to reach its final orbital destination. This
information allows the agencies to assess the payload's potential to
impact their operations. However, current regulations do not contain an
informational requirement that the applicant provide this information.
As a result, the FAA often must make additional requests to the
applicant in order to provide the requesting agencies with the
information.
In the past, most non-government payloads were telecommunications
or remote sensing satellites for which there were well-established
regulatory regimes. Operators are now proposing payloads with new
intended uses such as servicing other satellites and mapping frequency
use. The capabilities of payloads continue to grow; for example,
cubesats are appearing in great numbers with unique capabilities. As a
result, it is possible that these new uses may pose threats to national
security, such as the resolution of on-board cameras that might be used
to survey national security space assets. Consequently, payload reviews
increasingly need to address the threat that these new uses and
capabilities might pose to U.S. national security, either unintentional
or malicious.
Additionally, Sec. 415.53 provides that the FAA does not review
payloads regulated by the FCC or the Department of Commerce. Section
431.51 provides that the FAA does not review payloads subject to
regulation by other federal agencies. However, neither of these
regulations reflect current practice. In practice, the FAA includes
payload information in its interagency reviews for all payloads, with
the exception of certain U.S. Government payloads for which information
is unavailable due to national security concerns, because Sec. 415.51
provides that the safety requirements apply to all payloads, regardless
of whether the payload is otherwise exempt. Even though the FAA
conducts a review of all payloads, the FAA does not impinge on the
authority of the FCC or the Department of Commerce, nor question the
decision of the FCC or NOAA to approve communications or remote sensing
satellites. It does not question the decision of another federal agency
concerning its payloads. More accurately, while the FAA may conduct a
review of all payloads, the FAA does not make a payload determination
on what it considers an ``exempt'' payload.
Changes in the types of payloads that are being launched or
proposed have also complicated the scope of FAA payload reviews and
demonstrated that the language exempting certain payloads from review
is overly restrictive. The FAA has made payload determinations for
payloads that will undoubtedly require FCC or NOAA licensing, but the
proposed payload missions were beyond the scope of communications or
remote sensing. These payloads were examined in the interagency process
and neither the FCC nor NOAA took exception to the FAA's approach.
Section 50918 of Title 51 of the U.S. Code mandates that the
Secretary of Transportation consult with the Secretary of Defense on
matters affecting national security, the Secretary of State on matters
affecting foreign policy, and the heads of other agencies when
appropriate. Section 50919(b) states that chapter 509 of Title 51 does
not affect the authority of the FCC or Department of Commerce. The
language of FAA regulations exempting from review those payloads
subject to the jurisdiction of the FCC, NOAA, and other agencies, is
more restrictive regarding the FAA's authority than what is required in
the statutory mandate of 51 U.S.C. 50918 and 50919. The genesis of this
more-limited role by the FAA came from the Report of House of
Representatives, May 31, 1984, that accompanied H.R. 3942.
Specifically, the report stated: ``[t]he Committee intends that the
Secretary not review or otherwise evaluate the merits of communications
satellites licensed and approved by the FCC, other than to assure the
proper integration of such payload with the launch vehicle and its
launch into orbit.'' At that time, almost all non-government payloads
were communications or remote sensing satellites, regulated by the FCC
and NOAA, respectively.
When DOT published the initial licensing regulations in 1988, the
preamble noted that the payloads subject to existing payload regulation
included only telecommunications satellites licensed by the FCC and
remote sensing satellites licensed by NOAA. It went on to state that
payloads that were not subject to review by DOT included all domestic
payloads not presently regulated by the FCC or NOAA and all foreign
payloads. Almost any domestic payload, even if it is not a
telecommunications satellite, however, requires FCC licensing because
it will invariably have a U.S.-owned or -operated transmitter for
telemetry purposes. Therefore, it appears that the intention of the
rule was only to exclude from FAA regulation telecommunications
satellites licensed by the FCC and likewise, remote sensing satellites
licensed by
[[Page 15371]]
NOAA, and not any satellite with a transmitter licensed by the FCC or
with some incidental remote sensing capability.
In recent years, there have been proposals for commercial payloads
where the primary purpose might be scientific or exploratory or even
artistic. Despite their primary purpose, these payloads almost always
require an FCC license because they have transmitters for telemetry.
Similarly, some payloads also require approval by NOAA even though
remote sensing may be ancillary to the main purpose. Without an
interagency review, the FAA has no direct means of knowing whether a
payload is exempt from review and, as a result, has initiated
interagency reviews. These reviews also serve the purpose of alerting
the other agencies to launches of payloads that might jeopardize U.S.
national security or foreign policy interests, or international
obligations of the United States, even if they are exempt from an FAA
payload review. Although the FAA has not to date been faced with the
Department of Defense or the Department of State raising concerns
through the interagency review regarding national security or foreign
policy for an ``exempt'' payload, the FAA believes that it would be its
responsibility to convey those concerns to the appropriate agencies for
resolution.
The ARC asserts that the payload reviews being conducted are more
detailed than necessary to assure the protection of ``public health and
safety.'' The ARC recommended that payloads that stay within the
vehicle, have non-hazardous materials, or those that have previously
been approved for flight, should not require reviews. It recommended
that safety goals can be met by only requiring reviews for hazardous
payloads that could impact ``public health and safety.'' The ARC also
stated that it would be more cost effective to regulate only hazardous
payloads ejected from the launch vehicle in reportable quantities using
the existing standards in 49 CFR 172.101. It believes such an approach
would reduce unnecessary paperwork and subsequent FAA review for
``benign payloads,'' and the reduction of burden on the FAA to review
``non-safety related payloads'' would support industry's increased
flight tempo and reduce FAA review times.
The FAA does not agree with the ARC recommendation that payloads
that stay within the vehicle, payloads that are non-hazardous
materials, or those that have previously been approved for flight
should not require reviews. The fact that a payload remains on or
within the launch or reentry vehicle does not change the function of
the payload. The payload's intended use in space or changes in the
orbit of the vehicle to accommodate the payload operation might present
issues because it could affect NASA or Department of Defense assets
either due to its orbit or function. For example, the Department of
Defense has concerns regarding payloads that may pass close enough to
its assets to photograph them. The FAA recognizes that some payloads,
such as canisters of cremains, attached to an upper stage, might have
little or no safety or policy implications. However, a review is still
necessary to make that determination. Obviously, the absence of
hazardous materials also removes some safety concerns; however, as
previously discussed, hazardous materials are not the only concern
addressed in the payload review.
While payloads that stay within a vehicle, do not contain hazardous
materials, or have previously been approved may require less scrutiny,
a payload review is still required because the FAA is statutorily
mandated under 51 U.S.C. 50904(c) to determine whether a license
applicant or payload owner or operator has obtained all required
licenses, authorization, and permits. If no license or authorization or
permit is required by another federal agency, the FAA must determine
whether a launch would jeopardize public health and safety, safety of
property, U.S. national security or foreign policy interests, or
international obligations of the United States. Similarly, while
potentially it might be more cost effective to regulate only hazardous
payloads ejected from a launch vehicle in reportable quantities using
existing standards in 49 CFR 172.101, the FAA must still comply with
the statutory requirements imposed on it by 51 U.S.C. 50904(c). Both
the FAA's current and proposed regulations reflect this statutory
requirement.
As for payloads that have previously been approved for launch, the
FAA already authorizes classes of payloads under Sec. Sec. 431.53 and
415.55, but it still requires identification of the specific payload at
least 60 days prior to the launch in order to confirm that the payload
fits within the authorized class and to coordinate with other federal
agencies. The FAA currently does not make a new payload determination
if a payload fits within a class of payloads authorized under a
particular license, but the review is still necessary to confirm there
are no issues that affect public health and safety, the safety of
property, or national security. The more defined the payload class, the
less the likelihood of any issues once the specific payload is
identified. For series of virtually identical payloads, the FAA has
authorized the entire series. A payload or launch operator can work
with the FAA to facilitate and expedite payload approvals by defining
payload classes to accommodate possible payloads. Also, payload classes
authorized for one operator will usually be authorized for another
operator. The FAA acknowledges that the current 60-day notification
requirement might be unnecessary for certain well-defined payload
classes and proposes to modify this requirement to permit a shorter
notification on a case-by-case basis. The FAA anticipates that the
notification requirement would be specified either in the separate
payload determination or in a vehicle operator license.
The ARC recommended that payloads that contain hazardous materials
in Federally-reportable quantities be reviewed in 15 days. The FAA does
not agree with the ARC's recommendation because there are other
considerations regarding intended operations in space that might affect
national security or the safety of property. For example, a payload may
have the capability of observing or interfering with U.S. national
security assets or violate a provision of a treaty.
The FAA proposes to consolidate the requirements for a payload
review currently contained in subparts D of parts 415, 431, and 435 in
proposed Sec. 450.43 (Payload Review and Determination). The proposed
consolidation would retain most of the current payload review
requirements. The limited changes the FAA proposes to the payload
requirements are discussed in this section.
The FAA proposes to modify the relationship with other agencies by
removing the misleading statement that the FAA does not review payloads
that are subject to regulation by the FCC or the Department of
Commerce. Specifically, the FAA proposes to modify the regulation to
reflect that while it does not review those aspects of payloads that
are subject to regulation by the FCC or the Department of Commerce, it
still reviews the payloads to determine their effect on the safety of
launch. The FAA also consults with other agencies to determine whether
their launch would jeopardize public health and safety, safety of
property, U.S. national security or foreign policy interests, or
international obligations of the United States. Proposed Sec.
450.43(b) would provide that the FAA would not make a payload
determination over those aspects of payloads that are subject to
regulation by the FCC or the
[[Page 15372]]
Department of Commerce. The FAA does not intend to interfere with any
requirement that these agencies might impose or with approvals or
denials. This clarification is merely a recognition of current practice
regarding payloads that do not easily fit into the existing regulatory
rubric.
The FAA also proposes not to retain the specific reference to NOAA
in Sec. 415.53(a). Although commercial remote sensing is currently
licensed by NOAA's Office of Commercial Remote Sensing Regulatory
Affairs (CRSRA), the Secretary of Commerce recently proposed merging
CRSRA with NOAA's Office of Space Commerce and moving them directly
under the Office of the Secretary of Commerce. As a result, proposed
Sec. 450.43(b) would revise the description of which payloads are
exempt, to clarify that a payload planning to conduct remote sensing
operations would be exempt if licensed by any office within the
Department of Commerce.
In consolidating the informational requirements in parts 415, 431,
and 435, the FAA proposes to eliminate information requirements
concerning the method of securing a payload that was a requirement
under Sec. 431.57(g) for RLVs because that information is not relevant
to a payload review. The FAA considered replacing that informational
requirement with a more general one to provide the potential of the
payload to affect the dynamics of the vehicle. However, the FAA
determined such information was more pertinent to the vehicle operator
and should instead be included in systems safety analysis for the
launch or reentry, if appropriate.
Proposed Sec. 450.43(i)(1) also would require an applicant to
provide an expanded description for the payload that would include its
composition and any hosted payloads in addition to the current
requirements of physical dimensions and weight. The FAA proposes to ask
for any foreign ownership of the payload or payload operator. In
addition, the FAA would add the approximate transit times to final
orbit for the payload. The FAA proposes to elaborate what it means by
intended payload operations during the life of the payload by adding
its anticipated life span and any planned disposal. Further, it
proposes a requirement to describe any encryption associated with data
storage on the payload and transmissions to or from the payload.
Encryption helps ensure against cyber intrusion, loss of spacecraft
control, and potential debris-causing events. The FAA is proposing
these additions to the information requirements for launches to assist
other federal agencies because NASA and the Department of Defense
frequently have requested this information in response to the FAA's
interagency review in order to determine whether the proposed payload
would jeopardize the safety of government property in outer space, or
U.S. national security.
The FAA also proposes to add a general requirement that it may
request any other information necessary to make a determination based
on public health and safety, safety of property, U.S. national security
or foreign policy interests, or international obligations of the United
States. The FAA believes that it would rarely invoke this provision but
believes that it is crucial to address unique payloads.
The FAA anticipates that for payload classes--as distinguished from
specific payloads--the applicant might only be able to provide a range
of expected transit times and would find this acceptable. Similarly,
for classes of payloads the FAA would find it appropriate to provide
ranges for information related to size of the payload and quantities of
hazardous materials. It also proposes to add the explosive potential of
payload materials, alone and in combination with other materials on the
payload for launches, as it already does for reentries because the
information is equally relevant to the safety of a launch as for a
reentry.
The FAA anticipates that these additional data requirements would
impose minimal burden, if any, on the applicant. For example, the
payload operator should already have detailed plans for moving its
payload to its final destination, and the explosive equivalent for most
materials is easily calculated using readily-available information. As
another example, in requesting information about what encryption, if
any, is used, the FAA is not asking for a detailed account of
encryption methodology. Many operators are already using 256-bit
Advanced Encryption Standard encryption (AES-256) to protect commercial
telemetry, tracking, and control data links and mission data
transmission or storage. In this case, an operator would only need to
state that it uses AES-256. These additional data requirements help
inform the overall evaluation of a payload.
By specifying in its regulations what is required to expedite the
FAA's payload review process without the need to make supplemental
requests to an applicant to address interagency concerns, and the
applicant would avoid having to respond to such requests. The FAA seeks
comment on this proposed approach.
D. Safety Review and Approval
As part of its current licensing process under parts 415 and 431,
the FAA conducts a safety review to determine whether a proposed launch
or reentry will jeopardize public health and safety and safety of
property. The FAA would not change the philosophy or purpose of a
safety review in this rulemaking. As with the current regulations, an
applicant would have to satisfy the safety requirements in order to
obtain a license to conduct a launch or reentry. Only a vehicle
operator license applicant would be eligible to apply for a safety
approval, and may apply for a safety approval separately and
incrementally. As with current regulations, the FAA would advise an
applicant, in writing, of any issues raised during a safety review that
would impede issuance of a license, and the applicant may respond in
writing, or amend its license application in accordance with Sec.
413.17. This proposal would also not change the process by which the
FAA denies a license, and the recourse afforded an applicant if a
license is denied.
For launches and reentries from, or to, a Federal launch range or
any launch or reentry site where a Federal launch range provides
safety-related launch or reentry services or property by contract, the
FAA would accept the service or property as meeting the relevant
requirements of proposed part 450, as long as the FAA determines that
the Federal launch range's safety requirements for the launch or
reentry services or property provided satisfy those requirements. Note
that a Federal launch range could, at the direction of the operator,
provide FSA products such a debris risk analyses or flight safety
limits analyses, directly to the FAA on behalf of an operator.
While the FAA is not proposing to change the philosophy and purpose
of a safety review and approval, the FAA is proposing changes to the
requirements to obtain a safety approval. The FAA proposes to locate
the application requirements for a safety approval in proposed Sec.
450.45 (Safety Review and Approval), in paragraph (e), and throughout
proposed subpart C.
The application requirements in proposed Sec. 450.45(e) are
general and not specific to any safety requirement, and would include
information not covered explicitly in proposed subpart C. Proposed
Sec. 450.45(e)(1) would address basic requirements for an application,
such as the inclusion of a glossary of terms and a listing of
referenced material. This proposed requirement is similar to current
Sec. 415.107, although
[[Page 15373]]
the proposed regulation would not include the requirement for an
application to be logically organized, with a clear and consistent page
numbering system, and topics cross-referenced. The FAA expects an
applicant to ensure its application meets these basic organizational
standards without explicitly requiring them.
In proposed Sec. 450.45(e)(2), the FAA would require an applicant
to submit information about its launch or reentry site. This proposed
requirement is similar to current Sec. 415.109(a), with the addition
of references to a reentry site.
In proposed Sec. 450.45(e)(3), the FAA would require an applicant
to submit information about its launch or reentry vehicle, including
safety critical systems. This proposed requirement is similar to
current Sec. 415.109(b), but would include reentry vehicles in
addition to launch vehicles.
In proposed Sec. 450.45(e)(4), the FAA would require an applicant
to submit a generic launch or reentry processing schedule that
identifies any readiness activities, such as reviews and rehearsals,
each safety-critical preflight operation, and day of flight activities.
Although the proposed regulations do not necessarily require reviews or
rehearsals, should the applicant propose them to meet readiness
requirements, they should be included in the schedule. This proposed
requirement is similar to current Sec. 415.119, but with the addition
of reentry vehicles.
Proposed Sec. 450.45(e)(5) would apply to any proposed launch or
reentry with a human being on board the vehicle, and would require an
applicant to demonstrate compliance with certain safety requirements in
part 460. This proposed requirement is similar to current Sec. 415.8,
except that it would include reentry vehicles.
Proposed Sec. 450.45(e)(6) would address the potential launch or
reentry of radionuclides, similar to current Sec. 415.115(b) but with
the addition of reentries. Because such proposals are rare, it is the
current practice of the FAA to address the public safety issues on a
case-by-case basis. This proposed rule would not change this approach.
Lastly, in proposed Sec. 450.45(e)(7), the FAA would reserve the
right to request additional information if necessary. This request
would include information incorporated by reference in the license
application, such as a previous application submittal. The FAA could
also request additional products that would allow the FAA to conduct an
independent safety analysis. The FAA periodically conducts independent
system safety and flight safety analyses in order to gain a deeper
understanding of the safety issues associated with a launch or reentry
proposal. This independent analysis is particularly important for novel
systems or operations. The FAA proposes to continue this practice with
this rulemaking.
Proposed subpart C would contain the remainder of the application
requirements for a safety approval. With some exceptions, discussed
later, each safety requirement in proposed subpart C has application
requirements articulated at the end of each section. Under current
regulations for ELVs, application requirements are contained in part
415, while safety requirements are contained in part 417. Under current
regulations for RLVs contained in part 431, application requirements
and safety requirements are not distinguished so clearly. The proposed
approach is designed to clearly separate safety requirements from
application requirements.
However, the following proposed sections do not include application
requirements, either because they introduce other sections or because
the FAA would not require a demonstration of compliance to obtain a
license:
1. Sec. 450.101: This section would address the core public safety
criteria for launching a launch vehicle or reentering a reentry
vehicle. An applicant would demonstrate that it can meet these criteria
in other parts of proposed subpart C.
2. Sec. 450.113 (Flight Safety Analysis Requirements--Scope and
Applicability): This section would address the scope and applicability
of the FSA requirements contained in Sec. Sec. 450.113 through
450.141.
3. Sec. 450.157: This section would include requirements for
communication procedures, but an applicant would not have to
demonstrate compliance with this section in order to obtain a license.
4. Sec. 450.159: This section would include requirements for
preflight procedures. Similar to proposed Sec. 450.157, an applicant
would not have to demonstrate compliance with this section in order to
obtain a license.
5. Sec. 450.169: This section would include requirements for
launch and reentry collision avoidance analysis. An applicant would not
have to demonstrate compliance with this section in order to obtain a
license, but it would have to provide certain information to the FAA
prior to a launch or reentry.
6. Sec. 450.179 (Ground Safety--General): This section would
address the scope and applicability of the ground safety requirements
contained in Sec. Sec. 450.181 (Coordination with a Site Operator)
through 450.189.
E. Environmental Review
The FAA proposes to consolidate environmental review requirements
for launch and reentry operators in a single section, as proposed Sec.
450.47 (Environmental Review). Currently, these requirements are set
forth in Sec. Sec. 415.201, 415.203, 431.91, 431.93, and 435.61. In
addition, the FAA proposes to revise current Sec. Sec. 420.15, 433.7,
433.9, and 437.21 to conform to the changes in proposed Sec. 450.47.
Apart from consolidation, these proposed revisions would not alter the
current environmental review process.
The FAA is responsible for complying with the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and other applicable environmental
laws, regulations, and Executive Orders prior to issuing a launch or
reentry license. To comply with NEPA, the FAA must first determine
whether the licensing action requires a Categorical Exclusion (CATEX),
an Environmental Assessment (EA), or an Environmental Impact Statement
(EIS). A CATEX is appropriate when actions, individually or
cumulatively, do not have a significant effect on the human
environment. An EA broadly documents evidence and analysis necessary to
determine whether a proposed action may significantly affect the human
environment requiring the preparation of an EIS or results in a finding
of no significant impact (FONSI). If the action may significantly
affect the human environment, NEPA requires preparation of an EIS. An
EIS is a thorough analysis of a proposed action's impacts on the
environment, including a public involvement process.
Under current FAA practice, the issuance of a new launch or reentry
license does not fall within the scope of a CATEX. However, an
applicant may provide data and analysis to assist the FAA in
determining whether a CATEX could apply (including whether an
extraordinary circumstance exists) to a license modification. Examples
include modifications that are administrative in nature or involve
minor facility siting, construction, or maintenance actions. If a CATEX
does not apply to the proposed action, but it is not anticipated to
have significant environmental effects, then NEPA requires the
preparation of an EA instead. The FAA may prepare an EA using
applicant-provided information. In the alternative, an applicant may
prepare an EA with FAA oversight. When NEPA requires an EIS for
commercial space actions, the FAA uses third-party contracting to
[[Page 15374]]
prepare the document. That is, the FAA selects a contractor to prepare
the EIS, and the license applicant pays the contractor. Finally, if an
EA or EIS was previously developed, the FAA may require a written re-
evaluation of the environmental document to ensure the document's
continued adequacy, accuracy and validity.\183\
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\183\ FAA Order 1050.1F, Environmental Impacts: Policies and
Procedures, provides a more detailed description of the FAA's
policies and procedures for NEPA and CEQ compliance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This proposed rule would not alter the current environmental review
requirements. However, the consolidation of the launch and reentry
regulations would require a consolidation of the environmental review
requirements.
F. Additional License Terms and Conditions, Transfer of a Vehicle
Operator License, Rights Not Conferred by a Vehicle Operator License
As discussed earlier in this preamble, the FAA proposes to
consolidate, under proposed part 450, the differing types of launch and
reentry licenses, currently in parts 415, 431, and 435, into a single
vehicle operator license. As part of this consolidation, the FAA would
combine specified sections of parts 415, 431, and 435 into proposed
sections of part 450, such that the consolidated requirements would
apply to a single vehicle operator license. Except for these changes,
the current requirements would remain the same. The specific proposed
changes are identified below.
1. Additional Terms and Conditions
The FAA proposes to consolidate the current additional terms and
conditions requirements in Sec. Sec. 415.11, 431.11, and 435.11 into
proposed Sec. 450.9 (Additional License Terms and Conditions) without
substantive change. Therefore, the proposed requirement would state
that the FAA may amend a vehicle operator license at any time by
modifying or adding terms and conditions to the license to ensure
compliance with the Act and regulations.
2. Transfer of a Vehicle Operator License
The FAA proposes to consolidate the requirements to transfer a
license in current Sec. Sec. 415.13, 431.13, and 435.13 into proposed
Sec. 450.11 (Transfer of a Vehicle Operator License). Although the
location of the requirements would change, the requirements themselves
would not substantively change.
The proposed requirements would continue to provide that only the
FAA may transfer a vehicle operator license; and, that an applicant
must submit a license application to transfer a license according to
the provisions of part 413 and the requirements of proposed part 450.
Also, like the current requirements, the proposal would require an
applicant to satisfy all of the approvals and determinations required
under part 450 before the FAA would transfer a license to an applicant,
and the FAA would retain the ability to incorporate by reference any
findings made part of the record to support the initial licensing
determination and to modify a license to reflect any changes necessary
because of a license transfer.
3. Rights Not Conferred by a Vehicle Operator License
The FAA proposes to consolidate in proposed Sec. 450.13 (Rights
Not Conferred by a Vehicle Operator License) the requirements in
current Sec. Sec. 415.15, 431.15, and 435.15 regarding the rights that
are not conferred by issuance of a license. Although the location of
the requirements would change, the requirements themselves would not
substantively change.
The proposed requirements would continue to state that issuance of
a vehicle operator license does not relieve a licensee of its
obligation to comply with all applicable requirements of law or
regulation that may apply to its activities. In addition, the proposal
would state the issuance of a license does not confer any proprietary,
property or exclusive right in the use of any Federal launch range or
related facilities, airspace, or outer space.
G. Unique Safety Policies, Requirements, and Practices
Proposed Sec. 450.177 (Unique Policies, Requirements and
Practices) would require an operator to review operations, system
designs, analysis, and testing, and to identify any unique launch or
reentry hazards not otherwise addressed by proposed part 450,
consistent with current regulations and practice. An operator would be
required to implement any unique safety policy, requirement, or
practice needed to protect the public from the unique hazard. In its
application, an operator would have to identify any unique safety
policy, requirement, or practice, and demonstrate that each it protects
public health and safety and the safety of property.
Proposed Sec. 450.177 would also provide that the FAA may identify
and impose a unique policy, requirement, or practice, as needed, to
protect the public health and safety, safety of property, and the
national security and foreign policy interests of the United States. In
its application, an operator would need to demonstrate that each unique
safety policy, requirement, or practice imposed by the FAA protects
public health and safety, safety of property, and the national security
and foreign policy interests of the United States.
Proposed Sec. 450.177 is largely the same as Sec. 417.127 with
two differences. Section 417.127 requires an applicant to file a
request for license modification for any change to a unique safety
policy, requirement, or practice. The FAA would not incorporate this
requirement in proposed part 450 because it is duplicative given the
general license modification requirement in proposed Sec. 450.177.
Also, Sec. 417.127 applies only when necessary to protect the public,
whereas proposed Sec. 450.177(b) would also apply to national security
and foreign policy interests of the United States. This is necessary to
cover the full scope of FAA's licensing authority.
The purpose for this proposed section is the same as for current
Sec. 417.127. As the space transportation industry continues to grow,
advances in technology and implementation of innovations by launch and
reentry operators will likely introduce new and unforeseen safety
challenges. These unique challenges will require FAA officials and
operators to collaborate on a case-by-case basis to identify and
mitigate those unique hazards to public health and safety, safety of
property, and the national security and foreign policy interests of the
United States not specifically addressed by proposed part 450.
H. Compliance Monitoring
The FAA proposes to combine the compliance monitoring requirements
of parts 417 and 431 into Sec. 450.209 (Compliance Monitoring). In
combining the requirements, the FAA would adopt Sec. 417.23. The FAA
currently conducts safety inspections to ensure a licensee complies
with applicable regulations, the terms and conditions of its license,
and representations the licensee made in its application.
Compliance monitoring requirements are codified in Sec. Sec.
417.23, 431.83, and 435.51. Section 417.23 requires that a launch
operator cooperate with and allow Federal officers or employees access
to observe any of its activities associated with the conduct of a
licensed launch, and provide the FAA with a console for monitoring the
countdown's progress, and the communication on all channels of the
countdown communication network. The requirements of Sec. Sec.
417.23(a) and 431.83 are nearly identical in that both require a
licensee to cooperate with and
[[Page 15375]]
to allow Federal officers or employees access to observe any of its
activities associated with the conduct of a licensed RLV mission.
However, unlike Sec. 417.23, Sec. 431.83 does not require a licensee
to provide a console to the FAA for monitoring all the channels on the
countdown communication network.
Monitoring the communications channels--including countdown,
anomaly, range coordination, surveillance, and weather--is a vital part
of compliance monitoring and safety inspection operations, regardless
of operation type. Under part 417, a licensee cooperates with the FAA
and provides its inspectors with access and consoles to observe the
activities associated with the licensed launch. As a result, the FAA is
able to monitor all communication channels, and has access to the
safety official and the mission director through the communications
panel and through a phone line. FAA inspectors regularly monitor an
operator's communications channels. In doing so, an inspector can
become aware of issues that arise during a countdown. These issues may
include vehicle health, ground operations, FSS health, range readiness,
clearance of surveillance and hazard areas, weather, and countdown
procedures. Additionally, listening to the communications channels also
gives an inspector a sense of an operator's safety culture, rigor, and
readiness. In addition, inspectors can communicate face-to-face with
the safety official and the mission director, if necessary, because
they are typically collocated.
Although there is a requirement in part 431, and incorporated by
reference in part 435, that an operator cooperate with safety
inspectors, there is no specific requirement for the licensee to
provide access to all communication channels. The FAA has had to
discuss with the operator what channels will be available for
monitoring during these operations. Some operators have contended that
their employees will not be as forthcoming with information if they
know FAA inspectors are listening. However, being able to hear how the
operator communicates during critical operations is necessary for
inspectors to determine compliance and to address problems before they
occur. Since inspectors cannot physically listen to all channels
concurrently, an inspector will listen to one or more channels that can
provide situational awareness and information used to determine
compliance. The necessary discussions require additional time and may
cause a delay, consume man-hours, and is a cost to both the government
and the operator during the license application phase, or potentially
during a launch countdown.
Regarding the contention that personnel are less likely to discuss
problems if inspectors are monitoring their conversation, the FAA
strives to be as unobtrusive as possible so as not to affect
operations. Additionally, the purpose of compliance monitoring is not
to punish operators. Rather, channel monitoring and on-site inspection
allows inspectors to identify potential licensing issues and alert the
operator, so it can take action to maintain or return to compliance.
This approach ensures safety while minimizing impacts to the operator.
There have been many instances where inspectors noticed incorrect test
setups for FSS checks, for example, or other issues during compliance
monitoring that would affect public safety, and informed the operator
so they could be corrected before safety was impacted.
Compliance monitoring is important for ensuring public safety and
requires that FAA safety inspectors be exposed to actual operations in
order to be trained, qualified, and capable of performing their safety-
critical role. Because safety inspectors are trained to detect non-
compliances, they need to have access to, and the discretion to see and
hear, as much of the operation as they deem necessary. Observing
activities for training and familiarization purposes benefits both the
inspectors and the operator because the more familiar an inspector is
with an operation, the better he or she can perform the inspection.
Knowledgeable inspectors cause less operational impacts because they
ask fewer questions and are less likely to incorrectly identify a non-
compliance.
The FAA proposes to combine the compliance monitoring requirements
of Sec. Sec. 417.23 and 431.83 in proposed Sec. 450.209. The proposed
regulation would primarily adopt those requirements in Sec. 417.23,
but ``launch operator'' would be replaced by ``licensee'', and
``licensed launch'' would be replaced by ``licensed launch or
reentry.'' Additionally, the FAA proposes to allow an operator the
option to provide the FAA with means other than a console for
monitoring the communication and countdown channels. For example, a
smaller company may operate without consoles, in which case the
operator may provide the FAA with radio monitoring and a location in
close proximity to the necessary data to monitor launch. As a result,
the compliance monitoring requirements of proposed Sec. 450.209 would
apply to all launch and reentry operations, thereby capturing licensed
launch operations under current part 417 and licensed RLV operations
under current part 431. Proposed Sec. 450.209 also codifies current
FAA practice for conducting compliance monitoring of part 435
operations.
Proposed Sec. 450.209(b) would require the licensee to provide the
FAA with a console or other means for monitoring the countdown and
communication network. This proposed requirement would alleviate the
issues that result from extended negotiations. The option for ``other
means'' would provide the operator with some flexibility, as the FAA
recognizes that operations may occur with temporary infrastructure and
a console may be an unrealistic request. In this case, the operator
would be expected to provide the FAA with an alternative method to
monitor communications that is approved by the FAA prior to operations.
I. Registration of Space Objects
The FAA proposes to consolidate the requirements for the
registration of space objects in proposed Sec. 450.217 (Registration
of Space Objects). These requirements currently reside in Sec. Sec.
417.19 and 431.85 and are largely identical. This proposal would not
change the substantive requirements of either section, except to add a
registration requirement for objects owned by a foreign entity.
The 1975 Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer
Space (Registration Convention), to which the United States is a
signatory, requires details about the orbit of each space object. To
that end, current regulations require an applicant to provide
information on space objects that the FAA forwards to the Department of
State. The Department of State then registers the objects with the
United Nations as required by the Registration Convention. Since
enacting these current regulations, the Department of State has
requested that the FAA also provide this information for objects
possibly owned by foreign entities.
Current registration of space objects requirements is codified in
Sec. 417.19, applicable to ELVs, and Sec. 431.85, applicable to RLVs.
The two provisions are substantively identical in all respects but one.
That is, they both require the registration of any object placed in
space by a licensed mission, unless the object is owned and registered
by the U.S. Government or owned by a foreign entity. Similarly, both
sections require the licensee to submit information about the space
object's international designator, the date and location of the
mission, the general function of the space object, and
[[Page 15376]]
the final orbital parameters. The sole substantive distinction is that
Sec. 431.85 also requires an operator to notify the FAA when it
removes a space object.
Proposed Sec. 450.217 would deviate from current Sec. Sec. 417.19
and 431.85 by requiring the registration of foreign-owned space
objects. The FAA would not require the licensee to determine the
owner's nationality. The Department of State would use this information
to ensure that other nations meet their obligations by registering
their foreign objects. Proper registration of all objects owned by
foreign entities would allow for the protection of the United States
from liability associated with these objects.
Otherwise, the FAA would retain the same informational
requirements. It would continue to require a licensee to submit
information about the space object's international designator, the date
and location of the mission, the general function of the space object,
and the final orbital parameters. Additionally, proposed Sec. 450.217
would retain current Sec. 431.85's requirement that an operator notify
the FAA when it removes a space object.
J. Public Safety Responsibility, Compliance With License, Records,
Financial Responsibility, and Human Spaceflight Requirements
The FAA is not proposing any substantive changes to the
requirements specified below. However, the agency is proposing to
consolidate these requirements into the new, proposed part 450; clarify
that the consolidated requirements apply to any licensed launch or
reentry; and make other minor, clarifying edits. The following is a
summary of the proposed changes:
1. Public Safety Responsibility and Compliance With License
The FAA would consolidate the public safety responsibility
requirements in current Sec. Sec. 417.7 and 431.71(a) into proposed
Sec. 450.201 (Public Safety Responsibility). Also, the FAA would move
the compliance requirement in current Sec. 431.71(b) to its own
section, proposed Sec. 450.203, Compliance with License. Although the
location of these requirements would change, the requirements
themselves would not change.
Therefore, proposed Sec. 450.201 would provide that a licensee is
responsible for ensuring public safety and safety of property during
the conduct of a licensed launch or reentry. Proposed Sec. 450.203
(Compliance with License) would require that a licensee conduct a
licensed launch or reentry in accordance with representations made in
its license application, the requirements of proposed part 450,
subparts C and D, and the terms and conditions contained in the
license.
The proposed requirement for a licensee to conduct a licensed
launch or reentry in accordance with representations made in its
license application is the same, in substance, to Sec. Sec. 417.11(a)
and 431.71(b). Section 417.11(a) states that a launch operator must
conduct a licensed launch and carry out launch safety procedures in
accordance with its application. Section 431.71(b) states that a
licensee must conduct a licensed RLV mission and perform RLV safety
procedures in accordance with representations made in its license
application. The fact that representations made in a license
application become binding on a licensee is discussed earlier in this
preamble.
The proposed requirement for a licensee to conduct a licensed
launch or reentry in accordance with the requirements of proposed part
450, subparts C and D, is the same, in substance, to Sec.
417.1(b)(2)'s treatment of part 417 requirements. Section 417.1(b)(2)
states that the safety requirements of part 417, subparts B through E,
apply to all licensed launches of expendable launch vehicles. Part 431
does not have a similar requirement because application requirements
and safety requirements are interlinked, leaving uncertain the actual
safety requirements under a license. Note that in subpart C, the
application requirement paragraphs do not apply once a license is
issued, unless a licensee applies for a modification.
The proposed requirement for a licensee to conduct a licensed
launch or reentry in accordance with the terms and conditions contained
in the license is the same, in substance, to Sec. Sec. 415.9(b) and
431.71(b). Section 415.9(b) states that a launch license authorizes a
licensee to conduct a launch or launches subject to the licensee's
compliance with terms and conditions contained in license orders
accompanying the license. Section 431.71(b) states that a licensee's
failure to comply with any license condition is sufficient basis for
the revocation of a license or other appropriate enforcement action.
The FAA includes terms and conditions in a license to address license-
specific requirements. Under the proposal, a licensee's failure to act
in accordance with these items would be sufficient basis to revoke a
license, or some other appropriate enforcement action.
2. Financial Responsibility
The FAA would consolidate the current financial responsibility
requirements in Sec. Sec. 417.21 and 431.81 into proposed Sec.
450.205 (Financial Responsibility Requirements). Although the location
of the requirements would change, the requirements themselves would not
change.
As such, the proposed regulation would require a licensee to comply
with financial responsible requirements as required by part 440, and as
specified in a license or license order.
3. Human Spaceflight
The FAA would consolidate the human spaceflight requirements in
current Sec. Sec. 415.8, 431.8, and 435.8 into proposed Sec. 450.207
(Human Spaceflight Requirements). The proposal would require a licensee
conducting a launch or reentry with a human being on board the vehicle
to comply with human spaceflight requirements as required by part 460
of this chapter and as specified in a license or license order.
Although the location of the requirements would change, the
requirements themselves would not change.
4. Records
The FAA would consolidate the current record requirements in
Sec. Sec. 417.15(a) and (b) and 431.77(a) and (b) into proposed Sec.
450.219(a) and (b). However, the FAA would replace the terms ``launch
accident'' and ``launch incident'' in Sec. 417.15(b) and the terms
``launch accident,'' ``reentry accident,'' ``launch incident,'' and
``reentry incident'' in Sec. 431.77(b) with ``class 1 or class 2
mishap.'' As discussed in more detail earlier in this preamble, the FAA
proposes to replace current part 401 definitions involving
``accident,'' ``incident,'' and ``mishap'' with specified mishap
classes.
The proposed regulation would require an operator to maintain, for
3 years, all records, data, and other material necessary to verify that
a launch or reentry is conducted in accordance with representations
contained in the operator's application, the requirements of subparts C
and D, and the terms and conditions contained in the license. To
satisfy this requirement, the FAA expects an operator to keep a record
of the actual conditions at the time of flight and any deviations
outside of the flight commit criteria as specified in the current Sec.
417.113(c). Similar to current requirements, in the event of a class 1
or class 2 mishap, an operator would be required to preserve all
records related to the event until the completion of any
[[Page 15377]]
Federal investigation (which could be greater than 3 years) and the FAA
has notified the operator that the records need no longer be retained.
The operator would need to make all records required to be maintained
under the regulations available to Federal officials for inspection and
copying.
K. Applicability
1. General
Proposed Sec. 450.1 (Applicability) would state that part 450
prescribes requirements for obtaining and maintaining a license to
launch, reenter, or both launch and reenter, a launch or reentry
vehicle. As discussed previously, proposed part 450 would consolidate
licensing requirements currently covered in parts 415, 417, 431, and
435.
2. Grandfathering
Under proposed Sec. 450.1(b), proposed part 450 would not apply to
any launch or reentry that an operator elects to conduct pursuant to a
license issued by the FAA or an application accepted by the FAA prior
to the effective date of proposed part 450, with two exceptions. The
proposed requirements for collision avoidance analysis (COLA) and asset
protection would apply to all operators subject to the FAA's authority
under 51 U.S.C. chapter 509 who are conducting launches after the
effective date of the new regulations. The FAA would determine the
applicability of proposed part 450 to an application for a license
modification submitted after the effective date of the part on a case-
by-case basis.
The proposed regulations are more performance based, and many of
the current requirements would serve as a means of compliance to meet
the proposed regulations. As a result, activities authorized under the
existing regulations would be authorized under the proposed
regulations. The FAA proposes to allow an operator to operate under the
current regulations (specifically, parts 401, 415, 417, 431, and 435)
when conducting a launch after the effective date of new part 450
provided it holds a license or has had a license application accepted
prior to the effective date of this regulation. Pursuant to Space
Policy Directive-3 \184\ (SPD-3), proposed Sec. 450.169 and proposed
appendix A to part 450 would align the COLA criteria with current
common practice and provide better protection for inhabitable and
active orbiting objects. Additionally, Sec. 450.101 would require that
the probability of loss of functionality for each critical asset must
not exceed 1 x 10-\3\ to protect national assets. For that
reason, the FAA is proposing that all operators would be required to
comply with these two provisions on this rule's effective date.
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\184\ Space Policy Directive-3, National Space Traffic
Management Policy, 83 FR 28969 (June 21, 2018).
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Because many of the current regulations would serve as a means of
compliance for the proposed regulations, the FAA would review license
modifications that applied the current regulations as means of
demonstrating compliance with the proposed regulations. Additionally,
an operator could use a means of compliance other than the current
regulations to demonstrate compliance in a license modification
request. The FAA would determine the applicability of proposed part 450
to an application for a license modification submitted after the
effective date of the part on a case-by-case basis. The FAA does not
anticipate that a vehicle operator would have any greater difficulty
meeting the requirements under the proposed regulations than under the
existing regulations. In fact, the FAA believes that the proposed
regulations are more flexible because most allow for many different
means of compliance.
An applicant for a renewal would be required to meet all the
requirements of proposed part 450. The FAA anticipates that this would
not be burdensome for operators seeking license renewals because there
would be few, if any, additional application requirements that could
not be fulfilled by reference to previously submitted information.
L. Equivalent Level of Safety
In addition to developing performance-based requirements, this
proposal would preserve the equivalent-level-of-safety flexibility by
relocating the provision to proposed Sec. 450.37. Unlike using a means
of compliance, which requires demonstration of compliance with a
performance-based regulation, the ELOS provision would continue to
allow an applicant to propose an alternative method to meet the safety
intent of a current regulatory requirement. For example, Sec.
450.117(d)(3) would require representative normal flight trajectory
analysis outputs for each one second of flight. An applicant may wish
to request an ELOS determination to the one-second interval, and the
FAA would likely accept it if an alternative interval provides smooth
and continuous individual PC contours.
To demonstrate equivalent level of safety, an operator would
provide a clear and convincing demonstration, through technical
rationale, that the proposed alternative approach provided a level of
safety equivalent to the requirement it would replace. An ELOS
determination means an approximately equal level of safety as
determined by qualitative or quantitative means. Under Sec. 450.37(b),
an operator would not be able to use an ELOS determination to replace
the public risk criteria set forth in Sec. 450.101.
In 2018, the FAA issued a final rule that expanded the option to
satisfy commercial space transportation requirements by demonstrating
an equivalent level of safety in order to provide more choice to
operators and reduce the number of waivers that must be prepared by
industry and processed by the government.\185\ To utilize the option,
operators are required to demonstrate that they are achieving a level
of safety equivalent to any safety parameters specified in the
regulations. The FAA evaluates every request for an alternative means
of regulatory compliance under the ELOS provisions to ensure that the
safety of the public, property, or any national security or foreign
policy interest of the United States is maintained to be consistent
with the requirements in 14 CFR chapter III. The FAA would preserve the
process established in the 2018 rulemaking, and would include its ELOS
determination as part of any license issued applying this provision.
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\185\ Updates to Rulemaking and Waiver Procedures and Expansion
of the Equivalent Level of Safety Option, Final Rule, 83 FR 28528
(June 20, 2018).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The FAA requests comment on the potential use of ``safety cases''
when demonstrating an equivalent level of safety under proposed Sec.
450.37. A safety case is a structured argument, supported by a body of
evidence that provides a compelling, comprehensive, and valid case that
a system is safe, for a given application in a given environment.\186\
The ARC report (at p. 25) suggested that FAA review time could be
minimize if applicant submittals were ``structured as a reasonable
safety case that the proposed actions are safe under all plausible
scenarios.'' In fact, the ARC suggested ``safety cases'' could be
useful options several times. With respect to the proposed regulation,
a safety case would potentially show that certain requirements
identified by the applicant, excluding the requirements of Sec.
450.101, need not be complied with per se in order to demonstrate that
an alternative approach provides an equivalent level of safety to the
[[Page 15378]]
requirements identified by the applicant.
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\186\ This Safety Case definition is from the U.K. Ministry of
Defence (MOD) Standard 00-56, ``Safety Management Requirements for
Defence Systems.''
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A-P-T Research, Inc., under contract to the FAA, recommended the
use of a safety case approach as an alternate path to securing a
license.\187\ The FAA considered proposing a safety case approach to
demonstrating an equivalent level of safety under proposed Sec. 450.37
that would include a formal proposal process that must use a means of
compliance accepted by the Administrator, unless the Administrator
determines otherwise based on predicted public risks and consequences,
or demonstrated reliability. The formal proposal process would: (1)
Facilitate an FAA audit of all risk management methods proposed for
use, including a demonstration of how the proposed methods can
demonstrate compliance with Sec. 450.101; (2) implement all the
recommended improvements from the audit or justify all deviations from
the recommended improvements; (3) document the risk management methods
used and the verification evidence to demonstrate compliance with Sec.
450.101; (4) facilitate an audit by an FAA-approved third party of the
risk management methods used and the verification evidence to
demonstrate compliance with Sec. 450.101; and (5) submit the results
of the third party audit for FAA review and approval. An applicant that
sought to use this safety case approach would need to submit: (1) A
description of their plan to facilitate an FAA audit of all risk
management methods proposed for use, including a demonstration of how
the proposed methods can demonstrate compliance with Sec. 450.101; (2)
a description of the improvements implemented based on the FAA audit
and detailed justifications for any deviations from the FAA recommended
improvements; (3) a description of the risk management methods used and
the verification evidence to demonstrate compliance with Sec. 450.101;
(4) an agreement to facilitate an audit by an FAA-approved third party
of the risk management methods used and the verification evidence to
demonstrate compliance with Sec. 450.101; and (5) a description of the
results of the third party audit. The safety case approach recommended
by APT included the use of a third party to review. The FAA sees
potential complications, including liability considerations, when
involving a third party in the licensing process. The FAA seeks
comments on the potential usefulness and challenges associated with a
safety case approach, whether or not a third party would be involved.
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\187\ A-P-T Research, Inc. ``A New Path to Launch Licenses,''
Doc. No. CDSP-FL004-18-00402 (October 16, 2018).
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Additional Technical Justification and Rationale
The sections below provide detailed discussions of flight safety
analyses and software safety. Additionally, this section discusses the
numerous conforming changes the FAA proposes to the existing
regulations in order to implement the proposed regulations.
A. Flight Safety Analyses
As discussed earlier, for purposes of this proposed rule, an FSA
consists of a set of quantitative analyses used to determine flight
commit criteria, flight abort rules, flight hazard areas, and other
mitigation measures, and to verify compliance with the public safety
criteria in proposed Sec. 450.101. The FAA proposes 15 sections for
flight safety analysis, as discussed below.
1. Scope and Applicability
Proposed Sec. 450.113 establishes the portions of flight for which
an operator would be required to perform and document an FSA, and would
describe the analyses required for each type of operation. The portion
of flight governed by the public safety criteria is central to the
scope of the FSA.
The current scope of FSA regulations is laid out in Sec. Sec.
417.201 and 417.107(b) for ELVs. Specifically, Sec. 417.107(b)(1)
currently requires that FSAs quantify the collective risks from lift-
off through orbital insertion for orbital launches and from lift-off to
final impact for suborbital launches. Unfortunately, Sec.
417.107(b)(2) does not clearly specify the portion of flight for which
an FSA must quantify the individual risks. In practice, the FAA has
reconciled this vagueness by requiring the same scope for both
collective and individual risks: From lift-off through orbital
insertion for orbital launches and from lift-off to final impact for
suborbital launches.
It is also unclear in current regulations what portions of flight
the FSA needs to cover for RLVs. Section 431.35(b)(1) simply states
that the collective public risk limit applies to each proposed reentry,
but does not speak specifically to beginning and end of the period of
flight that an FSA must analyze. Reentry means to return or attempt to
return, purposefully, a reentry vehicle from earth orbit or from outer
space to Earth.\188\ Reentry includes activities conducted in Earth
orbit or outer space to determine reentry readiness and that are
critical to ensuring public health and safety and the safety of
property during reentry flight. The definition also includes activities
conducted on the ground after vehicle landing on Earth to ensure the
vehicle does not pose a threat to public health and safety or the
safety of property. In practice, the FAA has required public risk
assessments to begin at the final health check prior to initiation of
de-orbit burn and ending when flight stops, such as splashdown for a
capsule.
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\188\ 14 CFR 401.5.
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Further, for both ELVs and RLVs, the current regulations do not
expressly address the potential public safety hazards caused by the
disposal of a launch vehicle stage or component from orbit. That is,
Sec. Sec. 417.107(b) and 431.35(b)(1), in addressing the public risk
criteria, do not specifically address the disposal of launch vehicle
stages or components. As discussed earlier, such vehicle disposals have
become more common in recent years, reflecting the elevated priority
put on orbital debris mitigation. The FAA explained in the 2016 final
rule \189\ that when the FAA requires that the quantitative risk
analysis account for the planned impact of a first stage (or any stage)
jettisoned prior to orbital insertion, it includes accounting for stage
impacts regardless of whether the actual impact occurs before or after
orbital insertion.
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\189\ Changing the Collective Risk Limits for Launches and
Reentries and Clarifying the Risk Limit Used to Establish Hazard
Areas for Ships and Aircraft, Final Rule. 81 FR 47017 (July 20,
2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For reentry, proposed Sec. Sec. 450.101(b) and 450.113(a)(4) would
clarify and reduce the period FSAs must analyze when quantifying the
public risks posed by reentry operations. The proposal would clarify
that post-flight operations are not included in the safety analyses
necessary to quantify the public risks posed by reentry operations. In
Sec. 401.5, the FAA proposes to include a definition for deorbit that
clarifies that deorbit begins with the final command to commit the
vehicle to a perigee below 70 nautical miles, approximately 130 km, and
ends when all vehicle components come to rest on the Earth.
Proposed Sec. 450.113 replaces Sec. 417.201 to clarify the scope
and applicability of FSAs. In proposed Sec. 450.113(a)(1), an operator
would be required to perform and document an FSA for orbital launch,
from lift-off through orbital insertion,\190\ including any component
or stage landings. In proposed Sec. 450.113(a)(2), an operator would
be
[[Page 15379]]
required to perform and document an FSA for suborbital launch, from
lift-off through final impact. In proposed Sec. 450.113(a)(3), the FAA
clarifies the scope of disposal FSA that would be necessary to
demonstrate compliance with the disposal safety criteria in proposed
Sec. 450.101(d). Specifically, for disposal, an FSA would span from
the beginning of the deorbit burn through final impact.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\190\ The FAA proposes orbital insertion to mean the point at
which a vehicle achieves a minimum 70-nautical mile perigee based on
a computation that accounts for drag. This adopts the definition of
orbital insertion in RCC 321-17 Standard.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Proposed Sec. 450.113(a)(4) would require an operator to perform
and document an FSA for reentry, from the beginning of the deorbit burn
through landing. The proposal is consistent with current practice, but
would clarify that post-landing activities are not included in the FSA.
Proposed Sec. 450.113(a)(5) would explicitly address hybrid
vehicles, which include air-launch rockets released from carrier
aircraft such as the Pegasus rocket carried by a modified L-1011
airliner. The proposal would clarify that FSAs generally apply to
hybrid vehicles, for all phases of flight unless the Administrator
determines otherwise based on demonstrated reliability. Thus, the
proposal would enable an operator of a hybrid vehicle with a high level
of demonstrated reliability for the entire flight or for a phase of
flight, to be exempt from performing some FSAs without seeking a waiver
for the flight or phase of flight. Demonstrated reliability refers to
statistically valid probability of failure estimates based on the
outcomes of all previous flights of the vehicle or stage. For example,
if an applicant seeks to operate a hybrid vehicle that features an air-
launch rocket released from a carrier aircraft with minimal
modification from the original design certified as a commercial
transport aircraft, the FAA would find certain FSAs not applicable if
empirical data sufficiently showed that the demonstrated reliability
and estimated public risks of the system are equivalent to general
aviation aircraft during a given phase of flight. Specifically, the FAA
foresees that such an applicant could be exempt from some of the normal
flight trajectory analysis requirements during the captive carry phases
of flight if the applicant could demonstrate compliance with the public
safety criteria in proposed Sec. 450.101 without the benefit of some
of the normal flight trajectory analysis outputs.
Proposed Sec. 450.113(b) would identify the specific FSA actions
applicable to all launch and reentry vehicles (in paragraph (b)(1)), a
launch or reentry vehicle that relies on an FSS to comply with proposed
Sec. 450.101 (in paragraph (b)(2)), and launch of an unguided
suborbital launch vehicle (in paragraph (b)(3)).
2. Flight Safety Analysis Methods
Proposed Sec. 450.115 (Flight Safety Analysis Methods) would set
the methodology requirements for FSAs. This section would replace the
prescriptive requirements currently in Sec. 417.203 and appendices A,
B, C and I to part 417. Currently, Sec. 417.203(a) requires that FSAs
meet the requirements for methods of analysis contained in appendices A
(section A417) and B (section B417) to part 417 for a launch vehicle
flown with an FSS, and appendices B and C (section C417) for an
unguided suborbital launch vehicle that uses a wind-weighting safety
system. Specifically, section A417 provides prescriptive requirements
on the FSA methodologies and products for a launch vehicle flown with
an FSS. Section B417 provides prescriptive requirements on the FSA for
hazard area analyses for ship and aircraft protection. Section C417
provides prescriptive requirements on the FSA methodologies and
products for a launch vehicle flown with a wind weighting safety
system.
Section 417.203(b) specifically lists the broad categories of
approved methods of analysis while Sec. 417.203(c) addresses
requirements for alternate analysis methods. Section 417.203(c)
currently requires that an alternate FSA method be based on accurate
data and scientific principles, and is statistically valid. In
practice, the FAA has evaluated the validity of an applicant's proposed
methods by comparing the results to valid benchmarks such as data from
mishaps, test, or validated high-fidelity methods. Section 417.203(e)
requires that a launch operator demonstrate to the FAA compliance with
the requirements of part 417, subpart C. In its application, a launch
operator must include the analysis products required by parts 415,
subpart F, 417, subpart A, and appendices A, B, C, and I, depending on
whether the launch vehicle uses an FSS or a wind-weighting safety
system.
Pursuant to Sec. 431.35(c), the FSA for an RLV is required to
account for any reasonably foreseeable hazardous event and safety-
critical system failures during launch flight or reentry that could
result in a casualty to the public. However, part 431 does not include
requirements for the methods used to provide an FSA, thus providing no
standards for evaluating an FSA's validity or level of fidelity. The
part 431 license applications approved by the FAA included FSA
methodologies and products comparable to those in 417 license
applications.
Proposed Sec. 450.115(a) sets the scope for FSA methods. This
section would not materially change the scope of the FSA methods under
current parts 417 and 431, which account for the risk to the public
from hazards associated with normal and malfunctioning vehicle flight
in accordance to Sec. 417.205(a). However, proposed Sec. 450.115(a)
would add language currently not expressly provided in Sec. 417.205(a)
that would require an operator's FSA method to account for all
reasonably foreseeable events and failure of safety-critical systems.
This language is consistent with the current requirement in Sec.
431.35(c) to account for any reasonably foreseeable hazardous event,
and safety-critical system failures during launch flight or reentry
that could result in a casualty to the public.
Proposed Sec. 450.115(b) would establish the level of fidelity for
FSAs. Specifically, it would require a level of fidelity sufficient to
demonstrate that any risk to the public would satisfy the public risk
criteria of proposed Sec. 450.101, including the use of mitigations,
accounting for all known sources of uncertainty, using a means of
compliance accepted by the Administrator. It would also require that
the analysis identify the dominant source of each type of public risk
with a criterion in proposed Sec. 450.101(a) or (b) in terms of phase
of flight, source of hazard (such as toxic exposure, inert, or
explosive debris), and vehicle response mode. Thus, this proposed rule
would provide performance targets instead of the current part 417
approach that mandates a single level of fidelity equivalent to methods
that comply with the extensive requirements given in the appendices of
part 417.
The requirements in proposed Sec. 450.115(b) would account for all
known sources of uncertainty and identify the dominant sources of risk.
The proposal would be consistent with the best practices of other
regulatory agencies that use quantitative risk analyses as part of a
risk management approach to ensure public safety. The Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC), which has a long history of performance-
based regulations with quantitative risk analyses to ensure public
safety, has a long-standing policy to ensure that the quantitative
techniques used for regulatory decision-making take into account the
potential uncertainties that exist so that an estimate can be made on
the confidence level to be ascribed to the quantitative
[[Page 15380]]
results.\191\ The NRC has also found that, through use of quantitative
techniques, important uncertainties have been, and continue to be,
brought into better focus and may even be reduced as compared to those
that would remain with sole reliance on deterministic decision-making.
The NRC found that direct lack of severe accident experience makes it
necessary that proper attention be given not only to the range of
uncertainty surrounding probabilistic estimates, but also to the
phenomenology that most influences the uncertainties. In other words,
the NRC found the need to identify the dominant sources of public risks
and their uncertainties when using quantitative risk analyses to ensure
public safety.\192\
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\191\ Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Nuclear Regulatory Safety
Policy Goals. 51 FR 28044 (August 21, 1986).
\192\ The Department of the Interior (DOI), Bureau of
Reclamation, uses risk criteria for achieving public protection in
dam safety decision-making in a manner consistent with this proposed
rule. Specifically, the DOI uses mean values calculated from Monte
Carlo or similar analyses that include explicit treatment of input
uncertainty.
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The FAA would require that operators use a means of compliance
accepted by the Administrator for FSA methods. The FAA plans to publish
a draft version of that AC concurrently with this NPRM. An important
aspect of that AC is the use of approaches generally consistent with
the consensus U.S. Government standards on launch and reentry risk
assessments (e.g., RCC 321). The RCC 321 Standard (paragraph 2.4)
recognizes that there is significant uncertainty in the computed risks
of rocket launches and notes that confidence bounds of 90 percent
describing the uncertainty in the computed risk can span multiple
orders of magnitude. Thus, the consensus U.S. Government standards on
launch and reentry risk assessments contains a policy statement that
uncertainty cannot be ignored. The RCC 321 Supplement further concurred
with several statements originally made by the NRC, including the
following three: (1) The use of mean estimates does not, however,
resolve the need to quantify (to the extent reasonable) and understand
those important uncertainties involved in risk predictions; (2)
sensitivity studies should be performed to determine those
uncertainties most important to the probabilistic estimates; and (3)
the results of sensitivity studies should be displayed showing, for
example, the range of variation together with the underlying science or
engineering assumptions that dominate this variation. Even so, the RCC
went on to conclude that a formal uncertainty analysis may not be
necessary under conditions where the best mean estimate of the public
risk is low relative to the collective risk criterion.
For this rulemaking, the FAA considered adopting an approach to the
treatment of uncertainty following RCC 321 Standard and Supplement. The
FAA requests comment on whether this treatment of uncertainty is
reasonable. Specifically, the FAA solicits input on the process whereby
the uncertainty does not have to be considered if the computed risk is
less than one-third of the primary aggregated collective risk
criterion.\193\ Current Air Force practice is to include implementation
of measures to improve risk analyses to reduce the level of uncertainty
when the predicted risks exceed 3 x 10-5 EC.
Examples of that could include refined input data or a higher-fidelity
method for the risk computations.
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\193\ The choice of one-third was consistent with the
recommendation in AFSPCMAN 91-710 Vol.1, 1 July 2004. Attachment 5
states that if risk to all individuals from a single hazard exceeds
an EC of 30 x 10-6, a range user may have to
take additional measures to protect personnel and resources.
Examples include to fix, correct, or improve existing non-
compliances, improve risk analyses to reduce the level of
uncertainty, require a day-of-launch risk analysis, or establish
disaster aversion criteria.
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Similarly, if the estimated risk level exceeds 3 x 10-5
EC, the RCC 321 Standard states that the range should
compute the uncertainty to ensure that a launch is not allowed that
would violate the criterion based on best estimates that account for
uncertainty. There are published examples of uncertainty analyses for
launch risks that explicitly account for uncertainties associated with
the input data (e.g., the probability of failure associated with a
given break-up state vector), and biases and uncertainties in key sub-
models (e.g., the sub-model used to compute the PC given an
impact with a given piece of debris on a specific structure type).
However, the end effect of the RCC 321 Standard approach to uncertainty
treatment is that a range or range user could continue operating under
current practice, using their current tools without formal uncertainty
quantification for missions with a collective risk no greater than 3 x
10-5 EC. Under the RCC approach, only missions
that pose collective risks above 3 x 10-5 EC
based on point estimates would be required to perform formal
uncertainty quantification. The FAA requests comment on whether the
current approaches to uncertainty treatment employed by the RCC or the
Air Force are viable in the FAA's regulatory framework. The FAA further
requests comments on any currently available approaches to address
uncertainties in public risk assessments, including the approach
identified in the draft means of compliance on uncertainty and level of
fidelity in FSA methods.
Proposed Sec. 450.115(b) would require that an operator account
for all known sources of uncertainty in various FSAs. The FAA intends
to ensure that FSA methods account for known sources of aleatory
(random) uncertainties that are the result of inherently random
processes. An example of aleatory uncertainty is the influence of
prevailing weather conditions on the results of collective and
individual risk analyses for launch or reentry. The true EC
is often highly influenced by the prevailing weather conditions during
the proposed operation. The uncertainty in the true EC due
to weather conditions is substantial for a typical baseline risk
analysis that accounts for the foreseeable weather conditions in a
given month based upon historical data and assumes that an operation is
equally feasible under any of those likely weather conditions given all
the safety and mission assurance constraints. For example, most
vehicles would not attempt to fly through certain wind conditions due
to the potential for the vehicle to break up or veer off-course,
leading to a violation of safety or mission assurance constraints. The
uncertainty in the true EC for a day-of-launch risk analysis
is much smaller, but the uncertainty in any forecast or measured
weather input data will still produce some uncertainty in the
EC due to measurement errors and variability in the weather
measurements and forecasts. There are several other potentially
important sources of aleatory uncertainty in an EC analysis,
and there are various valid approaches to account for these aleatory
uncertainties. This proposed rule would require that aleatory
uncertainties are accounted for, including known sources of randomness
in critical input data. These would include normal and malfunction
trajectories, weather conditions, population and sheltering
characteristics (e.g., between day and night), velocities induced
during break-up, aerodynamic properties of the vehicle and debris, any
yield from an explosive impact, and the amount of debris that burns up
due to aero-thermal heating during re-entry.
Proposed Sec. 450.115(c) would establish application requirements
for methods of analysis. Specifically, the proposed rule would require
that an applicant submit a description of the FSA methodology for each
launch or reentry approved by the FAA, including identification of the
[[Page 15381]]
scientific principles and statistical methods used, and all assumptions
and their justifications. However, if the FAA determines that the
range's FSA methods meets FAA safety requirements, then the operator
would not be required to provide the FAA with a description of the FSA
methodology. Also, an applicant would be required to include the
rationale for the level of fidelity, the evidence for validation and
verification required by proposed Sec. 450.101(g), the extent that the
benchmark conditions are comparable to the foreseeable conditions of
the intended operations, and the extent the analyses accounted for risk
mitigations. The FAA intends for assumptions to be justified using
logic, historical flight experience data, relevant test data, and the
results from physics-based simulations.
3. Trajectory Analysis for Normal Flight
The FAA proposes a single regulation governing an FSA for normal
trajectories, applicable to all launch and reentry vehicles, in
proposed Sec. 450.117 (Trajectory Analysis for Normal Flight). The
provision would distinguish between variability in the intended
trajectory and uncertainties due to random sources of dispersion such
as winds and vehicle performance. It would also clarify application
requirements.
All the FSAs depend on some form of analysis of the trajectory
under normal conditions, otherwise known as a normal trajectory. That
is, one must first understand a vehicle's trajectory when it performs
as intended and under normal conditions before one can determine the
effects of malfunctions along its flight path.
Current regulations for normal trajectory analyses are found in
Sec. Sec. 417.207 and 431.35(d) and appendix A to part 417. Section
417.207 sets the current trajectory analysis requirements for ELVs.
Section 417.207(a)(1) requires an analysis that establishes the limits
of a launch vehicle's normal flight, as defined by the normal
trajectory and potential three-sigma trajectory dispersions about the
normal trajectory for any time after lift-off. Although this
requirement is generally clear, the uncertainties the analysis must
consider could be clearer. For example, the current requirement does
not distinguish between inherently random uncertainties that could
cause the actual trajectory to differ from the nominal trajectory, and
variability in the known conditions immediately prior to the initiation
of the operation (e.g., weather conditions at the time of the launch or
the time into a launch window that the launch occurs for a rendezvous
mission).
In terms of current RLV regulations in part 431, they describe
flight trajectory analyses requirements in a single paragraph in Sec.
431.35(d)(8). Specifically, the FAA requires that applicants provide
flight trajectory analyses covering launch or ascent of the vehicle
through orbital insertion and reentry or descent of the vehicle through
landing, including its three-sigma dispersion. This regulation is
silent as to the specific uncertainties for which the analysis must
account. In practice, part 431 license applicants have provided normal
trajectory data consistent with the part 417 regulations.
Proposed Sec. 450.117 would retain the substantive normal
trajectory analysis requirements currently in Sec. 417.207 and the
definitions of key terms such as ``normal flight'' and ``normal
trajectory.'' Proposed Sec. 450.117(a)(1) would require a trajectory
analysis that establishes the limits of a vehicles normal flight. The
proposal would retain the requirement in Sec. 417.207(a)(1) to
establish a nominal trajectory where the vehicle performs as designed
without any deviation due to winds, propulsion performance, or mass
properties but would add clarity about the sources of uncertainty that
a trajectory analysis must account for by distinguishing between
variability and random uncertainty.
Specifically, the proposal would expressly require a trajectory
analysis to establish two separate sets of trajectories to characterize
distinct sources of uncertainty, including variability and random
uncertainty. One set of normal trajectories in Sec. 450.117(a)(1)(ii)
would characterize the uncertainty during normal flight due to random
deviations from ideal conditions, such as wind conditions, vehicle
mass, and performance characteristics. Another set of normal
trajectories in Sec. 450.117(a)(1)(i) would characterize how the
intended trajectory could vary due to conditions known prior to
initiation of flight. An example of variability is how the intended
trajectory would change due to different times for lift-off within a
launch window that lasts several minutes for a mission with an orbital
rendezvous as the primary objective. Another example of variability is
how the intended trajectory would change due to wind conditions. In
such cases, the nominal trajectory represents the most likely lift-off
time. An FSA must distinguish between variability and random
uncertainty in the normal trajectory in order to demonstrate that the
criteria in proposed Sec. 450.101 would be satisfied at any time the
operator intends to initiate launch or re-entry flight.
Section 450.117(a)(2) would require a fuel exhaustion trajectory
that produces instantaneous impact points with the greatest range for
any given time after liftoff for any stage that has the potential to
impact the Earth and does not burn to propellant depletion before a
programmed thrust termination. This is the same as current Sec.
417.207(a)(2). The FAA is unaware of any challenges with the current
regulation regarding a fuel exhaustion trajectory.
For vehicles with an FSS, proposed Sec. 450.117(a)(3) would
establish a new requirement for trajectory data or parameters that
describe the limits of a useful mission. The FAA proposes in Sec.
401.5 to define the ``limits of a useful mission'' as the trajectory
data or other parameters that describes the limits of a mission that
can attain the primary objective, including but not limited to flight
azimuth limits. Thus, the proposal would require an operator to
establish the limits of a useful mission based on the values of
trajectory parameters necessary to attain the primary mission
objective, including flight azimuth limits. Note that the azimuth limit
data is currently required by the Air Force in Air Force Space Command
Manual (AFSPCMAN) 91-710 Vol. 2. The limits of a useful mission are
essential input data for the flight safety limits analysis, and for an
evaluation of whether a vehicle should be allowed to pass through a
gate, as discussed later in this preamble.
Proposed Sec. 450.117(b) would require a final trajectory analysis
to use a six-degree of freedom trajectory model, and proposed Sec.
450.117(c) would require a trajectory analysis to account for all wind
effects, including profiles of winds that are no less severe than the
worst wind conditions under which flight might be attempted, and for
uncertainty in the wind conditions. These are similar to Sec.
417.207(b) and (c), respectively.
Proposed Sec. 450.117(d) would provide application requirements
for trajectory analyses that address the proposed methodology, input
data, and output data. In paragraph (d)(1), an applicant would be
required to describe the methodology used to characterize normal flight
and the limits of a useful mission, including the scientific principles
and statistical methods used, all assumptions and their justifications,
the rationale for the level of fidelity of the methods, and the
evidence for validation and verification that would be required by
proposed Sec. 450.101(g). In paragraph (d)(2), the FAA proposes to
require that the applicant describe the
[[Page 15382]]
input data used in normal trajectory analyses and provides a list of
the minimum input data an applicant must describe. In paragraph (d)(3),
the FAA proposes to require that an applicant describe a representative
normal trajectory analysis outputs (e.g., position, velocity, and
vacuum instantaneous impact point) for each second of flight for (1)
the nominal trajectory, (2) a fuel exhaustion trajectory under
otherwise nominal conditions, (3) a set of trajectories that
characterize variability in the intended trajectory based on conditions
known prior to initiation of flight, (4) a set of trajectories that
characterize how the actual trajectory could differ from the intended
trajectory due to random uncertainties, and (5) a set of trajectories
that characterize the limits of a useful mission as described in
proposed Sec. 450.117(a). The proposed application requirements
provide regulatory clarity regarding the normal trajectory
characterization necessary to ensure compliance with proposed Sec.
450.101.
Note that in this proposed section, and other proposed flight
safety analysis application requirements, the FAA requires
representative data. This allows the FAA to evaluate an applicant's
methodologies. Representative data should be the best, meaning the most
realistic, data available given the intended flight parameters.
The applicant would also be required to submit additional products
that allow the FAA to conduct an independent analysis, if requested by
the Administrator. This same application requirement would also be in
proposed Sec. Sec. 450.119 through 450.141. At times, the FAA conducts
independent flight safety analyses which usually require additional
information than is normally required of an applicant. Instead of
attempting to list out what is needed for every independent analysis,
which is usually case-specific, the FAA proposes to simply state that
more information may be necessary. The FAA's conduct of an independent
analysis is usually reserved for new vehicle concepts, new analysis
methods, or proposals that involve unique public safety issues.
4. Trajectory Analysis for Malfunction Flight
Proposed Sec. 450.119 (Trajectory Analysis for Malfunction Flight)
would consolidate trajectory analysis requirements for all launch and
reentry vehicles. In consolidating, the FAA would also update its
requirements to reflect advancements in trajectory analysis
capabilities and clarify application requirements. A malfunction
trajectory analysis is necessary to determine how far a vehicle can
deviate from its normal flight path in case of a malfunction. This
analysis helps determine impact points in case of a malfunction and is
therefore a vital input for the analyses needed to demonstrate
compliance with risk criteria. The FAA's current regulations covering
trajectory analyses in case of malfunction are in Sec. 417.209
(Malfunction turn analysis), appendix A to part 417, and Sec.
431.35(d)(8).
Current Sec. 417.209 sets forth the trajectory analysis
requirements in case of a malfunction applicable to ELVs. Section
417.209(a)(1) requires a trajectory analysis to establish the launch
vehicle's turning capability in the event of a malfunction during
flight using a set of turn curves. Appendix A to part 417 (section
A417.9) also provides more detailed and prescriptive requirements for
analyzing ``turn curves.'' Turn curve data offered a reasonable way to
simulate failures that produce trajectory departures, particularly in
response to thrust offsets when computational limitations made it
impractical to perform six degrees of freedom (6-DOF) simulations of
malfunction trajectories.
In the past, turn curves produced a reasonable way to model the
classic cornus spiral behavior associated with a constant thrust offset
or nozzle burn-through. Thus, Sec. 417.209(b) requires a set of turn
curves to establish the launch vehicle velocity vector turn angle from
the nominal launch vehicle velocity vector, and to establish the
vehicle velocity turn magnitude from the nominal velocity magnitude.
There are two fundamental types of malfunction turn curves: (1) One
that shows how the magnitude velocity changes during the turn; and (2)
the other for the direction of the velocity. Given advancements in
computational capabilities, the use of turn curves as mandated by the
current regulations constitutes an outdated and unnecessarily
simplified analysis technique. For instance, through current
computational capabilities, particularly the prevalence of 6-DOF
trajectory models, it is generally more efficient and more accurate for
an applicant to provide sets of Monte Carlo trajectories that
characterize a given type of malfunction, even for the thrust vector
offsets and nozzle burn-through, than to provide turn curve data.
The current RLV regulations in part 431 do not explicitly address
malfunction trajectory analyses. Section 431.35(d)(8) describes flight
trajectory analysis requirements in a single paragraph. It requires
that applicants provide flight trajectory analyses covering launch or
ascent of the vehicle through orbital insertion and reentry or descent
of the vehicle through landing, including its three-sigma dispersion.
In practice, part 431 license applicants have provided malfunction
trajectory analyses consistent with the part 417 regulations. However,
the lack of clarity regarding the malfunction trajectory analysis
requirements and ensuing discussions between the FAA and operators has
resulted in inefficiencies and delays in the licensing process.
Proposed Sec. 450.119 would consolidate all trajectory analysis
requirements for a malfunctioning flight which would be applicable to
any launch or reentry vehicle. Based on the noted advancements in
computational capabilities that have rendered the current use of turn
curves outdated and over simplistic, the FAA proposes to remove the
Sec. 417.209(b) requirements related to turn curves in favor of more
modern Monte Carlo methods. Proposed Sec. 450.119(b) would provide
performance-based requirements regarding what a malfunction trajectory
analysis must account for, including applicable times in flight and
valid trajectory time intervals. Specifically, the proposal would
require the analysis to account for (1) all trajectory times during the
thrusting phases or when the lift vector is controlled during flight,
(2) the duration starting when a malfunction begins to cause each
flight deviation throughout the thrusting phases of flight, and (3)
trajectory time intervals between malfunction turn start times that are
sufficient to establish flight safety limits, if any, and individual
risk contours that are smooth and continuous. The proposal would retain
in Sec. 450.119(b)(4) the performance-based requirement currently in
Sec. 417.209(a)(3) to establish the relative probability of occurrence
of each malfunction turn of which the vehicle is capable. In proposed
Sec. 450.119(b)(5), the analysis would also have to account for the
probability distribution of position and velocity of the vehicle when
each malfunction will terminate due to vehicle breakup, along with the
cause of termination and the state of the vehicle.\194\ Finally, in
proposed Sec. 450.119(b)(6), the analysis would establish the
vehicle's flight behavior from the time when a malfunction begins to
cause a flight deviation until ground impact or predicted structural
failure, with trajectory time intervals that are
[[Page 15383]]
sufficient to establish individual risk contours that are smooth and
continuous.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\194\ The proposed Sec. 450.119(b)(5) requirement would be
equivalent to the Sec. 417.209(a)(4) through (9) requirements.
Under Sec. 417.209, the FAA prescribed the use of ``turn curves''
that were a particular way to compute the position and velocity at
the end of a malfunction trajectory.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Finally, proposed Sec. 450.119(c) would provide application
requirements for malfunction trajectory analyses that address the
proposed methodology, input data, and output data. An applicant would
be required to describe the methodology used to characterize
malfunction flight including the same elements required for the normal
trajectory analyses. The FAA proposes to require that an applicant
describe the input data used in malfunction trajectory analyses and
provides a list of the minimum data an applicant must describe. The FAA
also proposes to require that an applicant describe representative
malfunction trajectory analysis outputs (e.g., position, velocity, and
vacuum instantaneous impact point) for each second of flight and for
the probability of each trajectory that characterizes a type of
malfunction flight. Finally, the FAA may also request additional
products to conduct an independent analysis. These proposed application
requirements are consistent or less burdensome than current
requirements.
5. Debris Analysis
Proposed Sec. 450.121 (Debris Analysis) would set the requirements
for debris analysis by revising current requirements in Sec. 417.211
(Debris analysis), accounting for part 431 practices not fully
expressed in the regulatory language, consolidating requirements from
Sec. 417.107 (Flight Safety), and removing overly prescriptive and
burdensome requirements from Appendix A to part 417.
Under Sec. 417.211(a), a debris analysis must identify the inert,
explosive, and other hazardous vehicle debris that results from normal
and malfunctioning flight. Section 417.211(b) specifies that a debris
analysis must account for various causes of a launch vehicle breakup.
This analysis includes debris from any flight termination system
activation, launch vehicle explosion, aerodynamic loads, inertial
loads, atmospheric reentry heating, and impact of an intact vehicle.
Section 417.211(c) asks for a list of debris fragments for each cause
of breakup and any planned jettison of debris, launch vehicle
components, or payload. Also, Sec. 417.107(c) contains debris
threshold requirements for debris analysis and appendix A to part 417
(section A417.11) provides detailed direction on the debris analysis
constraints, debris models, and other debris analysis products.
Although part 431 does not expressly ask for a debris analysis, the
FAA has deemed Sec. 431.35(b) to require one, applying the same
standards as those in part 417. However, this lack of regulatory
specificity in part 431 has led to longer pre-application consultation
periods as the FAA and operators worked to ascertain the applicable
requirements.
Proposed Sec. 450.121 would provide performance-based regulations
regarding the level of fidelity required for key elements of a valid
debris analysis. Proposed Sec. 450.121(a) would include a debris
analysis that characterizes the debris generated for each foreseeable
vehicle response mode as a function of vehicle flight time, accounting
for the effects of fuel burn and any configuration changes.
The FAA proposes to add the references to fuel burn and
configuration changes that are absent from current part 417 because an
operator's debris list will change over time with variations to the
amount of available propellant and with the jettisoning of hardware.
Proposed Sec. 450.121(b) would require that the debris analysis
account for each foreseeable cause of vehicle breakup, including any
breakup caused by an FSS activation or by impact of an intact vehicle.
This proposal would include debris from a vehicle's jettisoned
components and payloads because such debris could cause a casualty due
to impact with an aircraft or waterborne vessel or could pose a toxic
or fire hazard. This proposal is consistent with the ARC recommendation
to develop a process for a debris catalogue. Foreseeable causes of
vehicle breakup would include engine or motor explosion, or exceeding
structural limits due to aerodynamic loads, inertial loads, or
aerothermal heating.
Proposed Sec. 450.121(c) is substantively the same as Sec.
417.107(c). The section contains the debris thresholds requirements. It
would adopt the references to inert, explosive, and other hazardous
vehicle debris currently in Sec. 417.211(a). The inert debris
requirement would include all debris that could impact a human being
with a mean expected kinetic energy at impact greater than or equal to
11 ft-lbs, or mean impact kinetic energy per unit area of 34 ft-lb/
in\2\. The required thresholds are well-established standards used by
Federal launch ranges. In general, the 11 ft-lb requirement is the
primary threshold for debris, whereas the 34 ft-lb/in\2\ is for
penetrating injuries. This paragraph also would clarify the need to
consider the effects of all inert debris on aircraft or waterborne
vessels, or those that pose a toxic or fire hazard. The debris analysis
would also be required to identify any explosive debris.
Proposed Sec. 450.121(d) would provide the debris analysis
application requirements. This paragraph would inherit, in a less
detailed and prescriptive manner, the requirements in appendix A to
part 417, section A417.11. It would expressly identify the information
and data needed by the FAA to evaluate compliance with the regulatory
requirements. Proposed Sec. 450.121(d) would describe the level of
fidelity required for the products of a debris analysis including (1) a
description of the debris analysis methodology, including input data,
assumptions, and justifications for the assumptions; (2) a description
of all vehicle breakup modes and the development of debris lists; and
(3) all debris fragment lists necessary to quantitatively describe the
physical, aerodynamic, and harmful characteristics of each debris
fragment or fragment class. Finally, as discussed earlier, the
applicant would be required to provide additional products as requested
by the FAA to conduct an independent analysis to ensure that public
safety criteria are satisfied.
6. Flight Safety Limits Analysis
Proposed Sec. 450.123 would set the requirements to identify
uncontrolled areas and establish flight safety limits that define when
an operator must initiate flight abort to (1) ensure compliance with
the public safety criteria of proposed Sec. 450.101 and (2) prevent
debris capable of causing a casualty from impacting in uncontrolled
areas if the vehicle is outside the limits of a useful mission.
Current Sec. 417.213(a) requires that a flight safety limits
analysis identify the location of populated or other protected areas
and establish flight safety limits to define when an FSS must terminate
a launch vehicle's flight to prevent hazardous impacts from reaching
any protected area and ensure that the public risk criteria of Sec.
417.107(b) are satisfied. Section 417.3 currently defines a flight
safety limit as criteria to ensure a set of impact limit lines
established for the flight of a launch vehicle flown with an FSS bound
the area where debris with a ballistic coefficient of 3 psf or more is
allowed to impact when an FSS functions. Thus, Sec. 417.213(a) and the
definition of flight safety limit require that any populated area be
protected by flight safety limits from where the FSS must be activated.
This requirement is not consistent with operations on Federal launch
ranges
[[Page 15384]]
that allow potential debris impact in populated areas inside the impact
limit lines, as long as the individual and collective public risks
remain within acceptable limits.
The requirements in Sec. 417.213(b) are specific about potential
contributors to the vehicle and debris dispersions for which the flight
safety limits analysis must account including time delays, all wind
effects, velocity imparted to vehicle fragments by breakup, all lift
and drag forces on the malfunctioning vehicle and falling debris, all
launch vehicle guidance and performance errors, all launch vehicle
malfunction turn capabilities, and any uncertainty due to map errors
and launch vehicle tracking errors.
Section 417.213(d) requires that the analysis establish designated
impact limit lines to bound the area where debris with a ballistic
coefficient of 3 psf is allowed to impact, assuming the FSS functions
properly. In contrast, part 431 does not contain any express
requirements for a flight safety limits analysis to set flight safety
limits. That being said, part 431 license applicants have performed a
flight safety limits analysis mirroring part 417 requirements in cases
where an FSS was employed to satisfy the public risk criteria in Sec.
431.35(b).
The FAA proposes to move the definition of ``flight safety limit''
from current Sec. 417.3 to Sec. 401.5 and update the definition to
mean criteria to ensure that public safety is protected from the flight
of a vehicle when an FSS functions properly. Thus, the proposal would
remove any ballistic coefficient threshold from the definition of a
flight safety limit. As previously discussed, the Air Force has
permanently waived its previous requirement that embedded a specific
ballistic coefficient threshold into the flight safety limits, and the
FAA has also waived the corresponding requirement in Sec.
417.213(d).\195\ When the FAA adopted the 3 psf ballistics coefficient
standard (in 2006), the FAA recognized that ballistic coefficient is
not well correlated with the probability of a casualty producing
impact.\196\ Simply put, ballistic coefficient is an imperfect
surrogate that was adopted based on past practice when computers were
less capable than today.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\195\ 81 FR 1470 (January 12, 2016).
\196\ Licensing and Safety Requirements for Launch, NPRM. 67 FR
49464 (October 28, 2002).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In Sec. 401.5, the proposal would also replace the term
``protected area'' with ``uncontrolled area,'' defined as an area of
land not controlled by a launch or reentry operator, a launch or
reentry site operator, an adjacent site operator, or other entity by
agreement. This change reflects the fact that all members of the
public, even those in areas of land controlled by a launch operator,
are protected to the extent that collective and individual public risk
limits apply everywhere. Specifically, proposed Sec. 450.123(a) would
require protection of uncontrolled areas by flight safety limits and
ensure compliance with the public safety criteria of proposed Sec.
450.101, while controlled areas would be required to meet only the
collective and individual risk requirements (also in accordance with
proposed Sec. 450.101).
The FAA intends to assess the need for flight safety limits to
protect environmentally-sensitive areas in the environmental review
process of proposed Sec. 450.47. The FAA anticipates that not all
environmentally-sensitive areas will need this protection. For example,
current practice for launches from the Western Range protects a
National Marine Sanctuary in the Pacific Ocean against planned impacts
of jettisoned items, but not against debris from a flight abort.
Proposed Sec. 450.123(a) would require an FSA to identify the
location of uncontrolled areas and establish flight safety limits that
would define when an operator must initiate flight abort to prevent
debris capable of causing a casualty from impacting in uncontrolled
areas if the vehicle is outside the limits of a useful mission, and to
ensure compliance with the public safety criteria of proposed Sec.
450.101. Given flight safety limits are only required to protect people
in uncontrolled areas and not people in controlled areas, the proposal
would reconcile the current inconsistency between the part 417
requirements versus the current practice at some Federal launch ranges
that allows the public's exposure to debris hazards as long as the
collective and individual risk criteria are met.
Proposed Sec. 450.123(b) would require a flight safety limits
analysis to identify flight safety limits for use in establishing
flight abort rules. The flight safety limits would be required to
account for temporal and geometric extents on the Earth's surface of
any vehicle hazards resulting from any planned or unplanned event for
all times during flight, and account for potential contributions to the
debris impact dispersions. This is the same as Sec. 417.213(b).
Proposed Sec. 450.123(b)(3) would add a requirement to design flight
safety limits to avoid flight abort under conditions that result in
increased collective risk to people in uncontrolled areas, compared to
continued flight. The proposed requirement is equivalent to the U.S.
Government consensus standard that a conditional risk management
process should be implemented to ensure that mission rules do not
induce unacceptable consequences when they are implemented.\197\ In the
flight safety context, a flight abort is a good example of a safety
intervention intended to mitigate public risks, but that typically
induces a conditional risk (e.g., a consequence associated with the
debris event triggered by the flight abort). A flight safety limits
analysis would ideally minimize all foreseeable consequences, not just
those to people on the ground or to the extent necessary to meet the
public safety criteria. For example, placing flight safety limits in
areas where flight abort might place debris on a busy shipping lane or
air corridor is not an ideal solution when other locations for the
limits could meet the public safety criteria and consequence criteria,
and still provide space for the vehicle to fly a useful mission. Also,
as a malfunctioning vehicle's debris footprint migrates towards a
populated area, the consequence to people on the ground from a flight
abort will increase from a low number and possibly reach the proposed
consequence limit. The ideal location for a flight safety limit on such
trajectory is not at the last location where an abort would still
result in meeting the consequence criteria, which would presumably
result in a consequence close to the limit, but at a location that
minimizes the consequence. This proposed approach could result in
flight safety limits that provide debris containment, or nearly so,
while also allowing normal flight and flight within the limits of a
useful mission without triggering an abort. In summary, the design of
the flight safety limits and the associated flight safety rules would
be required to avoid an increase in risk induced by a flight abort,
compared to inaction or action at a different time. This is relevant to
areas where debris containment is not possible, as discussed in greater
length in the next section on proposed Sec. 450.125.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\197\ RCC 321-10 at p. 2-7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Proposed Sec. 450.123(c) would require the flight safety analysis
to include a gate analysis for an orbital launch, or any launch or
reentry where one or more trajectories that represents a useful mission
intersects a flight safety limit that provides containment of debris
capable of causing a casualty. This is also discussed in more detail in
the next section on gate analysis.
Proposed Sec. 450.123(d) would provide flexibility to allow the
computation of
[[Page 15385]]
flight safety limits in real-time in lieu of computing flight safety
limits preflight. This alternative would reduce the number of
assumptions used in the flight safety limits analysis and allow for a
computation that uses the best available data on the vehicle state. The
proposal would allow the computation of flight safety limits in real-
time to be performed on the ground or onboard the vehicle.
The FAA proposes to remove the requirement for a straight-up time
analysis currently in Sec. 417.215. A straight-up time analysis
establishes when to terminate the flight of a vehicle that fails to
pitch over, and thus flies straight up, to achieve debris containment.
The straight-up time is not the only method of limiting the risks and
consequences to the launch area in the case of a vehicle that flies a
straight-up trajectory. Although the express provision is being removed
in the proposed rule, the new performance-based analysis permitted
under Sec. 450.213 would allow the straight-up time approach to
control the hazards from a straight-up flight, but its use would not be
required.
Proposed Sec. 450.123(e) lays out the application requirements for
flight safety limits analyses. The FAA would require an applicant to
submit: (1) A description of how each flight safety limit will be
computed; (2) representative flight safety limits and associated
parameters; (3) an indication of which flight abort rule from proposed
Sec. 450.165(c) is used in conjunction with each example flight safety
limit; (4) a graphic depiction or series of depictions of
representative flight safety limits, the launch or landing point, all
uncontrolled area boundaries, and vacuum instantaneous impact point
traces for the nominal trajectory, extents of normal flight, and limits
of a useful mission trajectories; (5) if the requirement for flight
abort is computed in real-time in lieu of precomputing flight safety
limits, a description of how the real-time flight abort requirement is
computed including references to public safety criteria of Sec.
450.101; and (6) additional products requested by the FAA for an
independent analysis when necessary to demonstrate compliance with risk
criteria. The proposed application requirements are consistent with
current practice under parts 417 and 431.
7. Gate Analysis
The FAA proposes Sec. 450.125 to make regulations governing gate
analyses more performance-based, flexible, and clear. This change would
include revising the definition of ``gate'' and, as discussed earlier,
adding a definition of the ``limits of a useful mission.'' The proposal
would also add an option to relax flight safety criteria without using
a gate.
Current Sec. 417.3 defines a ``gate'' as the portion of a flight
safety limit boundary through which the tracking icon of a launch
vehicle flown with an FSS may pass without flight termination. As
discussed earlier, a gate is an opening in a flight safety limit
through which a vehicle may fly, provided the vehicle meets certain
pre-defined conditions such that the vehicle performance indicates an
ability to continue safe flight. If the vehicle fails to meet the
required conditions to pass a gate, then flight abort would occur at
the flight safety limit. In other words, the gate would be closed.
The FAA has requirements for an overflight gate analysis in Sec.
417.217 and appendix A, section A417.17, and for a hold-and-resume gate
analysis in Sec. 417.218. An overflight gate analysis determines
whether a vehicle can overfly populated areas. This analysis requires a
launch operator determine why it is safe to allow flight through a
flight safety limit--the limit that protects populated or protected
areas--without terminating a flight. This analysis accounts for the
fact that it is potentially more dangerous to populated or protected
areas to destroy a malfunctioning vehicle during certain portions of a
launch than not to destroy it. In some circumstances, a destroyed
vehicle may disperse debris over a wider area affecting more people
than if the vehicle were to impact intact.
The primary purpose of flight safety limits and gates is to
establish safe locations and conditions to abort the flight prior to
the vehicle entering a region or condition where it may endanger
populated or other protected areas if flight were to continue. From an
operator's perspective, a gate should allow the vehicle to fly through
a flight safety limit when the trajectory corresponds to a useful
mission.\198\ Otherwise, a flight abort would be required for every
flight that intersects with a flight safety limit even if the mission
can still have a successful outcome. The optimal use of flight safety
limits and gates would be to prevent vehicles that cannot achieve a
useful mission from continuing flight, even when the flight is along a
trajectory that crosses a gate.
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\198\ As discussed earlier in this preamble, the FAA proposes in
Sec. 401.5 to define the ``limits of a useful mission'' as the
trajectory data or other parameters that describes the limits of a
mission that can attain the primary objective, including but not
limited to flight azimuth limits.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The current gate regulations imply that gates are the only option
when debris containment is not possible along a trajectory that
represents a useful mission, whether it is normal or outside of the
normal trajectory envelope. This requirement does not reflect current
practice at the Federal launch ranges. Federal launch ranges sometimes
relax flight safety limits to allow continued flight for these
trajectories without the use of a gate, as long as the operations
satisfies the collective risk criterion. Also, some Federal launch
ranges do not currently require explicit identification of the
conditional risk posed by a vehicle that flies on a trajectory within
the normal trajectory envelope or the limits of a useful mission. The
preflight risk due to such a trajectory is often small because the
vehicle is not likely to deviate far from nominal. However, a gate or
relaxed flight safety limit to allow flight on such a trajectory
implies that the risk must be acceptable given that the vehicle does
fly on such a trajectory. Such a failure to identify the conditional
risk associated with such a trajectory as part of the gate analysis is
inconsistent with the U.S. Government consensus standard (RCC 321-17
paragraph 2.3.6) that a conditional risk management process should be
implemented to ensure that mission rules do not induce unacceptable
levels of risk when they are implemented.
Although part 431 has no requirements related to gate analysis, the
one orbital RLV operation licensed to date employed an FSS and
performed a gate analysis.
The FAA's proposed Sec. 450.125 would establish a single set of
performance-based gate analysis requirements applicable to all launch
and reentry vehicles. The gate analysis requirements in Sec. Sec.
417.217 and 417.218 would be combined. Proposed Sec. 450.125 would
remove prescriptive requirements on the types of gates, standardize the
requirements for establishing a gate, and open the possibility of
relaxing flight safety limits. The FAA believes an operator should have
the freedom to select risk mitigation methods that will present the
best safety posture rather than prescribing certain strategies that may
not be the best for all scenarios and vehicles. The FAA also proposes
to revise the existing definition of ``gate'' in Sec. 401.5 to replace
the term ``flight termination'' with ``flight abort'' and to add
language to reflect that the flight must remain within specified
parameters to avoid flight abort.
Proposed Sec. 450.125(a) would require a gate analysis for an
orbital launch, or
[[Page 15386]]
any launch or reentry where one or more trajectories that represents a
useful mission intersects a flight safety limit that provides
containment of debris capable of causing a casualty.
Proposed Sec. 450.125(b) would set the gate analysis requirements.
The FAA would require an analysis to establish a relaxation of flight
safety limits to allow continued flight or a gate where a decision will
be made to abort the launch or reentry, or allow continued flight. If a
gate is established, the analysis should establish a measure of
performance at the gate that would enable the flight abort crew or
autonomous FSS to determine whether the vehicle is able to complete a
useful mission, and abort the flight if it is not. Further, the
analysis should establish accompanying flight abort rules. Finally, for
an orbital launch, the analysis should establish a gate at the last
opportunity to determine whether the vehicle's flight is in compliance
with the flight abort rules and can make a useful mission, and abort
the flight if not. This last requirement would achieve the goal of
assuring that only missions that can be useful are allowed to proceed
to orbit, thereby limiting the potential for space debris. In addition,
when the vehicle performance does not demonstrate an ability to reach a
minimum safe orbit (without an imminent random reentry), meaning it
cannot pass the useful mission requirement, the regulation would
require that flight abort occur.
In proposed Sec. 450.125(c), the FAA would require the extents of
any gate or relaxation of the flight safety limits to be based on
normal trajectories, trajectories that may achieve a useful mission,
collective risk, and consequence criteria. In proposed Sec.
450.125(c)(1), the FAA proposes to require a gate or relaxation of
flight safety limits anywhere a flight safety limit intersects with a
normal trajectory if that trajectory would meet the individual and
collective risk criteria of proposed Sec. 450.101(a)(1) and (2) or
(b)(1) and (2) when treated like a nominal trajectory with normal
trajectory dispersions.\199\ Requiring all normal trajectories to be
treated like a nominal trajectory with dispersions as input to a
conditional risk analysis (given a sample normal trajectory) for the
gate analysis would resolve the issue of an incomplete characterization
of the conditional risk of a vehicle that flies through what was a
flight safety limit while within the normal trajectory envelope.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\199\ The FAA would retain the definitions of ``normal flight''
and ``normal trajectory'' currently found in Sec. 417.3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Another requirement of the proposed gate analysis would be that the
predicted average consequence from flight abort resulting from any
reasonably foreseeable vehicle response mode, in any one-second period
of flight, using any modified flight safety limits must not exceed 1 x
10-2 CEC. The goal of this requirement is to
ensure that flight safety limits do not create an unacceptable
consequence when used, since debris containment is no longer provided.
A gate that does not have flight safety limits after the gate would not
need to meet this consequence criterion since it would be placed at the
same location as flight safety limits that do provide debris
containment. Under the proposal, any intersections of flight safety
limits with normal trajectories would result in flight safety limits
that are relaxed enough to allow passage, or an open gate in the flight
safety limit as long as there is enough data available to confirm that
the vehicle is healthy (i.e., appears capable of reaching a minimum
safe perigee). Flight on normal trajectories must still meet the public
safety criteria in proposed Sec. 450.101, so this practice would
ensure acceptable risks and use the best available data to confirm that
a vehicle is unlikely to fail before being allowed to fly through a
gate, if one is present. Whether flight safety limits would be relaxed
enough to let a vehicle fly through that area, or be gated, is
optional. A gate is preferred if it would reduce risk, given that there
is sufficient information available to make a decision on whether the
vehicle is sufficiently healthy to pass. This practice would align with
the Federal launch range's current practice and meet the intent of the
current requirement in Sec. 417.107(a)(2).
In proposed Sec. 450.125(c)(2), trajectories that are outside of
normal flight but within the limits of a useful mission would be
evaluated as potential normal trajectories. Proposed Sec.
450.125(c)(2) would allow flight safety limits to be gated or relaxed
where they intersect with any trajectory within the limits of a useful
mission, if the trajectory would meet the individual and collective
risk criteria of proposed Sec. 450.101(a)(1) and (2) or (b)(1) and
(2), assuming that the trajectory flown would be treated like a nominal
trajectory with normal trajectory dispersions. The predicted average
consequence from flight abort resulting from a failure in any one-
second period of flight, using any modified flight safety limits, would
be required to not exceed 1 x 10-2 CEC. The
philosophy behind proposed Sec. 450.125(c)(2) is to allow a non-normal
flight to continue as long as the mission does not pose an unacceptable
conditional risk given the present trajectory. A good example of
missions that fall into this category are missions that lift-off on an
incorrect flight azimuth, usually due to a software input error, such
as the Ariane 5 failure on January 25, 2018, during its 97th mission
(VA241). Apart from the programming error, these vehicles may be
healthy and are not expected to fail more frequently than a flight
without the programming error, so these flights should be allowed to
continue if they meet the individual and collective risk criteria on
the present azimuth (unless the risk from planned debris impacts was
unacceptable on the present flight azimuth). If they do not, such
flights would be required to implement an abort. This proposal is
consistent with the ARC's recommendation to expand part 431 to include
flight abort rules that apply when the vehicle is performing outside of
its profile and is unable to reach a useful orbit or survive, and needs
to be terminated prior to overflight of a populated area.
Proposed Sec. 450.125(d) would establish the application
requirements for gate analyses. Specifically, the proposal would
require an applicant to submit a description of the methodology used to
establish each gate or relaxation of a flight safety limit; a
description of the measure of performance used to determine whether a
vehicle will be allowed to cross a gate without flight abort, the
acceptable ranges of the measure of performance, and how these ranges
were determined; a graphic depiction showing representative flight
safety limits, any protected uncontrolled area overflight regions, and
instantaneous impact point traces for the nominal trajectory, extents
of normal flight, and limits of a useful mission trajectories; and any
additional products requested by the FAA to conduct an independent
analysis when necessary to ensure that public risk criteria are not
exceeded. The proposed application requirements are consistent with
current practice under parts 417 and 431.
8. Data Loss Flight Time and Planned Safe Flight State Analyses
The FAA proposes to consolidate and update data loss flight times
and planned safe flight states requirements in proposed Sec. 450.127
(Data Loss Flight Time and Planned Safe Flight State Analyses).
Data loss flight time analyses are used to establish when an
operator must abort a flight following the loss of vehicle tracking
information. In Sec. 417.3,
[[Page 15387]]
the FAA currently defines ``data loss flight time'' as the shortest
elapsed thrusting time during which a launch vehicle flown with an FSS
can move from its normal trajectory to a condition where it is possible
for the launch vehicle to endanger the public. This definition is
unclear as to what constitutes a condition where it is possible for the
launch vehicle to endanger the public. Given the overall approach to
impact limit lines in Sec. 417.213(d) and the treatment of data loss
flight times in appendix A to part 417, section A417.19, the FAA has
interpreted the definition to mean any impact on a protected area with
debris greater than 3 psf ballistic coefficient.
With this proposal, the FAA would move the definition of ``data
loss flight time'' from current Sec. 417.3 to Sec. 401.5 and update
the definition to mean the shortest elapsed thrusting or gliding time
during which a vehicle flown with an FSS can move from its trajectory
to a condition where it is possible for the vehicle to violate a flight
safety limit. An important change in the definition would be the
replacement of ``move from its normal trajectory'' with ``move from its
trajectory.'' Computing data loss flight times initialized using normal
trajectories or nominal trajectories would both be acceptable means of
compliance with the proposed regulation, since using the former should
be more conservative. This resolves the issue of varying practices at
different ranges and provides additional flexibility.
In Sec. 417.219(a), the FAA requires a launch operator to
establish data loss flight times and a planned safe flight state. In
Sec. 417.219(b), the FAA requires that thrust be considered as a means
of moving a vehicle towards a protected area, but some vehicles can
also glide a significant distance using lift. Further, Sec. 417.219(b)
requires the data loss flight time to be relative to reaching protected
areas, not flight safety limits. The requirements in Sec. 417.219(c)
also include a method of establishing the planned safe flight state
that includes the subjective phrase ``the absence of a flight safety
system would not significantly increase the accumulated risk from
debris impacts.'' Data loss times are currently computed in different
ways at Federal launch ranges, with some initializing the computation
from the nominal trajectory and some from trajectories within the
normal trajectory envelope, sometimes referred to as ``dispersed''
trajectories.
Part 431 has no requirements related to analysis to establish data
loss flight times or planned safe flight state. However, the one
orbital RLV operation licensed to date employed an FSS and established
data loss flight times.
The FAA's proposed Sec. 450.127(a) would require an FSA to
establish data loss flight times and a planned safe flight state for
each flight to establish each flight abort rule that applies when
vehicle tracking data is not available for use by the flight abort crew
or autonomous FSS. Substantively, this proposal is consistent with the
current rule in Sec. 417.219(a). However, the FAA's proposal would
update language to account for autonomous FSS and the use of the term
flight abort in place of flight termination.
Proposed Sec. 450.127(b)(1) would retain the data loss flight time
analysis requirements consistent with Sec. 417.219, but with the
addition of gliding flight as a means of moving a vehicle towards
flight safety limits (in lieu of protected areas in accordance with
Sec. 417.219). The proposal would replace the subjective method of
establishing the safe flight state with a more straightforward method
of analyzing when the vehicle's state vector reaches a state where the
vehicle is no longer required to have a flight safety system. This is
to avoid aborting a flight due to loss of track data during a phase of
flight in which track data is not required to ensure safe flight. Thus,
the proposal would encourage operators to avoid a flight abort, which
often correlates with creating debris, due to loss of track data when
in an area where flight abort is not required to meet the regulations.
Proposed Sec. 450.127(b)(2) would require data loss flight times
to account for forces that may stop the vehicle before reaching a
flight safety limit, such as aerodynamic forces that exceed the
structural limits of the vehicle. When more conservative methods are
used, such as assuming an instantaneous turn towards the nearest flight
safety limit, data loss flight times can be underestimated in that a
vehicle could not physically perform the turn without breaking up. Data
loss flight times that are unrealistically low create the risk of an
unnecessary abort (and thus, an unnecessary debris event) if track is
lost, since track may return and allow flight to continue if the data
loss flight times are greater.
Proposed Sec. 450.127(b)(3) would allow the computation of data
loss flight times in real-time in lieu of only computations made
preflight. This proposal would allow for a computation using the last-
known state vector of the vehicle before track was lost. Proposed Sec.
450.127(b)(3) would allow the computation of data loss flight times to
be performed on the ground or onboard the vehicle, depending on whether
a traditional command destruct or autonomous flight safety system is
used.
In proposed Sec. 450.127(c), the requirements regarding the
planned safe flight state would be consistent with those currently in
Sec. 417.219(c), only generalized to apply to reentry as well as
launch. Proposed Sec. 450.127(c)(1) would update the Sec.
417.219(c)(1) requirement using new terminology without any change to
the meaning.
Proposed Sec. 450.127(d) lays out the application requirements for
data loss flight time and planned safe flight state analyses.
Specifically, the proposal would require an applicant to submit a
description of the methodology used to determine data loss flight
times; tabular data describing the data loss flight times from a
representative mission; the safe flight state and methodology used to
determine it; and any additional products requested by the FAA to
conduct an independent analysis.
9. Time Delay Analysis
For ELVs, Sec. 417.221(a) requires a time delay analysis that
establishes the mean elapsed time between the violation of a flight
termination rule and the time when the flight safety system is capable
of terminating flight for use in establishing flight safety limits.
Section 417.221(b) requires the analysis to determine a time delay
distribution that accounts for the variance of all time delays for each
potential failure scenario, a flight safety official's decision and
reaction time, and flight termination hardware and software delays
which includes all delays inherent in tracking systems, data processing
systems, display systems, command control systems, and flight
termination systems.
The FAA has also required time delay analyses for RLVs under the
current regulatory scheme. Specifically, Sec. 431.39(a) requires an
RLV license applicant to submit contingency abort plans, if any, that
ensure safe conduct of mission operations during nominal and non-
nominal vehicle flight. In practice, a time delay analysis has been
necessary to ensure safe conduct of an RLV that uses flight abort.
The FAA proposes to streamline the regulations governing the
analysis of time delay in proposed Sec. 450.129 (Time Delay Analysis).
Proposed Sec. 450.129(a) would use language identical to Sec.
417.221(a), except that the term ``terminating'' would be replaced with
the term ``aborting.'' The proposal would replace the list of time
delay contributions prescribed in Sec. 417.221(b) with a performance-
based requirement in proposed Sec. 450.129(a), that the time delay
analysis would be required to
[[Page 15388]]
determine a time delay distribution that accounts for all foreseeable
sources of delay.
Proposed Sec. 450.129(b) would list application requirements.
Specifically, the proposal would require an applicant to submit a
description of the methodology used in the time delay analysis, a
tabular listing of each time delay source and the total delay, with
uncertainty, and any additional products the FAA would request to
conduct an independent analysis.
10. Probability of Failure
Proposed Sec. 450.131 (Probability of Failure Analysis) would
cover probability of failure (POF) analysis requirements for all launch
and reentry vehicles. The proposal would also make application
requirements clearer and implement performance-based requirements to
address allocation to flight times and vehicle response modes. The
proposed POF performance requirements would allow an operator to employ
alternative, potentially innovative methodologies so long as the
results satisfy proposed requirements such as valid input data.
Current regulations covering POF analysis requirements for ELVs are
found in Sec. 417.224. Part 431 does not have requirements for a POF
analysis. Even so, a POF analysis is necessary to demonstrate
compliance with the public risk criteria set for RLV operations in
Sec. 431.35(b).
Section 417.224(a) requires that POF analyses use accurate data,
scientific principles, and a method that is statistically or
probabilistically valid. For vehicles with fewer than two flights, the
POF must account for the outcome of all previous launches of vehicles
developed and launched in similar circumstances. If a vehicle has more
than two flights, the POF analysis must account for the outcomes of all
previous flights of the vehicle in a statistically valid manner.
Section 417.224(a) does not address the use of data on partial failures
and anomalies, which is a shortcoming the FAA seeks to correct. Section
417.224(b) defines failure to mean when a launch vehicle does not
complete any phase of normal flight, or when any anomalous condition
exhibits the potential for a stage or its debris to impact the Earth or
reenter the atmosphere during the mission, or any future mission, of
similar launch vehicle capability. The paragraph makes clear a launch
incident or accident also constitutes a failure. Finally, Section
417.224(c) explains that previous flights begin when the launch vehicle
normally or inadvertently lifts off from a launch platform and that
liftoff occurs with any motion of the launch vehicle with respect to
the launch platform.
Although the Sec. 417.224 definitions have generally served the
FAA and the industry well, Sec. 417.224 lacks requirements to address
allocation to flight times and vehicle response modes (VRMs), even
though these allocations are necessary to determine the public risks
posed by various VRMs at various times in flight. Given POF is a
primary factor in any risk computation, it is impossible for an
applicant to demonstrate compliance with the quantitative public risk
criteria without an analysis to determine the probability of any
reasonably foreseeable outcome, such as an on-trajectory loss of thrust
or a malfunction turn ending in aerodynamic break-up.
The FAA would retain the substantive Sec. 417.224 POF analysis
requirements in proposed Sec. 450.131, including the definitions of
key terms such as ``failure'' and ``previous flight''. However, the
proposal would apply to all launch and reentry vehicles. In addition,
it would clarify the data a POF analysis must use to establish a valid
allocation to flight times and vehicle response modes.
Proposed Sec. 450.131(a) would retain the same substantive
requirements regarding the an operator's estimation of the POF for
vehicles with fewer than two flights. However, for vehicles with two or
more previous flights, the proposal would change the Sec. 417.224(a)
provision by requiring that the outcomes of all previous flights of the
vehicle or vehicle stage account for data on partial failures and
anomalies including Class 3 and Class 4 mishaps. Thus, the proposal
would require an analysis to account for partial failures and
anomalies. These changes should improve the credibility of POF analyses
by giving due credit to stages that succeed even though a subsequent
stage fails. For example, consider a vehicle launched two times, with a
failure during the second stage on the first launch and no failures
during the second launch. For the third launch, the proposal would
allow a probability of failure analysis to account for the fact that
the first stage flew twice without a failure, while the second stage
flew twice with one failure.
Proposed Sec. 450.131(b) would retain essentially the same
definition of ``failure'' used in Sec. 417.224(b), with changes using
the proposed mishap terminology (Class 1 or Class 2) and to cover other
vehicles beyond ELVs.
Proposed Sec. 450.131(c) would retain essentially the same
definition of ``previous flight'' for FSA purposes, with changes
intended to encompass all launch and reentry vehicles, including cases
where an operator uses a carrier aircraft. Thus, ``previous flight''
for the purposes of an FSA would cover the flight of a launch vehicle
beginning when the vehicle normally or inadvertently lifts off from a
launch platform. Liftoff would still occur with any motion of the
launch vehicle with respect to the launch platform. The FAA would
clarify that this would include a carrier aircraft as a launch
platform, and would include any intentional or unintentional separation
from the launch platform. In terms of a reentry vehicle, the flight of
a reentry vehicle or deorbiting upper stage would begin when a vehicle
attempts to initiate a deorbit.
Proposed Sec. 450.131(d), titled ``Allocation,'' would establish
performance requirements to address POF allocation to flight times and
VRMs. The proposal would require that a vehicle POF be distributed
across flight times and vehicle response modes consistent with the data
available from all previous flights of vehicles developed and launched
or reentered in similar circumstances; and data from previous flights
of vehicles, stages, or components developed and launched or reentered
by the subject vehicle developer or operator. Such data may include
previous experience involving similar vehicle, stage, or component
design characteristics; development and integration processes,
including the extent of integrated system testing; and level of
experience of the vehicle operation and development team members. These
requirements were not in Sec. 417.224 or part 431. In this context,
phases of flight would be defined by planned events affecting the
vehicle configuration and its failure rate, such as ignition, first
stage flight, stage separation, second stage ignition, second stage
flight, payload fairing separation, etc. This proposal would require
what is already necessary and thus done in current practice.
In proposed Sec. 450.131(e), the FAA would require that a POF
allocation account for significant differences in the observed failure
rate and the conditional failure rate. The conditional failure rate
represents the failure rate conditional on the vehicle or subsystem
having survived, without a failure as defined earlier, to a given time
in flight. The observed failure rate is the product of the conditional
failure rate and the reliability function, which is commonly defined as
the probability that the vehicle or subsystem has not failed prior to a
given time in flight. For high reliability systems where the
reliability function is close to one (by definition),
[[Page 15389]]
the observed failure rate can be approximated as the conditional
failure rate. If the overall vehicle or stage POF is below 10 percent
(over the entire period of time corresponding to a phase of flight),
then this simplified approach produces a relative error less than
approximately 0.5 percent, which is generally not considered a
significant difference. For lower reliability systems, this
approximation does produce a significant difference between the
observed failure rate and the conditional failure rate. Here again, the
proposal would clarify what is already necessary and thus done in
current practice.
Proposed Sec. 450.131(e) would also require that a POF analysis
use a constant conditional failure rate for each phase of flight,
unless there is clear and convincing evidence of a different
conditional failure rate for a particular vehicle, stage, or phase of
flight. Thus, the proposal would require a POF analysis to assume that
the conditional failure rate can be represented as a piece-wise
constant function of time for each phase of flight, absent clear and
convincing evidence to the contrary. The points that define transitions
to a potentially different conditional failure rate must include
staging events or other vehicle configuration changes, such as ignition
of other engines or rocket motors. In some cases, the FAA anticipates
that there will be sufficient evidence to justify a different failure
rate, for example during a start-up or shut-down/burnout transient for
a rocket motor compared to steady state operation of a stage, engine,
or motor.
Proposed Sec. 450.131(f) would lay out the FAA's application
requirements for POF analyses that address the proposed methodology,
assumptions and justification, input data, and output data. An
applicant would also be required to provide a complete set of tabular
data and graphs of the predicted failure rate and cumulative failure
probability for each foreseeable VRM. The proposed requirements are
consistent with current practice to the extent that any valid FSA must
include the probability of failure assigned to each VRM as a function
of time into flight.
11. Flight Hazard Areas
The FAA proposes to streamline its regulations on flight hazard
area in proposed Sec. 450.133, applicable to all launch and reentry
vehicles. The FAA would codify its working definition of ``flight
hazard area'' to mean any region of land, sea, or air that must be
surveyed, publicized, controlled, or evacuated in order to protect the
public health and safety and safety of property. An FSA would include a
flight hazard area analysis to identify regions of land, sea, or air
where an operation poses a potential hazard to the public. The proposal
would reduce the size of the regions of land, sea, and air requiring
hazard warnings from normal flight events and would reduce the size of
regions requiring surveillance prior to initiating a commercial space
transportation operation. These changes would be consistent with
practices at Federal launch ranges.
The current FAA regulations most pertinent to flight hazard area
analysis are found in Sec. Sec. 417.107(b) (Flight safety) and 417.223
(Flight hazard analysis) for ELVs, and Sec. Sec. 431.35(b) (Acceptable
reusable launch vehicle mission risk) and 431.43(b) (Reusable launch
vehicle mission operational requirements and restrictions) for RLVs.
Both the ELV and RLV regulations require flight hazard areas to protect
against hazards posed by vehicle malfunctions (e.g., an in-flight
break-up) and normal flight events that create hazards (e.g., any
planned jettison of debris, launch vehicle components, or vehicle
stages).
The FAA currently sets requirements to warn of, or limit the
operations of, ELVs and RLVs in regions where planned debris impacts
are likely, for example, due to jettisoned stages. In Sec. 417.223(b),
the FAA currently requires flight hazard area analyses to establish
ship and aircraft hazard area warnings to mariners and airman in
regions that encompass the three-sigma impact dispersion area for each
planned debris impact. Similar language appears in Sec. 431.43(b),
which states that a nominal landing location is suitable if the area of
the predicted three-sigma dispersion of the vehicle impacts can be
wholly contained within the designated location. In the 2000 final
rule, the FAA explained that it intended the three-sigma to refer a
location where the vehicle or stage landing would be contained 997
times out of 1000 attempts, or 99.7 percent probability of
containment.\200\ Hence, these regulations used the term ``three-
sigma'' to refer to a univariate Gaussian distribution,\201\ despite
the fact that impact dispersions are bivariate, and not necessarily
Gaussian. Notably, neither Sec. 417.223 nor Sec. 431.43 stipulate
whether these warning areas must account for all debris or only debris
capable of causing a casualty. There is evidence that the separation of
large stages can liberate small fragments with a negligible probability
of creating a casualty, depending on the nature of the exposed
population. For example, people in aircraft are often more vulnerable
than people on the ground because a fragment that impacts an aircraft
has a much higher kinetic energy due to the velocity of the aircraft.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\200\ 65 FR 56618 (September 9, 2000), at 56629.
\201\ Gaussian distribution (also known as normal distribution)
is a bell-shaped curve, and it is assumed that during any
measurement values will follow a normal distribution with an equal
number of measurements above and below the mean value.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Both the ELV and RLV regulations require public risk controls, such
as evacuation or surveillance, to ensure that no individual member of
the public is exposed to greater one-in-a-million (1 x 10-6)
PC, irrespective of their location on land, sea, or air, to
satisfy risk criterion in Sec. Sec. 417.107(b) and 431.35(b). The part
417 regulations address the identification and surveillance of flight
hazard areas explicitly in several sections, including Sec. Sec.
417.111(b)(5), 417.121(f), and 417.223 as discussed below. Part 431
regulations do not expressly address flight hazard areas. However, the
preamble to the 2000 final rule stated that the individual risk limit
of 1 x 10-6 PC would dictate whether or not an
area must be evacuated for launch or reentry activity along that
trajectory to occur safely, and clarified that limit applied for any
person not involved in the licensed activity. Hence, the current RLV
regulations clearly intended the evacuation, and surveillance by
inference, of any area where a person not involved in the licensed
activity would otherwise experience more than 1 x 10-6
PC.
Only Sec. 417.223 and associated appendices provide specific
direction on conducting flight hazard area analyses. In Sec.
417.223(a), the FAA requires launch operators to perform a flight
hazard area analysis that identifies any regions of land, sea, or air
that must be surveyed, publicized, controlled, or evacuated in order to
control the risk to the public from debris impact hazards. In addition,
the current regulation notes that the risk management requirements of
Sec. 417.205(a) apply to the flight hazard area analyses. Lastly,
Sec. 417. 223(a) paragraph lists factors that the analysis must
account for.
Regarding aircraft hazard areas, the preamble to part 431 stated
that the FAA also reserves discretion to impose measures deemed
necessary by that office to protect public safety.\202\ This deference
to regional offices for aircraft protection resulted in a lack of
clarity and potential unevenness to the aircraft protection
requirements potentially imposed on RLV operators.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\202\ 65 FR 56618 (September 19, 2000), at 56646.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Proposed Sec. 450.133 would establish general requirements for the
flight hazard area analysis as well as
[[Page 15390]]
requirements specific to waterborne vessel hazard areas, land hazard
areas, airspace hazard volumes, and the license application. The
proposal would make uniform to launch and reentry the requirement in
current Sec. 417.223(a) that operators must identify any regions of
land, sea, or air that must be surveyed, publicized, controlled, or
evacuated to the extent necessary to ensure acceptable individual and
collective risks. However, as discussed later in this section, the
proposed regulations would allow operators to reduce, or otherwise
optimize, the size of the warning regions for hazards resulting from
normal flight events.
The proposal would add a definition of ``flight hazard area'' to
Sec. 405.1 to mean any region of land, sea, or air that must be
surveyed, publicized, controlled, or evacuated in order to protect the
public health and safety, and safety of property. This definition is
consistent with the current requirement in Sec. 417.223(a). Note that
the proposed definition would allow for the fact that it may be
appropriate to issue a public warning for a flight hazard area, but
unnecessary to survey or evacuate the area to ensure the public risks
are within the criteria given in proposed Sec. 450.101, as explained
in the discussion of hazard area surveillance and publication.
Proposed Sec. 450.133(a) would also revise the technical factors
for which the hazard area analysis must account to remove language
limiting those factors to launch activity alone, thus making consistent
the regulations for all types of commercial space transportation
operations. The proposal would merge current Sec. 417.223(a)(2), (3),
and (4) with slight changes into Sec. 450.133(a)(1) to require an
operator to account for the ``regions of land, sea, and air potentially
exposed to debris impact resulting from normal flight events and from
debris hazards resulting from any potential malfunction.'' Proposed
Sec. 450.133(a)(5) would also clarify that the analysis must account
for all foreseeable sources of debris dispersion during freefall,
including wind effects, guidance and control, velocity imparted by
break-up or jettison, lift, and drag forces with winds that are no less
severe than the worst wind conditions under which flight might be
attempted, and uncertainty in the wind conditions. In Sec.
417.223(a)(4), the current regulation implies that the analysis only
needed to account for some exposed populations in the vicinity of the
launch site. The proposed Sec. 450.133(a) would further clarify that
all sources of debris dispersion must be accounted for by removing any
ambiguity associated with what constitutes ``in the vicinity of the
launch site;'' by eliminating that phrase, and thus ensuring equal
protection for all public exposures. Finally, the proposal would
clarify that valid flight hazard area analyses would be required to
treat all planned debris hazards, planned impacts, and planned landings
as a virtual certainty, consistent with current practice and the
regulations in sections A417.23 and B417.13. Again, part 431 does not
address flight hazard areas, but current practice for RLVs is generally
consistent with the ELV regulations.
Proposed Sec. 450.133(b)(1), (c)(1), and (d)(1) would align FAA
regulations with practices at the Federal launch ranges by allowing
operators to reduce or otherwise optimize the size of the regions for
warnings of potential hazardous debris resulting from normal flight
events. Specifically, in Sec. 417.223(b), the FAA currently requires
hazard area analyses to establish ship and aircraft hazard area
warnings in regions that encompass the three-sigma impact dispersion
area for each planned debris impact. Similar language appears in Sec.
431.43(b), and the FAA previously took the position that ``three-
sigma'' in this context referred to 99.7 percent probability of
containment (as explained earlier). However, the current regulations do
not specify if the confidence of containment applies to all planned
debris or only debris capable of causing a casualty. In any case,
current practice includes the establishment of flight hazard areas
sufficient for 97 percent probability of containment of debris capable
of causing a casualty. Thus, the proposed requirements in Sec. 450.133
(b)(1), (c)(1), and (d)(1) would be revised to include language
reflecting that the provision applies to debris capable of causing a
casualty to any person located on land, sea, or air.
Finally, proposed Sec. 450.133(e) would list flight hazard area
application requirements. An applicant would need to submit a
description of the methodology to be used in the flight hazard area
analysis, including all assumptions and justifications for the
assumptions, vulnerability models, analysis methods, and input data.
This information would include the worst wind conditions under which
flight might be attempted accounting for uncertainty in the wind
conditions, the classes of waterborne vessels and vulnerability
criteria employed, and the classes of aircraft and vulnerability
criteria employed. Section 450.133(e)(2) would require an applicant to
submit representative hazard area analysis outputs to include tabular
data and graphs of the results of the flight hazard area analysis. Note
that the proposal would require hazard area results to identify the
regions of land, sea, and air considered hazardous, regardless of
location or ownership.\203\ The proposed requirement to show contours
of probability of impact (PI) and PC that are an
order of magnitude lower than those used to define the flight hazard
areas is necessary to demonstrate sufficient computational resolution
and analysis fidelity for the results that are critical to public
safety. Furthermore, the FAA Air Traffic Organization currently
requires identification of regions of air where the PI
exceeds 1 x 10-7 for all debris capable of causing a
casualty to persons on an aircraft, in order to facilitate safe and
efficient integration of launch and reentry operations into the NAS.
Proposed Sec. 450.133(e)(3) would specifically provide that applicants
must provide additional products if requested by the FAA to conduct an
independent analysis.
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\203\ However, as provided in proposed Sec. 450.161(c), an
operator would only be required to publicize warnings for flight
hazard areas that exclude any regions of land, sea, or air under the
control of the vehicle or site operator or other entity by
agreement.
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12. Debris Risk Analysis
The FAA proposes to streamline, clarify, and make consistent its
regulations on debris risk analysis used to evaluate compliance with
the public safety criteria in proposed Sec. 450.101. The proposal
would require launch and reentry operators to conduct a debris risk
analysis that demonstrates compliance with proposed Sec. 450.101
either prior to the day of the operation, accounting for all
foreseeable conditions within the flight commit criteria, or during the
countdown using the best available input data.
A debris risk analysis determines the expected average number of
casualties to the public, individually and collectively, due to inert
and explosive debris hazards. This analysis includes an evaluation of
risk to populations on land, including areas following passage through
any gate in a flight safety limit boundary. The current FAA regulations
require a debris risk analysis, but only part 417 provides any
specificity about what constitutes a valid analysis including
prescriptive requirements in section A417.25 of appendix A. Part 431
provides no requirements to clarify what constitutes a valid debris
risk analysis. In practice though, RLV license applicants often abided
by debris risk performance requirements set in part 417, such as the
need to use trajectory time intervals sufficient to
[[Page 15391]]
produce smooth and continuous individual risk contours.
Section A417.1 states that the appendix applies to the methods for
performing analysis required by Sec. Sec. 417.107 and 417.225, and
provides (1) an acceptable means of compliance, and (2) a standard and
a measure of fidelity against which the FAA will measure any proposed
alternative analysis approach. However, in some cases the 417
appendices are overly prescriptive and unduly burdensome. For example,
section A417.25(c) requires an operator to file with the FAA a debris
risk analysis report that includes all populated areas included in the
debris risk analysis, which typically translates into many thousands of
population centers for an orbital launch, as well as the values of
probability of impact and expected casualty for each populated area. In
other cases, the part 417 appendices mistakenly neglected to direct an
applicant to account for important phenomena, such as the influence of
uncertainties in atmospheric conditions on the propagation of debris
from each predicted breakup location to impact.
The FAA proposes to streamline, clarify, and make consistent its
regulations regarding debris risk analyses to determine if public risks
posed by a proposed launch or reentry can comply with the public safety
criteria in proposed Sec. 450.101. The proposal would provide
performance-based regulations regarding the level of fidelity required
for key elements of a valid debris risk analysis, including analyses
for the propagation of debris, public exposure and critical assets
model, and casualty areas. The proposed debris risk analysis
requirements in Sec. 450.135 would supplement the more generic
requirements for flight safety methods proposed in Sec. 450.115. The
proposal would also align FAA regulations with practices at the Federal
launch ranges.
Proposed Sec. 450.135(a) provides applicants an option to perform
a debris risk analysis that demonstrates compliance with public safety
criteria in Sec. 450.101, either prior to the day of the operation, by
accounting for all foreseeable conditions within the flight commit
criteria, or during the countdown using the best available input data.
Thus, the proposal provides flexibility that was lacking in both parts
417 and 431.
Proposed Sec. 450.135(b) would include performance-based
requirements to clarify the phenomena the propagation-of-debris portion
of the analysis must consider. The propagation of debris is a physics-
based analysis that predicts where debris impacts are likely to occur
in the case of a debris event while the vehicle is in flight, such as
jettison of a vehicle stage or an explosion. As mentioned previously,
section A417 provides some requirements regarding the sources of debris
impact dispersions that must be accounted for, but in some cases that
was either overly prescriptive or incomplete. A debris risk analysis
must compute statistically-valid debris impact probability
distributions using the input data produced by FSAs required in
proposed Sec. Sec. 450.117 through 450.133. The propagation of debris
from each predicted breakup location to impact would be required to
account for all foreseeable forces that can influence any debris impact
location, and all foreseeable sources of impact dispersion. At a
minimum, the foreseeable sources of impact dispersion must include the
uncertainties in atmospheric conditions, debris aerodynamic parameters,
pre-breakup position and velocity, and breakup-imparted
velocities.\204\
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\204\ The level of fidelity of the analysis would be subject to
the requirements in proposed Sec. 450.101(g) which, as proposed,
requires an operator's flight safety analysis method to use accurate
data and scientific principles and be statistically valid. The
method must produce results consistent with or more conservative
than the results available from previous mishaps, tests, or other
valid benchmarks, such as higher-fidelity methods.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Proposed Sec. 450.135(c) would provide performance-based
regulations that specify features of a valid exposure model. An
exposure model provides critical input data on the geographical
location of people and critical assets at various times when the launch
or reentry operation could occur. A debris risk analysis must use an
exposure model that accounts for the distribution of people and
critical assets. The exposure input data would be required to include
the entire region where there is a significant probability of impact of
hazardous debris, to characterize the distribution and vulnerability of
people and critical assets both geographically and temporally, and to
account for the distribution of people in various structure and vehicle
types with a resolution consistent with the characteristic size of the
impact probability distributions for relevant fragment groups. It would
be required to have sufficient temporal and spatial resolution that a
uniform distribution of people within each defined region can be
treated as a single average set of characteristics without degrading
the accuracy of any debris analysis output, and to use accurate source
data from demographic sources, physical surveys, or other methods. As
well, the exposure input data would be required to be regularly updated
to account for recent land-use changes, population growth, migration,
and construction. Finally, it would be required to account for
uncertainty in the source data and modeling approach.
In Sec. 450.135(d), the proposal would provide performance-based
regulations that set forth the features of a valid casualty area and
consequence analysis. The proposal would include a definition of
casualty area in Sec. 401.5. ``Casualty area'' would mean the area
surrounding each potential debris or vehicle impact point where serious
injuries, or worse, can occur. A debris risk analysis would be required
to model the casualty area and compute the predicted consequences of
each reasonably foreseeable vehicle response mode in terms of
conditional expected casualties. The casualty area and consequence
analysis would be required to account for all relevant debris fragment
characteristics and the characteristics of a representative person
exposed to any potential debris hazard; any direct impacts of debris
fragments, intact impact, or indirect impact effects; and vulnerability
of people and critical assets to debris impacts. The vulnerability of
people and critical assets to debris impacts would be required to
account for the effects of buildings, ground vehicles, waterborne
vessel, and aircraft upon the vulnerability of any occupants; for all
hazard sources, such as the potential for any toxic or explosive energy
releases; and for indirect or secondary effects such as bounce,
splatter, skip, slide or ricochet, including accounting for terrain. It
would also be required to account for the effect of wind on debris
impact vector and toxic releases, and for impact speed and angle (also
accounting for motion of vehicles). Finally, it would be required to
account for uncertainty in fragment impact parameters, and uncertainty
in modeling methodology. These broad performance-based items would
replace the unduly narrow and prescriptive requirements in appendix A
which would give operators more flexibility in demonstrating that
public risk criteria have been met.
In order to provide adequate protection from public safety risks
such as the risk of casualties, it is important that analyses used to
protect public safety account for all known influences on the
vulnerability of people and critical assets. At the same time, the
proposal recognizes in Sec. 450.101(g) that a valid method must
produce results consistent with or more conservative than the results
available from previous mishaps, tests, or other valid
[[Page 15392]]
benchmarks. Hence, the proposal would not require a vulnerability model
to account explicitly for each known influence on the empirical results
per se, but the proposal would require that a valid vulnerability model
produce results that are either consistent with the standard in
proposed Sec. 450.101(g).
Proposed Sec. 450.135(e) would list application requirements,
which are designed to be more balanced and less prescriptive and
ambiguous than current requirements in appendix A to part 417, section
A417. The proposal would require an application to describe the methods
used to compute debris impact distributions, population exposure data,
atmospheric data, as well as how the operator proposes to account for
the conditions immediately prior to enabling the launch or reentry
flight, per Sec. 450.135(e)(1) through (5).
Proposed Sec. 450.135(e)(6) and (7) would require an applicant to
submit sample debris risk analysis outputs, including the effective
unsheltered casualty area for all fragment classes, assuming a
representative impact vector; and the effective casualty area for all
fragments classes for a representative type of building, ground
vehicle, waterborne vessel, and aircraft, assuming a representative
impact vector. This is not a new requirement because the effective
casualty area was always necessary for computing the EC. The
proposal would define effective casualty area in Sec. 401.5 as the
aggregate casualty area of each piece of debris created by a vehicle
failure at a particular point on its trajectory. The effective casualty
area for each piece of debris is a modeling construct in which the area
within which 100 percent of the population are assumed to be a
casualty, and outside of which 100 percent of the population are
assumed not to be a casualty.
In proposed Sec. 450.135(e)(8), an applicant would be required to
submit sample collective and individual outputs under representative
conditions and the worst foreseeable conditions, including the total
collective casualty expectation for the proposed operation; a list of
the collective risk contribution for at least the top ten population
centers and all centers with collective risk exceeding 1 percent of the
collective risk criterion in proposed Sec. 450.101; a list of the
maximum individual PC for the top ten population centers and
all centers that exceed 10 percent of the individual risk criterion in
proposed Sec. 450.101. The applicant would also be required to submit
a list of the probability of loss of functionality of any critical
asset that exceeds 1 percent of the critical asset criterion in
proposed Sec. 450.101. Proposed Sec. 450.135(e)(9) would require an
operator to submit a list of the conditional collective casualty
expectation for each vehicle response mode for each one-second interval
of flight under representative conditions and the worst foreseeable
conditions. Finally, in all FSAs, the applicant must also submit
additional products that allow an independent analysis, if requested by
the FAA, in order to assure that the public risk criteria are
satisfied.
13. Far-field Overpressure Blast Effects
The FAA proposes to consolidate its regulations on far-field
overpressure blast effects analyses in proposed Sec. 450.137 (Far-
Field Overpressure Blast Effect Analysis), used to demonstrate
compliance with the public safety criteria in proposed Sec. 450.101.
This analysis looks at the potential public hazard from broken windows
as a result of impacting explosive debris, including impact of an
intact launch vehicle.
The near-field effects of explosions are covered under debris risk
analysis, where meteorological conditions do not significantly
influence the attenuation of overpressure. However, the FAA would
require a far-field blast effect analysis for peak incident
overpressures below 1 pound per square inch (psi,) the point where
meteorological conditions can significantly influence the attenuation
of explosive overpressures. A launch and reentry operator would be
required to conduct a far-field overpressure blast effects analysis
(also known as distance focusing overpressure, or DFO) that
demonstrates compliance with public safety criteria in proposed Sec.
450.101. An operator would need to complete the analysis either prior
to the day of the operation accounting for all foreseeable conditions
within the flight commit criteria or during the countdown using the
best available input data. An applicant would be required to describe
the critical input data, such as the meteorological measurements, and
develop flight commit criteria to include any hazard controls derived
from this FSA in accordance with proposed Sec. 450.165(b)(6).
Impacting explosive materials, both liquid and solid, have the
potential to explode. Given the appropriate combination of atmospheric
pressure and temperature gradients, the impact explosion can produce
distant focus overpressure at significant distance from the original
blast point. Overpressures from as low as 0.1 psi may cause windows to
break. However, other forms of overpressure, such as multiple pulses,
may also prove hazardous depending on the size and thickness of windows
and the number of windowpanes. Moreover, levels of overpressure will
change depending on distance, atmospherics, and a vehicle's explosive
yield.
Multiple historical events involving large explosions, including
rocket failures, have shown that under unfavorable atmospheric
conditions, a shock wave may focus to produce significant peak
overpressures at communities beyond the boundaries of the launch site,
potentially causing window breakage and injuries. In light of the
historical evidence of blast damage due to overpressure focusing, and
building on the legacy of U.S. agency efforts to protect against the
potential public risks associated with rocket explosions, the FAA
adopted regulations to protect the public from the DFO phenomena in
Sec. 417.229 (Far-field overpressure blast effect analysis) and
appendix A to part 417 (section A417.29.) In Sec. 417.229, the FAA
requires an FSA to establish flight commit criteria that protect the
public from any hazard associated with DFO effects and demonstrate
compliance with the public risk criterion. Section 417.229(b) currently
lists appropriate constraints on the analysis and section A417.29
provides an acceptable means of compliance. Section A417.29 includes
hazard controls based on ANSI S2.20-183 Standard,\205\ as well as a
standard and a measure of fidelity used to assess any proposed
alternative analytic approach. Section A417.29 also lists the products
of a valid DFO analysis.
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\205\ ANSI S2.20-1983, Estimating Air Blast Characteristics for
Single Point Explosions in Air, with a Guide to Evaluation of
Atmospheric Propagation and Effects, Acoustical Society of America,
New York (1983).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
However, current regulations lack clarity on when a day-of-launch
DFO analysis is necessary. Specifically, section A417.29(c) requires
that an operator conduct a risk analysis that accounts for ``current
meteorological conditions,'' unless the operator complies with the
prescriptive requirements in Sec. 417.229(b) that include the
extremely conservative method prescribed by the ANSI S2.20-183
Standard. These requirements have led to situations where an operator
was technically required to perform a day-of-launch risk analysis to
protect against the DFO hazard, when in fact the public risks due to
the DFO phenomena were insignificant based on every weather condition
measured over a period of many years.
Part 431 does not explicitly address the potential public hazard
posed by
[[Page 15393]]
DFO. However, since 2016, Sec. 431.35(b)(1)(i) has required an
applicant to demonstrate that the total collective risk does not exceed
1 x 10-\4\ EC, where the total risk consists of
risk posed by impacting inert and explosive debris, toxic release, and
far-field blast overpressure. Because the RLVs licensed to date under
part 431 have relatively low potential explosive yields (compared to
large ELVs), some part 431 license applicants were able to perform
hazard analyses based on the extremely conservative method prescribed
by the ANSI S2.20-183 Standard to demonstrate that the public risks due
to the DFO phenomena were insignificant.
The FAA proposes to streamline and clarify its regulations on DFO
analyses. Whereas part 417 regulations and relevant appendices contain
prescriptive methodology requirements in Appendix A, the proposal would
distill these sections into performance requirements applicable to both
launch and reentry flight operations.
Proposed Sec. 450.137(a) would provide applicants an option to
perform a DFO risk analysis that demonstrates compliance with public
safety criteria in proposed Sec. 450.101, either prior to the day of
the operation, by accounting for all foreseeable conditions within the
flight commit criteria, or during the countdown using the best
available input data. If an operator could satisfy Sec. 450.137(a)(1),
then it would not be required to satisfy Sec. 450.137(a)(2). There are
at least two different screening analyses that would demonstrate
compliance with Sec. 450.137(a)(1). Method one would be a very simple
deterministic window breakage screening analysis. Method two would be a
simplified risk-based screening analysis. If either screening analysis
indicates no potential hazards or insignificant risks, with or without
mitigations, then an operator would not be required to comply with
Sec. 450.137(a)(2). Conversely, an operator would be required to
satisfy proposed Sec. 450.137(a)(2) if it could not demonstrate
compliance with Sec. 450.137(a)(1). Thus, the proposal would provide
clarity regarding how to determine if a day-of-operations risk analysis
is necessary, and flexibility to establish flight commit criteria to
limit the contribution of DFO public risks based on analysis done prior
to the day of the operation. This clarity and flexibility were lacking
in both parts 417 and 431.
Proposed Sec. 450.137(b) would set required performance outcomes
and the specific factors that a DFO FSA must consider. Substantively,
Sec. 450.137(b) would contain the same requirements as those currently
in Sec. 417.229(b). Note that the level of fidelity of the DFO
analysis would be subject to the requirements in proposed Sec.
450.101(g), so that the analysis methods used must produce results
consistent with, or more conservative than, the results available from
valid benchmarks.
Proposed Sec. 450.137(c) would clarify the materials an operator
must submit with its license application, which are generally
consistent with those currently required to comply with part 417. This
paragraph would clarify the level of fidelity required for the products
of a DFO analysis by specifying the key input data and critical model
elements that an application would be required to describe. The
proposal would require an application to include: (1) A description of
the population centers, terrain, building types, and window
characteristics used as input to the far-field overpressure analysis;
(2) a description of the methods used to compute the foreseeable
explosive yield probability pairs, and the complete set of yield-
probability pairs, used as input to the far-field overpressure
analysis; (3) a description of the methods used to compute peak
incident overpressures as a function of distance from the explosion and
prevailing meteorological conditions, including sample calculations for
a representative range of the foreseeable meteorological conditions,
yields, and population center locations; (4) a description of the
methods used to compute the probability of window breakage, including
tabular data and graphs for the probability of breakage as a function
of the peak incident overpressure for a representative range of window
types, building types, and yields accounted for; (5) a description of
the methods used to compute the PC for a representative
individual, including tabular data and graphs for the PC, as
a function of location relative to the window and the peak incident
overpressure for a representative range of window types, building
types, and yields accounted for; (6) tabular data and graphs showing
the hypothetical location of any member of the public that could be
exposed to a PC of 1 x 10-\5\ or greater for
neighboring operations personnel, and 1 x 10-\6\ or greater
for other members of the public, given foreseeable meteorological
conditions, yields, and population exposures; (7) the maximum expected
casualties that could result from far-field overpressure hazards
greater given foreseeable meteorological conditions, yields, and
population exposures; and (8) a description of the meteorological
measurements used as input to any real-time far-field overpressure
analysis. It would also require the submission of any additional
products that allow an independent analysis, as requested by the
Administrator.
14. Toxic Hazards for Flight
The FAA proposes to replace current Sec. 417.227 and appendix I to
part 417 with the following two performance-based regulations: Sec.
450.139 for toxic hazard analyses for flight operations and Sec.
450.187 for toxic hazards mitigation for ground operations.
Currently, the requirements for a toxic release hazard analysis are
specified in Sec. 417.227. Section 417.277 requires that an FSA
establish flight commit criteria that protect the public from any
hazard associated with toxic release and demonstrate compliance with
the public risk criteria of Sec. 417.107(b). This analysis must
account for any toxic release that will occur during the proposed
flight of a launch vehicle or that would occur in the event of a flight
mishap, and for all members of the public that may be exposed to toxic
release. Additionally, Sec. 417.405 sets forth the requirements for a
ground safety analysis, and, although toxic release is not explicitly
enumerated, a launch operator must identify each potential hazard
including the sudden release of a hazardous material. Appendix I to
part 417 provides methodologies for performing toxic release hazard
analysis for the flight of a launch vehicle and for launch processing
at a launch site in the U.S. as required by Sec. 417.407(f).
Similarly, Sec. 431.35 requires that for a reusable launch vehicle
mission, an applicant must demonstrate that the proposed mission does
not exceed the acceptable risk defined in Sec. 417.107(b)(1) that
includes the risk associated with toxic release. Further, Sec.
431.35(c) requires that an applicant employ a system safety process to
identify the hazards and assess the risks to public health and safety
of property associated with the mission. Although parts 431 and 435
have the same risk criteria for toxic release as are contained in part
417, unlike part 417, they have no explicit requirements for
establishing toxic thresholds. Instead, toxic hazards are addressed as
part of the systems safety process. The lack of definitive requirements
in parts 431 and 435 has created a lack of clarity as to the
requirements for toxic release hazard analysis during the system safety
process.
The current toxic hazard requirements have a number of
shortcomings. The
[[Page 15394]]
requirements of Sec. 417.227 are not sufficiently definitive for an
operator to establish the toxic concentration and exposure duration
threshold for a toxic propellant, to evaluate toxic hazards for flight
or for ground operations, to determine a toxic hazard area in the event
of a release during flight or from a ground operations mishap, or to
require toxic containment or evacuation of the public from a toxic
hazard area.
Conversely, the existing appendix I to part 417 is overly
prescriptive in defining permissible values for assumptions and data
inputs to analyses but, as discussed later, lacks important items. In
many instances, appendix I requires specific methods, formulas,
acceptable sources, specific conditions, and assumptions. However,
often these are not the only ways in which the requirements or required
demonstrations can be made.
There are numerous examples of the prescriptive nature of appendix
I to part 417. For example, section I417.3(c)(1) identifies only three
agencies of the U.S. Government, namely, the Environmental Protection
Agency, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and the Department of
Transportation, that the launch operator is permitted to use as sources
of toxicant levels of concern (LOC). There are no common standards in
toxicological dose-response data. The data bases of concentration
thresholds are different from agency to agency. Specific toxic
chemicals that are released may not be included in some or many lists,
and some databases account for exposure durations where others do not.
Additionally, some databases account for differences in the age and
vulnerability of populations exposed, while others do not. Furthermore,
some databases account for differences in the severity of physiological
responses to exposure, when others do not. Therefore, excluding
available dose-response databases limits the capability of the operator
to select the most appropriate LOC. Other U.S Government agencies that
have established airborne toxic concentration thresholds of exposure,
including the National Research Council (NRC), the U.S. Occupational
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), the National Institute for
Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the American Conference of
Government Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH), the U.S. Department of
Defense, the National Institutes of Health (NIH), the U.S. National
Institute of Medicine, and the U.S. National Library of Medicine.
Other prescriptive examples in Appendix I include section
I417.3(c)(3) which requires the launch operator to use only one
formulation to determine the toxic concentration threshold for mixtures
of two or more toxicants, and section I417.5(c)(2), which prescribes a
set of single-valued worst-case conditions that a launch operator must
apply in an analysis of toxic hazard conditions for uncommon or unique
propellants. Other sections of the appendix mandate specific
assumptions.\206\
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\206\ For example, section I417.7(e)(2), the worst-case release
scenario for toxic liquids, requires an assumption that liquid
spreads to one centimeter deep, and that the volatilization rate
must account for the highest daily maximum temperature occurring the
past 3 years precluding more severe or more realistic worst-case
conditions, such as assuming the liquid spreads to a lesser depth,
exposing a greater surface area for evaporation. This may not be
conservative enough to provide acceptable public safety in some
cases.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition to being overly prescriptive, Appendix I also contains
inaccuracies and out of date information. For example, section
I417.7(b) (Process hazards analysis) provides that an analysis that
complies with 29 CFR 1910.119(e) satisfies section I417.7(b)(1) and
(2). However, the specific requirements of 29 CFR 1910.119(e) are not
completely congruent with the specific requirements of section
I417.7(b)(1) and (2). In particular, the following requirements of
section I417.7(b)(2) do not have counterparts in Sec. 1910.119(e):
location of the source of the release; each opportunity for equipment
malfunction or human error that can cause an accidental release; and
each safeguard used or needed to control each hazard or prevent
equipment malfunctions or human error. Thus, if an operator chooses to
satisfy Sec. 1910.119(e), important parts of section I417.7(b)(2) may
not be addressed, such as the location of the source of the release
which is needed to determine the toxic hazard area necessary to achieve
toxic containment.
The tables in appendix I are also problematic and in many cases
omit important information. For example, Table I417-1, Commonly Used
Non-Toxic Propellants, contains only three propellants, designated as
commonly used non-toxic propellants. However, this list leaves other
non-toxic liquid propellants such as liquid methane or liquefied
natural gas without an explicit exemption from performing a toxic
release hazard analysis.
The FAA proposes to consolidate the requirements for toxic release
analysis for the launch of an ELV currently contained in parts 415 and
417, the launch and reentry of an RLV in part 431, and the launch of a
reentry vehicle other than a reusable launch vehicle in part 435.
Specifically, the FAA proposes to replace current Sec. 417.227 and
appendix I to part 417, with two performance-based regulations--
proposed Sec. Sec. 450.139 and 450.187. The proposed requirements
would apply to all launches and reentries, and would provide more
definitive application requirements for the toxic release hazard
analysis.
Both proposed Sec. Sec. 450.139 and 450.187 would apply to launch
and reentry vehicles, including all components and payloads that have
toxic propellants or other toxic chemicals, making it explicitly clear
that reentry operations require a toxic hazard release analysis where
the requirement was not previously explicit in parts 431 and 435. The
FAA decided to split the toxic release analysis regulations into two
sections, one for flight and the other for ground operations, because
ground operations and flight operations have different criteria
available to establish an acceptable level of public safety.
Specifically, the FAA proposes to apply a quantitative public risk
acceptability criteria for flight consistent with the risk criteria in
Sec. 450.101 and to apply a qualitative hazard acceptability criterion
for ground hazards that is consistent with the standard in Sec.
450.109(a)(3).\207\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\207\ Section 450.109(a)(3) would require that the risk
associated with each hazard meets the following criteria: (i) The
likelihood of any hazardous condition that may cause death or
serious injury to the public must be extremely remote and (ii) the
likelihood of any hazardous condition that may cause major damage to
public property or critical assets must be remote.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Proposed Sec. 450.139(b)(1) would require an operator to conduct a
toxic release hazard analysis. Additionally, under paragraph (b)(2) an
operator would be required to manage the risk of casualties that could
arise from exposure to toxic release either through containing hazards
in accordance with proposed Sec. 450.139(d) or performing a toxic risk
assessment under proposed paragraph (e) that protects the public in
compliance with proposed Sec. 450.101, including toxic release.
Furthermore, under proposed Sec. 450.139(b)(3) an operator would be
required to establish flight commit criteria based on the results of
its toxic release hazard analysis, containment analysis, or toxic risk
assessment for any necessary evacuation of the public from any toxic
hazard area.
Section 450.139(c) would contain the requirements for a toxic
release hazard analysis, which are currently lacking in
[[Page 15395]]
Sec. 417.227. Specifically, under proposed Sec. 450.139(c) the toxic
release hazard analysis would require an operator to account for any
toxic releases that could occur during nominal or non-nominal launch or
reentry for flight operation. Furthermore, an operator's toxic release
hazard analysis would be required to include a worst-case release
scenario analysis or a maximum-credible release scenario analysis for
each process that involves a toxic propellant or other chemical;
determine if toxic release can occur based on an evaluation of the
chemical compositions and quantities of propellants, other chemicals,
vehicle materials, and projected combustion products, and the possible
toxic release scenarios; account for both normal combustion products
and any unreacted propellants and phase change or molecular derivatives
of released chemicals; and account for any operational constraints and
emergency procedures that provide protection from toxic release. While
the proposed Sec. 450.139(c) would contain more definitive
requirements than current regulations, it would also provide the
operator more flexibility in the analysis because unlike the current
regulations it would not require an operator to make specific
assumptions when performing a worst-case release scenario analysis to
determine worst-case released quantities of toxic propellants, toxic
liquids, or toxic gases from ground operations.
Proposed Sec. 450.139(b)(2) would require an operator to manage
the risk of casualties arising from toxic release either by containing
the hazards in accordance with paragraph (d) or by performing a toxic
risk assessment in accordance with paragraph (e) that protects the
public in compliance with the risk criteria of Sec. 450.101. If an
operator chose toxic containment to comply with proposed Sec.
450.139(b)(2), the operator would be required to manage the risk of
casualties by either (1) evacuating, or being prepared to evacuate, the
public from a toxic hazard area, where an average member of the public
would be exposed to greater than one percent conditional individual
PC in the case of worst-case release or maximum credible
release scenario, or (2) by employing meteorological constraints to
limit a launch operation to times when the prevailing winds would
transport a toxic release away from populated areas otherwise at risk.
The conditional individual PC would be computed assuming
that (1) a maximum credible release event occurs, and (2) average
members of the public are present along the boundary of the toxic
hazard area.
If an operator chose to comply with proposed Sec. 450.139(b)(2) by
conducting a toxic risk assessment that protects the public in
compliance with proposed Sec. 450.101, in accordance with Sec.
450.139(e), the toxic risk assessment would require the operator to
account for airborne concentration and duration thresholds of toxic
propellants or other chemicals. For any toxic propellant, other
chemicals, or combustion product, an operator would be required to use
airborne toxic concentration and duration thresholds identified in a
means of compliance accepted by the Administrator. Currently, the
thresholds set by the Acute Exposure Guideline Level 2 (AEGL-2), the
Emergency Response Planning Guidelines Level 2 (ERPG-2), or the Short-
term Public Emergency Guidance Level (SPEGL) \208\ would be accepted
means of compliance for proposed Sec. 450.139(e)(1) (and Sec.
450.187(d)(1)). These are thresholds designed to anticipate casualty-
causing health effects from exposure to certain airborne chemical
concentrations. The FAA anticipates, as discussed earlier, that
additional agencies' threshold values could satisfy the requirements
and would identify any additional accepted thresholds. By requiring an
operator to use airborne toxic concentration thresholds identified in a
means of compliance accepted by the Administrator under proposed Sec.
450.35, the FAA anticipates that operators would be provided with some
flexibility to utilize toxic concentration thresholds identified by
agencies other than the three currently identified in appendix I to
part 417 thereby enhancing the capability of the operator to select the
most appropriate LOC for its operation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\208\ AEGLs are used by EPA, the American Industrial Hygiene
Association's ERPGs are used by NOAA, and the National Research
Council's SPEGL is used by the DOD.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
An operator also would be required under Sec. 450.139(e)(2) to
account for physical phenomena (such as meteorological conditions and
characterization of the terrain) expected to influence any toxic
concentration and duration in the area surrounding the potential
release site instead of prescribing a set of single-valued wind speed
and atmospheric stability classes and dictating how an operator must
derive the variance of the mean wind directions. Hence, under proposed
Sec. 450.139(e)(2) the toxic assessment would likely be more
appropriate for the actual situation. Proposed Sec. 450.139(e)(3)
would require an operator to determine a toxic hazard area for the
launch or reentry, surrounding the potential release site for each
toxic propellant or other chemical based on the amount and toxicity of
the propellant or other chemical, the exposure duration, and the
meteorological conditions involved. Finally, under proposed Sec.
450.139(e)(4) and (5) the toxic assessment would be required to account
for all members of the public that may be exposed to the toxic release,
including all members of the public on land and on any waterborne
vessels, populated offshore structures, and aircraft that are not
operated in direct support of the launch or reentry, and for any risk
mitigation measures applied in the risk assessment.
In many respects, proposed Sec. Sec. 450.139 and 450.187 are
nearly identical, and the rationale behind the revisions proposed in
Sec. 450.139 would be the same for proposed Sec. 450.187. As
discussed previously, proposed Sec. 450.187 would apply to any launch
or reentry vehicle, including all vehicle components and payloads, that
uses toxic propellants or other toxic chemicals. Like Sec. 450.139,
Sec. 450.187(b) would require a toxic hazard analysis.
Under the proposed rule an operator would be required to manage
risk from a toxic release hazard or demonstrate compliance with
proposed Sec. 450.109(a)(3) \209\ with a toxic risk assessment. The
requirements for a toxic risk assessment under proposed Sec.
450.187(e) are substantially similar to those of proposed Sec.
450.139, except that ground operations use a qualitative acceptability
criteria and flight operations can use quantitative risk criteria. FAA
has not proposed quantitative criteria for ground operations because
there are no commonly accepted criteria.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\209\ As discussed earlier, Sec. 450.109(a)(3) would require
that the risk associated with each hazard meets the following
criteria: (i) The likelihood of any hazardous condition that may
cause death or serious injury to the public must be extremely remote
and (ii) the likelihood of any hazardous condition that may cause
major damage to public property or critical assets must be remote.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The proposed application requirements under Sec. 450.139(f) toxic
hazards for flight and under Sec. 450.187(e) for ground operations
would be similar. The FAA believes that the proposed approach will
provide applicants with a clear understanding of what the FAA requires
in order to avoid repeated requests for clarifications and additional
information. Both would require the applicant to submit: (1) The
identity of the toxic propellant, chemical, or toxic combustion
products or derivatives in the possible toxic release; (2) its selected
airborne toxic concentration and duration thresholds; (3)
meteorological conditions for the atmospheric
[[Page 15396]]
transport, and buoyant cloud rise of any toxic release from its source
to downwind receptor locations; (4) characterization of the terrain;
(5) the identity of the toxic dispersion model used, and any other
input data; (6) representative results of toxic dispersion modeling to
predict concentrations and durations at selected downwind receptor
locations; (7) a description of the failure modes and associated
relative probabilities for potential toxic release scenarios used in
the risk evaluation; (8) the methodology and representative results of
the worst-case or maximum-credible quantity of any toxic release; (9) a
demonstration that the public will not be exposed to airborne
concentrations above the toxic concentration and duration thresholds;
(10) the population density in receptor locations that are identified
by toxic dispersion modeling as toxic hazard areas; and (11) a
description of any risk mitigations applied in the toxic risk
assessment; and (12) the identity of the population database used. Like
other risk analyses, the FAA may request additional products that allow
the FAA to conduct an independent analysis.
15. Wind Weighting for the Flight of an Unguided Suborbital Launch
Vehicle
The FAA proposes to consolidate three current part 417 provisions
expressly regulating unguided suborbital launch vehicle operations into
Sec. 450.141. The proposed rule would retain the performance
requirements and remove the prescriptive provisions in Sec. Sec.
417.125 and 417.233. The FAA also proposes to incorporate the
overarching safety performance requirements in appendix C to part 417
related to wind weighting analysis products. This proposal applies
specifically to the flight of unguided suborbital launch vehicles using
wind weighting to meet the public safety criteria of proposed Sec.
450.101.
An unguided suborbital launch vehicle is a suborbital rocket that
does not contain active guidance or a directional control system.
Unlike the launch of a guided launch vehicle, an unguided suborbital
launch vehicle may safely fly by adjusting the launcher azimuth and
elevation (aiming the rocket) shortly before launch to correct for the
effects of wind conditions at the time of flight. This process limits
impact locations to those that minimize public exposure. The FAA refers
to this safety process as ``wind weighting,'' which involves unique
organizational and operational safety requirements.
Section 417.125 provides the broad requirements for launching an
unguided suborbital launch vehicle. Specifically, it lays out
provisions for a flight safety system, a wind weighting safety system,
public risk criteria, stability, tracking, and post launch review.
Section 417.125(b) requires an applicant to use an FSS if the vehicle
can reach a populated area and the applicant does not use an effective
wind weighting system. Section 417.125(c) sets requirements for a wind
weighting system if that system is used in place of an FSS. It provides
that the vehicle must not contain a guidance or directional control
system. It also requires the launcher azimuth and elevation setting to
be wind weighted to correct for the effects of wind conditions at the
time of flight in compliance with Sec. 417.233's FSA requirements, and
requires specific nominal launcher elevation angle for proven (85[deg],
and 86[deg] with wind correction) and unproven (80[deg], and 84[deg]
with wind correction) unguided suborbital launch vehicles. These
prescriptive launch elevation angles are used so that the vehicle does
not fly uprange. In other words, the rocket should not be angled so
vertically that winds could force the rocket uprange instead of the
intended downrange direction. Section 417.125(d) expressly requires
unguided suborbital launch vehicles to fly in accordance with the
public risk criteria required for all launch vehicles under part 417.
In addition, the current rule has stability, tracking, and post-
launch review requirements that are specific to unguided suborbital
launch vehicles. Section Sec. 417.125(e) requires specific stability
requirements measured in calibers to ensure that the unguided
suborbital launch vehicle is stable throughout flight. The tracking
requirements in Sec. 417.125(f) require that a launch operator track
impact locations after launch to verify that the preflight wind
weighting analysis was accurate. Section 417.125(g) is related to post-
launch review and states that the launch operator must provide these
impact locations, a comparison of actual to predicted nominal
performance, and investigation results of any launch anomaly.
Current Sec. 417.233 describes the FSA requirements particular to
unguided suborbital launch vehicles with wind weighting systems. The
analyses must establish flight commit criteria, wind constraints under
which launch may occur, and launcher azimuth and elevation settings
that correct for wind effects on the launch vehicle. This last
requirement is known as the wind weighting analysis.
Appendix C to part 417 contains flight safety methodologies and
products for an unguided suborbital launch vehicle flown with a wind
weighting safety system. These includes methodologies and products for
a trajectory analysis, a wind weighting analysis, a debris analysis, a
risk analysis, and a collision avoidance analysis. Section C417.3
requires the launch operator perform a six-degrees-of-freedom
trajectory simulation in order to determine a nominal trajectory,
impact point, and potential three-sigma dispersions about the nominal
impact point. Section C417.5 is related to wind weighting and describes
the methodology an applicant must use to measure winds and incorporate
them into the trajectory simulation in order to determine launch
elevation angle and azimuth settings. The debris (section C417.7) and
risk (section C417.9) analyses describe methodologies and analysis
products applicable to all launch vehicles for calculating
EC. The parts of appendix C that are covered elsewhere in
the proposed rule because they are applicable to all vehicles have not
been transferred to proposed Sec. 450.141. This includes the debris,
risk, and collision avoidance analyses.
Proposed Sec. 450.141 would consolidate the requirements of
Sec. Sec. 417.125 and 417.233 and appendix C, but would not carry over
the detailed methodological and prescriptive requirements. Proposed
Sec. 450.141(a) would explain that the section applies to the flight
of an unguided suborbital launch vehicle using a wind weighting safety
system to meet the public safety criteria of proposed Sec. 450.101.
The FAA proposes to define a wind weighting safety system as equipment,
procedures, analysis, and personnel functions used to determine the
launcher elevation and azimuth setting that correct for wind effects
that an unguided suborbital launch vehicle will experience during
flight. The FAA proposes the wind weighting safety system be a means to
satisfy the safety requirements in proposed Sec. 450.101.
Proposed Sec. 450.141(b) would set the requirements for the wind
weighting safety system. It would require that the launcher azimuth and
elevation angle settings (1) be wind weighted to correct for the
effects of wind conditions at the time of flight to provide a safe
impact location, and (2) ensure the rocket will not fly in an
unintended direction given wind uncertainties. This section would
replace current Sec. 417.125(b), which requires a flight safety system
unless the vehicle uses wind weighting or does not have sufficient
energy to reach a populated area. Rather than the blanket FSS
requirement in current Sec. 417.125(b), the consequence analysis in
proposed Sec. 450.135(d) would determine the need
[[Page 15397]]
for an FSS. This section also eliminates the requirement in Sec.
417.125(c)(3) regarding specific nominal launcher elevation angle for
proven (85[deg] and 86[deg] with wind correction) and unproven (80[deg]
and 84[deg] with wind correction) vehicles to prevent the vehicle from
flying uprange. Rather than requiring specific launcher elevation
angles to prevent a vehicle from flying uprange, the FAA would require
an operator to determine what angles would ensure the rocket not fly in
unintended direction given wind uncertainties. This flexibility would
allow a licensee to determine the best angle to both maximize mission
objectives given the particularities of their operation while
simultaneously ensuring safety.
Proposed Sec. 450.141(c) would contain FSA performance
requirements that apply only to the launch of an unguided suborbital
launch vehicle flown with a wind weighting safety system. It is
necessary to establish the flight commit criteria and other flight
safety rules to control risk to the public and satisfies the public
safety criteria in proposed Sec. 450.101. Proposed Sec. 450.141(c)
would require an operator to establish any wind constraints under which
launch could occur, and conduct a wind weighting analysis that
establishes the launcher azimuth and elevation settings. Proposed Sec.
450.141(c) is, in essence, the same as Sec. 417.233.
Proposed Sec. 450.141(d) would require an unguided suborbital
launch vehicle to remain stable in all configurations throughout each
stage of powered flight. This performance outcome would eliminate the
need for the specific prescriptive stability requirements of current
Sec. 417.125(e), which requires a suborbital launch vehicle be stable
in flexible body to 1.5 calibers and rigid body to 2.0 calibers
throughout each stage of powered flight.
Finally, proposed Sec. 450.141(e) would establish the agency's
application requirements specific to unguided suborbital launch
vehicles. The FAA would require a description of wind weighting
analysis methods, description of wind weighting system and equipment,
and a sample wind weighting analysis, all derived from part 417,
appendix C, section C417.5(d). The remainder of appendix C was not
included in the proposal because these are all prescriptive
methodologies, or are requirements applying to all launch vehicles
covered in other sections of the proposal. For instance, the Trajectory
Analysis of section C417.3 would be covered by proposed Sec. Sec.
450.117 and 450.119. Except for section C417.5(d) as described earlier,
section C417.5 was not included in the proposal since this is a
prescriptive methodology. The methodologies for debris analysis from
section C417.7 are not in the proposal and the debris analysis proposal
would now be in proposed Sec. 450.121. Similarly, section C417.9 would
be covered by proposed Sec. 450.135 without the prescribed
methodologies. Lastly, the collision avoidance section of the appendix,
section C417.11 would be covered by proposed Sec. 450.169.
B. Software
As discussed earlier, the FAA proposes software safety requirements
in Sec. 450.111. The risk mitigation measures that result from this
rule are meant to be minimums, and software development processes tend
to benefit from consistency across projects, so an applicant may apply
the requirements from its most critical software to all of its
software, but the FAA does not require that an applicant do so.
Software can contribute to accidents or losses in several ways.
Software may contain errors that, in certain system conditions, cause
unintended behaviors or prevent intended behaviors. Software may also
perform actions that while correct and intended in isolation, cause
hazards when interacting with other components or the system as a
whole. Software may provide accurate information to an operator in a
manner that confuses the operator, leading to a software-human
interaction error. Software safety therefore typically requires
separate analyses of the software, software and computing system
interaction, and the integration of software, hardware, and humans into
the entire system.
Software becomes safety-critical when the applicant uses its
outputs in safety decisions. The development, validation, and
evaluation of safety-critical software requires a level of rigor
commensurate with the severity of the potential hazards and the
software's degree of control over those hazards. Reliance on software
differs among operators. For example, some launch systems employ
Autonomous Flight Safety Systems (AFSS) that rely on rigorously-
developed and thoroughly-tested software to make safety decisions to
protect the public without human intervention. Other systems require
human intervention to make safety decisions, such as when a pilot or
ground transmitter operator must make decisions for launch systems.
Current FAA licensing regulations segregate software safety
requirements by type of vehicle (ELV, RLV, or reentry vehicle) in three
separate sections.\210\ Current software safety regulations in parts
415, 417, and 431 are flexible. With this flexibility comes
uncertainty. For example, Sec. 415.123(b) requires that a launch
operator provide all plans for software development, the results of
software hazard analyses, and plans and results of software validation
and verification, but does not give guidance on the minimum-acceptable
levels of rigor for those products or guidance on their contents. The
FAA and the operator must determine the appropriate level of rigor,
scope, and content of each plan and result for each operation. This
process can be labor-intensive, requiring multiple meetings over a
period of weeks or months.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\210\ Part 415 covers launch license application procedures for
ELVs; part 417 addresses launch safety requirements for ELVs, and
part 431 sets launch license and safety requirements for RLVs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Also, Sec. 417.123(c), applicable to ELVs, requires that a launch
operator conduct computing system and software hazard analyses for the
integrated system. This requirement does not specify the requisite
forms of the analyses, the scope and contents of the analyses, or the
application data required to demonstrate compliance with the
requirement. The FAA and the applicant must negotiate the specifics for
each of those items for every application. Similarly, Sec. 417.123(d)
requires that a launch operator develop and implement computing system
and software validation and verification plans, but is silent regarding
the contents of the plans. This again requires that the FAA and the
applicant discuss, often at length, the software test plans for every
operation.
Unlike Sec. Sec. 415.123 and 417.123, Sec. 431.35 does not
contain any explicit references to software safety. However, in
practice, the FAA has set software safety requirements under the
current system safety process requirements in Sec. 431.35(c). Pursuant
to Sec. 431.35(c), the FAA has required applicants satisfy Sec.
417.123 or demonstrate an equivalent level of safety, in order to meet
Sec. 431.35 for software safety. This lack of detail forces the FAA
and applicant to work collaboratively to develop the system safety
process criteria on a case-by-case basis.
Operators have offered consistent feedback on the FAA's software
safety requirements. Applicants frequently asked whether Sec. Sec.
417.123(b) and 431.35(c)'s verification and validation plan requirement
included a requirement for independent verification and validation.
Independent verification and validation is a common
[[Page 15398]]
and effective method of mitigating software hazards for high-
criticality software, one for which there is no known substitute. Thus,
although not explicitly stated in the regulations, the FAA has required
independent verification and validation as part of the verification and
validation requirements in Sec. Sec. 417.123(b) and 431.35(c). The FAA
considers software testers independent when the test organization is
independent of the development organization up to the senior-executive
level. Generally, an in-house software testing team can be sufficiently
independent to perform a credible independent verification and
validation function when rigorously insulated from software development
authorities and incentives. Still more independence may be required for
highly safety-critical autonomous software, such as an independent
contractor, depending on the risks and the other mitigation measures
implemented by the applicant. The FAA has required at least
independence up to the senior-management level and expected an
applicant to show evidence of this independence in its application.
Applicants have also often asked whether the FAA requires
submissions of software code. The FAA has not historically required
executable code submissions and does not plan to do so in this
proposal. Instead, the FAA's requirements focus on the software
development and testing processes, combined with analysis of the
software's use in the context of the system as a whole. Firstly, the
FAA seeks to understand the software development processes used for the
design, production, verification, and qualification of software to
determine the code quality. Proposed Sec. 450.111(a), (b), and (c)
would provide these general software process requirements that are
independent of the degree of control exercised by a given software
component. Secondly, the FAA must understand the impacts of the
software on the system as a whole. It is important to understand design
risks, which are those risks inherent to the software design and
architecture; and also process risks, which arise from the software
development processes and standards of the applicant. The FAA uses
these two components, process and implementation, to evaluate software
components and processes for the appropriate level of rigor.
The FAA must also understand the relationship between software
actions and system risks to set the appropriate level of rigor.
Establishing the required level of rigor and understanding its
implementation form the basis of software safety determinations.
Configuration management, including version control, then ensures the
operator uses the intended processes and functionality for the correct
software in the system's operation.
Applicants have often sought help in determining whether software
is safety-critical in accordance with Sec. Sec. 417.123(b) and
415.123(a). For instance, operators sometimes use software to generate
information used in safety-critical decisions, such as initiating a
deorbit burn. The FAA has consistently found software that generates
information used in safety-critical decisions to be safety-critical
software, albeit with a low degree of control over the system.
Applicants have also asked whether the FAA requires redundant
processing such as running a second instance of a software component on
a second independent computer, and if so, the required level of risk.
The FAA has made such determinations based on the hazards involved and
on the software's degree of control over those hazards. The FAA has
chosen not to prescribe a requirement for redundant processing because
such a requirement is best derived from the applicant's individual
approach to hazard mitigation at the system level. Redundant copies of
identical software contain identical software faults, so redundant
processing is best described as a mitigation for hardware failures. The
proposal would allow for software without redundant processing whenever
processing redundancy is not necessary to achieve acceptable risk. For
example, the FAA may not require redundant processing in fail-safe
systems, low-criticality systems, or where hardware ensures software
processing integrity by using hardware features such as watchdog timers
or error-correcting memory.
In light of the range of design strategies between commercial space
operators, the FAA realized that a one-size-fits-all approach to
software safety would not be practical. Instead, in proposed Sec.
450.111(d) through (g) the FAA would establish requirements for each
safety category of software. The safety categories, commonly known in
the software safety industry as ``levels of rigor'' or ``software
criticality indexes,'' would range from autonomous software with
catastrophic hazards to software with no safety impact.
Applicants may rely upon Federal launch range standards to show
compliance with the proposed rule, provided the standards meet the
regulations. The FAA maintains awareness of the Federal launch range
safety standards through the CSWG. The FAA currently incorporates the
known and coordinated standards maintained by the Federal launch ranges
into FAA licensing in order to avoid duplication of effort. The Federal
launch ranges have an extensive launch safety history, and their
standards meet or exceed the level of safety required by the FAA. The
FAA intends to retain the ability to apply Federal launch range safety
standards toward license evaluation and issuance.
In developing this proposed rule, the FAA has tried to remain
consistent with prevalent industry standards related to the ``level of
rigor'' approach to software safety. Specifically, the FAA has used the
level of rigor approaches applied by the Department of Defense and NASA
to inform the FAA's proposed level of rigor approach to software safety
regulation.
The FAA proposes to use the Department of Defense's MIL-STD-882E
concept of ``level of rigor'' to categorize software according to the
amount of risk it presents to the operation and use its ``level of
rigor tasks'' to derive appropriate regulatory requirements for each
level of rigor. MIL-STD-882E uses a software hazard severity category
with a software control category to assign level of rigor tasks to
software. This method has proven successful in achieving an acceptable
level of safety for space operations.
The FAA also used RCC 319, Flight Termination Systems Commonality
Standard, to develop the requirements for autonomous software in
proposed Sec. 450.111(d). RCC 319-14 provides detailed software
requirements for autonomous flight safety systems, which have been
extensively reviewed by the space community. RCC 319-14 creates
software categories that combine hazard severity and degree of control
in a single step, and provides deep detail on the appropriate risk
reduction tasks for each category. AFSPCMAN 91-712 (draft) is the
source of RCC 319-14's software categories and risk reduction tasks.
The FAA also reviewed NASA's Software Safety Standard (NASA-STD-
8719.13C), which provides standards applicable to defining the
requirements for implementing a systematic approach to software safety.
Like RCC 319-14, NASA-STD-8719.13C combines software hazard's severity
with the software's degree of control to assign analysis and testing
tasks. However, NASA expands its software control category definitions
to include software autonomy, software complexity, time-criticality,
and degree of hazard control. The FAA also considered NASA's Software
Assurance Standard (NASA-STD-8739.8), which provides criticality, risk,
resource investment, and financial impact categorizations and
correlates
[[Page 15399]]
these to levels of software assurance effort. These two NASA documents
provided the FAA with a wealth of potential software safety
requirements and methods to determine the requirements that would be
most appropriate for a variety of space systems. These documents also
provided a checklist of key aspects of software projects that enable
software safety. The FAA has drawn from these documents the minimum set
of requirements that would enable space operators to protect the
public, and the minimum set of data that would enable the FAA to verify
that space operators will protect the public in the course of their
innovations.
Finally, the FAA reviewed the Air Force Space Command's draft 91-
712, Launch Safety Software and Computing System Requirements. The Air
Force has successfully used 91-712 for military space projects and it
is the source of many RCC 319-14 requirements. 91-712, and the
standards discussed earlier, all prescribe increasing the effort
devoted to software safety in proportion to the severity of the hazards
that software can create and in proportion to the degree of control
that software exercises over those hazards.
The proposed software safety regulations would categorize software
and computing functions into the following degrees of control as
defined in proposed Sec. 450.111(d) through (g): Autonomous software,
semi-autonomous software, redundant fault-tolerant software,
influential software, and no safety impact.
This proposal for software safety would address the causes of
software faults and software failures. Software faults are design flaws
in software that cause unintended behaviors or prevent intended
behaviors. Software faults include errors in syntax, definitions,
steps, or processes that can cause a program to produce an unintended
or unanticipated result. The presence of software faults might not
always result in an observable software failure that is evident to the
user because it may appear to be behaving properly. A software failure,
in contrast, is an unintended or undesirable event caused by, or
unintentionally allowed by, one or more software faults. A software
fault is a defect or vulnerability in software while a software failure
results from the execution of faulty software.\211\
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\211\ An example of a software failure is the ``blue screen of
death,'' which causes a computer to end all processing. An example
of software fault is a fault in requirements for measurement units
and a fault in test procedures. The Mars Climate Orbiter was lost as
a result of these two faults when one function was written in
English units while the rest were written in metric.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This proposal would address faults in software requirements by
analytical means in proposed Sec. 450.111. Specifically, the proposal
would require an applicant to describe the functions and features,
including interfaces, of the software. The FAA has interpreted the need
to describe software to include providing the software requirements for
each safety-critical software component even though not explicitly
required by Sec. 431.35 or Sec. 417.123. The proposal therefore
codifies current practice.
Software requirements are an excellent, even indispensable, means
of understanding any software component's safety implications. Software
requirements, both documented and implied, are the basis of the
software design and constitute a key part of Sec. 417.123(a) through
(e) requirement for software designs. The FAA proposes to clarify the
necessity and scope of software requirements that would be required to
be included in an application in proposed Sec. 450.111(h). Software
requirements would need to be documented and analyzed whenever safety-
critical software is present.\212\ Software requirements are frequently
inherited from system requirements, and both must be internally and
mutually consistent and valid for the resulting software to work
safely. A system-level hazard analysis finds out what hazards software
presents to the system. The software analyses can use the system-level
analyses as initial assessments of software's criticality when starting
software safety analyses. If software requirements are flawed, the
software written to those software requirements will be flawed as well.
This causal path, where software faults originate in software
requirements, is the reason for the proposal's focus on identification,
documentation, validation, and verification of software requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\212\ Implied or undocumented software requirements are common
sources of software faults.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This proposal addresses faults in implementation by requiring
specific types of software verification and validation testing in
proposed Sec. 450.111(d)(4), (e)(4), (f)(3), and (g)(2). This proposal
would clarify the required types of software verification and
validation testing that are required under current Sec. Sec.
417.123(d) and 415.123(b)(8).\213\ Verification and validation are
standard aspects of a software development cycle and are used together
to determine that software meets its intended purpose. In this context,
verification refers to ensuring software meets the software
requirements and design specifications. Validation ensures that the
software achieves its intended purpose.\214\ While testing does not
ensure the absence of software faults, it helps detect and therefore
reduce their presence.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\213\ Examples of testing include unit testing to verify some of
the smallest units of code, such as functions, and acceptance
testing to validate high-level software requirements.
\214\ Verification takes place while the software is under
development while validation is performed after completing software
development and implementation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The proposal would address faults in configuration with explicit
requirements to establish and verify software configuration management
processes. Configuration management is the set of processes that ensure
that the flight components, including software components, are the
correct components with the appropriate development and test heritage.
Faults in configuration management can lead to unsuitable or
incompatible components in a system, resulting in an increased
potential for unintended and unsafe system actions.
Proposed Sec. 450.111(a) would require operators to document a
process that identifies the risks to the public health and safety and
the safety of property arising from computing systems and software.
This is consistent with the Sec. 417.123(a) requirement for a
description of the computing system and software system safety process.
It adds no more requirements than part 415 because Sec. 415.123(b)(6)
requires an applicant to describe the computing system and software
system safety process as required by Sec. 417.123(a). Unlike Sec.
431.35(c), proposed Sec. 450.111(a) specifically mentions computing
systems and software as items to be included in the system safety
process.
Proposed Sec. 450.111(b) would require an operator to identify all
safety-critical functions associated with its computing systems and
software. The 10 listed functions are a minimum set of items to include
whenever they are present in a system, because they represent the most
common safety-critical roles in which software can be employed. For
example, software used to control or monitor safety-critical systems is
capable of hazardous actions by definition. Similarly, software that
accesses safety-critical data is safety-critical because it may alter
safety-critical data or prevent other components from accessing safety-
critical data at required times. The software safety process must then
demonstrate that the software that accesses safety-critical data cannot
[[Page 15400]]
cause a hazard by doing so. These requirements are the same as in the
current Sec. 417.123(b), with the addition of one new criterion for
software that displays safety-critical information. Proposed Sec.
450.111 would retain the requirement of Sec. 417.123(b) for the
identification of safety-critical functions. The proposal would add
detail and clarity to this requirement, specifying that the identified
functions must be accompanied by assessments of the criticality of each
software function. This is normally done by assessing the consequences
of a functional failure or error and assessing the degree of control
that the software can exercise to implement the function. The proposal
would retain the examples of software that may have safety-critical
functions, with the expectation that the full list of safety-critical
functions is not limited to the examples. It differs from Sec.
415.123(b), which describes the documents and materials that the
applicant must provide, whereas proposed Sec. 450.111(b) would list
the safety-critical computing system and software functions that must
be identified and would not list the application requirements in the
same section. The proposal would depart from Sec. 431.35(d)(3) by
specifically requiring the applicant to identify all safety-critical
functions associated with its computing systems and software instead of
implicitly requiring the identification of safety-critical software as
part of the process of identifying safety-critical systems.
Proposed Sec. 450.111(c) would require the identification of
safety-critical software functions by consequence and degree of
control. It would elaborate on the requirements of Sec. Sec.
415.123(a) and 417.123(a), which require the identification and
assessment of the software risks to public safety by specifying that
the assessments must include the public safety consequences of each
safety-critical software function and the degree of control that
software exercises over the performance of that function. Proposed
Sec. 450.111(c) would provide the classification for the applicants to
use while the application requirements are contained in proposed Sec.
450.111(h). Requiring software degree of control would allow the FAA to
request less information for software components with reduced or no
influence on public safety. The proposal would differ from Sec. 431.35
by explicitly requiring identification of software hazards by function
and specifying the documentation requirements related to computing
systems and software in proposed Sec. 450.111(h). Even though this
language is different from Sec. 431.35, this is not a new requirement.
The requirements in the proposal vary based on the software degree
of control and degree of hazard presented. The first and highest degree
of control is autonomous software. Autonomous software would mean
software that exercises autonomous control over safety-critical
systems, subsystems, or components such that a control entity cannot
detect or intervene to prevent a hazard that may impact public health
and safety or the safety of property. It is any software that can act
without an opportunity for meaningful human intervention. The FAA would
impose the most stringent requirements for autonomous software with
potential catastrophic public safety consequences. Proposed Sec.
450.111(d) would set forth five criteria specific to autonomous
software.
Under proposed Sec. 450.111(d)(1), the software component would be
required to undergo full path coverage testing and any inaccessible
code must be documented and addressed. Full path coverage testing is a
systematic technique for ensuring that all routes through the code have
been tested. Path coverage testing includes decision, statement, and
entry and exit coverage. Proposed Sec. 450.111(d)(1) would retain and
clarify the current requirements in Sec. 431.35(d). Full path coverage
testing and documentation of inaccessible code would be required for
autonomous components because the presence of inaccessible code
segments presents a potential for the execution of untested
instructions, which is obviously deleterious for an autonomous system
that, by definition, depends on the correctness of its instructions for
safe operation.
Under proposed Sec. 450.111(d)(2), the software component's
functions would be required to be tested on flight-like hardware.
Testing would be required also to include nominal operation and fault
responses for all functions. The proposal would retain and clarify the
current requirements in Sec. Sec. 431.35(d) and 415.123(b)(8). Testing
software components on flight-like hardware, including nominal
operation and fault responses, is an industry standard for ensuring
that the software interfaces with the hardware as designed. All
autonomous safety-critical components require this testing.
Under proposed Sec. 450.111(d)(3), an operator would be required
to conduct hazard analyses of computing systems and software for the
integrated system and for each autonomous, safety-critical software
component. A software hazard analysis identifies those hazards
associated with safety-critical computer system functions, assesses
their risk, identifies methods for mitigating them, and specifies
evidence of the implementation of those mitigation measures. This
requirement is currently in Sec. Sec. 415.123(b)(7), 417.123(c), and
431.35(d)(4). All software components, regardless of degree of control,
require this analysis for the integrated system. This analysis is also
required for each autonomous, safety-critical software component.
Hazard analyses provide the essential foundation for risk assessment
and management of any system. This analysis is necessary throughout the
lifecycle of the system, from development to disposal. As a system is
modified during design, operation, and maintenance, changes to any part
of the system can lead to unexpected consequences that may incur new
hazards to public safety. It is important to consider risks that result
from software and computing errors as a class or subsystem, as well as
those resulting from the operation and interaction of software with all
other components of the system.
Proposed Sec. 450.111(d)(4) would require an operator to validate
and verify any computing systems and software. Current Sec. Sec.
415.123(b)(8) and 417.123(d) already require verification and
validation although this proposed rule would add the requirement that
testing be conducted by testers who are independent from the software
developers. Independence is essential because it enables testing of
cases and conditions that the software developers may not have
considered or may have inadvertently omitted.
Under proposed Sec. 450.111(d)(5), an operator would be required
to develop and implement software development plans as currently
required in Sec. Sec. 415.123(b)(9) and 417.123(e)(1) through (5). A
software development plan is a means to consolidate and standardize the
management of a software development process. These plans would include
descriptions of coding standards used, configuration control,
programmable logic controllers, and policies on use of commercial-off-
the-shelf software and software reuse. It would be updated as necessary
throughout the lifecycle of the project, and may be comprised of one or
several documents.
The configuration control of a software development project is
particularly important to ensure and facilitate an efficient and
accurate development process. Therefore, the proposal would retain the
existing, if implicit, requirements of Sec. 417.123(e)(2) to limit
faults in configuration by
[[Page 15401]]
requiring robust configuration management. Proper configuration
management ensures consistency and accuracy throughout a system's
design, development, operation, and maintenance. In software
engineering terms, it is a fundamental aspect of a disciplined approach
to the software lifecycle that provides a continuously current baseline
for the system. The FAA would set configuration management requirements
for all safety-critical documentation and code, including but not
limited to software requirements, hazard analysis, test plans, test
results, change requests, and development plans. Tools, processes, and
procedures for configuration management are employed throughout the
software industry.
Proposed Sec. 450.111(e) would apply to semi-autonomous software,
with a definition nearly identical to that stated in MIL-STD-882E. The
FAA regards semi-autonomous software as software that exercises control
over safety-critical hardware systems, subsystems, or components,
allowing time for safe detection and intervention by a control entity.
The software safety requirements for semi-autonomous software are a
subset of those required for autonomous software as described in
proposed Sec. 450.111(d).
Under proposed Sec. 450.111(e)(1), the software component's
safety-critical functions, as categorized by the process in proposed
Sec. 450.111(a), (b), and (c), would be required to be subjected to
full path coverage testing and any inaccessible code must be documented
and addressed. Proposed Sec. 450.111(e)(1) would retain and clarify
current Sec. 431.35(d) as described in proposed Sec. 450.111(d)(1).
The rationale for proposed Sec. 450.111(e)(1) and (d)(1) are
identical.
Under proposed Sec. 450.111(e)(2), the semi-autonomous software
component's safety-critical functions would be required to be tested on
flight-like hardware, including testing of nominal operation and fault
responses for all safety-critical functions. Proposed Sec.
450.111(e)(2) would also retain and clarify the current requirements in
Sec. 431.35(d) as described in proposed Sec. 450.111(d)(2).
Under proposed Sec. 450.111(e)(3), an operator would be required
to conduct computing system and software hazard analyses for the
integrated system. The proposal would retain the requirement of
conducting computing system and software hazard analyses that exists in
current Sec. Sec. 415.123(b)(7), 417.123(c), and 431.35(d)(4). All
software components, regardless of level of control, would require this
analysis for the integrated system. The rationale for proposed Sec.
450.111(e)(3) and (d)(3) are identical.
Under proposed Sec. 450.111(e)(4), an operator would need to
verify and validate any computing systems and software related to semi-
autonomous software as described earlier, with the associated
rationale, for autonomous software relative to proposed Sec.
450.111(d)(4). This verification and validation would be required to
include testing by a test team independent of the software development
division or organization. This would retain the requirement for
verification and validation of computing systems and software,
including testing by an independent test team, as currently required in
Sec. Sec. 415.123(b)(8) and 417.123(d).
Under proposed Sec. 450.111(e)(5), an operator would be required
to develop and implement software development plans as currently
required in Sec. Sec. 415.123(b)(9) and 417.123(e)(1) through (5). The
rationale for proposed Sec. 450.111(e)(5) and (d)(5) are identical.
Proposed Sec. 450.111(f) would apply to redundant fault-tolerant
software, which is defined as software that exercises control over
safety-critical hardware systems, subsystems, or components, for which
a non-software component must also fail in order to impact public
health and safety or the safety of property.\215\ There are redundant
sources of safety-significant information, and mitigating functionality
can respond within any time-critical period. The proposal would include
four criteria for redundant fault-tolerant software.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\215\ MIL-STD-882E elaborates that the definition of redundant
fault-tolerant assumes that there is adequate fault detection,
annunciation, tolerance, and system recovery to prevent the hazard
occurrence if software fails, malfunctions, or degrades.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Proposed Sec. 450.111(f)(1) is consistent with the second criteria
for autonomous and semi-autonomous software in proposed Sec.
450.111(d)(2) and (e)(2), in that the software component's safety-
critical functions would be required to be tested on flight-like
hardware, including testing of nominal operation and fault responses
for all safety-critical functions. The proposal would retain and
clarify the current requirements in Sec. 431.35(d).
Proposed Sec. 450.111(f)(2) would repeat the third criteria for
autonomous and semi-autonomous software as described in proposed Sec.
450.111(d)(3) and (e)(3). It would require that an operator conduct
computing system and software hazard analyses for the integrated
system. The proposal would retain the requirement of conducting
computing system and software hazard analyses that exists in the
current Sec. Sec. 415.123(b)(7), 417.123(c), and 431.35(d)(4). All
software components, regardless of level of control, would require this
analysis for the integrated system. The rationale for this part is the
same as that for proposed Sec. 450.111(d)(3).
Under proposed Sec. 450.111(f)(3), an operator would be required
to verify and validate any computing systems and software related to
redundant fault-tolerant software as described earlier, with associated
rationale, for autonomous software related to proposed Sec.
450.111(d)(4) and semi-autonomous software in proposed Sec.
450.111(e)(4). This verification and validation would be required to
include testing by a test team independent of the software development
division or organization. This would retain the requirement for
verification and validation of computing systems and software,
including testing by an independent test team, as currently required
under Sec. Sec. 415.123(b)(8) and 417.123(d).
Under proposed Sec. 450.111(f)(4), an operator would be required
to develop and implement software development plans as currently
required under Sec. Sec. 415.123(b)(9) and 417.123(e)(1) through (5).
The same rationale applies here as for proposed Sec. 450.111(d)(5) and
(e)(5).
Proposed Sec. 450.111(g) would apply to software that provides
information to a person who uses the information to take actions or
make decisions that can impact public health and safety or the safety
of property, but does not require operator action to avoid a mishap.
Influential software provides information that is used in safety-
critical decisions, but cannot cause a hazard on its own. The proposal
would include three criteria for influential software.
Proposed Sec. 450.111(g)(1) would require an operator to conduct
computing system and software hazard analyses for the integrated
system. The proposed rule would retain the requirement of conducting
computing system and software hazard analyses that exists in the
current Sec. Sec. 415.123(b)(7), 417.123(c), and 431.35(d)(4). All
software components, regardless of level of control, would require this
analysis for the integrated system. The rationale for this proposed
section is the same as that for proposed Sec. 450.111(d)(3).
Proposed Sec. 450.111(g)(2) would require an operator to verify
and validate any computing systems and software related to influential
software. This verification and validation would be required to include
testing by a test
[[Page 15402]]
team independent of the software development division or organization.
This would retain the requirement for verification and validation of
computing systems and software, including testing by an independent
test team, as currently required under Sec. Sec. 415.123(b)(8) and
417.123(d). The rationale for this proposed section is the same as that
for proposed Sec. 450.111(d)(4).
Proposed Sec. 450.111(g)(3) would require an operator to develop
and implement software development plans as required in existing
Sec. Sec. 415.123(b)(9) and 417.123(e)(1) through (5). The same
rationale applies here as for proposed Sec. 450.111(d)(5), (e)(5), and
(f)(4).
Proposed Sec. 450.111(h) would retain the application requirements
of Sec. Sec. 415.123 and 417.123, but would vary in the required
amount of detail according to the level of control of the software. The
amount of application materials would depend on the software
component's risk to safety. The proposal would differ from Sec. 431.35
by expressly requiring documentation related to computing systems and
software. This requirement was implicit in Sec. 431.35 and the FAA has
requested these documents in practice. The FAA would require
descriptions of software components with no safety impact but would not
impose process requirements. This information would be required to
supplement the vehicle description requirements contained elsewhere in
this proposal. It would also lead to a shared understanding of the
systems and components that do not have known safety significance
allowing the FAA only cursorily to review those systems during the
license application evaluation without undue concern over undocumented
systems, functions, or features.
C. Changes to Parts 401, 413, 414, 420, 437, 440
1. Part 401--Definitions
The FAA proposes to modify definitions in parts 401, 414, 417, 420,
437, and 440. This would include adding new definitions to or modifying
current definitions in Sec. 401.5 (Definitions) to align with the new
proposed regulations. The FAA also proposes to clarify and move some of
the definitions that are currently in part 417 to proposed part 450.
Also, the proposal would not retain some of the definitions currently
in part 417. Finally, the FAA proposes to remove various current
definitions from Sec. Sec. 401.5 and 420.5.
The FAA proposes to add new definitions to Sec. 401.5. These
definitions would be necessary additions to accompany the proposed part
450 requirements, especially in the area of flight safety analysis.
Proposed Sec. Sec. 450.113 through 450.139 would require the addition
of ``Casualty Area,'' ``Critical Asset,'' ``Deorbit,'' ``Dose-Response
Relationship,'' ``Disposal,'' ``Effective Casualty Area,'' ``Expected
Casualty,'' ``Flight Abort,'' ``Flight Abort Rules,'' ``Flight Hazard
Area,'' ``Liftoff,'' ``Limits of a Useful Mission,'' ``Orbital
Insertion,'' and ``Probability of Casualty.'' Most important within
that group are ``Critical Asset,'' which is driven by proposed
protection criteria for assets that are essential to the national
interests of the United States, and ``Disposal,'' which is driven by
proposed upper stage disposal risk criteria. The other terms and
associated definitions that would be added to support proposed
Sec. Sec. 450.113 through 450.139 are referenced in the proposed FSA
requirements.
The proposed system safety regulations would require the addition
of the following terms and associated definitions: ``Hazard Control''
and ``Launch or Reentry System.'' Proposed Sec. 450.101(a)(1) and
(b)(1) would require a definition for ``Neighboring Operations
Personnel''; proposed Sec. 450.107(b) would require a clear definition
of ``Physical Containment''; proposed Sec. 450.111 would require a
definition for ``Control Entity'' and ``Software Function''; proposed
Sec. Sec. 450.139 and 450.187 would require a definition for ``Toxic
Hazard Area.'' Proposed Sec. 450.101(c) would require the addition of
``Vehicle Response Mode.'' The collision avoidance requirements in
proposed Sec. 450.169 would require the addition of ``Reentry Window''
and ``Window Closure'' to Sec. 401.5, while the unguided suborbital
requirements in proposed Sec. 450.141 would require the addition of
``Unguided Suborbital Launch Vehicle'' and ``Wind Weighting Safety
System.''
These new definitions are discussed in detail in corresponding
sections of this preamble, including the proposed meaning and usage.
Current Sec. 401.5 definitions that would be modified by this rule
are as follows: ``Contingency Abort,'' which would be simplified;
``Flight Safety System,'' which would be simplified to incorporate the
new term ``Flight Abort;'' and ``Instantaneous Impact Point,'' which
would remove drag effects and clarify that this term means a predicted
impact point. ``Mishap'' would be defined as having four classes or
categories, from most to least severe, based on lessons learned as
discussed earlier in this preamble. The current definition of ``Public
Safety'' would be removed from Sec. 401.5 and the definition of
``Public'' would be removed from Sec. 420.5, and a new definition for
``Public'' would be added to Sec. 401.5. ``Launch'' and ``Reenter;
Reentry'' would be modified to remove language that further scopes what
aspects of space transportation are licensed, as discussed earlier.
Scoping language would be transferred to proposed Sec. 450.3. ``Safety
Critical'' would be modified to remove the last sentence because it is
unnecessary. The definition for ``State and United States'' would fix a
minor printing error.
Section 417.3 contains the definitions for part 417, only some of
which would be preserved and added to Sec. 401.5 by this proposed
rulemaking. These are ``Command Control System,'' ``Countdown,''
``Crossrange,'' ``Data Loss Flight Time,'' ``Downrange,'' ``Explosive
Debris,'' ``Flight Abort Crew,'' ``Flight Safety Limit,'' ``Gate,''
``Launch Window,'' ``Normal Flight,'' ``Normal Trajectory,''
``Operating Environment,'' ``Operation Hazard,'' ``Service Life,''
``System Hazard,'' ``Sub-Vehicle Point,'' ``Tracking Icon,'' and
``Uprange.'' A number of changes have been made as follows:
``Command Control System'' would be modified to take out
unnecessary detail.
``Countdown,'' ``Downrange,'' ``Explosive Debris,'' and
``Normal Flight'' would be modified to add reentry.
``Crossrange,'' ``Launch Window,'' ``Normal Trajectory,''
``Service Life,'' and ``System Hazard'' would be unchanged.
The term ``Flight Abort Crew'' would be changed from
``Flight Safety Crew,'' and would be simplified.
``Operating Environment'' would be changed to add reentry,
and would use the term ``lifecycle'' within the definition instead of
the limiting reference to acceptance testing, launch countdown, and
flight.
``Operation Hazard'' would be modified to clarify that a
system hazard is not an operation hazard.
The term ``Protected Area'' would be removed, and the term
``Uncontrolled Area'' would be added to Sec. 401.5 but with the
inclusion of a launch or reentry site operator, an adjacent site
operator, or other entity by agreement who can control an area of land.
The term ``Service life'' would be changed to replace
reference to a flight termination system component with any safety-
critical system component.
The last sentence in ``Sub-Vehicle Point'' and ``Uprange''
would be
[[Page 15403]]
removed because these sentences are unnecessary.
``Tracking Icon'' would be modified to include autonomous
flight safety systems.
``Data Loss Flight Time,'' ``Flight Safety Limit,'' and
``Gate'' would be changed as discussed earlier in this preamble.
In part 414, ``Safety Approval'' would be changed to ``Safety
Element Approval,'' so that a part 414 approval is not confused with a
proposed part 450 safety approval. Its meaning, however, would remain
the same as discussed earlier in this preamble.
The definition of ``Maximum Probable Loss (MPL)'' in Sec. 440.3
would be modified to include Neighboring Operations Personnel.
The definition of ``Anomaly'' would be removed from part 437 and
added to Sec. 401.5 with a revised meaning.
Definitions that would not be retained from part 417 are ``Command
Destruct Systems,'' ``Conjunction on Launch,'' ``Destruct,'' ``Drag
Impact Point,'' ``Dwell Time,'' ``Fail-Over,'' ``Family Performance
Data,'' ``Flight Safety System,'' ``Flight Termination System,''
``Inadvertent Separation Destruct System,'' ``In-Family,'' ``Launch
Azimuth,'' ``Launch Crew,'' ``Launch Wait,'' ``Meets Intent
Certification,'' ``Non-Operating Environment,'' ``Operating Life,''
``Out-of-Family,'' ``Passive Component,'' ``Performance
Specifications,'' ``Safe-Critical Computer System Function,'' ``Storage
Life,'' and ``Waiver.'' These would no longer be a part of commercial
space regulations because they have been replaced with different terms
(i.e., ``Conjunction on Launch'' and ``Launch Wait''), are already
defined in Sec. 401.5 (i.e., ``Flight Safety System''), or are simply
not used (all others).
This proposed rule would also remove from Sec. 401.5, ``Human
Space Flight Incident,'' ``Launch Accident,'' ``Launch Incident,''
``Reentry Accident,'' and ``Reentry Incident.'' In addition, it would
remove ``Launch Site Accident'' from Sec. 420.5. These definitions
would be removed because of the proposed changes in definitions related
to mishaps. The proposed rule would also remove from Sec. 401.5
``Emergency Abort,'' because it is no longer in use, and ``Vehicle
Safety Operations Personnel,'' because those personnel are referred to
as ``Safety Critical Personnel'' in proposed part 450.
The FAA also proposes to remove the definition of ``Instantaneous
Impact Point'' from Sec. 420.5. This definition would be removed
because a new definition with a modified meaning would be added to
Sec. 401.5.
2. Part 413--Application Procedures
i. Sec. 413.1 Clarification of the Term ``Application''
The FAA proposes to modify Sec. 413.1 to clarify the term
``application.'' Specifically, the FAA would add to Sec. 413.1 that
the term application means either an application in its entirety, or a
portion of an application for incremental review and determination in
accordance with Sec. 450.33. This change is necessary to enable
incremental review as discussed earlier.
ii. Sec. 413.21 Denial of a License or Permit Application
The FAA proposes to correct the section heading of Sec. 413.21 to
reflect the content of the section, and also correct paragraph (c) of
this section to reference both license and permit applications.
Section 413.21 applies to a license or permit application. However,
the section heading and paragraph (c) of this section only reference
``license.'' To correct this oversight, the FAA proposes to revise the
section heading to read, ``Denial of a license or permit application.''
In addition, the FAA proposes to remove the reference to ``license''
from paragraph (c) so that it would apply to both license and permit
applications.
iii. ``Complete Enough'' and ``Sufficiently Complete''
The FAA proposes to change the term ``sufficiently complete'' in
part 414 to ``complete enough,'' as used in Sec. 413.11, because the
two terms mean the same thing. That is, they both describe the point at
which the FAA has determined it has sufficient information to accept an
application and begin its evaluation to make findings regarding issuing
a license or permit.
Section 413.11 uses ``complete enough'' to describe when the FAA
will accept an application and begin its review for a launch license or
permit. The original intent was to use the same term in other chapter
III sections. However, the term ``sufficiently complete'' in Sec. Sec.
414.15(a), 415.107(a), and 417.203(c) was never changed to ``complete
enough.''
Therefore, the agency proposes to change the term ``sufficiently
complete'' to ``complete enough'' for consistency and clarity. The
proposed change would be made in part 414 and in proposed part 450,
since parts 415 and 417 would be consolidated under this new part.
iv. Electronic Submission
This rule proposes to amend Sec. 413.7(a)(3) to allow an applicant
the option to submit its application by email as a link to a secure
server, and remove the requirement that an application be in a format
that cannot be altered.
In 2015, the FAA published the ``Electronic Applications for
Licenses, Permits, and Safety Approvals'' rule.\216\ In that rule, the
FAA made the application process more flexible and efficient by
providing an applicant with the option to submit applications to the
FAA electronically, either via email or on an electronic storage
device, rather than submitting a paper application. Specifically, Sec.
413.7(a)(3) requires that an application made via email be submitted as
an email attachment to [email protected] in a format that cannot
be altered. The FAA's intent was to allow applicants to transact with
the agency electronically, in accordance with the Government Paperwork
Elimination Act. However, since the rule published, the FAA has found
that many of the files containing the necessary application materials
are too large to be transmitted successfully by email. When this
occurs, applicants have transmitted an email message with a File
Transfer Program (FTP) link or a link to a digital repository where the
materials can be downloaded by the FAA. The FAA has found this to be an
acceptable means of submitting an application. Because the FAA proposes
to amend application procedures in this rulemaking, the FAA also
proposes to align the regulations with the current acceptable practice
of allowing this form of electronic application submission.
Accordingly, the FAA proposes to amend Sec. 413.7(a)(3) to allow an
applicant the option to submit its application by email as a link to a
secure server.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\216\ Electronic Applications for Licenses, Permits, and Safety
Approvals, Direct Final Rule. 80 FR 30147 (May 27, 2015).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Additionally, the 2015 rulemaking identified that in requiring a
file format that could not be altered, the FAA would accept a PDF
document or a read-only Word file. Because both of these file types can
actually be modified, the FAA has found it is impossible to comply with
the requirement in Sec. 413.7(a)(3)(ii). However, the need for
document and version control of applications still exists for accurate
record keeping and to ensure that the application materials the FAA
evaluates and enforces represent the final and accurate submission from
the applicant and have not been altered in any way. As nearly every
form of electronic file submitted could be altered in some way or
another, the FAA proposes to replace the current Sec. 413.7(a)(3)(ii)
with a new
[[Page 15404]]
requirement that an applicant's email submission would be required to
identify each document appended to the email, including any that are
included as an attachment or that are stored on a secure server. The
FAA further proposes to include a new Sec. 413.7(a)(3)(iii) which
would require all electronic files be date stamped and include version
control documentation. The replacement of Sec. 413.7(a)(3)(ii) and the
addition of Sec. 413.7(a)(3)(iii) would further the FAA's intent to
prevent any unrecognized alteration.
The proposed amendments to Sec. 414.13(a)(3) would mirror the
proposed text of Sec. 413.7(a)(3). The FAA also proposes to remove
Sec. 414.11(a)(3) because those requirements would be addressed in the
proposed text of Sec. 414.13(a)(3). These changes would remove
unactionable application requirements and replace them with regulations
that align with current practice and practicable compliance.
The FAA also proposes to change the heading of part 413 from
``License Application Procedures'' to ``Application Procedures.'' The
proposed heading change reflects the multiple application procedures
under part 413, which includes launch and reentry licenses, launch and
reentry site licenses, and experimental permits. The FAA proposes this
title change to improve the regulatory clarity for future experimental
permit applicants.
3. Part 414--Safety Element Approvals
As discussed earlier, the FAA proposes to change the part 414 term
from ``safety approval'' to ``safety element approval'' to distinguish
it from ``safety approval'' as used in parts 415, 431, and 435, and
proposed part 450. Also, the FAA proposes to modify part 414 to enable
applicants to request a safety element approval in conjunction with a
license application as provided in proposed part 450.\217\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\217\ Discussion on safety element approval changes to part 414
can be found in the Process Improvements section A portion of this
preamble.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
4. Part 420--License To Operate a Launch Site
As discussed earlier, the proposal would modify the environmental
requirements in Sec. 420.15 to match the environmental requirements in
proposed Sec. 450.47. Also, the proposal would remove the definitions
of ``instantaneous impact point,'' ``launch site accident,'' and
``public'' from Sec. 420.5, and allow alternate time frames in Sec.
420.57. In addition, it would change the heading of Sec. 420.59 from
``Launch Site Accident Investigation Plan'' to ``Mishap Plan,'' and
modify the section as discussed earlier. Further, it would make a minor
edit in Sec. 420.51.
5. Part 433--License To Operate a Reentry Site
As discussed earlier, the proposal would modify the environmental
requirements in Sec. Sec. 433.7 and 433.9 to align them with the
environmental requirements in proposed Sec. 450.47.
6. Part 437--Experimental Permits
As discussed earlier, the FAA proposes to modify part 437
(Experimental Permits) in six ways. First, the proposal would remove
the definition of ``anomaly'' from Sec. 437.3 and include a modified
version in Sec. 401.5. Second, the proposal would modify the
environmental requirements in Sec. 437.21(b)(1) to match the
environmental requirements proposed in Sec. 450.47. Third, it would
change the name of ``safety approval'' to ``safety element approval''
in Sec. 437.21. Fourth, it would modify the mishap plan requirements
in Sec. Sec. 437.41 and 437.75. Fifth, it would change the
requirements for collision avoidance to match proposed Sec. 450.169.
Sixth, it would allow for alternate time frames in Sec. 437.89.
7. Part 440--Financial Responsibility
As discussed earlier, the FAA proposes to modify Sec. 440.15 to
allow for alternate time frames, and modify the definition of ``maximum
probable loss'' in Sec. 440.3 to align it with the new, proposed
definition of ``neighboring operations personnel.''
IV. Regulatory Notices and Analyses
A. Regulatory Evaluation
Changes to Federal regulations must undergo several economic
analyses. First, Executive Order 12866 and Executive Order 13563 direct
that each federal agency shall propose or adopt a regulation only upon
a reasoned determination that the benefits of the intended regulation
justify its costs. Second, the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (Pub.
L. 96-354) requires agencies to analyze the economic impact of
regulatory changes on small entities. Third, the Trade Agreements Act
(Pub. L. 96-39 as amended) prohibits agencies from setting standards
that create unnecessary obstacles to the foreign commerce of the United
States. In developing U.S. standards, the Trade Agreements Act requires
agencies to consider international standards and, where appropriate,
that they be the basis of U.S. standards. Fourth, the Unfunded Mandates
Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 104-4) requires agencies to prepare a
written assessment of the costs, benefits, and other effects of
proposed or final rules that include a Federal mandate likely to result
in the expenditure by State, local, or tribal governments, in the
aggregate, or by the private sector, of $100 million or more annually
(adjusted for inflation with base year of 1995). The FAA has provided a
more detailed Preliminary Regulatory Impact Analysis of the benefits
and costs of this proposed rule in the docket of this rulemaking. This
portion of the preamble summarizes this analysis.
In conducting these analyses, the FAA has determined that this
proposed rule: (1) Has benefits that justify its costs, (2) is not an
economically ``significant regulatory action'' as defined in section
3(f) of Executive Order 12866, (3) is ``significant'' as defined in
DOT's Regulatory Policies and Procedures, (4) will have a significant
economic impact on a substantial number of small entities, (5) will not
create unnecessary obstacles to the foreign commerce of the United
States, and (6) will not impose an unfunded mandate on state, local, or
tribal governments, or on the private sector by exceeding the threshold
identified earlier. These analyses are summarized below.
Baseline Problem and Statement of Need
The FAA is proposing this deregulatory action to comply with
President Donald J. Trump's Space Policy Directive-2 (SPD-2)
``Streamlining Regulations on Commercial Use of Space.'' The directive
instructed the Secretary of Transportation to publish for notice and
comment, proposed rules rescinding or revising the launch and reentry
licensing regulations. Section 2 of SPD-2 charged the Department of
Transportation with revising regulations to require a single license
for all types of commercial space flight operations and replace
prescriptive requirements with performance-based criteria. The subject
proposed rule would implement this section of SPD-2.
The FAA's existing regulations have been criticized as overly-
prescriptive, lacking sufficient clarity, outdated, and inconsistent
with the requirements of other Government agencies. The regulations for
ELV launches in parts 415 and 417 have proven to be too prescriptive
and one-size-fits-all. The requirements of these parts were written in
a very detailed fashion, which has caused some sections to become
outdated or obsolete. In contrast, the regulations for RLV launches
have proven to be too general, lacking
[[Page 15405]]
regulatory clarity. For example, part 431 does not contain specificity
regarding the qualification of flight safety systems, acceptable
methods for flight safety analysis, and ground safety requirements.
The purpose of the proposed rule is to streamline and simplify the
licensing of launch and reentry operations by relying on performance-
based regulations rather than prescriptive regulations. This action
would consolidate and revise multiple commercial space launch and
reentry regulations addressing licensing into a single regulatory part
that states safety objectives to be achieved for the launch of
suborbital and orbital expendable and reusable launch vehicles, and the
reentry of reentry vehicles. This action would also enable flexible
timeframes, remove unnecessarily burdensome ground safety regulations,
redefine when launch begins to allow specified pre-flight operations
prior to license approval, and allow applicants to seek a license to
launch from multiple sites. This proposal is necessary to reduce the
need to file and process waivers, improve clarity of the regulations,
and relieve administrative and cost burdens on industry and the FAA.
The intended effect of this action is to make commercial space
transportation regulations more efficient and effective, while
maintaining public safety.
Since the last comprehensive update to the regulations in 2006, the
differences between ELVs and RLVs have blurred. Vehicles that utilize
traditional flight safety systems now are partially reusable. For
example, the Falcon 9 first stage, launched by Space Exploration
Technologies Corp. (SpaceX), routinely returns to the launch site or
lands on a barge and other operators are developing launch vehicles
with similar capabilities. Although the reuse of safety critical
systems or components can have public safety implications, labeling a
launch vehicle as expendable or reusable has not shown to impact the
primary approach necessary to protect public safety, certainly not to
the extent suggested in the differences between part 431 and parts 415
and 417.
This deregulatory action would consolidate and revise multiple
commercial space regulatory parts to apply a single set of licensing
and safety regulations across several types of operations and vehicles.
It would also replace many prescriptive regulations with performance-
based regulations, giving industry greater flexibility to develop a
means of compliance that maximizes their business objectives. This
proposed rule would result in net cost savings for industry and enable
future innovation in U.S. commercial space transportation.
Affected Operators and Launches
At the time of writing based on FAA license data, the FAA estimates
this proposed rule would affect 12 operators that have an active
license or permit to conduct launch or reentry operations. In addition,
the FAA estimates this proposed rule would affect approximately 276
launches over the next 5 years based on actual launch and reentry
numbers and forecasted numbers.\218\ The FAA anticipates that the
proposed rule would reduce the costs of current and future launch
operations by removing current prescriptive requirements that are often
burdensome to meet or require a waiver. The FAA expects these changes
would lead to more efficient launch operations and have a positive
effect on expanding the number of future launch and reentry operations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\218\ See the Preliminary Regulatory Impact Analysis of this
proposed rule in the docket for more information. The FAA Office of
Commercial Space Transportation derived the launches affected by
this proposed rule for a 5-year period of analysis due to the
rapidly changing environment of commercial space transportation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Summary of Impacts
Over a 5-year period of analysis, this proposed rule would result
in net present value cost savings to industry of about $19 million
using a 7% discount rate or about $21 million using a 3% discount rate,
with annualized net cost savings to industry of about $4.6 million
using either discount rate. This proposed rule would also result in net
present value savings for FAA of about $0.8 million using a 7% discount
rate or about $1 million using a 3% discount rate, with annualized net
cost savings to FAA of about $0.2 million using either discount rate.
The largest quantified cost savings for industry would result from
eliminating or relaxing requirements for a flight safety system on some
launches (about $11 million in present value savings over 5 years at a
discount rate of 7% or about $12 million at a discount rate of 3%) and
from reducing the number of personnel that would have to be evacuated
from neighboring launch sites (about $8 million in present value
savings over 5 years at a discount rate of 7% or about $9 million at a
discount rate of 3%). These cost savings are described in more detail
below.
The FAA proposes to move from prescriptive flight safety system
requirements to performance-based requirements. As a result, the
proposed rule would not require all launch vehicles to have a full
flight safety system. Launch vehicles that have a very low probability
of multiple casualties even if vehicle control fails would not be
required to have a flight safety system. In addition, vehicles that
have moderately low probability of casualty even if vehicle control
fails would not be required to have robust flight safety systems.\219\
These performance-based requirements would reduce costs for some
vehicle operators, especially for small vehicles or those operating in
remote locations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\219\ See discussion in the preamble regarding being compliant
with the flight safety systems of part 417.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The proposed rule would provide a new definition of neighboring
operations personnel and establish new criteria for neighboring launch
site personnel for the purposes of risk and financial responsibility.
The change would allow affected operators to potentially reduce the
number of personnel that have to evacuate and enable more concurrent
operations by accepting a small safety risk tradeoff. The FAA has
monetized the value of this small increased safety risk as summarized
in the following tables. The FAA estimates the present value of these
small increased safety risks to be about $1.4 million discounted at 7%
or about $1.5 discounted at 3% over the five years.
The FAA estimates some small costs to industry that would assist
both industry and the FAA in the implementation of this proposed rule,
such as providing information to the FAA that other agencies frequently
request or performing one-time updates of flight safety limit analyses
and ground hazard analyses that would be used to determine performance-
based means of compliance that provide future savings. In addition,
there may be additional costs for the modification of existing licenses
to benefit from the cost saving provisions of this proposed rule. The
FAA would also incur small costs for payload review, ground hazard
analysis, and the review of modifications to existing licenses.
The following table summarizes total quantified savings, costs, and
net impacts.
[[Page 15406]]
Summary of Total 5-Year Quantified Savings, Costs and Net Impacts
[Presented in thousands of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Industry Industry
Impact present value present value FAA present FAA present
(7%) (3%) value (7%) value (3%)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cost Savings.................................... $19,386.1 $21,844.5 $1,045.7 $1,208.9
Costs........................................... -542.6 -569.5 -222.3 -237.0
---------------------------------------------------------------
Net Cost Savings............................ 18,843.5 21,275.0 823.4 971.8
---------------------------------------------------------------
Annualized Net Cost Savings............. 4,595.7 4,645.5 200.8 212.2
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Increased Safety Risks.......................... -1,370.2 -1,540.6 .............. ..............
---------------------------------------------------------------
Net Cost Savings less Increased Safety Risks 17,473.3 19,734.4 823.4 971.8
---------------------------------------------------------------
Annualized Net Cost Savings less 4,261.6 4,309.1 200.8 212.2
Increased Safety Risks.................
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table notes: The sum of individual items may not equal totals due to rounding. Negative signs are used to
indicate costs and increased safety risks in this table. Present value estimates provided at 7% and 3% per OMB
guidance.
The following table summarizes quantified impacts by provision
category.
Summary of 5-Year Quantified Savings, Costs and Net Impacts by Provisions
[Presented in thousands of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Industry Industry
Provision category/impact present value present value FAA present FAA present
(7%) (3%) value (7%) value (3%)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Waiver Avoidance:
--Definition of Launch...................... $32.8 $36.7 $10.3 $11.5
--Waterborne Vessel Hazard Areas............ 65.6 73.3 20.5 22.9
--Waiver for 48 Hour Readiness.............. 41.0 45.8 12,8 14.3
System Safety Program--Safety Official.......... 39.1 43.7 45.7 51.0
Duration of a Vehicle License................... 50.6 56.5 104.3 116.5
Readiness--Elimination of pre-launch meeting 15 709.9 799.0 127.7 143.6
days prior.....................................
Flight Safety System--Not required for all 10,612.6 11,981.3 572.5 679.2
launches.......................................
Flight Safety Analysis no longer required for 22.1 25.0 2.8 3.2
hybrids........................................
Neighboring Operations *........................ 7,698.9 8,656.7 .............. ..............
Ground Hazard Analysis.......................... 113.3 126.6 149.2 166.6
---------------------------------------------------------------
Total Cost Savings.......................... 19,386.1 21,844.5 1,045.7 1,208.9
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Payload Review and Determination................ -45.6 -51.2 -46.4 -52.2
Flight Safety Limit Analysis.................... -157.7 -163.8 .............. ..............
Ground Hazard Analysis.......................... -24.0 -26.8 -27.2 -30.4
Modification Costs for Existing Licenses........ -315.4 -327.6 -148.7 -154.5
---------------------------------------------------------------
Total Costs................................. -542.6 -569.5 -222.3 -237.0
---------------------------------------------------------------
Net Cost Savings........................ 18,843.5 21,275.0 823.4 971.8
---------------------------------------------------------------
Annualized Net cost Savings......... 4,595.7 4,645.5 200.8 212.2
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Increased Safety Risks: Neighboring Operations * -1,370.2 -1,540.6 .............. ..............
---------------------------------------------------------------
Net Cost Savings less Increased Safety Risks 17,473.3 19,734.4 823.4 971.8
---------------------------------------------------------------
Annualized Net Cost savings Less 4,261.6 4,309.1 200.8 212.2
Increased Safety Risks.................
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Changes to Neighboring Operations requirements result in net savings less increased safety risks.
Table notes: The sum of individual items may not equal totals due to rounding. Negative signs are used to
indicate costs and increased safety risks in this table. Present value estimates provided at 3% and 7% per OMB
guidance.
The FAA also expects industry will gain additional unquantified
savings and benefits from the proposed rule, since it provides
flexibility and scalability through performance-based requirements that
would reduce the future cost of innovation and improve the efficiency
and productivity of U.S. commercial space transportation.
The following table summarizes some of the proposed changes that
would result unquantified savings.
[[Page 15407]]
Unquantified Savings
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Change Savings
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Time Frames................... The proposal would revise time frames in
parts 404, 413, 414, 415, 417, 420,
431, 437, and 440 that may be
burdensome for some operators. This
would increase flexibility by allowing
an operator the option to propose
alternative time frames that better
suit their operations. Eligible time
frames include preflight and post-
flight reporting among others listed in
proposed Appendix A to Part 404--
Alternative Time Frames.
Safety Element Approval....... The proposal would remove the
requirement in part 414 to publish in
the Federal Register the criteria upon
which safety element approvals were
based. The purpose of this notification
requirement was to make clear the
criteria and standards the FAA used to
assess a safety element, particularly
when no clear regulatory requirement
existed and there could be other
potential users of the safety approval.
However, the FAA has found that this
requirement is unnecessary, and has
potentially discouraged applications
for safety element approvals due to
concerns that propriety data may be
disclosed. FAA anticipates that
removing this requirement will lead to
increased use of safety element
approvals, reducing industry burden and
potentially improving safety.
Mishaps....................... The proposal would provide the following
mishap-related enhancements, which FAA
expects to better tailor mishap
responses.
Replace current part 400 mishap
related definitions with a consolidated
mishap classification system
(streamlines and reduces confusion).
Consolidate existing part 400
mishap/accident investigation and
emergency response plan requirements
into a single part (streamlines and
reduces confusion).
Exempt pre-coordinated test-
induced property damage from being a
mishap (removes need to consider test-
induced property damages from mishap
requirements and likely results in
fewer investigations of minor mishaps).
This proposal also eliminates
the small $25,000 monetary threshold
from the current mishap and accident
investigation requirements potentially
reducing the number of mishaps being
investigated that do not pose a threat
to public safety. A minor damage that
does not pose a threat to public safety
can easily exceed the $25,000 monetary
threshold, triggering potentially
costly and burdensome notification,
reporting, and investigation
requirements.
Toxics........................ The proposal would replace part 417
toxic release hazard analysis
requirements with performance-based
regulations that would provide
flexibility for operators to comply
with the required risk criteria in
varied and innovative ways relative to
their operations.
Lightning protection The proposal would remove appendix G to
requirement. part 417, Natural and Triggered
Lightning Flight Commit Criteria, and
replace it with the performance-based
requirements. The current requirements
are outdated, inflexible, overly
conservative, and not explicitly
applicable to RLVs and RVs. The
proposed revision would provide an
operator with more flexibility, and
allow it to take into account the
vehicle's mission profile when
determining how to mitigate the direct
and indirect effects of a lightning
discharge.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The FAA intends to update its analysis with additional information
and data identified during the comment period to better assess the
impacts of this deregulatory action. Estimates may change for the final
rule as a result.
The FAA invites comments on the benefits, savings, or costs of this
proposed rule. Send comments by any of the methods identified under
Addresses in this proposed rule. Specifically, the FAA requests
information and data that can be used to quantify the additional
savings of this proposed rule. Please provide references and sources
for information and data.
B. Regulatory Flexibility Determination
The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (Pub. L. 96-354) (RFA)
establishes ``as a principle of regulatory issuance that agencies shall
endeavor, consistent with the objectives of the rule and of applicable
statutes, to fit regulatory and informational requirements to the scale
of the businesses, organizations, and governmental jurisdictions
subject to regulation. To achieve this principle, agencies are required
to solicit and consider flexible regulatory proposals and to explain
the rationale for their actions to assure that such proposals are given
serious consideration.'' The RFA covers a wide-range of small entities,
including small businesses, not-for-profit organizations, and small
governmental jurisdictions.
Agencies must perform a review to determine whether a rule will
have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small
entities. If the agency determines that it will, the agency must
prepare a regulatory flexibility analysis as described in the RFA.
Under Section 603(b) of the RFA, the initial regulatory flexibility
analysis for a proposed rule must:
Describe reasons the agency is considering the action;
State the legal basis and objectives;
Describe the recordkeeping and other compliance
requirements;
State all federal rules that may duplicate, overlap, or
conflict;
Describe an estimated number of small entities impacted;
and
Describe alternatives considered.
1. Description of Reasons the Agency Is Considering the Action
The Chair of the National Space Council, the Vice President,
directed the Secretaries of Transportation and Commerce, and the
Director of the Office of Management and Budget, to conduct a review of
the U.S. regulatory framework for commercial space activities and
report back within 45 days with a plan to remove barriers to commercial
space enterprises.
The Council approved four recommendations, including the Department
of Transportation's recommendation that the launch and reentry
regulations should be reformed into a consolidated, performance-based
licensing regime.
Codifying the recommendations of the Council, SPD-2 was issued on
May 24, 2018. SPD-2 instructed the Secretary of Transportation to
publish for notice and comment proposed rules rescinding or revising
the launch and reentry licensing regulations, no later than February 1,
2019. SPD-2 charged the Department with revising the regulations such
that they would require a single license for all types of commercial
space flight operations and replace prescriptive requirements with
performance-based criteria. The current action is complying with this
recommendation.
Current regulations setting forth procedures and requirements for
commercial space transportation licensing were based largely on the
distinction between expendable or reusable launch vehicles.
Specifically, 14 CFR parts 415 and 417 address the launch of expendable
launch vehicles, part 431 addresses the launch and
[[Page 15408]]
reentry of reusable launch vehicles, and part 435 addresses the reentry
of reentry vehicles.
The regulations in parts 415 and 417 are based on the Federal
launch range standards developed in the 1990s. Parts 431 and 435 are
primarily process-based, relying on a license applicant to derive
safety requirements through a ``system safety'' process. While these
regulations satisfied the need of the commercial launch industry at the
time they were issued, the industry has changed and continues to
evolve, thus rendering the current regulatory structure cumbersome and
outdated.
2. Statement of the Legal Basis and Objectives
The Commercial Space Launch Act of 1984, as amended and re-codified
at 51 U.S.C. 50901-50923 (the Act), authorizes the Department of
Transportation, and the FAA through delegation, to oversee, license,
and regulate commercial launch and reentry activities, and the
operation of launch and reentry sites as carried out by U.S. citizens
or within the United States. Section 50905 directs the FAA to exercise
this responsibility consistent with public health and safety, safety of
property, and the national security and foreign policy interests of the
United States. The FAA is authorized to regulate only to the extent
necessary to protect the public health and safety, safety of property,
and national security and foreign policy interests of the United
States. In addition, section 50903 requires that the FAA encourage,
facilitate, and promote commercial space launches and reentries by the
private sector.
If adopted as proposed, this rulemaking would streamline and
increase flexibility in the FAA's commercial space regulations. This
action would consolidate and revise multiple regulatory parts to apply
a single set of licensing and safety regulations across several types
of operations and vehicles. It would also replace many prescriptive
regulations with performance-based rules, giving industry greater
flexibility to develop means of compliance that maximize their business
objectives while maintaining an equivalent level of safety to the
agency's current regulations. Because this rulemaking would amend the
FAA's launch and reentry requirements, it falls under the authority
delegated by the Act.
3. Description of the Recordkeeping and Other Compliance Requirements
The FAA is not proposing any substantive changes to the
requirements specified below. However, the agency is proposing to
consolidate these requirements into a new, proposed part 450 (Launch
and Reentry License Requirements); clarify that the consolidated
requirements apply to any licensed launch or reentry; and make other
minor, clarifying edits. The following is a summary of the proposed
changes:
i. Public Safety Responsibility and Compliance With License
The FAA would consolidate the public safety responsibility
requirements in current Sec. Sec. 417.7 and 431.71(a) into proposed
Sec. 450.201, Public Safety Responsibility. Also, the FAA would move
the compliance requirement in current Sec. 431.71(b) to its own
section, proposed Sec. 450.203 (Compliance with License). Although the
location of these requirements would change, the requirements
themselves would not change.
Therefore, proposed Sec. 450.201 would provide that a licensee is
responsible for ensuring public safety and safety of property during
the conduct of a licensed launch or reentry. And proposed Sec. 450.203
would require that a licensee conduct a licensed launch or reentry in
accordance with representations made in its license application, the
requirements of part 450, subparts C and D, and the terms and
conditions contained in the license. A licensee's failure to act in
accordance with these items would be sufficient basis to revoke a
license, or some other appropriate enforcement action.
ii. Records.
The FAA would consolidate the current record requirements in
Sec. Sec. 417.15(a) and (b) and 431.77(a) and (b) into proposed Sec.
450.219(a) and (b). However, the FAA would replace the term ``launch
accident'' in paragraph (b) with ``class 1 or class 2 mishap.'' As
discussed in more detail in the Part 401--Definitions section of this
preamble, the FAA is proposing to replace current part 401 definitions
involving ``accident,'' ``incident,'' and ``mishap'' with specified
mishap classes.
As such, the proposed regulation would require a licensee to
maintain, for 3 years, all records, data, and other material necessary
to verify that a launch or reentry is conducted in accordance with
representations contained in the licensee's application. The exception
would be for a class 1 or class 2 mishap, where a licensee would be
required to preserve all records related to the event. These records
would be required to be retained until the completion of any Federal
investigation and the FAA has notified the licensee that the records
need not be retained. The licensee would be required to make all
records required to be maintained under the regulations available to
Federal officials for inspection and copying.
4. All Federal Rules That May Duplicate, Overlap, or Conflict
No other federal rules duplicate, overlap, or conflict with FAA's
launch and reentry licensing requirements.
5. Description and an Estimated Number of Small Entities Impacted
The FAA has identified two potential small entities that this
proposed rule would impact, Vector Launch, Inc. and Generation Orbit.
Both operators employ fewer than 1,500 people and both were in pre-
application consultation to launch under parts 415 and 417 at the time
of this writing.\220\ These two companies are the only small entities
identified in this analysis that may be directly affected by this
proposed rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\220\ The FAA uses the current Small Business Administration
size standard of 1,500 employees for passenger and freight air
transportation. This information is found in https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/files/Size_Standards_Table_2017.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
6. Alternatives Considered
The FAA considered three alternatives to the proposed rule.
i. No Change to Current Regulations
This alternative was not chosen because the current regulations are
outdated, prescriptive, and do not adequately reflect industry current
practices or technology development. The inefficiency of the licensing
process due to current regulations risks stifling innovation and growth
of the industry, especially for small operators.
ii. Propose a More Process-Based Regulatory Approach
With this alternative, the FAA would propose less detailed
regulations that would rely primarily on the outcome of an operator's
system safety process to protect public safety. This alternative was
not chosen because it would lack regulatory clarity without adding any
additional flexibility for a launch or reentry operator which may be
more burdensome to small operators compared to large operators.
iii. Propose a Defined Modular Application Process
With this alternative, the FAA would propose similar safety
requirements but would add a more defined incremental
[[Page 15409]]
or modular application process. The current proposal enables an
incremental application process, but does not define one with explicit
modules and time frames. This alternative was not chosen because the
FAA has no experience with an incremental or modular application
process with which to base a proposal. In addition, a more defined
incremental or modular application process may be less flexible and
scalable and therefore more burdensome to small operators.
The FAA expects this proposed rule would provide regulatory relief
to small entities from current prescriptive requirements and result in
net savings.
As discussed previously in this section, the FAA identified two
possible small entities that would be affected by this proposed rule
but they are in the pre-application stage for potential ELV and RLV
launches and we have little information on how they may comply with
existing or proposed requirements. As these entities have not begun
operations, we do not have estimates of the costs savings or costs that
would reliably apply. However, the following are some estimates of per
entity cost savings and costs based on data representing existing ELV
and RLV operators. We note that some of the estimated savings and costs
of this proposed rule may not apply to these entities.
Cost Savings
i. Readiness--Elimination of Pre-Launch Meeting 15 Days Prior (Sec.
450.155)
ELV operators might save $4,600 per avoided launch readiness
meeting, however this assumes the average number of people at each
meeting would be 25 and this might not apply to a small business.
ii. Flight Safety System--Not Required for All Launches (Sec. 450.145)
For launches where an FSS would not be required under the proposal,
RLV operators might save $195,000 per launch vehicle for a vehicle
using an existing design. An ELV operator might save $680,000 per
launch. Both ELV and RLV operators might save an estimated $1.3 million
for new vehicle designs by not having to incur all the research,
design, testing, materials and installation costs for an FSS.
iii. Ground Hazard Analysis (Sec. 450.185)
An ELV operator might save $28,000 per application by not having to
do a ground hazard analysis under this proposal.
Costs
i. Payload Review and Determination (Sec. 450.43)
The proposed rule could cause small operators to incur about $204
more per launch than due to additional payload review and determination
costs.
ii. Ground Hazard Analysis (Sec. 450.185)
RLV applicants might incur about $3,000 more per application due to
having to perform ground hazard analyses under the proposal.
The FAA invites comments on this initial regulatory flexibility
analysis for the proposed rule. Send comments by any of the methods
identified under Addresses in this proposed rule. Specifically, the FAA
requests information and data that can be used to quantify savings and
costs to small operators directly affected by this proposed rule.
Please provide references and sources for information and data.
C. International Trade Impact Assessment
The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 (Pub. L. 96-39), as amended by the
Uruguay Round Agreements Act (Pub. L. 103-465), prohibits federal
agencies from establishing standards or engaging in related activities
that create unnecessary obstacles to the foreign commerce of the United
States. Pursuant to these Acts, the establishment of standards is not
considered an unnecessary obstacle to the foreign commerce of the
United States, so long as the standard has a legitimate domestic
objective, such as the protection of safety, and does not operate in a
manner that excludes imports that meet this objective. The statute also
requires consideration of international standards and, where
appropriate, that they be the basis for U.S. standards. The FAA has
assessed the potential effect of this proposed rule and determined that
it will not create unnecessary obstacles to the foreign commerce of the
United States.
D. Unfunded Mandates Assessment
Title II of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 104-
4) requires each federal agency to prepare a written statement
assessing the effects of any Federal mandate in a proposed or final
agency rule that may result in an expenditure of $100 million or more
(in 1995 dollars) in any one year by State, local, and tribal
governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector; such a mandate
is deemed to be a ``significant regulatory action.'' The threshold
after adjustment for inflation is $150 million using the most current
annual (2017) Implicit Price Deflator for Gross Domestic Product from
the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. This proposed rule does not
contain such a mandate; therefore, the requirements of Title II of the
Act do not apply.
E. Paperwork Reduction Act
The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3507(d)) requires
that the FAA consider the impact of paperwork and other information
collection burdens imposed on the public. According to the 1995
amendments to the Paperwork Reduction Act (5 CFR 1320.8(b)(2)(vi)), an
agency may not collect or sponsor the collection of information, nor
may it impose an information collection requirement unless it displays
a currently valid Office of Management and Budget (OMB) control number.
This action contains the following proposed consolidation of two
existing information collection requirements, previously approved under
OMB Control Numbers 2120-0608 and 2120-0643, under a new OMB control
number. As required by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C.
3507(d)), the FAA will submit the proposed information collection
requirements to OMB for its review. In addition, the FAA has published
a separate notice of the proposed requirements for public comment, and
has included the notice in the docket for this rulemaking. The notice
includes instructions on how to submit comments specifically to the
proposed information collection requirements. Additional details on
assumptions and calculations used in this section are presented in the
Preliminary Regulatory Impact Analysis available in the docket of this
rulemaking. The following estimates are included in the total savings
and costs summarized in the Regulatory Evaluation section and
considered in the Regulatory Flexibility Determination section of this
proposed rule.
Summary: The FAA proposes to consolidate under a new part 450, the
requirements currently contained in parts 415 and 417 for the launch of
an ELV, in part 431 for the launch and reentry of an RLV, and in part
435 for the reentry of a reentry vehicle other than an RLV. The result
of this effort would be streamlined regulations designed to be more
flexible and scalable, with reduced timelines and minimal duplicative
jurisdiction. The net result would be reduced paperwork for operators,
although for some provisions paperwork would increase.
Use: The information would be used by FAA to evaluate the launch
and
[[Page 15410]]
reentry operators' applications and to ensure safety.
Paperwork Impact to Industry
Respondents (including number of): The information collection would
potentially affect 12 operators based on available data at the time of
writing.
Annual Burden Estimate: Most changes in part 450 would result in a
reduction in the paperwork burden. The paperwork associated with
industry requesting waivers to certain provisions would be alleviated.
Paperwork associated with industry requesting license modifications
would also be reduced because an operator would not have to modify a
license if the specific safety official were to change. In addition,
with the extension of RLV licenses to up to five years, it is likely
that fewer licenses would be issued, resulting in less paperwork. Due
to the change in launch scope, the documentation accompanying a ground
hazard analysis for ELV operators would be reduced.
Industry Cost Savings
The following table indicates the frequency of responses, the
estimated time per response, the burdened wage rate, annual hours, and
the cost for each cost saving provision. Response frequency is provided
for the estimated number of waivers avoided (Sec. 450.3), estimated
reduction in annual number of licenses modified (Sec. 450.103),
estimated reduction in annual license renewals, and the estimated
annual number of launches for which there would be a reduction in
ground hazard analysis paperwork (Sec. 450.185). An estimated time for
each response is also indicated below, as are burdened hourly wage
rates for the specific personnel associated with each provision and
annual hours and total cost savings.
Industry Paperwork Cost Savings
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Estimated time
Description Response per response Industry wage Annual hours Cost savings
frequency (hours) rate
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Waiver Avoidance (Sec. 450.3). 17 20 $100.03 340 $34,010
System Safety Program--Safety 5.6 24 71.01 134.4 9,544
Official (Sec. 450.103)......
Duration of a Vehicle License 1.2 126.5 81.28 151.8 12,338
(Sec. 450.7).................
Ground Safety (Sec. 450.185).. 1 340 81.28 340 27,634
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Annual Savings........ .............. .............. .............. 966 83,526
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cost savings includes paperwork related to waivers avoided due to
the definition of launch, waterborne vessel protection, and removal of
48-hour readiness requirement.
Industry Paperwork Burden
Other changes would result in an increase in paperwork burden. The
Payload Review and Determination section (Sec. 450.43) would add
requirements for applicants to provide explosive potential of payload
materials, alone and in combination with other materials on the payload
for launches, as well as the appropriate transit time to final orbit
for payloads with significant transit time after release from vehicle.
The FAA is adding requirements for ground hazard analysis (Sec.
450.185) for RLV launches. The proposed rule would require RLVs to
submit information to the FAA.
The table below indicates the frequency of responses, estimated
time per response, burdened hourly wage rate, annual hours, and the
cost for each provision that would add burden. Response frequency is
provided for the estimated number of explosive potential and transit
time calculations, and the estimated number of annual RLV applications
which would require ground hazard analysis. An estimated time per
response is also indicated below, as are burdened hourly wage rates for
the specific personnel associated with each provision and annual hours
and total cost savings.
Industry Paperwork Burden
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Estimated time
Description Response per response Industry wage Annual hours Cost
frequency (hours) rate
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Explosive Potential (Sec. 50 2 $81.28 100 $8,128
450.43)........................
Transit time (Sec. 450.43).... 50 0.5 81.28 25 2,032
Ground Safety (Sec. 450.185).. 2 36 81.28 72 5,852
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Cost Burden........... .............. .............. .............. 197 16,012
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The following table summarizes the industry total annual paperwork
savings, total annual burden and the net annual savings.
Industry Net Paperwork Savings
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Description Annual hours Cost savings
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Annual Savings.................... 966 $83,526
Total Annual Burden..................... 197 16,012
-------------------------------
[[Page 15411]]
Net Annual Savings.................. 769 67,514
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Paperwork Burden to the Federal Government
The following tables summarizes FAA paperwork savings and burden.
Similar to industry burden savings, the FAA would receive burden relief
from waivers avoided due to the definition of launch, waterborne vessel
protection, and removal of the 48-hour readiness requirement. See the
Regulatory Impact Analysis available in the docket for more details on
these estimates and calculations.
FAA Paperwork Cost Savings
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Estimated time
Description per response FAA wage rate Annual hours Cost savings
(hours)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Waiver Avoidance (Sec. 450.3)................. 7.5 $83.26 127.5 $10,616
System Safety Program--Safety Official (Sec. 24 82.88 134.4 11,139
450.103).......................................
Duration of a Vehicle License (Sec. 450.7).... 253.5 83.61 304.2 25,434
Ground Safety (Sec. 450.185).................. 439 82.88 439 36,384
---------------------------------------------------------------
Total Annual Savings........................ .............. .............. 1,005 83,573
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FAA Paperwork Burden
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Estimated time
Description per response FAA wage rate Annual hours Cost savings
(hours)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Explosive Potential (Sec. 450.43)............. 2.0 $82.88 100 $8,288
Transit time (Sec. 450.43).................... 0.5 82.88 25 2,072
Ground Safety (Sec. 450.185).................. 40 82.88 80 6,630
---------------------------------------------------------------
Total Annual Burden......................... .............. .............. 205 16,990
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FAA Net Paperwork Savings
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Description Annual hours Cost savings
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Annual Savings.................... 1,005 $83,573
Total Annual Burden..................... 205 16,990
-------------------------------
Net Annual Savings.................. 800 66,583
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Voluntary One-Time Modification of Existing Licenses
There are currently 24 active licenses held by 12 operators. Once
the rule is in effect, existing licenses would be grandfathered under
the current provisions, unless the licenses are modified. Operators may
choose to modify their licenses to benefit from the cost saving
provisions of the proposed rule--some operators may choose also to wait
until they apply for a new license. The FAA assumes modifications of
licenses would occur within the first year after the rule is effective.
The FAA assumes it would take about one month for an industry aerospace
engineer to develop documentation and analysis to apply for a
modification of an existing license and about two weeks for an FAA
employee to review an application for a modification of an existing
license.
The following estimates assume all licenses would be modified. This
overestimates paperwork costs, since some operators may not find it
advantageous to modify their existing licenses. The FAA requests
comment on these assumptions and the following estimates to apply for
applications to modify existing licenses. Specifically, the FAA
requests information if licenses holders would modify existing licenses
for changes from this proposed rule or wait to apply for new licenses.
The FAA may revise these assumptions and estimates for the final rule.
[[Page 15412]]
Industry Burden Costs for Applications To Modify Existing Licenses
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Time (one month
Year Wage rate of work hours) Cost per Number of Total burden Total costs
* license licenses hours
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1................................................. $81.28 173 $14,061 24 4,152 $337,457
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* One month of work hours based on the following calculations: 52 work weeks/year x 40 work hours/week = 2,080 work hours/year; and, 2,080 work hours/
year / 12 months = 173 work hours/month (rounded).
FAA Burden Costs To Review Applications To Modify Existing Licenses
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Hours (two
Year Wage rate weeks of work Cost per Number of Total burden Total costs
hours) license licenses hours
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1................................................. $82.88 80 $6,630 24 1,920 $159,130
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The agency is soliciting comments to--
(1) Evaluate whether the proposed information requirement is
necessary for the proper performance of the functions of the agency,
including whether the information will have practical utility;
(2) Evaluate the accuracy of the agency's estimate of the burden;
(3) Enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of the information to
be collected; and
(4) Minimize the burden of collecting information on those who are
to respond, including by using appropriate automated, electronic,
mechanical, or other technological collection techniques or other forms
of information technology.
Individuals and organizations may send comments on the information
collection requirement to the address listed in the ADDRESSES section
at the beginning of this preamble by June 14, 2019. Comments also
should be submitted to the Office of Management and Budget, Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs, Attention: Desk Officer for FAA,
New Executive Building, Room 10202, 725 17th Street NW, Washington, DC
20053.
F. International Compatibility
In keeping with U.S. obligations under the Convention on
International Civil Aviation, it is FAA policy to conform to
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Standards and
Recommended Practices to the maximum extent practicable. The FAA has
determined that there are no ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices
that correspond to these proposed regulations.
G. Environmental Analysis
FAA Order 1050.1F identifies FAA actions that are categorically
excluded from preparation of an environmental assessment or
environmental impact statement under the National Environmental Policy
Act in the absence of extraordinary circumstances. The FAA has
determined this rulemaking action qualifies for the categorical
exclusion identified in paragraph 5-6.6 and involves no extraordinary
circumstances.
V. Executive Order Determinations
A. Executive Order 13132, Federalism
The FAA has analyzed this proposed rule under the principles and
criteria of Executive Order 13132, Federalism. The agency has
determined that this action would not have a substantial direct effect
on the States, or the relationship between the Federal Government and
the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among
the various levels of government, and, therefore, would not have
Federalism implications.
B. Executive Order 13211, Regulations That Significantly Affect Energy
Supply, Distribution, or Use
The FAA analyzed this proposed rule under Executive Order 13211,
Actions Concerning Regulations that Significantly Affect Energy Supply,
Distribution, or Use (May 18, 2001). The agency has determined that it
would not be a ``significant energy action'' under the executive order
and would not be likely to have a significant adverse effect on the
supply, distribution, or use of energy.
C. Executive Order 13609, International Cooperation
Executive Order 13609, Promoting International Regulatory
Cooperation, promotes international regulatory cooperation to meet
shared challenges involving health, safety, labor, security,
environmental, and other issues and to reduce, eliminate, or prevent
unnecessary differences in regulatory requirements. The FAA has
analyzed this action under the policies and agency responsibilities of
Executive Order 13609, and has determined that this action would have
no effect on international regulatory cooperation.
D. Executive Order 13771, Reducing Regulation and Controlling
Regulatory Costs
This proposed rule is expected to be a deregulatory action under
Executive Order 13771 and would result in net cost savings for industry
that would likely reduce the future cost of innovation in U.S.
commercial space transportation. The Preliminary Regulatory Impact
Analysis for the proposed rule provides additional information.
VI. Additional Information
A. Comments Invited
The FAA invites interested persons to participate in this
rulemaking by submitting written comments, data, or views. Also, the
agency invites comments regarding potential overlap with the regulatory
requirements of other agencies not addressed in this proposed rule. In
addition, the FAA invites comments relating to the economic,
environmental, energy, or federalism impacts that might result from
adopting the proposals in this document. The most helpful comments
reference a specific portion of the proposal, explain the reason for
any recommended change, and include supporting data. To ensure the
docket does not contain duplicate comments, commenters should send only
one copy of written comments, or if comments are filed electronically,
commenters should submit only one time.
The FAA will file in the docket all comments it receives, as well
as a report summarizing each substantive public contact with FAA
personnel concerning this proposed rulemaking. Before acting on this
proposal, the FAA will consider all comments it receives on or before
the
[[Page 15413]]
closing date for comments. The FAA will consider comments filed after
the comment period has closed if it is possible to do so without
incurring expense or delay. The agency may change this proposal in
light of the comments it receives.
Proprietary or Confidential Business Information: Commenters should
not file proprietary or confidential business information in the
docket. Such information must be sent or delivered directly to the
person identified in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section of
this document, and marked as proprietary or confidential. If submitting
information on a disk or CD ROM, mark the outside of the disk or CD
ROM, and identify electronically within the disk or CD ROM the specific
information that is proprietary or confidential.
Under 14 CFR 11.35(b), if the FAA is aware of proprietary
information filed with a comment, the agency does not place it in the
docket. It is held in a separate file to which the public does not have
access, and the FAA places a note in the docket that it has received
it. If the FAA receives a request to examine or copy this information,
it treats it as any other request under the Freedom of Information Act
(5 U.S.C. 552). The FAA processes such a request under Department of
Transportation procedures found in 49 CFR part 7.
B. Availability of Rulemaking Documents
An electronic copy of rulemaking documents may be obtained from the
internet by--Searching the Federal eRulemaking Portal (http://www.regulations.gov);
Visiting the FAA's Regulations and Policies web page at http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies or
Accessing the Government Printing Office's web page at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/.
Copies may also be obtained by sending a request to the Federal
Aviation Administration, Office of Rulemaking, ARM-1, 800 Independence
Avenue SW, Washington, DC 20591, or by calling (202) 267-9680.
Commenters must identify the docket or notice number of this
rulemaking.
All documents the FAA considered in developing this proposed rule,
including economic analyses and technical reports, may be accessed from
the internet through the Federal eRulemaking Portal referenced in item
(1) above.
List of Subjects
14 CFR Part 401
Organization and functions (Government agencies), Space
transportation and exploration.
14 CFR Part 404
Administrative practice and procedure, Space transportation and
exploration.
14 CFR Part 413
Confidential business information, Space transportation and
exploration.
14 CFR Part 414
Airspace, Aviation safety, Space transportation and exploration.
14 CFR Part 420
Environmental protection, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements,
Space transportation and exploration.
14 CFR Part 437
Aircraft, Aviation safety, Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements, Space transportation and exploration.
14 CFR Part 440
Indemnity payments, Insurance, Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements, Space transportation and exploration.
14 CFR Part 450
Aircraft, Aviation safety, Environmental protection,
Investigations, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Space
transportation and exploration.
The Proposed Amendment
In consideration of the foregoing, the Federal Aviation
Administration proposes to amend chapter III of title 14, Code of
Federal Regulations as follows:
PART 401--ORGANIZATION AND DEFINITIONS
0
1. The authority citation for part 401 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 51 U.S.C. 50101-50923.
0
2. In Sec. 401.5:
0
a. Add, in alphabetical order, the definitions of ``Anomaly,''
``Casualty area,'' and ``Command control system'';
0
b. Revise the definition of ``Contingency abort'';
0
c. Add, in alphabetical order, the definitions of ``Control entity,''
``Countdown,'' ``Critical asset,'' ``Crossrange,'' ``Data loss flight
time,'' ``Deorbit,'' ``Disposal,'' ``Dose-response relationship,''
``Downrange,'' and ``Effective casualty area'';
0
d. Remove the definition of ``Emergency abort'';
0
e. Add, in alphabetical order, the definition of ``Expected casualty,''
``Explosive debris,'' ``Flight abort,'' ``Flight abort crew,'' ``Flight
abort rules,'' ``Flight hazard area,'' and ``Flight safety limit'';
0
f. Revise the definition of ``Flight safety system'';
0
g. Add, in alphabetical order, the definitions of ``Gate'' and ``Hazard
control'';
0
h. Remove the definition of ``Human space flight incident'';
0
i. Revise the definitions of ``Instantaneous impact point'' and
``Launch'';
0
j. Remove the definitions of ``Launch accident'' and ``Launch
incident'';
0
k. Add, in alphabetical order, the definitions of ``Launch or reentry
system,'' ``Launch window,'' ``Liftoff,'' and ``Limits of a useful
mission'';
0
l. Revise the definition of ``Mishap'';
0
m. Add, in alphabetical order, the definitions of ``Mishap, Class 1,''
``Mishap, Class 2,'' ``Mishap, Class 3'', ``Mishap, Class 4,''
``Neighboring operations personnel,'' ``Normal flight,'' ``Normal
trajectory,'' ``Operating environment,'' and ``Operation hazard'';
0
n. Revise the definition of ``Operator'';
0
o. Add, in alphabetical order, the definitions of ``Orbital
insertion,'' ``Physical containment,'' ``Probability of casualty,'' and
``Public'';
0
p. Remove the definition of ``Public safety'';
0
q. Revise the definition of ``Reenter; reentry'';
0
r. Remove the definitions of ``Reentry accident'' and ``Reentry
incident'';
0
s. Add, in alphabetical order, the definition of ``Reentry window'';
0
t. Revise the definition of ``Safety critical'';
0
u. Add, in alphabetical order, the definitions of ``Service life'' and
``Software function'';
0
v. Revise the definition of ``State and United States'';
0
w. Add, in alphabetical order, the definitions of ``Sub-vehicle
point,'' ``System hazard,'' ``Toxic hazard area,'' ``Tracking icon,''
``Uncontrolled area,'' ``Unguided suborbital launch vehicle,''
``Uprange,'' and ``Vehicle response modes'';
0
x. Remove the definition of ``Vehicle safety operations personnel'';
and
0
y. Add, in alphabetical order, the definitions of ``Wind weighting
safety system'' and ``Window closure''.
The additions and revisions read as follows:
Sec. 401.5 Definitions.
* * * * *
Anomaly means any condition during licensed or permitted activity
that
[[Page 15414]]
deviates from what is standard, normal, or expected, during the
verification or operation of a system, subsystem, process, facility, or
support equipment.
* * * * *
Casualty area means the area surrounding each potential debris or
vehicle impact point where serious injuries, or worse, can occur.
Command control system means the portion of a flight safety system
that includes all components needed to send a flight abort control
signal to the on-board portion of a flight safety system.
Contingency abort means a flight abort with a landing at a planned
location that has been designated in advance of vehicle flight.
Control entity means a person or device that can control another
device or process.
Countdown means the timed sequence of events that must take place
to initiate flight of a launch vehicle or reentry of a reentry vehicle.
* * * * *
Critical asset means an asset that is essential to the national
interests of the United States. Critical assets include property,
facilities, or infrastructure necessary to maintain national defense,
or assured access to space for national priority missions.
Crossrange means the distance measured along a line whose direction
is either 90 degrees clockwise (right crossrange) or counter-clockwise
(left crossrange) to the projection of a vehicle's planned nominal
velocity vector azimuth onto a horizontal plane tangent to the
ellipsoidal Earth model at the vehicle's sub-vehicle point. The terms
right crossrange and left crossrange may also be used to indicate
direction.
Data loss flight time means the shortest elapsed thrusting or
gliding time during which a vehicle flown with a flight safety system
can move from its trajectory to a condition where it is possible for
the vehicle to violate a flight safety limit.
Deorbit means the flight of a vehicle that begins with the final
command to commit to a perigee below 70 nautical miles (approximately
130 kilometers), and ends when all vehicle components come to rest on
the Earth.
Disposal means the return or attempt to return, purposefully, a
launch vehicle stage or component, not including a reentry vehicle,
from Earth orbit to Earth, in a controlled manner.
Dose-response relationship means a quantitative methodology used to
assign a probability of casualty within a population group given
exposure to a toxic chemical of known or predicted concentration and
duration.
Downrange means the distance measured along a line whose direction
is parallel to the projection of a vehicle's planned nominal velocity
vector azimuth into a horizontal plane tangent to the ellipsoidal Earth
model at the vehicle sub-vehicle point. The term downrange may also be
used to indicate direction.
Effective casualty area means the aggregate casualty area of each
piece of debris created by a vehicle failure at a particular point on
its trajectory. The effective casualty area for each piece of debris is
a modeling construct in which the area within which 100 percent of the
population are assumed to be a casualty, and outside of which 100
percent of the population are assumed not to be a casualty.
* * * * *
Expected casualty means the mean number of casualties predicted to
occur per flight operation if the operation were repeated many times.
* * * * *
Explosive debris means solid propellant fragments or other pieces
of a vehicle or payload that result from breakup of the vehicle during
flight and that explode upon impact with the Earth's surface and cause
overpressure.
* * * * *
Flight abort means the process to limit or restrict the hazards to
public health and safety, and the safety of property, presented by a
launch vehicle or reentry vehicle, including any payload, while in
flight by initiating and accomplishing a controlled ending to vehicle
flight.
Flight abort crew means the personnel who make a flight abort
decision.
Flight abort rules means the conditions under which a flight safety
system must abort the flight to ensure compliance with public safety
criteria.
* * * * *
Flight hazard area means any region of land, sea, or air that must
be surveyed, publicized, controlled, or evacuated in order to protect
public health and safety and the safety of property.
Flight safety limit means criteria to ensure that public safety is
protected from the flight of a vehicle when a flight safety system
functions properly.
Flight safety system means a system used to implement flight abort.
A human can be a part of a flight safety system.
Gate means the portion of a flight safety limit boundary through
which the tracking icon of a vehicle flown with a flight safety system
may pass without flight abort, provided the flight remains within
specified parameters.
Hazard control means a preventative measure or mitigation put in
place for systems or operations to reduce the severity of a hazard or
the likelihood of the hazard occurring.
* * * * *
Instantaneous impact point means a predicted impact point,
following thrust termination of a vehicle.
Launch means to place or try to place a launch vehicle or reentry
vehicle and any payload or human being from Earth in a suborbital
trajectory, in Earth orbit in outer space, or otherwise in outer space,
including activities involved in the preparation of a launch vehicle or
payload for launch, when those activities take place at a launch site
in the United States.
* * * * *
Launch or reentry system means the integrated set of subsystems,
personnel, products, and processes that, when combined together, safely
carries out a launch or reentry.
* * * * *
Launch window means a period of time during which the flight of a
launch vehicle may be initiated.
Liftoff means any motion of the launch vehicle with intention to
initiate flight.
Limits of a useful mission means the trajectory data or other
parameters that describe the limits of a mission that can attain the
primary objective, including flight azimuth limits.
Mishap means any event, or series of events associated with a
licensed or permitted activity, that meets the criteria of a Class 1,
2, 3 or 4 mishap.
Mishap, Class 1 means any event resulting in one or more of the
following:
(1) A fatality or serious injury (as defined in 49 CFR 830.2) as a
result of licensed or permitted activity to any person who is not
associated with the licensed or permitted activity, including ground
activities at a launch or reentry site; or
(2) A fatality or serious injury to any space flight participant,
crew, or government astronaut.
Mishap, Class 2 means any event, other than a Class 1 mishap,
resulting in one or more of the following:
(1) A malfunction of a flight safety system or safety-critical
system; or
(2) A failure of the licensee's or permittee's safety organization,
safety operations, safety procedures; or
(3) High risk, as determined by the FAA, of causing a serious or
fatal injury to any space flight participant, crew, government
astronaut, or member of the public; or
[[Page 15415]]
(4) Substantial damage, as determined by the FAA, to property not
associated with licensed or permitted activity.
Mishap, Class 3 means any unplanned event, other than a Class 1 or
Class 2 mishap, resulting in one or more of the following:
(1) Permanent loss of a launch or reentry vehicle during licensed
activity; or
(2) The impact of a licensed or permitted launch or reentry
vehicle, its payload, or any component thereof outside the planned
landing site or designated hazard area.
Mishap, Class 4 means an unplanned event, other than a Class 1,
Class 2, or Class 3 mishap, resulting in one or more of the following:
(1) Permanent loss of a vehicle during permitted activity;
(2) Failure to achieve mission objectives; or
(3) Substantial damage, as determined by the FAA, to property
associated with licensed or permitted activity.
Neighboring operations personnel means, as determined by the
Federal or licensed launch or reentry site operator, those members of
the public located within a launch or reentry site, or an adjacent
launch or reentry site, who are not associated with a specific
hazardous licensed or permitted operation currently being conducted but
are required to perform safety, security, or critical tasks at the site
and are notified of the operation.
* * * * *
Normal flight means the flight of a properly performing vehicle
whose real-time vacuum instantaneous impact point does not deviate from
the nominal vacuum instantaneous impact point by more than the sum of
the wind effects and the three-sigma guidance and performance
deviations in the uprange, downrange, left-crossrange, or right-
crossrange directions.
Normal trajectory means a trajectory that describes normal flight.
Operating environment means an environment that a launch or reentry
vehicle component will experience during its lifecycle. Operating
environments include shock, vibration, thermal cycle, acceleration,
humidity, and thermal vacuum.
Operation hazard means a hazard created by an operating environment
or by an unsafe act.
* * * * *
Operator means a holder of a license or permit under 51 U.S.C.
Subtitle V, chapter 509.
Orbital insertion means the point at which a vehicle achieves a
minimum 70-nautical mile perigee based on a computation that accounts
for drag.
* * * * *
Physical containment means a launch vehicle does not have
sufficient energy for any hazards associated with its flight to reach
the public or critical assets.
* * * * *
Probability of casualty means the likelihood that a person will
suffer a serious injury or worse, including a fatal injury, due to all
hazards from an operation at a specific location.
Public means, for a particular licensed or permitted launch or
reentry, people and property that are not involved in supporting the
launch or reentry and includes those people and property that may be
located within the launch or reentry site, such as visitors,
individuals providing goods or services not related to launch or
reentry processing or flight, and any other operator and its personnel.
Reenter; reentry means to return or attempt to return,
purposefully, a reentry vehicle and its payload or human being, if any,
from Earth orbit or from outer space to Earth.
* * * * *
Reentry window means a period of time during which the reentry of a
reentry vehicle may be initiated.
* * * * *
Safety critical means essential to safe performance or operation. A
safety-critical system, subsystem, component, condition, event,
operation, process, or item, is one whose proper recognition, control,
performance, or tolerance, is essential to ensuring public safety.
Service life means, for a safety-critical system component, the sum
total of the component's storage life and operating life.
* * * * *
Software function means a collection of computer code that
implements a requirement or performs an action. This includes firmware
and operating systems.
* * * * *
State and United States means, when used in a geographical sense,
the several States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico, American Samoa, the United States Virgin Islands, Guam,
and any other commonwealth, territory, or possession of the United
States.
Sub-vehicle point means the location on an ellipsoidal Earth model
where the normal to the ellipsoid passes through the vehicle's center
of gravity.
System hazard means a hazard associated with a system and generally
exists even when no operation is occurring.
* * * * *
Toxic hazard area means a region on the Earth's surface where toxic
concentrations and durations may be greater than approved toxic
thresholds for acute casualty, in the event of a release during launch
or reentry.
Tracking icon means the representation of a vehicle's instantaneous
impact point, debris footprint, or other vehicle performance metric
used during real-time tracking of the vehicle's flight.
Uncontrolled area is an area of land not controlled by a launch or
reentry operator, a launch or reentry site operator, an adjacent site
operator, or other entity by agreement.
Unguided suborbital launch vehicle means a suborbital rocket that
does not contain active guidance or a directional control system.
* * * * *
Uprange means the distance measured along a line that is 180
degrees to the downrange direction.
* * * * *
Vehicle response modes means mutually exclusive scenarios that
characterize foreseeable combinations of vehicle trajectory and debris
generation.
* * * * *
Wind weighting safety system means equipment, procedures, analysis
and personnel functions used to determine the launcher elevation and
azimuth settings that correct for wind effects that an unguided
suborbital launch vehicle will experience during flight.
Window closure means a period of time when launch or reentry is not
permitted in order to avoid a collision with an object in orbit. A
window closure may occur within a launch or reentry window, may delay
the start of a window, or terminate a window early.
PART 404--REGULATIONS AND LICENSING REQUIREMENTS
0
3. The authority citation for part 404 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 51 U.S.C. 50901-50923.
0
4. Revise Sec. 404.5 to read as follows:
Sec. 404.5 Filing a petition for waiver.
(a) A petition for waiver must be submitted at least 60 days before
the proposed effective date of the waiver, unless the Administrator
agrees to a different time frame in accordance with Sec. 404.15.
(b) The petition for waiver must include:
(1) The specific section or sections of this chapter from which the
petitioner seeks relief;
[[Page 15416]]
(2) The extent of the relief sought and the reason the relief is
being sought;
(3) The reason why granting the request for relief is in the public
interest and will not jeopardize the public health and safety, safety
of property, and national security and foreign policy interests of the
United States; and
(4) Any additional facts, views, and data available to the
petitioner to support the waiver request.
0
5. Add Sec. 404.15 to read as follows:
Sec. 404.15 Alternative time frames.
(a) General. Unless otherwise approved by the Administrator, an
applicant, a licensee, a permittee, or a safety element approval holder
must meet the time frames set forth in this chapter.
(b) Request to change a time frame. A person may file a written
request to the FAA to propose an alternative time frame to any of the
time frames included in the sections listed in appendix A to this part.
The request must be--
(1) Submitted no later than the specific time frame included in the
regulation; and
(2) Emailed to [email protected]; or
(3) Mailed to the Federal Aviation Administration, Associate
Administrator for Commercial Space Transportation, Room 331, 800
Independence Avenue SW, Washington, DC 20591. Attention: Alternative
Time Frame Request.
(c) Administrator review. The Administrator will review and make a
decision or grant a request for an alternative time-frame as follows:
(1) The FAA will conduct its review on a case-by-case basis, taking
into account the complexity of the request and whether it allows
sufficient time for the FAA to conduct its review and make the
requisite public health and safety, safety of property, and national
security and foreign policy findings; and
(2) The FAA will provide its decision in writing.
0
6. Add appendix A to part 404 the read as follows:
Appendix A to Part 404--Alternative Time Frames
A404.1 GENERAL
Alternative time frames. This appendix lists the sections and
corresponding paragraphs in this chapter that provide the eligible
time frames for an applicant, licensee, permittee or a safety
element approval holder, as applicable, to request an alternative
time frame.
Table A404.1--Eligible Time Frames
------------------------------------------------------------------------
49 CFR Paragraphs
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sec. 404.5--Filing a petition for waiver...... (a)
Sec. 413.23--License or permit renewal........ (a)
Sec. 414.31--Safety element approval renewal.. (a)
Sec. 420.57--Notifications.................... (d)
Sec. 437.89--Preflight reporting.............. (a), (b)
Sec. 440.15--Demonstration of compliance...... (a)(1), (a)(2),
(a)(3), (a)(4)
Sec. 450.169-- Launch and Reentry Collision (f)(1)
Avoidance Analysis Requirements.
Sec. 450.213--Preflight reporting............. (b), (c), (d), (e)
Sec. 450.215--Post-flight reporting........... (a)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
PART 413--APPLICATION PROCEDURES
0
7. The authority citation for part 413 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 51 U.S.C. 50901-50923.
0
8. Revise the heading for part 413 to read as set forth above.
0
9. Revise Sec. 413.1 to read as follows:
Sec. 413.1 Scope of this part.
(a) This part explains how to apply for a license or experimental
permit. These procedures apply to all applications for obtaining a
license or permit, transferring a license, and renewing a license or
permit. In this part, the term application means either an application
in its entirety, or a portion of an application for incremental review
and determination in accordance with Sec. 450.33 of this chapter.
(b) Use the following table to locate specific requirements:
Table 1 to Paragraph (b)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Subject Part
------------------------------------------------------------------------
License to Operate a Launch Site........................ 420
License to Operate a Reentry Site....................... 433
Experimental Permits.................................... 437
Launch And Reentry License Requirements................. 450
------------------------------------------------------------------------
0
10. Amend Sec. 413.7 by revising the section heading and paragraph
(a)(3) to read as follows:
Sec. 413.7 Application submission.
(a) * * *
(3) For an application submitted by email, an applicant must send
the application as an email attachment, or as a link to a secure
server, to [email protected]. The application and the email to
which the application is attached or linked must also satisfy the
following criteria:
(i) The email to which the application is attached or linked must
be sent from an email address controlled by the person who signed the
application or by an authorized representative of the applicant;
(ii) The email must identify each document that is included as an
attachment or that is stored on a secure server; and
(iii) The electronic files must be date-stamped and have version
control documentation.
* * * * *
0
11. Amend Sec. 413.11 by revising paragraph (a) to read as follows:
Sec. 413.11 Acceptance of an application.
* * * * *
(a) The FAA accepts the application and will initiate review; or
* * * * *
[[Page 15417]]
0
12. Revise Sec. 413.15 to read as follows:
Sec. 413.15 Review period.
(a) Review period duration. Unless otherwise specified in this
chapter, the FAA reviews and makes a license or permit determination on
an application within 180 days of receiving an accepted license
application or within 120 days of receiving an accepted permit
application. The FAA will establish the time frame for any incremental
review and determination with an applicant on a case-by-case basis
during pre-application consultation.
(b) Review period tolled. If an accepted application does not
provide sufficient information to continue or complete the reviews or
evaluations required by this chapter for a license, permit, or
incremental determination, or an issue exists that would affect a
determination, the FAA notifies the applicant, in writing, and informs
the applicant of any information required to complete the application.
If the FAA cannot review an accepted application because of lack of
information or for any other reason, the FAA will toll the review
period until the FAA receives the information it needs or the applicant
resolves the issue.
(c) Notice. Unless applying under incremental review and
determination in accordance with Sec. 450.33 of this chapter, if the
FAA does not make a decision within 120 days of receiving an accepted
license application or within 90 days of receiving an accepted permit
application, the FAA informs the applicant, in writing, of any
outstanding information needed to complete the review, or of any issues
that would affect the decision.
0
13. Amend Sec. 413.21 by revising the section heading and paragraphs
(b) and (c) to read as follows:
Sec. 413.21 Denial of a license or permit application.
* * * * *
(b) If the FAA has denied an application in its entirety, the
applicant may either--
(1) Attempt to correct any deficiencies identified and ask the FAA
to reconsider the revised application. The FAA has 60 days or the
number of days remaining in the review period, whichever is greater,
within which to reconsider the decision; or
(2) Request a hearing in accordance with part 406 of this chapter,
for the purpose of showing why the application should not be denied.
(c) An applicant whose application is denied after reconsideration
under paragraph (b)(1) of this section may request a hearing in
accordance with paragraph (b)(2) of this section.
0
14. Revise part 414 to read as follows:
PART 414--SAFETY ELEMENT APPROVALS
Sec.
Subpart A--General
414.1 Scope.
414.3 Definitions.
414.5 Applicability.
414.7 Eligibility.
Subpart B--Application Procedures
414.9 Pre-application consultation.
414.11 Application.
414.13 Application separate from a vehicle operator license
application.
414.15 Application concurrent with vehicle operator license
application.
414.17 Confidentiality.
414.19 Processing the initial application.
414.21 Maintaining the continued accuracy of the initial application.
Subpart C--Safety Element Approval Review and Issuance
414.23 Technical criteria for reviewing a safety element approval
application.
414.25 Terms and conditions for issuing a safety element approval;
duration of a safety element approval.
414.27 Maintaining the continued accuracy of the safety element
approval application.
414.29 Safety element approval records.
414.31 Safety element approval renewal.
414.33 Safety element approval transfer.
414.35 Monitoring compliance with the terms and conditions of a
safety element approval.
414.37 Modification, suspension, or revocation of a safety element
approval.
414.39 [Reserved]
Subpart D--Appeal Procedures
414.41 Hearings in safety element approval actions.
414.43 Submissions; oral presentations in safety element approval
actions.
414.45 Administrative law judge's recommended decision in safety
element approval actions.
Authority: 51 U.S.C. 50901-50923.
Subpart A--General
Sec. 414.1 Scope.
This part establishes procedures for obtaining a safety element
approval and renewing and transferring an existing safety element
approval. Safety element approvals issued under this part may be used
to support the application review for one or more vehicle operator
license requests under other parts of this chapter.
Sec. 414.3 Definitions.
For purposes of this part the following definitions apply:
Safety element approval. A safety element approval is an FAA
document containing the FAA determination that one or more of the
safety elements listed in paragraphs (1) and (2) of this definition,
when used or employed within a defined envelope, parameter, or
situation, will not jeopardize public health and safety or safety of
property. A safety element approval may be issued independent of a
license, and it does not confer any authority to conduct activities for
which a license is required under this chapter. A safety element
approval does not relieve its holder of the duty to comply with all
applicable requirements of law or regulation that may apply to the
holder's activities.
(1) Launch vehicle, reentry vehicle, safety system, process,
service, or any identified component thereof; or
(2) Qualified and trained personnel, performing a process or
function related to licensed activities or vehicles.
Safety element. A safety element is any one of the items or persons
(personnel) listed in paragraphs (1) and (2) of the definition of
``safety approval'' in this section.
Sec. 414.5 Applicability.
This part applies to an applicant that wants to obtain a safety
element approval for any of the safety elements defined under this part
and to persons granted a safety element approval under this part. Any
person eligible under this part may apply to become the holder of a
safety element approval.
Sec. 414.7 Eligibility.
(a) There is no citizenship requirement to obtain a safety element
approval.
(b) You may be eligible for a safety element approval if you are--
(1) A designer, manufacturer, or operator of a launch or reentry
vehicle or component thereof;
(2) The designer or developer of a safety system or process; or
(3) Personnel who perform safety critical functions in conducting a
licensed launch or reentry.
(c) A safety element approval applicant must have sufficient
knowledge and expertise to show that the design and operation of the
safety element for which safety element approval is sought qualify for
a safety element approval.
(d) Only the safety elements defined under this part are eligible
for a safety element approval. The applicant must consult with the FAA
before submitting an application. Unless the applicant or the FAA
requests another form of consultation, consultation is oral discussion
with the FAA about the
[[Page 15418]]
application process and the potential issues relevant to the FAA's
safety element approval decision.
Subpart B--Application Procedures
Sec. 414.9 Pre-application consultation.
The applicant must consult with the FAA before submitting an
application. Unless the applicant or the FAA requests another form of
consultation, consultation is oral discussion with the FAA about the
application process and the potential issues relevant to the FAA's
safety approval decision.
Sec. 414.11 Application.
An applicant may submit an application for a safety element
approval in one of two ways:
(a) Separate from a vehicle operator license application in
accordance with Sec. 414.13; or
(b) Concurrent with a vehicle operator license application in
accordance with Sec. 414.15.
Sec. 414.13 Application separate from a vehicle operator license
application.
(a) An applicant must make an application in writing and in
English. The applicant must file the application with the Federal
Aviation Administration either by paper, by use of physical electronic
storage, or by email in the following manner:
(1) For an application submitted on paper, an applicant must send
two copies of the application to the Federal Aviation Administration,
Associate Administrator for Commercial Space Transportation, Room 331,
800 Independence Avenue SW, Washington, DC 20591. Attention:
Application Review.
(2) For an application submitted by use of physical electronic
storage, the applicant must either mail the application to the address
specified in paragraph (a)(1) of this section or hand-deliver the
application to an authorized FAA representative. The application and
the physical electronic storage containing the application must also
satisfy all of the following criteria:
(i) The application must include a cover letter that is printed on
paper and signed by the person who signed the application or by an
authorized representative of the applicant;
(ii) The cover letter must identify each document that is included
on the physical electronic storage; and
(iii) The physical electronic storage must be in a format such that
its contents cannot be altered.
(3) For an application submitted by email, an applicant must send
the application as an email attachment, or as a link to a secure
server, to [email protected]. The application and the email to
which the application is attached must also satisfy the following
criteria:
(i) The email to which the application is attached must be sent
from an email address controlled by the person who signed the
application or by an authorized representative of the applicant; and
(ii) The email must identify each document that is included as an
attachment or that is stored on a secure server; and
(iii) The electronic files must be date-stamped and have version
control documentation.
(b) The application must identify the following basic information:
(1) Name and address of the applicant.
(2) Name, address, and telephone number of any person to whom
inquiries and correspondence should be directed.
(3) Safety element as defined under this part for which the
applicant seeks a safety element approval.
(c) The application must contain the following technical
information:
(1) A Statement of Conformance letter, describing the specific
criteria the applicant used to show the adequacy of the safety element
for which a safety element approval is sought, and showing how the
safety element complies with the specific criteria.
(2) The specific operating limits for which the safety element
approval is sought.
(3) The following as applicable:
(i) Information and analyses required under this chapter that may
be applicable to demonstrating safe performance of the safety element
for which the safety element approval is sought.
(ii) Engineering design and analyses that show the adequacy of the
proposed safety element for its intended use, such that the use in a
licensed launch or reentry will not jeopardize public health or safety
or the safety of property.
(iii) Relevant manufacturing processes.
(iv) Test and evaluation procedures.
(v) Test results.
(vi) Maintenance procedures.
(vii) Personnel qualifications and training procedures.
(d) The application must be legibly signed, dated, and certified as
true, complete, and accurate by one of the following:
(1) For a corporation, an officer or other individual authorized to
act for the corporation in licensing or safety element approval
matters.
(2) For a partnership or a sole proprietorship, a general partner
or proprietor, respectively.
(3) For a joint venture, association, or other entity, an officer
or other individual duly authorized to act for the joint venture,
association, or other entity in licensing matters.
(e) Failure to comply with any of the requirements set forth in
this section is sufficient basis for denial of a safety element
approval application.
Sec. 414.15 Application concurrent with vehicle operator license
application.
(a) An applicant for a vehicle operator license may also identify
one or more sections of its application for which it seeks to obtain a
safety element approval concurrently with a license. An applicant
applying for a safety element approval concurrently with a license
must--
(1) Meet the applicable requirements of part 450 of this chapter;
(2) Provide the information required in Sec. 414.13(b)(3) and
(c)(2) and (3); and
(3) Specify the sections of the license application that support
its application for a safety element approval.
(b) The scope of the safety element approval will be limited to
what the application supports. The technical criteria for reviewing a
safety element submitted as part of a vehicle operator license
application are limited to the applicable requirements of part 450 of
this chapter.
Sec. 414.17 Confidentiality.
(a) To ensure confidentiality of data or information in the
application, the applicant must--
(1) Send a written request with the application that trade secrets
or proprietary commercial or financial data be treated as confidential,
and include in the request the specific time frame confidential
treatment is required.
(2) Mark data or information that require confidentiality with an
identifying legend, such as ``Proprietary Information,'' ``Proprietary
Commercial Information,'' ``Trade Secret,'' or ``Confidential Treatment
Requested.'' Where this marking proves impracticable, attach a cover
sheet that contains the identifying legend to the data or information
for which confidential treatment is sought.
(b) If the applicant requests confidential treatment for previously
submitted data or information, the FAA will honor that request to the
extent practicable in case of any prior distribution of the data or
information.
(c) Data or information for which confidential treatment is
requested or data or information that qualifies for
[[Page 15419]]
exemption under 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(4) will not be disclosed to the public
unless the Associate Administrator determines that withholding the data
or information is contrary to the public or national interest.
Sec. 414.19 Processing the initial application.
(a) The FAA will initially screen an application to determine if
the application is complete enough for the FAA to start its review.
(b) After completing the initial screening, the FAA will inform the
applicant in writing of one of the following:
(1) The FAA accepts the application and will begin the reviews or
evaluations required for a safety element approval determination under
this part.
(2) The FAA rejects the application because it is incomplete or
indefinite making initiation of the reviews or evaluations required for
a safety element approval determination under this part inappropriate.
(c) The written notice will state the reason(s) for rejection and
corrective actions necessary for the application to be accepted. The
FAA may return a rejected application to the applicant or may hold it
until the applicant provides more information.
(d) The applicant may withdraw, amend, or supplement an application
any time before the FAA makes a final determination on the safety
element approval application by making a written request to the
Associate Administrator. If the applicant amends or supplements the
initial application, the revised application must meet all the
applicable requirements under this part.
Sec. 414.21 Maintaining the continued accuracy of the initial
application.
The applicant is responsible for the continuing accuracy and
completeness of information provided to the FAA as part of the safety
element approval application. If at any time after submitting the
application, circumstances occur that cause the information to no
longer be accurate and complete in any material respect, the applicant
must submit a written statement to the Associate Administrator
explaining the circumstances and providing the new or corrected
information. The revised application must meet all requirements under
Sec. 414.13 or Sec. 414.15.
Subpart C--Safety Element Approval Review and Issuance
Sec. 414.23 Technical criteria for reviewing a safety element
approval application.
The FAA will determine whether a safety element is eligible for and
may be issued a safety approval. We will base our determination on
performance-based criteria, against which we may assess the effect on
public health and safety and on safety of property, in the following
hierarchy:
(a) FAA or other appropriate Federal regulations.
(b) Government-developed or adopted standards.
(c) Industry consensus performance-based criteria or standard.
(d) Applicant-developed criteria. Applicant-developed criteria are
performance standards customized by the manufacturer that intends to
produce the system, system component, or part. The applicant-developed
criteria must define--
(1) Design and minimum performance;
(2) Quality assurance system requirements;
(3) Production acceptance test specifications; and
(4) Continued operational safety monitoring system characteristics.
Sec. 414.25 Terms and conditions for issuing a safety element
approval; duration of a safety approval.
(a) The FAA will issue a safety element approval to an applicant
that meets all the requirements under this part.
(b) The scope of the safety element approval will be limited by the
scope of the safety demonstration contained in the application on which
the FAA based the decision to grant the safety element approval.
(c) The FAA will determine specific terms and conditions of a
safety element approval individually, limiting the safety element
approval to the scope for which it was approved. The terms and
conditions will include reporting requirements tailored to the
individual safety element approval.
(d) A safety element approval is valid for five years and may be
renewed.
Sec. 414.27 Maintaining the continued accuracy of the safety element
approval application.
(a) The holder of a safety element approval must ensure the
continued accuracy and completeness of representations contained in the
safety element approval application, on which the approval was issued,
for the entire term of the safety element approval.
(b) If any representation contained in the application that is
material to public health and safety or safety of property ceases to be
accurate and complete, the safety element approval holder must prepare
and submit a revised application according to Sec. 414.13 or Sec.
414.15. The safety element approval holder must point out any part of
the safety element approval or the associated application that would be
changed or affected by a proposed modification. The FAA will review and
make a determination on the revised application under the terms of this
part.
Sec. 414.29 Safety element approval records.
The holder of a safety element approval must maintain all records
necessary to verify that the holder's activities are consistent with
the representations contained in the application for which the approval
was issued for the duration of the safety element approval plus one
year.
Sec. 414.31 Safety element approval renewal.
(a) Eligibility. A holder of a safety element approval may apply to
renew it by sending the FAA a written application at least 90 days
before the expiration date of the approval, unless the Administrator
agrees to a different time frame in accordance with Sec. 404.15 of
this chapter.
(b) Application. (1) A safety element approval renewal application
must meet all the requirements under Sec. 414.13 or Sec. 414.15.
(2) The application may incorporate by reference information
provided as part of the application for the expiring safety element
approval or any modification to that approval.
(3) Any proposed changes in the conduct of a safety element for
which the FAA has issued a safety element approval must be described
and must include any added information necessary to support the fitness
of the proposed changes to meet the criteria upon which the FAA
evaluated the safety element approval application.
(c) Review of application. The FAA conducts the reviews required
under this part to determine whether the safety element approval may be
renewed. We may incorporate by reference any findings that are part of
the record for the expiring safety element approval.
(d) Grant of safety element approval renewal. If the FAA makes a
favorable safety element approval determination, the FAA issues an
order that amends the expiration date of the safety element approval or
issues a new safety element approval. The FAA may impose added or
revised terms and conditions
[[Page 15420]]
necessary to protect public health and safety and the safety of
property.
(e) Written notice. The FAA will provide written notice to the
applicant of our determination on the safety element approval renewal
request.
(f) Denial of a safety element approval renewal. If the FAA denies
the renewal application, the applicant may correct any deficiency the
FAA identified and request a reconsideration of the revised
application. The applicant also has the right to appeal a denial as set
forth in subpart D of this part.
Sec. 414.33 Safety element approval transfer.
(a) Only the FAA may approve a transfer of a safety element
approval.
(b) Either the holder of a safety element approval or the
prospective transferee may request a safety element approval transfer.
(c) Both the holder and prospective transferee must agree to the
transfer.
(d) The person requesting the transfer must submit a safety element
approval application according to Sec. 414.13 or Sec. 414.15, must
meet the applicable requirements of this part, and may incorporate by
reference relevant portions of the initial application.
(e) The FAA will approve a transfer of a safety element approval
only after all the approvals and determinations required under this
chapter for a safety element approval have been met. In conducting
reviews and issuing approvals and determinations, the FAA may
incorporate by reference any findings made part of the record to
support the initial safety element approval determination. The FAA may
modify the terms and conditions of a safety element approval to reflect
any changes necessary because of a safety element approval transfer.
(f) The FAA will provide written notice to the person requesting
the safety element approval transfer of our determination.
Sec. 414.35 Monitoring compliance with the terms and conditions of a
safety element approval.
Each holder of a safety element approval must allow access by, and
cooperate with, Federal officers or employees or other individuals
authorized by the Associate Administrator to inspect manufacturing,
production, testing, or assembly performed by a holder of a safety
element approval or its contractor. The FAA may also inspect a safety
element approval process or service, including training programs and
personnel qualifications.
Sec. 414.37 Modification, suspension, or revocation of a safety
element approval.
(a) The safety element approval holder. The safety element approval
holder may submit an application to the FAA to modify the terms and
conditions of the holder's safety element approval. The application
must meet all the applicable requirements under this part. The FAA will
review and make a determination on the application using the same
procedures under this part applicable to an initial safety element
approval application. If the FAA denies the request to modify a safety
element approval, the holder may correct any deficiency the FAA
identified and request reconsideration. The holder also has the right
to appeal a denial as set forth in subpart D of this part.
(b) The FAA. If the FAA finds it is in the interest of public
health and safety, safety of property, or if the safety element
approval holder fails to comply with any applicable requirements of
this part, any terms and conditions of the safety approval, or any
other applicable requirement, the FAA may--
(1) Modify the terms and conditions of the safety element approval;
or
(2) Suspend or revoke the safety element approval.
(c) Effective date. Unless otherwise stated by the FAA, any
modification, suspension, or revocation of a safety element approval
under paragraph (b) of this section--
(1) Takes effect immediately; and
(2) Continues in effect during any reconsideration or appeal of
such action under this part.
(d) Notification and Right to Appeal. If the FAA determines it is
necessary to modify, suspend, or revoke a safety element approval, we
will notify the safety element approval holder in writing. If the
holder disagrees with the FAA's determination, the holder may correct
any deficiency the FAA identified and request a reconsideration of the
determination. The applicant also has the right to appeal the
determination as set forth in subpart D of this part.
Sec. 414.39 [Reserved]
Subpart D--Appeal Procedures
Sec. 414.41 Hearings in safety element approval actions.
(a) The FAA will give the safety element approval applicant or
holder, as appropriate, written notice stating the reason for issuing a
denial or for modifying, suspending, or revoking a safety element
approval under this part.
(b) A safety element approval applicant or holder is entitled to a
determination on the record after an opportunity for a hearing.
Sec. 414.43 Submissions; oral presentations in safety element
approval actions.
(a) Determinations in safety element approval actions under this
part will be made on the basis of written submissions unless the
administrative law judge, on petition or on his or her own initiative,
determines that an oral presentation is required.
(b) Submissions must include a detailed exposition of the evidence
or arguments supporting the petition.
(c) Petitions must be filed as soon as practicable, but in no event
more than 30 days after issuance of decision or finding under Sec.
414.37.
Sec. 414.45 Administrative law judge's recommended decision in safety
element approval actions.
(a) The Associate Administrator, who will make the final decision
on the matter at issue, will review the recommended decision of the
administrative law judge. The Associate Administrator will make such
final decision within 30 days of issuance of the recommended decision.
(b) The authority and responsibility to review and decide rests
solely with the Associate Administrator and may not be delegated.
PART 415 [REMOVE AND RESERVE]
0
15. Remove and reserve part 415.
PART 417 [REMOVE AND RESERVE]
0
16. Remove and reserve part 417.
PART 420--LICENSE TO OPERATE A LAUNCH SITE
0
17. The authority citation for part 420 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 51 U.S.C. 50901-50923.
Sec. 420.5 [Amended]
0
18. Amend Sec. 420.5 by removing the definitions for ``Instantaneous
impact point,'' ``Launch site accident,'' and ``Public.''
0
19. Amend Sec. 420.15 by revising paragraph (b) to read as follows:
Sec. 420.15 Information requirements.
* * * * *
(b) Environmental. The FAA is responsible for complying with the
procedures and policies of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)
and other applicable environmental laws, regulations, and Executive
Orders prior to issuing a launch site license. An applicant must
provide the FAA with information needed to comply with such
requirements. The FAA will
[[Page 15421]]
consider and document the potential environmental effects associated
with issuing a launch site license.
(1) Environmental Impact Statement or Environmental Assessment. An
applicant must--
(i) Prepare an Environmental Assessment with FAA oversight;
(ii) Assume financial responsibility for preparation of an
Environmental Impact Statement by an FAA-selected and -managed
consultant contractor; or
(iii) Submit a written re-evaluation of a previously submitted
Environmental Assessment or Environmental Impact Statement when
requested by the FAA.
(2) Categorical exclusion. An applicant may request a categorical
exclusion determination from the FAA by submitting the request and
supporting rationale.
(3) Environmental information. An application must include an
approved FAA Environmental Assessment, Environmental Impact Statement,
categorical exclusion determination, or written re-evaluation covering
all planned licensed activities in compliance with NEPA and the Council
on Environmental Quality Regulations for Implementing the Procedural
Provisions of NEPA.
* * * * *
0
20. Revise Sec. 420.51 to read as follows:
Sec. 420.51 Responsibilities--general.
A licensee must operate its launch site in accordance with the
representations in its application.
0
21. Amend Sec. 420.57 by revising paragraph (d) to read as follows:
Sec. 420.57 Notifications.
* * * * *
(d) At least 2 days prior to flight of a launch vehicle, unless the
Administrator agrees to a different time frame in accordance with Sec.
404.15 of this chapter, the licensee must notify local officials and
all owners of land adjacent to the launch site of the flight schedule.
0
22. Revise Sec. 420.59 to read as follows:
Sec. 420.59 Mishap plan.
(a) A licensee must submit a mishap response plan that meets the
requirements of Sec. 450.173 of this chapter.
(b) A launch site operator's mishap plan must also contain--
(1) Procedures for participating in an investigation of a launch
mishap for launches launched from the launch site; and
(2) Require the licensee to cooperate with FAA or National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigations of a mishap for
launches launched from the launch site.
(c) Emergency response and investigation procedures developed in
accordance with 29 CFR 1910.119 and 40 CFR part 68 will satisfy the
requirements of Sec. 450.173(d) and (e) to the extent that they
include the elements required by Sec. 450.173(d) and (e).
PART 431 [REMOVE AND RESERVE]
0
23. Remove and reserve part 431.
PART 433--LICENSE TO OPERATE A REENTRY SITE
0
24. The authority citation for part 433 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 51 U.S.C. 50901-50923.
0
25. Revise Sec. 433.7 to read as follows:
Sec. 433.7 Environmental.
(a) General. The FAA is responsible for complying with the
procedures and policies of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)
and other applicable environmental laws, regulations, and Executive
Orders prior to issuing a reentry site license. An applicant must
provide the FAA with information needed to comply with such
requirements. The FAA will consider and document the potential
environmental effects associated with issuing a license for a reentry
site.
(b) Environmental Impact Statement or Environmental Assessment. An
applicant must--
(1) Prepare an Environmental Assessment with FAA oversight;
(2) Assume financial responsibility for preparation of an
Environmental Impact Statement by an FAA-selected and -managed
consultant contractor; or
(3) Submit a written re-evaluation of a previously submitted
Environmental Assessment or Environmental Impact Statement when
requested by the FAA.
(c) Categorical exclusion. An applicant may request a categorical
exclusion determination from the FAA by submitting the request and
supporting rationale.
(d) Environmental information. An application must include an
approved FAA Environmental Assessment, Environmental Impact Statement,
categorical exclusion determination, or written re-evaluation covering
all planned licensed activities in compliance with NEPA and the Council
on Environmental Quality Regulations for Implementing the Procedural
Provisions of NEPA.
Sec. 433.9 [Removed and Reserved]
0
26. Remove and reserve Sec. 433.9.
PART 435 [REMOVED AND RESERVED]
0
27. Remove and reserve part 435.
PART 437--EXPERIMENTAL PERMITS
0
28. The authority citation for part 437 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 51 U.S.C. 50901-50923.
Sec. 437.3 [Amended]
0
29. Amend Sec. 437.3 by removing the definition for ``Anomaly.''
0
30. Amend Sec. 437.21 by revising paragraphs (b) and (c) to read as
follows:
Sec. 437.21 General.
* * * * *
(b) Other regulations--(1) Environmental--(i) General. The FAA is
responsible for complying with the procedures and policies of the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and other applicable
environmental laws, regulations, and Executive Orders to consider and
document the potential environmental effects associated with proposed
reusable suborbital rocket launches or reentries. An applicant must
provide the FAA with information needed to comply with such
requirements. The FAA will consider and document the potential
environmental effects associated with proposed reusable suborbital
rocket launches or reentries.
(ii) Environmental Impact Statement or Environmental Assessment. An
applicant must--
(A) Prepare an Environmental Assessment with FAA oversight;
(B) Assume financial responsibility for preparation of an
Environmental Impact Statement by an FAA-selected and -managed
consultant contractor; or
(C) Submit a written re-evaluation of a previously submitted
Environmental Assessment or Environmental Impact Statement when
requested by the FAA.
(iii) Categorical exclusion. An applicant may request a categorical
exclusion determination from the FAA by submitting the request and
supporting rationale.
(iv) Information requirements. An application must include an
approved FAA Environmental Assessment, Environmental Impact Statement,
categorical exclusion determination, or written re-evaluation covering
all planned licensed activities in compliance with NEPA and the Council
on Environmental Quality Regulations for Implementing the Procedural
Provisions of NEPA.
(2) Financial responsibility. An applicant must provide the
information required by part 3 of appendix A of part 440 of this
chapter for the FAA to
[[Page 15422]]
conduct a maximum probable loss analysis.
(3) Human space flight. An applicant proposing launch or reentry
with flight crew or a space flight participant on board a reusable
suborbital rocket must demonstrate compliance with Sec. Sec. 460.5,
460.7, 460.11, 460.13, 460.15, 460.17, 460.51 and 460.53 of this
subchapter.
(c) Use of a safety element approval. If an applicant proposes to
use any reusable suborbital rocket, safety system, process, service, or
personnel for which the FAA has issued a safety element approval under
part 414 of this chapter, the FAA will not reevaluate that safety
element to the extent its use is within its approved envelope. As part
of the application process, the FAA will evaluate the integration of
that safety element into vehicle systems or operations.
* * * * *
0
31. Revise Sec. 437.41 to read as follows:
Sec. 437.41 Mishap plan.
An applicant must submit a mishap plan that meets the requirements
of Sec. 450.173 of this chapter.
0
32. Revise Sec. 437.65 to read as follows:
Sec. 437.65 Collision avoidance analysis.
For a permitted flight with a planned maximum altitude greater than
150 kilometers, a permittee must obtain a collision avoidance analysis
in accordance with Sec. 450.169 of this chapter.
Sec. 437.75 [Removed and Reserved]
0
33. Remove and reserve Sec. 437.75.
0
34. Amend Sec. 437.89 by:
0
a. Revising paragraph (a) introductory text;
0
b. In paragraphs (a)(1) through (3), removing the comma at the end of
the paragraphs and adding a semicolon in its place; and
0
c. Revise paragraph (b).
The revisions read as follows:
Sec. 437.89 Pre-flight reporting.
(a) Not later than 30 days before each flight or series of flights
conducted under an experimental permit, unless the Administrator agrees
to a different time frame in accordance with Sec. 404.15 of this
chapter, a permittee must provide the FAA with the following
information:
* * * * *
(b) Not later than 15 days before each permitted flight planned to
reach greater than 150 km altitude, unless the Administrator agrees to
a different time frame in accordance with Sec. 404.15, a of this
chapter permittee must provide the FAA its planned trajectory for a
collision avoidance analysis.
PART 440--FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
0
35. The authority citation for part 440 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 51 U.S.C. 50901-50923.
0
36. Amend Sec. 440.3 by revising the definition for ``Maximum probable
loss'' to read as follows:
Sec. 440.3 Definitions.
* * * * *
Maximum probable loss (MPL) means the greatest dollar amount of
loss for bodily injury or property damage that is reasonably expected
to result from a licensed or permitted activity:
(1) Losses to third parties, excluding Government personnel and
other launch or reentry participants' employees involved in licensed or
permitted activities and neighboring operations personnel, that are
reasonably expected to result from a licensed or permitted activity are
those that have a probability of occurrence of no less than one in ten
million.
(2) Losses to Government property and Government personnel involved
in licensed or permitted activities and neighboring operations
personnel that are reasonably expected to result from licensed or
permitted activities are those that have a probability of occurrence of
no less than one in one hundred thousand.
* * * * *
0
37. Amend Sec. 440.15 by revising paragraphs (a)(1) through (4) to
read as follows:
Sec. 440.15 Demonstration of compliance.
(a) * * *
(1) All reciprocal waiver of claims agreements required under Sec.
440.17(c) must be submitted at least 30 days before the start of any
licensed or permitted activity involving a customer, crew member, or
space flight participant; unless the Administrator agrees to a
different time frame in accordance with Sec. 404.15 of this chapter;
(2) Evidence of insurance must be submitted at least 30 days before
commencement of any licensed launch or permitted activity, and for
licensed reentry no less than 30 days, before commencement of launch
activities involving the reentry licensee, unless the Administrator
agrees to a different time frame in accordance with Sec. 404.15 of
this chapter;
(3) Evidence of financial responsibility in a form other than
insurance, as provided under Sec. 440.9(f) must be submitted at least
60 days before commencement of a licensed or permitted activity, unless
the Administrator agrees to a different time frame in accordance with
Sec. 404.15 of this chapter; and
(4) Evidence of renewal of insurance or other form of financial
responsibility must be submitted at least 30 days in advance of its
expiration date, unless the Administrator agrees to a different time
frame in accordance with Sec. 404.15 of this chapter.
* * * * *
0
38. Add part 450 to read as follows:
PART 450--LAUNCH AND REENTRY LICENSE REQUIREMENTS
Sec.
Subpart A--General Information
450.1 Applicability.
450.3 Scope of a vehicle operator license.
450.5 Issuance of a vehicle operator license.
450.7 Duration of a vehicle operator license.
450.9 Additional license terms and conditions.
450.11 Transfer of a vehicle operator license.
450.13 Rights not conferred by a vehicle operator license.
Subpart B--Requirements to Obtain a Vehicle Operator License
450.31 General.
450.33 Incremental review and determinations.
450.35 Accepted means of compliance.
450.37 Equivalent level of safety.
450.39 Use of safety element approval.
450.41 Policy review and approval.
450.43 Payload review and determination.
450.45 Safety review and approval.
450.47 Environmental review.
Subpart C--Safety Requirements
Public Safety Criteria
450.101 Public safety criteria.
System Safety Program
450.103 System safety program.
Preliminary Safety Assessment for Flight and Hazard Control Strategies
450.105 Preliminary safety assessment for flight.
450.107 Hazard control strategies.
Flight Hazard Analyses for Hardware and Software
450.109 Flight hazard analysis.
450.111 Computing systems and software.
Flight Safety Analyses
450.113 Flight safety analysis requirements--scope and
applicability.
450.115 Flight safety analysis methods.
450.117 Trajectory analysis for normal flight.
450.119 Trajectory analysis for malfunction flight.
450.121 Debris analysis.
450.123 Flight safety limits analysis.
450.125 Gate analysis.
450.127 Data loss Flight time and planned safe flight state
analyses.
[[Page 15423]]
450.129 Time delay analysis.
450.131 Probability of failure analysis.
450.133 Flight hazard area analysis.
450.135 Debris risk analysis.
450.137 Far-field overpressure blast effects analysis.
450.139 Toxic hazards for flight.
450.141 Wind weighting for the flight of an unguided suborbital
launch vehicle.
Prescribed Hazard Controls
450.143 Safety-critical system design, test, and documentation.
450.145 Flight safety system.
450.147 Agreements.
450.149 Safety-critical personnel qualifications.
450.151 Work shift and rest requirements.
450.153 Radio frequency management.
450.155 Readiness.
450.157 Communications.
450.159 Preflight procedures.
450.161 Surveillance and publication of hazard areas.
450.163 Lightning hazard mitigation.
450.165 Flight safety rules.
450.167 Tracking.
450.169 Launch and reentry collision avoidance analysis
requirements.
450.171 Safety at end of launch.
450.173 Mishap plan--reporting, response, and investigation
requirements.
450.175 Test-induced damage.
450.177 Unique Policies, requirements, and practices.
Ground Safety
450.179 Ground safety--general.
450.181 Coordination with a site operator.
450.183 Explosive site plan.
450.185 Ground hazard analysis.
450.187 Toxic hazards mitigation for ground operations.
450.189 Ground safety prescribed hazard controls.
Subpart D--Terms and Conditions of a Vehicle Operator License.
450.201 Public safety responsibility.
450.203 Compliance with license.
450.205 Financial responsibility requirements.
450.207 Human Spaceflight Requirements.
450.209 Compliance monitoring.
450.211 Continuing accuracy of license application; application for
modification of license.
450.213 Preflight reporting.
450.215 Post-flight reporting.
450.217 Registration of space objects.
450.219 Records.
Appendix A to Part 450--Collision Analysis Worksheet
Authority: 51 U.S.C. 50901-50923.
Subpart A--General Information
Sec. 450.1 Applicability.
(a) General. This part prescribes requirements for obtaining and
maintaining a license to launch, reenter, or both launch and reenter, a
launch or reentry vehicle.
(b) Grandfathering. Except for Sec. Sec. 450.169 and 450.101(a)(4)
and (b)(4), this part does not apply to any launch or reentry that an
operator elects to conduct pursuant to a license issued by the FAA or
an application accepted by the FAA no later than [EFFECTIVE DATE OF
FINAL RULE]. The Administrator will determine the applicability of this
part to an application for a license modification submitted after
[EFFECTIVE DATE OF FINAL RULE] on a case-by-case basis.
Sec. 450.3 Scope of a vehicle operator license.
(a) A vehicle operator license authorizes a licensee to conduct one
or more launches or reentries using the same vehicle or family of
vehicles. A vehicle operator license identifies the scope of
authorization as defined in paragraphs (b) and (c) of this section or
as agreed to by the Administrator.
(b) A vehicle operator license authorizes launch, which includes
the flight of a launch vehicle and pre- and post-flight ground
operations as follows:
(1) Launch begins when hazardous preflight ground operations
commence at a U.S. launch site that pose a threat to the public. Unless
a later point is agreed to by the Administrator, hazardous preflight
ground operations commence when a launch vehicle or its major
components arrive at a U.S. launch site.
(2) At a non-U.S. launch site, launch begins at ignition or at the
first movement that initiates flight, whichever occurs earlier.
(3) Launch ends when any of the following events occur:
(i) For an orbital launch of a vehicle without a reentry of the
vehicle, launch ends after the licensee's last exercise of control over
its vehicle on orbit, after vehicle stage impact on Earth, after
activities necessary to return the vehicle or stage to a safe condition
on the ground after landing, or after activities necessary to return
the site to a safe condition, whichever occurs later;
(ii) For an orbital launch of a vehicle with a reentry of the
vehicle, launch ends after deployment of all payloads, upon completion
of the vehicle's first steady-state orbit if there is no payload, or
after activities necessary to return the site to a safe condition,
whichever occurs later;
(iii) For a suborbital launch that includes a reentry, launch ends
after reaching apogee; or
(iv) For a suborbital launch that does not include a reentry,
launch ends after the vehicle or vehicle component impact on Earth,
after activities necessary to return the vehicle or vehicle component
to a safe condition on the ground after landing, or after activities
necessary to return the site to a safe condition, whichever occurs
later.
(c) A vehicle operator's license authorizes reentry, which includes
activities conducted in Earth orbit or outer space to determine reentry
readiness and that are critical to ensuring public health and safety
and the safety of property during reentry flight. Reentry also includes
activities necessary to return the reentry vehicle to a safe condition
on the ground after landing.
Sec. 450.5 Issuance of a vehicle operator license.
(a) The FAA issues a vehicle operator license to an applicant who
has obtained all approvals and determinations required under this part
for a license.
(b) A vehicle operator license authorizes a licensee to conduct
launches or reentries, in accordance with the representations contained
in the licensee's application, with subparts C and D of this part, and
subject to the licensee's compliance with terms and conditions
contained in license orders accompanying the license, including
financial responsibility requirements.
Sec. 450.7 Duration of a vehicle operator license.
A vehicle operator license is valid for the period of time
determined by the Administrator as necessary to conduct the licensed
activity but may not exceed 5 years from the issuance date.
Sec. 450.9 Additional license terms and conditions.
The FAA may modify a vehicle operator license at any time by
modifying or adding license terms and conditions to ensure compliance
with the Act (as defined in Sec. 401.5 of this chapter) and its
implementing regulations in this chapter.
Sec. 450.11 Transfer of a vehicle operator license.
(a) Only the FAA may transfer a vehicle operator license.
(b) An applicant for transfer of a vehicle operator license must
submit a license application in accordance with part 413 of this
chapter and must meet the requirements of part 450 of this chapter. The
FAA will transfer a license to an applicant that has obtained all of
the approvals and determinations required under this part for a
license. In conducting its reviews and issuing approvals and
determinations, the FAA may incorporate by reference any findings made
part of the record to support the initial licensing determination. The
FAA may modify a
[[Page 15424]]
license to reflect any changes necessary as a result of a license
transfer.
Sec. 450.13 Rights not conferred by a vehicle operator license.
Issuance of a vehicle operator license does not relieve a licensee
of its obligation to comply with all applicable requirements of law or
regulation that may apply to its activities, nor does issuance confer
any proprietary, property or exclusive right in the use of any Federal
launch range or related facilities, airspace, or outer space.
Subpart B--Requirements to Obtain a Vehicle Operator License
Sec. 450.31 General.
(a) To obtain a vehicle operator license, an applicant must--
(1) Submit a license application in accordance with the procedures
in part 413 of this chapter;
(2) Obtain a policy approval from the Administrator in accordance
with Sec. 450.41;
(3) Obtain a favorable payload determination from the Administrator
in accordance with Sec. 450.43;
(4) Obtain a safety approval from the Administrator in accordance
with Sec. 450.45;
(5) Satisfy the environmental review requirements of Sec. 450.47;
and
(6) Provide the information required by appendix A of part 440 of
this chapter for the Administrator to conduct a maximum probable loss
analysis for the applicable licensed operation.
(b) An applicant may apply for the approvals and determinations in
paragraphs (a)(2) through (6) of this section separately or all
together in one complete application, using the application procedures
contained in part 413 of this chapter.
(c) An applicant may also apply for a safety approval in an
incremental manner, in accordance with Sec. 450.33.
(d) An applicant may reference materials previously provided as
part of a license application in order to meet the application
requirements of this part.
Sec. 450.33 Incremental review and determinations.
An applicant may submit its application for a safety review
incrementally using an approach approved by the Administrator.
(a) An applicant must identify to the Administrator, prior to
submitting an application, whether it will submit an incremental
application for any approval or determination.
(b) An applicant using an incremental approach must have the
approach approved by the Administrator prior to submitting an
application.
(c) The Administrator may make incremental determinations as part
of this review process.
Sec. 450.35 Accepted means of compliance.
(a) An applicant must demonstrate compliance with applicable
sections of this part using a means of compliance accepted by the
Administrator. These applicable sections specify that only an accepted
means of compliance can be used to demonstrate compliance.
(b) The FAA will provide public notice of each means of compliance
that the Administrator has accepted.
(c) An applicant requesting acceptance of an alternative means of
compliance must submit the alternative means of compliance to the FAA
in a form and manner acceptable to the Administrator.
Sec. 450.37 Equivalent level of safety.
(a) An applicant must demonstrate compliance with each requirement
of this part, unless the applicant clearly and convincingly
demonstrates that an alternative approach provides an equivalent level
of safety to the requirement of this part.
(b) Paragraph (a) of this section does not apply to the
requirements of Sec. 450.101.
Sec. 450.39 Use of safety element approval.
If an applicant proposes to use any vehicle, safety system,
process, service, or personnel for which the FAA has issued a safety
element approval under part 414 of this chapter, the FAA will not
reevaluate that safety element during a license application evaluation
to the extent its use is within its approved envelope.
Sec. 450.41 Policy review and approval.
(a) General. The FAA issues a policy approval to an applicant
unless the FAA determines that a proposed launch or reentry would
jeopardize U.S. national security or foreign policy interests, or
international obligations of the United States.
(b) Interagency consultation. (1) The FAA consults with the
Department of Defense to determine whether a license application
presents any issues affecting U.S. national security.
(2) The FAA consults with the Department of State to determine
whether a license application presents any issues affecting U.S.
foreign policy interests or international obligations.
(3) The FAA consults with other Federal agencies, including the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, authorized to address
issues identified under paragraph (a) of this section, associated with
an applicant's proposal.
(c) Issues during policy review. The FAA will advise an applicant,
in writing, of any issue raised during a policy review that would
impede issuance of a policy approval. The applicant may respond, in
writing, or amend its license application as required by Sec. 413.17
of this chapter.
(d) Denial of policy approval. The FAA notifies an applicant, in
writing, if it has denied policy approval for a license application.
The notice states the reasons for the FAA's determination. The
applicant may respond in writing to the reasons for the determination
and request reconsideration in accordance with Sec. 413.21 of this
chapter.
(e) Application requirements for policy review. In its license
application, an applicant must--
(1) Identify the model, type, and configuration of any vehicle
proposed for launch or reentry by the applicant;
(2) Describe the vehicle by characteristics that include individual
stages, their dimensions, type and amounts of all propellants, and
maximum thrust;
(3) Identify foreign ownership of the applicant as follows:
(i) For a sole proprietorship or partnership, identify all foreign
ownership;
(ii) For a corporation, identify any foreign ownership interests of
10 percent or more; and
(iii) For a joint venture, association, or other entity, identify
any participating foreign entities; and
(4) Identify proposed vehicle flight profile, including:
(i) Launch or reentry site, including any contingency abort
locations;
(ii) Flight azimuths, trajectories, and associated ground tracks
and instantaneous impact points for the duration of the licensed
activity, including any contingency abort profiles;
(iii) Sequence of planned events or maneuvers during flight;
(iv) Normal impact or landing areas for all mission hardware; and
(v) For each orbital mission, the range of intermediate and final
orbits of each vehicle upper stage and their estimated orbital
lifetimes.
Sec. 450.43 Payload review and determination.
(a) General. The FAA issues a favorable payload determination for a
launch or reentry to a license applicant or payload owner or operator
if--
(1) The applicant, payload owner, or payload operator has obtained
all required licenses, authorizations, and permits; and
[[Page 15425]]
(2) Its launch or reentry would not jeopardize public health and
safety, safety of property, U.S. national security or foreign policy
interests, or international obligations of the United States.
(b) Relationship to other executive agencies. The FAA does not make
a determination under paragraph (a)(2) of this section for--
(1) Those aspects of payloads that are subject to regulation by the
Federal Communications Commission or the Department of Commerce; or
(2) Payloads owned or operated by the U.S. Government.
(c) Classes of payloads. The FAA may review and issue findings
regarding a proposed class of payload, including communications, remote
sensing, or navigation. However, prior to a launch or reentry, each
payload is subject to verification by the FAA that its launch or
reentry would not jeopardize public health and safety, safety of
property, U.S. national security or foreign policy interests, or
international obligations of the United States.
(d) Payload owner or payload operator may apply. In addition to a
launch or reentry operator, a payload owner or payload operator may
request a payload review and determination.
(e) Interagency consultation. The FAA consults with other agencies
as follows:
(1) The Department of Defense to determine whether launch or
reentry of a proposed payload or payload class would present any issues
affecting U.S. national security;
(2) The Department of State to determine whether launch or reentry
of a proposed payload or payload class would present any issues
affecting U.S. foreign policy interests or international obligations;
or
(3) Other Federal agencies, including the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration, authorized to address issues of public health and
safety, safety of property, U.S. national security or foreign policy
interests, or international obligations of the United States,
associated with the launch or reentry of a proposed payload or payload
class.
(f) Issues during payload review. The FAA will advise a person
requesting a payload determination, in writing, of any issue raised
during a payload review that would impede issuance of a license to
launch or reenter that payload or payload class. The person requesting
payload review may respond, in writing, or amend its application as
required by Sec. 413.17 of this chapter.
(g) Denial of a payload determination. The FAA notifies an
applicant, in writing, if it has denied a favorable payload
determination. The notice states the reasons for the FAA's
determination. The applicant may respond in writing to the reasons for
the determination and request reconsideration in accordance with Sec.
413.21 of this chapter.
(h) Incorporation of payload determination in license application.
A favorable payload determination issued for a payload or class of
payload may be included by a license applicant as part of its
application. However, any change in information provided under
paragraph (i) of this section must be reported in accordance with Sec.
413.17 of this chapter. The FAA determines whether a favorable payload
determination remains valid in light of reported changes and may
conduct an additional payload review.
(i) Application requirements. A person requesting review of a
particular payload or payload class must identify the following:
(1) For launch of a payload:
(i) Payload name or class, and function;
(ii) Description, including physical dimensions, weight,
composition, and any hosted payloads;
(iii) Payload owner and payload operator, if different from the
person requesting payload review and determination,
(iv) Any foreign ownership of the payload or payload operator, as
specified in Sec. 450.41(e)(3);
(v) Hazardous materials as defined in Sec. 401.5 of this chapter,
radioactive materials, and the amounts of each;
(vi) Explosive potential of payload materials, alone and in
combination with other materials found on the payload;
(vii) For orbital launches, parameters for parking, transfer and
final orbits, and approximate transit times to final orbit;
(viii) Delivery point in flight at which the payload will no longer
be under the licensee's control;
(ix) Intended operations during the lifetime of the payload,
including anticipated life span and any planned disposal;
(x) Any encryption associated with data storage on the payload and
transmissions to or from the payload; and
(xi) Any other information necessary to make a determination based
on public health and safety, safety of property, U.S. national security
or foreign policy interests, or international obligations of the United
States; or
(2) For reentry of a payload:
(i) Payload name or class and function;
(ii) Physical characteristics, dimensions, and weight of the
payload;
(iii) Payload owner and payload operator, if different from the
person requesting the payload review and determination;
(iv) Type, amount, and container of hazardous materials and
radioactive materials in the payload;
(v) Explosive potential of payload materials, alone and in
combination with other materials found on the payload or reentry
vehicle during reentry; and
(vi) Designated reentry site.
Sec. 450.45 Safety review and approval.
(a) General. The FAA issues a safety approval to an applicant if it
determines that an applicant can conduct launch or reentry without
jeopardizing public health and safety and safety of property. A license
applicant must satisfy the application requirements in this section and
subpart C of this part.
(b) Services or property provided by a Federal launch range. The
FAA will accept any safety-related launch or reentry service or
property provided by a Federal launch range or other Federal entity by
contract, as long as the FAA determines that the launch or reentry
services or property provided satisfy this part.
(c) Issues during safety review. The FAA will advise an applicant,
in writing, of any issues raised during a safety review that would
impede issuance of a safety approval. The applicant may respond, in
writing, or amend its license application as required by Sec. 413.17
of this chapter.
(d) Denial of a safety approval. The FAA notifies an applicant, in
writing, if it has denied a safety approval for a license application.
The notice states the reasons for the FAA's determination. The
applicant may respond in writing to the reasons for the determination
and request reconsideration in accordance with Sec. 413.21 of this
chapter.
(e) Application requirements. An applicant must submit the
application requirements information in subpart C of this part, as well
as the following:
(1) General. An application must--
(i) Contain a glossary of unique terms and acronyms used in
alphabetical order;
(ii) Contain a listing of all referenced material;
(iii) Use equations and mathematical relationships derived from or
referenced to a recognized standard or text, and define all algebraic
parameters;
(iv) Include the units of all numerical values provided; and
(v) Include a legend or key that identifies all symbols used for
any schematic diagrams.
(2) Site description. An applicant must identify the proposed
launch or
[[Page 15426]]
reentry site, including contingency abort locations, and submit the
following:
(i) Boundaries of the site;
(ii) Launch or landing point locations, including latitude and
longitude;
(iii) Identity of any site operator; and
(iv) Identity of any facilities at the site that will be used for
pre- or post-flight ground operations.
(3) Vehicle description. An applicant must submit the following:
(i) A written description of the vehicle or family of vehicles,
including structural, thermal, pneumatic, propulsion, electrical, and
avionics and guidance systems used in each vehicle, and all
propellants. The description must include a table specifying the type
and quantities of all hazardous materials on each vehicle and must
include propellants, explosives, and toxic materials; and
(ii) A drawing of each vehicle that identifies:
(A) Each stage, including strap-on motors;
(B) Physical dimensions and weight;
(C) Location of all safety-critical systems;
(D) Location of all major vehicle control systems, propulsion
systems, pressure vessels, and any other hardware that contains
potential hazardous energy or hazardous material; and
(E) For an unguided suborbital launch vehicle, the location of the
rocket's center of pressure in relation to its center of gravity for
the entire flight profile.
(4) Mission schedule. An applicant must submit a generic launch or
reentry processing schedule that identifies any readiness activities,
such as reviews and rehearsals, and each safety-critical preflight
operation to be conducted. The mission schedule must also identify day
of flight activities.
(5) Human space flight. For a proposed launch or reentry with a
human being on board a vehicle, an applicant must demonstrate
compliance with Sec. Sec. 460.5, 460.7, 460.11, 460.13, 460.15,
460.17, 460.51, and 460.53 of this chapter.
(6) Radionuclides. The FAA will evaluate the launch or reentry of
any radionuclide on a case-by-case basis, and issue an approval if the
FAA finds that the launch or reentry is consistent with public health
and safety, safety of property, and national security and foreign
policy interests of the United States. For any radionuclide on a launch
or reentry vehicle, an applicant must--
(i) Identify the type and quantity;
(ii) Include a reference list of all documentation addressing the
safety of its intended use; and
(iii) Describe all approvals by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
for preflight ground operations.
(7) Additional material. The FAA may also request--
(i) Any information incorporated by reference in the license
application; and
(ii) Additional products that allow the FAA to conduct an
independent safety analysis.
Sec. 450.47 Environmental review.
(a) General. The FAA is responsible for complying with the
procedures and policies of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)
and other applicable environmental laws, regulations, and Executive
Orders prior to issuing a launch or reentry license. An applicant must
provide the FAA with information needed to comply with such
requirements. The FAA will consider and document the potential
environmental effects associated with issuing a launch or reentry
license consistent with paragraph (b) of this section.
(b) Environmental Impact Statement or Environmental Assessment. An
applicant must--
(1) Prepare an Environmental Assessment with FAA oversight;
(2) Assume financial responsibility for preparation of an
Environmental Impact Statement by an FAA-selected and -managed
consultant contractor; or
(3) Submit a written re-evaluation of a previously submitted
Environmental Assessment or Environmental Impact Statement when
requested by the FAA.
(c) Categorical exclusion. An applicant may request a categorical
exclusion determination from the FAA by submitting the request and
supporting rationale.
(d) Application requirements. An application must include an
approved FAA Environmental Assessment, Environmental Impact Statement,
categorical exclusion determination, or written re-evaluation, which
should address compliance with any other applicable environmental laws,
regulations, and Executive Orders covering all planned licensed
activities in compliance with NEPA and the Council on Environmental
Quality Regulations for Implementing the Procedural Provisions of NEPA.
Subpart C--Safety Requirements
Public Safety Criteria
Sec. 450.101 Public safety criteria.
(a) Launch risk criteria. An operator may initiate the flight of a
launch vehicle only if all risks to the public satisfy the criteria in
paragraphs (a)(1) through (4) of this section. The following criteria
apply to each launch from liftoff through orbital insertion for an
orbital launch, and through final impact or landing for a suborbital
launch:
(1) Collective risk. The collective risk, measured as expected
number of casualties (EC), consists of risk posed by
impacting inert and explosive debris, toxic release, and far field
blast overpressure. The FAA will determine whether to approve public
risk due to any other hazard associated with the proposed flight of a
launch vehicle on a case-by-case basis.
(i) The risk to all members of the public, excluding persons in
aircraft and neighboring operations personnel, must not exceed an
expected number of 1 x 10-4 casualties.
(ii) The risk to all neighboring operations personnel must not
exceed an expected number of 2 x 10-4 casualties.
(2) Individual risk. The individual risk, measured as probability
of casualty (PC), consists of risk posed by impacting inert
and explosive debris, toxic release, and far field blast overpressure.
The FAA will determine whether to approve public risk due to any other
hazard associated with the proposed flight of a launch vehicle on a
case-by-case basis.
(i) The risk to any individual member of the public, excluding
neighboring operations personnel, must not exceed a probability of
casualty of 1 x 10-6 per launch.
(ii) The risk to any individual neighboring operations personnel
must not exceed a probability of casualty of 1 x 10-5 per
launch.
(3) Aircraft risk. A launch operator must establish any aircraft
hazard areas necessary to ensure the probability of impact with debris
capable of causing a casualty for aircraft does not exceed 1 x
10-\6\.
(4) Risk to critical assets. The probability of loss of
functionality for each critical asset must not exceed 1 x
10-\3\, or a more stringent probability if the FAA
determines, in consultation with relevant Federal agencies, it is
necessary to protect the national security interests of the United
States.
(b) Reentry risk criteria. An operator may initiate the deorbit of
a vehicle only if all risks to the public satisfy the criteria in
paragraphs (b)(1) through (4) of this section. The following criteria
apply to each reentry, from the final health check prior to the deorbit
burn through final impact or landing:
(1) Collective risk. The collective risk, measured as expected
number of casualties (EC), consists of risk posed by
impacting inert and explosive debris, toxic release, and far field
blast
[[Page 15427]]
overpressure. The FAA will determine whether to approve public risk due
to any other hazard associated with the proposed deorbit of a reentry
vehicle on a case-by-case basis.
(i) The risk to all members of the public, excluding persons in
aircraft and neighboring operations personnel, must not exceed an
expected number of 1 x 10-\4\ casualties.
(ii) The risk to all neighboring operations personnel must not
exceed an expected number of 2 x 10-\4\ casualties.
(2) Individual risk. The individual risk, measured as probability
of casualty (PC), consists of risk posed by impacting inert
and explosive debris, toxic release, and far field blast overpressure.
The FAA will determine whether to approve public risk due to any other
hazard associated with the proposed flight of a launch vehicle on a
case-by-case basis.
(i) The risk to any individual member of the public, excluding
neighboring operations personnel, must not exceed a probability of
casualty of 1 x 10-\6\ per reentry.
(ii) The risk to any individual neighboring operations personnel
must not exceed a probability of casualty of 1 x 10-\5\ per
reentry.
(3) Aircraft risk. A reentry operator must establish any aircraft
hazard areas necessary to ensure the probability of impact with debris
capable of causing a casualty for aircraft does not exceed 1 x
10-\6\.
(4) Risk to critical assets. The probability of loss of
functionality for each critical asset must not exceed 1 x
10-\3\, or a more stringent probability if the FAA
determines, in consultation with relevant Federal agencies, it is
necessary to protect the national security interests of the United
States.
(c) Flight abort. An operator must use flight abort with a flight
safety system that meets the requirements of Sec. 450.145 as a hazard
control strategy if the consequence of any reasonably foreseeable
vehicle response mode, in any one-second period of flight, is greater
than 1 x 10-3 conditional expected casualties for
uncontrolled areas. This requirement applies to all phases of flight,
unless otherwise agreed to by the Administrator based on the
demonstrated reliability of the launch or reentry vehicle during that
phase of flight.
(d) Disposal safety criteria. A launch operator must ensure that
any disposal meets the criteria of paragraphs (b)(1), (2), and (3) of
this section, or targets a broad ocean area.
(e) Protection of people and property on-orbit. (1) A launch or
reentry operator must prevent the collision between a launch or reentry
vehicle stage or component and people or property on-orbit, in
accordance with the requirements in Sec. 450.169(a).
(2) For any launch vehicle stage or component that reaches Earth
orbit, a launch operator must prevent the creation of debris through
the conversion of energy sources into energy that fragments the stage
or component, in accordance with the requirements in Sec. 450.171.
(f) Notification of planned impacts. For any launch, reentry, or
disposal, an operator must notify the public of any region of land,
sea, or air that contain, with 97 percent probability of containment,
all debris resulting from normal flight events capable of causing a
casualty.
(g) Validity of the analysis. For any analysis used to demonstrate
compliance with this section, an operator must use accurate data and
scientific principles and be statistically valid. The method must
produce results consistent with or more conservative than the results
available from previous mishaps, tests, or other valid benchmarks, such
as higher-fidelity methods.
System Safety Program
Sec. 450.103 System safety program.
An operator must implement and document a system safety program
throughout the operational lifecycle of a launch or reentry system that
includes the following:
(a) Safety organization. An operator must maintain and document a
safety organization that has clearly defined lines of communication and
approval authority for all public safety decisions. At a minimum, the
safety organization must have the following positions:
(1) Mission director. For each launch or reentry, an operator must
designate a position responsible for the safe conduct of all licensed
activities and authorized to provide final approval to proceed with
licensed activities. This position is referred to as the mission
director in this part.
(2) Safety official. For each launch or reentry, an operator must
designate a position with direct access to the mission director that
is--
(i) Responsible for communicating potential safety and
noncompliance issues to the mission director; and
(ii) Authorized to examine all aspects of the operator's ground and
flight safety operations, and to independently monitor compliance with
the operator's safety policies, safety procedures, and licensing
requirements.
(3) Addressing safety concerns. The mission director must ensure
that all of the safety official's concerns are addressed.
(b) Procedures. An operator must establish procedures to evaluate
the operational lifecycle of the launch or reentry system:
(1) An operator must conduct a preliminary safety assessment as
required by Sec. 450.105, and the system safety program must include:
(i) Methods to review and assess the validity of the preliminary
safety assessment throughout the operational lifecycle of the launch or
reentry system;
(ii) Methods for updating the preliminary safety assessment; and
(iii) Methods for communicating and implementing the updates
throughout the organization.
(2) For operators that must conduct a flight hazard analysis as
required by Sec. 450.109, the system safety program must include:
(i) Methods to review and assess the validity of the flight hazard
analysis throughout the operational lifecycle of the launch or reentry
system;
(ii) Methods for updating the flight hazard analysis;
(iii) Methods for communicating and implementing the updates
throughout the organization; and
(iv) A process for tracking hazards, risks, mitigation and hazard
control measures, and verification activities.
(c) Configuration management and control. An operator must--
(1) Employ a process that tracks configurations of all safety-
critical systems and documentation related to the operation;
(2) Ensure the use of correct and appropriate versions of systems
and documentation tracked in paragraph (c)(1) of this section; and
(3) Maintain records of launch or reentry system configurations and
document versions used for each licensed activity, as required by Sec.
450.219.
(d) Post-flight data review. An operator must employ a process for
evaluating post-flight data to--
(1) Ensure consistency between the assumptions used for the
preliminary safety assessment, any hazard or flight safety analysis,
and associated mitigation and hazard control measures;
(2) Resolve any identified inconsistencies prior to the next flight
of the vehicle;
(3) Identify any anomaly that may impact any flight hazard
analysis, flight safety analysis, or safety critical system, or is
otherwise material to public health and safety and the safety of
property; and
(4) Address any anomaly identified in paragraph (d)(3) of this
section prior to
[[Page 15428]]
the next flight, including updates to any flight hazard analysis,
flight safety analysis, or safety critical system.
(e) Application requirements. An applicant must submit in its
application the following:
(1) A description of the applicant's safety organization as
required by paragraph (a) of this section, identifying the applicant's
lines of communication and approval authority, both internally and
externally, for all public safety decisions and the provision of public
safety services; and
(2) A summary of the processes and products identified in the
system safety program requirements in paragraphs (b), (c), and (d) of
this section.
Preliminary Safety Assessment for Flight and Hazard Control Strategies
Sec. 450.105 Preliminary safety assessment for flight.
(a) Preliminary safety assessment. An operator must conduct and
document a preliminary safety assessment for the flight of a launch or
reentry vehicle that identifies--
(1) Vehicle response modes;
(2) Public safety hazards associated with vehicle response modes,
including impacting inert and explosive debris, toxic release, and far
field blast overpressure;
(3) Geographical areas where vehicle response modes could
jeopardize public safety;
(4) Any population exposed to public safety hazards in or near the
identified geographical areas;
(5) The CEC, unless otherwise agreed to by the
Administrator based on the demonstrated reliability of the launch or
reentry vehicle during any phase of flight;
(6) A preliminary hazard list which documents all hardware,
operational, and design causes of vehicle response modes that,
excluding mitigation, have the capability to create a hazard to the
public;
(7) Safety-critical systems; and
(8) A timeline of all safety-critical events.
(b) Application requirements. An applicant must submit the result
of the preliminary safety assessment, including all of the items
identified in paragraph (a) of this section.
Sec. 450.107 Hazard control strategies.
(a) General. For each phase of a launch or reentry vehicle's
flight--
(1) If the public safety hazards identified in the preliminary
safety assessment can be mitigated adequately to meet the requirements
of Sec. 450.101 using physical containment, wind weighting, or flight
abort, in accordance with paragraphs (b), (c), and (d) of this section,
an operator does not need to conduct a flight hazard analysis for that
phase of flight.
(2) If the public safety hazards identified in the preliminary
safety assessment cannot be mitigated adequately to meet the public
risk criteria of Sec. 450.101 using physical containment, wind
weighting, or flight abort, in accordance with paragraphs (b), (c), and
(d) of this section, an operator must conduct a flight hazard analysis
in accordance with Sec. 450.109 to derive hazard controls for that
phase of flight.
(b) Physical containment. To use physical containment as a hazard
control strategy, an operator must--
(1) Ensure that the launch vehicle does not have sufficient energy
for any hazards associated with its flight to reach outside the flight
hazard area developed in accordance with Sec. 450.133; and
(2) Apply other mitigation measures to ensure no public exposure to
hazards as agreed to by the Administrator on a case-by-case basis.
(c) Wind weighting. To use wind weighting as a hazard control
strategy--
(1) The launch vehicle must be a suborbital rocket that does not
contain any guidance or directional control system; and
(2) An operator must conduct the launch using a wind weighting
safety system in accordance with Sec. 450.141.
(d) Flight abort. To use flight abort as a hazard control strategy
an operator must employ a flight safety system, or other safeguards
agreed to by the Administrator, that meets the requirements of Sec.
450.145.
(e) Application requirement. An applicant must--
(1) Describe its hazard control strategy for each phase of flight;
and
(2) If using physical containment as a hazard control strategy--
(i) Demonstrate that the launch vehicle does not have sufficient
energy for any hazards associated with its flight to reach outside the
flight hazard area developed in accordance with Sec. 450.133; and
(ii) Describe the methods used to ensure that flight hazard areas
are cleared of the public and critical assets.
Flight Hazard Analyses for Hardware and Software
Sec. 450.109 Flight hazard analysis.
Unless an operator uses physical containment, wind weighting, or
flight abort as a hazard control strategy, an operator must perform and
document a flight hazard analysis, and continue to maintain it
throughout the lifecycle of the launch or reentry system. Hazards
associated with computing systems and software are further addressed in
Sec. 450.111.
(a) Flight hazard analysis. A flight hazard analysis must identify,
describe, and analyze all reasonably foreseeable hazards to public
safety and safety of property resulting from the flight of a launch or
reentry vehicle. Each flight hazard analysis must--
(1) Identify all reasonably foreseeable hazards, and the
corresponding vehicle response mode for each hazard, associated with
the launch or reentry system relevant to public safety and safety of
property, including those resulting from:
(i) Vehicle operation, including staging and release;
(ii) System, subsystem, and component failures or faults;
(iii) Software operations;
(iv) Environmental conditions;
(v) Human factors;
(vi) Design inadequacies;
(vii) Procedure deficiencies;
(viii) Functional and physical interfaces between subsystems,
including any vehicle payload;
(ix) Reuse of components or systems; and
(x) Interactions of any of the items in paragraphs (a)(1)(i)
through (ix) of this section.
(2) Assess each hazard's likelihood and severity.
(3) Ensure that the risk associated with each hazard meets the
following criteria:
(i) The likelihood of any hazardous condition that may cause death
or serious injury to the public must be extremely remote; and
(ii) The likelihood of any hazardous condition that may cause major
damage to public property or critical assets must be remote.
(4) Identify and describe the risk elimination and mitigation
measures required to satisfy paragraph (a)(3) of this section.
(5) Demonstrate that the risk elimination and mitigation measures
achieve the risk levels of paragraph (a)(3) of this section through
validation and verification. Verification includes:
(i) Analysis;
(ii) Test;
(iii) Demonstration; or
(iv) Inspection.
(b) Identification of new hazards. An operator must establish and
document the criteria and techniques for identifying new hazards
throughout the lifecycle of the launch or reentry system.
(c) Completeness for each flight. For every launch or reentry, the
flight
[[Page 15429]]
hazard analysis must be complete and all hazards must be mitigated to
an acceptable level in accordance with paragraph (a)(3) of this
section.
(d) Updates throughout the lifecycle. An operator must continually
update the flight hazard analysis throughout the operational lifecycle
of the launch or reentry system.
(e) Application requirements. An applicant must submit in its
application the following:
(1) Flight hazard analysis products of paragraphs (a)(1) through
(5) of this section, including data that verifies the risk elimination
and mitigation measures resulting from the applicant's flight hazard
analyses required by paragraph (a)(5) of this section; and
(2) The criteria and techniques for identifying new hazards
throughout the lifecycle of the launch or reentry system as required by
paragraph (b) of this section.
Sec. 450.111 Computing systems and software.
(a) General. An operator must implement and document a process that
identifies the hazards and assesses the risks to public health and
safety and the safety of property arising from computing systems and
software.
(b) Safety-critical functions. An operator must identify all
safety-critical functions associated with its computing systems and
software. Safety-critical computing system and software functions
include the following:
(1) Software used to control or monitor safety-critical systems;
(2) Software that transmits safety-critical data, including time-
critical data and data about hazardous conditions;
(3) Software that computes safety-critical data;
(4) Software that accesses or manages safety-critical data;
(5) Software that displays safety-critical data;
(6) Software used for fault detection in safety-critical computer
hardware or software;
(7) Software that responds to the detection of a safety-critical
fault;
(8) Software used in a flight safety system;
(9) Processor-interrupt software associated with safety-critical
computer system functions; and
(10) Software used for wind weighting.
(c) Consequence and the degree of control. Safety-critical
functions must be identified by consequence and the degree of control
exercised by the software component as defined by paragraphs (d)
through (h) of this section.
(d) Autonomous software. This section applies to software that
exercises autonomous control over safety-critical hardware systems,
subsystems, or components, such that a control entity cannot detect and
intervene to prevent a hazard that may impact public health and safety
or the safety of property. Autonomous software must meet the following
criteria:
(1) The software component must be subjected to full path coverage
testing. Any inaccessible code must be documented and addressed;
(2) The software component's functions must be tested on flight-
like hardware. Testing must include nominal operation and fault
responses for all functions;
(3) An operator must conduct computing system and software hazard
analyses for the integrated system and for each autonomous, safety-
critical software component;
(4) An operator must verify and validate any computing systems and
software. Verification and validation must include testing by a test
team independent of the software development division or organization;
and
(5) An operator must develop and implement software development
plans, including descriptions of the following:
(i) Coding standards used;
(ii) Configuration control;
(iii) Programmable logic controllers;
(iv) Policy on use of any commercial-off-the-shelf software; and
(v) Policy on software reuse.
(e) Semi-autonomous software. This section applies to software that
exercises control over safety-critical hardware systems, subsystems, or
components, allowing time for predetermined safe detection and
intervention by a control entity to detect and intervene to prevent a
hazard that may impact public health and safety or the safety of
property. Semi-autonomous software must meet the following criteria:
(1) The software component's safety-critical functions must be
subjected to full path coverage testing. Any inaccessible code in a
safety-critical function must be documented and addressed;
(2) The software component's safety-critical functions must be
tested on flight-like hardware. Testing must include nominal operation
and fault responses for all safety-critical functions;
(3) An operator must conduct computing system and software hazard
analyses for the integrated system;
(4) An operator must verify and validate any computing systems and
software. Verification and validation must include testing by a test
team independent of the software development division or organization;
and
(5) An operator must develop and implement software development
plans, including descriptions of the following:
(i) Coding standards used;
(ii) Configuration control;
(iii) Programmable logic controllers;
(iv) Policy on use of any commercial-off-the-shelf software; and
(v) Policy on software reuse.
(f) Redundant fault-tolerant software. This section applies to
software that exercises control over safety-critical hardware systems,
subsystems, or components, for which a non-software component must also
fail in order to impact public health and safety or the safety of
property. Redundant fault-tolerant software must meet the following
criteria:
(1) The software component's safety-critical functions must be
tested on flight-like hardware. Testing must include nominal operation
and fault responses for all safety-critical functions;
(2) An operator must conduct computing system and software hazard
analyses for the integrated system;
(3) An operator must verify and validate any computing systems and
software. Verification and validation must include testing by a test
team independent of the software development division or organization;
and
(4) An operator must develop and implement software development
plans, including descriptions of the following:
(i) Coding standards used;
(ii) Configuration control;
(iii) Programmable logic controllers;
(iv) Policy on use of any commercial-off-the-shelf software; and
(v) Policy on software reuse.
(g) Influential software. This section applies to software that
provides information to a person who uses the information to take
actions or make decisions that can impact public health and safety or
the safety of property, but does not require operator action to avoid a
mishap. Influential software must meet the following criteria:
(1) An operator must conduct computing system and software hazard
analyses for the integrated system;
(2) An operator must verify and validate any computing systems and
software. Verification and validation must include testing by a test
team independent of the software development division or organization;
and
[[Page 15430]]
(3) An operator must develop and implement software development
plans, including descriptions of the following:
(i) Coding standards used;
(ii) Configuration control;
(iii) Programmable logic controllers;
(iv) Policy on use of any commercial-off-the-shelf software; and
(v) Policy on software reuse.
(h) Application requirements. An applicant must document and
include in its application the following:
(1) For autonomous software:
(i) Test plans and results as required by paragraphs (d)(1) and (2)
of this section;
(ii) All software requirements, and design and architecture
documentation;
(iii) The outputs of the hazard analyses as required by paragraph
(d)(3) of this section; and
(iv) Computing system and software validation and verification
plans as required by paragraph (d)(4) of this section.
(2) For semi-autonomous software:
(i) Test plans and results as required by paragraphs (e)(1) and (2)
of this section;
(ii) All software requirements, and design and architecture
documentation;
(iii) The outputs of the hazard analyses as required by paragraph
(e)(3) of this section; and
(iv) Computing system and software validation and verification
plans as required by paragraph (e)(4) of this section.
(3) For redundant fault-tolerant software:
(i) Test plans and results as required by paragraph (f)(1) of this
section; and
(ii) All software requirements and design documents.
(4) For influential software:
(i) The software component's development and testing; and
(ii) The software component's functionality.
(5) For software that the applicant has determined to have no
safety impact, the software component's functionality must be described
in detail.
Flight Safety Analyses
Sec. 450.113 Flight safety analysis requirements--scope and
applicability.
(a) Scope. An operator must perform and document a flight safety
analysis--
(1) For orbital launch, from liftoff through orbital insertion, and
any component or stage landings;
(2) For suborbital launch, from liftoff through final impact;
(3) For disposal, from the beginning of the deorbit burn through
final impact;
(4) For reentry, from the beginning of the deorbit burn through
landing; and
(5) For hybrid vehicles, for all phases of flight, unless the
Administrator determines otherwise based on demonstrated reliability.
(b) Applicability. (1) Sections 450.115 through 450.121 and 450.131
through 450.139 apply to all launch and reentry vehicles;
(2) Sections 450.123 through 450.129 apply to a launch or reentry
vehicle that relies on flight abort to comply with Sec. 450.101; and
(3) Section 450.141 applies to the launch of an unguided suborbital
launch vehicle.
Sec. 450.115 Flight safety analysis methods.
(a) Scope of the analysis. An operator's flight safety analysis
method must account for all reasonably foreseeable events and failures
of safety-critical systems during nominal and non-nominal launch or
reentry that could jeopardize public health and safety, and the safety
of property.
(b) Level of fidelity of the analysis. An operator's flight safety
analysis method must have a level of fidelity sufficient to--
(1) Demonstrate that any risk to the public satisfies the public
safety criteria of Sec. 450.101, including the use of mitigations,
accounting for all known sources of uncertainty, using a means of
compliance accepted by the Administrator; and
(2) Identify the dominant source of each type of public risk with a
criterion in Sec. 450.101(a) or (b) in terms of phase of flight,
source of hazard (such as toxic exposure, inert, or explosive debris),
and vehicle response mode.
(c) Application requirements. An applicant must submit a
description of the flight safety analysis methodology, including
identification of:
(1) The scientific principles and statistical methods used;
(2) All assumptions and their justifications;
(3) The rationale for the level of fidelity;
(4) The evidence for validation and verification required by Sec.
450.101(g);
(5) The extent that the benchmark conditions are comparable to the
foreseeable conditions of the intended operations; and
(6) The extent that risk mitigations were accounted for in the
analyses.
Sec. 450.117 Trajectory analysis for normal flight.
(a) General. A flight safety analysis must include a trajectory
analysis that establishes--
(1) For any phase of flight within the scope as provided by Sec.
450.113(a), the limits of a launch or reentry vehicle's normal flight
as defined by the nominal trajectory, and the following sets of
trajectories sufficient to characterize variability and uncertainty
during normal flight:
(i) A set of trajectories to characterize variability. This set
must describe how the intended trajectory could vary due to conditions
known prior to initiation of flight; and
(ii) A set of trajectories to characterize uncertainty. This set
must describe how the actual trajectory could differ from the intended
trajectory due to random uncertainties.
(2) A fuel exhaustion trajectory that produces instantaneous impact
points with the greatest range for any given time after liftoff for any
stage that has the potential to impact the Earth and does not burn to
propellant depletion before a programmed thrust termination.
(3) For vehicles with a flight safety system, trajectory data or
parameters that describe the limits of a useful mission.
(b) Trajectory model. A final trajectory analysis must use a six-
degree of freedom trajectory model to satisfy the requirements of
paragraph (a) of this section.
(c) Wind effects. A trajectory analysis must account for all wind
effects, including profiles of winds that are no less severe than the
worst wind conditions under which flight might be attempted, and for
uncertainty in the wind conditions.
(d) Application requirements. An applicant must submit the
following:
(1) A description of the methodology used to characterize the
vehicle's flight behavior throughout normal flight and limits of a
useful mission, including:
(i) The scientific principles and statistical methods used;
(ii) All assumptions and their justifications;
(iii) The rationale for the level of fidelity, and
(iv) The evidence for validation and verification required by Sec.
450.101(g).
(2) A description of the input data used to characterize the
vehicle's flight behavior throughout normal flight and limits of a
useful mission, including:
(i) The worst wind conditions under which flight might be
attempted, and a description of how the operator will evaluate the wind
conditions and uncertainty in the wind conditions prior to initiating
the operation;
(ii) A description of the wind input data, including uncertainties;
(iii) A description of the parameters with a significant influence
on the vehicle's behavior throughout normal flight, including a
quantitative description of the nominal value for
[[Page 15431]]
each significant parameter throughout normal flight;
(iv) A description of the random uncertainties with a significant
influence on the vehicle's behavior throughout normal flight, including
a quantitative description of the statistical distribution for each
significant parameter; and
(v) The primary mission objectives and the conditions that describe
the limits of a useful mission.
(3) Representative normal flight trajectory analysis outputs,
including the position, velocity, and vacuum instantaneous impact
point, for each second of flight for--
(i) The nominal trajectory;
(ii) A fuel exhaustion trajectory under otherwise nominal
conditions;
(iii) A set of trajectories that characterize variability in the
intended trajectory based on conditions known prior to initiation of
flight;
(iv) A set of trajectories that characterize how the actual
trajectory could differ from the intended trajectory due to random
uncertainties, and
(v) A set of trajectories that characterize the limits of a useful
mission as described in paragraph (a)(3) of this section.
(4) Additional products that allow an independent analysis, as
requested by the Administrator.
Sec. 450.119 Trajectory analysis for malfunction flight.
(a) General. A flight safety analysis must include a trajectory
analysis that establishes--
(1) The vehicle's capability to depart from normal flight; and
(2) The vehicle's deviation capability in the event of a
malfunction during flight.
(b) Characterizing foreseeable trajectories. A malfunction
trajectory analysis must account for each cause of a malfunction
flight, including software and hardware failures. For each cause of a
malfunction trajectory, the analysis must characterize the foreseeable
trajectories resulting from a malfunction. The analysis must account
for--
(1) All trajectory times during the thrusting phases, or when the
lift vector is controlled, during flight;
(2) The duration, starting when a malfunction begins to cause each
flight deviation throughout the thrusting phases of flight;
(3) Trajectory time intervals between malfunction turn start times
that are sufficient to establish flight safety limits, if any, and
individual risk contours that are smooth and continuous;
(4) The relative probability of occurrence of each malfunction turn
of which the vehicle is capable;
(5) The probability distribution of position and velocity of the
vehicle when each malfunction will terminate due to vehicle breakup,
along with the cause of termination and the state of the vehicle; and
(6) The vehicle's flight behavior from the time when a malfunction
begins to cause a flight deviation until ground impact or predicted
structural failure, with trajectory time intervals that are sufficient
to establish individual risk contours that are smooth and continuous.
(c) Application requirements. An applicant must submit--
(1) A description of the methodology used to characterize the
vehicle's flight behavior throughout malfunction flight, including:
(i) The scientific principles and statistical methods used;
(ii) All assumptions and their justifications;
(iii) The rationale for the level of fidelity; and
(iv) The evidence for validation and verification required by Sec.
450.101(g).
(2) A description of the input data used to characterize the
vehicle's malfunction flight behavior, including:
(i) A list of each cause of malfunction flight considered;
(ii) A list of each type of malfunction flight for which
malfunction flight behavior was characterized;
(iii) A description of the parameters with a significant influence
on the vehicle's behavior throughout malfunction flight for each type
of malfunction flight characterized, including a quantitative
description of the nominal value for each significant parameter
throughout normal flight; and
(iv) A description of the random uncertainties with a significant
influence on the vehicle's behavior throughout malfunction flight for
each type of malfunction flight characterized, including a quantitative
description of the statistical distribution for each significant
parameter.
(3) Representative malfunction flight trajectory analysis outputs,
including the position, velocity, and vacuum instantaneous impact point
for each second of flight for--
(i) Each set of trajectories that characterizes a type of
malfunction flight; and
(ii) The probability of each trajectory that characterizes a type
of malfunction flight.
(4) Additional products that allow an independent analysis, as
requested by the Administrator.
Sec. 450.121 Debris analysis.
(a) General. A flight safety analysis must include a debris
analysis that characterizes the debris generated for each foreseeable
vehicle response mode as a function of vehicle flight time, accounting
for the effects of fuel burn and any configuration changes.
(b) Vehicle impact or breakup. A debris analysis must account for
each foreseeable cause of vehicle breakup, including any breakup caused
by flight safety system activation, and for impact of an intact
vehicle.
(c) Debris thresholds. A debris analysis must account for all
inert, explosive, and other hazardous vehicle, vehicle component, and
payload debris foreseeable from normal and malfunctioning vehicle
flight. At a minimum, the debris analysis must identify--
(1) All inert debris that can cause a casualty or loss of
functionality of a critical asset, including all debris that could--
(i) Impact a human being with a mean expected kinetic energy at
impact greater than or equal to 11 ft-lbs;
(ii) Impact a human being with a mean impact kinetic energy per
unit area at impact greater than or equal to 34 ft-lb/in\2\;
(iii) Cause a casualty due to impact with an aircraft;
(iv) Cause a casualty due to impact with a waterborne vessel; or
(v) Pose a toxic or fire hazard.
(2) Any explosive debris that could cause a casualty or loss of
functionality of a critical asset.
(d) Application requirements. An applicant must submit:
(1) A description of the debris analysis methodology, including
input data, assumptions, and justifications for the assumptions;
(2) A description of all vehicle breakup modes and the development
of debris lists;
(3) All debris fragment lists necessary to quantitatively describe
the physical, aerodynamic, and harmful characteristics of each debris
fragment or fragment class; and
(4) Additional products that allow an independent analysis, as
requested by the Administrator.
Sec. 450.123 Flight safety limits analysis.
(a) General. A flight safety analysis must identify the location of
uncontrolled areas and establish flight safety limits that define when
an operator must initiate flight abort to--
(1) Ensure compliance with the public safety criteria of Sec.
450.101; and
(2) Prevent debris capable of causing a casualty from impacting in
[[Page 15432]]
uncontrolled areas if the vehicle is outside the limits of a useful
mission.
(b) Flight safety limits. The analysis must identify flight safety
limits for use in establishing flight abort rules. The flight safety
limits must--
(1) Account for temporal and geometric extents on the Earth's
surface of any vehicle hazards resulting from any planned or unplanned
event for all times during flight;
(2) Account for potential contributions to the debris impact
dispersions; and
(3) Be designed to avoid flight abort that results in increased
collective risk to people in uncontrolled areas, compared to continued
flight.
(c) Gates. For an orbital launch, or any launch or reentry where
one or more trajectories that represents a useful mission intersects a
flight safety limit that provides containment of debris capable of
causing a casualty, the flight safety analysis must include a gate
analysis as required by Sec. 450.125.
(d) Real-time flight safety limits. As an alternative to flight
safety limits analysis, flight abort time can be computed and applied
in real-time during vehicle flight as necessary to meet the criteria in
Sec. 450.101.
(e) Application requirements. An applicant must submit:
(1) A description of how each flight safety limit will be computed
including references to public safety criteria of Sec. 450.101;
(2) Representative flight safety limits and associated parameters;
(3) An indication of which flight abort rule from Sec. 450.165(c)
is used in conjunction with each example flight safety limit;
(4) A graphic depiction or series of depictions of representative
flight safety limits, the launch or landing point, all uncontrolled
area boundaries, and vacuum instantaneous impact point traces for the
nominal trajectory, extents of normal flight, and limits of a useful
mission trajectories;
(5) If the requirement for flight abort is computed in real-time in
lieu of precomputing flight safety limits, a description of how the
real-time flight abort requirement is computed including references to
public safety criteria of Sec. 450.101; and
(6) Additional products that allow an independent analysis, as
requested by the Administrator.
Sec. 450.125 Gate analysis.
(a) Applicability. The flight safety analysis must include a gate
analysis for an orbital launch or any launch or reentry where one or
more trajectories that represent a useful mission intersect a flight
safety limit that provides containment of debris capable of causing a
casualty.
(b) Analysis requirements. The analysis must establish--
(1) A relaxation of the flight safety limits that allows continued
flight or a gate where a decision will be made to abort the launch or
reentry, or allow continued flight;
(2) If a gate is established, a measure of performance at the gate
that enables the flight abort crew or autonomous flight safety system
to determine whether the vehicle is able to complete a useful mission,
and abort the flight if it is not;
(3) Accompanying flight abort rules; and
(4) For an orbital launch, a gate at the last opportunity to
determine whether the vehicle's flight is in compliance with the flight
abort rules and can make a useful mission, and abort the flight if it
is not.
(c) Gate extents. The extents of any gate or relaxation of the
flight safety limits must be based on normal trajectories, trajectories
that may achieve a useful mission, collective risk, and consequence
criteria as follows:
(1) Flight safety limits must be gated or relaxed where they
intersect with a normal trajectory if that trajectory would meet the
individual and collective risk criteria of Sec. 450.101(a)(1) and (2)
or (b)(1) and (2) when treated like a nominal trajectory with normal
trajectory dispersions. The predicted average consequence from flight
abort resulting from any reasonable vehicle response mode, in any one-
second period of flight, using the modified flight safety limits, must
not exceed 1 x 10-2 conditional expected casualties;
(2) Flight safety limits may be gated or relaxed where they
intersect with a trajectory within the limits of a useful mission if
that trajectory would meet the individual and collective risk criteria
of Sec. 450.101(a)(1) and (2) or (b)(1) and (2) when treated like a
nominal trajectory with normal trajectory dispersions. The predicted
average consequence from flight abort resulting from any reasonable
vehicle response mode, in any one-second period of flight, using the
modified flight safety limits, must not exceed 1 x 10-2
conditional expected casualties; and
(3) For an orbital launch, in areas where no useful mission
trajectories intersect with flight safety limits, the final gate may
extend no further than necessary to allow vehicles on a useful mission
to continue flight.
(d) Application requirements. An applicant must submit:
(1) A description of the methodology used to establish each gate or
relaxation of a flight safety limit;
(2) A description of the measure of performance used to determine
whether a vehicle will be allowed to cross a gate without flight abort,
the acceptable ranges of the measure of performance, and how these
ranges were determined;
(3) A graphic depiction or depictions showing representative flight
safety limits, any uncontrolled area overflight regions, and
instantaneous impact point traces for the nominal trajectory, extents
of normal flight, and limits of a useful mission trajectories; and
(4) Additional products that allow an independent analysis, as
requested by the Administrator.
Sec. 450.127 Data loss flight time and planned safe flight state
analyses.
(a) General. For each flight, a flight safety analysis must
establish data loss flight times and a planned safe flight state to
establish each flight abort rule that applies when vehicle tracking
data is not available for use by the flight abort crew or autonomous
flight safety system.
(b) Data loss flight times. (1) A flight safety analysis must
establish a data loss flight time for each trajectory time interval
along the nominal trajectory from initiation of the flight of a launch
or reentry vehicle through that point during nominal flight when the
minimum elapsed thrusting or gliding time is no greater than the time
it would take for a normal vehicle to reach the final gate crossing, or
the planned safe flight state established under paragraph (c) of this
section, whichever occurs earlier.
(2) Data loss flight times must account for forces that may stop
the vehicle before reaching a flight safety limit.
(3) Data loss flight times may be computed and applied in real-time
during vehicle flight in which case the state vector just prior to loss
of data should be used as the nominal state vector.
(c) Planned safe flight state. For a vehicle that performs normally
during all portions of flight, the planned safe flight state is the
point during the nominal flight of a vehicle where--
(1) The vehicle cannot reach a flight safety limit for the
remainder of the flight;
(2) The vehicle achieves orbital insertion; or
(3) The vehicle's state vector reaches a state where the vehicle is
no longer required to have a flight safety system.
(d) Application requirements. An applicant must submit:
(1) A description of the methodology used to determine data loss
flight times;
[[Page 15433]]
(2) Tabular data describing the data loss flight times from a
representative mission;
(3) The safe flight state for a representative mission and
methodology used to determine it; and
(4) Additional products that allow an independent analysis, as
requested by the Administrator.
Sec. 450.129 Time delay analysis.
(a) General. A flight safety analysis must include a time delay
analysis that establishes the mean elapsed time between the violation
of a flight abort rule and the time when the flight safety system is
capable of aborting flight for use in establishing flight safety
limits. The time delay analysis must determine a time delay
distribution that accounts for all foreseeable sources of delay.
(b) Application requirements. An applicant must submit:
(1) A description of the methodology used in the time delay
analysis;
(2) A tabular listing of each time delay source and the total
delay, with uncertainty; and
(3) Additional products that allow an independent analysis, as
requested by the Administrator.
Sec. 450.131 Probability of failure analysis.
(a) General. For each hazard and phase of flight, a flight safety
analysis for a launch or reentry must account for vehicle failure
probability. The probability of failure must be consistent for all
hazards and phases of flight.
(1) For a vehicle or vehicle stage with fewer than two flights, the
failure probability estimate must account for the outcome of all
previous flights of vehicles developed and launched or reentered in
similar circumstances.
(2) For a vehicle or vehicle stage with two or more flights,
vehicle failure probability estimates must account for the outcomes of
all previous flights of the vehicle or vehicle stage in a statistically
valid manner. The outcomes of all previous flights of the vehicle or
vehicle stage must account for data on partial failures and anomalies,
including Class 3 and Class 4 mishaps, as defined in Sec. 401.5 of
this chapter.
(b) Failure. For flight safety analysis purposes, a failure occurs
when a vehicle does not complete any phase of normal flight or when any
anomalous condition exhibits the potential for a stage or its debris to
impact the Earth or reenter the atmosphere outside the normal
trajectory envelope during the mission or any future mission of similar
vehicle capability. Also, a Class 1 or Class 2 mishap, as defined in
Sec. 401.5 of this chapter, constitutes a failure.
(c) Previous flight. For flight safety analysis purposes--
(1) The flight of a launch vehicle begins at a time in which a
launch vehicle normally or inadvertently lifts off from a launch
platform; and
(2) The flight of a reentry vehicle or deorbiting upper stage
begins at a time in which a vehicle attempts to initiate a deorbit.
(d) Allocation. The vehicle failure probability estimate must be
distributed across flight time and vehicle response mode. The
distribution must be consistent with--
(1) The data available from all previous flights of vehicles
developed and launched or reentered in similar circumstances; and
(2) Data from previous flights of vehicles, stages, or components
developed and launched or reentered by the subject vehicle developer or
operator. Such data may include previous experience involving similar--
(i) Vehicle, stage, or component design characteristics;
(ii) Development and integration processes, including the extent of
integrated system testing; and
(iii) Level of experience of the vehicle operation and development
team members.
(e) Observed vs. conditional failure rate. Probability of failure
allocation must account for significant differences in the observed
failure rate and the conditional failure rate. A probability of failure
analysis must use a constant conditional failure rate for each phase of
flight, unless there is clear and convincing evidence of a different
conditional failure rate for a particular vehicle, stage, or phase of
flight.
(f) Application requirements. An applicant must submit:
(1) A description of the probability of failure analysis, including
all assumptions and justifications for the assumptions, analysis
methods, input data, and results;
(2) A representative set of tabular data and graphs of the
predicted failure rate and cumulative failure probability for each
foreseeable vehicle response mode; and
(3) Additional products that allow an independent analysis, as
requested by the Administrator.
Sec. 450.133 Flight hazard area analysis.
(a) General. A flight safety analysis must include a flight hazard
area analysis that identifies any region of land, sea, or air that must
be surveyed, publicized, controlled, or evacuated in order to control
the risk to the public. A flight hazard area analysis must account for
all reasonably foreseeable vehicle response modes during nominal and
non-nominal flight that could result in a casualty. The analysis must
account for, at a minimum--
(1) The regions of land, sea, and air potentially exposed to debris
impact resulting from normal flight events and from debris hazards
resulting from any potential malfunction;
(2) Any hazard controls implemented to control risk to any hazard;
(3) The limits of a launch or reentry vehicle's normal flight,
including winds that are no less severe than the worst wind conditions
under which flight might be attempted and uncertainty in the wind
conditions;
(4) The debris identified for each foreseeable cause of breakup,
and any planned jettison of debris, launch or reentry vehicle
components, or payload;
(5) All foreseeable sources of debris dispersion during freefall,
including wind effects, guidance and control, velocity imparted by
break-up or jettison, lift, and drag forces; and
(6) A probability of one for any planned debris hazards or planned
impacts.
(b) Waterborne vessel hazard areas. The flight hazard area analysis
for waterborne vessels must determine the areas and durations for
regions of water--
(1) That are necessary to contain, with 97 percent probability of
containment, all debris resulting from normal flight events capable of
causing a casualty to persons on waterborne vessels;
(2) That are necessary to contain either where the probability of
debris capable of causing a casualty impacting on or near a vessel
would exceed 1 x 10-5, accounting for all relevant hazards,
or where the individual probability of casualty for any person on board
a vessel would exceed the criterion in Sec. 450.101(a)(2) or (b)(2);
and
(3) Where reduced vessel traffic is necessary to meet collective
risk criterion in Sec. 450.101(a)(1) or (b)(1).
(c) Land hazard areas. The flight hazard area analysis for land
must determine the durations and areas regions of land--
(1) That are necessary to contain, with 97 percent probability of
containment, all debris resulting from normal flight events capable of
causing a casualty to any person on land;
(2) Where the individual probability of casualty for any person on
land would exceed the criterion in Sec. 450.101(a)(2) or (b)(2); and
(3) Where reduced population is necessary to meet the collective
risk criterion in Sec. 450.101(a)(1) or (b)(1).
(d) Airspace hazard volumes. The flight hazard area analysis for
airspace must determine the durations and
[[Page 15434]]
volumes for regions of air to be submitted to the FAA for approval--
(1) That are necessary to contain, with 97 percent probability of
containment, all debris resulting from normal flight events capable of
causing a casualty to persons on an aircraft; and
(2) Where the probability of impact on an aircraft would exceed the
criterion in Sec. 450.101(a)(3) or (b)(3).
(e) Application requirements. An applicant must submit:
(1) A description of the methodology to be used in the flight
hazard area analysis including all assumptions and justifications for
the assumptions, vulnerability models, analysis methods, input data,
including:
(i) Input wind data and justification that those represent the
worst wind conditions under which flight might be attempted accounting
for uncertainty in the wind conditions;
(ii) Classes of waterborne vessel and vulnerability criteria
employed; and
(iii) Classes of aircraft and vulnerability criteria employed.
(2) Tabular data and graphs of the results of the flight hazard
area analysis, including:
(i) Geographical coordinates of all hazard areas that are
representative of those to be published prior to any proposed
operation;
(ii) Representative 97 percent probability of containment contours
for all debris resulting from normal flight events capable of causing a
casualty, regardless of location, including regions of land, sea, or
air;
(iii) Representative individual probability of casualty contours
regardless of location;
(iv) If applicable, representative 1 x 10-5 and 1 x
10-6 probability of impact contours for all debris capable
of causing a casualty to persons on an waterborne vessel regardless of
location; and
(v) Representative 1 x 10-6 and 1 x 10-7
probability of impact contours for all debris capable of causing a
casualty to persons on an aircraft regardless of location.
(3) Additional products that allow an independent analysis, as
requested by the Administrator.
Sec. 450.135 Debris risk analysis.
(a) General. A debris risk analysis must demonstrate compliance
with public safety criteria in Sec. 450.101, either--
(1) Prior to the day of the operation, accounting for all
foreseeable conditions within the flight commit criteria; or
(2) During the countdown using the best available input data.
(b) Propagation of debris. A debris risk analysis must compute
statistically valid debris impact probability distributions using the
input data produced by flight safety analyses required in Sec. Sec.
450.117 through 450.133. The propagation of debris from each predicted
breakup location to impact must account for--
(1) All foreseeable forces that can influence any debris impact
location; and
(2) All foreseeable sources of impact dispersion, including, at a
minimum:
(i) The uncertainties in atmospheric conditions;
(ii) Debris aerodynamic parameters;
(iii) Pre-breakup position and velocity; and
(iv) Breakup-imparted velocities.
(c) Exposure model. A debris risk analysis must account for the
distribution of people and critical assets. The exposure input data
must--
(1) Include the entire region where there is a significant
probability of impact of hazardous debris;
(2) Characterize the distribution and vulnerability of people and
critical assets both geographically and temporally;
(3) Account for the distribution of people in various structures
and vehicle types with a resolution consistent with the characteristic
size of the impact probability distributions for relevant fragment
groups;
(4) Have sufficient temporal and spatial resolution that a uniform
distribution of people within each defined region can be treated as a
single average set of characteristics without degrading the accuracy of
any debris analysis output;
(5) Use accurate source data from demographic sources, physical
surveys, or other methods;
(6) Be regularly updated to account for recent land-use changes,
population growth, migration, and construction; and
(7) Account for uncertainty in the source data and modeling
approach.
(d) Casualty area and consequence analysis. A debris risk analysis
must model the casualty area, and compute the predicted consequences of
each reasonably foreseeable vehicle response mode in any one-second
period of flight in terms of conditional expected casualties. The
casualty area and consequence analysis must account for--
(1) All relevant debris fragment characteristics and the
characteristics of a representative person exposed to any potential
debris hazard.
(2) Any direct impacts of debris fragments, intact impact, or
indirect impact effects.
(3) The vulnerability of people and critical assets to debris
impacts, including:
(i) Effects of buildings, ground vehicles, waterborne vessel, and
aircraft upon the vulnerability of any occupants;
(ii) All hazard sources, such as the potential for any toxic or
explosive energy releases;
(iii) Indirect or secondary effects such as bounce, splatter, skip,
slide or ricochet, including accounting for terrain;
(iv) Effect of wind on debris impact vector and toxic releases;
(v) Impact speed and angle, accounting for motion of impacted
vehicles;
(vi) Uncertainty in fragment impact parameters; and
(vii) Uncertainty in modeling methodology.
(e) Application requirements. An applicant must submit:
(1) A description of the methods used to compute the parameters
required to demonstrate compliance with the public safety criteria in
Sec. 450.101, including a description of how the operator will account
for the conditions immediately prior to enabling the flight of a launch
vehicle or the reentry of a reentry vehicle, such as the final
trajectory, atmospheric conditions, and the exposure of people and
critical assets;
(2) A description of the methods used to compute debris impact
distributions;
(3) A description of the methods used to develop the population
exposure input data;
(4) A description of the exposure input data, including, for each
population center, a geographic definition and the distribution of
population among shelter types as a function of time of day, week,
month, or year;
(5) A description of the atmospheric data used as input to the
debris risk analysis;
(6) The effective unsheltered casualty area for all fragment
classes assuming a representative impact vector;
(7) The effective casualty area for all fragment classes for a
representative type of building, ground vehicle, waterborne vessel, and
aircraft, assuming a representative impact vector;
(8) Collective and individual debris risk analysis outputs under
representative conditions and the worst foreseeable conditions,
including:
(i) Total collective casualty expectation for the proposed
operation;
(ii) A list of the collective risk contribution for at least the
top ten population centers and all centers with collective risk
exceeding 1 percent of the collective risk criterion in Sec. 450.101;
[[Page 15435]]
(iii) A list of the maximum individual probability of casualty for
the top ten population centers and all centers that exceed 10 percent
of the individual risk criterion in Sec. 450.101; and
(iv) A list of the probability of loss of functionality of any
critical asset that exceeds 1 percent of the critical asset criterion
in Sec. 450.101;
(9) A list of the conditional collective casualty expectation for
each vehicle response mode for each one-second interval of flight under
representative conditions and the worst foreseeable conditions; and
(10) Additional products that allow an independent analysis, as
requested by the Administrator.
Sec. 450.137 Far-field overpressure blast effects analysis.
(a) General. The far-field overpressure blast effect analysis must
demonstrate compliance with public safety criteria in Sec. 450.101,
either--
(1) Prior to the day of the operation, accounting for all
foreseeable conditions within the flight commit criteria; or
(2) During the countdown using the best available input data.
(b) Analysis constraints. The analysis must account for--
(1) The potential for distant focus overpressure or overpressure
enhancement given current meteorological conditions and terrain
characteristics;
(2) The potential for broken windows due to peak incident
overpressures below 1.0 psi and related casualties;
(3) The explosive capability of the vehicle at impact and at
altitude and potential explosions resulting from debris impacts,
including the potential for mixing of liquid propellants;
(4) Characteristics of the vehicle flight and the surroundings that
would affect the population's susceptibility to injury, including
shelter types and time of day of the proposed operation;
(5) Characteristics of the potentially affected windows, including
their size, location, orientation, glazing material, and condition; and
(6) The hazard characteristics of the potential glass shards,
including falling from upper building stories or being propelled into
or out of a shelter toward potentially occupied spaces.
(c) Application requirements. An applicant must submit a
description of the far-field overpressure analysis, including all
assumptions and justifications for the assumptions, analysis methods,
input data, and results. At a minimum, the application must include:
(1) A description of the population centers, terrain, building
types, and window characteristics used as input to the far-field
overpressure analysis;
(2) A description of the methods used to compute the foreseeable
explosive yield probability pairs, and the complete set of yield-
probability pairs, used as input to the far-field overpressure
analysis;
(3) A description of the methods used to compute peak incident
overpressures as a function of distance from the explosion and
prevailing meteorological conditions, including sample calculations for
a representative range of the foreseeable meteorological conditions,
yields, and population center locations;
(4) A description of the methods used to compute the probability of
window breakage, including tabular data and graphs for the probability
of breakage as a function of the peak incident overpressure for a
representative range of window types, building types, and yields
accounted for;
(5) A description of the methods used to compute the probability of
casualty for a representative individual, including tabular data and
graphs for the probability of casualty, as a function of location
relative to the window and the peak incident overpressure for a
representative range of window types, building types, and yields
accounted for;
(6) Tabular data and graphs showing the hypothetical location of
any member of the public that could be exposed to a probability of
casualty of 1 x 10-5 or greater for neighboring operations
personnel, and 1 x 10-6 or greater for other members of the
public, given foreseeable meteorological conditions, yields, and
population exposures;
(7) The maximum expected casualties that could result from far-
field overpressure hazards greater given foreseeable meteorological
conditions, yields, and population exposures;
(8) A description of the meteorological measurements used as input
to any real-time far-field overpressure analysis; and
(9) Additional products that allow an independent analysis, as
requested by the Administrator.
Sec. 450.139 Toxic hazards for flight.
(a) Applicability. This section applies to any launch or reentry
vehicle, including all vehicle components and payloads, that use toxic
propellants or other toxic chemicals.
(b) General. An operator must--
(1) Conduct a toxic release hazard analysis in accordance with
paragraph (c) of this section;
(2) Manage the risk of casualties that could arise from the
exposure to toxic release through one of the following means:
(i) Contain hazards caused by toxic release in accordance with
paragraph (d) of this section; or
(ii) Perform a toxic risk assessment, in accordance with paragraph
(e) of this section, that protects the public in compliance with the
risk criteria of Sec. 450.101, including toxic release hazards.
(3) Establish flight commit criteria based on the results of its
toxic release hazard analysis, containment analysis, or toxic risk
assessment for any necessary evacuation of the public from any toxic
hazard area.
(c) Toxic release hazard analysis. A toxic release hazard analysis
must--
(1) Account for any toxic release that could occur during nominal
or non-nominal flight;
(2) Include a worst-case release scenario analysis or a maximum-
credible release scenario analysis;
(3) Determine if toxic release can occur based on an evaluation of
the chemical compositions and quantities of propellants, other
chemicals, vehicle materials, and projected combustion products, and
the possible toxic release scenarios;
(4) Account for both normal combustion products and any unreacted
propellants and phase change or chemical derivatives of released
substances; and
(5) Account for any operational constraints and emergency
procedures that provide protection from toxic release.
(d) Toxic containment. An operator using toxic containment must
manage the risk of any casualty from the exposure to toxic release
either by--
(1) Evacuating, or being prepared to evacuate, the public from a
toxic hazard area, where an average member of the public would be
exposed to greater than one percent conditional individual probability
of casualty in the event of a worst-case release or maximum credible
release scenario; or
(2) Employing meteorological constraints to limit a launch
operation to times during which prevailing winds and other conditions
ensure that an average member of the public would not be exposed to
greater than one percent conditional individual probability of casualty
in the event of a worst-case release or maximum credible release
scenario.
(e) Toxic risk assessment. An operator using toxic risk assessment
must establish flight commit criteria that demonstrate compliance with
the public risk criterion of Sec. 450.101. A toxic risk assessment
must--
[[Page 15436]]
(1) Account for airborne concentration and duration thresholds of
toxic propellants or other chemicals. For any toxic propellant, other
chemicals, or combustion product, an operator must use airborne toxic
concentration and duration thresholds identified in a means of
compliance accepted by the Administrator;
(2) Account for physical phenomena expected to influence any toxic
concentration and duration in the area surrounding the potential
release site;
(3) Determine a toxic hazard area for the launch or reentry,
surrounding the potential release site for each toxic propellant or
other chemical based on the amount and toxicity of the propellant or
other chemical, the exposure duration, and the meteorological
conditions involved;
(4) Account for all members of the public that may be exposed to
the toxic release, including all members of the public on land and on
any waterborne vessels, populated offshore structures, and aircraft
that are not operated in direct support of the launch or reentry; and
(5) Account for any risk mitigation measures applied in the risk
assessment.
(f) Application requirements. An applicant must submit:
(1) The identity of toxic propellant, chemical, or combustion
products or derivatives in the possible toxic release;
(2) The applicant's selected airborne toxic concentration and
duration thresholds;
(3) The meteorological conditions for the atmospheric transport and
buoyant cloud rise of any toxic release from its source to downwind
receptor locations;
(4) Characterization of the terrain, as input for modeling the
atmospheric transport of a toxic release from its source to downwind
receptor locations;
(5) The identity of the toxic dispersion model used, and any other
input data;
(6) Representative results of an applicant's toxic dispersion
modeling to predict concentrations and durations at selected downwind
receptor locations, to determine the toxic hazard area for a released
quantity of the toxic substance;
(7) For toxic release hazard analysis in accordance with paragraph
(c) of this section:
(i) A description of the failure modes and associated relative
probabilities for potential toxic release scenarios used in the risk
evaluation; and
(ii) The methodology and representative results of an applicant's
determination of the worst-case or maximum-credible quantity of any
toxic release that might occur during the flight of a vehicle;
(8) For toxic risk assessment in accordance with paragraph (e) of
this section:
(i) A demonstration that the public will not be exposed to airborne
concentrations above the toxic concentration and duration thresholds,
based upon representative results of the toxic release hazard analysis;
(ii) The population density in receptor locations that are
identified by toxic dispersion modeling as toxic hazard areas;
(iii) A description of any risk mitigations applied in the toxic
risk assessment; and
(iv) The identity of the population database used; and
(9) Additional products that allow an independent analysis, as
requested by the Administrator.
Sec. 450.141 Wind weighting for the flight of an unguided suborbital
launch vehicle.
(a) Applicability. This section applies to the flight of an
unguided suborbital launch vehicle using wind weighting to meet the
public safety criteria of Sec. 450.101.
(b) Wind weighting safety system. The flight of an unguided
suborbital launch vehicle that uses a wind weighting safety system must
meet the following:
(1) The launcher azimuth and elevation settings must be wind
weighted to correct for the effects of wind conditions at the time of
flight to provide a safe impact location; and
(2) An operator must use launcher azimuth and elevation angle
settings that ensures the rocket will not fly in an unintended
direction given wind uncertainties.
(c) Analysis. An operator must--
(1) Establish flight commit criteria and other flight safety rules
that control the risk to the public from potential adverse effects
resulting from normal and malfunctioning flight;
(2) Establish any wind constraints under which flight may occur;
and
(3) Conduct a wind weighting analysis that establishes the launcher
azimuth and elevation settings that correct for the windcocking and
wind-drift effects on the unguided suborbital launch vehicle.
(d) Stability. An unguided suborbital launch vehicle, in all
configurations, must be stable throughout each stage of powered flight.
(e) Application requirements. An applicant must submit:
(1) A description of its wind weighting analysis methods, including
its method and schedule of determining wind speed and wind direction
for each altitude layer;
(2) A description of its wind weighting safety system and identify
all equipment used to perform the wind weighting analysis;
(3) A representative wind weighting analysis using actual or
statistical winds for the launch area and provide samples of the
output; and
(4) Additional products that allow an independent analysis, as
requested by the Administrator.
Prescribed Hazard Controls
Sec. 450.143 Safety-critical system design, test, and documentation.
(a) Applicability. This section applies to all safety-critical
systems. Flight safety systems that are required to meet the
requirements of Sec. 450.101(c) must meet additional requirements in
Sec. 450.145.
(b) Fault-tolerant design. An operator must design safety-critical
systems to be fault-tolerant such that there is no single credible
fault that can lead to increased risk to public safety beyond nominal
safety-critical system operation.
(c) Qualification testing of design. An operator must functionally
demonstrate the design of the vehicle's safety-critical systems at
conditions beyond its predicted operating environment. The operator
must select environmental test levels that ensure the design is
sufficiently stressed to demonstrate that system performance is not
degraded due to design tolerances, manufacturing variances, or
uncertainties in the environment.
(d) Acceptance of hardware. An operator must--
(1) Functionally demonstrate any safety-critical system while
exposed to its predicted operating environment with margin to
demonstrate that it is free of defects, free of integration and
workmanship errors, and ready for operational use; or
(2) Combine in-process controls and a quality assurance process to
ensure functional capability of any safety-critical system during its
service life.
(e) Lifecycle of safety-critical systems. (1) The predicted
operating environment must be based on conditions predicted to be
encountered in all phases of flight, recovery, and transportation.
(2) An operator must monitor the flight environments experienced by
safety-critical system components to the extent necessary to--
(i) Validate the predicted operating environment; and
(ii) Assess the actual component life remaining or adjust any
inspection period.
(f) Application requirements. An applicant must submit to the FAA
the following as part of its application:
[[Page 15437]]
(1) A list and description of each safety-critical system;
(2) Drawings and schematics for each safety-critical system;
(3) A summary of the analysis to determine the predicted operating
environment and duration to be applied to qualification and acceptance
testing covering the service life of any safety-critical system;
(4) A description of any instrumentation or inspection processes to
monitor aging of any safety-critical system; and
(5) The criteria and procedures for disposal or refurbishment for
service life extension of safety-critical system components.
Sec. 450.145 Flight safety system.
(a) General. For each phase of flight for which an operator must
implement flight abort to meet the requirement of Sec. 450.101(c), the
operator must use a flight safety system, or other safeguards agreed to
by the Administrator, on the launch or reentry vehicle, vehicle
component, or payload with the following reliability:
(1) If the consequence any vehicle response mode is 1 x
10-2 conditional expected casualties or greater for
uncontrolled areas, an operator must employ a flight safety system with
design reliability of 0.999 at 95 percent confidence and commensurate
design, analysis, and testing; or
(2) If the consequence of any vehicle response mode is between 1 x
10-2 and 1 x 10-3 conditional expected casualties
for uncontrolled areas, an operator must employ a flight safety system
with a design reliability of 0.975 at 95 percent confidence and
commensurate design, analysis, and testing.
(b) Accepted means of compliance. To comply with paragraph (a) of
this section, an applicant must use a means of compliance accepted by
the Administrator.
(c) Monitoring. An operator must monitor the flight environments
experienced by any flight safety system component.
(d) Application requirements. An applicant must submit the
information identified in paragraphs (d)(1) through (5) of this
section, for any flight safety system including any flight safety
system located on board a launch or reentry vehicle; any ground based
command control system; any support system, including telemetry
subsystems and tracking subsystems, necessary to support a flight abort
decision; and the functions of any personnel who operate the flight
safety system hardware or software:
(1) Flight safety system description. An applicant must describe
the flight safety system and its operation in detail, including all
components, component functions, and possible operational scenarios.
(2) Flight safety system diagram. An applicant must submit a
diagram that identifies all flight safety system subsystems and shows
the interconnection of all the elements of the flight safety system.
The diagram must include any subsystems used to implement flight abort
both on and off the vehicle, including any subsystems used to make the
decision to abort flight.
(3) Flight safety system analyses. An applicant must submit any
analyses and detailed analysis reports of all flight safety system
subsystems necessary to demonstrate the reliability and confidence
levels required by paragraph (a) of this section.
(4) Tracking validation procedures. An applicant must document and
submit the procedures for validating the accuracy of any vehicle
tracking data utilized by the flight safety system to make the decision
to abort flight.
(5) Flight safety system test plans. An applicant must submit
acceptance, qualification, and preflight test plans of any flight
safety system, subsystems, and components. The test plans must include
test procedures and test environments.
Sec. 450.147 Agreements.
(a) General. An operator must establish a written agreement with
any entity that provides a service or property that meets a requirement
in this part, including:
(1) Launch and reentry site use agreements. A Federal launch range
operator, a licensed launch or reentry site operator, or any other
person that provides services or access to or use of property required
to support the safe launch or reentry under this part;
(2) Agreements for notices to mariners. Unless otherwise addressed
in agreements with the site operator, for overflight of navigable
water, the U.S. Coast Guard or other applicable maritime authority to
establish procedures for the issuance of a Notice to Mariners prior to
a launch or reentry and other measures necessary to protect public
health and safety;
(3) Agreements for notices to airmen. Unless otherwise addressed in
agreements with the site operator, the FAA Air Traffic Organization or
other applicable air navigation authority to establish procedures for
the issuance of a Notice to Airmen prior to a launch or reentry, for
closing of air routes during the respective launch and reentry windows,
and for other measures necessary to protect public health and safety;
and
(4) Mishap response. Emergency response providers, including local
government authorities, to satisfy the requirements of Sec. 450.173.
(b) Roles and responsibilities. The agreements required in this
section must clearly delineate the roles and responsibilities of each
party to support the safe launch or reentry under this part.
(c) Effective date. The agreements required in this section must be
in effect before a license can be issued, unless otherwise agreed to by
the Administrator.
(d) Application requirement. The applicant must describe each
agreement in this section. The applicant must provide a copy of any
agreement, or portion thereof, to the FAA upon request.
Sec. 450.149 Safety-critical personnel qualifications.
(a) Qualification requirements. An operator must ensure safety-
critical personnel are trained, qualified, and capable of performing
their safety-critical tasks, and that their training is current.
(b) Application requirements. An applicant must--
(1) Identify safety-critical tasks that require qualified
personnel;
(2) Provide internal training and currency requirements, completion
standards, or any other means of demonstrating compliance with the
requirements of this section; and
(3) Describe the process for tracking training currency.
Sec. 450.151 Work shift and rest requirements.
(a) General. For any launch or reentry, an operator must document
and implement rest requirements that ensure safety-critical personnel
are physically and mentally capable of performing all assigned tasks.
(b) Specific items to address. An operator's rest requirements must
address the following:
(1) Duration of each work shift and the process for extending this
shift, including the maximum allowable length of any extension;
(2) Number of consecutive work shift days allowed before rest is
required;
(3) Minimum rest period required--
(i) Between each work shift, including the period of rest required
immediately before the flight countdown work shift; and
(ii) After the maximum number of work shift days allowed; and
[[Page 15438]]
(4) Approval process for any deviation from the rest requirements.
(c) Application requirements. An applicant must submit rest rules
that demonstrate compliance with the requirements of this section.
Sec. 450.153 Radio frequency management.
(a) Frequency management. For any radio frequency used, an operator
must--
(1) Identify each frequency, all allowable frequency tolerances,
and each frequency's intended use, operating power, and source;
(2) Provide for the monitoring of frequency usage and enforcement
of frequency allocations; and
(3) Coordinate use of radio frequencies with any site operator and
any local and Federal authorities.
(b) Application requirements. An applicant must submit procedures
or other means to demonstrate compliance with the radio frequency
requirements of this section.
Sec. 450.155 Readiness.
(a) Flight readiness. An operator must document and implement
procedures to assess readiness to proceed with the flight of a launch
or reentry vehicle. These procedures must address, at minimum, the
following:
(1) Readiness of vehicle and launch, reentry, or landing site,
including any contingency abort location;
(2) Readiness of safety-critical personnel, systems, software,
procedures, equipment, property, and services; and
(3) Readiness to implement the mishap plan required by Sec.
450.173.
(b) Application requirements. An applicant must--
(1) Demonstrate compliance with the requirements of paragraph (a)
of this section through procedures that may include a readiness meeting
close in time to flight; and
(2) Describe the criteria for establishing readiness to proceed
with the flight of a launch or reentry vehicle.
Sec. 450.157 Communications.
(a) Communication procedures. An operator must implement
communication procedures during the countdown and flight of a launch or
reentry vehicle that--
(1) Define the authority of personnel, by individual or position
title, to issue ``hold/resume,'' ``go/no go,'' and abort commands;
(2) Assign communication networks so that personnel identified in
paragraph (a)(1) of this section have direct access to real-time
safety-critical information required to issue ``hold/resume,'' ``go/no
go,'' and any abort commands;
(3) Ensure personnel, identified in paragraph (a)(1) of this
section, monitor each common intercom channel during countdown and
flight; and
(4) Implement a protocol for using defined radio telephone
communications terminology.
(b) Currency. An operator must ensure the currency of the
communication procedures, and that all personnel are working with the
approved version of the communication procedures.
(c) Communication records. An operator must record all safety-
critical communications network channels that are used for voice,
video, or data transmissions that support safety critical systems
during each countdown.
Sec. 450.159 Preflight procedures.
(a) Preflight procedures. An operator must implement preflight
procedures that--
(1) Verify that each flight commit criterion is satisfied before
flight is initiated; and
(2) Ensure the operator can return the vehicle to a safe state
after a countdown abort or delay.
(b) Currency. An operator must ensure the currency of the preflight
procedures, and that all personnel are working with the approved
version of the preflight procedures.
Sec. 450.161 Surveillance and publication of hazard areas.
(a) General. The operator must publicize, survey, and evacuate each
flight hazard area prior to initiating flight of a launch vehicle or
the reentry of a reentry vehicle to the extent necessary to ensure
compliance with Sec. 450.101.
(b) Verification. The launch or reentry operator must perform
surveillance sufficient to verify or update the assumptions, input
data, and results of the flight safety analyses.
(c) Publication. An operator must publicize warnings for each
flight hazard area, except for regions of land, sea, or air under the
control of the vehicle operator, site operator, or other entity by
agreement. If the operator relies on another entity to publicize these
warnings, it must verify that the warnings have been issued.
(d) Application requirements. An applicant must submit:
(1) A description of how it will provide for day-of-flight
surveillance of flight hazard areas, if necessary, to ensure that the
presence of any member of the public in or near a flight hazard area is
consistent with flight commit criteria developed for each launch or
reentry as required by Sec. 450.165(b); and
(2) A description of how it will establish flight commit criteria
based on the results of its toxic release hazard analysis, containment
analysis, or toxic risk assessment for any necessary evacuation of the
public from any toxic hazard area.
Sec. 450.163 Lightning hazard mitigation.
(a) Lighting hazard mitigation. An operator must--
(1) Establish flight commit criteria that mitigate the potential
for a launch or reentry vehicle intercepting or initiating a lightning
strike, or encountering a nearby discharge, using a means of compliance
accepted by the Administrator;
(2) Use a vehicle designed to continue safe flight in the event of
a direct lightning strike or nearby discharge; or
(3) Ensure compliance with Sec. 450.101, given any direct
lightning strike or an encounter with a nearby discharge.
(b) Application requirements. (1) An applicant electing to comply
with paragraph (a)(1) of this section must submit flight commit
criteria that mitigate the potential for a launch or reentry vehicle
intercepting or initiating a direct lightning strike, or encountering a
nearby lightning discharge.
(2) An applicant electing to comply with paragraph (a)(2) of this
section must submit documentation providing evidence that the vehicle
is designed to protect safety-critical systems against the effects of a
direct lightning strike or nearby discharge.
(3) An applicant electing to comply with paragraph (a)(3) of this
section must submit documentation providing evidence that the safety
criteria in Sec. 450.101 will be met given any direct lightning strike
or an encounter with a nearby discharge.
Sec. 450.165 Flight safety rules.
(a) General. For each launch or reentry, an operator must establish
and observe flight safety rules that govern the conduct of the launch
or reentry.
(b) Flight commit criteria. The flight safety rules must include
flight commit criteria that identify each condition necessary prior to
flight of a launch vehicle or the reentry of a reentry vehicle to
satisfy the requirements of Sec. 450.101, and must include:
(1) Surveillance of any region of land, sea, or air in accordance
with Sec. 450.161;
(2) Monitoring of any meteorological condition necessary to--
(i) Be consistent with any safety analysis required by this part;
and
(ii) If necessary in accordance with Sec. 450.163, mitigate the
potential for a launch or reentry vehicle intercepting a lightning
strike, or encountering a nearby discharge;
[[Page 15439]]
(3) Implementation of any launch or reentry window closure in the
launch or reentry window for the purpose of collision avoidance in
accordance with Sec. 450.169;
(4) Confirmation that any safety-critical system is ready for
flight;
(5) For any reentry vehicle, except a suborbital vehicle,
monitoring by the operator or an on board system that the status of
safety-critical systems are healthy before enabling reentry flight, to
assure the vehicle can reenter safely to Earth; and
(6) Any other hazard controls derived from any safety analysis
required by this part.
(c) Flight abort rules. (1) For a vehicle that uses a flight safety
system, the flight safety rules must identify the conditions under
which the flight safety system, including the functions of any flight
abort crew, must abort the flight to:
(i) Ensure compliance with Sec. 450.101; and
(ii) Prevent debris capable of causing a casualty from impacting in
uncontrolled areas if the vehicle is outside the limits of a useful
mission.
(2) Vehicle data required to evaluate flight abort rules must be
available to the flight safety system across the range of normal and
malfunctioning flight.
(3) The flight abort rules must include the following:
(i) The flight safety system must abort flight when valid, real-
time data indicate the vehicle has violated any flight safety limit;
(ii) The flight safety system must abort flight when the vehicle
state approaches conditions that are anticipated to compromise the
capability of the flight safety system and further flight has the
potential to violate a flight safety limit;
(iii) The flight safety system must incorporate data loss flight
times to abort flight at the first possible violation of a flight
safety limit, or earlier, if valid tracking data is insufficient for
evaluating a minimum set of flight abort rules required to maintain
compliance with Sec. 450.101; and
(iv) Flight may continue past any gate established under Sec.
450.125 only if the parameters used to establish the ability of the
vehicle to complete a useful mission are within limits.
(d) Application requirements. An applicant must submit:
(1) For flight commit criteria, a list of all flight commit
criteria; and
(2) For flight abort rules:
(i) A description of each rule, and the parameters that will be
used to evaluate each rule;
(ii) A list that identifies the rules necessary for compliance with
each requirement in Sec. 450.101; and
(iii) A description of the vehicle data that will be available to
evaluate flight abort rules across the range of normal and
malfunctioning flight.
Sec. 450.167 Tracking.
(a) Vehicle tracking. During the flight of a launch or reentry
vehicle, an operator must measure and record in real time the position
and velocity of the vehicle. The system used to track the vehicle must
provide data to determine the actual impact locations of all stages and
components, and to obtain vehicle performance data for comparison with
the preflight performance predictions.
(b) Application requirements. An applicant must identify and
describe each method or system used to meet the tracking requirements
of paragraph (a) of this section.
Sec. 450.169 Launch and reentry collision avoidance analysis
requirements.
(a) Criteria. For an orbital or suborbital launch or reentry, an
operator must establish window closures needed to ensure that the
launch or reentry vehicle, any jettisoned components, or payloads meet
the following requirements with respect to orbiting objects, not
including any object being launched or reentered.
(1) For inhabitable objects, one of three criteria in paragraphs
(a)(1)(i) through (iii) of this section must be met:
(i) The probability of collision between the launching or
reentering objects and any inhabitable object must not exceed 1 x
10-6;
(ii) The launching or reentering objects must maintain an
ellipsoidal separation distance of 200 km in-track and 50 km cross-
track and radially from the inhabitable object; or
(iii) The launching or reentering objects must maintain a spherical
separation distance of 200 km from the inhabitable object.
(2) For objects that are neither orbital debris nor inhabitable,
one of the two criteria in paragraphs (a)(2)(i) and (ii) of this
section must be met:
(i) The probability of collision between the launching or
reentering objects and any object must not exceed 1 x 10-5;
or
(ii) The launching or reentering objects must maintain a spherical
separation distance of 25 km from the object.
(3) For all other known orbital debris identified by the FAA or
other Federal Government entity as 10 cm squared or larger, the
launching or reentering objects must maintain a spherical separation
distance of 2.5 km from the object.
(b) Screening time. A launch or reentry operator must ensure the
requirements of paragraph (a) of this section are follows:
(1) Through the entire flight of a suborbital launch vehicle;
(2) For an orbital launch, during ascent from a minimum of 150 km
to initial orbital insertion and for a minimum of 3 hours from liftoff;
(3) For reentry, during descent from initial reentry burn to 150 km
altitude; and
(4) For disposal, during descent from initial disposal burn to 150
km altitude.
(c) Rendezvous. Planned rendezvous operations that occur within the
screening time frame are not considered a violation of collision
avoidance if the involved operators have pre-coordinated the rendezvous
or close approach.
(d) Analysis not required. A launch collision avoidance analysis is
not required if the maximum altitude attainable by a launch operator's
suborbital launch vehicle and any released debris is less than 150 km.
The maximum altitude attainable means an optimized trajectory, assuming
maximum performance within 99.7% confidence bounds, extended through
fuel exhaustion of each stage, to achieve a maximum altitude.
(e) Analysis. Collision avoidance analysis must be obtained for
each launch or reentry from a Federal entity identified by the FAA.
(1) An operator must use the results of the collision avoidance
analysis to establish flight commit criteria for collision avoidance;
and
(2) Account for uncertainties associated with launch or reentry
vehicle performance and timing, and ensure that each window closure
incorporates all additional time periods associated with such
uncertainties.
(f) Timing and information required. An operator must prepare a
collision avoidance analysis worksheet for each launch or reentry using
a standardized format that contains the input data required by appendix
A to this part, as follows:
(1) An operator must file the input data with a Federal entity
identified by the FAA and the FAA at least 15 days before the first
attempt at the flight of a launch vehicle or the reentry of a reentry
vehicle, unless the Administrator agrees to a different time frame in
accordance with Sec. 404.15 of this chapter;
(2) An operator must obtain a collision avoidance analysis
performed by a Federal entity identified by the FAA 6 hours before the
beginning of a launch or reentry window; and
(3) If an operator needs an updated collision avoidance analysis
due to a launch or reentry delay, the operator
[[Page 15440]]
must file the request with the Federal entity and the FAA at least 12
hours prior to the beginning of the new launch or reentry window.
Sec. 450.171 Safety at end of launch.
(a) Debris mitigation. An operator must ensure for any proposed
launch that for all vehicle stages or components that reach Earth
orbit--
(1) There is no unplanned physical contact between the vehicle or
any of its components and the payload after payload separation;
(2) Debris generation does not result from the conversion of energy
sources into energy that fragments the vehicle or its components.
Energy sources include chemical, pressure, and kinetic energy; and
(3) For all vehicle stages or components that are left in orbit,
stored energy is removed by depleting residual fuel and leaving all
fuel line valves open, venting any pressurized system, leaving all
batteries in a permanent discharge state, and removing any remaining
source of stored energy.
(b) Application requirements. An applicant must demonstrate
compliance with the requirements in paragraph (a) of this section.
Sec. 450.173 Mishap plan--reporting, response, and investigation
requirements.
(a) General. An operator must report, respond, and investigate
class 1, 2, 3, and 4 mishaps, as defined in Sec. 401.5 of this
chapter, in accordance with paragraphs (b) through (h) of this section
using a plan or other written means.
(b) Responsibilities. An operator must document--
(1) Responsibilities for personnel assigned to implement the
requirements of this section;
(2) Reporting responsibilities for personnel assigned to conduct
investigations and for anyone retained by the licensee to conduct or
participate in investigations; and
(3) Allocation of roles and responsibilities between the launch
operator and any site operator for reporting, responding to, and
investigating any mishap during ground activities at the site.
(c) Cooperation with FAA and NTSB. An operator must report to, and
cooperate with, the FAA and NTSB investigations and designate one or
more points of contact for the FAA and NTSB.
(d) Mishap reporting requirements. An operator must--
(1) Immediately notify the FAA Washington Operations Center in case
of a mishap that involves a fatality or serious injury (as defined in
49 CFR 830.2);
(2) Notify within 24 hours the FAA Washington Operations Center in
the case of a mishap that does not involve a fatality or serious injury
(as defined in 49 CFR 830.2); and
(3) Submit a written preliminary report to the FAA Office of
Commercial Space Transportation within five days of any mishap. The
preliminary report must include the following information, as
applicable:
(i) Date and time of the mishap;
(ii) Description of the mishap and sequence of events leading to
the mishap, to the extent known;
(iii) Intended and actual location of the launch or reentry or
other landing on Earth;
(iv) Vehicle or debris impact points, including those outside a
planned landing or impact area;
(v) Identification of the vehicle;
(vi) Identification of any payload;
(vii) Number and general description of any fatalities or injuries;
(viii) Description and estimated costs of any property damage;
(ix) Identification of hazardous materials, as defined in Sec.
401.5 of this chapter, involved in the event, whether on the vehicle,
any payload, or on the ground;
(x) Action taken by any person to contain the consequences of the
event;
(xi) Weather conditions at the time of the event; and
(xii) Potential consequences for other similar vehicles, systems,
or operations.
(e) Emergency response requirements. An operator must--
(1) Activate emergency response services to protect the public
following a mishap as necessary including, but not limited to:
(i) Evacuating and rescuing members of the public, taking into
account debris dispersion and toxic plumes; and
(ii) Extinguishing fires;
(2) Maintain existing hazard area surveillance and clearance as
necessary to protect public safety;
(3) Contain and minimize the consequences of a mishap, including:
(i) Securing impact areas to ensure that no members of the public
enter;
(ii) Safely disposing of hazardous materials; and
(iii) Controlling hazards at the site or impact areas;
(4) Preserve data and physical evidence; and
(5) Implement agreements with government authorities and emergency
response services, as necessary, to satisfy the requirements of this
section.
(f) Mishap investigation requirements. In the event of a mishap, an
operator must--
(1) Investigate the root causes of the mishap; and
(2) Report investigation results to the FAA.
(g) Preventative measures. An operator must identify and implement
preventive measures for avoiding recurrence of the mishap prior to the
next flight, unless otherwise approved by the Administrator.
(h) Mishap records. An operator must maintain records associated
with the mishap in accordance with Sec. 450.219(b).
(i) Application requirements. An applicant must submit the plan or
other written means required by this section.
Sec. 450.175 Test-induced damage.
(a) Coordination of anticipated test-induced damage. Test-induced
damage is not a mishap if all of the following are true:
(1) An operator coordinates potential test-induced damage with the
FAA before the planned activity, and with sufficient time for the FAA
to evaluate the operator's proposal during the application process or
as a license modification; and
(2) The test-induced damage did not result in any of the following:
(i) Serious injury or fatality (as defined in 49 CFR 830.2);
(ii) Damage to property not associated with the licensed activity;
and
(iii) Hazardous debris leaving the pre-defined hazard area; or
(3) The test-induced damage falls within the scope of activities
coordinated with the FAA in paragraph (a)(1) of this section.
(b) Application requirements. An applicant must submit the
following information:
(1) Test objectives;
(2) Test limits;
(3) Expected outcomes;
(4) Potential risks, including the applicant's best understanding
of the uncertainties in environments, test limits, or system
performance;
(5) Applicable procedures;
(6) Expected time and duration of the test; and
(7) Additional information as required by the FAA to ensure
protection of public health and safety, safety of property, and the
national security and foreign policy interests of the United States.
Sec. 450.177 Unique policies, requirements, and practices.
(a) Operator identified unique hazards. An operator must review
operations, system designs, analysis, and testing, and identify any
unique hazards not otherwise addressed by this part. An operator must
implement any
[[Page 15441]]
unique safety policy, requirement, or practice needed to protect the
public from the unique hazard.
(b) FAA unique policy, requirement, or practice. The FAA may
identify and impose a unique policy, requirement, or practice as needed
to protect the public health and safety, safety of property, and the
national security and foreign policy interests of the United States.
(c) Application requirements. (1) An operator must identify any
unique safety policy, requirement, or practice necessary in accordance
with paragraph (a) of this section, and demonstrate that each unique
safety policy, requirement, or practice protects public health and
safety and the safety of property.
(2) An operator must demonstrate that each unique safety policy,
requirement, or practice imposed by the FAA in accordance with
paragraph (b) of this section, protects public health and safety,
safety of property, and the national security and foreign policy
interests of the United States.
Ground Safety
Sec. 450.179 Ground safety--general.
At a U.S. launch or reentry site, an operator must protect the
public from adverse effects of hazardous operations and systems
associated with--
(a) Preparing a launch vehicle for flight;
(b) Returning a launch or reentry vehicle to a safe condition after
landing, or after an aborted launch attempt; and
(c) Returning a site to a safe condition.
Sec. 450.181 Coordination with a site operator.
(a) General. For a launch or reentry conducted from or to a Federal
launch or reentry site or a site licensed under part 420 or 433 of this
chapter, an operator must coordinate with the site operator to ensure--
(1) Public access is controlled where and when necessary to protect
public safety;
(2) Launch or reentry operations are coordinated with other launch
and reentry operators and other affected parties to prevent unsafe
interference;
(3) Any ground hazard area that affects the operations of a launch
or reentry site is coordinated with the Federal or licensed launch or
reentry site operator; and
(4) Prompt and effective response in the event of a mishap that
could impact public safety.
(b) Licensed site operator. For a launch or reentry conducted from
or to a site licensed under part 420 or 433 of this chapter, an
operator must also coordinate with the site operator to establish roles
and responsibilities for reporting, responding to, and investigating
any mishap during ground activities at the site.
(c) Application requirements. An applicant must describe how it is
coordinating with a Federal or licensed launch or reentry site operator
in compliance with this section.
Sec. 450.183 Explosive site plan.
(a) Exclusive use sites. For a launch or reentry conducted from or
to a site exclusive to its own use, an operator must comply with the
explosive siting requirements of Sec. Sec. 420.63, 420.65, 420.66,
420.67, 420.69, and 420.70 of this chapter.
(b) Application requirements. An applicant must submit an explosive
site plan in accordance with paragraph (a) of this section.
Sec. 450.185 Ground hazard analysis.
An operator must perform and document a ground hazard analysis, and
continue to maintain it throughout the lifecycle of the launch or
reentry system. The analysis must--
(a) Hazard identification. Identify system and operation hazards
posed by the vehicle and ground hardware, including site and ground
support equipment. Hazards identified must include the following:
(1) System hazards, including:
(i) Vehicle over-pressurization;
(ii) Sudden energy release, including ordnance actuation;
(iii) Ionizing and non-ionizing radiation;
(iv) Fire or deflagration;
(v) Radioactive materials;
(vi) Toxic release;
(vii) Cryogens;
(viii) Electrical discharge; and
(ix) Structural failure; and
(2) Operation hazards, including:
(i) Propellant handling and loading;
(ii) Transporting of vehicle or vehicle components;
(iii) Vehicle testing; and
(iv) Vehicle or system activation.
(b) Hazard assessment. Assess each hazard's likelihood and
severity.
(c) Risk criteria. Ensure that the risk associated with each hazard
meets the following criteria:
(1) The likelihood of any hazardous condition that may cause death
or serious injury to the public must be extremely remote; and
(2) The likelihood of any hazardous condition that may cause major
damage to public property or critical assets must be remote.
(d) Risk elimination and mitigation. Identify and describe the risk
elimination and mitigation measures required to satisfy paragraph (c)
of this section.
(e) Validation and verification. Demonstrate that the risk
elimination and mitigation measures achieve the risk levels of
paragraph (c) of this section through validation and verification.
Verification includes:
(1) Analysis;
(2) Test;
(3) Demonstration; or
(4) Inspection.
(f) Application requirements. An applicant must submit--
(1) A description of the methodology used to perform the ground
hazard analysis;
(2) A list of all systems and operations that may cause a hazard
involving the vehicle or any payload; and
(3) The ground hazard analysis products of paragraphs (a) through
(e) of this section, including data that verifies the risk elimination
and mitigation measures.
Sec. 450.187 Toxic hazards mitigation for ground operations.
(a) Applicability. This section applies to any launch or reentry
vehicle, including all vehicle components and payloads, that use toxic
propellants or other toxic chemicals.
(b) Toxic release hazard analysis. An operator must conduct a toxic
release hazard analysis that--
(1) Accounts for any toxic release that could occur during nominal
or non-nominal launch or reentry ground operations;
(2) Includes a worst-case release scenario analysis or a maximum-
credible release scenario analysis for each process that involves a
toxic propellant or other chemical;
(3) Determines if toxic release can occur based on an evaluation of
the chemical compositions and quantities of propellants, other
chemicals, vehicle materials, and projected combustion products, and
the possible toxic release scenarios;
(4) Accounts for both normal combustion products and any unreacted
propellants and phase change or chemical derivatives of released
substances; and
(5) Accounts for any operational constraints and emergency
procedures that provide protection from toxic release.
(c) Toxic containment. An operator using toxic containment must
manage the risk of casualty from the exposure to toxic release either
by--
(1) Evacuating, or being prepared to evacuate, the public from a
toxic hazard area, where an average member of the public would be
exposed to greater than one percent conditional individual probability
of casualty in the event of a
[[Page 15442]]
worst-case release or maximum credible release scenario; or
(2) Employing meteorological constraints to limit a ground
operation to times during which prevailing winds and other conditions
ensure that an average member of the public would not be exposed to
greater than one percent conditional individual probability of casualty
in the event of a worst-case release or maximum credible release
scenario.
(d) Toxic risk assessment. An operator using toxic risk assessment
must manage the risk from any toxic release hazard and demonstrate
compliance with the criteria in Sec. 450.109(a)(3). A toxic risk
assessment must--
(1) Account for airborne concentration and duration thresholds of
toxic propellants or other chemicals. For any toxic propellant, other
chemicals, or combustion product, an operator must use airborne toxic
concentration and duration thresholds identified in a means of
compliance accepted by the Administrator;
(2) Account for physical phenomena expected to influence any toxic
concentration and duration in the area surrounding the potential
release site;
(3) Determine a toxic hazard area for each process, surrounding the
potential release site for each toxic propellant or other chemical
based on the amount and toxicity of the propellant or other chemical,
the exposure duration, and the meteorological conditions involved;
(4) Account for all members of the public that may be exposed to
the toxic release; and
(5) Account for any risk mitigation measures applied in the risk
assessment.
(e) Application requirements. An applicant must submit:
(1) The identity of the toxic propellant, chemical, or toxic
combustion products in the possible toxic release;
(2) The applicant's selected airborne toxic concentration and
duration thresholds;
(3) The meteorological conditions for the atmospheric transport and
buoyant cloud rise of any toxic release from its source to downwind
receptor locations;
(4) Characterization of the terrain, as input for modeling the
atmospheric transport of a toxic release from its source to downwind
receptor locations;
(5) The identity of the toxic dispersion model used, and any other
input data;
(6) Representative results of an applicant's toxic dispersion
modeling to predict concentrations and durations at selected downwind
receptor locations, to determine the toxic hazard area for a released
quantity of the toxic substance;
(7) For toxic release hazard analysis in accordance with paragraph
(b) of this section:
(i) A description of the failure modes and associated relative
probabilities for potential toxic release scenarios used in the risk
evaluation; and
(ii) The methodology and results of an applicant's determination of
the worst-case or maximum-credible quantity of any toxic release that
might occur during ground operations;
(8) For toxic risk assessment in accordance with paragraph (d) of
this section:
(i) A demonstration that the public will not be exposed to airborne
concentrations above the toxic concentration and duration thresholds,
based upon the representative results of the toxic release hazard
analysis;
(ii) The population density in receptor locations that are
identified by toxic dispersion modeling as toxic hazard areas;
(iii) A description of any risk mitigation measures applied in the
toxic risk assessment; and
(iv) The identity of the population database used; and
(9) Additional products that allow an independent analysis, as
requested by the Administrator.
Sec. 450.189 Ground safety prescribed hazard controls.
(a) General. In addition to the hazard controls derived form an
operator's ground hazard analysis and toxic hazard analysis, an
operator must comply with paragraphs (b) through (e) of this section.
(b) Protection of public on the site. An operator must document a
process for protecting members of the public who enter any area under
the control of a launch or reentry operator, including:
(1) Procedures for identifying and tracking the public while on the
site; and
(2) Methods the operator uses to protect the public from hazards in
accordance with the ground hazard analysis and toxic hazard analysis.
(c) Countdown abort. Following a countdown abort or recycle
operation, an operator must establish, maintain, and perform procedures
for controlling hazards related to the vehicle and returning the
vehicle, stages, or other flight hardware and site facilities to a safe
condition. When a launch vehicle does not liftoff after a command to
initiate flight was sent, an operator must--
(1) Ensure that the vehicle and any payload are in a safe
configuration;
(2) Prohibit entry of the public into any identified hazard areas
until the site is returned to a safe condition; and
(3) Maintain and verify that any flight safety system remains
operational until verification that the launch vehicle does not
represent a risk of inadvertent flight.
(d) Fire suppression. An operator must have reasonable precautions
in place to report and control any fire caused by licensed activities.
(e) Emergency procedures. An operator must have general emergency
procedures that apply to any emergencies not covered by the mishap plan
of Sec. 450.173 that may create a hazard to the public.
(f) Application requirements. An applicant must submit the process
for protecting members of the public who enter any area under the
control of a launch or reentry operator in accordance with paragraph
(b) of this section.
Subpart D--Terms and Conditions of a Vehicle Operator License
Sec. 450.201 Public safety responsibility.
A licensee is responsible for ensuring public safety and safety of
property during the conduct of a licensed launch or reentry.
Sec. 450.203 Compliance with license.
A licensee must conduct a licensed launch or reentry in accordance
with representations made in its license application, the requirements
of subpart C of this part and this subpart, and the terms and
conditions contained in the license. A licensee's failure to act in
accordance with the representations made in the license application,
the requirements of subpart C of this part and this subpart, and the
terms and conditions contained in the license, is sufficient basis for
the revocation of a license or other appropriate enforcement action.
Sec. 450.205 Financial responsibility requirements.
A licensee must comply with financial responsibility requirements
as required by part 440 of this chapter and as specified in a license
or license order.
Sec. 450.207 Human spaceflight requirements.
A licensee conducting a launch or reentry with a human being on
board the vehicle must comply with human spaceflight requirements as
required by part 460 of this chapter and as specified in a license or
license order.
Sec. 450.209 Compliance monitoring.
(a) A licensee must allow access by, and cooperate with, Federal
officers or employees or other individuals authorized by the FAA to
observe any of its activities, or of its contractors or
[[Page 15443]]
subcontractors, associated with the conduct of a licensed launch or
reentry.
(b) For each licensed launch or reentry, a licensee must provide
the FAA with a console or other means for monitoring the progress of
the countdown and communication on all channels of the countdown
communications network. A licensee must also provide the FAA with the
capability to communicate with the mission director designated by Sec.
450.103(a)(1).
(c) If the FAA finds a licensee has not complied with any of the
requirements in subpart C of this part or this subpart, the FAA may
require the licensee to revise its procedures to achieve compliance.
Sec. 450.211 Continuing accuracy of license application; application
for modification of license.
(a) A licensee is responsible for the continuing accuracy of
representations contained in its application for the entire term of the
license. After a license has been issued, a licensee must apply to the
FAA for modification of the license if--
(1) The licensee proposes to conduct a launch or reentry in a
manner not authorized by the license; or
(2) Any representation contained in the license application that is
material to public health and safety or the safety of property is no
longer accurate and complete or does not reflect the licensee's
procedures governing the actual conduct of a launch or reentry. A
change is material to public health and safety or the safety of
property if it alters or affects the--
(i) Class of payload;
(ii) Type of launch or reentry vehicle;
(iii) Type or quantity of hazardous material;
(iv) Flight trajectory;
(v) Launch site or reentry site or other landing site; or
(vi) Any system, policy, procedure, requirement, criteria, or
standard that is safety critical.
(b) An application to modify a license must be prepared and
submitted in accordance with part 413 of this chapter. If requested
during the application process, the FAA may approve an alternate method
for requesting license modifications. The licensee must indicate any
part of its license or license application that would be changed or
affected by a proposed modification.
(c) Upon approval of a modification, the FAA issues either a
written approval to the licensee or a license order amending the
license if a stated term or condition of the license is changed, added,
or deleted. An approval has the full force and effect of a license
order and is part of the licensing record.
Sec. 450.213 Preflight reporting.
(a) Preflight reporting methods. An operator must send the
information in this section as an email attachment to
[email protected], or other method as agreed to by the
Administrator in the license.
(b) Mission information. A licensee must submit to the FAA the
following mission-specific information not less than 60 days before
each mission conducted under the license, unless the Administrator
agrees to a different time frame in accordance with Sec. 404.15 of
this chapter in the license, except when the information was provided
in the license application:
(1) Payload information in accordance with Sec. 450.43(i); and
(2) Flight information, including the vehicle, launch site, planned
flight path, staging and impact locations, each payload delivery point,
intended reentry or landing sites including any contingency abort
location, and the location of any disposed launch or reentry vehicle
stage or component that is deorbited.
(c) Flight safety analysis products. An operator must submit to the
FAA updated flight safety analysis products, using previously-approved
methodologies, for each mission no less than 30 days before flight,
unless the Administrator agrees to a different time frame in accordance
with Sec. 404.15 of this chapter in the license.
(1) An operator is not required to submit the flight safety
analysis products if--
(i) The analysis submitted in the license application satisfies all
the requirements of this section; or
(ii) The operator demonstrated during the application process that
the analysis does not need to be updated to account for mission-
specific factors.
(2) If the operator is required to submit the flight safety
analysis products, the operator--
(i) Must account for vehicle and mission specific input data;
(ii) Must account for potential variations in input data that may
affect any analysis product within the final 30 days before flight;
(iii) Must submit the analysis products using the same format and
organization used in its license application; and
(iv) May not change an analysis product within the final 30 days
before flight unless the operator has a process, approved in the
license, for making a change in that period as part of the operator's
flight safety analysis process.
(d) Flight safety system test data. Any licensee that is required
to use a flight safety system to protect public safety as required by
Sec. 450.101(c) must submit to the FAA, or provide the FAA access to,
any test reports, in accordance with approved flight safety system test
plans, no less than 30 days before flight, unless the Administrator
agrees to a different time frame in accordance with Sec. 404.15 of
this chapter in the license. These reports must include:
(1) A summary of the system, subsystem, and component-level test
results, including all test failures and corrective actions
implemented;
(2) A summary of test results demonstrating sufficient margin to
predicted operating environments;
(3) A comparison matrix of the actual qualification and acceptance
test levels used for each component in each test compared against the
predicted flight levels for each environment, including any test
tolerances allowed for each test; and
(4) A clear identification of any components qualified by
similarity analysis or a combination of analysis and test.
(e) Collision avoidance analysis. In accordance with Sec.
450.169(f), at least 15 days before the first attempt at the flight of
a launch vehicle or the reentry of a reentry vehicle, or at least 12
hours prior to the beginning of a new launch or reentry window due to a
launch or reentry delay, unless the Administrator agrees to a different
time frame in accordance with Sec. 404.15 of this chapter, a licensee
must submit to a Federal entity identified by the FAA and the FAA the
collision avoidance information in appendix A to this part.
(f) Launch or reentry schedule. A licensee must file a launch or
reentry schedule that identifies each review, rehearsal, and safety-
critical operation. The schedule must be filed and updated in time to
allow FAA personnel to participate in the reviews, rehearsals, and
safety-critical operations.
Sec. 450.215 Post-flight reporting.
(a) An operator must submit to the FAA the information in paragraph
(b) of this section no later than 90 days after a launch or reentry,
unless the Administrator agrees to a different time frame in accordance
with Sec. 404.15 of this chapter.
(b) An operator must send the following information as an email
attachment to [email protected], or other method as agreed to by
the Administrator in the license:
(1) Any anomaly that occurred during countdown or flight that is
material to
[[Page 15444]]
public health and safety and the safety of property;
(2) Any corrective action implemented or to be implemented after
the flight due to an anomaly or mishap;
(3) The number of humans on board the vehicle;
(4) The actual trajectory flown by the vehicle, if requested by the
FAA; and
(5) For an unguided suborbital launch vehicle, the actual impact
location of all impacting stages and impacting components, if requested
by the FAA.
Sec. 450.217 Registration of space objects.
(a) To assist the U.S. Government in implementing Article IV of the
1975 Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space,
each licensee must submit to the FAA the information required by
paragraph (b) of this section for all objects placed in space by a
licensed launch, including a launch vehicle and any components, except
any object owned and registered by the U.S. Government.
(b) For each object that must be registered in accordance with this
section, not later than 30 days following the conduct of a licensed
launch, an operator must file the following information:
(1) The international designator of the space object;
(2) Date and location of launch;
(3) General function of the space object;
(4) Final orbital parameters, including:
(i) Nodal period;
(ii) Inclination;
(iii) Apogee; and
(iv) Perigee; and
(5) Ownership, and country of ownership, of the space object.
(c) A licensee must notify the FAA when it removes an object that
it has previously placed in space.
Sec. 450.219 Records.
(a) Except as specified in paragraph (b) of this section, a
licensee must maintain for 3 years all records, data, and other
material necessary to verify that a launch or reentry is conducted in
accordance with representations contained in the licensee's
application, the requirements of subpart C of this part and this
subpart, and the terms and conditions contained in the license.
(b) In the event of a class 1 or class 2 mishap, as defined in
Sec. 401.5 of this chapter, a licensee must preserve all records
related to the event. Records must be retained until completion of any
Federal investigation and the FAA advises the licensee that the records
need not be retained. The licensee must make all records required to be
maintained under the regulations available to Federal officials for
inspection and copying.
Appendix A to Part 450--Collision Analysis Worksheet
(a) Launch or reentry information. An operator must file the
following information:
(1) Mission name and launch location. A mnemonic given to the
launch vehicle/payload combination identifying the launch mission
from all others. Launch site location in latitude and longitude;
(2) Launch or reentry window. The launch or reentry window
opening and closing times in Greenwich Mean Time (referred to as
ZULU time) and the Julian dates for each scheduled launch or reentry
attempts including primary and secondary launch or reentry dates;
(3) Epoch. The epoch time, in Greenwich Mean Time (GMT), of the
expected launch vehicle liftoff time;
(4) Segment number. A segment is defined as a launch vehicle
stage or payload after the thrusting portion of its flight has
ended. This includes the jettison or deployment of any stage or
payload. For each segment, an operator must determine the orbital
parameters;
(5) Orbital parameters. An operator must identify the orbital
parameters for all objects achieving orbit including the parameters
for each segment after thrust end (such as SECO-1 and SECO-2);
(6) Orbiting objects to evaluate. An operator must identify all
orbiting object descriptions including object name, length, width,
depth, diameter, and mass;
(7) Time of powered flight and sequence of events. The elapsed
time in hours, minutes, and seconds, from liftoff to passivation or
disposal. The input data must include the time of powered flight for
each stage or jettisoned component measured from liftoff; and
(8) Point of contact. The person or office within an operator's
organization that collects, analyzes, and distributes collision
avoidance analysis results.
(b) Collision avoidance analysis results transmission medium. An
operator must identify the transmission medium, such as voice or
email, for receiving results.
(c) Deliverable schedule/need dates. An operator must identify
the times before flight, referred to as ``L-times,'' for which the
operator requests a collision avoidance analysis. The final
collision avoidance analysis must be used to establish flight commit
criteria for a launch.
(d) Trajectory files. Individual position and velocity
trajectory files, including:
(1) The position coordinates in the Earth-Fixed Greenwich (EFG)
coordinates coordinate system measured in kilometers and the EFG
velocity components measured in kilometers per second, of each
launch vehicle stage or payload starting below 150 km through
screening time frame;
(2) Radar cross section values for each individual file;
(3) Covariance, if probability of impact analysis option is
desired; and
(4) Separate trajectory files identified by valid window time
frames, if launch or reentry trajectory changes during launch or
reentry window.
(e) Screening. An operator must select spherical, ellipsoidal,
or collision probability screening as defined in this paragraph (e)
for determining any conjunction:
(1) Spherical screening. Spherical screening centers a sphere on
each orbiting object's center-of-mass to determine any conjunction;
(2) Ellipsoidal screening. Ellipsoidal screening utilizes an
impact exclusion ellipsoid of revolution centered on the orbiting
object's center-of-mass to determine any conjunction. An operator
must provide input in the UVW coordinate system in kilometers. The
operator must provide delta-U measured in the radial-track
direction, delta-V measured in the in-track direction, and delta-W
measured in the cross-track direction; or
(3) Probability of Collision. Collision probability is
calculated using position and velocity information with covariance
in both position and velocity.
Issued under authority provided by 49 U.S.C. 106(f) and 51
U.S.C. chapter 509 in Washington, DC, on March 22, 2019.
Wayne R. Monteith,
Associate Administrator, Office of Commercial Space Transportation.
[FR Doc. 2019-05972 Filed 4-12-19; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P