[Federal Register Volume 84, Number 61 (Friday, March 29, 2019)]
[Presidential Documents]
[Pages 12041-12046]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2019-06325]



[[Page 12039]]

Vol. 84

Friday,

No. 61

March 29, 2019

Part II





The President





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Executive Order 13865--Coordinating National Resilience to 
Electromagnetic Pulses
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                         Presidential Documents 
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  Federal Register / Vol. 84 , No. 61 / Friday, March 29, 2019 / 
Presidential Documents  

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 Title 3--
 The President

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                Executive Order 13865 of March 26, 2019

                
Coordinating National Resilience to 
                Electromagnetic Pulses

                By the authority vested in me as President by the 
                Constitution and the laws of the United States of 
                America, it is hereby ordered as follows:

                Section 1. Purpose. An electromagnetic pulse (EMP) has 
                the potential to disrupt, degrade, and damage 
                technology and critical infrastructure systems. Human-
                made or naturally occurring EMPs can affect large 
                geographic areas, disrupting elements critical to the 
                Nation's security and economic prosperity, and could 
                adversely affect global commerce and stability. The 
                Federal Government must foster sustainable, efficient, 
                and cost-effective approaches to improving the Nation's 
                resilience to the effects of EMPs.

                Sec. 2. Definitions. As used in this order:

                    (a) ``Critical infrastructure'' means systems and 
                assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the 
                United States that the incapacity or destruction of 
                such systems and assets would have a debilitating 
                impact on security, national economic security, 
                national public health or safety, or any combination of 
                those matters.
                    (b) ``Electromagnetic pulse'' is a burst of 
                electromagnetic energy. EMPs have the potential to 
                negatively affect technology systems on Earth and in 
                space. A high-altitude EMP (HEMP) is a type of human-
                made EMP that occurs when a nuclear device is detonated 
                at approximately 40 kilometers or more above the 
                surface of Earth. A geomagnetic disturbance (GMD) is a 
                type of natural EMP driven by a temporary disturbance 
                of Earth's magnetic field resulting from interactions 
                with solar eruptions. Both HEMPs and GMDs can affect 
                large geographic areas.
                    (c) ``National Critical Functions'' means the 
                functions of government and the private sector so vital 
                to the United States that their disruption, corruption, 
                or dysfunction would have a debilitating effect on 
                security, national economic security, national public 
                health or safety, or any combination thereof.
                    (d) ``National Essential Functions'' means the 
                overarching responsibilities of the Federal Government 
                to lead and sustain the Nation before, during, and in 
                the aftermath of a catastrophic emergency, such as an 
                EMP that adversely affects the performance of 
                Government.
                    (e) ``Prepare'' and ``preparedness'' mean the 
                actions taken to plan, organize, equip, train, and 
                exercise to build and sustain the capabilities 
                necessary to prevent, protect against, mitigate the 
                effects of, respond to, and recover from those threats 
                that pose the greatest risk to the security of the 
                Nation. These terms include the prediction and 
                notification of impending EMPs.
                    (f) A ``Sector-Specific Agency'' (SSA) is the 
                Federal department or agency that is responsible for 
                providing institutional knowledge and specialized 
                expertise as well as leading, facilitating, or 
                supporting the security and resilience programs and 
                associated activities of its designated critical 
                infrastructure sector in the all-hazards environment. 
                The SSAs are those identified in Presidential Policy 
                Directive 21 of February 12, 2013 (Critical 
                Infrastructure Security and Resilience).

                Sec. 3. Policy. (a) It is the policy of the United 
                States to prepare for the effects of EMPs through 
                targeted approaches that coordinate whole-of-government 
                activities and encourage private-sector engagement. The 
                Federal Government must provide warning of an impending 
                EMP; protect against, respond

[[Page 12042]]

                to, and recover from the effects of an EMP through 
                public and private engagement, planning, and 
                investment; and prevent adversarial events through 
                deterrence, defense, and nuclear nonproliferation 
                efforts. To achieve these goals, the Federal Government 
                shall engage in risk-informed planning, prioritize 
                research and development (R&D) to address the needs of 
                critical infrastructure stakeholders, and, for 
                adversarial threats, consult Intelligence Community 
                assessments.

                    (b) To implement the actions directed in this 
                order, the Federal Government shall promote 
                collaboration and facilitate information sharing, 
                including the sharing of threat and vulnerability 
                assessments, among executive departments and agencies 
                (agencies), the owners and operators of critical 
                infrastructure, and other relevant stakeholders, as 
                appropriate. The Federal Government shall also provide 
                incentives, as appropriate, to private-sector partners 
                to encourage innovation that strengthens critical 
                infrastructure against the effects of EMPs through the 
                development and implementation of best practices, 
                regulations, and appropriate guidance.

                Sec. 4. Coordination. (a) The Assistant to the 
                President for National Security Affairs (APNSA), 
                through National Security Council staff and in 
                consultation with the Director of the Office of Science 
                and Technology Policy (OSTP), shall coordinate the 
                development and implementation of executive branch 
                actions to assess, prioritize, and manage the risks of 
                EMPs. The APNSA shall, on an annual basis, submit a 
                report to the President summarizing progress on the 
                implementation of this order, identifying gaps in 
                capability, and recommending how to address those gaps.

                    (b) To further the Federal R&D necessary to prepare 
                the Nation for the effects of EMPs, the Director of 
                OSTP shall coordinate efforts of agencies through the 
                National Science and Technology Council (NSTC). The 
                Director of OSTP, through the NSTC, shall annually 
                review and assess the R&D needs of agencies conducting 
                preparedness activities for EMPs, consistent with this 
                order.

                Sec. 5. Roles and Responsibilities. (a) The Secretary 
                of State shall:

(i) lead the coordination of diplomatic efforts with United States allies 
and international partners regarding enhancing resilience to the effects of 
EMPs; and

(ii) in coordination with the Secretary of Defense and the heads of other 
relevant agencies, strengthen nuclear nonproliferation and deterrence 
efforts, which would reduce the likelihood of an EMP attack on the United 
States or its allies and partners by limiting the availability of nuclear 
devices.

                    (b) The Secretary of Defense shall:

(i) in cooperation with the heads of relevant agencies and with United 
States allies, international partners, and private-sector entities as 
appropriate, improve and develop the ability to rapidly characterize, 
attribute, and provide warning of EMPs, including effects on space systems 
of interest to the United States;

(ii) provide timely operational observations, analyses, forecasts, and 
other products for naturally occurring EMPs to support the mission of the 
Department of Defense along with United States allies and international 
partners, including the provision of alerts and warnings for natural EMPs 
that may affect weapons systems, military operations, or the defense of the 
United States;

(iii) conduct R&D and testing to understand the effects of EMPs on 
Department of Defense systems and infrastructure, improve capabilities to 
model and simulate the environments and effects of EMPs, and develop 
technologies to protect Department of Defense systems and infrastructure 
from the effects of EMPs to ensure the successful execution of Department 
of Defense missions;

(iv) review and update existing EMP-related standards for Department of 
Defense systems and infrastructure, as appropriate;

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(v) share technical expertise and data regarding EMPs and their potential 
effects with other agencies and with the private sector, as appropriate;

(vi) incorporate attacks that include EMPs as a factor in defense planning 
scenarios; and

(vii) defend the Nation from adversarial EMPs originating outside of the 
United States through defense and deterrence, consistent with the mission 
and national security policy of the Department of Defense.

                    (c) The Secretary of the Interior shall support the 
                research, development, deployment, and operation of 
                capabilities that enhance understanding of variations 
                of Earth's magnetic field associated with EMPs.
                    (d) The Secretary of Commerce shall:

(i) provide timely and accurate operational observations, analyses, 
forecasts, and other products for natural EMPs, exclusive of the 
responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense set forth in subsection 
(b)(ii) of this section; and

(ii) use the capabilities of the Department of Commerce, the private 
sector, academia, and nongovernmental organizations to continuously improve 
operational forecasting services and the development of standards for 
commercial EMP technology.

                    (e) The Secretary of Energy shall conduct early-
                stage R&D, develop pilot programs, and partner with 
                other agencies and the private sector, as appropriate, 
                to characterize sources of EMPs and their couplings to 
                the electric power grid and its subcomponents, 
                understand associated potential failure modes for the 
                energy sector, and coordinate preparedness and 
                mitigation measures with energy sector partners.
                    (f) The Secretary of Homeland Security shall:

(i) provide timely distribution of information on EMPs and credible 
associated threats to Federal, State, and local governments, critical 
infrastructure owners and operators, and other stakeholders;

(ii) in coordination with the heads of any relevant SSAs, use the results 
of risk assessments to better understand and enhance resilience to the 
effects of EMPs across all critical infrastructure sectors, including 
coordinating the identification of national critical functions and the 
prioritization of associated critical infrastructure at greatest risk to 
the effects of EMPs;

(iii) coordinate response to and recovery from the effects of EMPs on 
critical infrastructure, in coordination with the heads of appropriate 
SSAs;

(iv) incorporate events that include EMPs as a factor in preparedness 
scenarios and exercises;

(v) in coordination with the heads of relevant SSAs, conduct R&D to better 
understand and more effectively model the effects of EMPs on national 
critical functions and associated critical infrastructure--excluding 
Department of Defense systems and infrastructure--and develop technologies 
and guidelines to enhance these functions and better protect this 
infrastructure;

(vi) maintain survivable means to provide necessary emergency information 
to the public during and after EMPs; and

(vii) in coordination with the Secretaries of Defense and Energy, and 
informed by intelligence-based threat assessments, develop quadrennial risk 
assessments on EMPs, with the first risk assessment delivered within 1 year 
of the date of this order.

                    (g) The Director of National Intelligence shall:

(i) coordinate the collection, analysis, and promulgation, as appropriate, 
of intelligence-based assessments on adversaries' capabilities to conduct 
an attack utilizing an EMP and the likelihood of such an attack; and

[[Page 12044]]

(ii) provide intelligence-based threat assessments to support the heads of 
relevant SSAs in the development of quadrennial risk assessments on EMPs.

                    (h) The heads of all SSAs, in coordination with the 
                Secretary of Homeland Security, shall enhance and 
                facilitate information sharing with private-sector 
                counterparts, as appropriate, to enhance preparedness 
                for the effects of EMPs, to identify and share 
                vulnerabilities, and to work collaboratively to reduce 
                vulnerabilities.
                    (i) The heads of all agencies that support National 
                Essential Functions shall ensure that their all-hazards 
                preparedness planning sufficiently addresses EMPs, 
                including through mitigation, response, and recovery, 
                as directed by national preparedness policy.

                Sec. 6. Implementation. (a) Identifying national 
                critical functions and associated priority critical 
                infrastructure at greatest risk.

(i) Within 90 days of the date of this order, the Secretary of Homeland 
Security, in coordination with the heads of SSAs and other agencies as 
appropriate, shall identify and list the national critical functions and 
associated priority critical infrastructure systems, networks, and assets, 
including space-based assets that, if disrupted, could reasonably result in 
catastrophic national or regional effects on public health or safety, 
economic security, or national security. The Secretary of Homeland Security 
shall update this list as necessary.

(ii) Within 1 year of the identification described in subsection (a)(i) of 
this section, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with the 
heads of other agencies as appropriate, shall, using appropriate government 
and private-sector standards for EMPs, assess which identified critical 
infrastructure systems, networks, and assets are most vulnerable to the 
effects of EMPs. The Secretary of Homeland Security shall provide this list 
to the President, through the APNSA. The Secretary of Homeland Security 
shall update this list using the results produced pursuant to subsection 
(b) of this section, and as necessary thereafter.

                    (b) Improving understanding of the effects of EMPs.

(i) Within 180 days of the identification described in subsection (a)(ii) 
of this section, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with 
the heads of SSAs and in consultation with the Director of OSTP and the 
heads of other appropriate agencies, shall review test data--identifying 
any gaps in such data--regarding the effects of EMPs on critical 
infrastructure systems, networks, and assets representative of those 
throughout the Nation.

(ii) Within 180 days of identifying the gaps in existing test data, as 
directed by subsection (b)(i) of this section, the Secretary of Homeland 
Security, in coordination with the heads of SSAs and in consultation with 
the Director of OSTP and the heads of other appropriate agencies, shall use 
the sector partnership structure identified in the National Infrastructure 
Protection Plan to develop an integrated cross-sector plan to address the 
identified gaps. The heads of agencies identified in the plan shall 
implement the plan in collaboration with the private sector, as 
appropriate.

(iii) Within 1 year of the date of this order, and as appropriate 
thereafter, the Secretary of Energy, in consultation with the heads of 
other agencies and the private sector, as appropriate, shall review 
existing standards for EMPs and develop or update, as necessary, 
quantitative benchmarks that sufficiently describe the physical 
characteristics of EMPs, including waveform and intensity, in a form that 
is useful to and can be shared with owners and operators of critical 
infrastructure.

(iv) Within 4 years of the date of this order, the Secretary of the 
Interior shall complete a magnetotelluric survey of the contiguous United 
States to help critical infrastructure owners and operators conduct EMP 
vulnerability assessments.


[[Page 12045]]



                    (c) Evaluating approaches to mitigate the effects 
                of EMPs.

(i) Within 1 year of the date of this order, and every 2 years thereafter, 
the Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with the Secretaries of 
Defense and Energy, and in consultation with the Director of OSTP, the 
heads of other appropriate agencies, and private-sector partners as 
appropriate, shall submit to the President, through the APNSA, a report 
that analyzes the technology options available to improve the resilience of 
critical infrastructure to the effects of EMPs. The Secretaries of Defense, 
Energy, and Homeland Security shall also identify gaps in available 
technologies and opportunities for future technological developments to 
inform R&D activities.

(ii) Within 180 days of the completion of the activities directed by 
subsections (b)(iii) and (c)(i) of this section, the Secretary of Homeland 
Security, in coordination with the heads of other agencies and in 
consultation with the private sector as appropriate, shall develop and 
implement a pilot test to evaluate available engineering approaches for 
mitigating the effects of EMPs on the most vulnerable critical 
infrastructure systems, networks, and assets, as identified in subsection 
(a)(ii) of this section.

(iii) Within 1 year of the date of this order, the Secretary of Homeland 
Security, in coordination with the heads of relevant SSAs, and in 
consultation with appropriate regulatory and utility commissions and other 
stakeholders, shall identify regulatory and non-regulatory mechanisms, 
including cost recovery measures, that can enhance private-sector 
engagement to address the effects of EMPs.

                    (d) Strengthening critical infrastructure to 
                withstand the effects of EMPs.

(i) Within 90 days of completing the actions directed in subsection (c)(ii) 
of this section, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with 
the Secretaries of Defense and Energy and in consultation with the heads of 
other appropriate agencies and with the private sector as appropriate, 
shall develop a plan to mitigate the effects of EMPs on the vulnerable 
priority critical infrastructure systems, networks, and assets identified 
under subsection (a)(ii) of this section. The plan shall align with and 
build on actions identified in reports required by Executive Order 13800 of 
May 11, 2017 (Strengthening the Cybersecurity of Federal Networks and 
Critical Infrastructure). The Secretary of Homeland Security shall 
implement those elements of the plan that are consistent with Department of 
Homeland Security authorities and resources, and report to the APNSA 
regarding any additional authorities and resources needed to complete its 
implementation. The Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with 
the Secretaries of Defense and Energy, shall update the plan as necessary 
based on results from the actions directed in subsections (b) and (c) of 
this section.

(ii) Within 180 days of the completion of the actions identified in 
subsection (c)(i) of this section, the Secretary of Defense, in 
consultation with the Secretaries of Homeland Security and Energy, shall 
conduct a pilot test to evaluate engineering approaches used to harden a 
strategic military installation, including infrastructure that is critical 
to supporting that installation, against the effects of EMPs.

(iii) Within 180 days of completing the pilot test described in subsection 
(d)(ii) of this section, the Secretary of Defense shall report to the 
President, through the APNSA, regarding the cost and effectiveness of the 
evaluated approaches.

                    (e) Improving response to EMPs.

(i) Within 180 days of the date of this order, the Secretary of Homeland 
Security, through the Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency, in coordination with the heads of appropriate SSAs, shall review 
and update Federal response plans, programs, and procedures to account for 
the effects of EMPs.

[[Page 12046]]

(ii) Within 180 days of the completion of actions directed by subsection 
(e)(i) of this section, agencies that support National Essential Functions 
shall update operational plans documenting their procedures and 
responsibilities to prepare for, protect against, and mitigate the effects 
of EMPs.

(iii) Within 180 days of identifying vulnerable priority critical 
infrastructure systems, networks, and assets as directed by subsection 
(a)(ii) of this section, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in 
consultation with the Secretaries of Defense and Commerce, and the Chairman 
of the Federal Communications Commission, shall provide the Deputy 
Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism and 
the Director of OSTP with an assessment of the effects of EMPs on critical 
communications infrastructure, and recommend changes to operational plans 
to enhance national response and recovery efforts after an EMP.

                Sec. 7. General Provisions. (a) Nothing in this order 
                shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:

(i) the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or 
the head thereof; or

(ii) the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget 
relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.

                    (b) This order shall be implemented consistent with 
                applicable law and subject to the availability of 
                appropriations.
                    (c) This order is not intended to, and does not, 
                create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, 
                enforceable at law or in equity by any party against 
                the United States, its departments, agencies, or 
                entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any 
                other person.
                
                
                    (Presidential Sig.)

                THE WHITE HOUSE,

                    March 26, 2019.

[FR Doc. 2019-06325
Filed 3-28-19; 11:15 am]
Billing code 3295-F9-P