[Federal Register Volume 83, Number 248 (Friday, December 28, 2018)]
[Notices]
[Pages 67368-67372]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2018-28203]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket No. 50-219; NRC-2018-0288]
Exelon Generation Company, LLC; Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating
Station
AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
ACTION: Exemption; issuance.
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SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing
exemptions in response to a letter dated March 29, 2018, as
supplemented by a letter dated May 8, 2018, exemption request from
Exelon Generation Company, LLC (Exelon or the licensee). The exemption
permits Exelon to reduce the required level of primary offsite
liability insurance from $450 million to $100 million and to eliminate
the requirement to carry secondary financial protection for Oyster
Creek Nuclear Generating Station.
DATES: The exemption was issued on December 19, 2018.
ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID NRC-2018-0288 when contacting the
[[Page 67369]]
NRC about the availability of information regarding this document. You
may obtain publicly-available information related to this document
using any of the following methods:
Federal Rulemaking Web Site: Go to http://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2018-0288. Address
questions about Docket IDs in Regulations.gov to Krupskaya Castellon;
telephone: 301-287-9221; email: [email protected]. For
technical questions, contact the individual listed in the FOR FURTHER
INFORMATION CONTACT section of this document.
NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System
(ADAMS): You may obtain publicly-available documents online in the
ADAMS Public Documents collection at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To begin the search, select ``Begin Web-based ADAMS
Search.'' For problems with ADAMS, please contact the NRC's Public
Document Room (PDR) reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737, or
by email to [email protected]. The ADAMS accession number for each
document referenced (if it is available in ADAMS) is provided the first
time that it is mentioned in this document.
NRC's PDR: You may examine and purchase copies of public
documents at the NRC's PDR, Room O1-F21, One White Flint North, 11555
Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: John G. Lamb, Office of Nuclear
Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC
20555-0001; telephone: 301-415-3100; email: [email protected].
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The text of the exemption is attached.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 21st day of December 2018.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
John G. Lamb,
Senior Project Manager, Special Projects and Process Branch, Division
of Operating Reactor Licensing, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
Attachment--Exemption
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Docket No. 50-219
Exelon Generation Company, LLC
Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station
Exemption
I. Background.
Exelon Generation Company, LLC (Exelon, the licensee), is the
holder of Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-16 for Oyster
Creek Nuclear Generating Station (Oyster Creek). By letter dated
February 14, 2018 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System
(ADAMS) Accession No. ML18045A084), Exelon submitted to the U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) a certification in accordance
with Sections 50.82(a)(1)(i) of Title 10 of the Code of Federal
Regulations (10 CFR), indicating that it plans to cease permanent
operation no later than October 31, 2018. Exelon permanently ceased
operations at Oyster Creek on September 17, 2018. The facility
consists of a permanently shutdown and defueled boiling-water
reactor located in the town of Forked River, Ocean County, New
Jersey.
II. Request/Action.
By letter dated March 29, 2018 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML18088A849), as supplemented by letter dated May 8, 2018 (ADAMS
Accession No. ML18128A291), Exelon submitted a request for exemption
from 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4), concerning offsite primary and secondary
liability insurance. The exemption from 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4) would
permit Exelon to reduce the required level of primary offsite
liability insurance from $450 million to $100 million and to
eliminate the requirement to carry secondary financial protection
for Oyster Creek.
The regulation at 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4) requires each licensee to
have and maintain primary financial protection in an amount of $450
million. In addition, the licensee is required to participate in an
industry retrospective rating plan (secondary financial protection)
that commits each licensee to pay into an insurance pool to be used
for damages that may exceed primary insurance coverage.
Participation in the industry retrospective rating plan will subject
Exelon to deferred premium charges up to a maximum total deferred
premium of $131,056,000 with respect to any nuclear incident at any
operating nuclear power plant, and up to a maximum annual deferred
premium of $20,496,000 per incident.
The licensee states that the risk of an offsite radiological
release is significantly lower at a nuclear power reactor that has
permanently shut down and defueled, when compared to an operating
power reactor. Similarly, the associated risk of offsite liability
damages that would require insurance or indemnification is
commensurately lower for permanently shut down and defueled plants.
Therefore, Exelon is requesting an exemption from 10 CFR
140.11(a)(4), to permit a reduction in primary offsite liability
insurance and to withdraw from participation in the industry
retrospective rating plan.
III. Discussion.
Pursuant to 10 CFR 140.8, ``Specific exemptions,'' the
Commission may, upon application of any interested person or upon
its own initiative, grant such exemptions from the requirements of
the regulations in 10 CFR part 140, when the exemptions are
authorized by law and are otherwise in the public interest. The NRC
staff has reviewed Exelon's request for an exemption from 10 CFR
140.11(a)(4) and has concluded that the requested exemption is
authorized by law and is otherwise in the public interest.
The Price Anderson Act of 1957 (PAA) requires that nuclear power
reactor licensees have insurance to compensate the public for
damages arising from a nuclear incident. Specifically, the PAA
requires licensees of facilities with a ``rated capacity of 100,000
electrical kilowatts or more'' to maintain the maximum amount of
primary offsite liability insurance commercially available
(currently $450 million) and a specified amount of secondary
insurance coverage (currently up to $131,056,000 per reactor). In
the event of an accident causing offsite damages in excess of $450
million, each licensee would be assessed a prorated share of the
excess damages, up to $131,056,000 per reactor, for a total of
approximately $13 billion per nuclear incident. The NRC's
regulations at 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4) implement these PAA insurance
requirements and set forth the amount of primary and secondary
insurance each power reactor licensee must have.
As noted above, the PAA requirements with respect to primary and
secondary insurance, and the implementing regulations at 10 CFR
140.11(a)(4), apply to licensees of facilities with a ``rated
capacity of 100,000 electrical kilowatts or more.'' When the NRC
issues a license amendment to a decommissioning licensee to reflect
the defueled status of the facility, the license amendment includes
removal of the rated capacity of the reactor from the license.
Accordingly, a reactor that is undergoing decommissioning has no
``rated capacity.'' Removal of the rated capacity from the facility
of a decommissioning licensee, thus, allows the NRC to take the
reactor licensee out of the category of reactor licensees that are
required to maintain the maximum available insurance and to
participate in the secondary retrospective insurance pool under the
PAA, subject to a technical finding that lesser potential hazards
exist at the facility after termination of operations.
The financial protection limits of 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4) were
established to require a licensee to maintain sufficient insurance,
as specified under the PAA, to satisfy liability claims by members
of the public for personal injury, property damage, and the legal
cost associated with lawsuits, as the result of a nuclear accident
at an operating reactor with a rated capacity of 100,000 kilowatts
electric (or greater). Thus, the insurance levels established by
this regulation, as required by the PAA, were associated with the
risks and potential consequences of an accident at an operating
reactor with a rated capacity of 100,000 kilowatts electric (or
greater).
The legal and associated technical basis for granting exemptions
from 10 CFR part 140 is set forth in SECY-93-127, ``Financial
Protection Required of Licensees of Large Nuclear Power Plants
During Decommissioning,'' dated May 10, 1993 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML12257A628). The legal analysis underlying SECY-93-127 concluded
that, upon a technical finding that lesser potential hazards exist
after termination of operations (and removal of the rated capacity),
the Commission has the discretion under the PAA to reduce the amount
of insurance required of a licensee undergoing decommissioning.
As a technical matter, the fact that a reactor has permanently
ceased operations is not
[[Page 67370]]
itself determinative as to whether a licensee may cease providing
the offsite liability coverage required by the PAA and 10 CFR
140.11(a)(4). In light of the presence of freshly discharged
irradiated fuel in the spent fuel pool (SFP) at a recently shutdown
reactor, the primary consideration is the risk of offsite
radiological release from a zirconium fire. That risk generally
remains for about 10-16 months of decay time for the fuel used in
the last cycle of power operation. After that time, the offsite
consequences of an offsite radiological release from a zirconium
fire are negligible for shutdown reactors, but the SFP is still
operational and an inventory of radioactive materials still exists
onsite. Therefore, an evaluation of the potential for offsite damage
is necessary to determine the appropriate level of offsite insurance
post shutdown, in accordance with the Commission's discretionary
authority under the PAA to establish an appropriate level of
required financial protection for such shutdown facilities.
The NRC staff has conducted an evaluation and concluded that,
aside from the handling, storage, and transportation of spent fuel
and radioactive materials for a permanently shut down and defueled
reactor, no reasonably conceivable potential accident exists that
could cause significant offsite damage. During normal power reactor
operations, the forced flow of water through the reactor coolant
system removes heat generated by the reactor. The reactor coolant
system transfers this heat away from the reactor core by converting
reactor feedwater to steam, which then flows to the main turbine
generator to produce electricity. Most of the accident scenarios
postulated for operating power reactors involve failures or
malfunctions of systems that could affect the fuel in the reactor
core, which in the most severe postulated accidents, would involve
the release of large quantities of fission products. With the
permanent cessation of reactor operations at Oyster Creek and the
permanent removal of the fuel from the reactor core, such accidents
are no longer possible. The reactor, reactor coolant system, and
supporting systems no longer operate and have no function related to
the storage of the irradiated fuel. Therefore, postulated accidents
involving failure or malfunction of the reactor, reactor coolant
system, or supporting systems are no longer applicable.
During reactor decommissioning, the principal radiological risks
are associated with the storage of spent fuel onsite. On a case-by-
case basis, licensees undergoing decommissioning have been granted
permission to reduce the required amount of primary offsite
liability insurance coverage from $450 million to $100 million and
to withdraw from the secondary insurance pool. One of the technical
criteria for granting the exemption is that the possibility of a
design-basis event that could cause significant offsite damage has
been eliminated.
The NRC staff performed an evaluation of the design-basis
accidents for Oyster Creek being permanently defueled as part of
SECY-18-0062, ``Request by the Exelon Generation Company, LLC for
Exemptions from Certain Emergency Planning Requirements for the
Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station,'' dated May 31, 2018 (ADAMS
Accession No. ML18030B340).
The licensee has stated, and the NRC staff agrees, that while
spent fuel remains in the SFP, the only postulated design-basis
accident that would remain applicable to Oyster Creek in the
permanently defueled condition that could contribute a significant
dose will be a fuel handling accident (FHA) in the Reactor Building,
where the SFP is located. For completeness, the NRC staff also
evaluated the applicability of other design-basis accidents
documented in the Oyster Creek Updated Final Safety Analysis Report
(UFSAR) (ADAMS Accession No. ML15307A558), to ensure that these
accidents would not have consequences that could potentially exceed
the 10 CFR 50.67 dose limits and Regulatory Guide 1.183,
``Alternative Radiological Source Terms for Evaluating Design Basis
Accidents at Nuclear Power Reactors,'' dose acceptance criteria or
approach the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) early phase
protective action guides (PAGs).
In the Oyster Creek UFSAR, the licensee has determined that
within 33 days after shutdown, the FHA doses would decrease to a
level that would not warrant protective actions under the EPA early
phase PAG framework, notwithstanding meeting the dose limit
requirements under 10 CFR 50.67 and dose acceptance criteria under
Regulatory Guide 1.183.
The NRC staff notes that the doses from an FHA are dominated by
the isotope Iodine-131. The date of cessation of power operations of
Oyster Creek occurred on September 17, 2018. With 12 months of
decay, the thyroid dose from an FHA would be negligible. After 12
months of decay, the only isotope remaining in significant amounts,
among those postulated to be released in a design-basis accident
FHA, would be Krypton-85. Since Krypton-85 primarily decays by beta
emission, the calculated skin dose from an FHA analysis would make
an insignificant contribution to the total effective dose equivalent
(TEDE), which is the parameter of interest in the determination of
the EPA early phase PAGs for sheltering or evacuation. The NRC staff
concludes that the dose consequence from an FHA for the permanently
defueled Oyster Creek would not approach the EPA early phase PAGs.
Therefore, any offsite consequence from a design-basis radiological
release is unlikely, and a significant amount of offsite liability
insurance coverage is not required.
The only beyond design-basis event that has the potential to
lead to a significant radiological release at a permanently shut
down and defueled (decommissioning) reactor is a zirconium fire. The
zirconium fire scenario is a postulated, but highly unlikely,
accident scenario that involves the loss of water inventory from the
SFP, resulting in a significant heatup of the spent fuel and
culminating in substantial zirconium cladding oxidation and fuel
damage. The probability of a zirconium fire scenario is related to
the decay heat of the irradiated fuel stored in the SFP. Therefore,
the risks from a zirconium fire scenario continue to decrease as a
function of the time that Oyster Creek has been permanently shut
down.
In the analysis provided in Attachment 2, ``Oyster Creek Nuclear
Generating Station Zirconium Fire Analysis for Drained Spent Fuel
Pool (Calculation C-1302-226-E310-457),'' to the application, as
supplemented by letters dated March 8, 2018, and March 19, 2018
(ADAMS Accession Nos. ML18067A087 and ML18078A146, respectively),
the licensee compared the conditions for the hottest fuel assembly
stored in the SFP to a criterion proposed in SECY[dash]99[dash]168,
``Improving Decommissioning Regulations for Nuclear Power Plants,''
dated June 30, 1999 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12265A598), applicable to
offsite emergency response for the unit in the decommissioning
process. This criterion considers the time for the hottest assembly
to heat up from 30 degrees Celsius ([deg]C) to 900 [deg]C
adiabatically. If the heatup time is greater than 10 hours, then
offsite emergency preplanning involving the plant is not necessary.
Based on the limiting fuel assembly for decay heat and adiabatic
heatup analysis presented in Attachment 2, at 12 months (365 days)
after permanent cessation of power operations (i.e., 12 months decay
time), the time for the hottest fuel assembly to reach 900 [deg]C is
10 hours after the assemblies have been uncovered. As stated in
NUREG-1738, ``Technical Study of Spent Fuel Pool Accident Risk at
Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants,'' February 2001 (ADAMS
Accession No. ML010430066), 900 [deg]C is an acceptable temperature
to use for assessing onset of fission product release under
transient conditions (to establish the critical decay time for
determining availability of 10 hours for deployment of mitigation
equipment and, if necessary, for offsite agencies to take
appropriate action to protect the health and safety of the public,
if fuel and cladding oxidation occurs in air).
The NRC staff reviewed the calculation to verify that important
physical properties of materials were within acceptable ranges and
the results were accurate. The NRC staff determined that physical
properties were appropriate. Therefore, the NRC staff found that
after 12 months (365 days), more than 10 hours would be available
before a significant offsite release could begin. The NRC staff
concluded that the adiabatic heatup calculation provided an
acceptable method for determining the minimum time available for
deployment of mitigation equipment and, if necessary, implementing
measures under a comprehensive general emergency plan.
In this regard, one technical criterion for relieving
decommissioning reactor licensees from the insurance obligations
applicable to an operating reactor is a finding that the heat
generated by the SFP has decayed to the point where the possibility
of a zirconium fire is highly unlikely.
This was addressed in SECY-93-127, where the NRC staff concluded
that there was a low likelihood and reduced short-term public health
consequences of a zirconium fire once a decommissioning plant's
spent fuel has sufficiently decayed. In its Staff Requirements
Memorandum, ``Financial Protection Required of Licensees of Large
Nuclear Power Plants during Decommissioning,'' dated July 13, 1993
(ADAMS Accession No. ML003760936), the
[[Page 67371]]
Commission approved a policy that authorized, through the exemption
process, withdrawal from participation in the secondary insurance
layer and a reduction in commercial liability insurance coverage to
$100 million, when a licensee is able to demonstrate that the spent
fuel could be air-cooled if the SFP was drained of water.
The NRC staff has used this technical criterion to grant similar
exemptions to other decommissioning reactors (e.g., Maine Yankee
Atomic Power Station, published in the Federal Register on January
19, 1999 (64 FR 2920); Zion Nuclear Power Station, published in the
Federal Register on December 28, 1999 (64 FR 72700); Kewaunee Power
Station, published in the Federal Register on March 24, 2015 (80 FR
15638); and Crystal River Unit 3 Nuclear Generation Plant, published
in the Federal Register on May 6, 2015 (80 FR 26100)).
Additional discussions of other decommissioning reactor
licensees that have received exemptions to reduce their primary
insurance level to $100 million are provided in
SECY[dash]96[dash]256, ``Changes to the Financial Protection
Requirements for Permanently Shutdown Nuclear Power Reactors, 10 CFR
50.54(w) and 10 CFR 140.11,'' dated December 17, 1996 (ADAMS
Accession No. ML15062A483). These prior exemptions were based on the
licensee demonstrating that the SFP could be air-cooled, consistent
with the technical criterion discussed above.
The NRC staff has evaluated the issue of zirconium fires in SFPs
and presented an independent evaluation of a SFP subject to a severe
earthquake in NUREG-2161, ``Consequence Study of a Beyond-Design-
Basis Earthquake Affecting the Spent Fuel Pool for a U.S. Mark I
Boiling Water Reactor,'' September 2014 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML14255A365). This evaluation concluded that, for a representative
boiling-water reactor, fuel in a dispersed high-density
configuration would be adequately cooled by natural circulation air
flow within several months after discharge from a reactor if the
pool was drained of water.
By letters dated August 22 and December 6, 2017 (ADAMS Accession
Nos. ML17234A082 and ML17340A708, respectively), Exelon confirmed
that the plant design and fuel storage configuration considered in
NUREG-2161 were consistent with the Oyster Creek plant design and
fuel storage configurations to be used in the decommissioning of
Oyster Creek. The NRC staff independently confirmed that the Oyster
Creek fuel assembly decay levels are also consistent with the spent
fuel considered in NUREG-2161. Thus, the NRC staff has determined
that after 12 months (365 days) decay, the fuel stored in the Oyster
Creek SFP will be able to adequately be cooled by air in the
unlikely event of pool drainage.
In SECY-00-0145, ``Integrated Rulemaking Plan for Nuclear Power
Plant Decommissioning,'' dated June 28, 2000, and SECY-01-0100,
``Policy Issues Related to Safeguards, Insurance, and Emergency
Preparedness Regulations at Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants
Storing Fuel in Spent Fuel Pools,'' dated June 4, 2001 (ADAMS
Accession Nos. ML003721626 and ML011450420, respectively), the NRC
staff discussed additional information concerning SFP zirconium fire
risks at decommissioning reactors and associated implications for
offsite insurance. Analyzing when the spent fuel stored in the SFP
is capable of adequate air-cooling is one measure that demonstrates
when the probability of a zirconium fire would be exceedingly low.
The licensee's analyses referenced in its exemption request
demonstrate that under conditions where the SFP water inventory has
drained and only air cooling of the stored irradiated fuel is
available, there is reasonable assurance that 12 months (365 days)
after the certification of permanent removal of fuel from the
reactor vessel that the Oyster Creek spent fuel will remain at
temperatures far below those associated with a significant
radiological release.
In addition, the licensee performed adiabatic heatup analyses,
in which a complete drainage of the SFP is combined with
rearrangement of spent fuel rack geometry and/or the addition of
rubble to the SFP; this type of analysis postulates that decay heat
transfer from the spent fuel via conduction, convection, or
radiation would be impeded. The licensee's adiabatic heatup analyses
demonstrate that 12 months (365 days) after the certification of
permanent removal of the fuel from the reactor vessel, there would
be at least 10 hours after the loss of all means of cooling (both
air and/or water), before the spent fuel cladding would reach a
temperature where the potential for a significant offsite
radiological release could occur.
In Exelon's letter dated March 19, 2018 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML18088A849), the licensee furnished the following information:
``Because of the length of time it would take for the adiabatic
heatup to occur, there is ample time to respond (>=10 hours) to any
drain down event that might cause such an occurrence by restoring
cooling or makeup, or providing spray. As a result, the likelihood
that such a scenario would progress to a zirconium fire is not
deemed credible.''
In the NRC staff's evaluation contained in SECY-18-0062,
``Request by the Exelon Generation Company, LLC for Exemptions from
Certain Emergency Planning Requirements for the Oyster Creek Nuclear
Generating Station,'' dated May 31, 2018 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML18030B340), the NRC staff assessed the Exelon accident analyses
associated with the radiological risks from a zirconium fire at a
permanently shut down and defueled Oyster Creek site. For the very
unlikely beyond design-basis accident scenario where the SFP coolant
inventory is lost in such a manner that all methods of heat removal
from the spent fuel are no longer available, the NRC staff found
there will be a minimum of 10 hours from the initiation of the
accident until the cladding reaches a temperature where offsite
radiological release might occur. The NRC staff finds that 10 hours
is sufficient time to support deployment of mitigation equipment,
consistent with plant conditions, to prevent the zirconium cladding
from reaching a point of rapid oxidation.
The NRC staff has determined that the licensee's proposed
reduction in primary offsite liability coverage to a level of $100
million, and the licensee's proposed withdrawal from participation
in the secondary insurance pool for offsite financial protection,
are consistent with the policy established in SECY-93-127 and
subsequent insurance considerations resulting from zirconium fire
risks, as discussed in SECY-00-0145 and SECY-01-0100. The NRC has
previously determined in SECY-00-0145 that the minimum offsite
financial protection requirement may be reduced to $100 million and
that secondary insurance is not required, once it is determined that
the spent fuel in the SFP is no longer thermal-hydraulically capable
of sustaining a zirconium fire based on a plant-specific analysis.
In addition, the NRC staff notes that similar exemptions from these
insurance requirements, have been granted to other permanently
shutdown and defueled power reactors, upon satisfactory
demonstration that zirconium fire risk from the irradiated fuel
stored in the SFP is of negligible concern.
A. The Exemption is Authorized by Law
The PAA, and its implementing regulations in 10 CFR
140.11(a)(4), require licensees of nuclear reactors that have a
rated capacity of 100,000 kilowatts electric or more to have and
maintain $450 million in primary financial protection and to
participate in a secondary retrospective insurance pool. In
accordance with 10 CFR 140.8, the Commission may grant exemptions
from the regulations in 10 CFR part 140, as the Commission
determines are authorized by law. The legal and associated technical
basis for granting exemptions from 10 CFR part 140 are set forth in
SECY-93-127. The legal analysis underlying SECY-93-127 concluded
that, upon a technical finding that lesser potential hazards exist
after termination of operations, the Commission has the discretion
under the Price-Anderson Act to reduce the amount of insurance
required of a licensee undergoing decommissioning.
Based on its review of Exelon's exemption request, the NRC staff
concludes that the technical criteria for relieving Exelon from its
existing primary and secondary insurance obligations have been met.
As explained above, the NRC staff has concluded that no reasonably
conceivable design-basis accident exists that could cause an offsite
release greater than the EPA PAGs, and therefore, that any offsite
consequence from a design-basis radiological release is unlikely,
and the need for a significant amount of offsite liability insurance
coverage is unwarranted. Additionally, the NRC staff determined
that, after 12 months (365 days) decay, the fuel stored in the
Oyster Creek SFP will be able to adequately be cooled by air in the
unlikely event of pool drainage. Moreover, in the very unlikely
beyond design-basis accident scenario where the SFP coolant
inventory is lost in such a manner that all methods of heat removal
from the spent fuel are no longer available, the NRC staff has
determined that 10 hours would be available and is sufficient time
to support deployment of mitigation equipment, consistent with plant
conditions, to prevent the zirconium cladding from reaching a point
of rapid oxidation. Thus, the NRC staff concludes that the fuel
stored in
[[Page 67372]]
the Oyster Creek SFP will have decayed sufficiently by the requested
effective exemption date of 12 months (365 days) after the
certification that the fuel has been permanently removed from the
reactor vessel, to support a reduction in the required insurance
consistent with SECY-00-0145.
The NRC staff has determined that granting of the licensee's
proposed exemption will not result in a violation of the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954, Section 170, or other laws, as amended, which
require licensees to maintain adequate financial protection.
Accordingly, consistent with the legal standard presented in SECY-
93-127, under which decommissioning reactor licensees may be
relieved of the requirements to carry the maximum amount of
insurance available and to participate in the secondary
retrospective premium pool where there is sufficient technical
justification, the NRC staff concludes that the requested exemption
is authorized by law.
B. The Exemption is Otherwise in the Public Interest
The financial protection limits of 10 CFR 140.11 were
established to require licensees to maintain sufficient offsite
liability insurance to ensure adequate funding for offsite liability
claims, following an accident at an operating reactor. However, the
regulation does not consider the reduced potential for and
consequence of nuclear incidents at permanently shutdown and
decommissioning reactors.
The basis provided in SECY-93-127, SECY-00-0145, and SECY-01-
0100 allows licensees of decommissioning plants to reduce their
primary offsite liability insurance and to withdraw from
participation in the retrospective rating pool for deferred premium
charges. As discussed in these documents, once the zirconium fire
concern is determined to be negligible, possible accident scenario
risks at permanently shutdown and defueled reactors are greatly
reduced, when compared to the risks at operating reactors, and the
associated potential for offsite financial liabilities from an
accident are commensurately less. The licensee has analyzed and the
NRC staff has confirmed that the risks of accidents that could
result in an offsite radiological risk are minimal, thereby
justifying the proposed reductions in offsite primary liability
insurance and withdrawal from participation in the secondary
retrospective rating pool for deferred premium charges.
Additionally, participation in the secondary retrospective
rating pool could potentially have adverse consequences on the safe
and timely completion of decommissioning. If a nuclear incident
sufficient to trigger the secondary insurance layer occurred at
another nuclear power plant, the licensee could incur financial
liability of up to $131,056,000. However, because Oyster Creek is
permanently shut down, it cannot produce revenue from electricity
generation sales to cover such a liability. Therefore, such
liability if subsequently incurred, could significantly affect the
ability of the facility to conduct and complete timely radiological
decontamination and decommissioning activities. In addition, as
SECY-93-127 concluded, the shared financial risk exposure to Exelon
is greatly disproportionate to the radiological risk posed by Oyster
Creek, when compared to operating reactors. The reduced overall risk
to the public at decommissioning power plants does not warrant that
Exelon be required to carry full operating reactor insurance
coverage, after the requisite spent fuel cooling period has elapsed
following final reactor shutdown. The licensee's proposed financial
protection limits will maintain a level of liability insurance
coverage commensurate with the risk to the public. These changes are
consistent with previous NRC policy as discussed in SECY-00-0145,
and exemptions approved for other decommissioning reactors. Thus,
the underlying purpose of the regulations will not be adversely
affected by the reductions in insurance coverage. Accordingly, an
exemption from participation in the secondary insurance pool and a
reduction in the primary insurance to $100 million, a value more in
line with the potential consequences of accidents, would be in the
public interest in that this assures there will be adequate funds to
address any of those consequences and helps to assure the safe and
timely decommissioning of the reactor.
Therefore, the NRC staff has concluded that an exemption from 10
CFR 140.11(a)(4), which would permit Exelon to lower the Oyster
Creek primary insurance levels and to withdraw from the secondary
retrospective premium pool at the requested effective date of 12
months (365 days) after the certification of permanent fuel removal
from the reactor vessel, is in the public interest.
C. Environmental Considerations
The NRC's approval of an exemption from insurance or indemnity
requirements belongs to a category of actions that the Commission,
by rule or regulation, has declared to be a categorical exclusion,
after first finding that the category of actions does not
individually or cumulatively have a significant effect on the human
environment. Specifically, the exemption is categorically excluded
from the requirement to prepare an environmental assessment or
environmental impact statement, in accordance with 10 CFR
51.22(c)(25).
Under 10 CFR 51.22(c)(25), granting of an exemption from the
requirements of any regulation of Chapter I to 10 CFR is a
categorical exclusion provided that: (i) There is no significant
hazards consideration; (ii) there is no significant change in the
types or significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that
may be released offsite; (iii) there is no significant increase in
individual or cumulative public or occupational radiation exposure;
(iv) there is no significant construction impact; (v) there is no
significant increase in the potential for or consequences from
radiological accidents; and (vi) the requirements from which an
exemption is sought involve surety, insurance, or indemnity
requirements.
As the Deputy Director, Division of Operating Reactor Licensing,
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, I have determined that
approval of the exemption request involves no significant hazards
consideration, as defined in 10 CFR 50.92, because reducing a
licensee's offsite liability requirements at Oyster Creek does not:
(1) Involve a significant increase in the probability or
consequences of an accident previously evaluated; (2) create the
possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident
previously evaluated; or (3) involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety. The exempted financial protection regulation is
unrelated to the operation of Oyster Creek or site activities.
Accordingly, there is no significant change in the types or
significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be
released offsite, and no significant increase in individual or
cumulative public or occupational radiation exposure. The exempted
regulation is not associated with construction, so there is no
significant construction impact. The exempted regulation does not
concern the source term (i.e., potential amount of radiation in an
accident), nor any activities conducted at the site. Therefore,
there is no significant increase in the potential for, or
consequences of, a radiological accident. In addition, there would
be no significant impacts to biota, water resources, historic
properties, cultural resources, or socioeconomic conditions in the
region resulting from issuance of the requested exemption. The
requirement for offsite liability insurance involves surety,
insurance, or indemnity matters only.
Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) and 51.22(c)(25), no
environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be
prepared in connection with the approval of this exemption request.
IV. Conclusions.
Accordingly, the Commission has determined that, pursuant to 10
CFR 140.8, the exemption is authorized by law and is otherwise in
the public interest. Therefore, the Commission hereby grants Exelon
an exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4) for Oyster
Creek. The licensee permanently ceased operation at Oyster Creek on
September 17, 2018. The exemption from 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4) permits
Oyster Creek to reduce the required level of primary financial
protection, from $450 million to $100 million and to withdraw from
participation in the secondary layer of financial protection 12
months (365 days) after the certification of permanent fuel removal
from the reactor vessel.
The exemption is effective 12 months (365 days) after the
certification of permanent fuel removal from the reactor vessel
under Sec. 50.82(a)(1).
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 19th day of December 2018.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Kathryn M. Brock,
Deputy Director, Division of Operating Reactor Licensing, Office of
Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 2018-28203 Filed 12-27-18; 8:45 am]
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