[Federal Register Volume 83, Number 241 (Monday, December 17, 2018)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 64660-64728]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2018-24924]



[[Page 64659]]

Vol. 83

Monday,

No. 241

December 17, 2018

Part III





Department of the Treasury





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Office of the Comptroller of the Currency





Federal Reserve System





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Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation





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12 CFR Parts 3, 32, 217, and 324





Standardized Approach for Calculating the Exposure Amount of Derivative 
Contracts; Proposed Rules

  Federal Register / Vol. 83 , No. 241 / Monday, December 17, 2018 / 
Proposed Rules  

[[Page 64660]]


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DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY

Office of the Comptroller of the Currency

12 CFR Parts 3 and 32

[Docket ID OCC-2018-0030]
RIN 1557-AE44

FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM

12 CFR Part 217

[Docket R-1629]
RIN 7100-AF22

FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION

12 CFR Part 324

RIN 3064-AE80


Standardized Approach for Calculating the Exposure Amount of 
Derivative Contracts

AGENCY: The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation; and the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency, Treasury.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking.

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SUMMARY: The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency (together, the agencies) are inviting 
public comment on a proposal that would implement a new approach for 
calculating the exposure amount of derivative contracts under the 
agencies' regulatory capital rule. The proposed approach, called the 
standardized approach for counterparty credit risk (SA-CCR), would 
replace the current exposure methodology (CEM) as an additional 
methodology for calculating advanced approaches total risk-weighted 
assets under the capital rule. An advanced approaches banking 
organization also would be required to use SA-CCR to calculate its 
standardized total risk-weighted assets; a non-advanced approaches 
banking organization could elect to use either CEM or SA-CCR for 
calculating its standardized total risk-weighted assets. In addition, 
the proposal would modify other aspects of the capital rule to account 
for the proposed implementation of SA-CCR. Specifically, the proposal 
would require an advanced approaches banking organization to use SA-CCR 
with some adjustments to determine the exposure amount of derivative 
contracts for calculating total leverage exposure (the denominator of 
the supplementary leverage ratio). The proposal also would incorporate 
SA-CCR into the cleared transactions framework and would make other 
amendments, generally with respect to cleared transactions. The 
proposed introduction of SA-CCR would indirectly affect the Board's 
single counterparty credit limit rule, along with other rules. The 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency also is proposing to update 
cross-references to CEM and add SA-CCR as an option for determining 
exposure amounts for derivative contracts in its lending limit rules.

DATES: Comments should be received on or before February 15, 2019.

ADDRESSES: Comments should be directed to:
    Board: You may submit comments, identified by Docket No. [R-1629 
and RIN 7100-AF22], by any of the following methods:
    1. Agency Website: http://www.federalreserve.gov. Follow the 
instructions for submitting comments at http://www.federalreserve.gov/generalinfo/foia/ProposedRegs.cfm.
    2. Email: [email protected]. Include docket number 
in the subject line of the message.
    3. Fax: (202) 452-3819 or (202) 452-3102.
    4. Mail: Ann E. Misback, Secretary, Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System, 20th Street and Constitution Avenue NW, 
Washington, DC 20551. All public comments are available from the 
Board's website at http://www.federalreserve.gov/generalinfo/foia/ProposedRegs.cfm as submitted, unless modified for technical reasons or 
to remove sensitive personal identifying information (PII) at the 
commenter's request. Public comments may also be viewed electronically 
or in paper form in Room 3515, 1801 K Street NW (between 18th and 19th 
Streets NW), Washington, DC 20006 between 9:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. on 
weekdays.
    FDIC: You may submit comments, identified by RIN 3064-AE80, by any 
of the following methods:
     Agency Website: http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/federal. Follow instructions for submitting comments on the Agency 
website.
     Email: [email protected]. Include ``RIN 3064-AE80'' on the 
subject line of the message.
     Mail: Robert E. Feldman, Executive Secretary, Attention: 
Comments/RIN 3064-AE80, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 550 17th 
Street NW, Washington, DC 20429.
     Hand Delivery/Courier: Comments may be hand delivered to 
the guard station at the rear of the 550 17th Street Building (located 
on F Street) on business days between 7 a.m. and 5 p.m. All comments 
received must include the agency name (FDIC) and RIN 3064-AE80 and will 
be posted without change to http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/federal, including any personal information provided.
    OCC: You may submit comments to the OCC by any of the methods set 
forth below. Commenters are encouraged to submit comments through the 
Federal eRulemaking Portal or email, if possible. Please use the title 
``Capital Adequacy: Standardized Approach for Calculating the Exposure 
Amount of Derivative Contracts'' to facilitate the organization and 
distribution of the comments. You may submit comments by any of the 
following methods:
     Federal eRulemaking Portal--``Regulations.gov'': Go to 
www.regulations.gov. Enter ``Docket ID OCC-2018-0030'' in the Search 
Box and click ``Search.'' Click on ``Comment Now'' to submit public 
comments.
     Click on the ``Help'' tab on the Regulations.gov home page 
to get information on using Regulations.gov, including instructions for 
submitting public comments.
     Email: [email protected].
     Mail: Legislative and Regulatory Activities Division, 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, 400 7th Street SW, suite 3E-
218, Washington, DC 20219.
     Hand Delivery/Courier: 400 7th Street SW, Suite 3E-218, 
Washington, DC 20219.
    Instructions: You must include ``OCC'' as the agency name and 
``Docket ID OCC-2018-0030'' in your comment. In general, the OCC will 
enter all comments received into the docket and publish the comments on 
the Regulations.gov website without change, including any business or 
personal information that you provide such as name and address 
information, email addresses, or phone numbers. Comments received, 
including attachments and other supporting materials, are part of the 
public record and subject to public disclosure. Do not include any 
information in your comment or supporting materials that you consider 
confidential or inappropriate for public disclosure.
    You may review comments and other related materials that pertain to 
this rulemaking action by any of the following methods:
     Viewing Comments Electronically: Go to 
www.regulations.gov. Enter ``Docket ID OCC-2018-0030'' in the Search 
box and click ``Search.'' Click on

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``Open Docket Folder'' on the right side of the screen. Comments and 
supporting materials can be viewed and filtered by clicking on ``View 
all documents and comments in this docket'' and then using the 
filtering tools on the left side of the screen.
     Click on the ``Help'' tab on the Regulations.gov home page 
to get information on using Regulations.gov. The docket may be viewed 
after the close of the comment period in the same manner as during the 
comment period.
     Viewing Comments Personally: You may personally inspect 
comments at the OCC, 400 7th Street SW, Washington, DC 20219. For 
security reasons, the OCC requires that visitors make an appointment to 
inspect comments. You may do so by calling (202) 649-6700 or, for 
persons who are deaf or hearing impaired, TTY, (202) 649-5597. Upon 
arrival, visitors will be required to present valid government-issued 
photo identification and submit to security screening in order to 
inspect comments.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 
    Board: Constance M. Horsley, Deputy Associate Director, (202) 452-
5239; David Lynch, Deputy Associate Director, (202) 452-2081; Elizabeth 
MacDonald, Manager, (202) 475-6316; Michael Pykhtin, Manager, (202) 
912-4312; Mark Handzlik, Senior Supervisory Financial Analyst, (202) 
475-6636; Sara Saab, Supervisory Financial Analyst, (202) 872-4936; or 
Noah Cuttler, Senior Financial Analyst, (202) 912-4678; Division of 
Supervision and Regulation; or Benjamin W. McDonough, Assistant General 
Counsel, (202) 452-2036; Mark Buresh, Counsel, (202) 452-5270; Andrew 
Hartlage, Counsel, (202) 452-6483; Legal Division, Board of Governors 
of the Federal Reserve System, 20th and C Streets NW, Washington, DC 
20551. For the hearing impaired only, Telecommunication Device for the 
Deaf, (202) 263-4869.
    FDIC: Bobby R. Bean, Associate Director, [email protected]; Irina 
Leonova, Senior Policy Analyst, [email protected]; Peter Yen, Senior 
Policy Analyst, [email protected], Capital Markets Branch, Division of Risk 
Management Supervision, (202) 898-6888; or Michael Phillips, Counsel, 
[email protected]; Catherine Wood, Counsel, [email protected]; 
Supervision Branch, Legal Division, Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation, 550 17th Street NW, Washington, DC 20429.
    OCC: Guowei Zhang, Risk Expert, Capital Policy, (202) 649-7106; 
Kevin Korzeniewski, Counsel, (202) 649-5490; or Ron Shimabukuro, Senior 
Counsel, (202) 649-5490, or, for persons who are deaf or hearing 
impaired, TTY, (202) 649-5597, Chief Counsel's Office, Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency, 400 7th Street SW, Washington, DC 20219.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Table of Contents

I. Background
    A. Scope and Application of the Proposed Rule
    B. Proposal's Interaction With Agency Requirements and Other 
Proposals
    C. Overview of Derivative Contracts
    D. Mechanics of the Current Exposure Methodology
    E. Mechanics of the Internal Models Methodology
    F. Review of the Capital Rule's Treatment of Derivative 
Contracts
II. Standardized Approach for Counterparty Credit Risk
    A. Key Concepts
    1. Netting Sets
    2. Hedging Sets
    3. Derivative Contract Amount for the PFE Component Calculation
    4. Collateral Recognition and Differentiation Between Margined 
and Unmargined Derivative Contracts
    B. Mechanics of the Standardized Approach for Counterparty 
Credit Risk
    1. Exposure Amount
    2. Replacement Cost
    3. Aggregated Amount and Hedging Set Amounts
    4. PFE Multiplier
    5. PFE Calculation for Nonstandard Margin Agreements
    6. Adjusted Derivative Contract Amount
    7. Example of Calculation
III. Revisions to the Cleared Transactions Framework
    A. Trade Exposure Amount
    B. Treatment of Collateral
    C. Treatment of Default Fund Contributions
IV. Revisions to the Supplementary Leverage Ratio
V. Technical Amendments
    A. Receivables Due From a QCCP
    B. Treatment of Client Financial Collateral Held by a CCP
    C. Clearing Member Exposure When CCP Performance is Not 
Guaranteed
    D. Bankruptcy Remoteness of Collateral
    E. Adjusted Collateral Haircuts for Derivative Contracts
    F. OCC Revisions to Lending Limits
VI. Impact of the Proposed Rule
VII. Regulatory Analyses
    A. Paperwork Reduction Act
    B. Regulatory Flexibility Act
    C. Plain Language
    D. Riegle Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act 
of 1994
    E. OCC Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 Determination

I. Background

    A firm with a positive exposure on a derivative contract expects to 
receive a payment from its counterparty and is subject to the credit 
risk that the counterparty will default on its obligations and fail to 
pay the amount owed under the derivative contract. Because of this, the 
regulatory capital rule (capital rule) \1\ of the Board of Governors of 
the Federal Reserve System (Board), the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC), and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 
(OCC) (together, the agencies) requires a banking organization \2\ to 
hold regulatory capital based on the exposure amount of its derivative 
contracts. The agencies are issuing this notice of proposed rulemaking 
(proposal) to implement a new approach for calculating the exposure 
amount of derivative contracts under the capital rule.
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    \1\ See 12 CFR part 3 (OCC); 12 CFR part 217 (Board); 12 CFR 
part 324 (FDIC). The agencies have codified the capital rule in 
different parts of title 12 of the CFR (part 3 (OCC); part 217 
(Board); and part 324 (FDIC)), but the internal structure of the 
sections within each agency's rule are identical. All references to 
sections in the capital rule or the proposal are intended to refer 
to the corresponding sections in the capital rule of each agency.
    \2\ Banking organizations subject to the agencies' capital rule 
include national banks, state member banks, insured state nonmember 
banks, savings associations, and top-tier bank holding companies and 
savings and loan holding companies domiciled in the United States, 
but exclude banking organizations subject to the Board's Small Bank 
Holding Company Policy Statement (12 CFR part 225, appendix C), and 
certain savings and loan holding companies that are substantially 
engaged in insurance underwriting or commercial activities or that 
are estate trusts, and bank holding companies and savings and loan 
holding companies that are employee stock ownership plans.
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    As discussed in greater detail below, the capital rule prescribes 
different approaches to measuring the exposure amount of derivative 
contracts, depending on the size and complexity of the banking 
organization. For example, all banking organizations are required to 
use the current exposure methodology (CEM) to determine the exposure 
amount of their derivative contracts under the standardized approach of 
the capital rule, which is based on formulas described in the capital 
rule. Advanced approaches banking organizations also may use an 
internal models-based approach, the internal models methodology (IMM), 
to determine the exposure amount of their derivative contracts under 
the advanced approaches of the capital rule.\3\ The addition of a new 
approach, called the standardized approach for counterparty credit risk 
(SA-CCR), would provide

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important improvements to risk-sensitivity and calibration relative to 
CEM, but also would provide a less complex and non-model-dependent 
approach than IMM.
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    \3\ A banking organization is an advanced approaches banking 
organization if it has at least $250 billion in total consolidated 
assets or if it has consolidated on-balance sheet foreign exposures 
of at least $10 billion, or if it is a subsidiary of a depository 
institution, bank holding company, savings and loan holding company 
or intermediate holding company that is an advanced approaches 
banking organization. See 12 CFR 3.100(b) (OCC); 12 CFR 217.100(b) 
(Board); and 12 CFR 324.100(b) (FDIC).
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    In addition, the agencies are proposing to revise the capital 
rule's cleared transactions framework and the supplementary leverage 
ratio to accommodate the proposed implementation of SA-CCR, as well as 
make certain other changes to the cleared transaction framework in the 
capital rule.

A. Scope and Application of the Proposed Rule

    The capital rule provides two methodologies for determining total 
risk-weighted assets: The standardized approach, which applies to all 
banking organizations, and the advanced approaches, which apply only to 
advanced approaches banking organizations. The standardized approach 
serves as a floor on advanced approaches banking organizations' total 
risk-weighted assets, and thus such banking organizations must 
calculate total risk-weighted assets under both approaches.\4\ Total 
risk-weighted assets are the denominator of the risk-based capital 
ratios; regulatory capital is the numerator.
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    \4\ 12 CFR 3.10(c) (OCC); 12 CFR 217.10(c) (Board); and 12 CFR 
324.10(c) (FDIC). For example, an advanced approaches banking 
organization's tier 1 capital ratio is the lower of the ratio of the 
banking organization's common equity tier 1 capital to standardized 
total risk-weighted assets and the ratio of the banking 
organization's common equity tier 1 capital to advanced approaches 
total risk-weighted assets.
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    Under the standardized approach, the risk-weighted asset amount for 
a derivative contract is the product of the exposure amount of the 
derivative contract and the risk weight applicable to the counterparty, 
as provided under the capital rule. Under the advanced approaches, the 
risk-weighted asset amount for a derivative contract is derived using 
the internal ratings-based approach, which multiplies the exposure 
amount (or exposure at default amount) of the derivative contract by a 
models-based formula that uses risk parameters determined by a banking 
organization's internal methodologies.\5\
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    \5\ See generally 12 CFR 3.132 (OCC); 12 CFR 217.132 (Board); 
and 12 CFR 324.132 (FDIC).
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    Both the standardized approach and the advanced approaches require 
a banking organization to determine the exposure amount for its 
derivative contracts that are not cleared transactions (i.e., over-the-
counter derivative contracts or noncleared derivative contracts). As 
part of the cleared transactions framework, both the standardized 
approach and the advanced approaches require a banking organization to 
determine the exposure amount of its derivative contracts that are 
cleared transactions (i.e., cleared derivative contracts) and determine 
the risk-weighted asset amounts of its contributions or commitments to 
mutualized loss sharing agreements with central counterparties (i.e., 
default fund contributions). For the advanced approaches, an advanced 
approaches banking organization may use either CEM or IMM to calculate 
the exposure amount of its noncleared and cleared derivative contracts, 
as well as the risk-weighted asset amounts of its default fund 
contributions. For purposes of determining these amounts for the 
standardized approach, all banking organizations must use CEM.
    The proposal would revise the standardized approach and the 
advanced approaches for advanced approaches banking organizations by 
replacing CEM with SA-CCR. As a result, for purposes of determining 
total risk-weighted assets under the advanced approaches, an advanced 
approaches banking organization would have the option to use SA-CCR or 
IMM to calculate the exposure amount of its noncleared and cleared 
derivative contracts, as well as to determine the risk-weighted asset 
amount of its default fund contributions. For purposes of determining 
the exposure amount of these items under the standardized approach, an 
advanced approaches banking organization would be required to use SA-
CCR.
    The capital rule also requires an advanced approaches banking 
organization to meet a supplementary leverage ratio. The denominator of 
the supplementary leverage ratio, called total leverage exposure, 
includes the exposure amount of a banking organization's derivative 
contracts. The capital rule requires an advanced approaches banking 
organization to use CEM to determine the exposure amount of its 
derivative contracts for total leverage exposure. Under the proposal, 
an advanced approaches banking organization would be required to use 
SA-CCR to determine the exposure amount of its derivative contracts for 
total leverage exposure.
    As it applies to advanced approaches banking organizations, the 
proposed implementation of SA-CCR would provide important improvements 
to risk-sensitivity and calibration relative to CEM, resulting in more 
appropriate capital requirements for derivative contracts. SA-CCR also 
would be responsive to concerns raised regarding the current regulatory 
capital treatment for derivative contracts under CEM. For example, the 
industry has raised concerns that CEM does not appropriately recognize 
collateral, including the risk-reducing nature of variation margin, and 
does not provide sufficient netting for derivative contracts that share 
similar risk factors. The agencies intend for the proposed 
implementation of SA-CCR to respond to these concerns, and to be 
substantially consistent with international standards issued by the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (Basel Committee). In addition, 
requiring an advanced approaches banking organization to use SA-CCR or 
IMM for all purposes under the advanced approaches would facilitate 
regulatory reporting and the supervisory assessment of an advanced 
approaches banking organization's capital management program.
    The proposed implementation of SA-CCR would require advanced 
approaches banking organizations to augment existing systems or develop 
new ones. Accordingly, the proposal includes a transition period, until 
July 1, 2020, by which time an advanced approaches banking organization 
must implement SA-CCR. An advanced approaches banking organization may, 
however, adopt SA-CCR as of the effective date of the final rule. In 
addition, the technical revisions in this proposal, as described in 
section V of this Supplementary Information, would become effective as 
of the effective date of the final rule.
    While the agencies recognize that implementation of SA-CCR offers 
several improvements to CEM, it also will require, particularly for 
banking organizations with relatively small derivatives portfolios, 
internal systems enhancements and other operational modifications that 
could be costly and present additional burden. Therefore, the proposal 
would not require non-advanced approaches banking organizations to use 
SA-CCR, but instead would provide SA-CCR as an optional approach. 
However, a non-advanced approaches banking organization that elects to 
use SA-CCR for calculating its exposure amount for noncleared 
derivative contracts also would be required to use SA-CCR to calculate 
the exposure amount for its cleared derivative contracts and for 
calculating the risk-weighted asset amount of its default fund 
contributions. This approach should provide meaningful flexibility, 
while promoting consistency for the regulatory capital treatment of 
derivative contracts for non-advanced approaches banking organizations. 
The proposal also would

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allow non-advanced approaches banking organizations to adopt SA-CCR as 
of the effective date of the final rule.

                              Table 1--Scope and Applicability of the Proposed Rule
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                                        Non-cleared derivative    Cleared transactions         Default fund
                                              contracts                framework               contribution
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Advanced approaches banking            Option to use SA-CCR or  Must use the approach    Must use SA-CCR for
 organizations, advanced approaches     IMM to determine         selected for purposes    purposes of the
 total risk-weighted assets.            exposure amount for      of the counterparty      default fund
                                        derivative contracts     credit risk framework    contribution included
                                        under the advanced       (either SA-CCR or        in risk-weighted
                                        approaches.              IMM), to determine the   assets.
                                                                 trade exposure amount
                                                                 for cleared derivative
                                                                 contracts.
Advanced approaches banking            Must use SA-CCR to       Must use SA-CCR to       Must use SA-CCR for
 organizations, standardized approach   determine exposure       determine trade          purposes of the
 total risk-weighted assets.            amount for derivative    exposure amount for      default fund
                                        contracts.               cleared derivative       contribution included
                                                                 contracts.               in risk-weighted
                                                                                          assets.
Non-advanced approaches banking        Option to use CEM or SA- Must use the approach    Must use the approach
 organizations, standardized approach   CCR to determine         selected for purposes    selected for purposes
 total risk-weighted assets.            exposure amount for      of the counterparty      of the counterparty
                                        derivative contracts.    credit risk framework    credit risk framework
                                                                 (either CEM or SA-       (either CEM or SA-CCR)
                                                                 CCR), to determine the   for purposes of the
                                                                 trade exposure amount    default fund
                                                                 for cleared derivative   contribution included
                                                                 contracts.               in risk-weighted
                                                                                          assets.
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Advanced approaches banking            Must use modified SA-CCR to determine the exposure amount of derivative
 organizations, supplementary           contracts for total leverage exposure under the supplementary leverage
 leverage ratio.                        ratio.
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    Question 1: The agencies invite comment on all aspects of this 
proposal. In addition to the risk-sensitivity enhancements SA-CCR 
provides relative to CEM, what other considerations relevant to the 
determination of whether to replace CEM with SA-CCR for advanced 
approaches banking organizations should the agencies consider?
    Question 2: The agencies invite comment on the proposed effective 
date of SA-CCR for advanced approaches banking organizations. What 
alternative timing should be considered and why?

B. Proposal's Interaction With Agency Requirements and Other Proposals

    The Board's single counterparty credit limit rule (SCCL) authorizes 
a banking organization subject to the SCCL to use any methodology that 
such a banking organization may use under the capital rule to value a 
derivative contract for purposes of the SCCL.\6\ Thus, for valuing a 
derivative contract under the SCCL, the proposal would require an 
advanced approaches banking organization that is subject to the SCCL to 
use SA-CCR or IMM and would require a non-advanced approaches banking 
organization that is subject to the SCCL to use CEM or SA-CCR.\7\ In 
addition, the agencies net stable funding ratio proposed rules would 
cross-reference provisions of the agencies' supplementary leverage 
ratio that are proposed to be amended in this proposal, and thus this 
proposal potentially could affect elements of the net stable funding 
ratio rulemaking.\8\
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    \6\ 83 FR 38460 (August 6, 2018).
    \7\ Many of the Board's other regulations rely on amounts 
determined under the capital rule, and the introduction of SA-CCR 
therefore could indirectly effect all such rules.
    \8\ See 81 FR 35124 (June 1, 2016).
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    The agencies also are in the process of considering the appropriate 
scope of ``advanced approaches banking organizations'' and may propose 
changes to the scope of this term in the near future. The agencies 
anticipate that the proposal on the scope of ``advanced approaches 
banking organizations'' would have an overlapping comment period with 
this proposal. Commenters should consider both proposals together for 
purposes of their comments to the agencies.

C. Overview of Derivative Contracts

    In general, derivative contracts represent agreements between 
parties either to make or receive payments or to buy or sell an 
underlying asset on a certain date (or dates) in the future. Parties 
generally use derivative contracts to mitigate risk, although 
nonhedging use of derivative contracts also occurs. For example, an 
interest rate derivative contract allows a party to manage the risk 
associated with a change in interest rates, while a commodity 
derivative contract allows a party to lock in commodity prices in the 
future and thereby minimize any exposure attributable to any 
uncertainty with respect to subsequent movements in those prices.
    The value of a derivative contract, and thus a party's exposure to 
its counterparty, changes over the life of the contract based on 
movements in the value of the reference rates, assets, or indices 
underlying the contract. A party with a positive current exposure 
expects to receive a payment or other beneficial transfer from the 
counterparty and is considered to be ``in the money.'' A party that is 
in the money is subject to counterparty credit risk: The risk that the 
counterparty will default on its obligations and fail to pay the amount 
owed under the transaction. In contrast, a party with a zero or 
negative current exposure does not expect to receive a payment or 
beneficial transfer from the counterparty and is considered to be ``at 
the money'' or ``out of the money.'' A party that has no current 
exposure to counterparty credit risk may have exposure to counterparty 
credit risk in the future if the derivative contract becomes ``in the 
money.''
    To mitigate the counterparty credit risk of a derivative contract, 
parties typically exchange collateral. In the derivatives context, 
collateral is either variation margin or initial margin (also known as 
independent collateral). Parties exchange variation margin on a 
periodic basis during the term of a derivative contract, as typically 
specified in a variation margin

[[Page 64664]]

agreement or by regulation.\9\ Variation margin offsets changes in the 
market value of a derivative contract and thereby covers the potential 
loss arising from default of a counterparty. Variation margin may not 
always be sufficient to cover a party's positive exposure (e.g., due to 
delays in receiving collateral), and thus parties may exchange initial 
margin. Parties typically exchange initial margin at the outset of the 
derivative contract and usually in an amount that does not directly 
depend on changes in the value of the derivative contract. Parties 
typically post initial margin in amounts that would reduce the 
likelihood of a positive exposure amount for the derivative contract in 
the event of the counterparty's default, resulting in 
overcollateralization.
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    \9\ See, e.g., Swap Margin Rule, 12 CFR part 45 (OCC); 12 CFR 
part 237 (Board); 12 CFR part 349 (FDIC).
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    To facilitate the exchange of collateral, variation margin 
agreements typically provide for a threshold amount and a minimum 
transfer amount. The threshold amount is the amount by which the market 
value of the derivative contract can change before a party must collect 
or post variation margin (in other words, the threshold amount 
specifies an acceptable amount of under-collateralization). The minimum 
transfer amount is the smallest amount of collateral that a party must 
transfer when it is required to exchange collateral under the variation 
margin agreement. Parties generally apply a discount (also known as a 
haircut) to collateral to account for a potential reduction in the 
value of the collateral during the period between the last exchange of 
collateral before the close out of the derivative contract (as in the 
case of default of the counterparty) and the replacement of the 
contract on the market. This period is known as the margin period of 
risk (MPOR). Often, two parties will enter into a large number of 
derivative contracts together. In such cases, the parties may enter 
into a netting agreement to allow for offsetting of the derivative 
contracts and to streamline certain aspects of the contracts, including 
the exchange of collateral.
    Parties to a derivative contract may clear their derivative 
contracts through a central counterparty (CCP). The use of central 
clearing is designed to improve the safety and soundness of the 
derivatives markets through the multilateral netting of exposures, 
establishment and enforcement of collateral requirements, and the 
promotion of market transparency. A party engages with a CCP either as 
a clearing member or as a clearing member client. A clearing member is 
a member of, or direct participant in, a CCP that is entitled to enter 
into transactions with the CCP. A clearing member client is a party to 
a cleared transaction associated with a CCP in which a clearing member 
acts as a financial intermediary with respect to the clearing member 
client and either takes one position with the client and an offsetting 
position with the CCP (the principal model) or guarantees the 
performance of the clearing member client to the CCP (the agency 
model). With respect to the latter, the clearing member generally is 
responsible for fulfilling CCP initial and variation margin calls 
irrespective of the client's ability to post collateral.

D. Mechanics of the Current Exposure Methodology

    Under CEM, the exposure amount of a single derivative contract is 
equal to the sum of its current credit exposure and potential future 
exposure (PFE).\10\ Current credit exposure reflects a banking 
organization's current exposure to its counterparty and is equal to the 
greater of zero and the on-balance sheet fair value of the derivative 
contract.\11\ PFE approximates the banking organization's potential 
exposure to its counterparty over the remaining maturity of the 
derivative contract. PFE equals the product of the notional amount of 
the derivative contract and a supervisory-provided conversion factor, 
which reflects the potential volatility in the reference asset for the 
derivative contract.\12\ The capital rule gives the supervisory-
provided conversion factors via a simple look-up table, based on the 
derivative contract's type and remaining maturity.\13\ In general, 
potential exposure increases as volatility and duration of the 
derivative contract increases.
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    \10\ See 12 CFR 3.34 (OCC); 12 CFR 217.34 (Board); 12 CFR 324.34 
(FDIC).
    \11\ 12 CFR 3.34(a)(1)(i) (OCC); 12 CFR 217.34(a)(1)(i) (Board); 
12 CFR 324.34(a)(1)(i) (FDIC).
    \12\ 12 CFR 3.34(a)(1)(ii) (OCC); 12 CFR 217.34(a)(1)(ii) 
(Board); 12 CFR 324.34(a)(1)(ii) (FDIC).
    \13\ 12 CFR 3.34, Table 1 to Sec.  3.34 (OCC); 12 CFR 217.34, 
Table 1 to Sec.  217.34 (Board); 12 CFR 324.34, Table 1 to Sec.  
324.34 (FDIC). The derivative contract types are interest rate, 
exchange rate, investment grade credit, non-investment grade credit, 
equity, gold, precious metals except gold, and other. The maturities 
are one year or less, greater than one year and less than or equal 
to five years, and greater than five years.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    If certain criteria are met, CEM allows a banking organization to 
measure the exposure amount of a portfolio of its derivative contracts 
with a counterparty on a net basis, rather than on a gross basis, 
resulting in a lower measure of exposure and thus a lower capital 
requirement. A banking organization may measure, on a net basis, 
derivative contracts that are subject to the same qualifying master 
netting agreement (QMNA). A QMNA, in general, means a netting agreement 
that permits a banking organization to terminate, close-out on a net 
basis, and promptly liquidate or set off collateral upon an event of 
default of the counterparty.\14\ To qualify as a QMNA, the netting 
agreement must satisfy certain operational requirements under Sec.  _.3 
of the capital rule.\15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \14\ See 12 CFR 3.2 (OCC); 12 CFR 217.2 (Board); and 12 CFR 
324.2 (FDIC). In 2017, the agencies adopted a final rule that 
requires U.S. global systemically important banking institutions 
(GSIBs) and the U.S. operations of foreign GSIBs to amend their 
qualified financial contracts to prevent their immediate 
cancellation or termination if such a firm enters bankruptcy or a 
resolution process. Qualified financial contracts include derivative 
contracts, securities lending, and short-term funding transactions 
such as repurchase agreements. The 2017 rulemaking would have 
invalidated the ability of derivative contracts to be subject to a 
QMNA. Therefore, as part of the 2017 rulemaking, the agencies 
revised the definition of QMNA under the capital rule such that 
qualified financial contracts could be subject to a QMNA 
(notwithstanding other operational requirements). See 82 FR 42882 
(September 2017).
    \15\ See Definition of ``qualifying master netting agreement,'' 
12 CFR 3.3 (OCC); 12 CFR 217.3 (Board); and 12 CFR 324.3 (FDIC).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    For derivative contracts subject to a QMNA, the exposure amount 
equals the sum of the net current credit exposure and the adjusted sum 
of the PFE amounts of the derivative contracts.\16\ The net current 
credit exposure is the greater of the net sum of all positive and 
negative fair values of the individual derivative contracts subject to 
the QMNA or zero.\17\ Thus, derivative contracts that have positive and 
negative fair values can offset each other to reduce the net current 
credit exposure, subject to a floor of zero. The adjusted sum of the 
PFE amount component provides the netting function, and is a function 
of the gross PFE amount of the derivative contracts and the net-to-
gross ratio. The gross PFE amount is the sum of the PFE of each 
derivative contract subject to the QMNA. The net-to-gross ratio is the 
ratio of the net current credit exposure of each derivative contract 
subject to the QMNA to the sum of the positive current credit exposure 
of these derivative contracts. Specifically, the adjusted sum of the 
PFE amounts equals the sum of (1) the gross PFE amount multiplied by 
0.4 and (2) the gross PFE

[[Page 64665]]

amount multiplied by the net-to-gross ratio and 0.6.\18\ Thus, as the 
net-to-gross ratio decreases so will the adjusted sum of the PFE 
amounts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \16\ 12 CFR 3.34(a)(2) (OCC); 12 CFR 217.34(a)(2) (Board); 12 
CFR 324.34(a)(2) (FDIC).
    \17\ 12 CFR 3.34(a)(2)(i) (OCC); 12 CFR 217.34(a)(2)(i) (Board); 
12 CFR 324.34(a)(2)(i) (FDIC).
    \18\ 12 CFR 3.34(a)(2)(ii) (OCC); 12 CFR 217.34(a)(2)(ii) 
(Board); 12 CFR 324.34(a)(2)(ii) (FDIC).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    For all derivative contracts calculated under CEM, a banking 
organization may recognize the credit-risk-mitigating benefits of 
financial collateral, pursuant to Sec.  _.37 of the capital rule. In 
particular, a banking organization may either apply the risk weight 
applicable to the collateral to the secured portion of the exposure or 
net exposure amounts and collateral amounts according to a regulatory 
formula that includes certain haircuts for collateral.\19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \19\ 12 CFR 3.34(b) (referencing 12 CFR 3.37) (OCC); 12 CFR 
217.34(b) (referencing 12 CFR 217.37) (Board); 12 CFR 324.34(b) 
(referencing 12 CFR 324.37) (FDIC).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

E. Mechanics of the Internal Models Methodology

    Under IMM, an advanced approaches banking organization uses its own 
internal models of exposure to determine the exposure amount of its 
derivative contracts. The exposure amount under IMM is calculated as 
the product of the effective expected positive exposure (EEPE) for a 
netting set, which is the time-weighted average of the effective 
expected exposures (EE) profile over a one-year horizon, and an alpha 
factor.\20\ For the purposes of regulatory capital calculations, the 
resulting exposure amount is treated as a loan equivalent exposure, 
which is the amount effectively loaned by the banking organization to 
the counterparty under the derivative contract.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \20\ A banking organization arrives at the exposure amount by 
first determining the EE profile for each netting set. In general, 
EE profile is determined by computing exposure distributions over a 
set of future dates using Monte Carlo simulations, and the 
expectation of exposure at each date is the simple average of all 
Monte Carlo simulations for each date. The expiration of short-term 
trades can cause the EE profile to decrease, even though a banking 
organization is likely to replace short-term trades with new trades 
(i.e., rollover). To account for rollover, a banking organization 
converts the EE profile for each netting set into an effective EE 
profile by applying a nondecreasing constraint to the corresponding 
EE profile over the first year. The nondecreasing constraint 
prevents the effective EE profile from declining with time by 
replacing the EE amount at a given future date with the maximum of 
the EE amounts across this and all prior simulation dates. The EEPE 
for a netting set is the time-weighted average of the effective EE 
profile over a one-year horizon. EEPE would be the appropriate loan 
equivalent exposure in a credit risk capital calculation if the 
following assumptions were true: There is no concentration risk, 
systematic market risk, and wrong-way risk (i.e., the size of an 
exposure is positively correlated with the counterparty's 
probability of default). However, these conditions nearly never 
exist with respect to a derivative contract. Thus, to account for 
these risks, IMM requires a banking organization to multiply EEPE by 
1.4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

F. Review of the Capital Rule's Treatment of Derivative Contracts

    CEM was developed several decades ago and, as a result, does not 
reflect recent market conventions and regulatory requirements that are 
designed to reduce the risks associated with derivative contracts.\21\ 
For banking organizations with substantial derivatives portfolios in 
particular, this can result in a significant mismatch between the risk 
posed by these portfolios and the regulatory capital that the banking 
organization must hold against them. For instance, CEM does not 
differentiate between margined and unmargined derivative contracts, and 
it does not function well with other regulatory requirements, including 
the swap margin rule, which mandates the exchange of initial margin and 
variation margin for specified covered swap entities.\22\ In addition, 
the net-to-gross ratio under CEM does not recognize, in an economically 
meaningful way, the risk-reducing benefits of a balanced derivative 
portfolio (i.e., mixed long and short positions). Further, the agencies 
developed the supervisory conversion factors provided under CEM prior 
to the 2007-2008 financial crisis and they have not been recalibrated 
to reflect stress volatilities observed in recent years.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \21\ The agencies initially adopted CEM in 1989. 54 FR 4168 
(January 27, 1989) (OCC); 54 FR 4186 (January 27, 1989) (Board); 54 
FR 11500 (March 21, 1989) (FDIC). The last significant update to CEM 
was in 1995. 60 FR 46170 (September 5, 1995).
    \22\ See supra n. 9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Although IMM is more risk-sensitive than CEM, IMM is more complex 
and requires prior supervisory approval before an advanced approaches 
banking organization may use it. Specifically, an advanced approaches 
banking organization seeking to use IMM must demonstrate to its primary 
federal supervisor that it has established and maintains an 
infrastructure with risk measurement and management processes 
appropriate for the firm's size and level of complexity.\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \23\ See 12 CFR 3.122 (OCC); 12 CFR 217.122 (Board); 12 CFR 
324.122 (FDIC).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    For these reasons, the Basel Committee developed SA-CCR and 
published it as a final standard in 2014.\24\ Relative to CEM, SA-CCR 
provides a more risk-sensitive approach to determining the replacement 
cost and PFE for a derivative contract. Notably, SA-CCR improves 
collateral recognition (e.g., by differentiating between margined and 
unmargined derivative contracts); allows a banking organization to 
recognize meaningful, risk-reducing relationships between derivative 
contracts within a balanced derivative portfolio; and better captures 
recently observed stress volatilities among the primary risk drivers 
for derivative contracts. In addition, relative to IMM, SA-CCR provides 
a standardized, nonmodelled approach that is more accessible to banking 
organizations to determine the exposure amount for derivative 
contracts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \24\ ``The standardized approach for measuring counterparty 
credit risk exposures,'' Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 
March 2014 (rev. April 2014), https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs279.pdf. 
See ``Foundations of the standardised approach for measuring 
counterparty credit risk exposures'' (August 2014, rev. June 2017), 
https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs_wp26.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

II. Standardized Approach for Counterparty Credit Risk

A. Key Concepts

1. Netting Sets
    Under SA-CCR, a banking organization would calculate the exposure 
amount of its derivative contracts at the netting set level. The Basel 
Committee standard provides that a netting set may not be subject to 
more than one margin agreement. Thus, a banking organization, under the 
Basel Committee standard, would need to calculate the exposure amount 
at the level of each margin agreement and not at the level of each 
QMNA, regardless whether multiple margin agreements are under the same 
QMNA. The agencies recognize, however, that the Basel Committee 
standard does not reflect current industry practice and regulatory 
requirements, in which QMNAs often cover multiple margin agreements to 
order to reduce credit risk by increasing the net settlement of 
derivative contracts. Accordingly, and as with CEM, the proposal would 
allow a banking organization to calculate the exposure amount of 
multiple derivative contracts under the same netting set so long as 
each derivative contract is subject to the same QMNA. For purposes of 
SA-CCR, a derivative contract that is not subject to a QMNA would 
comprise a netting set of one derivative contract. Thus, the proposal 
would define a netting set to mean either one derivative contract 
between a banking organization and a single counterparty, or a group of 
derivative contracts between a banking organization and a single 
counterparty that are subject to a QMNA. The proposal would retain the 
capital rule's current definition of a QMNA.
2. Hedging Sets
    For the PFE calculation under SA-CCR, a banking organization would 
fully

[[Page 64666]]

or partially net derivative contracts within the same netting set that 
share similar risk factors. This approach would recognize that 
derivative contracts with similar risk factors share economically 
meaningful relationships (i.e., are more tightly correlated) and thus 
netting would be appropriate. In contrast, CEM recognizes only 60 
percent of the netting benefits of derivative contracts subject to a 
QMNA, without accounting for relationships between derivative 
contracts' underlying risk factors.
    To effectuate this approach, the proposal would introduce the 
concept of hedging sets, which would generally mean those derivative 
contracts within the same netting set that share similar risk factors. 
The proposal would define five types of hedging sets--interest rate, 
exchange rate, credit, equity, and commodities--and would provide 
formulas for netting within each hedging set. Each formula would be 
particular to each hedging set type and would reflect regulatory 
correlation assumptions between risk factors in the hedging set.
3. Derivative Contract Amount for the PFE Component Calculation
    As with CEM, a banking organization would use an adjusted 
derivative contract amount for the PFE component calculation under SA-
CCR. Unlike CEM, the agencies intend for the adjusted derivative 
contract amount under SA-CCR to reflect, in general, a conservative 
estimate of EEPE for a netting set composed of a single derivative 
contract, assuming zero fair value and zero collateral. As part of the 
estimate, SA-CCR would use updated supervisory factors that reflect 
stress volatilities observed during the financial crisis. The 
supervisory factors would reflect the variability of the primary risk 
factor of the derivative contract over a one-year horizon. In addition, 
SA-CCR would apply a separate maturity factor to each derivative 
contract that would scale down, if necessary, the default one-year risk 
horizon of the supervisory factor to the risk horizon appropriate for 
the derivative contract. A banking organization would apply a positive 
sign to the derivative contract amount if the derivative contract is 
long the risk factor and a negative sign if the derivative contract is 
short the risk factor. This adjustment, along with the assumption of 
zero fair value and zero collateral, would allow a banking organization 
to recognize offsetting and diversification between derivative 
contracts that share similar risk factors (i.e., long and short 
derivative contracts within the same hedging set would be able to fully 
or partially offset one another).
4. Collateral Recognition and Differentiation Between Margined and 
Unmargined Derivative Contracts
    The proposal would make several improvements to the recognition of 
collateral under SA-CCR. The proposal would account for collateral 
directly within the SA-CCR exposure amount calculation, whereas under 
CEM a banking organization recognizes the collateral only after the 
exposure amount has been determined. For replacement cost, the proposal 
would recognize collateral on a one-for-one basis. For PFE, SA-CCR 
would introduce the concept of a PFE multiplier, which would allow a 
banking organization to reduce the PFE amount through recognition of 
overcollateralization, in the form of both variation margin and 
independent collateral, and account for negative fair value amounts of 
the derivative contracts within the netting set. In addition, the 
proposal would differentiate between margined and unmargined derivative 
contracts such that a netting set that is subject to a variation margin 
agreement (as defined in the proposal) would always have a lower or 
equal exposure amount than an equivalent netting set that is not 
subject to a variation margin agreement.

B. Mechanics of the Standardized Approach for Counterparty Credit Risk

1. Exposure Amount
    Under Sec.  _.132(c)(5) of the proposed rule, the exposure amount 
of a netting set would be equal to an alpha factor of 1.4 multiplied by 
the sum of the replacement cost of the netting set and PFE of the 
netting set. The can be represented as follows:

exposure amount = 1.4 * (replacement cost + PFE)

    The alpha factor was included in the Basel Committee standard under 
the view that a standardized approach, such as SA-CCR, should not 
produce lower exposure amounts than a modelled approach. Therefore, to 
instill a level of conservatism consistent with the Basel Committee 
standard, the proposal would apply an alpha factor of 1.4 in order to 
produce exposure measure outcomes that generally are no lower than 
those amounts calculated using IMM. While the estimates of PFE under 
SA-CCR are conservative in many cases, the estimates of the sum of the 
replacement cost and PFE under SA-CCR would necessarily be close to 
IMM's EEPE for netting sets where the replacement cost dominates 
PFE.\25\ Thus, reducing the value of alpha in SA-CCR below 1.4 could 
result in exposure amounts produced by SA-CCR that are smaller than 
exposure amounts produced by IMM for such deep in-the-money netting 
sets.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \25\ For an unmargined netting set, IMM's EE profile starts at 
t=0, which is the date at which replacement cost under SA-CCR is 
calculated. For a deep in-the-money netting set, PFE would be much 
smaller than replacement cost, while IMM's EE profile would not 
increase significantly above replacement cost before declining (due 
to cash flow payments and trade expiration), because IMM 
volatilities typically are smaller than the volatilities implied by 
SA-CCR's PFE. The nondecreasing constraint would not allow the 
effective EE profile to drop below the replacement cost level, 
resulting in IMM's EEPE being slightly above replacement cost. Thus, 
both IMM's EEPE and SA-CCR's replacement cost plus PFE would be 
slightly above replacement cost and, therefore, close to each other.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The exposure amount would be zero, however, for a netting set that 
consists only of sold options in which the counterparties to the 
options have paid the premiums up front and the options are not subject 
to a variation margin agreement.
    Question 3: The agencies invite comment on whether the objective of 
ensuring that SA-CCR produces more conservative exposure amounts than 
IMM is appropriate for the implementation of SA-CCR. Does the 
incorporation of the alpha factor support this objective, why or why 
not? Are there alternative measures the agencies could incorporate into 
SA-CCR to support this objective? Are there other objectives regarding 
the comparability of SA-CCR and IMM that the agencies should consider? 
The agencies encourage commenters to provide appropriate data or 
examples to support their response.
2. Replacement Cost
    SA-CCR would provide separate formulas for replacement cost 
depending on whether the counterparty to a banking organization is 
required to post variation margin. In general, when a banking 
organization is a net receiver of financial collateral, the amount of 
financial collateral would be positive, which would reduce replacement 
cost. Conversely, when the banking organization is a net provider of 
financial collateral, the amount of financial collateral would be 
negative, which would increase replacement cost. In all cases, 
replacement cost cannot be lower than zero. In addition, for purposes 
of calculating the replacement cost component (and the PFE multiplier), 
the fair value amount of the derivative contract would exclude any 
valuation adjustments. The purpose of excluding valuation adjustments 
is to

[[Page 64667]]

arrive at the risk-free value of the derivative contract, and this 
requirement would exclude credit valuation adjustments, among other 
adjustments, as applicable.
    Section _.2 of the proposed rule provides a definition of variation 
margin and independent collateral, as well as the variation margin 
amount and the independent collateral amount. The proposal would define 
variation margin as financial collateral that is subject to a 
collateral agreement provided by one party to its counterparty to meet 
the performance of the first party's obligations under one or more 
transactions between the parties as a result of a change in value of 
such obligations since the last time such financial collateral was 
provided. Variation margin amount would mean the fair value amount of 
the variation margin that a counterparty to a netting set has posted to 
a banking organization less the fair value amount of the variation 
margin posted by the banking organization to the counterparty.
    Further, consistent with the capital rule, the amount of variation 
margin included in the variation margin amount would be adjusted by the 
standard supervisory haircuts under Sec.  _.132(b)(2)(ii) of the 
capital rule. The standard supervisory haircuts ensure that the 
derivative contract remains appropriately collateralized from a 
regulatory capital perspective, notwithstanding any changes in the 
value of the financial collateral. In particular, the standard 
supervisory haircuts address the possible decrease in the value of the 
financial collateral received by a banking organization and an increase 
in the value of the financial collateral posted by the banking 
organization over a one-year time horizon.
    The standard supervisory haircuts are based on a ten-business-day 
holding period for derivative contracts, and the capital rule requires 
a banking organization to adjust, as applicable, the standard 
supervisory haircuts to align with the risk horizon of the associated 
derivative contract. To be consistent with this proposal, the agencies 
are proposing to revise the standard supervisory haircuts so that they 
align with the maturity factor adjustments as provided under SA-CCR. In 
particular, an unmargined derivative contract and a margined derivative 
contract that is not a cleared transaction would receive a holding 
period of 10 business days. A derivative contract that is a cleared 
transaction would receive a holding period of five business days.\26\ A 
banking organization would be required to use a holding period of 20 
business days for collateral associated with a derivative contract that 
is within a netting set that is composed of more than 5,000 derivative 
contracts that are not cleared transactions, and if a netting set 
contains one or more trades involving illiquid collateral or a 
derivative contract that cannot be easily replaced. Notwithstanding the 
aforementioned, a banking organization would be required to double the 
applicable holding period if the derivative contract is subject to an 
outstanding dispute over variation margin.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \26\ As described in section V of this preamble, the agencies 
are proposing to apply a five-day holding period to all derivative 
contracts that are cleared transactions, regardless whether the 
method the banking organization uses to calculate the exposure 
amount of the derivative contract.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposal would define independent collateral as financial 
collateral, other than variation margin, that is subject to a 
collateral agreement, or in which a banking organization has a 
perfected, first-priority security interest or, outside of the United 
States, the legal equivalent thereof (with the exception of cash on 
deposit; and notwithstanding the prior security interest of any 
custodial agent or any prior security interest granted to a CCP in 
connection with collateral posted to that CCP), and the amount of which 
does not change directly in response to the value of the derivative 
contract or contracts that the financial collateral secures.
    The proposal would define the net independent collateral amount as 
the fair value amount of the independent collateral that a counterparty 
to a netting set has posted to a banking organization less the fair 
value amount of the independent collateral posted by the banking 
organization to the counterparty, excluding such amounts held in a 
bankruptcy remote manner,\27\ or posted to a qualifying central 
counterparty (QCCP) and held in conformance with the operational 
requirements in Sec.  _.3 of the capital rule. As with variation 
margin, independent collateral also would be subject to the standard 
supervisory haircuts under Sec.  _.132(b)(2)(ii) of the capital rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \27\ ``Bankruptcy remote'' is defined in Sec.  _.2 of the 
capital rule. See 12 CFR 3.2 (OCC); 12 CFR 217.2 (Board); and 12 CFR 
324.2 (FDIC).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Under Sec.  _.132(c)(6)(ii) of the proposed rule, the replacement 
cost of a netting set that is not subject to a variation margin 
agreement is the greater of (1) the sum of the fair values (after 
excluding any valuation adjustments) of the derivative contracts within 
the netting set, less the net independent collateral amount applicable 
to such derivative contracts, or (2) zero. This can be represented as 
follows:

replacement cost = max{V-C; 0{time} 

Where:

V is the fair values (after excluding any valuation adjustments) of 
the derivative contracts within the netting set; and
C is the net independent collateral amount applicable to such 
derivative contracts.

    The same requirement would apply to a netting set that is subject 
to a variation margin agreement under which the counterparty is not 
required to post variation margin. In the latter case, C would also 
include the negative amount of the variation margin that the banking 
organization posted to the counterparty (thus increasing replacement 
cost).
    For netting sets subject to a variation margin agreement under 
which the counterparty must post variation margin, the replacement 
cost, as provided under Sec.  _.132(c)(6)(i) of the proposed rule, 
would equal the greater of (1) the sum of the fair values (after 
excluding any valuation adjustments) of the derivative contracts within 
the netting set less the sum of the net independent collateral amount 
and the variation margin amount applicable to such derivative 
contracts; (2) the sum of the variation margin threshold and the 
minimum transfer amount applicable to the derivative contracts within 
the netting set less the net independent collateral amount applicable 
to such derivative contracts; or (3) zero. This can be represented as 
follows:

replacement cost = max{V-C; VMT + MTA-NICA; 0{time} 

Where:

V is the fair values (after excluding any valuation adjustments) of 
the derivative contracts within the netting set;
VMT is the variation margin threshold applicable to the derivative 
contracts within the netting set;
MTA is the minimum transfer amount applicable to the derivative 
contracts within the netting set; and
C is the sum of the net independent collateral amount and the 
variation margin amount applicable to such derivative contracts.
NICA is the net independent collateral amount applicable to such 
derivative contracts.

    The requirement for the replacement cost of a netting set subject 
to a variation margin agreement is designed to account for the maximum 
possible unsecured exposure amount of the netting set that would not 
trigger a variation margin call. For example, a

[[Page 64668]]

derivative contract with a high variation margin threshold would have a 
higher replacement cost compared to an equivalent derivative contract 
with a lower variation margin threshold. Section _.2 of the proposed 
rule would define the variation margin threshold and the minimum 
transfer amount. The variation margin threshold would mean the amount 
of the credit exposure of a banking organization to its counterparty 
that, if exceeded, would require the counterparty to post variation 
margin to the banking organization. The minimum transfer amount would 
mean the smallest amount of variation margin that may be transferred 
between counterparties to a netting set.
    In the agencies' experience, variation margin agreements can 
include variation margin thresholds that are set at such high levels 
that the netting set is effectively unmargined since the counterparty 
would never breach the threshold and be required to post variation 
margin. The agencies are concerned that in such a case the variation 
margin threshold would result in an unreasonably high replacement cost, 
because it is not attributable to the risk associated with the 
derivative contract but rather the terms of the variation margin 
agreement. Therefore, the proposal would cap the exposure amount of a 
netting set subject to a variation margin agreement at the exposure 
amount of the same netting set calculated as if the netting set were 
not subject to a variation margin agreement.\28\
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    \28\ There could be a situation unrelated to the value of the 
variation margin threshold in which the exposure amount of a 
margined netting set would be greater than the exposure amount of an 
equivalent unmargined netting set. For example, in the case of a 
margined netting set composed of short-term transactions with a 
residual maturity of 10 business days or less, the risk horizon 
would be the MPOR, which the proposal would floor at 10 business 
days. The risk horizon for an equivalent unmargined netting set also 
would be equal to 10 business days because this would be the floor 
for the remaining maturity of such a netting set. However, the 
maturity factor for the margined netting set would be greater than 
the one for the equivalent unmargined netting set because of the 
application of a factor of 1.5 to margined derivative contracts. In 
such an instance, the exposure amount of a margined netting set 
would be more than the exposure amount of an equivalent unmargined 
netting set by a factor of 1.5, thus triggering the cap. In 
addition, in the case of disputes, the MPOR of a margined netting 
set would be doubled, which could further increase the exposure 
amount of a margined netting set composed of short-term transactions 
with a residual maturity of 10 business days or less above an 
equivalent unmargined netting set. The agencies believe, however, 
that such instances rarely occur and thus would have minimal effect 
on banking organizations' regulatory capital.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    For a netting set that is subject to multiple variation margin 
agreements, or a hybrid netting set, a banking organization would 
determine replacement cost using the methodology described in Sec.  
_.132(c)(11)(i) of the proposed rule. A hybrid netting set is a netting 
set composed of at least one derivative contract subject to variation 
margin agreement under which the counterparty must post variation 
margin and at least one derivative contract that is not subject to such 
a variation margin agreement. In particular, a banking organization 
would use the methodology described in Sec.  _.132(c)(6)(ii) for 
netting sets subject to a variation margin agreement, except that the 
variation margin threshold would equal the sum of the variation margin 
thresholds of all the variation margin agreements within the netting 
set and the minimum transfer amount would equal the sum of the minimum 
transfer amounts of all the variation margin agreements within the 
netting set.
    For multiple netting sets subject to a single variation margin 
agreement, a banking organization would assign a single replacement 
cost to the multiple netting sets, according to the following formula, 
as provided under Sec.  _.132(c)(10)(i) of the proposed rule:

Replacement Cost = max{[Sigma]NSmax{VNS; 0{time} -max{CMA; 0{time} ; 
0{time}  + max{[Sigma]NSmin{VNS; 0{time} -min{CMA; 0{time} ; 0{time} ,

Where:

NS is each netting set subject to the variation margin agreement MA;
VNS is the sum of the fair values (after excluding any 
valuation adjustments) of the derivative contracts within the 
netting set NS; and
CMA is the sum of the net independent collateral amount 
and the variation margin amount applicable to the derivative 
contracts within the netting sets subject to the single variation 
margin agreement.

    The component max{SNS max{VNS; 0{time} -max{CMA; 0{time} ; 0{time}  
reflects the exposure amount produced by the netting sets that have 
current positive market value. The exposure amount can be offset by 
variation margin and independent collateral when the banking 
organization is the net receiver of such amounts (i.e., when CMA is 
positive). However, netting sets that have current negative market 
value would not be allowed to offset the exposure amount. The component 
max{SNS min{VNS; 0{time} -min{CMA; 0{time} ; 0{time}  reflects the 
exposure amount produced when the banking organization posts variation 
margin and independent collateral to its counterparty (i.e., this 
component contributes to replacement cost only in instances when CMA is 
negative), and the exposure amount would be offset by the netting sets 
that have current negative market value.
    Question 4: What are the potential consequences of the proposal to 
cap the exposure amount for a netting set subject to a variation margin 
agreement at the exposure amount for such netting set in the absence of 
a variation margin agreement?
    Question 5: What are the potential consequences of the proposal to 
exclude from the fair value amount of the derivative contract any 
valuation adjustments? What are the potential consequences of instead 
using the market value of the derivative contract less any valuation 
adjustments that are specific to the banking organization?
    Question 6: The agencies invite comment on the proposed alignment 
of the standard supervisory haircuts with the maturity factor 
adjustments. How could the agencies better align the standard 
supervisory haircuts under the capital rule with the maturity factor 
adjustments provided under SA-CCR?
    Question 7: The agencies invite comment on the proposed definitions 
included in this proposal. What, if any, alternative definitions should 
the agencies consider, particularly to achieve greater consistency 
across other agencies' regulations?
3. Aggregated Amount and Hedging Set Amounts
    Under Sec.  _.132(c)(7) of the proposed rule, the PFE of a netting 
set would be the product of the PFE multiplier and the aggregated 
amount. The proposal would define the aggregated amount as the sum of 
all hedging set amounts within the netting set. This can be represented 
as follows:

PFE = PFE multiplier * aggregated amount,

Where:

aggregated amount is the sum of each hedging set amount within the 
netting set.

    To determine the hedging set amounts, a banking organization would 
first group into separate hedging sets derivative contracts that share 
similar risk factors based on the following asset classes: Interest 
rate, exchange rate, credit, equity, and commodities. Basis derivative 
contracts and volatility derivative contracts would require separate 
hedging sets. A banking organization would then determine each hedging 
set amount using asset-class specific formulas that allow for full or 
partial netting. If the risk of a derivative contract materially 
depends on more than one risk factor, whether interest rate, exchange 
rate, credit, equity, or commodity risk factor, a banking

[[Page 64669]]

organization's primary federal regulator \29\ may require the banking 
organization to include the derivative contract in each appropriate 
hedging set. The hedging set amount of a hedging set composed of a 
single derivative contract would equal the absolute value of the 
adjusted derivative contract amount of the derivative contract.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \29\ For the capital rule, the Board is the primary federal 
regulator for all bank and savings and loan holding companies, 
intermediate holding companies of foreign banks, and state member 
banks; the OCC is the primary federal regulator for all national 
banks and federal thrifts; and the FDIC is the primary federal 
regulatory for all state nonmember banks.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Section _.132(c)(2)(iii) of the proposal provides the respective 
hedging set definitions. Specifically, an interest rate hedging set 
would mean all interest rate derivative contracts within a netting set 
that reference the same reference currency. Thus, there would be as 
many interest rate hedging sets in a netting set as distinct currencies 
referenced by the interest rate derivative contracts. A credit 
derivative hedging set would mean all credit derivative contracts 
within a netting set. Similarly, an equity derivative hedging set would 
mean all equity derivative contracts within a netting set. Thus, there 
could be at most one equity hedging set and one credit hedging set 
within a netting set. A commodity derivative contract hedging set would 
mean all commodity derivative contracts within a netting set that 
reference one of the following commodity classes: Energy, metal, 
agricultural, or other commodities. Thus, there could be no more than 
four commodity derivative contract hedging sets within a netting set.
    The proposal would define an exchange rate hedging set as all 
exchange rate derivative contracts within a netting set that reference 
the same currency pair. Thus, under this approach, there could be as 
many exchange rate hedging sets within a netting set as distinct 
currency pairs referenced by the exchange rate derivative contracts. 
This treatment would be generally consistent with the Basel Committee's 
standard. The agencies recognize, however, that the proposed approach 
to grouping exchange rate derivative contracts into hedging sets would 
not recognize economic relationships of exchange rate chains (i.e., 
when more than one currency pair can offset the risk of another). For 
example, a Yen/Dollar forward contract and a Dollar/Euro forward 
contract, taken together, may be economically equivalent, with properly 
set notional amounts, to a Yen/Euro forward contract. To capture this 
economic relationship, the agencies are seeking comment on an 
alternative definition of an exchange rate hedging set that differs 
from the one in the Basel Committee's standard. Under the alternative 
definition, an exchange rate derivative contract hedging set would mean 
all exchange rate derivative contracts within a netting set that 
reference the same non-U.S. currency. Thus, a banking organization 
would be required, under the proposed alternative definition, to 
include in separate hedging sets an exchange rate derivative contract 
that references two or more foreign currencies. For example, a banking 
organization would include the Yen/Euro forward contract both in one 
hedging set consisting of Yen derivative contracts and another hedging 
set consisting of Euro derivative contracts. Under this alternative 
approach, there could be as many exchange rate derivative contract 
hedging sets as non-U.S. referenced currencies.
    The proposal sets forth treatments for volatility derivative 
contracts and basis derivative contracts separate from the treatment 
for the risk factors described above. A basis derivative contract would 
mean a non-foreign-exchange derivative contract (i.e., the contract is 
denominated in a single currency) in which the cash flows of the 
derivative contract depend on the difference between two risk factors 
that are attributable solely to one of the following derivative asset 
classes: Interest rate, credit, equity, or commodity. A basis 
derivative contract hedging set would mean all basis derivative 
contracts within a netting set that reference the same pair of risk 
factors and are denominated in the same currency. A volatility contract 
would mean a derivative contract in which the payoff of the derivative 
contract explicitly depends on a measure of the volatility of an 
underlying risk factor to the derivative contract. Examples of 
volatility derivative contracts include variance and volatility swaps 
and options on realized or implied volatility. A volatility derivative 
contract hedging set would mean all volatility derivative contracts 
within a netting set that reference one of interest rate, exchange 
rate, credit, equity, or commodity risk factors, separated according to 
the requirements under Sec.  _.132(c)(2)(iii)(A)-(E) of the proposed 
rule.
    Question 8: Should SA-CCR include the alternative treatment for 
exchange rate derivative contracts in order to recognize the economic 
equivalence of chains of exchange rate transactions? What would be the 
benefit of including such an alternative treatment? Commenters 
providing information regarding an alternative treatment are encouraged 
to provide support for such treatment, together with information 
regarding any associated burden and complexity.
a. Interest Rate Derivative Contracts
    The hedging set amount for interest rate derivative contracts would 
be determined under Sec.  _.132(c)(8)(i) of the proposed rule. The 
agencies recognize that interest rate derivative contracts with close 
tenors (i.e., the amount of time remaining before the end date of the 
derivative contract) are generally highly correlated, and thus provide 
a greater offset relative to interest rate derivative contracts that do 
not have close tenors. Accordingly, the formula to determine the 
hedging set amount for interest rate derivative contracts would permit 
full offsetting within a tenor category, and partial offsetting across 
tenor categories. The tenor categories are less than one year, between 
one and five years, and more than five years. The proposal would use a 
correlation factor of 70 percent across adjacent tenor categories and a 
correlation factor of 30 percent across nonadjacent tenor 
categories.\30\ The tenor of a derivative contract would be based on 
the period between the present date and the end date of the derivative 
contract, which, under the proposal, would mean the last date of the 
period referenced by the derivative contract, or if the derivative 
contract references another instrument, the period referenced by the 
underlying instrument.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \30\ See ``Foundations of the standardised approach for 
measuring counterparty credit risk exposures.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Accordingly, a banking organization would calculate the hedging set 
amount for interest rate derivative contracts according to the 
following formula:

[[Page 64670]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP17DE18.000

    The proposal also includes a simpler formula that does not provide 
an offset across tenor categories. In this case, the hedging set amount 
of the interest rate derivative contracts would equal the sum of the 
absolute amounts of each tenor category, which would be the sum of the 
adjusted derivative contract amounts within each respective tenor 
category. The simpler formula would always result in a more 
conservative measure of the hedging set amount for interest rate 
derivative contracts of different tenor categories but may be less 
burdensome for banking organizations with smaller interest rate 
derivative contract portfolios. Under the proposal, a banking 
organization could elect to use this simpler formula for some or all of 
its interest rate derivative contracts.
b. Exchange Rate Derivative Contracts
    The hedging set amount for exchange rate derivative contracts would 
be determined under Sec.  _.132(c)(8)(ii) of the proposed rule. The 
agencies recognize that exchange rate derivative contracts that 
reference the same currency pair generally are driven by the same 
market factor (i.e., the exchange spot rate between these currencies) 
and thus are highly correlated. Therefore, the formula to determine the 
hedging set amount for exchange rate derivative contracts would allow 
for full offsetting within the exchange rate derivative contract 
hedging set. Accordingly, the hedging set amount for exchange rate 
derivative contracts would equal the absolute value of the sum of the 
adjusted derivative contract amounts within the hedging set.
c. Credit Derivative Contracts and Equity Derivative Contracts
    A banking organization would use the same formula to determine the 
hedging set amount for both its credit derivative contracts and equity 
derivative contracts. The formula would be provided under Sec.  
_.132(c)(8)(iii) of the proposed rule. The formula would allow for full 
offsetting for credit or equity contracts referencing the same entity, 
and would use a single-factor model to allow for partial offsetting 
when aggregating across distinct reference entities. The proposed 
single-factor model recognizes that credit spreads and equity prices of 
different entities within a hedging set are, on average, positively 
correlated.\31\ The proposed

[[Page 64671]]

single-factor model would use a single systematic component to describe 
joint movement of credit spreads or equity prices that are responsible 
for positive correlations, and would use an idiosyncratic component to 
describe entity-specific dynamics of each derivative contract.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \31\ The dependence between N random variables can be described 
by an NxN correlation matrix. In the most general case, such a 
correlation matrix requires estimation of N*(N-1)/2 individual 
correlation parameters. Estimating these correlations is problematic 
when N is large. Factor models are a popular means of reducing the 
number of independent correlation parameters by assuming that each 
random variable is driven by a combination of a small number of 
systematic factors (which are the same for all N random variables) 
and an idiosyncratic factor (which is unique to each random variable 
and is independent from all other factors). The simplest factor 
model is a single-factor model that assumes that a single systematic 
factor drives all N random variables.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposal would provide supervisory correlation parameters for 
credit derivative contracts and equity derivative contracts that depend 
on whether the derivative contract references a single name entity or 
an index. A single name entity credit derivative and a single name 
entity equity derivative would receive a correlation factor of 50 
percent, while a credit index and equity index would receive a 
correlation factor of 80 percent, the higher number reflecting partial 
diversification of idiosyncratic risk within an index. The pairwise 
correlation between two entities is the product of the corresponding 
correlation factors, so that the pairwise correlation between two 
single name entities is 25 percent, between one single name entity and 
one index is 40 percent, and between two indices is 64 percent. Thus, 
the pairwise correlation between two single name entities is less than 
the pairwise correlation between an entity and an index, which is less 
than the pairwise correlation between two indices. The application of a 
higher correlation factor does not necessarily result in a higher 
exposure amount, as there would be a reduction of the exposure amount 
for balanced portfolios but an increase in the exposure amount for 
directional portfolios.\32\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \32\ A higher correlation factor means that the underlying risk 
factors are more closely aligned. For a directional portfolio, more 
alignment between the risk factors would result in a more 
concentrated risk, leading to a higher exposure amount. For a 
balanced portfolio, more alignment between the risk factors would 
result in more offsetting of risk, leading to a lower exposure 
amount.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A banking organization would calculate the hedging set amount for a 
credit derivative contract hedging set or an equity derivative contract 
hedging set according to the following formula:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP17DE18.001

Where:

k is each reference entity within the hedging set;
K is the number of reference entities within the hedging set;
AddOn (Refk) equals the sum of the adjusted derivative contract 
amounts for all derivative contracts within the hedging set that 
reference reference entity k; and
rk equals the applicable supervisory correlation factor, as provided 
in Table 2.
d. Commodity Derivative Contracts
    A banking organization would use a similar single-factor model to 
determine the hedging set amount for commodity derivative contracts as 
it would use for credit derivative contracts and equity derivative 
contracts. The hedging set amount of commodity derivative contracts 
would be determined under Sec.  _.132(c)(8)(iv) of the proposed rule. 
Under the proposal, a banking organization would group commodity 
derivatives into one of four hedging sets based on the following 
commodity classes: Energy, metal, agricultural and other. Under the 
single-factor model used for commodity derivative contracts, a banking 
organization would be able to offset fully all derivative contracts 
within a hedging set that reference the same commodity type; however, 
the banking organization could only partially offset derivative 
contracts within a hedging set that reference different commodity 
types. For example, a hedging set composed of energy commodities may 
include crude oil derivatives and coal derivatives. Under the proposal, 
a banking organization could fully offset all crude oil derivatives; 
however, it could only partially offset a crude oil derivative against 
a coal derivative. In addition, a banking organization cannot offset 
commodity derivatives that belong to different hedging sets (i.e., a 
forward contract on crude oil cannot hedge a forward contract on corn).
    The agencies recognize that specifying individual commodity types 
is operationally difficult. Indeed, it is likely impossible to specify 
sufficiently all relevant distinctions between commodity types so that 
all basis risk is captured. Accordingly, the proposal would allow 
banking organizations to recognize commodity types without regard to 
characteristics such as location or quality. For example, a banking 
organization may recognize crude oil as a commodity type, and would not 
need to distinguish further between West Texas Intermediate and Saudi 
Light crude oil. The agencies expect to monitor the commodity-type 
distinctions made within the industry to ensure that they are 
sufficiently correlated for full-offset treatment under SA-CCR.
    The agencies are proposing not to provide separate supervisory 
factors for electricity and oil/gas components of the energy commodity 
class, as provided under the Basel Committee standard. Rather, the 
agencies are proposing to provide a single supervisory factor for an 
energy commodity class that generally would include derivative 
contracts that reference electricity and oil/gas. In addition, the 
agencies are proposing not to provide more granular commodity 
categories than those provided under the Basel Committee's standard. 
The agencies believe that more granular commodity classes could pose 
operational challenges for banking organizations and could negate 
certain hedging benefits that may otherwise be available. This is 
because SA-CCR only permits offsetting within commodity classes, and 
additional commodity classes thereby may reduce the derivative 
contracts across which a banking organization may hedge.
    A banking organization would calculate the hedging set amount for a 
commodity derivative contract hedging set according to the following 
formula:

[[Page 64672]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP17DE18.002

Where:

k is each commodity type within the hedging set;
K is the number of commodity types within the hedging set;
AddOn (Typek) equals the sum of the adjusted derivative contract 
amounts for all derivative contracts within the hedging set that 
reference commodity type k; and
r equals the applicable supervisory correlation factor, as provided 
in Table 2.

    Question 9: What other commodity classes should the agencies 
consider for hedging set treatment, taking into account operational 
challenges for banking organizations and potential hedging benefits of 
the derivative contracts? What would be the consequences of not 
specifying the commodity types within each commodity class that are 
eligible for full offsetting? What level of granularity regarding the 
attributes of a commodity type would be required to appropriately 
distinguish among them?
4. PFE Multiplier
    Under SA-CCR, the aggregated amount formula would not recognize 
financial collateral and would assume a zero market value for all 
derivative contracts. However, excess collateral and negative fair 
value of the derivative contracts within the netting set reduce PFE. 
This reduction in PFE is achieved through the PFE multiplier, which 
would recognize, if present, the amount of excess collateral available 
and the negative fair value of the derivative contracts within the 
netting set.
    Under the proposal, the PFE multiplier would decrease exponentially 
from a value of one as the value of the financial collateral held 
exceeds the net fair value of the derivative contracts within the 
netting set, subject to a floor of 0.05. The PFE multiplier would 
decrease as the net fair value of the derivative contracts within the 
netting set decreases below zero, to reflect that ``out-of-the-money'' 
transactions have less chance to return to a positive, ``in-the-money'' 
value. Specifically, when the component V-C is greater than zero, the 
multiplier would be equal to one. When the component V-C is less than 
zero, the multiplier would be less than one and would decrease 
exponentially in value as the absolute value of V-C increases. The PFE 
multiplier would approach the floor of 0.05 as the absolute value of V-
C becomes very large as compared with the aggregated amount of the 
netting set. Thus, the combination of the exponential function and the 
floor provides a sufficient level of conservatism by prohibiting overly 
favorable decreases in PFE when excess collateral increases and 
preventing PFE from reaching zero at any amounts of margin.
    Under Sec.  _.132(c)(7)(i) of the proposal, a banking organization 
would calculate the PFE multiplier according to the following formula:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP17DE18.003

Where:

V is the sum of the fair values (after excluding any valuation 
adjustments) of the derivative contracts within the netting set;
C is the sum of the net independent collateral amount and the 
variation margin amount applicable to the derivative contracts 
within the netting set; and
A is the aggregated amount of the netting set.

    Question 10: Can the PFE multiplier be calibrated to more 
appropriately recognize the risk-reducing effects of collateral and a 
netting set with a negative market value for purposes of the PFE 
calculation? Is the 5 percent floor appropriate, particularly in view 
of the exponential functioning of the formula for PFE multiplier, why 
or why not? Commenters are encouraged to provide data to support their 
responses.
5. PFE Calculation for Nonstandard Margin Agreements
    When a single variation margin agreement covers multiple netting 
sets, the parties exchange variation margin based on the aggregated 
market value of the netting sets. Thus, netting sets with positive and 
negative market values can offset one another to reduce the amount of 
variation margin that the parties must exchange. However, a banking 
organization's exposure amount for a netting set is floored by zero. 
Thus, for purposes of determining a banking organization's aggregate 
exposure amount, a netting set with a negative market value cannot 
offset a netting set with a positive market value. Therefore, in cases 
when a single variation agreement covers multiple setting sets and at 
least one netting set has a negative market value, the amount of 
variation margin exchanged between the parties will be insufficient 
relative to the banking organization's exposure amount for the netting 
sets.\33\ Under Sec.  _.132(c)(10)(ii) of the proposed rule, for 
multiple netting sets covered by a single variation margin agreement 
such that the banking organization's counterparty must post variation 
margin, a banking organization would be required to assign a single PFE 
equal to the sum of PFEs for each such netting set calculated as if 
none of the derivative contracts within the netting set are subject to 
a variation margin agreement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \33\ For example, consider a variation margin agreement with a 
zero threshold amount that covers two netting sets, one with a 
market value of 100 and the other with a market value of negative 
100. The aggregate market value of the netting sets would be zero 
and thus no variation margin would be exchanged. However, the 
banking organization's aggregate exposure amount for these netting 
sets would be equal to 100 because the negative market value of the 
second netting set would not be available to offset the positive 
market value of the first netting set. In the event of default of 
the counterparty, the banking organization would pay the 
counterparty 100 for the second netting set and would be exposed to 
a loss of 100 on the first netting set.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Since swap margin requirements came into effect in September 2016, 
the amounts of netting agreements that are subject to more than one 
variation margin agreement and hybrid netting sets have increased. 
While all derivative contracts within a netting set can fully offset 
each other in the replacement cost component calculation, regardless of 
whether the netting set is subject to multiple variation margin 
agreements or is a hybrid netting set, margined derivative contracts 
cannot offset unmargined derivative contracts in the

[[Page 64673]]

PFE component calculation because of different applicable risk 
horizons. Similarly, derivative contracts with different MPORs cannot 
offset each other.
    Therefore, the agencies are proposing, under Sec.  _.132(c)(11)(ii) 
of the proposed rule, that for a netting set subject to multiple 
variation margin agreements such that the counterparty to each 
variation margin agreement must post variation margin, or a netting set 
composed of at least one derivative contract subject to a variation 
margin agreement under which the counterparty to the derivative 
contract must post variation margin and at least one derivative 
contract that is not subject to such a variation margin agreement, a 
banking organization must divide the netting set into sub-netting sets 
and calculate the aggregated amount for each sub-netting set.
    All derivative contracts within the netting set that are not 
subject to a variation margin agreement or that are subject to a 
variation margin agreement under which the counterparty is not required 
to post variation margin would form a single sub-netting set. A banking 
organization would calculate the aggregated amount for this sub-netting 
set as if the netting set were not subject to a variation margin 
agreement. All derivative contracts within the netting set that are 
subject to variation margin agreements under which the counterparty 
must post variation margin and that share the same MPOR value would 
form another sub-netting set. A banking organization would calculate 
the aggregated amount for this sub-netting set as if the netting set is 
subject to a variation margin agreement, using the MPOR value shared by 
the derivative contracts within the netting set. A banking organization 
would calculate the PFE multiplier at the netting set level.
6. Adjusted Derivative Contract Amount
    The agencies intend for the adjusted derivative contract amount to 
represent a conservative estimate of EEPE of a netting set consisting 
of a single derivative contract, assuming zero market value and zero 
collateral, that is either positive (if a long position) or negative 
(if a short position).\34\ The proposal would calculate the adjusted 
derivative contract amount as a product of four quantities: The 
adjusted notional amount, the applicable supervisory factor, the 
applicable supervisory delta adjustment, and the maturity factor. This 
can be represented as follows:

    \34\ For a derivative contract that can be represented as a 
combination of standard option payoffs (such as collar, butterfly 
spread, calendar spread, straddle, and strangle), each standard 
option component would be treated as a separate derivative contract. 
For a derivative contract that includes multiple-payment options, 
(such as interest rate caps and floors) each payment option could be 
represented as a combination of effective single-payment options 
(such as interest rate caplets and floorlets). Linear derivative 
contracts (such as swaps) would not be decomposed into components.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

adjusted derivative contract amount = di * [delta]i * MFi * SFi

Where:

di is the adjusted notional amount;
[delta]i is the applicable supervisory delta adjustment;
MFi is the applicable maturity factor; and
SFi is the applicable supervisory factor.

    The adjusted notional amount accounts for the size of the 
derivative contract and reflects attributes of the most common 
derivative contracts in each asset class. The supervisory factor would 
convert the adjusted notional amount of the derivative contract into an 
EEPE based on the measured volatility specific to each asset class over 
a one-year horizon.\35\ Multiplication by the supervisory delta 
adjustment accounts for the sensitivity of a derivative contract 
(scaled to unit size) to the underlying primary risk factor, including 
the correct sign (positive or negative) to account for the direction of 
the derivative contract amount relative to the primary risk factor.\36\ 
Finally, multiplication by the maturity factor scales down, if 
necessary, the derivative contract amount from the standard one-year 
horizon used for supervisory factor calibration to the risk horizon 
relevant for a given contract. The adjusted derivative contract amount 
is determined under Sec.  _.132(c)(9) of the proposed rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \35\ Specifically, the supervisory factors are intended to 
reflect the EEPE of a single at-the-money linear trade of unit size, 
zero market value and one-year maturity referencing a given risk 
factor in the absence of collateral.
    \36\ Sensitivity of a derivative contract to a risk factor is 
the ratio of the change in the market value of the derivative 
contract caused by a small change in the risk factor to the value of 
the change in the risk factor. In a linear derivative contract, the 
payoff of the derivative contract moves at a constant rate with the 
change in the value of the underlying risk factor. In a nonlinear 
contract, the payoff of the derivative contract does not move at a 
constant rate with the change in the value of the underlying risk 
factor. The sensitivity is positive if the derivative contract is 
long the risk factor and negative if the derivative contract is 
short the risk factor.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

a. Adjusted Notional Amount
    A banking organization would apply the same formula to interest 
rate derivative contracts and credit derivative contracts to arrive at 
the adjusted notional amount. For such contracts, the adjusted notional 
amount would equal the product of the notional amount of the derivative 
contract, as measured in U.S. dollars, using the exchange rate on the 
date of the calculation, and the supervisory duration. The agencies 
intend for the supervisory duration to recognize that interest rate 
derivative contracts and credit derivative contracts with a longer 
tenor would have a greater degree of variability than an identical 
derivative contract with a shorter tenor for the same change in the 
underlying risk factor (interest rate or credit spread).
    The supervisory duration would be calculated for the period that 
starts at S and ends at E. S would be equal to the number of business 
days between the present date and the start date for the derivative 
contract, or zero if the start date has passed, and E would be equal to 
the number of business days from the present date until the end date 
for the derivative contract. The supervisory duration is based on the 
assumption of a continuous stream of equal payments and a constant 
continuously compounded interest rate of 5 percent. The exponential 
function provides discounting for S and E at 5 percent continuously 
compounded. In all cases, the supervisory duration is floored at 10 
business days (or 0.04, based on an average of 250 business days per 
year).
    The supervisory duration formula is provided as follows:
    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP17DE18.004
    
Where:

S is the number of business days from the present day until the 
start date for the derivative contract, or zero if the start date 
has already passed; and
E is the number of business days from the present day until the end 
date for the derivative contract.


[[Page 64674]]


    For an interest rate derivative contract or credit derivative 
contract that is a variable notional swap, the notional amount would 
equal the time-weighted average of the contract notional amounts of 
such a swap over the remaining life of the swap. For an interest rate 
derivative contract or credit derivative contract that is a leveraged 
swap, in which the notional amounts of all legs of the derivative 
contract are divided by a factor and all rates of the derivative 
contract are multiplied by the same factor, the notional amount would 
equal the notional amount of an equivalent unleveraged swap.
    For an exchange rate derivative contract, the adjusted notional 
amount would equal the notional amount of the non-U.S. denominated 
currency leg of the derivative contract, as measured in U.S. dollars 
using the exchange rate on the date of the calculation. In general, the 
non-U.S. dollar denominated currency leg is the source of exchange rate 
volatility. If both legs of the exchange rate derivative contract are 
denominated in currencies other than U.S. dollars, the adjusted 
notional amount of the derivative contract would be the largest leg of 
the derivative contract, measured in U.S. dollars. Under the agencies' 
alternative approach for treating exchange rate derivative contracts 
discussed above, the adjusted notional amount of an exchange rate 
derivative contract would be the notional amount of the derivative 
contract that is denominated in the foreign currency of the hedging 
set, as measured in U.S. dollars using the exchange rate on the date of 
the calculation. For an exchange rate derivative contract with multiple 
exchanges of principal, the notional amount would equal the notional 
amount of the derivative contract multiplied by the number of exchanges 
of principal under the derivative contract. For an equity derivative 
contract or a commodity derivative contract, the adjusted notional 
amount is the product of the fair value of one unit of the reference 
instrument underlying the derivative contract and the number of such 
units referenced by the derivative contract. The proposed treatment is 
designed to reflect the current price of the underlying reference 
entity. For example, if a banking organization has a derivative 
contract that references 15,000 pounds of frozen concentrated orange 
juice currently priced at $0.0005 a pound then the adjusted notional 
amount would be $75.
    The payoff of a volatility derivative contract generally is 
determined based on a notional amount and the realized or implied 
volatility (or variance) referenced by the derivative contract and not 
necessarily the unit price of the underlying reference entity. 
Accordingly, for an equity derivative contract or a commodity 
derivative contract that is a volatility derivative contract, a banking 
organization would be required to replace the unit price with the 
underlying volatility referenced by the volatility derivative contract 
and replace the number of units with the notional amount of the 
volatility derivative contract.
    The agencies anticipate that for most derivative contracts banking 
organizations would be able to determine the adjusted notional amount 
using one of the formulas or methodologies described above. The 
agencies recognize, however, that such approaches may not be applicable 
to all types of derivative contracts, and that a different approach may 
be necessary to determine the adjusted notional amount of a derivative 
contract. In such a case, the agencies would expect a banking 
organization to consult with its appropriate federal supervisor prior 
to using an alternative approach to the formulas or methodologies 
described above.
    Question 11: The agencies invite comment on the proposed approaches 
to determine the adjusted notional amount of derivative contracts. In 
particular, how can the agencies improve the approaches set forth in 
the proposal to determine the adjusted notional amount for nonstandard 
derivative contracts so that they are appropriate for such 
transactions, including using formulas of the market value of 
underlying contracts? What, if any, nonstandard derivative contracts 
are not addressed by the proposal, and what approaches should be used 
to determine the adjusted notional amount for those contracts? Please 
provide examples and descriptions of how such adjusted notional amounts 
would be determined.
b. Supervisory Factor
    Table 2 to Sec.  _.132 of the proposed rule provides the proposed 
supervisory factors. The agencies are proposing to use the same 
supervisory factors provided in the Basel Committee standard, with the 
exception of the supervisory factors for credit derivative contracts 
that reference single-name entities, which are based on the applicable 
credit rating of the reference entity.\37\ Section 939A of the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act) 
prohibits the use of credit ratings in federal regulations, and 
therefore, the agencies are unable to propose implementing this feature 
of the Basel Committee standard.\38\ Accordingly, the agencies are 
proposing an approach that satisfies the requirements of section 939A 
while allowing for a level of granularity among the supervisory factors 
applicable to single-name credit derivatives that is generally 
consistent with the Basel Committee standard.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \37\ Specifically, the BCBS supervisory factors are as follow 
(in percent): AAA and AA--0.38, A--0.42; BBB--0.54; BB--1.06; B--
1.6; CCC--6.0.
    \38\ Public Law 11-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010), Sec.  939A. This 
provision is codified as part of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
at 15 U.S.C. 78o-7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Specifically, the agencies are proposing to apply a supervisory 
factor to single-name credit derivative contracts based on the 
following categories: Investment grade, speculative grade, and sub-
speculative grade. For credit derivative contracts that reference 
indices, the agencies are proposing to apply a higher supervisory 
factor to speculative grade indices than investment grade indices, 
because of the additional risk present with speculative grade credits. 
The proposal would maintain the current definition of investment grade 
in the capital rule and would propose new definitions for speculative 
grade and sub-speculative grade.
    The investment grade category would capture single-name credit 
derivative contracts consistent with the three highest supervisory 
factor categories under the Basel Committee standard. The capital rule 
defines investment grade to mean that the entity to which the banking 
organization is exposed through a loan or security, or the reference 
entity with respect to a credit derivative contract, has adequate 
capacity to meet financial commitments for the projected life of the 
asset or exposure. Such an entity or reference entity has adequate 
capacity to meet financial commitments, as the risk of its default is 
low and the full and timely repayment of principal is expected.\39\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \39\ See 12 CFR 3.2 (OCC); 12 CFR 217.2 (Board); and 12 CFR 
324.2 (FDIC).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The agencies intend for the speculative grade category to cover 
single-name credit derivative contracts consistent with the next two 
lower supervisory factor categories under the Basel Committee standard. 
The proposal would define speculative grade to mean that the reference 
entity has adequate capacity to meet financial commitments in the near 
term, but is vulnerable to adverse economic conditions, such that 
should economic conditions deteriorate, the reference entity would 
present an elevated default risk. The agencies

[[Page 64675]]

intend for the sub-speculative grade category to cover the lowest 
supervisory factor category under the Basel Committee standard. The 
proposal would define sub-speculative grade to mean that the reference 
entity depends on favorable economic conditions to meet its financial 
commitments, such that should economic conditions deteriorate, the 
reference entity likely would default on its financial commitments. The 
agencies believe that each of the proposed categories include exposures 
that perform largely in accordance with the performance criteria that 
would define each category under the proposed rule, and therefore would 
result in capital requirements that are largely equivalent to those 
resulting from application of the supervisory factors under the Basel 
Committee standard.
    To determine the supervisory factor that would apply to the 
investment and speculative grade categories, the agencies reviewed 
ratings issuance data from 2012 to 2017, using information made 
publicly available by the Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation 
(DTCC).\40\ The agencies used the DTCC data to determine the weighted-
average supervisory factor for the investment and speculative grade 
categories, and rounded that supervisory factor to the nearest tenth. 
The agencies are proposing to retain the supervisory factor from the 
Basel Committee standard for the sub-speculative grade category, 
because that category would consist only of single name credit 
derivatives with the lowest credit quality.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \40\ Markit North America, Inc., accessed via Wharton Research 
Data Services (WRDS), wrds-web.wharton.upenn.edu/wrds/about/databaselist.cfm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The agencies considered using the same investment grade/non-
investment grade distinction as provided under the standardized 
approach for determining whether a guarantor is an eligible guarantor 
for purposes of the rule. However, the agencies are concerned that this 
approach would not provide for sufficient risk differentiation across 
credit derivative products. The agencies also considered calibrating 
the supervisory factor for the investment and speculative grade 
categories by using a simple average of the ratings issued in 
accordance with the DTCC data, or the most conservative supervisory 
factor applicable to the credit ratings that mapped to each category. 
For example, if for purposes of the investment grade category the DTCC 
data demonstrated that the average rating in that category is AA (using 
a simple average of all ratings issued for single-name credit 
derivatives), the proposal would apply a 0.38 percent supervisory 
factor to investment grade single-name credit derivatives, because that 
supervisory factor corresponds to a AA rating under the Basel Committee 
standard. Under the other alternative considered, the proposal would 
apply the most conservative (i.e., stringent) supervisory factor among 
the supervisory factors that apply to a given category. Under this 
approach, a supervisory factor of 1.6 percent would apply to 
speculative grade single-name credit derivatives, as that is the most 
stringent supervisory factor under the Basel Committee standard that 
corresponds to the categories intended to be captured by the term 
``speculative grade.'' The agencies believe, however, that the 
weighted-average approach more accurately reflects the ratings issuance 
data and therefore would more closely align to the single-name credit 
derivatives held in banking organizations' derivatives portfolios.
    The agencies expect that banking organizations would conduct their 
own due diligence to determine the appropriate category for a single-
name credit derivative, in view of the performance criteria in the 
definitions for each category under the proposed rule. Although a 
banking organization would be able to consider the credit rating for a 
single-name credit derivative in making that determination, the credit 
rating should be part of a multi-factor analysis. In addition, the 
agencies would expect a banking organization to support its analysis 
and assignment of the respective credit categories.
    Interest rate derivative contracts and exchange rate derivative 
contracts would each be subject to a single supervisory factor. Equity 
derivative contracts that reference single-name equities would be 
subject to a higher supervisory factor than derivative contracts that 
reference equity indices in recognition of the effect of 
diversification in the index. Commodity derivative contracts that 
reference energy would receive a higher supervisory factor than 
commodity derivative contracts that reference metals, agriculture, and 
other commodities (each of which would receive the same supervisory 
factor), to reflect the observed additional volatility inherent in the 
energy markets.
    For volatility derivative contracts, a banking organization would 
multiply the applicable supervisory factor based on the asset class 
related to the volatility measure by a factor of five. The agencies are 
proposing this treatment because volatility derivative contracts are 
inherently subject to more price volatility than the underlying asset 
classes they reference. For basis derivative contracts, the agencies 
are proposing to multiply the applicable supervisory factor based on 
the asset class related to the basis measure by a factor of one half. 
The agencies are proposing this treatment because the volatility of a 
basis between highly correlated risk factors would be less than the 
volatility of the risk factors (assuming the factors have equal 
volatility).

             Table 2--Supervisory Option Volatility and Supervisory Factors for Derivative Contracts
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                    Supervisory     Supervisory
              Asset class                       Subclass              option        correlation     Supervisory
                                                                  volatility (%)  parameters (%)  factor \a\ (%)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Interest rate.........................  N/A.....................              50             N/A             0.5
Exchange rate.........................  N/A.....................              15             N/A             4.0
Credit, single name...................  Investment grade........             100              50             0.5
                                        Speculative grade.......             100              50             1.3
                                        Sub-speculative grade...             100              50             6.0
Credit, index.........................  Investment Grade........              80              80            0.38
                                        Speculative Grade.......              80              80            1.06
Equity, single name...................  N/A.....................             120              50              32
Equity, index.........................  N/A.....................              75              80              20
Commodity.............................  Energy..................             150              40              40

[[Page 64676]]

 
                                        Metals..................              70              40              18
                                        Agricultural............              70              40              18
                                        Other...................              70              40              18
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a\ The applicable supervisory factor for basis derivative contract hedging sets is equal to one-half of the
  supervisory factor provided in Table 2, and the applicable supervisory factor for volatility derivative
  contract hedging sets is equal to 5 times the supervisory factor provided in Table 2.

    Question 12: Can the agencies improve the supervisory factors under 
the proposal to reflect more appropriately the volatility specific to 
each asset class? What, if any, additional categories and respective 
supervisory factors should the agencies consider? Commenters supporting 
changes to the supervisory factors or the categories within the asset 
classes should provide analysis supporting their request.
    Question 13: Can the agencies improve the non-ratings-based 
methodology under the proposal to determine the supervisory factor 
applicable to a single-name credit derivative contract? Are there other 
non-ratings-based methodologies that could be used to determine the 
applicable supervisory factor for single-name credit derivatives? What 
would be the benefit of any such alternative relative to the proposal? 
What would be the burden associated with the proposed methodology, as 
well as any alternative suggested by commenters?
c. Supervisory Delta Adjustment
    Under the proposal, derivative contracts that are not options or 
collateralized debt obligation tranches are considered to be linear in 
the primary underlying risk factor. For such derivative contracts, the 
supervisory delta adjustment would need to account only for the 
direction of the derivative contract (positive or negative) with 
respect to the underlying risk factor. Therefore, the supervisory delta 
adjustment would be equal to one if such a derivative contract is long 
in the primary risk factor and negative one if such a derivative 
contract is short in the primary risk factor. A derivative contract is 
long in the primary risk factor if the fair value of the instrument 
increases when the value of the primary risk factor increases. A 
derivative contract is short in the primary risk factor if the fair 
value of the instrument decreases when the value of the primary risk 
factor increases.
    Because option contracts are nonlinear, the proposal would require 
a banking organization to use the Black-Scholes Model to determine the 
supervisory delta adjustment, as provided in Table 2. The agencies are 
proposing to use the Black-Scholes Model to determine the supervisory 
delta adjustment because the model is a widely used option-pricing 
model within the industry. The Black Scholes-Model assumes, however, 
that the underlying risk factor is greater than zero. In particular, 
the Black Scholes delta formula contains a ratio P/K that is an input 
into the natural logarithm function. P is the fair value of the 
underlying instrument and K is the strike price. Because the natural 
logarithm function can be defined only for amounts greater than zero, a 
reference risk factor with a negative value (e.g., negative interest 
rates) would make the supervisory delta adjustment inoperable. 
Therefore, the formula incorporates a parameter, lambda, the purpose of 
which is to adjust the fraction P/K so that it has a positive value.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP17DE18.005

Where:

F is the standard normal cumulative distribution function;
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \41\ A banking organization would be required to represent 
binary options with strike K as the combination of one bought 
European option and one sold European option of the same type as the 
original option (put or call) with the strike prices set equal to 
0.95 * K and 1.05 * K. The size of the position in the European 
options must be such that the payoff of the binary option is 
reproduced exactly outside the region between the two strikes. The 
absolute value of the sum of the adjusted derivative contract 
amounts of the bought and sold options is capped at the payoff 
amount of the binary option.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

P equals the current fair value of the instrument or risk factor, as 
applicable, underlying the option;
K equals the strike price of the option;
T equals the number of business days until the latest contractual 
exercise date of the option; and
l equals zero for all derivative contracts, except that for interest 
rate options that reference currencies currently associated with 
negative interest rates l must be equal to; max {-L + 0.1%; 
0{time} ; \42\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \42\ The same value li of must be used for all 
interest rate options that are denominated in the same currency. The 
value of li for a given currency would be equal to the 
lowest value L of Pi and Ki of all interest 
rate options in a given currency that the banking organization has 
with all counterparties.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 64677]]

and [sigma] equals the supervisory option volatility, determined in 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
accordance with Table 2.

    For a derivative contract that is a collateralized debt obligation 
tranche, the supervisory delta adjustment would be determined according 
to the following formula:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP17DE18.006

Where:

A is the attachment point, which equals the ratio of the notional 
amounts of all underlying exposures that are subordinated to the 
banking organization's exposure to the total notional amount of all 
underlying exposures, expressed as a decimal value between zero and 
one; \43\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \43\ In the case of a first-to-default credit derivative, there 
are no underlying exposures that are subordinated to the banking 
organization's exposure and A=0. In the case of a second-or-
subsequent-to-default credit derivative, the smallest (n-1) notional 
amounts of the underlying exposures are subordinated to the banking 
organization's exposure.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

D is the detachment point, which equals one minus the ratio of the 
notional amounts of all underlying exposures that are senior to the 
banking organization's exposure to the total notional amount of all 
underlying exposures, expressed as a decimal value between zero and 
one; and
The proposal would apply a positive sign to the resulting amount if 
the banking organization purchased the collateralized debt 
obligation tranche and would apply a negative sign if the banking 
organization sold the collateralized debt obligation tranche.
d. Maturity Factor
    For derivative contracts not subject to a variation margin 
agreement, or derivative contracts subject to a variation margin 
agreement under which the counterparty to the variation margin 
agreement is not required to post variation margin to the banking 
organization, the risk horizon would be the lesser of one year and the 
remaining maturity of the derivative contract, subject to a 10-
business-day floor. Accordingly, for such a derivative contract, a 
banking organization would use the following formula:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP17DE18.007

    Where M equals the greater of 10 business days and the remaining 
maturity of the contract, as measured in business days.
    For derivative contracts subject to a variation margin agreement 
under which the counterparty must post variation margin, the risk 
horizon would be equal to the MPOR of the variation margin agreement. 
Accordingly, for such a derivative contract a banking organization 
would use the following formula:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP17DE18.008

    Where MPOR refers to the period from the most recent exchange of 
collateral under a variation margin agreement with a defaulting 
counterparty until the derivative contracts are closed out and the 
resulting market risk is re-hedged.
    For derivative contracts that are not cleared transactions, MPOR 
would be floored at 10 business days. For derivative contracts between 
a clearing member banking organization and its client that are cleared 
transactions, MPOR would be floored at five business days. Under the 
capital rule, however, the exposure of a clearing member banking 
organization to its clearing member client is not a cleared transaction 
where the clearing member banking organization is either acting as a 
financial intermediary and enters into an offsetting transaction with a 
CCP or where the clearing member banking organization provides a 
guarantee to the CCP on the performance of the client. Accordingly, in 
such cases, MPOR may not be less than 10 business days. If either a 
cleared or noncleared derivative contract is subject to an outstanding 
dispute over variation margin, the applicable MPOR would be twice the 
MPOR provided for those transactions in the absence of such a 
dispute.\44\ For a derivative contract that is within a netting set 
that is composed of more than 5,000 derivative contracts that are not 
cleared transactions, MPOR would be floored at 20 business days.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \44\ In general, a party will not have violated its obligation 
to collect or post variation margin from or to a counterparty if the 
counterparty has refused or otherwise failed to provide or accept 
the required variation margin to or from the party; and the party 
has made the necessary efforts to collect or post the required 
variation margin, including the timely initiation and continued 
pursuit of formal dispute resolution mechanisms; or has otherwise 
demonstrated that it has made appropriate efforts to collect or post 
the required variation margin; or commenced termination of the 
derivative contract with the counterparty promptly following the 
applicable cure period and notification requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    For a derivative contract in which on specified dates any 
outstanding exposure of the derivative contract is settled and the 
terms of the derivative contract are reset so that the fair value of 
the derivative contract is zero, the remaining maturity of the 
derivative contract is the period until the next reset date.\45\ In 
addition, derivative contracts with daily settlement would be treated 
as unmargined derivative contracts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \45\ See ``Regulatory Capital Treatment of Certain Centrally-
cleared Derivative Contracts Under Regulatory Capital Rules'' 
(August 14, 2017), OCC Bulletin: 2017-27; FDIC Letter FIL-33-2017; 
and Board SR letter 07-17.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 64678]]

7. Example Calculation \46\
    To calculate the exposure amount of a netting set a banking 
organization would need to determine (1) the replacement cost, (2) the 
adjusted derivative contract amount of each derivative contract within 
the netting set, (3) the aggregated amount, which is the sum of each 
hedging set within the netting set, (4) the PFE multiplier, and (5) 
PFE. A banking organization may calculate these items together for 
derivative contracts that are subject to the same QMNA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \46\ This example is intended only for use as an illustrative 
guide. The calculation mechanics may vary based on a variety of 
factors, including for example, the number of hedging sets, the 
frequency at which variation margin is exchanged, and certain terms 
of the derivative contracts and underlying reference assets. SA-CCR 
considers a number of risk attributes to determine the exposure 
amount of a derivative contract, or netting set thereof, and not all 
of those attributes are captured in this example.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In this example, the netting set consists of two fixed versus 
floating interest rate swaps that are subject to the same QMNA. Table 4 
summarizes the relevant contractual terms for these derivative 
contracts. The netting set is subject to a variation margin agreement, 
and the banking organization has received from the counterparty, as of 
the calculation date, variation margin in the amount of $10,000 and 
initial margin in the amount of $200,000. Both the variation margin 
threshold and the minimum transfer amount are zero. All notional 
amounts and market values in Table 4 are denominated in U.S. Dollars.

                                                 Table 4--Contractual Terms for the Derivative Contracts
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                                                            Fair value
                                                            Residual                                                                         excluding
           Derivative                     Type              maturity           Base currency              Pay leg            Notional        valuation
                                                             (years)                                                        (thousands)     adjustments
                                                                                                                                            (thousands)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1..............................  Interest rate swap....              10  USD                       Fixed................         $10,000             $30
2..............................  Interest rate swap....               4  USD                       Floating.............          10,000             -20
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Step 1: Determine the Replacement Cost
    Under Sec.  _.132(c)(6)(i) of the proposed rule, the replacement 
cost of a netting set subject to a variation margin agreement would 
equal the greater of (1) the sum of the fair values (after excluding 
any valuation adjustments) of the derivative contracts within the 
netting set less the sum of the net independent collateral amount and 
the variation margin amount applicable to such derivative contracts; 
(2) the sum of the variation margin threshold and the minimum transfer 
amount applicable to the derivative contracts within the netting set 
less the net independent collateral amount applicable to such 
derivative contracts; and (3) zero.
    The replacement cost of the netting set in the example is given as 
follows:
 RC = max{(30-20)-(200 + 10); 0 + 0 - 200; 0{time}  = 0
Step 2: Determine the Adjusted Derivative Contract Amount of Each 
Derivative Contract Within the Netting Set
    A banking organization would determine the adjusted derivative 
contract amount of each derivative contract within the netting set, in 
accordance with Sec.  _.132(c)(9) of the proposed rule. The adjusted 
derivative contract amount would be the product of the adjusted 
notional amount, the supervisory delta adjustment, the maturity factor, 
and the applicable supervisory factor, which are given as follows:

Adjusted derivative contract amountiiR = diIR * di * MFi * SFi

    Under Sec.  _.132(c)(9)(ii)(A) of the proposed rule, for each 
derivative contract i, the adjusted notional amount would be calculated 
as follows:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP17DE18.009

Si and Ei represent the number of business days 
from the present day until the start date and the end date, 
respectively, of the period referenced by the interest rate derivative 
contracts. The residual maturity of derivative contract 1 is 10 years 
and thus term Ei equals 250 multiplied by 10. The residual 
maturity of derivative contract 2 is 4 years and thus term 
Ei equals 250 multiplied by 4. Accordingly, the adjusted 
notional amounts for derivative contract 1 and derivative contract 2 
are given as follows:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP17DE18.010

    The supervisory delta adjustment would be assigned to each 
derivative contract in accordance with Sec.  _.132(c)(9)(iii) of the 
proposed rule. Derivative contract 1 is long in the primary risk factor 
and is not an option; therefore, the supervisory delta is equal to one. 
Derivative contract 2 is short in the primary risk factor and is not an 
option; therefore, the supervisory delta is equal to negative one.

[[Page 64679]]

    The maturity factor would be assigned to each derivative contract 
in accordance with Sec.  _.132(c)(9)(iv)(A) of the proposed rule. 
Assuming a MPOR of 15 business days, the maturity factor is given as 
follows:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP17DE18.011

    The supervisory factor for interest rate derivative contracts is 
0.50 percent, as provided in Table 2.
    For derivative contract 1, the adjusted derivative contract amount 
would equal 1 * 78,694 * 0.3674 * 0.50% = 144.57. For derivative 
contract 2, the adjusted derivative contract amount equals -1 * 36,254 
* 0.3674 * 0.50% = -66.60.
Step 3: Determine the Hedging Set Amount
    A banking organization would determine the hedging set amount for 
interest rate derivative contracts in accordance with Sec.  
_.134(c)(8)(i) of the proposed rule, as follows:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP17DE18.012


[[Page 64680]]


[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP17DE18.013

Step 4: Determine the Aggregated Amount
    Because the netting set includes only one hedging set, the 
aggregated amount is equal to 108.89.
Step 5: Determine the PFE Multiplier
    A banking organization would calculate the PFE multiplier in 
accordance with Sec.  _.132(c)(7)(i) of the proposed rule, as follows:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP17DE18.014

Where:

(A) V is the sum of the fair values (after excluding any valuation 
adjustments) of the derivative contracts within the netting set;
(B) C is the sum of the net independent collateral amount and the 
variation margin amount applicable to the derivative contracts 
within the netting set
(C) A is the aggregated amount of the netting set

    The PFE multiplier would be given as:
    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP17DE18.015
    
Step 6: Determine PFE
    In accordance with Sec.  _.132(c)(7) of the proposed rule, PFE 
would equal the product of the PFE multiplier and the aggregated 
amount. Thus, PFE would be calculated as 0.4113 * 108.89 = 44.79.
Step 7: Determine the Exposure Amount
    In accordance with Sec.  _.132(c)(5) of the proposed rule, the 
exposure amount of a netting net would equal sum of the replacement 
cost of the netting set and the PFE of the netting set multiplied by 
1.4. Therefore, the exposure amount of the netting set in the example 
would be calculated as, 1.4 * (0 + 44.79) = 62.70.

III. Revisions to the Cleared Transactions Framework

    Under the cleared transactions framework in the capital rule, a 
banking organization is required to hold risk-based capital for its 
exposure to, and certain collateral posted in connection with, a 
derivative contract that is a cleared transaction. In addition, a 
clearing member banking organization must hold risk-based capital for 
its default fund contributions. The capital requirement for a cleared 
derivative contract reflects the counterparty credit risk of the 
derivative contract, whereas the capital requirement for collateral 
posted in connection with such a derivative contract reflects the risk 
that a banking organization may not be able to recover its collateral 
upon default of the entity holding the collateral. The capital 
requirement for a default fund contribution reflects the risk that a 
clearing member banking organization may incur loss on such 
contribution resulting from the CCP's or another clearing member's 
default. In addition, in recognition of the credit risk of the 
collateral itself, a banking organization must calculate a risk-
weighted asset amount for any collateral provided to a CCP, clearing 
member, or a custodian in connection with a cleared transaction.
    In general, the risk-based capital treatment under the cleared 
transactions framework distinguishes between derivative contracts 
cleared through a CCP and those cleared through a QCCP, whether the 
derivative contract is with a clearing member or clearing member 
client, and, with respect to collateral, the treatment depends on 
whether the collateral is held in a bankruptcy remote manner. Compared 
to transactions cleared through a CCP, those involving a QCCP generally 
are considered to be less risky, because to qualify as a QCCP for 
purposes of the capital rule a central counterparty must meet certain 
risk-management, supervision, and other requirements.\47\ For purposes 
of the capital rule, ``bankruptcy remote'' generally means that 
collateral posted by a clearing member to a CCP would be excluded from 
the CCP's estate in receivership, insolvency, liquidation, or similar 
proceeding, and thus the banking organization would be more likely to 
recover such collateral upon the CCP's default.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \47\ See the definition of ``qualifying central counterparty'' 
in 12 CFR 3.2 (OCC); 12 CFR 217.2 (Board); and 12 CFR 324.2 (FDIC). 
The requirements are consistent with the principles developed by the 
Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems and Technical Committee 
of the International Organization of Securities Commissions. See 
``Principles for financial market infrastructure,'' Committee on 
Payment and Settlement Systems and Technical Committee of the 
International Organization of Securities Commissions, (April 2012), 
available at https://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d101a.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The agencies are proposing to revise the cleared transactions 
framework under the capital rule by requiring certain banking 
organizations to use SA-CCR to determine the trade exposure amount for 
a cleared derivative contract. In addition, the agencies are proposing 
to simplify the formula used to determine the risk-weighted asset 
amount for a default fund contribution. The proposed revisions are 
consistent with standards developed by the Basel Committee.\48\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \48\ ``Capital requirements for bank exposures to central 
counterparties,'' Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, April 
2014, https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs282.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Notwithstanding the proposed implementation of SA-CCR, the 
requirements under the capital rule regarding the treatment of cleared 
derivative contracts, including the definition for cleared transactions 
and the operational requirements for cleared derivative contracts, 
would still apply irrespective of whether the exposure is associated 
with a CCP or a QCCP.\49\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \49\ 12 CFR 3.3 (OCC); 12 CFR 217.3 (Board); 12 CFR 324.3 
(FDIC).

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 64681]]

A. Trade Exposure Amount

    To determine the risk-weighted asset amount for a cleared 
derivative contract, a banking organization must multiply the trade 
exposure amount of the derivative contract by the risk weight 
applicable to the CCP. In general, the trade exposure amount is the sum 
of the exposure amount of the derivative contract and the fair value of 
any related collateral held in a manner that is not bankruptcy remote. 
Under the standardized approach, a banking organization must use CEM to 
determine the trade exposure amount of its derivative contracts, 
whereas under the advanced approaches, an advanced approaches banking 
organization may use CEM or IMM to determine the trade exposure amount.
    Consistent with the proposal to replace the use of CEM with SA-CCR 
in the advanced approaches for determining the exposure amount for a 
noncleared derivative contract, the agencies are proposing to require 
advanced approaches banking organizations to use SA-CCR or IMM to 
determine the trade exposure amount for a cleared derivative contract. 
Thus, an advanced approaches banking organization would be required to 
use the same approach (SA-CCR or IMM) for both noncleared and cleared 
derivative contracts. As noted above, the agencies believe that 
requiring an advanced approaches banking organization to use either SA-
CCR or IMM for all purposes under the advanced approaches would 
facilitate regulatory reporting and the supervisory assessment of a 
banking organization's capital management program. In addition, for 
purposes of the standardized approach, an advanced approaches banking 
organization would be required to use SA-CCR to determine the trade 
exposure amount of its cleared derivative contracts.
    For non-advanced approaches banking organizations, the proposal 
would permit the use of CEM or SA-CCR to determine the trade exposure 
amount for a derivative contract. However, similar to the uniformity 
requirement for the elections of advanced approaches banking 
organizations, a non-advanced approaches banking organization that 
elects to use SA-CCR for purposes of determining the exposure amount of 
a derivative contract (under Sec.  _.34 of the capital rule) would also 
be required to use SA-CCR (instead of CEM) to determine the trade 
exposure amount for a cleared derivative contract under the cleared 
transactions framework. Similarly, a non-advanced approaches banking 
organization that continues to use CEM under Sec.  _.34 of the proposed 
capital rule would continue to use CEM to determine the trade exposure 
amount of all its derivative contracts.
    Question 14: Should the agencies maintain the use of CEM for 
purposes of the cleared transactions framework under the advanced 
approaches? What other factors should the agencies consider in 
determining whether SA-CCR is a more or less appropriate approach for 
calculating the trade exposure amount for derivative transactions with 
central counterparties?
    Question 15: What would be the pros and cons of allowing advanced 
approaches banking organizations to use either SA-CCR or IMM for 
purposes of determining the risk-weighted asset amount of both 
centrally and noncentrally cleared derivative transactions?

B. Treatment of Default Fund Contributions

    Under the capital rule, a clearing member banking organization must 
determine a risk-weighted asset amount for its default fund 
contributions according to one of three approaches. A clearing member 
banking organization's risk-weighted asset amount for its default fund 
contributions to a CCP that is not a QCCP generally is the sum of such 
default fund contributions multiplied by 1,250 percent. A clearing 
member banking organization's risk-weighted asset amount for its 
default fund contributions to a QCCP equals the sum of its capital 
requirement for each QCCP to which a banking organization contributes 
to a default fund, as calculated under one of two methods. Method one 
is a complex three-step approach that compares the default fund of the 
QCCP to the capital the QCCP would be required to hold if it were a 
banking organization and provides a method to allocate the default fund 
deficit or excess back to the clearing member. Method two is a 
simplified approach in which the risk-weighted asset amount for a 
default fund contribution to a QCCP equals 1,250 percent multiplied by 
the default fund contribution, subject to a cap.
    The proposal would eliminate method one and method two under the 
capital rule and implement a new method for a clearing member banking 
organization to determine the risk-weighted asset amount for its 
default fund contributions to a QCCP. The agencies intend for the new 
method to be less complex than the current method one but also more 
granular than the current method two. Under the proposal, the risk-
weighted asset amount for a clearing member banking organization's 
default fund contribution would be its pro-rata share of the QCCP's 
default fund.
    To determine the capital requirement for a default fund 
contribution, a clearing member banking organization would first 
calculate the hypothetical capital requirement of the QCCP 
(KCCP), unless the QCCP has already disclosed it, in which 
case the banking organization must rely on that disclosed figure. In 
either case, a banking organization may choose to use a higher amount 
of KCCP than the minimum calculated under the formula if the 
banking organization has concerns about the nature, structure, or 
characteristics of the QCCP. In effect, KCCP would serve as 
a consistent measure of a QCCP's default fund amount.
    A clearing member banking organization would calculate 
KCCP according to the following formula:

KCCP = SCMi EADi * 1.6 percent,

Where:

CMi is each clearing member of the QCCP; and
EADi is the exposure amount of each clearing member of 
the QCCP to the QCCP, as determined under Sec.  _.133(d)(6).

    The component EADi would include both the clearing member banking 
organization's own transactions, its client transactions guaranteed by 
the clearing member, and all values of collateral held by the QCCP 
(including the clearing member banking organization's pre-funded 
default fund contribution against these transactions).\50\ The amount 
1.6 percent represents the product of a capital ratio of 8 percent and 
a 20 percent risk weight of a clearing member banking organization, 
which is equal to the sum of the 2 percent capital requirement for 
trade exposure plus 18 percent for the default fund portion of a 
banking organization's exposure to a QCCP.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \50\ The definition of default fund contribution includes fund 
commitments made by a clearing member to a CCP's mutualized loss 
sharing arrangements. The references to the commitments could 
include terms such as assessments, special assessments, guarantee 
commitments, and contingent capital commitments, among other terms.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A banking organization that is required to use SA-CCR to determine 
the exposure amount for its derivative contracts under the standardized 
approach would be required to use SA-CCR to calculate KCCP 
for both the standardized approach and the

[[Page 64682]]

advanced approaches.\51\ For purposes of calculating KCCP, 
the PFE multiplier would include collateral held by a QCCP in which the 
QCCP has a legal claim in the event of the default of the member or 
client, including default fund contributions of that member. In 
addition, a banking organization would use a MPOR of 10 days in the 
maturity factor adjustment. A banking organization that elects to use 
CEM to determine the exposure amount of its derivative contracts under 
the standardized approach would use CEM to calculate KCCP.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \51\ The agencies are not proposing to make revisions to the 
calculations to determine the exposure amount of repo-style 
transactions for purposes of determining the risk-weighted asset 
amount of a banking organization's default fund contributions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    EAD must be calculated separately for each clearing member's sub-
client accounts and sub-house account (i.e., for the clearing member's 
propriety activities). If the clearing member's collateral and its 
client's collateral are held in the same account, then the EAD of that 
account would be the sum of the EAD for the client-related transactions 
within the account and the EAD of the house-related transactions within 
the account. In such a case, for purposes of determining such EADs, the 
independent collateral of the clearing member and its client would be 
allocated in proportion to the respective total amount of independent 
collateral posted by the clearing member to the QCCP. This treatment 
would protect against a clearing member recognizing client collateral 
to offset the CCP's exposures to the clearing members' proprietary 
activity in the calculation of KCCP.
    In addition, if any account or sub-account contains both derivative 
contracts and repo-style transactions, the EAD of that account is the 
sum of the EAD for the derivative contracts within the account and the 
EAD of the repo-style transactions within the account. If independent 
collateral is held for an account containing both derivative contracts 
and repo-style transactions, then such collateral must be allocated to 
the derivative contracts and repo-style transactions in proportion to 
the respective product specific exposure amounts. The respective 
product specific exposure amounts would be calculated, excluding the 
effects of collateral, according to Sec.  _.132(b) of the capital rule 
for repo-style transactions and to Sec.  _.132(c)(5) for derivative 
contracts. Second, a clearing member banking organization would 
calculate its capital requirement (KCMi), which would be the clearing 
member's share of the QCCP's default fund, subject to a floor equal to 
a 2 percent risk weight multiplied by the clearing member banking 
organization's prefunded default fund contribution to the QCCP and an 8 
percent capital ratio. This calculation would allocate KCCP 
on a pro rata basis to each clearing member based on the clearing 
member's share of the overall default fund contributions. Thus, a 
clearing member banking organization's capital requirement would 
increase as its contribution to the default fund increases relative to 
the QCCP's own prefunded amounts and the total prefunded default fund 
contributions from all clearing members to the QCCP. In all cases, a 
banking organization's capital requirement for its default fund 
contribution to a QCCP may not exceed the capital requirement that 
would apply if the same exposure were calculated as if it were to a 
CCP.
    A clearing member banking organization would calculate according to 
the following formula:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP17DE18.016


[[Page 64683]]



IV. Revisions to the Supplementary Leverage Ratio

    Under the capital rule, an advanced approaches banking organization 
must satisfy a minimum supplementary leverage ratio of 3 percent. An 
advanced approaches banking organization's supplementary leverage ratio 
is the ratio of its tier 1 capital to its total leverage exposure. 
Total leverage exposure includes both on-balance sheet assets and 
certain off-balance sheet exposures.\52\ For the on-balance sheet 
amount, a banking organization must include the balance sheet carrying 
value of its derivative contracts and certain cash variation 
margin.\53\ For the off-balance sheet amount, the banking organization 
must include the PFE for each derivative contract (or each single-
product netting set of derivative contracts), using CEM, as provided 
under Sec.  _.34 of the capital rule, but without regard to financial 
collateral.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \52\ See 3.10(c)(4)(ii) (OCC); 12 CFR 217.10(c)(4)(ii) (Board); 
324.10(c)(4)(ii) (FDIC).
    \53\ To determine the carrying value of derivative contracts, 
U.S. generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) provide a 
banking organization with the option to reduce any positive fair 
value of a derivative contract by the amount of any cash collateral 
received from the counterparty, provided the relevant GAAP criteria 
for offsetting are met (the GAAP offset option). Similarly, under 
the GAAP offset option, a banking organization has the option to 
offset the negative mark-to-fair value of a derivative contract with 
a counterparty. See Accounting Standards Codification paragraphs 
815-10-45-1 through 7 and 210-20-45-1. Under the capital rule, a 
banking organization that applies the GAAP offset option to 
determine the carrying value of its derivative contracts would be 
required to reverse the effect of the GAAP offset option for 
purposes of determining total leverage exposure, unless the 
collateral is cash variation margin recognized as settled with the 
derivative contract as a single unit of account for balance sheet 
presentation and satisfies the conditions under Sec.  
_.10(c)(4)(ii)(C)(1)-(7) of the capital rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The agencies are proposing to revise the capital rule to require 
advanced approaches banking organizations to use a modified version of 
SA-CCR to determine the on- and off-balance sheet amounts of derivative 
contracts for purposes of calculating total leverage exposure.\54\ The 
agencies believe that SA-CCR provides a more appropriate measure of 
derivative contracts for leverage capital purposes than the current 
approach. The agencies also are sensitive to the operational complexity 
that could result from requiring advanced approaches banking 
organizations to continue to use CEM for leverage capital purposes and 
another approach, SA-CCR, for risk-based capital purposes. Further, in 
comments on prior proposals, banking organizations have requested that 
the agencies adopt SA-CCR for leverage capital purposes.\55\ The 
proposal is consistent with the Basel Committee's standard on leverage 
capital requirements.\56\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \54\ Written options create an exposure to the derivative 
contact reference asset and thus must be included in total leverage 
exposure even though the proposal would allow certain written 
options to receive an exposure amount of zero for risk-based capital 
purposes.
    \55\ See 79 FR 57725, 57736 (Sept. 26, 2014).
    \56\ ``Basel III: Finalising post-crisis reforms,'' Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, December 2017, https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d424.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    For the on-balance sheet amount, an advanced approaches banking 
organization would include in total leverage exposure 1.4 multiplied by 
the greater of (1) the sum of the fair value of the derivative 
contracts within a netting set less the net amount of applicable cash 
variation margin, or (2) zero. Consistent with CEM, an advanced 
approaches banking organization would be able to recognize cash 
variation margin in the on-balance component calculation only if (1) 
the cash variation margin meets the conditions under Sec.  
_.10(c)(4)(ii)(C)(3)-(7) of the proposed rule; and (2) it has not been 
recognized in the form of a reduction in the fair value of the 
derivative contracts within the netting set under the advanced 
approaches banking organization's operative accounting standard. The 
proposed rule would maintain the current treatment for the recognition 
of cash variation margin in the supplementary leverage ratio.
    A banking organization would use this same approach to determine 
the on-balance sheet amount for a single netting set subject to 
multiple variation margin agreements. To calculate the on-balance sheet 
amount for multiple netting sets that are subject to a single variation 
margin agreement or a hybrid netting set, a banking organization would 
use the formula under Sec.  _.132(c)(10)(i) of the proposed rule, 
except the term ``CMA'' in Sec.  _.132(c)(10)(i)(C) would 
include only cash variation margin that meets the requirements under 
Sec.  _.10(c)(4)(ii)(C)(3)-(7) of the proposed rule.
    For the off-balance sheet amount, an advanced approaches banking 
organization would include in total leverage exposure 1.4 multiplied by 
the PFE of each netting set, calculated according to Sec.  _.132(c)(7) 
of the proposal, except an advanced approaches banking organization 
would not be permitted to recognize collateral in the PFE 
multiplier.\57\ Thus, for purposes of calculating total leverage 
exposure, the term ``C'' under Sec.  _.132(c)(7)(i)(B) of the proposal 
would be equal to zero. These adjustments are consistent with the 
current treatment under the capital rule, which generally limits 
collateral recognition in leverage capital requirements, and also with 
the leverage standards developed by the Basel Committee. While the 
proposal would limit recognition of collateral in the PFE multiplier, 
the proposal would recognize the shorter default risk horizon 
applicable to margined derivative contracts. Thus, under the proposal, 
a netting set subject to a variation margin agreement would apply the 
maturity factor as provided under Sec.  _.132(c)(9)(iv) of the proposed 
rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \57\ Accordingly, a banking organization would not use Sec.  
_.132(c)(7)(iii)-(iv) for purposes of calculating the PFE amount for 
the supplementary leverage ratio.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Compared to CEM, the implementation of a modified SA-CCR for 
purposes of the supplementary leverage ratio would increase advanced 
approaches banking organizations' supplementary leverage ratios. 
However, the agencies are sensitive to impediments to banking 
organizations' willingness and ability to provide client-clearing 
services. The agencies also are mindful of international commitments to 
support the migration of derivative contracts to central clearing 
frameworks,\58\ the Dodd-Frank Act mandate to mitigate systemic risk 
and promote financial stability by, in part, developing uniform 
standards for the conduct of systemically important payment, clearing, 
and settlement activities of financial institutions.\59\ In view of 
these important, post-crisis reform objectives, the agencies are 
inviting comment on the consequences of not recognizing collateral 
provided by a clearing member client banking organization in connection 
with a cleared transaction.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \58\ See, e.g., G-20 Pittsburgh Summit: Leaders Statement 
(September 2009); see also Consultative Document, ``Leverage ratio 
treatment of client cleared derivatives,'' Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision, October 2018, https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d451.pdf.
    \59\ See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act, section 802(b).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Question 16: What concerns do commenters have regarding the 
proposal to replace the use of CEM with a modified version of SA-CCR, 
as proposed, for purposes of the supplementary leverage ratio?
    Question 17: The agencies invite comment on the recognition of 
collateral provided by clearing member client banking organizations in 
connection with a cleared transaction for purposes of the SA-CCR 
methodology. What are the pros and cons of recognizing such collateral 
in the calculation of

[[Page 64684]]

replacement cost and potential future exposure? Commenters should 
provide data regarding how alternative approaches regarding the 
treatment of collateral would affect the cost of clearing services, as 
well as provide data regarding how such approaches would affect 
leverage capital allocation for that activity.

V. Technical Amendments

    The proposed rule would make certain technical corrections and 
clarifications to the capital rule to address certain provisions that 
warrant revision, based on questions presented by banking organizations 
and further review by the agencies.

A. Receivables Due From a QCCP

    The agencies are proposing to revise Sec.  _.32 of the capital rule 
to clarify that cash collateral posted by a clearing member banking 
organization to a QCCP, and which could be considered a receivable due 
from the QCCP under generally accepted accounting principles, would not 
be risk-weighted as a corporate exposure. Instead, for a client-cleared 
trade the cash collateral posted to a QCCP would receive a risk weight 
of 2 percent, if the cash associated with the trade meets the 
requirements under Sec.  _.35(b)(i)(3)(A) or Sec.  _.133(b)(i)(3)(A) of 
the capital rule, or 4 percent, if the collateral does not meet the 
requirements necessary to receive the 2 percent risk weight. For a 
trade made on behalf of the clearing member's own account, the cash 
collateral posted to a QCCP would receive a 2 percent risk weight. This 
amendment is intended to maintain incentives for banking organizations 
to post cash collateral and recognize that a receivable from a QCCP 
that arises in the context of a trade exposure should not be treated as 
equivalent to a receivable that would arise if, for example, a banking 
organization made a loan to a CCP.

B. Treatment of Client Financial Collateral Held by a CCP

    Under Sec.  _.2 of the capital rule, financial collateral means, in 
part, collateral in which a banking organization has a perfected first-
priority security interest in the collateral. However, when a banking 
organization is acting as a clearing member, it generally is required 
to post any client collateral to the CCP, in which case the CCP 
establishes and maintains a perfected first-priority security interest 
in the collateral instead of the clearing member. As a result, the 
capital rule does not permit a clearing member banking organization to 
recognize client collateral posted to a CCP as financial collateral.
    Client collateral posted to a CCP remains available to support the 
credit risk of a derivative contract in the event of a client default. 
Specifically, where a client defaults the CCP will use the client 
collateral to offset its exposure to the client, and the clearing 
member would be required to cover only the amount of any deficiency 
between the liquidation value of the collateral and the exposure to the 
CCP. However, were the clearing member banking organization to enter 
into the derivative contract directly with the client, the clearing 
member would establish and maintain a perfected first-priority security 
interest in the collateral, and the exposure of the clearing member to 
the client would similarly be mitigated only to the extent the 
collateral is sufficient to cover the exposure amount of the 
transaction at the time of default. Therefore, the agencies are 
proposing to revise the definition of financial collateral to allow 
clearing member banking organizations to recognize as financial 
collateral noncash client collateral posted to a CCP. In this 
situation, the clearing member banking organization would not be 
required to establish and retain a first-priority security interest in 
the collateral for it to qualify as financial collateral under Sec.  
_.2 of the capital rule.

C. Clearing Member Exposure When CCP Performance Is Not Guaranteed

    The agencies are proposing to revise Sec.  _.35(c)(3) of the 
capital rule to align the capital requirements under the standardized 
approach for client-cleared transactions with the treatment under Sec.  
_.133(c)(3) of the advanced approaches. Specifically, the proposal 
would allow a clearing member that does not guarantee the performance 
of the CCP to the clearing member's client to apply a zero percent risk 
weight to the CCP-facing portion of the transaction. The agencies 
already have implemented this treatment for purposes of the advanced 
approaches.\60\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \60\ See 80 FR 41411 (July 15, 2015).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

D. Bankruptcy Remoteness of Collateral

    The agencies are proposing to remove the requirement in Sec.  
_.35(b)(4)(i) of the standardized approach and Sec.  _.133(b)(4)(i) of 
the advanced approaches that collateral posted by a clearing member 
client banking organization to a clearing member must be bankruptcy-
remote from a custodian in order for the client banking organization to 
avoid the application of risk-based capital requirements to the 
collateral, and clarify that a custodian must be acting in its capacity 
as a custodian for this treatment to apply.\61\ The agencies believe 
this revision is appropriate because the collateral would generally be 
considered to be bankruptcy-remote if the custodian is acting in its 
capacity as a custodian with respect to the collateral. Therefore, this 
revision would apply only in cases where the collateral is deposited 
with a third-party custodian, not in cases where a clearing member 
offers ``self-custody'' arrangements with its clients. In addition, 
this revision would make the collateral requirement for a clearing 
member client banking organization consistent with the treatment of 
collateral posted by a clearing member banking organization, which does 
not require that the posted collateral be bankruptcy-remote from the 
custodian, but would require in each case that the custodian be acting 
in its capacity as a custodian.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \61\ See 12 CFR 3.35(b)(4) and 3.133(b)(4) (OCC); 12 CFR 
217.35(b)(4) and 217.133(b)(4) (Board); 12 CFR 324.35(b)(4) and 
324.133(b)(4) (FDIC).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

E. Adjusted Collateral Haircuts for Derivative Contracts

    If a clearing member banking organization is acting as an agent 
between a client and a CCP and receives collateral from the client, the 
clearing member must determine the exposure amount for the client-
facing portion of the derivative contract using the collateralized 
transactions framework under Sec.  _.37 of the capital rule or the 
counterparty credit risk framework under Sec.  _.132 of the capital 
rule. The clearing member banking organization may recognize the credit 
risk-mitigation benefits of the collateral posted by the client; 
however, under Sec. Sec.  _.37(c) and _.132(b) of the capital rule, the 
value of the collateral must be discounted by the application of a 
standard supervisory haircut to reflect any market price volatility in 
the value of the collateral over a 10-day holding period. For a repo-
style transaction, the capital rule applies a scaling factor of 0.71 to 
the standard supervisory haircuts to reflect the limited risk to 
collateral in those transactions and effectively reduce the holding 
period to 5 days. The agencies believe a similar reduction in the 
haircuts should be provided for cleared derivative contracts, as they 
typically have a holding period of less than 10 days. Therefore, the 
agencies are proposing to revise Sec. Sec.  _.37 and _.132 of the 
capital rule to add an exception to the 10-day holding period for 
cleared derivative contracts and apply a scaling factor of 0.71 to the 
standard

[[Page 64685]]

supervisory haircuts to reflect a 5-day holding period.

F. OCC Revisions to Lending Limits

    The OCC proposes to revise its lending limit rule at 12 CFR part 
32. The current lending limits rule references sections of CEM in the 
OCC's advanced approaches capital rule as one available methodology for 
calculating exposures to derivatives transactions. However, these 
sections are proposed to be amended or replaced with SA-CCR in the 
advanced approaches. Therefore, the OCC is proposing to replace the 
references to CEM in the advanced approaches with references to CEM in 
the standardized approach. The OCC is also proposing to adopt SA-CCR as 
an option for calculation of exposures under lending limits.
    Question 18: Should the OCC permit or require banking organizations 
to calculate exposures for derivatives transactions for lending limits 
purposes using SA-CCR? What advantages or disadvantages does this offer 
compared with the current methods allowed for calculating derivatives 
exposures for lending limits purposes?

VI. Impact of the Proposed Rule

    To assess the effect of the proposed changes to the capital rule, 
the agencies reviewed data provided by advanced approaches banking 
organizations that represent a significant majority of the derivatives 
market. In particular, the agencies analyzed the change in exposure 
amount between CEM and SA-CCR, as well as the change in risk-weighted 
assets as determined under the standardized approach.\62\ The data 
covers diverse portfolios of derivative contracts, both in terms of 
asset type and counterparty. In addition, the data includes firms that 
serve as clearing members, allowing the agencies to consider the effect 
of the proposal under the cleared transactions framework for both a 
direct exposure to a CCP and an exposure to a CCP on behalf of a 
client. As a result, the analysis provides a reasonable proxy for the 
potential changes for all advanced approaches banking organizations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \62\ The agencies estimate that, on aggregate, exposure amounts 
under SA-CCR would equal approximately 170 percent of the exposure 
amounts for identical derivative contracts under IMM. Thus, firms 
that use IMM currently would likely continue to use IMM to determine 
the exposure amount of their derivative contracts to determine 
advanced approaches total risk-weighted assets. However, the 
standardized approach serves as a floor on advanced approaches 
banking organizations' total risk-weighted assets. Thus, a firm 
would only receive the benefit of IMM if the firm is not bound by 
standardized total risk-weighted assets.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As noted above, SA-CCR would improve risk-sensitivity when 
measuring the exposure amount for derivative contracts compared to CEM, 
including through improved collateral recognition. For instance, the 
exposure amount of margined derivative contracts for these firms would 
decrease by approximately 44 percent, while the exposure amount of 
unmargined derivative contracts for these firms would increase by 
approximately 90 percent. Overall, the agencies estimate that, under 
the proposal, the exposure amount for derivative contracts held by 
advanced approaches banking organizations would decrease by 
approximately 7 percent.
    The agencies also analyzed the changes based on both asset classes 
and counterparties for these firms. With respect to asset classes, the 
exposure amount would increase for interest rate derivative contracts, 
equity derivative contracts, and commodity derivative contracts, while 
the exposure amount would decrease for exchange rate derivative 
contracts and credit derivative contracts. These changes are largely 
due to the updated supervisory factors, which reflect stress 
volatilities observed during the financial crisis. With respect to 
counterparties, the exposure amount would decrease for derivative 
contracts with banks, broker-dealers, and CCPs, which are typically 
margined, hedged, and subject to QMNAs. In contrast, exposure amounts 
would increase for derivative contracts with other financial 
institutions, such as asset managers, investment funds, and pension 
funds; sovereigns and municipalities; and commercial entities that use 
derivative contracts to hedge commercial risk.
    The agencies estimate that the proposal would result in an 
approximately 5 percent increase in advanced approaches banking 
organizations' standardized risk-weighted assets associated with 
derivative contract exposures.\63\ This would result in a reduction 
(approximately 6 basis points) in advanced approaches banking 
organizations' tier 1 risk-based capital ratios, on average. This 
estimate assumes, consistent with the proposal, that a netting set is 
defined to include all derivative contracts subject to a QMNA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \63\ Total risk-weighted assets are a function of the exposure 
amount of the netting set and the applicable risk-weight of the 
counterparty. Total risk-weighted assets increase under the analysis 
while exposure amounts decrease because higher applicable risk-
weights amplify increases in the exposure amount of certain 
derivative contracts, which outweighs decreases in the exposure 
amount of other derivative contracts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The agencies estimate that the proposal would result in an increase 
(approximately 30 basis points) in advanced approaches banking 
organizations' supplementary leverage ratio, on average. However, this 
estimate does not reflect the broad definition of netting set in the 
proposal, which, if adopted, would likely result in an additional 
increase in advanced approaches banking organizations' supplementary 
leverage ratio. The proposal would use a modified version of SA-CCR 
that would recognize only certain cash variation margin in the 
replacement cost component calculation for purposes of the 
supplementary leverage ratio. Additional recognition of client 
collateral in the modified version of SA-CCR would further increase 
clearing member banking organizations' supplementary leverage ratio, 
but such an increase would largely depend on the degree of client 
clearing services provided by a clearing member banking organization.
    The effects of the proposed rule likely would be limited for non-
advanced approaches banking organizations. First, these banking 
organizations hold relatively small derivative portfolios. Non-advanced 
approaches banking organizations account for less than 8 percent of 
derivative contracts of all banking organizations, even though they 
account for 40 percent of total assets of all banking 
organizations.\64\ Second, non-advanced approaches banking organization 
are not subject to supplementary leverage ratio requirements, and thus 
would not be affected by any changes to the calculation of total 
leverage exposure. Finally, these banking organizations retain the 
option of using CEM, and the agencies anticipate that only those 
banking organizations that receive a net benefit from using SA-CCR 
would elect to use it.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \64\ According to data from the Consolidated Reports of 
Condition and Income for a Bank with Domestic and Foreign Offices 
(FFIEC report forms 031, 041, and 051), as of March 31, 2018.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

VII. Regulatory Analyses

A. Paperwork Reduction Act

    Certain provisions of the proposed rule contain ``collection of 
information'' requirements within the meaning of the Paperwork 
Reduction Act (PRA) of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501-3521). In accordance with 
the requirements of the PRA, the agencies may not conduct or sponsor, 
and the respondent is not required to respond to, an information 
collection unless it displays a currently-valid Office of Management 
and Budget (OMB) control number. The OMB

[[Page 64686]]

control number for the OCC is 1557-0318, Board is 7100-0313, and FDIC 
is 3064-0153. These information collections will be extended for three 
years, with revision. The information collection requirements contained 
in this proposed rulemaking have been submitted by the OCC and FDIC to 
OMB for review and approval under section 3507(d) of the PRA (44 U.S.C. 
3507(d)) and Sec.  1320.11 of the OMB's implementing regulations (5 CFR 
part 1320). The Board reviewed the proposed rule under the authority 
delegated to the Board by OMB.
    Comments are invited on:
    a. Whether the collections of information are necessary for the 
proper performance of the Board's functions, including whether the 
information has practical utility;
    b. The accuracy or the estimate of the burden of the information 
collections, including the validity of the methodology and assumptions 
used;
    c. Ways to enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of the 
information to be collected;
    d. Ways to minimize the burden of the information collections on 
respondents, including through the use of automated collection 
techniques or other forms of information technology; and
    e. Estimates of capital or startup costs and costs of operation, 
maintenance, and purchase of services to provide information.
    All comments will become a matter of public record. Comments on 
aspects of this notice that may affect reporting, recordkeeping, or 
disclosure requirements and burden estimates should be sent to the 
addresses listed in the ADDRESSES section of this document. A copy of 
the comments may also be submitted to the OMB desk officer by mail to 
U.S. Office of Management and Budget, 725 17th Street NW, #10235, 
Washington, DC 20503; facsimile to (202) 395-6974; or email to 
[email protected], Attention, Federal Banking Agency Desk 
Officer.
Proposed Information Collection
    Title of Information Collection: Recordkeeping and Disclosure 
Requirements Associated With Capital Adequacy.
    Frequency: Quarterly, annual.
    Affected Public: Businesses or other for-profit.
    Respondents:
    OCC: National banks and federal savings associations.
    Board: State member banks (SMBs), bank holding companies (BHCs), 
U.S. intermediate holding companies (IHCs), savings and loan holding 
companies (SLHCs), and global systemically important bank holding 
companies (GSIBs) domiciled in the United States.
    FDIC: State nonmember banks, state savings associations, and 
certain subsidiaries of those entities.
    Current Actions: The proposal would revise Sec. Sec.  _.2, _.10, 
_.32, _.34 (including Table 1), _.35, _.132 (including Table 2), and 
_.133 of the capital rule to implement SA-CCR in order to calculate the 
exposure amount of derivatives contracts under the agencies' regulatory 
capital rule as well as update other parts of the capital rule to 
account for the proposed incorporation of SA-CCR.
    The proposal will not, however, result in changes to the burden. In 
order to be consistent across the agencies, the agencies are applying a 
conforming methodology for calculating the burden estimates. The 
agencies are also updating the number of respondents based on the 
current number of supervised entities even though this proposal only 
affects a limited number of entities. The agencies believe that any 
changes to the information collections associated with the proposed 
rule are the result of the conforming methodology and updates to the 
respondent count, and not the result of the proposed rule changes.
PRA Burden Estimates
OCC
    OMB control number: 1557-0318.
    Estimated number of respondents: 1,365 (of which 18 are advanced 
approaches institutions).
    Estimated average hours per response:
    Minimum Capital Ratios (1,365 institutions affected for ongoing)
    Recordkeeping (Ongoing)--16.
    Standardized Approach (1,365 institutions affected for ongoing)
    Recordkeeping (Initial setup)--122.
    Recordkeeping (Ongoing)--20.
    Disclosure (Initial setup)--226.25.
    Disclosure (Ongoing quarterly)--131.25.
    Advanced Approach (18 institutions affected for ongoing)
    Recordkeeping (Initial setup)--460.
    Recordkeeping (Ongoing)--540.77.
    Recordkeeping (Ongoing quarterly)--20.
    Disclosure (Initial setup)--280.
    Disclosure (Ongoing)--5.78.
    Disclosure (Ongoing quarterly)--35.
    Estimated annual burden hours: 1,088 hours initial setup, 64,929 
for ongoing.
Board
    Agency form number: FR Q.
    OMB control number: 7100-0313.
    Estimated number of respondents: 1,431 (of which 17 are advanced 
approaches institutions).
    Estimated average hours per response:
    Minimum Capital Ratios (1,431 institutions affected for ongoing)
    Recordkeeping (Ongoing)--16.
    Standardized Approach (1,431 institutions affected for ongoing)
    Recordkeeping (Initial setup)--122.
    Recordkeeping (Ongoing)--20.
    Disclosure (Initial setup)--226.25.
    Disclosure (Ongoing quarterly)--131.25.
    Advanced Approach (17 institutions affected)
    Recordkeeping (Initial setup)--460.
    Recordkeeping (Ongoing)--540.77.
    Recordkeeping (Ongoing quarterly)--20.
    Disclosure (Initial setup)--280.
    Disclosure (Ongoing)--5.78.
    Disclosure (Ongoing quarterly)--35.
    Disclosure (Table 13 quarterly)--5.
    Risk-based Capital Surcharge for GSIBs (21 institutions affected)
    Recordkeeping (Ongoing)--0.5.
    Estimated annual burden hours: 1,088 hours initial setup, 78,183 
hours for ongoing.
FDIC
    OMB control number: 3064-0153.
    Estimated number of respondents: 3,604 (of which 2 are advanced 
approaches institutions).
    Estimated average hours per response:
    Minimum Capital Ratios (3,604 institutions affected)
    Recordkeeping (Ongoing)--16.
    Standardized Approach (3,604 institutions affected)
    Recordkeeping (Initial setup)--122.
    Recordkeeping (Ongoing)--20.
    Disclosure (Initial setup)--226.25.
    Disclosure (Ongoing quarterly)--131.25.
    Advanced Approach (2 institutions affected)
    Recordkeeping (Initial setup)--460.
    Recordkeeping (Ongoing)--540.77.
    Recordkeeping (Ongoing quarterly)--20.
    Disclosure (Initial setup)--280.
    Disclosure (Ongoing)--5.78.
    Disclosure (Ongoing quarterly)--35.
    Estimated annual burden hours: 1,088 hours initial setup, 131,802 
hours for ongoing.
    Also as a result of this proposed rule, the agencies would clarify 
the reporting instructions for the Consolidated Reports of Condition 
and Income (Call Reports) (FFIEC 031, FFIEC 041, and FFIEC 051) and 
Regulatory Capital Reporting for Institutions Subject to the Advanced 
Capital Adequacy Framework (FFIEC 101). The OCC and FDIC would clarify 
the reporting instructions for

[[Page 64687]]

DFAST 14A, and the Board would clarify the reporting instructions for 
the Consolidated Financial Statements for Holding Companies (FR Y-9C), 
Capital Assessments and Stress Testing (FR Y-14A and FR Y-14Q), and 
Banking Organization Systemic Risk Report (FR Y-15) to reflect the 
changes to the capital rules that would be required under this 
proposal. The OCC also is proposing to update cross-references in its 
lending limit rules to account for the proposed incorporation of SA-
CCR.

B. Regulatory Flexibility Act

    OCC: The Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. 601 et seq., (RFA), 
requires an agency, in connection with a proposed rule, to prepare an 
Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis describing the impact of the 
rule on small entities (defined by the Small Business Administration 
(SBA) for purposes of the RFA to include commercial banks and savings 
institutions with total assets of $550 million or less and trust 
companies with total revenue of $38.5 million or less) or to certify 
that the proposed rule would not have a significant economic impact on 
a substantial number of small entities. As of December 31, 2017, the 
OCC supervised 886 small entities. The rule would impose requirements 
on all OCC supervised entities that are subject to the advanced 
approaches risk-based capital rules, which typically have assets in 
excess of $250 billion, and therefore would not be small entities. 
While small entities would have the option to adopt SA-CCR, the OCC 
does not expect any small entities to elect that option. Therefore, the 
OCC estimates the proposed rule would not generate any costs for small 
entities. Therefore, the OCC certifies that the proposed rule would not 
have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of OCC-
supervised small entities.
    FDIC: The Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA), 5 U.S.C. 601 et seq., 
generally requires an agency, in connection with a proposed rule, to 
prepare and make available for public comment an initial regulatory 
flexibility analysis that describes the impact of a proposed rule on 
small entities.\65\ However, a regulatory flexibility analysis is not 
required if the agency certifies that the rule will not have a 
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. 
The Small Business Administration (SBA) has defined ``small entities'' 
to include banking organizations with total assets of less than or 
equal to $550 million.\66\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \65\ 5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.
    \66\ The SBA defines a small banking organization as having $550 
million or less in assets, where an organization's ``assets are 
determined by averaging the assets reported on its four quarterly 
financial statements for the preceding year.'' See 13 CFR 121.201 
(as amended, effective December 2, 2014). In its determination, the 
``SBA counts the receipts, employees, or other measure of size of 
the concern whose size is at issue and all of its domestic and 
foreign affiliates.'' See 13 CFR 121.103. Following these 
regulations, the FDIC uses a covered entity's affiliated and 
acquired assets, averaged over the preceding four quarters, to 
determine whether the covered entity is ``small'' for the purposes 
of RFA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As of March 31, 2018, there were 3,604 FDIC-supervised 
institutions, of which 2,804 are considered small entities for the 
purposes of RFA. These small entities hold $505 billion in assets, 
accounting for 17 percent of total assets held by FDIC-supervised 
institutions.\67\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \67\ FDIC Call Report, March 31, 2018.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposed rule would require advanced approaches institutions to 
replace CEM with SA-CCR as an option for calculating EAD. There are no 
FDIC-supervised advanced approaches institutions that are considered 
small entities for the purposes of RFA.
    In addition, the proposed rule would allow non-advanced approaches 
institutions to replace CEM with SA-CCR as the approach for calculating 
EAD. This allowance applies to all 2,804 small institutions supervised 
by the FDIC. Institutions that elect to use SA-CCR would incur some 
costs related to other compliance requirements of the proposed rule. 
However, these costs are difficult to estimate given that adoption of 
SA-CCR is voluntary. The FDIC expects that non-advanced approaches 
institutions will elect to use SA-CCR only if the net benefits of doing 
so are positive. Thus, the FDIC expects the proposed rule will not 
impose any net economic costs on these entities.
    According to recent data, 395 (14.1 percent) small FDIC-supervised 
institutions, reporting $107 billion in assets, report holding some 
volume of derivatives and would thus have the option of electing to use 
SA-CCR. However, these institutions report holding only $5.4 billion 
(or 5 percent of assets) in derivatives.\68\ Therefore, the potential 
effects of electing SA-CCR are likely to be insignificant for these 
institutions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \68\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Based on the information above, the FDIC certifies that the 
proposed rule will not have a significant economic impact on a 
substantial number of small entities.
    The FDIC invites comments on all aspects of the supporting 
information provided in this RFA section. In particular, would this 
rule have any significant effects on small entities that the FDIC has 
not identified?
    Board: The Board is providing an initial regulatory flexibility 
analysis with respect to this proposed rule. The Regulatory Flexibility 
Act, 5 U.S.C. 601 et seq., (RFA), requires an agency to consider 
whether the rules it proposes will have a significant economic impact 
on a substantial number of small entities.\69\ In connection with a 
proposed rule, the RFA requires an agency to prepare an Initial 
Regulatory Flexibility Analysis describing the impact of the rule on 
small entities or to certify that the proposed rule would not have a 
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. 
An initial regulatory flexibility analysis must contain (1) a 
description of the reasons why action by the agency is being 
considered; (2) a succinct statement of the objectives of, and legal 
basis for, the proposed rule; (3) a description of, and, where 
feasible, an estimate of the number of small entities to which the 
proposed rule will apply; (4) a description of the projected reporting, 
recordkeeping, and other compliance requirements of the proposed rule, 
including an estimate of the classes of small entities that will be 
subject to the requirement and the type of professional skills 
necessary for preparation of the report or record; (5) an 
identification, to the extent practicable, of all relevant Federal 
rules which may duplicate, overlap with, or conflict with the proposed 
rule; and (6) a description of any significant alternatives to the 
proposed rule which accomplish its stated objectives.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \69\ Under regulations issued by the Small Business 
Administration, a small entity includes a depository institution, 
bank holding company, or savings and loan holding company with total 
assets of $550 million or less and trust companies with total assets 
of $38.5 million or less. As of June 30, 2018, there were 
approximately 3,304 small bank holding companies, 216 small savings 
and loan holding companies, and [541] small state member banks.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Board has considered the potential impact of the proposed rule 
on small entities in accordance with the RFA. Based on its analysis and 
for the reasons stated below, the Board believes that this proposed 
rule will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial 
number of small entities. Nevertheless, the Board is publishing and 
inviting comment on this initial regulatory flexibility analysis. A 
final regulatory flexibility analysis will be conducted after comments 
received during the public comment period have been considered. The 
proposal would also make corresponding changes to the Board's reporting 
forms.

[[Page 64688]]

    As discussed in detail above, the proposed rule would amend the 
capital rule to provide a new methodology for calculating the exposure 
amount for derivative contracts. For purposes of calculating advanced 
approaches total risk-weighted assets, an advanced approaches Board-
regulated institution would be able to use either SA-CCR or the 
internal models methodology. For purposes of calculating standardized 
approach total risk-weighted assets, an advanced approaches Board-
regulated institution would be required to use SA-CCR and a non-
advanced approaches Board-regulated institution would be able to elect 
either SA-CCR or the existing methodology. In addition, for purposes of 
the denominator of the supplementary leverage ratio, the proposal would 
integrate SA-CCR into the calculation of the denominator, replacing 
CEM.
    The Board has broad authority under the International Lending 
Supervision Act (ILSA) \70\ and the PCA provisions of the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Act \71\ to establish regulatory capital requirements 
for the institutions it regulates. For example, ILSA directs each 
Federal banking agency to cause banking institutions to achieve and 
maintain adequate capital by establishing minimum capital requirements 
as well as by other means that the agency deems appropriate.\72\ The 
PCA provisions of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act direct each Federal 
banking agency to specify, for each relevant capital measure, the level 
at which an IDI subsidiary is well capitalized, adequately capitalized, 
undercapitalized, and significantly undercapitalized.\73\ In addition, 
the Board has broad authority to establish regulatory capital standards 
for bank holding companies, savings and loan holding companies, and 
U.S. intermediate holding companies of foreign banking organizations 
under the Bank Holding Company Act, the Home Owners' Loan Act, and the 
Dodd-Frank Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act).\74\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \70\ 12 U.S.C. 3901-3911.
    \71\ 12 U.S.C. 1831o.
    \72\ 12 U.S.C. 3907(a)(1).
    \73\ 12 U.S.C. 1831o(c)(2).
    \74\ See 12 U.S.C. 1467a, 1844, 5365, 5371.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposed rule would only impose mandatory changes on advanced 
approaches banking organizations. Advanced approaches banking 
organizations include depository institutions, bank holding companies, 
savings and loan holding companies, or intermediate holding companies 
with at least $250 billion in total consolidated assets or has 
consolidated on-balance sheet foreign exposures of at least $10 
billion, or a subsidiary of a depository institution, bank holding 
company, savings and loan holding company, or intermediate holding 
company that is an advanced approaches banking organization. The 
proposed rule therefore would not impose mandatory requirements on any 
small entities. However, the proposal would allow Board-regulated 
institutions that are not advanced approaches Board-regulated 
institutions to elect to use SA-CCR instead of CEM. Small entities that 
are subject to the Board's capital rule could make such an election, 
which would require immediate changes to reporting, recordkeeping, and 
compliance systems, as well as the ongoing burden of maintaining these 
different systems. However, the entities that elect to use SA-CCR may 
face reduced regulatory capital requirements as a result.
    Further, as discussed previously in the Paperwork Reduction Act 
section, the proposal would make changes to the projected reporting, 
recordkeeping, and other compliance requirements of the rule by 
proposing to collect information from advanced approaches Board-
regulated institutions and non-advanced approaches Board-regulated 
institutions that elect to use SA-CCR. These changes would include 
limited revisions to the Call Report (FFIEC 031, 041, and 051), the 
Consolidated Financial Statements for Holding Companies (FR Y-9C), and 
the Regulatory Capital Reporting for Institutions Subject to the 
Advanced Capital Adequacy Framework (FFIEC 101) to provide for 
reporting of derivative contracts under SA-CCR. Firms would be required 
to update their systems to implement these changes to reporting forms. 
The Board does not expect that the compliance, recordkeeping, and 
reporting updates described previously would impose a significant cost 
on small Board-regulated institutions. These changes would only impact 
small entities that elect to use SA-CCR. In addition, the Board is 
aware of no other Federal rules that duplicate, overlap, or conflict 
with the proposed changes to the capital rule. Therefore, the Board 
believes that the proposed rule will not have a significant economic 
impact on small banking organizations supervised by the Board and 
therefore believes that there are no significant alternatives to the 
proposed rule that would reduce the economic impact on small banking 
organizations supervised by the Board.
    The Board welcomes comment on all aspects of its analysis. In 
particular, the Board requests that commenters describe the nature of 
any impact on small entities and provide empirical data to illustrate 
and support the extent of the impact.

C. Plain Language

    Section 722 of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act requires the Federal 
banking agencies to use plain language in all proposed and final rules 
published after January 1, 2000. The agencies have sought to present 
the proposed rule in a simple and straightforward manner, and invite 
comment on the use of plain language. For example:
     Have the agencies organized the material to suit your 
needs? If not, how could they present the rule more clearly?
     Are the requirements in the rule clearly stated? If not, 
how could the rule be more clearly stated?
     Do the regulations contain technical language or jargon 
that is not clear? If so, which language requires clarification?
     Would a different format (grouping and order of sections, 
use of headings, paragraphing) make the regulation easier to 
understand? If so, what changes would achieve that?
     Is this section format adequate? If not, which of the 
sections should be changed and how?
     What other changes can the agencies incorporate to make 
the regulation easier to understand?

D. Riegle Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994

    Pursuant to section 302(a) of the Riegle Community Development and 
Regulatory Improvement Act (RCDRIA),\75\ in determining the effective 
date and administrative compliance requirements for new regulations 
that impose additional reporting, disclosure, or other requirements on 
IDIs, each Federal banking agency must consider, consistent with 
principles of safety and soundness and the public interest, any 
administrative burdens that such regulations would place on depository 
institutions, including small depository institutions, and customers of 
depository institutions, as well as the benefits of such regulations. 
In addition, section 302(b) of RCDRIA requires new regulations and 
amendments to regulations that impose additional reporting, 
disclosures, or other new requirements on IDIs generally to take effect 
on the first day of a calendar quarter that begins on or after the date 
on which the regulations are published in final form.\76\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \75\ 12 U.S.C. 4802(a).
    \76\ 12 U.S.C. 4802.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 64689]]

    Because the proposal [would/would not] impose additional reporting, 
disclosure, or other requirements on IDIs, section 302 of the RCDRIA 
therefore [does/does not] apply. Nevertheless, the requirements of 
RCDRIA will be considered as part of the overall rulemaking process. In 
addition, the agencies also invite any other comments that further will 
inform the agencies' consideration of RCDRIA.

E. OCC Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 Determination

    The OCC analyzed the proposed rule under the factors set forth in 
the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA) (2 U.S.C. 1532). Under 
this analysis, the OCC considered whether the proposed rule includes a 
Federal mandate that may result in the expenditure by State, local, and 
Tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector, of $100 
million or more in any one year (adjusted for inflation). The OCC has 
determined that this proposed rule would not result in expenditures by 
State, local, and Tribal governments, or the private sector, of $100 
million or more in any one year. Accordingly, the OCC has not prepared 
a written statement to accompany this proposal.

List of Subjects

12 CFR Part 3

    Administrative practice and procedure, Capital, National banks, 
Risk.

12 CFR Part 32

    National banks, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.

12 CFR Part 217

    Administrative practice and procedure, Banks, Banking, Capital, 
Federal Reserve System, Holding companies.

12 CFR Part 324

    Administrative practice and procedure, Banks, Banking, Capital 
adequacy, Savings associations, State non-member banks.

Office of the Comptroller of the Currency

    For the reasons set out in the joint preamble, the OCC proposes to 
amend 12 CFR parts 3 and 32 as follows:

PART 3--CAPITAL ADEQUACY STANDARDS

0
1. The authority citation for part 3 continues to read as follows:

    Authority:  12 U.S.C. 93a, 161, 1462, 1462a, 1463, 1464, 1818, 
1828(n), 1828 note, 1831n note, 1835, 3907, 3909, and 5412(b)(2)(B).

0
2. Section 3.2 is amended by:
0
a. Adding the definitions of ``Basis derivative contract'' in 
alphabetical order;
0
b. Revising paragraph (2) of the definition of ``Financial 
collateral;''
0
c. Adding the definitions of ``Independent collateral,'' ``Minimum 
transfer amount,'' and ``Net independent collateral amount'' in 
alphabetical order;
0
d. Revising the definition of ``Netting set;'' and
0
e. Adding the definitions of ``Speculative grade,'' ``Sub-speculative 
grade,'' ``Variation margin,'' ``Variation margin agreement,'' 
``Variation margin amount,'' ``Variation margin threshold,'' and 
``Volatility derivative contract'' in alphabetical order.
    The additions and revisions read as follows:


Sec.  3.2  Definitions.

* * * * *
    Basis derivative contract means a non-foreign-exchange derivative 
contract (i.e., the contract is denominated in a single currency) in 
which the cash flows of the derivative contract depend on the 
difference between two risk factors that are attributable solely to one 
of the following derivative asset classes: Interest rate, credit, 
equity, or commodity.
* * * * *
    Financial collateral * * *
    (2) In which the national bank and Federal savings association has 
a perfected, first-priority security interest or, outside of the United 
States, the legal equivalent thereof (with the exception of cash on 
deposit; and notwithstanding the prior security interest of any 
custodial agent or any priority security interest granted to a CCP in 
connection with collateral posted to that CCP).
* * * * *
    Independent collateral means financial collateral, other than 
variation margin, that is subject to a collateral agreement, or in 
which a national bank and Federal savings association has a perfected, 
first-priority security interest or, outside of the United States, the 
legal equivalent thereof (with the exception of cash on deposit; 
notwithstanding the prior security interest of any custodial agent or 
any prior security interest granted to a CCP in connection with 
collateral posted to that CCP), and the amount of which does not change 
directly in response to the value of the derivative contract or 
contracts that the financial collateral secures.
* * * * *
    Minimum transfer amount means the smallest amount of variation 
margin that may be transferred between counterparties to a netting set.
* * * * *
    Net independent collateral amount means the fair value amount of 
the independent collateral, as adjusted by the standard supervisory 
haircuts under Sec.  3.132(b)(2)(ii), as applicable, that a 
counterparty to a netting set has posted to a national bank or Federal 
savings association less the fair value amount of the independent 
collateral, as adjusted by the standard supervisory haircuts under 
Sec.  3.132(b)(2)(ii), as applicable, posted by the national bank or 
Federal savings association to the counterparty, excluding such amounts 
held in a bankruptcy remote manner, or posted to a QCCP and held in 
conformance with the operational requirements in Sec.  3.3.
    Netting set means either one derivative contract between a national 
bank or Federal savings association and a single counterparty, or a 
group of derivative contracts between a national bank or Federal 
savings association and a single counterparty, that are subject to a 
qualifying master netting agreement.
* * * * *
    Speculative grade means the reference entity has adequate capacity 
to meet financial commitments in the near term, but is vulnerable to 
adverse economic conditions, such that should economic conditions 
deteriorate, the reference entity would present an elevated default 
risk.
* * * * *
    Sub-speculative grade means the reference entity depends on 
favorable economic conditions to meet its financial commitments, such 
that should such economic conditions deteriorate the reference entity 
likely would default on its financial commitments.
* * * * *
    Variation margin means financial collateral that is subject to a 
collateral agreement provided by one party to its counterparty to meet 
the performance of the first party's obligations under one or more 
transactions between the parties as a result of a change in value of 
such obligations since the last time such financial collateral was 
provided.
    Variation margin agreement means an agreement to collect or post 
variation margin.
    Variation margin amount means the fair value amount of the 
variation margin, as adjusted by the standard supervisory haircuts 
under Sec.  3.132(b)(2)(ii), as applicable, that a counterparty to a 
netting set has posted to a national bank or Federal savings

[[Page 64690]]

association less the fair value amount of the variation margin, as 
adjusted by the standard supervisory haircuts under Sec.  
3.132(b)(2)(ii), as applicable, posted by the national bank or Federal 
savings association to the counterparty.
    Variation margin threshold means the amount of credit exposure of a 
national bank or Federal savings association to its counterparty that, 
if exceeded, would require the counterparty to post variation margin to 
the national bank or Federal savings association.
    Volatility derivative contract means a derivative contract in which 
the payoff of the derivative contract explicitly depends on a measure 
of the volatility of an underlying risk factor to the derivative 
contract.
* * * * *
0
3. Section 3.10 is amended by revising paragraphs (c)(4)(ii)(A) through 
(C) to read as follows:


Sec.  3.10  Minimum capital requirements.

* * * * *
    (c) * * *
    (4) * * *
    (ii) * * *
    (A) The balance sheet carrying value of all the national bank's or 
Federal savings association's on-balance sheet assets, plus the value 
of securities sold under a repurchase transaction or a securities 
lending transaction that qualifies for sales treatment under U.S. GAAP, 
less amounts deducted from tier 1 capital under Sec.  3.22(a), (c), and 
(d), less the value of securities received in security-for-security 
repo-style transactions, where the national bank or Federal savings 
association acts as a securities lender and includes the securities 
received in its on-balance sheet assets but has not sold or re-
hypothecated the securities received, and less the fair value of any 
derivative contracts;
    (B) The PFE for each netting set (including cleared transactions 
except as provided in paragraph (c)(4)(ii)(I) of this section and, at 
the discretion of the national bank or Federal savings association, 
excluding a forward agreement treated as a derivative contract that is 
part of a repurchase or reverse repurchase or a securities borrowing or 
lending transaction that qualifies for sales treatment under U.S. 
GAAP), as determined under Sec.  3.132(c)(7), in which the term C in 
Sec.  3.132(c)(7)(i)(B) equals zero, multiplied by 1.4;
    (C) The sum of:
    (1)(i) 1.4 multiplied by the replacement cost of each derivative 
contract or single product netting set of derivative contracts to which 
the national bank or Federal savings association is a counterparty, 
calculated according to the following formula:

Replacement Cost = max{V-CVMr + CVMp; 0{time} 

Where:

V equals the fair value for each derivative contract or each single-
product netting set of derivative contracts (including a cleared 
transaction except as provided in paragraph (c)(4)(ii)(I) of this 
section and, at the discretion of the national bank or Federal 
savings association, excluding a forward agreement treated as a 
derivative contract that is part of a repurchase or reverse 
repurchase or a securities borrowing or lending transaction that 
qualifies for sales treatment under U.S. GAAP);
CVMr equals the amount of cash collateral received from a 
counterparty to a derivative contract and that satisfies the 
conditions in paragraph (c)(4)(ii)(C)(3) through (7); and
CVMp equals the amount of cash collateral that is posted to a 
counterparty to a derivative contract and that has not off-set the 
fair value of the derivative contract and that satisfies the 
conditions in paragraphs (c)(4)(ii)(C)(3) through (7) of this 
section; and

    (ii) Notwithstanding paragraph (c)(4)(ii)(C)(1)(i) of this section, 
where multiple netting sets are subject to a single variation margin 
agreement, a national bank or Federal savings association must apply 
the formula for replacement cost provided in Sec.  3.132(c)(10), in 
which the term may only include cash collateral that satisfies the 
conditions in paragraphs (c)(4)(ii)(C)(3) through (7) of this section;
    (2) The amount of cash collateral that is received from a 
counterparty to a derivative contract that has off-set the fair value 
of a derivative contract and that does not satisfy the conditions in 
paragraphs (c)(4)(ii)(C)(3) through (7) of this section;
    (3) For derivative contracts that are not cleared through a QCCP, 
the cash collateral received by the recipient counterparty is not 
segregated (by law, regulation or an agreement with the counterparty);
    (4) Variation margin is calculated and transferred on a daily basis 
based on the fair value of the derivative contract;
    (5) The variation margin transferred under the derivative contract 
or the governing rules for a cleared transaction is the full amount 
that is necessary to fully extinguish the net current credit exposure 
to the counterparty of the derivative contracts, subject to the 
threshold and minimum transfer amounts applicable to the counterparty 
under the terms of the derivative contract or the governing rules for a 
cleared transaction;
    (6) The variation margin is in the form of cash in the same 
currency as the currency of settlement set forth in the derivative 
contract, provided that for the purposes of this paragraph 
(c)(4)(ii)(C)(6), currency of settlement means any currency for 
settlement specified in the governing qualifying master netting 
agreement and the credit support annex to the qualifying master netting 
agreement, or in the governing rules for a cleared transaction; and
    (7) The derivative contract and the variation margin are governed 
by a qualifying master netting agreement between the legal entities 
that are the counterparties to the derivative contract or by the 
governing rules for a cleared transaction, and the qualifying master 
netting agreement or the governing rules for a cleared transaction must 
explicitly stipulate that the counterparties agree to settle any 
payment obligations on a net basis, taking into account any variation 
margin received or provided under the contract if a credit event 
involving either counterparty occurs;
* * * * *
0
4. Section 3.32 is amended by revising paragraph (f) to read as 
follows:


Sec.  3.32  General risk weights.

* * * * *
    (f) Corporate exposures. (1) A national bank or Federal savings 
association must assign a 100 percent risk weight to all its corporate 
exposures, except as provided in paragraph (f)(2) of this section.
    (2) A national bank or Federal savings association must assign a 2 
percent risk weight to an exposure to a QCCP arising from the national 
bank or Federal savings association posting cash collateral to the QCCP 
in connection with a cleared transaction that meets the requirements of 
Sec.  3.35(b)(3)(i)(A) and a 4 percent risk weight to an exposure to a 
QCCP arising from the national bank or Federal savings association 
posting cash collateral to the QCCP in connection with a cleared 
transaction that meets the requirements of Sec.  3.35(b)(3)(i)(B).
    (3) A national bank or Federal savings association must assign a 2 
percent risk weight to an exposure to a QCCP arising from the national 
bank or Federal savings association posting cash collateral to the QCCP 
in connection with a cleared transaction that meets the requirements of 
Sec.  3.35(c)(3)(i).
* * * * *
0
5. Section 3.34 is revised to read as follows:


Sec.  3.34  Derivative contracts.

    (a) Exposure amount for derivative contracts--(1) National bank or 
Federal savings association that is not an advanced approaches national 
bank or

[[Page 64691]]

Federal savings association. (i) A national bank or Federal savings 
association that is not an advanced approaches national bank or Federal 
savings association must use the current exposure methodology (CEM) 
described in paragraph (b) of this section to calculate the exposure 
amount for all its OTC derivative contracts, unless the national bank 
or Federal savings association makes the election provided in paragraph 
(a)(1)(ii) of this section.
    (ii) A national bank or Federal savings association that is not an 
advanced approaches national bank or Federal savings association may 
elect to calculate the exposure amount for all its OTC derivative 
contracts under the standardized approach for counterparty credit risk 
(SA-CCR) in Sec.  3.132(c), rather than calculating the exposure amount 
for all its derivative contracts using the CEM. A national bank or 
Federal savings association that elects under this paragraph (a)(1)(ii) 
to calculate the exposure amount for its OTC derivative contracts under 
the SA-CCR must apply the treatment of cleared transactions under Sec.  
3.133 to its derivative contracts that are cleared transactions, rather 
than applying Sec.  3.35. A national bank or Federal savings 
association that is not an advanced approaches national bank or Federal 
savings association must use the same methodology to calculate the 
exposure amount for all its derivative contracts and may change its 
election only with prior approval of the OCC.
    (2) Advanced approaches national bank or Federal savings 
association. An advanced approaches national bank or Federal savings 
association must calculate the exposure amount for all its derivative 
contracts using the SA-CCR in Sec.  3.132(c). An advanced approaches 
national bank or Federal savings association must apply the treatment 
of cleared transactions under Sec.  3.133 to its derivative contracts 
that are cleared transactions.
    (b) Current exposure methodology exposure amount--(1) Single OTC 
derivative contract. Except as modified by paragraph (c) of this 
section, the exposure amount for a single OTC derivative contract that 
is not subject to a qualifying master netting agreement is equal to the 
sum of the national bank's or Federal savings association's current 
credit exposure and potential future credit exposure (PFE) on the OTC 
derivative contract.
    (i) Current credit exposure. The current credit exposure for a 
single OTC derivative contract is the greater of the fair value of the 
OTC derivative contract or zero.
    (ii) PFE. (A) The PFE for a single OTC derivative contract, 
including an OTC derivative contract with a negative fair value, is 
calculated by multiplying the notional principal amount of the OTC 
derivative contract by the appropriate conversion factor in Table 1 to 
this section.
    (B) For purposes of calculating either the PFE under this paragraph 
(b) or the gross PFE under paragraph (b)(2) of this section for 
exchange rate contracts and other similar contracts in which the 
notional principal amount is equivalent to the cash flows, notional 
principal amount is the net receipts to each party falling due on each 
value date in each currency.
    (C) For an OTC derivative contract that does not fall within one of 
the specified categories in Table 1 to this section, the PFE must be 
calculated using the appropriate ``other'' conversion factor.
    (D) A national bank or Federal savings association must use an OTC 
derivative contract's effective notional principal amount (that is, the 
apparent or stated notional principal amount multiplied by any 
multiplier in the OTC derivative contract) rather than the apparent or 
stated notional principal amount in calculating PFE.
    (E) The PFE of the protection provider of a credit derivative is 
capped at the net present value of the amount of unpaid premiums.

                                      Table 1 to Sec.   3.34--Conversion Factor Matrix for Derivative Contracts \1\
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                              Credit       Credit  (non-
                                                              Foreign       (investment     investment-                      Precious
         Remaining maturity \2\            Interest rate   exchange rate       grade           grade          Equity      metals (except       Other
                                                             and gold        reference       reference                         gold)
                                                                            asset) \3\        asset)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
One year or less........................            0.00            0.01            0.05            0.10            0.06            0.07            0.10
Greater than one year and less than or             0.005            0.05            0.05            0.10            0.08            0.07            0.12
 equal to five years....................
Greater than five years.................           0.015           0.075            0.05            0.10            0.10            0.08            0.15
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ For a derivative contract with multiple exchanges of principal, the conversion factor is multiplied by the number of remaining payments in the
  derivative contract.
\2\ For an OTC derivative contract that is structured such that on specified dates any outstanding exposure is settled and the terms are reset so that
  the fair value of the contract is zero, the remaining maturity equals the time until the next reset date. For an interest rate derivative contract
  with a remaining maturity of greater than one year that meets these criteria, the minimum conversion factor is 0.005.
\3\ A national bank or Federal savings association must use the column labeled ``Credit (investment-grade reference asset)'' for a credit derivative
  whose reference asset is an outstanding unsecured long-term debt security without credit enhancement that is investment grade. A national bank or
  Federal savings association must use the column labeled ``Credit (non-investment-grade reference asset)'' for all other credit derivatives.

    (2) Multiple OTC derivative contracts subject to a qualifying 
master netting agreement. Except as modified by paragraph (c) of this 
section, the exposure amount for multiple OTC derivative contracts 
subject to a qualifying master netting agreement is equal to the sum of 
the net current credit exposure and the adjusted sum of the PFE amounts 
for all OTC derivative contracts subject to the qualifying master 
netting agreement.
    (i) Net current credit exposure. The net current credit exposure is 
the greater of the net sum of all positive and negative fair values of 
the individual OTC derivative contracts subject to the qualifying 
master netting agreement or zero.
    (ii) Adjusted sum of the PFE amounts. The adjusted sum of the PFE 
amounts, Anet, is calculated as

Anet = (0.4 x Agross) + (0.6 x NGR x Agross),

Where:

(A) Agross = the gross PFE (that is, the sum of the PFE amounts as 
determined under paragraph (b)(1)(ii) of this section for each 
individual derivative contract subject to the qualifying master 
netting agreement); and
(B) Net-to-gross Ratio (NGR) = the ratio of the net current credit 
exposure to the gross current credit exposure. In calculating the 
NGR, the gross current credit exposure equals the sum of the 
positive current credit exposures (as determined under paragraph 
(b)(1)(i) of this section) of all individual derivative contracts 
subject to the qualifying master netting agreement.

    (c) Recognition of credit risk mitigation of collateralized OTC 
derivative contracts. (1) A national bank or Federal savings 
association using the

[[Page 64692]]

CEM under paragraph (b) of this section may recognize the credit risk 
mitigation benefits of financial collateral that secures an OTC 
derivative contract or multiple OTC derivative contracts subject to a 
qualifying master netting agreement (netting set) by using the simple 
approach in Sec.  3.37(b).
    (2) As an alternative to the simple approach, a national bank or 
Federal savings association using the CEM under paragraph (b) of this 
section may recognize the credit risk mitigation benefits of financial 
collateral that secures such a contract or netting set if the financial 
collateral is marked-to-fair value on a daily basis and subject to a 
daily margin maintenance requirement by applying a risk weight to the 
uncollateralized portion of the exposure, after adjusting the exposure 
amount calculated under paragraph (b)(1) or (2) of this section using 
the collateral haircut approach in Sec.  3.37(c). The national bank or 
Federal savings association must substitute the exposure amount 
calculated under paragraph (b)(1) or (2) of this section for [Sigma]E 
in the equation in Sec.  3.37(c)(2).
    (d) Counterparty credit risk for credit derivatives--(1) Protection 
purchasers. A national bank or Federal savings association that 
purchases a credit derivative that is recognized under Sec.  3.36 as a 
credit risk mitigant for an exposure that is not a covered position 
under subpart F of this part is not required to compute a separate 
counterparty credit risk capital requirement under Sec.  3.32 provided 
that the national bank or Federal savings association does so 
consistently for all such credit derivatives. The national bank or 
Federal savings association must either include all or exclude all such 
credit derivatives that are subject to a qualifying master netting 
agreement from any measure used to determine counterparty credit risk 
exposure to all relevant counterparties for risk-based capital 
purposes.
    (2) Protection providers. (i) A national bank or Federal savings 
association that is the protection provider under a credit derivative 
must treat the credit derivative as an exposure to the underlying 
reference asset. The national bank or Federal savings association is 
not required to compute a counterparty credit risk capital requirement 
for the credit derivative under Sec.  3.32, provided that this 
treatment is applied consistently for all such credit derivatives. The 
national bank or Federal savings association must either include all or 
exclude all such credit derivatives that are subject to a qualifying 
master netting agreement from any measure used to determine 
counterparty credit risk exposure.
    (ii) The provisions of this paragraph (d)(2) apply to all relevant 
counterparties for risk-based capital purposes unless the national bank 
or Federal savings association is treating the credit derivative as a 
covered position under subpart F of this part, in which case the 
national bank or Federal savings association must compute a 
supplemental counterparty credit risk capital requirement under this 
section.
    (e) Counterparty credit risk for equity derivatives. (1) A national 
bank or Federal savings association must treat an equity derivative 
contract as an equity exposure and compute a risk-weighted asset amount 
for the equity derivative contract under Sec. Sec.  3.51 through 3.53 
(unless the national bank or Federal savings association is treating 
the contract as a covered position under subpart F of this part).
    (2) In addition, the national bank or Federal savings association 
must also calculate a risk-based capital requirement for the 
counterparty credit risk of an equity derivative contract under this 
section if the national bank or Federal savings association is treating 
the contract as a covered position under subpart F of this part.
    (3) If the national bank or Federal savings association risk 
weights the contract under the Simple Risk-Weight Approach (SRWA) in 
Sec.  3.52, the national bank or Federal savings association may choose 
not to hold risk-based capital against the counterparty credit risk of 
the equity derivative contract, as long as it does so for all such 
contracts. Where the equity derivative contracts are subject to a 
qualified master netting agreement, a national bank or Federal savings 
association using the SRWA must either include all or exclude all of 
the contracts from any measure used to determine counterparty credit 
risk exposure.
    (f) Clearing member national bank's or Federal savings 
association's exposure amount. The exposure amount of a clearing member 
national bank or Federal savings association using the CEM under 
paragraph (b) of this section for an OTC derivative contract or netting 
set of OTC derivative contracts where the national bank or Federal 
savings association is either acting as a financial intermediary and 
enters into an offsetting transaction with a QCCP or where the national 
bank or Federal savings association provides a guarantee to the QCCP on 
the performance of the client equals the exposure amount calculated 
according to paragraph (b)(1) or (2) of this section multiplied by the 
scaling factor 0.71. If the national bank or Federal savings 
association determines that a longer period is appropriate, the 
national bank or Federal savings association must use a larger scaling 
factor to adjust for a longer holding period as follows:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP17DE18.017

    Where H = the holding period greater than five days. Additionally, 
the OCC may require the national bank or Federal savings association to 
set a longer holding period if the OCC determines that a longer period 
is appropriate due to the nature, structure, or characteristics of the 
transaction or is commensurate with the risks associated with the 
transaction.
0
6. Section 3.35 is amended by adding paragraph (a)(3), revising 
paragraph (b)(4)(i), and adding paragraph (c)(3)(iii) to read as 
follows:


Sec.  3.35  Cleared transactions.

    (a) * * *
    (3) Alternate requirements. Notwithstanding any other provision of 
this section, an advanced approaches national bank or Federal savings 
association or a national bank or Federal savings association that is 
not an advanced approaches national bank or Federal savings association 
and that has elected to use SA-CCR under Sec.  3.34(a)(1) must apply 
Sec.  3.133 to its derivative contracts that are cleared transactions 
rather than this section.
    (b) * * *
    (4) * * *
    (i) Notwithstanding any other requirements in this section, 
collateral posted by a clearing member client national bank or Federal 
savings association that is held by a custodian (in its capacity as 
custodian) in a manner that is bankruptcy remote from the CCP, clearing 
member, and other clearing member clients of the clearing member, is 
not subject to a capital requirement under this section.
* * * * *
    (c) * * *
    (3) * * *
    (iii) Notwithstanding paragraphs (c)(3)(i) and (ii) of this 
section, a clearing member national bank or Federal savings association 
may apply a risk weight of zero percent to the trade exposure amount 
for a cleared transaction with a CCP where the clearing member national 
bank or Federal savings association is acting as a financial 
intermediary on behalf of a clearing member client, the transaction 
offsets another transaction that satisfies the requirements set forth 
in Sec.  3.3(a),

[[Page 64693]]

and the clearing member national bank or Federal savings association is 
not obligated to reimburse the clearing member client in the event of 
the CCP default.
* * * * *
0
7. Section 3.37 is amended by revising paragraph (c)(3)(iii) to read as 
follows:


Sec.  3.37  Collateralized transactions.

* * * * *
    (c) * * *
    (3) * * *
    (iii) For repo-style transactions and cleared transactions, a 
national bank or Federal savings association may multiply the standard 
supervisory haircuts provided in paragraphs (c)(3)(i) and (ii) of this 
section by the square root of \1/2\ (which equals 0.707107).
* * * * *


Sec. Sec.  3.134, 3.202, and 3.210   [Amended]

0
8. For each section listed in the following table, the footnote number 
listed in the ``Old footnote number'' column is redesignated as the 
footnote number listed in the ``New footnote number'' column as 
follows:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                           Old footnote    New footnote
                 Section                        No.             No.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
3.134(d)(3).............................              30              31
3.202, paragraph (1) introductory text                31              32
 of the definition of ``Covered
 position''.............................
3.202, paragraph (1)(i) of the                        32              33
 definition of ``Covered position''.....
3.210(e)(1).............................              33              34
------------------------------------------------------------------------

0
9. Section 3.132 is amended by:
0
a. Revising paragraphs (b)(2)(ii)(A)(3) through (5);
0
b. Adding paragraphs (b)(2)(ii)(A)(6) and (7);
0
c. Revising paragraphs (c) heading and (c)(1) and (2) and (5) through 
(8);
0
d. Adding paragraphs (c)(9) through (12);
0
e. Removing ``Table 3 to Sec.  3.132'' and adding in its place ``Table 
4 to this section'' in paragraphs (e)(5)(i)(A) and (H); and
0
f. Redesignating Table 3 to Sec.  3.132 as Table 4 to Sec.  3.132.
    The revisions and additions read as follows:


Sec.  3.132  Counterparty credit risk of repo-style transactions, 
eligible margin loans, and OTC derivative contracts.

* * * * *
    (b) * * *
    (2) * * *
    (ii) * * *
    (A) * * *
    (3) For repo-style transactions and cleared transactions, a 
national bank or Federal savings association may multiply the 
supervisory haircuts provided in paragraphs (b)(2)(ii)(A)(1) and (2) of 
this section by the square root of \1/2\ (which equals 0.707107).
    (4) A national bank or Federal savings association must adjust the 
supervisory haircuts upward on the basis of a holding period longer 
than ten business days (for eligible margin loans) or five business 
days (for repo-style transactions), using the formula provide in 
paragraph (b)(2)(ii)(A)(6) of this section where the following 
conditions apply. If the number of trades in a netting set exceeds 
5,000 at any time during a quarter, a national bank or Federal savings 
association must adjust the supervisory haircuts upward on the basis of 
a holding period of twenty business days for the following quarter 
(except when a national bank or Federal savings association is 
calculating EAD for a cleared transaction under Sec.  3.133). If a 
netting set contains one or more trades involving illiquid collateral, 
a national bank or Federal savings association must adjust the 
supervisory haircuts upward on the basis of a holding period of twenty 
business days. If over the two previous quarters more than two margin 
disputes on a netting set have occurred that lasted more than the 
holding period, then the national bank or Federal savings association 
must adjust the supervisory haircuts upward for that netting set on the 
basis of a holding period that is at least two times the minimum 
holding period for that netting set.
    (5)(i) A national bank or Federal savings association must adjust 
the supervisory haircuts upward on the basis of a holding period longer 
than ten business days for collateral associated derivative contracts 
that are not cleared transactions using the formula provided in 
paragraph (b)(2)(ii)(A)(6) of this section where the following 
conditions apply. For collateral associated with a derivative contract 
that is within a netting set that is composed of more than 5,000 
derivative contracts that are not cleared transactions, a national bank 
or Federal savings association must use a holding period of twenty 
business days. If a netting set contains one or more trades involving 
illiquid collateral or a derivative contract that cannot be easily 
replaced, a national bank or Federal savings association must use a 
holding period of twenty business days.
    (ii) Notwithstanding paragraph (b)(2)(ii)(A)(1) or (3) or 
(b)(2)(ii)(A)(5)(i) of this section, for collateral associated with a 
derivative contract that is subject to an outstanding dispute over 
variation margin, the holding period is twice the amount provide under 
paragraph (b)(2)(ii)(A)(1) or (3) or (b)(2)(ii)(A)(5)(i) of this 
section.
    (6) A national bank or Federal savings association must adjust the 
standard supervisory haircuts upward, pursuant to the adjustments 
provided in paragraphs (b)(2)(ii)(A)(4) and (5) of this section, using 
the following formula:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP17DE18.018

Where:

TM equals a holding period of longer than 10 business days for 
eligible margin loans and derivative contracts or longer than 5 
business days for repo-style transactions;
Hs equals the standard supervisory haircut; and
Ts equals 10 business days for eligible margin loans and derivative 
contracts or 5 business days for repo-style transactions.

    (7) If the instrument a national bank or Federal savings 
association has lent, sold subject to repurchase, or posted as 
collateral does not meet the definition of financial collateral, the 
national bank or Federal savings association must use a 25.0 percent 
haircut for market price volatility (Hs).
* * * * *
    (c) EAD for derivative contracts--(1) Options for determining EAD. 
A national bank or Federal savings association must determine the EAD 
for a derivative contract using the standardized approach for 
counterparty credit risk (SA-CCR) under paragraph (c)(5) of this 
section or using the internal models methodology described in paragraph 
(d) of this section. If a national bank or Federal savings association 
elects to use SA-CCR for one or more derivative contracts, the exposure 
amount determined under SA-CCR is the EAD for the derivative

[[Page 64694]]

contract or derivatives contracts. A national bank or Federal savings 
association must use the same methodology to calculate the exposure 
amount for all its derivative contracts and may change its election 
only with prior approval of the OCC.
    (2) Definitions. For purposes of this paragraph (c), the following 
definitions apply:
    (i) Except as otherwise provided in paragraph (c) of this section, 
the end date means the last date of the period referenced by an 
interest rate or credit derivative contract or, if the derivative 
contract references another instrument, by the underlying instrument.
    (ii) Except as otherwise provided in paragraph (c) of this section, 
the start date means the first date of the period referenced by an 
interest rate or credit derivative contract or, if the derivative 
contract references the value of another instrument, by underlying 
instrument.
    (iii) Hedging set means:
    (A) With respect interest rate derivative contracts, all such 
contracts within a netting set that reference the same reference 
currency;
    (B) With respect to exchange rate derivative contracts, all such 
contracts within a netting set that reference the same currency pair;
    (C) With respect to credit derivative contract, all such contracts 
within a netting set;
    (D) With respect to equity derivative contracts, all such contracts 
within a netting set;
    (E) With respect to a commodity derivative contract, all such 
contracts within a netting set that reference one of the following 
commodity classes: Energy, metal, agricultural, or other commodities;
    (F) With respect to basis derivative contracts, all such contracts 
within a netting set that reference the same pair of risk factors and 
are denominated in the same currency; or
    (G) With respect to volatility derivative contracts, all such 
contracts within a netting set that reference one of interest rate, 
exchange rate, credit, equity, or commodity risk factors, separated 
according to the requirements under paragraphs (c)(2)(iii)(A) through 
(E) of this section.
    (H) If the risk of a derivative contract materially depends on more 
than one of interest rate, exchange rate, credit, equity, or commodity 
risk factors, the OCC may require a national bank or Federal savings 
association to include the derivative contract in each appropriate 
hedging set under paragraphs (c)(2)(iii)(A) through (E) of this 
section.
* * * * *
    (5) Exposure amount. The exposure amount of a netting set, as 
calculated under paragraph (c) of this section, is equal to 1.4 
multiplied by the sum of the replacement cost of the netting set, as 
calculated under paragraph (c)(6) of this section, and the potential 
future exposure of the netting set, as calculated under paragraph 
(c)(7) of this section, except that, notwithstanding the requirements 
of this paragraph (c)(5):
    (i) The exposure amount of a netting set subject to a variation 
margin agreement, excluding a netting set that is subject to a 
variation margin agreement under which the counterparty to the 
variation margin agreement is not required to post variation margin, is 
equal to the lesser of the exposure amount of the netting set and the 
exposure amount of the netting set calculated as if the netting set 
were not subject to a variation margin agreement; and
    (ii) The exposure amount of a netting set that consists of only 
sold options in which the premiums have been fully paid and that are 
not subject to a variation margin agreement is zero.
    (6) Replacement cost of a netting set--(i) Netting set subject to a 
variation margin agreement under which the counterparty must post 
variation margin. The replacement cost of a netting set subject to a 
variation margin agreement, excluding a netting set that is subject to 
a variation margin agreement under which the counterparty is not 
required to post variation margin, is the greater of:
    (A) The sum of the fair values (after excluding any valuation 
adjustments) of the derivative contracts within the netting set less 
the sum of the net independent collateral amount and the variation 
margin amount applicable to such derivative contracts;
    (B) The sum of the variation margin threshold and the minimum 
transfer amount applicable to the derivative contracts within the 
netting set less the net independent collateral amount applicable to 
such derivative contracts; or
    (C) Zero.
    (ii) Netting sets not subject to a variation margin agreement under 
which the counterparty must post variation margin. The replacement cost 
of a netting set that is not subject to a variation margin agreement 
under which the counterparty must post variation margin to the national 
bank or Federal savings association is the greater of:
    (A) The sum of the fair values (after excluding any valuation 
adjustments) of the derivative contracts within the netting set less 
the net independent collateral amount and variation margin amount 
applicable to such derivative contracts; or
    (B) Zero.
    (iii) Multiple netting sets subject to a single variation margin 
agreement. Notwithstanding paragraphs (c)(6)(i) and (ii) of this 
section, the replacement cost for multiple netting sets subject to a 
single variation margin agreement must be calculated according to 
paragraph (c)(10)(i) of this section.
    (iv) Multiple netting sets subject to multiple variation margin 
agreements or a hybrid netting set. Notwithstanding paragraphs 
(c)(6)(i) and (ii) of this section, the replacement cost for a netting 
set subject to multiple variation margin agreements or a hybrid netting 
set must be calculated according to paragraph (c)(11)(i) of this 
section.
    (7) Potential future exposure of a netting set. The potential 
future exposure of a netting set is the product of the PFE multiplier 
and the aggregated amount.
    (i) PFE multiplier. The PFE multiplier is calculated according to 
the following formula:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP17DE18.018


[[Page 64695]]


Where:

V is the sum of the fair values (after excluding any valuation 
adjustments) of the derivative contracts within the netting set;
C is the sum of the net independent collateral amount and the 
variation margin amount applicable to the derivative contracts 
within the netting set; and
A is the aggregated amount of the netting set.

    (ii) Aggregated amount. The aggregated amount is the sum of all 
hedging set amounts, as calculated under paragraph (c)(8) of this 
section, within a netting set.
    (iii) Multiple netting sets subject to a single variation margin 
agreement. Notwithstanding paragraphs (c)(7)(i) and (ii) of this 
section and when calculating the PFE amount for purposes of total 
leverage exposure under Sec.  3.10(c)(4)(ii)(B), the potential future 
exposure for multiple netting sets subject to a single variation margin 
agreement must be calculated according to paragraph (c)(10)(ii) of this 
section.
    (iv) Multiple netting sets subject to multiple variation margin 
agreements or a hybrid netting set. Notwithstanding paragraphs 
(c)(7)(i) and (ii) of this section and when calculating the PFE amount 
for purposes of total leverage exposure under Sec.  3.10(c)(4)(ii)(B), 
the potential future exposure for a netting set subject to multiple 
variation margin agreements or a hybrid netting set must be calculated 
according to paragraph (c)(11)(ii) of this section.
    (8) Hedging set amount--(i) Interest rate derivative contracts. To 
calculate the hedging set amount of an interest rate derivative 
contract hedging set, a national bank or Federal savings association 
may use either of the formulas provided in paragraphs (c)(8)(i)(A) and 
(B) of this section:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP17DE18.020


[[Page 64696]]


    (ii) Exchange rate derivative contracts. For an exchange rate 
derivative contract hedging set, the hedging set amount equals the 
absolute value of the sum of the adjusted derivative contract amounts, 
as calculated under paragraph (c)(9) of this section, within the 
hedging set.
    (iii) Credit derivative contracts and equity derivative contracts. 
The hedging set amount of a credit derivative contract hedging set or 
equity derivative contract hedging set within a netting set is 
calculated according to the following formula:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP17DE18.021

Where:

k is each reference entity within the hedging set.
K is the number of reference entities within the hedging set.
AddOn(Refk) equals the sum of the adjusted derivative contract 
amounts, as determined under paragraph (c)(9) of this section, for 
all derivative contracts within the hedging set that reference 
reference entity k.
rk equals the applicable supervisory correlation factor, as provided 
in Table 2 to this section.

    (iv) Commodity derivative contracts. The hedging set amount of a 
commodity derivative contract hedging set within a netting set is 
calculated according to the following formula:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP17DE18.022

Where:

k is each commodity type within the hedging set.
K is the number of commodity types within the hedging set.
AddOn(Typek) equals the sum of the adjusted derivative contract 
amounts, as determined under paragraph (c)(9) of this section, for 
all derivative contracts within the hedging set that reference 
reference commodity type k.
r equals the applicable supervisory correlation factor, as provided 
in Table 2 to this section.

    (v) Basis derivative contracts and volatility derivative contracts. 
Notwithstanding paragraphs (c)(8)(i) through (iv) of this section, a 
national bank or Federal savings association must calculate a separate 
hedging set amount for each basis derivative contract hedging set and 
each volatility derivative contract hedging set. A national bank or 
Federal savings association must calculate such hedging set amounts 
using one of the formulas under paragraphs (c)(8)(i) through (iv) that 
corresponds to the primary risk factor of the hedging set being 
calculated.
    (9) Adjusted derivative contract amount--(i) Summary. To calculate 
the adjusted derivative contract amount of a derivative contract, a 
national bank or Federal savings association must determine the 
adjusted notional amount of derivative contract, pursuant to paragraph 
(c)(9)(ii) of this section, and multiply the adjusted notional amount 
by each of the supervisory delta adjustment, pursuant to paragraph 
(c)(9)(iii) of this section, the maturity factor, pursuant to paragraph 
(c)(9)(iv) of this section, and the applicable supervisory factor, as 
provided in Table 2 to this section.
    (ii) Adjusted notional amount. (A)(1) For an interest rate 
derivative contract or a credit derivative contract, the adjusted 
notional amount equals the product of the notional amount of the 
derivative contract, as measured in U.S. dollars using the exchange 
rate on the date of the calculation, and the supervisory duration, as 
calculated by the following formula:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP17DE18.023

Where:

S is the number of business days from the present day until the 
start date of the derivative contract, or zero if the start date has 
already passed; and
E is the number of business days from the present day until the end 
date of the derivative contract.
    (2) For purposes of paragraph (c)(9)(ii)(A)(1) of this section:
    (i) For an interest rate derivative contract or credit 
derivative contract that is a variable notional swap, the notional 
amount is equal to the time-weighted average of the contractual 
notional amounts of such a swap over the remaining life of the swap; 
and
    (ii) For an interest rate derivative contract or a credit 
derivative contract that is a leveraged swap, in which the notional 
amount of all legs of the derivative contract are divided by a 
factor and all rates of the derivative contract are multiplied by 
the same factor, the notional amount is equal to the notional amount 
of an equivalent unleveraged swap.
    (B)(1) For an exchange rate derivative contract, the adjusted 
notional amount is the notional amount of the non-U.S. denominated 
currency leg of the derivative contract, as measured in U.S. dollars 
using the exchange rate on the date of the calculation. If both legs 
of the exchange rate

[[Page 64697]]

derivative contract are denominated in currencies other than U.S. 
dollars, the adjusted notional amount of the derivative contract is 
the largest leg of the derivative contract, as measured in U.S. 
dollars using the exchange rate on the date of the calculation.
    (2) Notwithstanding paragraph (c)(9)(ii)(B)(1) of this section, 
for an exchange rate derivative contract with multiple exchanges of 
principal, the national bank or Federal savings association must set 
the adjusted notional amount of the derivative contract equal to the 
notional amount of the derivative contract multiplied by the number 
of exchanges of principal under the derivative contract.
    (C)(1) For an equity derivative contract or a commodity 
derivative contract, the adjusted notional amount is the product of 
the fair value of one unit of the reference instrument underlying 
the derivative contract and the number of such units referenced by 
the derivative contract.
    (2) Notwithstanding paragraph (c)(9)(ii)(C)(1) of this section, 
when calculating the adjusted notional amount for an equity 
derivative contract or a commodity derivative contract that is a 
volatility derivative contract, the national bank or Federal savings 
association must replace the unit price with the underlying 
volatility referenced by the volatility derivative contract and 
replace the number of units with the notional amount of the 
volatility derivative contract.
    (iii) Supervisory delta adjustments. (A) For a derivative 
contract that is not an option contract or collateralized debt 
obligation tranche, the supervisory delta adjustment is 1 if the 
fair value of the derivative contract increases when the value of 
the primary risk factor increases and -1 if the fair value of the 
derivative contract decreases when the value of the primary risk 
factor increases;
    (B)(1) For a derivative contract that is an option contract, the 
supervisory delta adjustment is determined by the following 
formulas, as applicable:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP17DE18.024

    (2) As used in the formulas in Table 3 to this section:
    (i) [b.Phi] is the standard normal cumulative distribution 
function;
    (ii) P equals the current fair value of the instrument or risk 
factor, as applicable, underlying the option;
    (iii) K equals the strike price of the option;
    (iv) T equals the number of business days until the latest 
contractual exercise date of the option;
    (v) l equals zero for all derivative contracts except interest 
rate options for the currencies where interest rates have negative 
values. The same value of l must be used for all interest rate 
options that are denominated in the same currency. To determine the 
value of l for a given currency, a national bank or Federal savings 
association must find the lowest value L of P and K of all interest 
rate options in a given currency that the national bank or Federal 
savings association has with all counterparties. Then, l is set 
according to this formula: l = max{-L + 0.1%, 0{time} ; and
    (vi) [sigma] equals the supervisory option volatility, as 
provided in Table 2 to of this section.
    (C)(1) For a derivative contract that is a collateralized debt 
obligation tranche, the supervisory delta adjustment is determined 
by the following formula:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP17DE18.025

    (2) As used in the formula in paragraph (c)(9)(iii)(C)(1) of 
this section:
    (i) A is the attachment point, which equals the ratio of the 
notional amounts of all underlying exposures that are subordinated 
to the national bank's or Federal savings association's exposure to 
the total notional amount of all underlying exposures, expressed as 
a decimal value between zero and one; \30\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \30\ In the case of a first-to-default credit derivative, there 
are no underlying exposures that are subordinated to the national 
bank's or Federal savings association's exposure. In the case of a 
second-or-subsequent-to-default credit derivative, the smallest (n-
1) notional amounts of the underlying exposures are subordinated to 
the national bank's or Federal savings association's exposure.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (ii) D is the detachment point, which equals one minus the ratio 
of the notional amounts of all underlying exposures that are senior 
to the national bank's or Federal savings association's exposure to 
the total notional amount of all underlying exposures, expressed as 
a decimal value between zero and one; and
    (iii) The resulting amount is designated with a positive sign if 
the collateralized debt obligation tranche was purchased by the 
national bank or Federal savings association and is designated with 
a negative sign if the collateralized debt obligation tranche was 
sold by the national bank or Federal savings association.
    (iv) Maturity factor. (A)(1) The maturity factor of a derivative 
contract that is subject to a variation margin agreement, excluding 
derivative contracts that are subject to a variation margin 
agreement under which the counterparty is not required to post 
variation margin, is determined by the following formula:

[[Page 64698]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP17DE18.026

    Where MPOR refers to the period from the most recent exchange of 
collateral covering a netting set of derivative contracts with a 
defaulting counterparty until the derivative contracts are closed 
out and the resulting market risk is re-hedged.
    (2) Notwithstanding paragraph (c)(9)(iv)(A)(1) of this section:
    (i) For a derivative contract that is not a cleared transaction, 
MPOR cannot be less than ten business days plus the periodicity of 
re-margining expressed in business days minus one business day;
    (ii) For a derivative contract that is a cleared transaction, 
MPOR cannot be less than five business days plus the periodicity of 
re-margining expressed in business days minus one business day; and
    (iii) For a derivative contract that is within a netting set 
that is composed of more than 5,000 derivative contracts that are 
not cleared transactions, MPOR cannot be less than twenty business 
days.
    (3) Notwithstanding paragraphs (c)(9)(iv)(A)(1) and (2) of this 
section, for a derivative contract subject to an outstanding dispute 
over variation margin, the applicable floor is twice the amount 
provided in (c)(9)(iv)(A)(1) and (2) of this section.
    (B) The maturity factor of a derivative contract that is not 
subject to a variation margin agreement, or derivative contracts 
under which the counterparty is not required to post variation 
margin, is determined by the following formula:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP17DE18.027

    Where M equals the greater of 10 business days and the remaining 
maturity of the contract, as measured in business days.
    (C) For purposes of paragraph (c)(9)(iv) of this section, 
derivative contracts with daily settlement are treated as derivative 
contracts not subject to a variation margin agreement and daily 
settlement does not change the end date of the period referenced by 
the derivative contract.
    (v) Derivative contract as multiple effective derivative 
contracts. A national bank or Federal savings association must 
separate a derivative contract into separate derivative contracts, 
according to the following rules:
    (A) For an option where the counterparty pays a predetermined 
amount if the value of the underlying asset is above or below the 
strike price and nothing otherwise (binary option), the option must 
be treated as two separate options. For purposes of paragraph 
(c)(9)(iii)(B) of this section, a binary option with strike K must 
be represented as the combination of one bought European option and 
one sold European option of the same type as the original option 
(put or call) with the strikes set equal to 0.95*K and 1.05*K so 
that the payoff of the binary option is reproduced exactly outside 
the region between the two strikes. The absolute value of the sum of 
the adjusted derivative contract amounts of the bought and sold 
options is capped at the payoff amount of the binary option.
    (B) For a derivative contract that can be represented as a 
combination of standard option payoffs (such as collar, butterfly 
spread, calendar spread, straddle, and strangle), each standard 
option component must be treated as a separate derivative contract.
    (C) For a derivative contract that includes multiple-payment 
options, (such as interest rate caps and floors) each payment option 
may be represented as a combination of effective single-payment 
options (such as interest rate caplets and floorlets).
    (10) Multiple netting sets subject to a single variation margin 
agreement--(i) Calculating replacement cost. Notwithstanding 
paragraph (c)(6) of this section, a national bank or Federal savings 
association shall assign a single replacement cost to multiple 
netting sets that are subject to a single variation margin agreement 
under which the counterparty must post variation margin, calculated 
according to the following formula:

Replacement Cost = max{SNS max{VNS; 0{time} -max{CMA; 0{time} ; 
0{time}  + max{SNS min{VNS; 0{time} -min{CMA; 0{time} ; 0{time} 

Where:

NS is each netting set subject to the variation margin agreement MA.
VNS is the sum of the fair values (after excluding any 
valuation adjustments) of the derivative contracts within the 
netting set NS.
CMA is the sum of the net independent collateral amount 
and the variation margin amount applicable to the derivative 
contracts within the netting sets subject to the single variation 
margin agreement.

    (ii) Calculating potential future exposure. Notwithstanding 
paragraph (c)(5) of this section, a national bank or Federal savings 
association shall assign a single potential future exposure to multiple 
netting sets that are subject to a single variation margin agreement 
under which the counterparty must post variation margin equal to the 
sum of the potential future exposure of each such netting set, each 
calculated according to paragraph (c)(7) of this section as if such 
nettings sets were not subject to a variation margin agreement.
    (11) Netting set subject to multiple variation margin agreements or 
a hybrid netting set--(i) Calculating replacement cost. To calculate 
replacement cost for either a netting set subject to multiple variation 
margin agreements under which the counterparty to each variation margin 
agreement must post variation margin, or a netting set composed of at 
least one derivative contract subject to variation margin agreement 
under which the counterparty must post variation margin and at least 
one derivative contract that is not subject to such a variation margin 
agreement, the calculation for replacement cost is provided under 
paragraph (c)(6)(ii) of this section, except that the variation margin 
threshold equals the sum of the variation margin thresholds of all 
variation margin agreements within the netting set and the minimum 
transfer amount equals the sum of the minimum transfer amounts of all 
the variation margin agreements within the netting set.
    (ii) Calculating potential future exposure. (A) To calculate 
potential future exposure for a netting set subject to multiple 
variation margin agreements under which the counterparty to each 
variation margin agreement must post variation margin, or a netting set 
composed of at least one derivative contract subject to variation 
margin agreement under which the counterparty to the derivative 
contract must post variation margin and at least one derivative 
contract that is not subject to such a variation margin agreement, a 
national bank or Federal savings association must divide the netting 
set into sub-netting sets and calculate the aggregated amount for each 
sub-netting set. The aggregated amount for the netting set is 
calculated as the sum of the aggregated amounts for the sub-netting 
sets. The multiplier is calculated for the entire netting set.
    (B) For purposes of paragraph (c)(11)(ii)(A) of this section, the 
netting set must be divided into sub-netting sets as follows:
    (1) All derivative contracts within the netting set that are not 
subject to a variation margin agreement or that are subject to a 
variation margin agreement

[[Page 64699]]

under which the counterparty is not required to post variation margin 
form a single sub-netting set. The aggregated amount for this sub-
netting set is calculated as if the netting set is not subject to a 
variation margin agreement.
    (2) All derivative contracts within the netting set that are 
subject to variation margin agreements in which the counterparty must 
post variation margin and that share the same value of the MPOR form a 
single sub-netting set. The aggregated amount for this sub-netting set 
is calculated as if the netting set is subject to a variation margin 
agreement, using the MPOR value shared by the derivative contracts 
within the netting set.
    (12) Treatment of cleared transactions. (i) A national bank or 
Federal savings association must apply the adjustments in paragraph 
(c)(12)(iii) of this section to the calculation of exposure amount 
under this paragraph (c) for a netting set that is composed solely of 
one or more cleared transactions.
    (ii) A national bank or Federal savings association that is a 
clearing member must apply the adjustments in paragraph (c)(12)(iii) of 
this section to the calculation of exposure amount under this paragraph 
(c) for a netting set that is composed solely of one or more exposures, 
each of which are exposures of the national bank or Federal savings 
association to its clearing member client where the national bank or 
Federal savings association is either acting as a financial 
intermediary and enters into an offsetting transaction with a CCP or 
where the national bank or Federal savings association provides a 
guarantee to the CCP on the performance of the client.
    (iii)(A) For purposes of calculating the maturity factor under 
paragraph (c)(9)(iv)(B) of this section, MPOR may not be less than 10 
business days;
    (B) For purposes of calculating the maturity factor under paragraph 
(c)(9)(iv)(B) of this section, the minimum MPOR under paragraph 
(c)(9)(iv)(A)(3) of this section does not apply if there are no 
outstanding disputed trades in the netting set, there is no illiquid 
collateral in the netting set, and there are no exotic derivative 
contracts in the netting set; and
    (C) For purposes of calculating the maturity factor under paragraph 
(c)(9)(iv)(A) and (B) of this section, if the CCP collects and holds 
variation margin and the variation margin is not bankruptcy remote from 
the CCP, Mi may not exceed 250 business days.

   Table 2 to Sec.   3.132--Supervisory Option Volatility, Supervisory Correlation Parameters, and Supervisory
                                        Factors for Derivative Contracts
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                    Supervisory     Supervisory
              Asset class                       Subclass              option        correlation     Supervisory
                                                                  volatility (%)    factor (%)    factor \1\ (%)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Interest rate.........................  N/A.....................              50             N/A            0.50
Exchange rate.........................  N/A.....................              15             N/A             4.0
Credit, single name...................  Investment grade........             100              50             0.5
                                        Speculative grade.......             100              50             1.3
                                        Sub-speculative grade...             100              50             6.0
Credit, index.........................  Investment Grade........              80              80            0.38
                                        Speculative Grade.......              80              80            1.06
Equity, single name...................  N/A.....................             120              50              32
Equity, index.........................  N/A.....................              75              80              20
Commodity.............................  Energy..................             150              40              40
                                        Metals..................              70              40              18
                                        Agricultural............              70              40              18
                                        Other...................              70              40              18
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The applicable supervisory factor for basis derivative contract hedging sets is equal to one-half of the
  supervisory factor provided in this Table 2, and the applicable supervisory factor for volatility derivative
  contract hedging sets is equal to 5 times the supervisory factor provided in this Table 2.

* * * * *
0
10. Section 3.133 is amended by revising paragraphs (a), (b) heading, 
(b)(1) through (3), (b)(4)(i), (c)(1) thorough (3), (c)(4)(i), and (d) 
to read as follows:


Sec.  3.133  Cleared transactions.

    (a) General requirements--(1) Clearing member clients. A national 
bank or Federal savings association that is a clearing member client 
must use the methodologies described in paragraph (b) of this section 
to calculate risk-weighted assets for a cleared transaction.
    (2) Clearing members. A national bank or Federal savings 
association that is a clearing member must use the methodologies 
described in paragraph (c) of this section to calculate its risk-
weighted assets for a cleared transaction and paragraph (d) of this 
section to calculate its risk-weighted assets for its default fund 
contribution to a CCP.
    (b) Clearing member client national bank or Federal savings 
association--(1) Risk-weighted assets for cleared transactions. (i) To 
determine the risk-weighted asset amount for a cleared transaction, a 
national bank or Federal savings association that is a clearing member 
client must multiply the trade exposure amount for the cleared 
transaction, calculated in accordance with paragraph (b)(2) of this 
section, by the risk weight appropriate for the cleared transaction, 
determined in accordance with paragraph (b)(3) of this section.
    (ii) A clearing member client national bank's or Federal savings 
association's total risk-weighted assets for cleared transactions is 
the sum of the risk-weighted asset amounts for all of its cleared 
transactions.
    (2) Trade exposure amount. (i) For a cleared transaction that is a 
derivative contract or a netting set of derivative contracts, trade 
exposure amount equals the EAD for the derivative contract or netting 
set of derivative contracts calculated using the methodology used to 
calculate EAD for derivative contracts set forth in Sec.  3.132(c) or 
(d), plus the fair value of the collateral posted by the clearing 
member client national bank or Federal savings association and held by 
the CCP or a clearing member in a manner that is not bankruptcy remote. 
When the national bank or Federal savings association calculates EAD 
for the cleared transaction using the

[[Page 64700]]

methodology in Sec.  3.132(d), EAD equals EADunstressed.
    (ii) For a cleared transaction that is a repo-style transaction or 
netting set of repo-style transactions, trade exposure amount equals 
the EAD for the repo-style transaction calculated using the methodology 
set forth in Sec.  3.132(b)(2) or (3) or (d), plus the fair value of 
the collateral posted by the clearing member client national bank or 
Federal savings association and held by the CCP or a clearing member in 
a manner that is not bankruptcy remote. When the national bank or 
Federal savings association calculates EAD for the cleared transaction 
under Sec.  3.132(d), EAD equals EADunstressed.
    (3) Cleared transaction risk weights. (i) For a cleared transaction 
with a QCCP, a clearing member client national bank or Federal savings 
association must apply a risk weight of:
    (A) 2 percent if the collateral posted by the national bank or 
Federal savings association to the QCCP or clearing member is subject 
to an arrangement that prevents any loss to the clearing member client 
national bank or Federal savings association due to the joint default 
or a concurrent insolvency, liquidation, or receivership proceeding of 
the clearing member and any other clearing member clients of the 
clearing member; and the clearing member client national bank or 
Federal savings association has conducted sufficient legal review to 
conclude with a well-founded basis (and maintains sufficient written 
documentation of that legal review) that in the event of a legal 
challenge (including one resulting from an event of default or from 
liquidation, insolvency or receivership proceedings) the relevant court 
and administrative authorities would find the arrangements to be legal, 
valid, binding and enforceable under the law of the relevant 
jurisdictions.
    (B) 4 percent, if the requirements of paragraph (b)(3)(i)(A) of 
this section are not met.
    (ii) For a cleared transaction with a CCP that is not a QCCP, a 
clearing member client national bank or Federal savings association 
must apply the risk weight applicable to the CCP under Sec.  3.32.
    (4) * * *
    (i) Notwithstanding any other requirement of this section, 
collateral posted by a clearing member client national bank or Federal 
savings association that is held by a custodian (in its capacity as a 
custodian) in a manner that is bankruptcy remote from the CCP, clearing 
member, and other clearing member clients of the clearing member, is 
not subject to a capital requirement under this section.
* * * * *
    (c) * * *
    (1) Risk-weighted assets for cleared transactions. (i) To determine 
the risk-weighted asset amount for a cleared transaction, a clearing 
member national bank or Federal savings association must multiply the 
trade exposure amount for the cleared transaction, calculated in 
accordance with paragraph (c)(2) of this section by the risk weight 
appropriate for the cleared transaction, determined in accordance with 
paragraph (c)(3) of this section.
    (ii) A clearing member national bank's or Federal savings 
association's total risk-weighted assets for cleared transactions is 
the sum of the risk-weighted asset amounts for all of its cleared 
transactions.
    (2) Trade exposure amount. A clearing member national bank or 
Federal savings association must calculate its trade exposure amount 
for a cleared transaction as follows:
    (i) For a cleared transaction that is a derivative contract or a 
netting set of derivative contracts, trade exposure amount equals the 
EAD calculated using the methodology used to calculate EAD for 
derivative contracts set forth in Sec.  3.132(c) or (d), plus the fair 
value of the collateral posted by the clearing member national bank or 
Federal savings association and held by the CCP in a manner that is not 
bankruptcy remote. When the clearing member national bank or Federal 
savings association calculates EAD for the cleared transaction using 
the methodology in Sec.  3.132(d), EAD equals EADunstressed.
    (ii) For a cleared transaction that is a repo-style transaction or 
netting set of repo-style transactions, trade exposure amount equals 
the EAD calculated under Sec.  3.132(b)(2) or (3) or (d), plus the fair 
value of the collateral posted by the clearing member national bank or 
Federal savings association and held by the CCP in a manner that is not 
bankruptcy remote. When the clearing member national bank or Federal 
savings association calculates EAD for the cleared transaction under 
Sec.  3.132(d), EAD equals EADunstressed.
    (3) Cleared transaction risk weights. (i) A clearing member 
national bank or Federal savings association must apply a risk weight 
of 2 percent to the trade exposure amount for a cleared transaction 
with a QCCP.
    (ii) For a cleared transaction with a CCP that is not a QCCP, a 
clearing member national bank or Federal savings association must apply 
the risk weight applicable to the CCP according to Sec.  3.32.
    (iii) Notwithstanding paragraphs (c)(3)(i) and (ii) of this 
section, a clearing member national bank or Federal savings association 
may apply a risk weight of zero percent to the trade exposure amount 
for a cleared transaction with a QCCP where the clearing member 
national bank or Federal savings association is acting as a financial 
intermediary on behalf of a clearing member client, the transaction 
offsets another transaction that satisfies the requirements set forth 
in Sec.  3.3(a), and the clearing member national bank or Federal 
savings association is not obligated to reimburse the clearing member 
client in the event of the QCCP default.
    (4) * * *
    (i) Notwithstanding any other requirement of this section, 
collateral posted by a clearing member client national bank or Federal 
savings association that is held by a custodian (in its capacity as a 
custodian) in a manner that is bankruptcy remote from the CCP, clearing 
member, and other clearing member clients of the clearing member, is 
not subject to a capital requirement under this section.
* * * * *
    (d) Default fund contributions--(1) General requirement. A clearing 
member national bank or Federal savings association must determine the 
risk-weighted asset amount for a default fund contribution to a CCP at 
least quarterly, or more frequently if, in the opinion of the national 
bank or Federal savings association or the OCC, there is a material 
change in the financial condition of the CCP.
    (2) Risk-weighted asset amount for default fund contributions to 
nonqualifying CCPs. A clearing member national bank's or Federal 
savings association's risk-weighted asset amount for default fund 
contributions to CCPs that are not QCCPs equals the sum of such default 
fund contributions multiplied by 1,250 percent, or an amount determined 
by the OCC, based on factors such as size, structure and membership 
characteristics of the CCP and riskiness of its transactions, in cases 
where such default fund contributions may be unlimited.
    (3) Risk-weighted asset amount for default fund contributions to 
QCCPs. A clearing member national bank's or Federal savings 
association's risk-weighted asset amount for default fund contributions 
to QCCPs equals the sum of its capital requirement, KCM for 
each QCCP, as calculated under the methodology set forth in paragraph 
(e)(4) of this section.

[[Page 64701]]

    (i) EAD must be calculated separately for each clearing member's 
sub-client accounts and sub-house account (i.e., for the clearing 
member's propriety activities). If the clearing member's collateral and 
its client's collateral are held in the same default fund contribution 
account, then the EAD of that account is the sum of the EAD for the 
client-related transactions within the account and the EAD of the 
house-related transactions within the account. For purposes of 
determining such EADs, the independent collateral of the clearing 
member and its client must be allocated in proportion to the respective 
total amount of independent collateral posted by the clearing member to 
the QCCP.
    (ii) If any account or sub-account contains both derivative 
contracts and repo-style transactions, the EAD of that account is the 
sum of the EAD for the derivative contracts within the account and the 
EAD of the repo-style transactions within the account. If independent 
collateral is held for an account containing both derivative contracts 
and repo-style transactions, then such collateral must be allocated to 
the derivative contracts and repo-style transactions in proportion to 
the respective product specific exposure amounts, calculated, excluding 
the effects of collateral, according to Sec.  3.132(b) for repo-style 
transactions and to Sec.  3.132(c)(5) for derivative contracts.
    (4) Risk-weighted asset amount for default fund contributions to a 
QCCP. A clearing member national bank's or Federal savings 
association's capital requirement for its default fund contribution to 
a QCCP (KCM) is equal to:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP17DE18.028

    (5) Hypothetical capital requirement of a QCCP. Where a QCCP has 
provided its KCCP, a national bank or Federal savings 
association must rely on such disclosed figure instead of calculating 
KCCP under this paragraph (d)(5), unless the national bank 
or Federal savings association determines that a more conservative 
figure is appropriate based on the nature, structure, or 
characteristics of the QCCP. The hypothetical capital requirement of a 
QCCP (KCCP), as determined by the national bank or Federal savings 
association, is equal to:

KCCP = [Sigma]CMi EADi * 1.6 percent

Where:

CMi is each clearing member of the QCCP; and
EADi is the exposure amount of each clearing member of the QCCP to 
the QCCP, as determined under paragraph (d)(6) of this section.

    (6) EAD of a clearing member national bank or Federal savings 
association to a QCCP. (i) The EAD of a clearing member national bank 
or Federal savings association to a QCCP is equal to the sum of the EAD 
for derivative contracts determined under paragraph (d)(6)(ii) of this 
section and the EAD for repo-style transactions determined under 
paragraph (d)(6)(iii) of this section.
    (ii) With respect to any derivative contracts between the national 
bank or Federal savings association and the CCP that are cleared 
transactions and any guarantees that the national bank or Federal 
savings association has provided to the CCP with respect to performance 
of a clearing member client on a derivative contract, the EAD is equal 
to the sum of:
    (A) The exposure amount for all such derivative contracts and 
guarantees of derivative contracts calculated under SA-CCR in Sec.  
3.132(c) using a value of

[[Page 64702]]

10 business days for purposes of Sec.  3.132(c)(9)(iv)(B);
    (B) The value of all collateral held by the CCP posted by the 
clearing member national bank or Federal savings association or a 
clearing member client of the national bank or Federal savings 
association in connection with a derivative contract for which the 
national bank or Federal savings association has provided a guarantee 
to the CCP; and
    (C) The amount of the prefunded default fund contribution of the 
national bank or Federal savings association to the CCP.
    (iii) With respect to any repo-style transactions between the 
national bank or Federal savings association and the CCP that are 
cleared transactions, EAD is equal to:

EAD = max{EBRM - IM - DF; 0{time} 


Where:

EBRM is the sum of the exposure amounts of each repo-style 
transaction between the national bank or Federal savings association 
and the CCP as determined under Sec.  3.132(b)(2) and without 
recognition of any collateral securing the repo-style transactions;
IM is the initial margin collateral posted by the national bank or 
Federal savings association to the CCP with respect to the repo-
style transactions; and
DF is the prefunded default fund contribution of the national bank 
or Federal savings association to the CCP.

0
11. Section 3.300 is amended by adding paragraph (f) to read as 
follows:


Sec.  3.300  Transitions.

* * * * *
    (f) SA-CCR. After giving prior notice to the OCC, an advanced 
approaches national bank or Federal savings association may use CEM 
rather than SA-CCR to determine the exposure amount for purposes of 
Sec.  3.34 and the EAD for purposes of Sec.  3.132 for its derivative 
contracts until July 1, 2020. On July 1, 2020, and thereafter, an 
advanced approaches national bank or Federal savings association must 
use SA-CCR for purposes of Sec.  3.34 and must use either SA-CCR or IMM 
for purposes of Sec.  3.132. Once an advanced approaches national bank 
or Federal savings association has begun to use SA-CCR, the advanced 
approaches national bank or Federal savings association may not change 
to use CEM.

PART 32--LENDING LIMITS

0
12. The authority citation for part 32 continues to read as follows:

    Authority:  12 U.S.C. 1 et seq., 12 U.S.C. 84, 93a, 1462a, 1463, 
1464(u), 5412(b)(2)(B), and 15 U.S.C. 1639h.

0
13. Section 32.9 is amended by revising paragraph (b)(1)(iii) and 
adding paragraph (b)(1)(iv) to read as follows:


Sec.  32.9  Credit exposure arising from derivative and securities 
financing transactions.

* * * * *
    (b) * * *
    (1) * * *
    (iii) Current Exposure Method. The credit exposure arising from a 
derivative transaction (other than a credit derivative transaction) 
under the Current Exposure Method shall be calculated pursuant to 12 
CFR 3.34(b)(1) and (2) and (c) or 324.34(b)(1) and (2) and (c), as 
appropriate.
    (iv) Standardized Approach for Counterparty Credit Risk Method. The 
credit exposure arising from a derivative transaction (other than a 
credit derivative transaction) under the Standardized Approach for 
Counterparty Credit Risk Method shall be calculated pursuant to 12 CFR 
3.132(c)(5) or 324.132(c)(5), as appropriate.
* * * * *

FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM

12 CFR Chapter II

Authority and Issuance

    For the reasons set forth in the preamble, chapter II of title 12 
of the Code of Federal Regulations is proposed to be amended as set 
forth below:

PART 217--CAPITAL ADEQUACY OF BANK HOLDING COMPANIES, SAVINGS AND 
LOAN HOLDING COMPANIES, AND STATE MEMBER BANKS (REGULATION Q)

0
14. The authority citation for part 217 continues to read as follows:

    Authority:  12 U.S.C. 248(a), 321-338a, 481-486, 1462a, 1467a, 
1818, 1828, 1831n, 1831o, 1831p-l, 1831w, 1835, 1844(b), 1851, 3904, 
3906-3909, 4808, 5365, 5368, 5371.

0
15. Section 217.2 is amended by:
0
a. Adding the definition of ``Basis derivative contract'' in 
alphabetical order;
0
b. Revising paragraph (2) of the definition of ``Financial 
collateral;''
0
c. Adding the definitions of ``Independent collateral,'' ``Minimum 
transfer amount,'' and ``Net independent collateral amount'' in 
alphabetical order;
0
d. Revising the definition of ``Netting set;''
0
e. Adding the definitions of ``Speculative grade,'' ``Sub-speculative 
grade,'' ``Variation margin,'' ``Variation margin agreement,'' 
``Variation margin amount,'' ``Variation margin threshold,'' and 
``Volatility derivative contract'' in alphabetical order.
    The additions and revisions read as follows:


Sec.  217.2  Definitions.

* * * * *
    Basis derivative contract means a non-foreign-exchange derivative 
contract (i.e., the contract is denominated in a single currency) in 
which the cash flows of the derivative contract depend on the 
difference between two risk factors that are attributable solely to one 
of the following derivative asset classes: interest rate, credit, 
equity, or commodity.
* * * * *
    Financial collateral * * *
    (2) In which the Board-regulated institution has a perfected, 
first-priority security interest or, outside of the United States, the 
legal equivalent thereof, (with the exception of cash on deposit; and 
notwithstanding the prior security interest of any custodial agent or 
any priority security interest granted to a CCP in connection with 
collateral posted to that CCP).
* * * * *
    Independent collateral means financial collateral, other than 
variation margin, that is subject to a collateral agreement, or in 
which a Board-regulated institution has a perfected, first-priority 
security interest or, outside of the United States, the legal 
equivalent thereof (with the exception of cash on deposit; 
notwithstanding the prior security interest of any custodial agent or 
any prior security interest granted to a CCP in connection with 
collateral posted to that CCP), and the amount of which does not change 
directly in response to the value of the derivative contract or 
contracts that the financial collateral secures.
* * * * *
    Minimum transfer amount means the smallest amount of variation 
margin that may be transferred between counterparties to a netting set.
* * * * *
    Net independent collateral amount means the fair value amount of 
the independent collateral, as adjusted by the standard supervisory 
haircuts under Sec.  217.132(b)(2)(ii), as applicable, that a 
counterparty to a netting set has posted to a Board-regulated 
institution less the fair value amount of the independent collateral, 
as adjusted by the standard supervisory haircuts under Sec.  
217.132(b)(2)(ii), as applicable, posted by the Board-regulated 
institution to the counterparty, excluding such amounts held in a 
bankruptcy remote manner, or posted to a QCCP and held in

[[Page 64703]]

conformance with the operational requirements in Sec.  217.3.
    Netting set means either one derivative contract between a Board-
regulated institution and a single counterparty, or a group of 
derivative contracts between a Board-regulated institution and a single 
counterparty, that are subject to a qualifying master netting 
agreement.
* * * * *
    Speculative grade means the reference entity has adequate capacity 
to meet financial commitments in the near term, but is vulnerable to 
adverse economic conditions, such that should economic conditions 
deteriorate, the reference entity would present an elevated default 
risk.
* * * * *
    Sub-speculative grade means the reference entity depends on 
favorable economic conditions to meet its financial commitments, such 
that should such economic conditions deteriorate the reference entity 
likely would default on its financial commitments.
* * * * *
    Variation margin means financial collateral that is subject to a 
collateral agreement provided by one party to its counterparty to meet 
the performance of the first party's obligations under one or more 
transactions between the parties as a result of a change in value of 
such obligations since the last time such financial collateral was 
provided.
    Variation margin agreement means an agreement to collect or post 
variation margin.
    Variation margin amount means the fair value amount of the 
variation margin, as adjusted by the standard supervisory haircuts 
under Sec.  217.132(b)(2)(ii), as applicable, that a counterparty to a 
netting set has posted to a Board-regulated institution less the fair 
value amount of the variation margin, as adjusted by the standard 
supervisory haircuts under Sec.  217.132(b)(2)(ii), as applicable, 
posted by the Board-regulated institution to the counterparty.
    Variation margin threshold means the amount of credit exposure of a 
Board-regulated institution to its counterparty that, if exceeded, 
would require the counterparty to post variation margin to the Board-
regulated institution.
    Volatility derivative contract means a derivative contract in which 
the payoff of the derivative contract explicitly depends on a measure 
of the volatility of an underlying risk factor to the derivative 
contract.
* * * * *
0
16. Section 217.10 is amended by revising paragraphs (c)(4)(ii)(A) 
through (C) to read as follows:


Sec.  217.10  Minimum capital requirements.

* * * * *
    (c) * * *
    (4) * * *
    (ii) * * *
    (A) The balance sheet carrying value of all the Board-regulated 
institution's on-balance sheet assets, plus the value of securities 
sold under a repurchase transaction or a securities lending transaction 
that qualifies for sales treatment under U.S. GAAP, less amounts 
deducted from tier 1 capital under Sec.  217.22(a), (c), and (d), less 
the value of securities received in security-for-security repo-style 
transactions, where the Board-regulated institution acts as a 
securities lender and includes the securities received in its on-
balance sheet assets but has not sold or re-hypothecated the securities 
received, and less the fair value of any derivative contracts;
    (B) The PFE for each netting set (including cleared transactions 
except as provided in paragraph (c)(4)(ii)(I) of this section and, at 
the discretion of the Board-regulated institution, excluding a forward 
agreement treated as a derivative contract that is part of a repurchase 
or reverse repurchase or a securities borrowing or lending transaction 
that qualifies for sales treatment under U.S. GAAP), as determined 
under Sec.  217.132(c)(7), in which the term C in Sec.  
217.132(c)(7)(i)(B) equals zero, multiplied by 1.4;
    (C) The sum of:
    (1)(i) 1.4 multiplied by the replacement cost of each derivative 
contract or single product netting set of derivative contracts to which 
the Board-regulated institution is a counterparty, calculated according 
to the following formula:

Replacement Cost = {V - CVMr + CVMp; 0{time} 

Where:

V equals the fair value for each derivative contract or each single-
product netting set of derivative contracts (including a cleared 
transaction except as provided in paragraph (c)(4)(ii)(I) of this 
section and, at the discretion of the Board-regulated institution, 
excluding a forward agreement treated as a derivative contract that 
is part of a repurchase or reverse repurchase or a securities 
borrowing or lending transaction that qualifies for sales treatment 
under U.S. GAAP);
CVMr equals the amount of cash collateral received from a 
counterparty to a derivative contract and that satisfies the 
conditions in paragraphs (c)(4)(ii)(C)(3) through (7) of this 
section; and
CVMp equals the amount of cash collateral that is posted to a 
counterparty to a derivative contract and that has not off-set the 
fair value of the derivative contract and that satisfies the 
conditions in paragraphs (c)(4)(ii)(C)(3) through (7) of this 
section; and

    (ii) Notwithstanding paragraph (c)(4)(ii)(C)(1)(i) of this section, 
where multiple netting sets are subject to a single variation margin 
agreement, a Board-regulated institution must apply the formula for 
replacement cost provided in Sec.  217.132(c)(10), in which the term 
may only include cash collateral that satisfies the conditions in 
paragraphs (c)(4)(ii)(C)(3) through (7) of this section;
    (2) The amount of cash collateral that is received from a 
counterparty to a derivative contract that has off-set the fair value 
of a derivative contract and that does not satisfy the conditions in 
paragraphs (c)(4)(ii)(C)(3) through (7) of this section;
    (3) For derivative contracts that are not cleared through a QCCP, 
the cash collateral received by the recipient counterparty is not 
segregated (by law, regulation or an agreement with the counterparty);
    (4) Variation margin is calculated and transferred on a daily basis 
based on the fair value of the derivative contract;
    (5) The variation margin transferred under the derivative contract 
or the governing rules for a cleared transaction is the full amount 
that is necessary to fully extinguish the net current credit exposure 
to the counterparty of the derivative contracts, subject to the 
threshold and minimum transfer amounts applicable to the counterparty 
under the terms of the derivative contract or the governing rules for a 
cleared transaction;
    (6) The variation margin is in the form of cash in the same 
currency as the currency of settlement set forth in the derivative 
contract, provided that for the purposes of this paragraph 
(c)(4)(ii)(C)(6), currency of settlement means any currency for 
settlement specified in the governing qualifying master netting 
agreement and the credit support annex to the qualifying master netting 
agreement, or in the governing rules for a cleared transaction; and
    (7) The derivative contract and the variation margin are governed 
by a qualifying master netting agreement between the legal entities 
that are the counterparties to the derivative contract or by the 
governing rules for a cleared transaction, and the qualifying master 
netting agreement or the governing rules for a cleared transaction must 
explicitly stipulate that the counterparties agree to settle any 
payment obligations on a net

[[Page 64704]]

basis, taking into account any variation margin received or provided 
under the contract if a credit event involving either counterparty 
occurs;
* * * * *
0
17. Section 217.32 is amended by revising paragraph (f) to read as 
follows:


Sec.  217.32  General risk weights.

* * * * *
    (f) Corporate exposures. (1) A Board-regulated institution must 
assign a 100 percent risk weight to all its corporate exposures, except 
as provided in paragraph (f)(2) of this section.
    (2) A Board-regulated institution must assign a 2 percent risk 
weight to an exposure to a QCCP arising from the Board-regulated 
institution posting cash collateral to the QCCP in connection with a 
cleared transaction that meets the requirements of Sec.  
217.35(b)(3)(i)(A) and a 4 percent risk weight to an exposure to a QCCP 
arising from the Board-regulated institution posting cash collateral to 
the QCCP in connection with a cleared transaction that meets the 
requirements of Sec.  217.35(b)(3)(i)(B).
    (3) A Board-regulated institution must assign a 2 percent risk 
weight to an exposure to a QCCP arising from the Board-regulated 
institution posting cash collateral to the QCCP in connection with a 
cleared transaction that meets the requirements of Sec.  
217.35(c)(3)(i).
* * * * *
0
18. Section 217.34 is revised to read as follows:


Sec.  217.34  Derivative contracts.

    (a) Exposure amount for derivative contracts--(1) Board-regulated 
institution that is not an advanced approaches Board-regulated 
institution. (i) A Board-regulated institution that is not an advanced 
approaches Board-regulated institution must use the current exposure 
methodology (CEM) described in paragraph (b) of this section to 
calculate the exposure amount for all its OTC derivative contracts, 
unless the Board-regulated institution makes the election provided in 
paragraph (a)(1)(ii) of this section.
    (ii) A Board-regulated institution that is not an advanced 
approaches Board-regulated institution may elect to calculate the 
exposure amount for all its OTC derivative contracts under the 
standardized approach for counterparty credit risk (SA-CCR) in Sec.  
217.132(c), rather than calculating the exposure amount for all its 
derivative contracts using the CEM. A Board-regulated institution that 
elects under this paragraph (a)(1)(ii) to calculate the exposure amount 
for its OTC derivative contracts under the SA-CCR must apply the 
treatment of cleared transactions under Sec.  217.133 to its derivative 
contracts that are cleared transactions, rather than applying Sec.  
217.35. A Board-regulated institution that is not an advanced 
approaches Board-regulated institution must use the same methodology to 
calculate the exposure amount for all its derivative contracts and may 
change its election only with prior approval of the Board.
    (2) Advanced approaches Board-regulated institution. An advanced 
approaches Board-regulated institution must calculate the exposure 
amount for all its derivative contracts using the SA-CCR in Sec.  
217.132(c). An advanced approaches Board-regulated institution must 
apply the treatment of cleared transactions under Sec.  217.133 to its 
derivative contracts that are cleared transactions.
    (b) Current exposure methodology exposure amount--(1) Single OTC 
derivative contract. Except as modified by paragraph (c) of this 
section, the exposure amount for a single OTC derivative contract that 
is not subject to a qualifying master netting agreement is equal to the 
sum of the Board-regulated institution's current credit exposure and 
potential future credit exposure (PFE) on the OTC derivative contract.
    (i) Current credit exposure. The current credit exposure for a 
single OTC derivative contract is the greater of the fair value of the 
OTC derivative contract or zero.
    (ii) PFE. (A) The PFE for a single OTC derivative contract, 
including an OTC derivative contract with a negative fair value, is 
calculated by multiplying the notional principal amount of the OTC 
derivative contract by the appropriate conversion factor in Table 1 to 
this section.
    (B) For purposes of calculating either the PFE under this paragraph 
(b) or the gross PFE under paragraph (b)(2) of this section for 
exchange rate contracts and other similar contracts in which the 
notional principal amount is equivalent to the cash flows, notional 
principal amount is the net receipts to each party falling due on each 
value date in each currency.
    (C) For an OTC derivative contract that does not fall within one of 
the specified categories in Table 1 to this section, the PFE must be 
calculated using the appropriate ``other'' conversion factor.
    (D) A Board-regulated institution must use an OTC derivative 
contract's effective notional principal amount (that is, the apparent 
or stated notional principal amount multiplied by any multiplier in the 
OTC derivative contract) rather than the apparent or stated notional 
principal amount in calculating PFE.
    (E) The PFE of the protection provider of a credit derivative is 
capped at the net present value of the amount of unpaid premiums.

                                     Table 1 to Sec.   217.34--Conversion Factor Matrix for Derivative Contracts \1\
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                              Credit       Credit (non-
                                                              Foreign       (investment     investment-                      Precious
         Remaining maturity \2\            Interest rate   exchange rate       grade           grade          Equity      metals (except       Other
                                                             and gold        reference       reference                         gold)
                                                                            asset) \3\        asset)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
One year or less........................            0.00            0.01            0.05            0.10            0.06            0.07            0.10
Greater than one year and less than or             0.005            0.05            0.05            0.10            0.08            0.07            0.12
 equal to five years....................
Greater than five years.................           0.015           0.075            0.05            0.10            0.10            0.08            0.15
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ For a derivative contract with multiple exchanges of principal, the conversion factor is multiplied by the number of remaining payments in the
  derivative contract.
\2\ For an OTC derivative contract that is structured such that on specified dates any outstanding exposure is settled and the terms are reset so that
  the fair value of the contract is zero, the remaining maturity equals the time until the next reset date. For an interest rate derivative contract
  with a remaining maturity of greater than one year that meets these criteria, the minimum conversion factor is 0.005.
\3\ A Board-regulated institution must use the column labeled ``Credit (investment-grade reference asset)'' for a credit derivative whose reference
  asset is an outstanding unsecured long-term debt security without credit enhancement that is investment grade. A Board-regulated institution must use
  the column labeled ``Credit (non-investment-grade reference asset)'' for all other credit derivatives.

    (2) Multiple OTC derivative contracts subject to a qualifying 
master netting agreement. Except as modified by paragraph (c) of this 
section, the exposure amount for multiple OTC derivative contracts 
subject to a qualifying master netting agreement is equal to the sum of 
the net current credit exposure and the adjusted sum of

[[Page 64705]]

the PFE amounts for all OTC derivative contracts subject to the 
qualifying master netting agreement.
    (i) Net current credit exposure. The net current credit exposure is 
the greater of the net sum of all positive and negative fair values of 
the individual OTC derivative contracts subject to the qualifying 
master netting agreement or zero.
    (ii) Adjusted sum of the PFE amounts. The adjusted sum of the PFE 
amounts, Anet, is calculated as Anet = (0.4 x Agross) + (0.6 x NGR x 
Agross), where:
    (A) Agross = the gross PFE (that is, the sum of the PFE amounts as 
determined under paragraph (b)(1)(ii) of this section for each 
individual derivative contract subject to the qualifying master netting 
agreement); and
    (B) Net-to-gross Ratio (NGR) = the ratio of the net current credit 
exposure to the gross current credit exposure. In calculating the NGR, 
the gross current credit exposure equals the sum of the positive 
current credit exposures (as determined under paragraph (b)(1)(i) of 
this section) of all individual derivative contracts subject to the 
qualifying master netting agreement.
    (c) Recognition of credit risk mitigation of collateralized OTC 
derivative contracts. (1) A Board-regulated institution using the CEM 
under paragraph (b) of this section may recognize the credit risk 
mitigation benefits of financial collateral that secures an OTC 
derivative contract or multiple OTC derivative contracts subject to a 
qualifying master netting agreement (netting set) by using the simple 
approach in Sec.  217.37(b).
    (2) As an alternative to the simple approach, a Board-regulated 
institution using the CEM under paragraph (b) of this section may 
recognize the credit risk mitigation benefits of financial collateral 
that secures such a contract or netting set if the financial collateral 
is marked-to-fair value on a daily basis and subject to a daily margin 
maintenance requirement by applying a risk weight to the 
uncollateralized portion of the exposure, after adjusting the exposure 
amount calculated under paragraph (b)(1) or (2) of this section using 
the collateral haircut approach in Sec.  217.37(c). The Board-regulated 
institution must substitute the exposure amount calculated under 
paragraph (b)(1) or (2) of this section for [Sigma]E in the equation in 
Sec.  217.37(c)(2).
    (d) Counterparty credit risk for credit derivatives--(1) Protection 
purchasers. A Board-regulated institution that purchases a credit 
derivative that is recognized under Sec.  217.36 as a credit risk 
mitigant for an exposure that is not a covered position under subpart F 
of this part is not required to compute a separate counterparty credit 
risk capital requirement under Sec.  217.32 provided that the Board-
regulated institution does so consistently for all such credit 
derivatives. The Board-regulated institution must either include all or 
exclude all such credit derivatives that are subject to a qualifying 
master netting agreement from any measure used to determine 
counterparty credit risk exposure to all relevant counterparties for 
risk-based capital purposes.
    (2) Protection providers. (i) A Board-regulated institution that is 
the protection provider under a credit derivative must treat the credit 
derivative as an exposure to the underlying reference asset. The Board-
regulated institution is not required to compute a counterparty credit 
risk capital requirement for the credit derivative under Sec.  217.32, 
provided that this treatment is applied consistently for all such 
credit derivatives. The Board-regulated institution must either include 
all or exclude all such credit derivatives that are subject to a 
qualifying master netting agreement from any measure used to determine 
counterparty credit risk exposure.
    (ii) The provisions of this paragraph (d)(2) apply to all relevant 
counterparties for risk-based capital purposes unless the Board-
regulated institution is treating the credit derivative as a covered 
position under subpart F of this part, in which case the Board-
regulated institution must compute a supplemental counterparty credit 
risk capital requirement under this section.
    (e) Counterparty credit risk for equity derivatives. (1) A Board-
regulated institution must treat an equity derivative contract as an 
equity exposure and compute a risk-weighted asset amount for the equity 
derivative contract under Sec. Sec.  217.51 through 217.53 (unless the 
Board-regulated institution is treating the contract as a covered 
position under subpart F of this part).
    (2) In addition, the Board-regulated institution must also 
calculate a risk-based capital requirement for the counterparty credit 
risk of an equity derivative contract under this section if the Board-
regulated institution is treating the contract as a covered position 
under subpart F of this part.
    (3) If the Board-regulated institution risk weights the contract 
under the Simple Risk-Weight Approach (SRWA) in Sec.  217.52, the 
Board-regulated institution may choose not to hold risk-based capital 
against the counterparty credit risk of the equity derivative contract, 
as long as it does so for all such contracts. Where the equity 
derivative contracts are subject to a qualified master netting 
agreement, a Board-regulated institution using the SRWA must either 
include all or exclude all of the contracts from any measure used to 
determine counterparty credit risk exposure.
    (f) Clearing member Board-regulated institution's exposure amount. 
The exposure amount of a clearing member Board-regulated institution 
using the CEM under paragraph (b) of this section for an OTC derivative 
contract or netting set of OTC derivative contracts where the Board-
regulated institution is either acting as a financial intermediary and 
enters into an offsetting transaction with a QCCP or where the Board-
regulated institution provides a guarantee to the QCCP on the 
performance of the client equals the exposure amount calculated 
according to paragraph (b)(1) or (2) of this section multiplied by the 
scaling factor 0.71. If the Board-regulated institution determines that 
a longer period is appropriate, the Board-regulated institution must 
use a larger scaling factor to adjust for a longer holding period as 
follows:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP17DE18.029

    Where H = the holding period greater than five days. Additionally, 
the Board may require the Board-regulated institution to set a longer 
holding period if the Board determines that a longer period is 
appropriate due to the nature, structure, or characteristics of the 
transaction or is commensurate with the risks associated with the 
transaction.
0
19. Section 217.35 is amended by adding paragraph (a)(3), revising 
paragraph (b)(4)(i), and adding paragraph (c)(3)(iii) to read as 
follows:


Sec.  217.35  Cleared transactions.

    (a) * * *
    (3) Alternate requirements. Notwithstanding any other provision of 
this section, an advanced approaches Board-regulated institution or a 
Board-regulated institution that is not an advanced approaches Board-
regulated institution and that has elected to use SA-CCR under Sec.  
217.34(a)(1) must apply Sec.  217.133 to its derivative contracts that 
are cleared transactions rather than this section.
    (b) * * *
    (4) * * *
    (i) Notwithstanding any other requirements in this section, 
collateral posted by a clearing member client Board-regulated 
institution that is held by a custodian (in its capacity as custodian) 
in a manner that is bankruptcy remote from the CCP,

[[Page 64706]]

clearing member, and other clearing member clients of the clearing 
member, is not subject to a capital requirement under this section.
* * * * *
    (c) * * *
    (3) * * *
    (iii) Notwithstanding paragraphs (c)(3)(i) and (ii) of this 
section, a clearing member Board-regulated institution may apply a risk 
weight of zero percent to the trade exposure amount for a cleared 
transaction with a CCP where the clearing member Board-regulated 
institution is acting as a financial intermediary on behalf of a 
clearing member client, the transaction offsets another transaction 
that satisfies the requirements set forth in Sec.  217.3(a), and the 
clearing member Board-regulated institution is not obligated to 
reimburse the clearing member client in the event of the CCP default.
* * * * *
0
20. Section 217.37 is amended by revising paragraph (c)(3)(iii) to read 
as follows:


Sec.  217.37  Collateralized transactions.

* * * * *
    (c) * * *
    (3) * * *
    (iii) For repo-style transactions and cleared transactions, a 
Board-regulated institution may multiply the standard supervisory 
haircuts provided in paragraphs (c)(3)(i) and (ii) of this section by 
the square root of \1/2\ (which equals 0.707107).
* * * * *


Sec. Sec.  217.134, 217.202, and 217.210   [Amended]

0
21. For each section listed in the following table, the footnote number 
listed in the ``Old footnote number'' column is redesignated as the 
footnote number listed in the ``New footnote number'' column as 
follows:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                           Old  footnote   New  footnote
                 Section                        No.             No.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
217.134(d)(3)...........................              30              31
217.202, paragraph (1) introductory text              31              32
 of the definition of ``Covered
 position''.............................
217.202, paragraph (1)(i) of the                      32              33
 definition of ``Covered position''.....
217.210(e)(1)...........................              33              34
------------------------------------------------------------------------

0
22. Section 217.132 is amended by:
0
a. Revising paragraphs (b)(2)(ii)(A)(3) through (5);
0
b. Adding paragraphs (b)(2)(ii)(A)(6) and (7);
0
c. Revising paragraphs (c) heading and (c)(1) and (2) and (5) through 
(8);
0
d. Adding paragraphs (c)(9) through (12);
0
e. Removing ``Table 3 to Sec.  217.132'' and adding in its place 
``Table 4 to this section'' in paragraphs (e)(5)(i)(A) and (H); and
0
f. Redesignating Table 3 to Sec.  217.132 as Table 4 to Sec.  217.132.
    The revisions and additions read as follows:


Sec.  217.132  Counterparty credit risk of repo-style transactions, 
eligible margin loans, and OTC derivative contracts.

* * * * *
    (b) * * *
    (2) * * *
    (ii) * * *
    (A) * * *
    (3) For repo-style transactions and cleared transactions, a Board-
regulated institution may multiply the supervisory haircuts provided in 
paragraphs (b)(2)(ii)(A)(1) and (2) of this section by the square root 
of \1/2\ (which equals 0.707107).
    (4) A Board-regulated institution must adjust the supervisory 
haircuts upward on the basis of a holding period longer than ten 
business days (for eligible margin loans) or five business days (for 
repo-style transactions), using the formula provide in paragraph 
(b)(2)(ii)(A)(6) of this section where the following conditions apply. 
If the number of trades in a netting set exceeds 5,000 at any time 
during a quarter, a Board-regulated institution must adjust the 
supervisory haircuts upward on the basis of a holding period of twenty 
business days for the following quarter (except when a Board-regulated 
institution is calculating EAD for a cleared transaction under Sec.  
217.133). If a netting set contains one or more trades involving 
illiquid collateral, a Board-regulated institution must adjust the 
supervisory haircuts upward on the basis of a holding period of twenty 
business days. If over the two previous quarters more than two margin 
disputes on a netting set have occurred that lasted more than the 
holding period, then the Board-regulated institution must adjust the 
supervisory haircuts upward for that netting set on the basis of a 
holding period that is at least two times the minimum holding period 
for that netting set.
    (5)(i) A Board-regulated institution must adjust the supervisory 
haircuts upward on the basis of a holding period longer than ten 
business days for collateral associated derivative contracts that are 
not cleared transactions using the formula provided in paragraph 
(b)(2)(ii)(A)(6) of this section where the following conditions apply. 
For collateral associated with a derivative contract that is within a 
netting set that is composed of more than 5,000 derivative contracts 
that are not cleared transactions, a Board-regulated institution must 
use a holding period of twenty business days. If a netting set contains 
one or more trades involving illiquid collateral or a derivative 
contract that cannot be easily replaced, a Board-regulated institution 
must use a holding period of twenty business days.
    (ii) Notwithstanding paragraph (b)(2)(ii)(A)(1) or (3) or 
(b)(2)(ii)(A)(5)(i) of this section, for collateral associated with a 
derivative contract that is subject to an outstanding dispute over 
variation margin, the holding period is twice the amount provide under 
paragraph (b)(2)(ii)(A)(1) or (3) or (b)(2)(ii)(A)(5)(i) of this 
section.
    (6) A Board-regulated institution must adjust the standard 
supervisory haircuts upward, pursuant to the adjustments provided in 
paragraphs (b)(2)(ii)(A)(4) and (5) of this section, using the 
following formula:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP17DE18.030


Where:

TM equals a holding period of longer than 10 business days for 
eligible margin loans and derivative contracts or longer than 5 
business days for repo-style transactions;
Hs equals the standard supervisory haircut; and
Ts equals 10 business days for eligible margin loans and derivative 
contracts or 5 business days for repo-style transactions.

    (7) If the instrument a Board-regulated institution has lent, sold 
subject to repurchase, or posted as collateral does not meet the 
definition of financial collateral, the Board-regulated

[[Page 64707]]

institution must use a 25.0 percent haircut for market price volatility 
(Hs).
* * * * *
    (c) EAD for derivative contracts--(1) Options for determining EAD. 
A Board-regulated institution must determine the EAD for a derivative 
contract using the standardized approach for counterparty credit risk 
(SA-CCR) under paragraph (c)(5) of this section or using the internal 
models methodology described in paragraph (d) of this section. If a 
Board-regulated institution elects to use SA-CCR for one or more 
derivative contracts, the exposure amount determined under SA-CCR is 
the EAD for the derivative contract or derivatives contracts. A Board-
regulation institution must use the same methodology to calculate the 
exposure amount for all its derivative contracts and may change its 
election only with prior approval of the Board.
    (2) Definitions. For purposes of this paragraph (c), the following 
definitions apply:
    (i) Except as otherwise provided in paragraph (c) of this section, 
the end date means the last date of the period referenced by an 
interest rate or credit derivative contract or, if the derivative 
contract references another instrument, by the underlying instrument.
    (ii) Except as otherwise provided in paragraph (c) of this section, 
the start date means the first date of the period referenced by an 
interest rate or credit derivative contract or, if the derivative 
contract references the value of another instrument, by underlying 
instrument.
    (iii) Hedging set means:
    (A) With respect interest rate derivative contracts, all such 
contracts within a netting set that reference the same reference 
currency;
    (B) With respect to exchange rate derivative contracts, all such 
contracts within a netting set that reference the same currency pair;
    (C) With respect to credit derivative contract, all such contracts 
within a netting set;
    (D) With respect to equity derivative contracts, all such contracts 
within a netting set;
    (E) With respect to a commodity derivative contract, all such 
contracts within a netting set that reference one of the following 
commodity classes: Energy, metal, agricultural, or other commodities;
    (F) With respect to basis derivative contracts, all such contracts 
within a netting set that reference the same pair of risk factors and 
are denominated in the same currency; or
    (G) With respect to volatility derivative contracts, all such 
contracts within a netting set that reference one of interest rate, 
exchange rate, credit, equity, or commodity risk factors, separated 
according to the requirements under paragraphs (c)(2)(iii)(A) through 
(E) of this section.
    (H) If the risk of a derivative contract materially depends on more 
than one of interest rate, exchange rate, credit, equity, or commodity 
risk factors, the Board may require a Board-regulated institution to 
include the derivative contract in each appropriate hedging set under 
paragraphs (c)(1)(iii)(A) through (E) of this section.
* * * * *
    (5) Exposure amount. The exposure amount of a netting set, as 
calculated under paragraph (c) of this section, is equal to 1.4 
multiplied by the sum of the replacement cost of the netting set, as 
calculated under paragraph (c)(6) of this section, and the potential 
future exposure of the netting set, as calculated under paragraph 
(c)(7) of this section, except that, notwithstanding the requirements 
of this paragraph (c)(5):
    (i) The exposure amount of a netting set subject to a variation 
margin agreement, excluding a netting set that is subject to a 
variation margin agreement under which the counterparty to the 
variation margin agreement is not required to post variation margin, is 
equal to the lesser of the exposure amount of the netting set and the 
exposure amount of the netting set calculated as if the netting set 
were not subject to a variation margin agreement; and
    (ii) The exposure amount of a netting set that consists of only 
sold options in which the premiums have been fully paid and that are 
not subject to a variation margin agreement is zero.
    (6) Replacement cost of a netting set--(i) Netting set subject to a 
variation margin agreement under which the counterparty must post 
variation margin. The replacement cost of a netting set subject to a 
variation margin agreement, excluding a netting set that is subject to 
a variation margin agreement under which the counterparty is not 
required to post variation margin, is the greater of:
    (A) The sum of the fair values (after excluding any valuation 
adjustments) of the derivative contracts within the netting set less 
the sum of the net independent collateral amount and the variation 
margin amount applicable to such derivative contracts;
    (B) The sum of the variation margin threshold and the minimum 
transfer amount applicable to the derivative contracts within the 
netting set less the net independent collateral amount applicable to 
such derivative contracts; or
    (C) Zero.
    (ii) Netting sets not subject to a variation margin agreement under 
which the counterparty must post variation margin. The replacement cost 
of a netting set that is not subject to a variation margin agreement 
under which the counterparty must post variation margin to the Board-
regulated institution is the greater of:
    (A) The sum of the fair values (after excluding any valuation 
adjustments) of the derivative contracts within the netting set less 
the net independent collateral amount and variation margin amount 
applicable to such derivative contracts; or
    (B) Zero.
    (iii) Multiple netting sets subject to a single variation margin 
agreement. Notwithstanding paragraphs (c)(6)(i) and (ii) of this 
section, the replacement cost for multiple netting sets subject to a 
single variation margin agreement must be calculated according to 
paragraph (c)(10)(i) of this section.
    (iv) Multiple netting sets subject to multiple variation margin 
agreements or a hybrid netting set. Notwithstanding paragraphs 
(c)(6)(i) and (ii) of this section, the replacement cost for a netting 
set subject to multiple variation margin agreements or a hybrid netting 
set must be calculated according to paragraph (c)(11)(i) of this 
section.
    (7) Potential future exposure of a netting set. The potential 
future exposure of a netting set is the product of the PFE multiplier 
and the aggregated amount.
    (i) PFE multiplier. The PFE multiplier is calculated according to 
the following formula:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP17DE18.031


[[Page 64708]]


Where:

V is the sum of the fair values (after excluding any valuation 
adjustments) of the derivative contracts within the netting set;
C is the sum of the net independent collateral amount and the 
variation margin amount applicable to the derivative contracts 
within the netting set; and
A is the aggregated amount of the netting set.

    (ii) Aggregated amount. The aggregated amount is the sum of all 
hedging set amounts, as calculated under paragraph (c)(8) of this 
section, within a netting set.
    (iii) Multiple netting sets subject to a single variation margin 
agreement. Notwithstanding paragraphs (c)(7)(i) and (ii) of this 
section and when calculating the PFE amount for purposes of total 
leverage exposure under Sec.  217.10(c)(4)(ii)(B), the potential future 
exposure for multiple netting sets subject to a single variation margin 
agreement must be calculated according to paragraph (c)(10)(ii) of this 
section.
    (iv) Multiple netting sets subject to multiple variation margin 
agreements or a hybrid netting set. Notwithstanding paragraphs 
(c)(7)(i) and (ii) of this section and when calculating the PFE amount 
for purposes of total leverage exposure under Sec.  
217.10(c)(4)(ii)(B), the potential future exposure for a netting set 
subject to multiple variation margin agreements or a hybrid netting set 
must be calculated according to paragraph (c)(11)(ii) of this section.
    (8) Hedging set amount--(i) Interest rate derivative contracts. To 
calculate the hedging set amount of an interest rate derivative 
contract hedging set, a Board-regulated institution may use either of 
the formulas provided in paragraphs (c)(8)(i)(A) and (B) of this 
section:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP17DE18.032


[[Page 64709]]


    (ii) Exchange rate derivative contracts. For an exchange rate 
derivative contract hedging set, the hedging set amount equals the 
absolute value of the sum of the adjusted derivative contract amounts, 
as calculated under paragraph (c)(9) of this section, within the 
hedging set.
    (iii) Credit derivative contracts and equity derivative contracts. 
The hedging set amount of a credit derivative contract hedging set or 
equity derivative contract hedging set within a netting set is 
calculated according to the following formula:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP17DE18.033

Where:
k is each reference entity within the hedging set.
K is the number of reference entities within the hedging set.
AddOn(Refk) equals the sum of the adjusted derivative contract 
amounts, as determined under paragraph (c)(9) of this section, for 
all derivative contracts within the hedging set that reference 
reference entity k.
[rho]k equals the applicable supervisory correlation factor, as 
provided in Table 2 to this section.

    (iv) Commodity derivative contracts. The hedging set amount of a 
commodity derivative contract hedging set within a netting set is 
calculated according to the following formula:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP17DE18.034

Where:

k is each commodity type within the hedging set.
K is the number of commodity types within the hedging set.
AddOn(Typek) equals the sum of the adjusted derivative contract 
amounts, as determined under paragraph (c)(9) of this section, for 
all derivative contracts within the hedging set that reference 
reference commodity type k.
    [rho] equals the applicable supervisory correlation factor, as 
provided in Table 2 to this section.

    (v) Basis derivative contracts and volatility derivative contracts. 
Notwithstanding paragraphs (c)(8)(i) through (iv) of this section, a 
Board-regulated institution must calculate a separate hedging set 
amount for each basis derivative contract hedging set and each 
volatility derivative contract hedging set. A Board-regulated 
institution must calculate such hedging set amounts using one of the 
formulas under paragraphs (c)(8)(i) through (iv) that corresponds to 
the primary risk factor of the hedging set being calculated.
    (9) Adjusted derivative contract amount--(i) Summary. To calculate 
the adjusted derivative contract amount of a derivative contract, a 
Board-regulated institution must determine the adjusted notional amount 
of derivative contract, pursuant to paragraph (c)(9)(ii) of this 
section, and multiply the adjusted notional amount by each of the 
supervisory delta adjustment, pursuant to paragraph (c)(9)(iii) of this 
section, the maturity factor, pursuant to paragraph (c)(9)(iv) of this 
section, and the applicable supervisory factor, as provided in Table 2 
to this section.
    (ii) Adjusted notional amount. (A)(1) For an interest rate 
derivative contract or a credit derivative contract, the adjusted 
notional amount equals the product of the notional amount of the 
derivative contract, as measured in U.S. dollars using the exchange 
rate on the date of the calculation, and the supervisory duration, as 
calculated by the following formula:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP17DE18.035

Where:

S is the number of business days from the present day until the 
start date of the derivative contract, or zero if the start date has 
already passed; and
E is the number of business days from the present day until the end 
date of the derivative contract.

    (2) For purposes of paragraph (c)(9)(ii)(A)(1) of this section:
    (i) For an interest rate derivative contract or credit derivative 
contract that is a variable notional swap, the notional amount is equal 
to the time-weighted average of the contractual notional amounts of 
such a swap over the remaining life of the swap; and
    (ii) For an interest rate derivative contract or a credit 
derivative contract that is a leveraged swap, in which the notional 
amount of all legs of the derivative contract are divided by a factor 
and all rates of the derivative contract are multiplied by the same 
factor, the notional amount is equal to the notional amount of an 
equivalent unleveraged swap.
    (B)(1) For an exchange rate derivative contract, the adjusted 
notional amount is the notional amount of the non-U.S.

[[Page 64710]]

denominated currency leg of the derivative contract, as measured in 
U.S. dollars using the exchange rate on the date of the calculation. If 
both legs of the exchange rate derivative contract are denominated in 
currencies other than U.S. dollars, the adjusted notional amount of the 
derivative contract is the largest leg of the derivative contract, as 
measured in U.S. dollars using the exchange rate on the date of the 
calculation.
    (2) Notwithstanding paragraph (c)(9)(i)(B)(1) of this section, for 
an exchange rate derivative contract with multiple exchanges of 
principal, the Board-regulated institution must set the adjusted 
notional amount of the derivative contract equal to the notional amount 
of the derivative contract multiplied by the number of exchanges of 
principal under the derivative contract.
    (C)(1) For an equity derivative contract or a commodity derivative 
contract, the adjusted notional amount is the product of the fair value 
of one unit of the reference instrument underlying the derivative 
contract and the number of such units referenced by the derivative 
contract.
    (2) Notwithstanding paragraph (c)(9)(i)(C)(1) of this section, when 
calculating the adjusted notional amount for an equity derivative 
contract or a commodity derivative contract that is a volatility 
derivative contract, the Board-regulated institution must replace the 
unit price with the underlying volatility referenced by the volatility 
derivative contract and replace the number of units with the notional 
amount of the volatility derivative contract.
    (iii) Supervisory delta adjustments. (A) For a derivative contract 
that is not an option contract or collateralized debt obligation 
tranche, the supervisory delta adjustment is 1 if the fair value of the 
derivative contract increases when the value of the primary risk factor 
increases and -1 if the fair value of the derivative contract decreases 
when the value of the primary risk factor increases;
    (B)(1) For a derivative contract that is an option contract, the 
supervisory delta adjustment is determined by the following formulas, 
as applicable:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP17DE18.036

    (2) As used in the formulas in Table 3 to this section:
    (i) F is the standard normal cumulative distribution function;
    (ii) P equals the current fair value of the instrument or risk 
factor, as applicable, underlying the option;
    (iii) K equals the strike price of the option;
    (iv) T equals the number of business days until the latest 
contractual exercise date of the option;
    (v) [lgr] equals zero for all derivative contracts except interest 
rate options for the currencies where interest rates have negative 
values. The same value of [lgr] must be used for all interest rate 
options that are denominated in the same currency. To determine the 
value of [lgr] for a given currency, a Board-regulated institution must 
find the lowest value L of P and K of all interest rate options in a 
given currency that the Board-regulated institution has with all 
counterparties. Then, [lgr] is set according to this formula: [lgr] = 
max{-L + 0.1%, 0{time}  and
    (vi) [sigma] equals the supervisory option volatility, as provided 
in Table 2 to this section.
    (C)(1) For a derivative contract that is a collateralized debt 
obligation tranche, the supervisory delta adjustment is determined by 
the following formula:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP17DE18.037

    (2) As used in the formula in paragraph (c)(9)(iii)(C)(1) of this 
section:
    (i) A is the attachment point, which equals the ratio of the 
notional amounts of all underlying exposures that are subordinated to 
the Board-regulated institution's exposure to the total notional amount 
of all underlying exposures, expressed as a decimal value between zero 
and one; \30\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \30\ In the case of a first-to-default credit derivative, there 
are no underlying exposures that are subordinated to the Board-
regulated institution's exposure. In the case of a second-or-
subsequent-to-default credit derivative, the smallest (n-1) notional 
amounts of the underlying exposures are subordinated to the Board-
regulated institution's exposure.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (ii) D is the detachment point, which equals one minus the ratio of 
the notional amounts of all underlying exposures that are senior to the 
Board-regulated institution's exposure to the total notional amount of 
all underlying exposures, expressed as a decimal value between zero and 
one; and
    (iii) The resulting amount is designated with a positive sign if 
the collateralized debt obligation tranche was purchased by the Board-
regulated institution and is designated with a

[[Page 64711]]

negative sign if the collateralized debt obligation tranche was sold by 
the Board-regulated institution.
    (iv) Maturity factor. (A)(1) The maturity factor of a derivative 
contract that is subject to a variation margin agreement, excluding 
derivative contracts that are subject to a variation margin agreement 
under which the counterparty is not required to post variation margin, 
is determined by the following formula:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP17DE18.038

    Where MPOR refers to the period from the most recent exchange of 
collateral covering a netting set of derivative contracts with a 
defaulting counterparty until the derivative contracts are closed out 
and the resulting market risk is re-hedged.
    (2) Notwithstanding paragraph (c)(9)(iv)(A)(1) of this section:
    (i) For a derivative contract that is not a cleared transaction, 
MPOR cannot be less than ten business days plus the periodicity of re-
margining expressed in business days minus one business day;
    (ii) For a derivative contract that is a cleared transaction, MPOR 
cannot be less than five business days plus the periodicity of re-
margining expressed in business days minus one business day; and
    (iii) For a derivative contract that is within a netting set that 
is composed of more than 5,000 derivative contracts that are not 
cleared transactions, MPOR cannot be less than twenty business days.
    (3) Notwithstanding paragraphs (c)(9)(iv)(A)(1) and (2) of this 
section, for a derivative contract subject to an outstanding dispute 
over variation margin, the applicable floor is twice the amount 
provided in (c)(9)(iv)(A)(1) and (2) of this section.
    (B) The maturity factor of a derivative contract that is not 
subject to a variation margin agreement, or derivative contracts under 
which the counterparty is not required to post variation margin, is 
determined by the following formula:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP17DE18.039

    Where M equals the greater of 10 business days and the remaining 
maturity of the contract, as measured in business days.
    (C) For purposes of paragraph (c)(9)(iv) of this section, 
derivative contracts with daily settlement are treated as derivative 
contracts not subject to a variation margin agreement and daily 
settlement does not change the end date of the period referenced by the 
derivative contract.
    (v) Derivative contract as multiple effective derivative contracts. 
A Board-regulated institution must separate a derivative contract into 
separate derivative contracts, according to the following rules:
    (A) For an option where the counterparty pays a predetermined 
amount if the value of the underlying asset is above or below the 
strike price and nothing otherwise (binary option), the option must be 
treated as two separate options. For purposes of paragraph 
(c)(9)(iii)(B) of this section, a binary option with strike K must be 
represented as the combination of one bought European option and one 
sold European option of the same type as the original option (put or 
call) with the strikes set equal to 0.95*K and 1.05*K so that the 
payoff of the binary option is reproduced exactly outside the region 
between the two strikes. The absolute value of the sum of the adjusted 
derivative contract amounts of the bought and sold options is capped at 
the payoff amount of the binary option.
    (B) For a derivative contract that can be represented as a 
combination of standard option payoffs (such as collar, butterfly 
spread, calendar spread, straddle, and strangle), each standard option 
component must be treated as a separate derivative contract.
    (C) For a derivative contract that includes multiple-payment 
options, (such as interest rate caps and floors) each payment option 
may be represented as a combination of effective single-payment options 
(such as interest rate caplets and floorlets).
    (10) Multiple netting sets subject to a single variation margin 
agreement--(i) Calculating replacement cost. Notwithstanding paragraph 
(c)(6) of this section, a Board-regulated institution shall assign a 
single replacement cost to multiple netting sets that are subject to a 
single variation margin agreement under which the counterparty must 
post variation margin, calculated according to the following formula:

Replacement Cost = max{[Sigma]NSmax {VNS; 0{time}  - max {CMA; 
0{time} ; 0{time}  + max{[Sigma]NSmin {VNS;0{time}  - min {CMA0{time} ; 
0{time} 

Where:

NS is each netting set subject to the variation margin agreement MA;

VNS is the sum of the fair values (after excluding any 
valuation adjustments) of the derivative contracts within the 
netting set NS; and
CMA is the sum of the net independent collateral amount 
and the variation margin amount applicable to the derivative 
contracts within the netting sets subject to the single variation 
margin agreement.

    (ii) Calculating potential future exposure. Notwithstanding 
paragraph (c)(5) of this section, a Board-regulated institution shall 
assign a single potential future exposure to multiple netting sets that 
are subject to a single variation margin agreement under which the 
counterparty must post variation margin equal to the sum of the 
potential future exposure of each such netting set, each calculated 
according to paragraph (c)(7) of this section as if such nettings sets 
were not subject to a variation margin agreement.
    (11) Netting set subject to multiple variation margin agreements or 
a hybrid netting set--(i) Calculating replacement cost. To calculate 
replacement cost for either a netting set subject to multiple variation 
margin agreements under which the counterparty to each variation margin 
agreement must post variation margin, or a netting set composed of at 
least one derivative contract subject to variation margin agreement 
under which the counterparty must post variation margin and at least 
one derivative contract that is not subject to such a variation margin

[[Page 64712]]

agreement, the calculation for replacement cost is provided under 
paragraph (c)(6)(ii) of this section, except that the variation margin 
threshold equals the sum of the variation margin thresholds of all 
variation margin agreements within the netting set and the minimum 
transfer amount equals the sum of the minimum transfer amounts of all 
the variation margin agreements within the netting set.
    (ii) Calculating potential future exposure. (A) To calculate 
potential future exposure for a netting set subject to multiple 
variation margin agreements under which the counterparty to each 
variation margin agreement must post variation margin, or a netting set 
composed of at least one derivative contract subject to variation 
margin agreement under which the counterparty to the derivative 
contract must post variation margin and at least one derivative 
contract that is not subject to such a variation margin agreement, a 
Board-regulated institution must divide the netting set into sub-
netting sets and calculate the aggregated amount for each sub-netting 
set. The aggregated amount for the netting set is calculated as the sum 
of the aggregated amounts for the sub-netting sets. The multiplier is 
calculated for the entire netting set.
    (B) For purposes of paragraph (c)(11)(ii)(A) of this section, the 
netting set must be divided into sub-netting sets as follows:
    (1) All derivative contracts within the netting set that are not 
subject to a variation margin agreement or that are subject to a 
variation margin agreement under which the counterparty is not required 
to post variation margin form a single sub-netting set. The aggregated 
amount for this sub-netting set is calculated as if the netting set is 
not subject to a variation margin agreement.
    (2) All derivative contracts within the netting set that are 
subject to variation margin agreements in which the counterparty must 
post variation margin and that share the same value of the MPOR form a 
single sub-netting set. The aggregated amount for this sub-netting set 
is calculated as if the netting set is subject to a variation margin 
agreement, using the MPOR value shared by the derivative contracts 
within the netting set.
    (12) Treatment of cleared transactions. (i) A Board-regulated 
institution must apply the adjustments in paragraph (c)(12)(iii) of 
this section to the calculation of exposure amount under this paragraph 
(c) for a netting set that is composed solely of one or more cleared 
transactions.
    (ii) A Board-regulated institution that is a clearing member must 
apply the adjustments in paragraph (c)(12)(iii) of this section to the 
calculation of exposure amount under this paragraph (c) for a netting 
set that is composed solely of one or more exposures, each of which are 
exposures of the Board-regulated institution to its clearing member 
client where the Board-regulated institution is either acting as a 
financial intermediary and enters into an offsetting transaction with a 
CCP or where the Board-regulated institution provides a guarantee to 
the CCP on the performance of the client.
    (iii)(A) For purposes of calculating the maturity factor under 
paragraph (c)(9)(iv)(B) of this section, MPOR may not be less than 10 
business days;
    (B) For purposes of calculating the maturity factor under paragraph 
(c)(9)(iv)(B) of this section, the minimum MPOR under paragraph 
(c)(9)(iv)(A)(3) of this section does not apply if there are no 
outstanding disputed trades in the netting set, there is no illiquid 
collateral in the netting set, and there are no exotic derivative 
contracts in the netting set; and
    (C) For purposes of calculating the maturity factor under 
paragraphs (c)(9)(iv)(A) and (B) of this section, if the CCP collects 
and holds variation margin and the variation margin is not bankruptcy 
remote from the CCP, Mi may not exceed 250 business days.

  Table 2 to Sec.   217.132--Supervisory Option Volatility, Supervisory Correlation Parameters, and Supervisory
                                        Factors for Derivative Contracts
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                    Supervisory     Supervisory
              Asset class                       Subclass              option        correlation     Supervisory
                                                                  volatility (%)    factor (%)    factor \1\ (%)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Interest rate.........................  N/A.....................              50             N/A            0.50
Exchange rate.........................  N/A.....................              15             N/A             4.0
Credit, single name...................  Investment grade........             100              50             0.5
                                        Speculative grade.......             100              50             1.3
                                        Sub-speculative grade...             100              50             6.0
Credit, index.........................  Investment Grade........              80              80            0.38
                                        Speculative Grade.......              80              80            1.06
Equity, single name...................  N/A.....................             120              50              32
Equity, index.........................  N/A.....................              75              80              20
Commodity.............................  Energy..................             150              40              40
                                        Metals..................              70              40              18
                                        Agricultural............              70              40              18
                                        Other...................              70              40              18
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The applicable supervisory factor for basis derivative contract hedging sets is equal to one-half of the
  supervisory factor provided in this Table 2, and the applicable supervisory factor for volatility derivative
  contract hedging sets is equal to 5 times the supervisory factor provided in this Table 2.

* * * * *
0
23. Section 217.133 is amended by revising paragraphs (a), (b)(1) 
through (3), (b)(4)(i), (c)(1) through (3), (c)(4)(i), and (d) to read 
as follows:


Sec.  217.133  Cleared transactions.

    (a) General requirements--(1) Clearing member clients. A Board-
regulated institution that is a clearing member client must use the 
methodologies described in paragraph (b) of this section to calculate 
risk-weighted assets for a cleared transaction.
    (2) Clearing members. A Board-regulated institution that is a 
clearing member must use the methodologies described in paragraph (c) 
of this section to calculate its risk-weighted assets for a cleared 
transaction and

[[Page 64713]]

paragraph (d) of this section to calculate its risk-weighted assets for 
its default fund contribution to a CCP.
    (b) * * *
    (1) Risk-weighted assets for cleared transactions. (i) To determine 
the risk-weighted asset amount for a cleared transaction, a Board-
regulated institution that is a clearing member client must multiply 
the trade exposure amount for the cleared transaction, calculated in 
accordance with paragraph (b)(2) of this section, by the risk weight 
appropriate for the cleared transaction, determined in accordance with 
paragraph (b)(3) of this section.
    (ii) A clearing member client Board-regulated institution's total 
risk-weighted assets for cleared transactions is the sum of the risk-
weighted asset amounts for all of its cleared transactions.
    (2) Trade exposure amount. (i) For a cleared transaction that is a 
derivative contract or a netting set of derivative contracts, trade 
exposure amount equals the EAD for the derivative contract or netting 
set of derivative contracts calculated using the methodology used to 
calculate EAD for derivative contracts set forth in Sec.  217.132(c) or 
(d), plus the fair value of the collateral posted by the clearing 
member client Board-regulated institution and held by the CCP or a 
clearing member in a manner that is not bankruptcy remote. When the 
Board-regulated institution calculates EAD for the cleared transaction 
using the methodology in Sec.  217.132(d), EAD equals 
EADunstressed.
    (ii) For a cleared transaction that is a repo-style transaction or 
netting set of repo-style transactions, trade exposure amount equals 
the EAD for the repo-style transaction calculated using the methodology 
set forth in Sec.  217.132(b)(2) or (3) or (d), plus the fair value of 
the collateral posted by the clearing member client Board-regulated 
institution and held by the CCP or a clearing member in a manner that 
is not bankruptcy remote. When the Board-regulated institution 
calculates EAD for the cleared transaction under Sec.  217.132(d), EAD 
equals EADunstressed.
    (3) Cleared transaction risk weights. (i) For a cleared transaction 
with a QCCP, a clearing member client Board-regulated institution must 
apply a risk weight of:
    (A) 2 percent if the collateral posted by the Board-regulated 
institution to the QCCP or clearing member is subject to an arrangement 
that prevents any loss to the clearing member client Board-regulated 
institution due to the joint default or a concurrent insolvency, 
liquidation, or receivership proceeding of the clearing member and any 
other clearing member clients of the clearing member; and the clearing 
member client Board-regulated institution has conducted sufficient 
legal review to conclude with a well-founded basis (and maintains 
sufficient written documentation of that legal review) that in the 
event of a legal challenge (including one resulting from an event of 
default or from liquidation, insolvency or receivership proceedings) 
the relevant court and administrative authorities would find the 
arrangements to be legal, valid, binding and enforceable under the law 
of the relevant jurisdictions.
    (B) 4 percent, if the requirements of paragraph (b)(3)(i)(A) of 
this section are not met.
    (ii) For a cleared transaction with a CCP that is not a QCCP, a 
clearing member client Board-regulated institution must apply the risk 
weight applicable to the CCP under Sec.  217.32.
    (4) * * *
    (i) Notwithstanding any other requirement of this section, 
collateral posted by a clearing member client Board-regulated 
institution that is held by a custodian (in its capacity as a 
custodian) in a manner that is bankruptcy remote from the CCP, clearing 
member, and other clearing member clients of the clearing member, is 
not subject to a capital requirement under this section.
* * * * *
    (c) * * *
    (1) Risk-weighted assets for cleared transactions. (i) To determine 
the risk-weighted asset amount for a cleared transaction, a clearing 
member Board-regulated institution must multiply the trade exposure 
amount for the cleared transaction, calculated in accordance with 
paragraph (c)(2) of this section by the risk weight appropriate for the 
cleared transaction, determined in accordance with paragraph (c)(3) of 
this section.
    (ii) A clearing member Board-regulated institution's total risk-
weighted assets for cleared transactions is the sum of the risk-
weighted asset amounts for all of its cleared transactions.
    (2) Trade exposure amount. A clearing member Board-regulated 
institution must calculate its trade exposure amount for a cleared 
transaction as follows:
    (i) For a cleared transaction that is a derivative contract or a 
netting set of derivative contracts, trade exposure amount equals the 
EAD calculated using the methodology used to calculate EAD for 
derivative contracts set forth in Sec.  217.132(c) or (d), plus the 
fair value of the collateral posted by the clearing member Board-
regulated institution and held by the CCP in a manner that is not 
bankruptcy remote. When the clearing member Board-regulated institution 
calculates EAD for the cleared transaction using the methodology in 
Sec.  217.132(d), EAD equals EADunstressed.
    (ii) For a cleared transaction that is a repo-style transaction or 
netting set of repo-style transactions, trade exposure amount equals 
the EAD calculated under Sec.  217.132(b)(2) or (3) or (d), plus the 
fair value of the collateral posted by the clearing member Board-
regulated institution and held by the CCP in a manner that is not 
bankruptcy remote. When the clearing member Board-regulated institution 
calculates EAD for the cleared transaction under Sec.  217.132(d), EAD 
equals EADunstressed.
    (3) Cleared transaction risk weights. (i) A clearing member Board-
regulated institution must apply a risk weight of 2 percent to the 
trade exposure amount for a cleared transaction with a QCCP.
    (ii) For a cleared transaction with a CCP that is not a QCCP, a 
clearing member Board-regulated institution must apply the risk weight 
applicable to the CCP according to Sec.  217.32.
    (iii) Notwithstanding paragraphs (c)(3)(i) and (ii) of this 
section, a clearing member Board-regulated institution may apply a risk 
weight of zero percent to the trade exposure amount for a cleared 
transaction with a QCCP where the clearing member Board-regulated 
institution is acting as a financial intermediary on behalf of a 
clearing member client, the transaction offsets another transaction 
that satisfies the requirements set forth in Sec.  217.3(a), and the 
clearing member Board-regulated institution is not obligated to 
reimburse the clearing member client in the event of the QCCP default.
    (4) * * *
    (i) Notwithstanding any other requirement of this section, 
collateral posted by a clearing member client Board-regulated 
institution that is held by a custodian (in its capacity as a 
custodian) in a manner that is bankruptcy remote from the CCP, clearing 
member, and other clearing member clients of the clearing member, is 
not subject to a capital requirement under this section.
* * * * *
    (d) Default fund contributions--(1) General requirement. A clearing 
member Board-regulated institution must determine the risk-weighted 
asset amount for a default fund contribution to a CCP at least 
quarterly, or more frequently if, in the opinion of the Board-regulated 
institution or the Board,

[[Page 64714]]

there is a material change in the financial condition of the CCP.
    (2) Risk-weighted asset amount for default fund contributions to 
nonqualifying CCPs. A clearing member Board-regulated institution's 
risk-weighted asset amount for default fund contributions to CCPs that 
are not QCCPs equals the sum of such default fund contributions 
multiplied by 1,250 percent, or an amount determined by the Board, 
based on factors such as size, structure and membership characteristics 
of the CCP and riskiness of its transactions, in cases where such 
default fund contributions may be unlimited.
    (3) Risk-weighted asset amount for default fund contributions to 
QCCPs. A clearing member Board-regulated institution's risk-weighted 
asset amount for default fund contributions to QCCPs equals the sum of 
its capital requirement, KCM for each QCCP, as calculated 
under the methodology set forth in paragraph (e)(4) of this section.
    (i) EAD must be calculated separately for each clearing member's 
sub-client accounts and sub-house account (i.e., for the clearing 
member's propriety activities). If the clearing member's collateral and 
its client's collateral are held in the same default fund contribution 
account, then the EAD of that account is the sum of the EAD for the 
client-related transactions within the account and the EAD of the 
house-related transactions within the account. For purposes of 
determining such EADs, the independent collateral of the clearing 
member and its client must be allocated in proportion to the respective 
total amount of independent collateral posted by the clearing member to 
the QCCP.
    (ii) If any account or sub-account contains both derivative 
contracts and repo-style transactions, the EAD of that account is the 
sum of the EAD for the derivative contracts within the account and the 
EAD of the repo-style transactions within the account. If independent 
collateral is held for an account containing both derivative contracts 
and repo-style transactions, then such collateral must be allocated to 
the derivative contracts and repo-style transactions in proportion to 
the respective product specific exposure amounts, calculated, excluding 
the effects of collateral, according to Sec.  217.132(b) for repo-style 
transactions and to Sec.  217.132(c)(5) for derivative contracts.
    (4) Risk-weighted asset amount for default fund contributions to a 
QCCP. A clearing member Board regulated institution's capital 
requirement for its default fund contribution to a QCCP 
(KCM) is equal to:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP17DE18.040

    (5) Hypothetical capital requirement of a QCCP. Where a QCCP has 
provided its KCCP, a Board-regulated institution must rely 
on such disclosed figure instead of calculating KCCP under 
this paragraph (d)(5), unless the Board-regulated institution 
determines that a more conservative figure is appropriate based on the 
nature, structure, or characteristics of the QCCP. The hypothetical 
capital requirement of a QCCP (KCCP), as determined by the 
Board-regulated institution, is equal to:

KCCP = SCMi EADi * 1.6 percent

Where:

CMi is each clearing member of the QCCP; and
EADi is the exposure amount of each clearing member of the QCCP to 
the QCCP, as determined under paragraph (d)(6) of this section.


[[Page 64715]]


    (6) EAD of a clearing member Board-regulated institution to a QCCP. 
(i) The EAD of a clearing member Board-regulated institution to a QCCP 
is equal to the sum of the EAD for derivative contracts determined 
under paragraph (d)(6)(ii) of this section and the EAD for repo-style 
transactions determined under paragraph (d)(6)(iii) of this section.
    (ii) With respect to any derivative contracts between the Board-
regulated institution and the CCP that are cleared transactions and any 
guarantees that the Board-regulated institution has provided to the CCP 
with respect to performance of a clearing member client on a derivative 
contract, the EAD is equal to the sum of:
    (A) The exposure amount for all such derivative contracts and 
guarantees of derivative contracts calculated under SA-CCR in Sec.  
217.132(c) using a value of 10 business days for purposes of Sec.  
217.132(c)(9)(iv)(B);
    (B) The value of all collateral held by the CCP posted by the 
clearing member Board-regulated institution or a clearing member client 
of the Board-regulated institution in connection with a derivative 
contract for which the Board-regulated institution has provided a 
guarantee to the CCP; and
    (C) The amount of the prefunded default fund contribution of the 
Board-regulated institution to the CCP.
    (iii) With respect to any repo-style transactions between the 
Board-regulated institution and the CCP that are cleared transactions, 
EAD is equal to:

EAD = max{EBRM-IM-DF; 0{time} 

Where:

EBRM is the sum of the exposure amounts of each repo-style 
transaction between the Board-regulated institution and the CCP as 
determined under Sec.  217.132(b)(2) and without recognition of any 
collateral securing the repo-style transactions;
IM is the initial margin collateral posted by the Board-regulated 
institution to the CCP with respect to the repo-style transactions; 
and
DF is the prefunded default fund contribution of the Board-
regulation institution to the CCP.
0
24. Section 217.300 is amended by adding paragraph (g) to read as 
follows:


Sec.  217.300  Transitions.

* * * * *
    (g) SA-CCR. After giving prior notice to the Board, an advanced 
approaches Board-regulated institution may use CEM rather than SA-CCR 
to determine the exposure amount for purposes of Sec.  217.34 and the 
EAD for purposes of Sec.  217.132 for its derivative contracts until 
July 1, 2020. On July 1, 2020, and thereafter, an advanced approaches 
Board-regulated institution must use SA-CCR for purposes of Sec.  
217.34 and must use either SA-CCR or IMM for purposes of Sec.  217.132. 
Once an advanced approaches Board-regulated institution has begun to 
use SA-CCR, the advanced approaches Board-regulated institution may not 
change to use CEM.

12 CFR Part 324

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation

    For the reasons forth out in the preamble, 12 CFR part 324 is 
proposed to be amended as set forth below.

PART 324--CAPITAL ADEQUACY OF FDIC-SUPERVISED INSTITUTIONS

0
25. The authority citation for part 324 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 12 U.S.C. 1815(a), 1815(b), 1816, 1818(a), 1818(b), 
1818(c), 1818(t), 1819(Tenth), 1828(c), 1828(d), 1828(i), 1828(n), 
1828(o), 1831o, 1835, 3907, 3909, 4808; 5371; 5412; Pub. L. 102-233, 
105 Stat. 1761, 1789, 1790 (12 U.S.C. 1831n note); Pub. L. 102-242, 
105 Stat. 2236, 2355, as amended by Pub. L. 103-325, 108 Stat. 2160, 
2233 (12 U.S.C. 1828 note); Pub. L. 102-242, 105 Stat. 2236, 2386, 
as amended by Pub. L. 102-550, 106 Stat. 3672, 4089 (12 U.S.C. 1828 
note); Pub. L. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1887 (15 U.S.C. 78o-7 note).

0
26. Section 324.2 is amended by:
0
a. Adding the definition of ``Basis derivative contract'' in 
alphabetical order;
0
b. Revising paragraph (2) of the definition of ``Financial 
collateral;''
0
c. Adding the definitions of ``Independent collateral,'' ``Minimum 
transfer amount,'' and ``Net independent collateral amount'' in 
alphabetical order.
0
d. Revising the definition of ``Netting set;'' and
0
e. Adding the definitions of ``Speculative grade,'' ``Sub-speculative 
grade,'' ``Variation margin,'' ``Variation margin agreement,'' 
``Variation margin amount,'' ``Variation margin threshold,'' and 
``Volatility derivative contract'' in alphabetical order.
    The additions and revisions read as follows:


Sec.  324.2  Definitions.

* * * * *
    Basis derivative contract means a non-foreign-exchange derivative 
contract (i.e., the contract is denominated in a single currency) in 
which the cash flows of the derivative contract depend on the 
difference between two risk factors that are attributable solely to one 
of the following derivative asset classes: Interest rate, credit, 
equity, or commodity.
* * * * *
    Financial collateral * * *
    (2) In which the FDIC-supervised institution has a perfected, 
first-priority security interest or, outside of the United States, the 
legal equivalent thereof (with the exception of cash on deposit; and 
notwithstanding the prior security interest of any custodial agent or 
any priority security interest granted to a CCP in connection with 
collateral posted to that CCP).
* * * * *
    Independent collateral means financial collateral, other than 
variation margin that is subject to a collateral agreement, or in which 
a FDIC-supervised institution has a perfected, first-priority security 
interest or, outside of the United States, the legal equivalent thereof 
(with the exception of cash on deposit; notwithstanding the prior 
security interest of any custodial agent or any prior security interest 
granted to a CCP in connection with collateral posted to that CCP), and 
the amount of which does not change directly in response to the value 
of the derivative contract or contracts that the financial collateral 
secures.
* * * * *
    Minimum transfer amount means the smallest amount of variation 
margin that may be transferred between counterparties to a netting set.
* * * * *
    Net independent collateral amount means the fair value amount of 
the independent collateral, as adjusted by the standard supervisory 
haircuts under Sec.  324.132(b)(2)(ii), as applicable, that a 
counterparty to a netting set has posted to a FDIC-supervised 
institution less the fair value amount of the independent collateral, 
as adjusted by the standard supervisory haircuts under Sec.  
324.132(b)(2)(ii), as applicable, posted by the FDIC-supervised 
institution to the counterparty, excluding such amounts held in a 
bankruptcy remote manner, or posted to a QCCP and held in conformance 
with the operational requirements in Sec.  324.3.
    Netting set means either one derivative contract between a FDIC-
supervised institution and a single counterparty, or a group of 
derivative contracts between a FDIC-supervised institution and a single 
counterparty, that are subject to a qualifying master netting 
agreement.
* * * * *
    Speculative grade means the reference entity has adequate capacity 
to meet financial commitments in the near term, but is vulnerable to 
adverse economic

[[Page 64716]]

conditions, such that should economic conditions deteriorate, the 
reference entity would present an elevated default risk.
* * * * *
    Sub-speculative grade means the reference entity depends on 
favorable economic conditions to meet its financial commitments, such 
that should such economic conditions deteriorate the reference entity 
likely would default on its financial commitments.
* * * * *
    Variation margin means financial collateral that is subject to a 
collateral agreement provided by one party to its counterparty to meet 
the performance of the first party's obligations under one or more 
transactions between the parties as a result of a change in value of 
such obligations since the last time such financial collateral was 
provided.
    Variation margin agreement means an agreement to collect or post 
variation margin.
    Variation margin amount means the fair value amount of the 
variation margin, as adjusted by the standard supervisory haircuts 
under Sec.  324.132(b)(2)(ii), as applicable, that a counterparty to a 
netting set has posted to a FDIC-supervised institution less the fair 
value amount of the variation margin, as adjusted by the standard 
supervisory haircuts under Sec.  324.132(b)(2)(ii), as applicable, 
posted by the FDIC-supervised institution to the counterparty.
    Variation margin threshold means the amount of credit exposure of a 
FDIC-supervised institution to its counterparty that, if exceeded, 
would require the counterparty to post variation margin to the FDIC-
supervised institution.
    Volatility derivative contract means a derivative contract in which 
the payoff of the derivative contract explicitly depends on a measure 
of the volatility of an underlying risk factor to the derivative 
contract.
* * * * *
0
27. Section 324.10 is amended by revising paragraphs (c)(4)(ii)(A) 
through (C) to read as follows:


Sec.  324.10  Minimum capital requirements.

* * * * *
    (c) * * *
    (4) * * *
    (ii) * * *
    (A) The balance sheet carrying value of all the FDIC-supervised 
institution's on-balance sheet assets, plus the value of securities 
sold under a repurchase transaction or a securities lending transaction 
that qualifies for sales treatment under U.S. GAAP, less amounts 
deducted from tier 1 capital under Sec.  324.22(a), (c), and (d), less 
the value of securities received in security-for-security repo-style 
transactions, where the FDIC-supervised institution acts as a 
securities lender and includes the securities received in its on-
balance sheet assets but has not sold or re-hypothecated the securities 
received, and less the fair value of any derivative contracts;
    (B) The PFE for each netting set (including cleared transactions 
except as provided in paragraph (c)(4)(ii)(I) of this section and, at 
the discretion of the FDIC-supervised institution, excluding a forward 
agreement treated as a derivative contract that is part of a repurchase 
or reverse repurchase or a securities borrowing or lending transaction 
that qualifies for sales treatment under U.S. GAAP), as determined 
under Sec.  324.132(c)(7), in which the term C in Sec.  
324.132(c)(7)(i)(B) equals zero, multiplied by 1.4;
    (C) The sum of:
    (1)(i) 1.4 multiplied by the replacement cost of each derivative 
contract or single product netting set of derivative contracts to which 
the FDIC-supervised institution is a counterparty, calculated according 
to the following formula:

Replacement Cost = max{V - CVMr + CVMp; 0{time} 

Where:

V equals the fair value for each derivative contract or each single-
product netting set of derivative contracts (including a cleared 
transaction except as provided in paragraph (c)(4)(ii)(I) of this 
section and, at the discretion of the FDIC-supervised institution, 
excluding a forward agreement treated as a derivative contract that 
is part of a repurchase or reverse repurchase or a securities 
borrowing or lending transaction that qualifies for sales treatment 
under U.S. GAAP);
CVMr equals the amount of cash collateral received from a 
counterparty to a derivative contract and that satisfies the 
conditions in paragraphs (c)(4)(ii)(C)(3) through (7); and
CVMp equals the amount of cash collateral that is posted 
to a counterparty to a derivative contract and that has not off-set 
the fair value of the derivative contract and that satisfies the 
conditions in paragraphs (c)(4)(ii)(C)(3) through (7) of this 
section; and

    (ii) Notwithstanding paragraph (c)(4)(ii)(C)(1)(i) of this section, 
where multiple netting sets are subject to a single variation margin 
agreement, a FDIC-supervised institution must apply the formula for 
replacement cost provided in Sec.  324.132(c)(10), in which the term 
may only include cash collateral that satisfies the conditions in 
paragraphs (c)(4)(ii)(C)(3) through (7) of this section;
    (2) The amount of cash collateral that is received from a 
counterparty to a derivative contract that has off-set the fair value 
of a derivative contract and that does not satisfy the conditions in 
paragraphs (c)(4)(ii)(C)(3) through (7) of this section;
    (3) For derivative contracts that are not cleared through a QCCP, 
the cash collateral received by the recipient counterparty is not 
segregated (by law, regulation or an agreement with the counterparty);
    (4) Variation margin is calculated and transferred on a daily basis 
based on the fair value of the derivative contract;
    (5) The variation margin transferred under the derivative contract 
or the governing rules for a cleared transaction is the full amount 
that is necessary to fully extinguish the net current credit exposure 
to the counterparty of the derivative contracts, subject to the 
threshold and minimum transfer amounts applicable to the counterparty 
under the terms of the derivative contract or the governing rules for a 
cleared transaction;
    (6) The variation margin is in the form of cash in the same 
currency as the currency of settlement set forth in the derivative 
contract, provided that for the purposes of this paragraph, currency of 
settlement means any currency for settlement specified in the governing 
qualifying master netting agreement and the credit support annex to the 
qualifying master netting agreement, or in the governing rules for a 
cleared transaction; and
    (7) The derivative contract and the variation margin are governed 
by a qualifying master netting agreement between the legal entities 
that are the counterparties to the derivative contract or by the 
governing rules for a cleared transaction, and the qualifying master 
netting agreement or the governing rules for a cleared transaction must 
explicitly stipulate that the counterparties agree to settle any 
payment obligations on a net basis, taking into account any variation 
margin received or provided under the contract if a credit event 
involving either counterparty occurs;
* * * * *
0
28. Section 324.32 is amended by revising paragraph (f) to read as 
follows:


Sec.  324.32  General risk weights.

* * * * *
    (f) Corporate exposures. (1) A FDIC-supervised institution must 
assign a 100 percent risk weight to all its corporate exposures, except 
as provided in paragraph (f)(2) of this section.

[[Page 64717]]

    (2) A FDIC-supervised institution must assign a 2 percent risk 
weight to an exposure to a QCCP arising from the FDIC-supervised 
institution posting cash collateral to the QCCP in connection with a 
cleared transaction that meets the requirements of Sec.  
324.35(b)(3)(i)(A) and a 4 percent risk weight to an exposure to a QCCP 
arising from the FDIC-supervised institution posting cash collateral to 
the QCCP in connection with a cleared transaction that meets the 
requirements of Sec.  324.35(b)(3)(i)(B).
    (3) A FDIC-supervised institution must assign a 2 percent risk 
weight to an exposure to a QCCP arising from the FDIC-supervised 
institution posting cash collateral to the QCCP in connection with a 
cleared transaction that meets the requirements of Sec.  
324.35(c)(3)(i).
* * * * *
0
29. Section 324.34 is revised to read as follows:


Sec.  324.34  Derivative contracts.

    (a) Exposure amount for derivative contracts--(1) FDIC-supervised 
institution that is not an advanced approaches FDIC-supervised 
institution. (i) A FDIC-supervised institution that is not an advanced 
approaches FDIC-supervised institution must use the current exposure 
methodology (CEM) described in paragraph (b) of this section to 
calculate the exposure amount for all its OTC derivative contracts, 
unless the FDIC-supervised institution makes the election provided in 
paragraph (a)(1)(ii) of this section.
    (ii) A FDIC-supervised institution that is not an advanced 
approaches FDIC-supervised institution may elect to calculate the 
exposure amount for all its OTC derivative contracts under the 
standardized approach for counterparty credit risk (SA-CCR) in Sec.  
324.132(c), rather than calculating the exposure amount for all its 
derivative contracts using the CEM. A FDIC-supervised institution that 
elects under this paragraph (a)(1)(ii) to calculate the exposure amount 
for its OTC derivative contracts under the SA-CCR must apply the 
treatment of cleared transactions under Sec.  324.133 to its derivative 
contracts that are cleared transactions, rather than applying Sec.  
324.35. A FDIC-supervised institution that is not an advanced 
approaches FDIC-supervised institution must use the same methodology to 
calculate the exposure amount for all its derivative contracts and may 
change its election only with prior approval of the FDIC.
    (2) Advanced approaches FDIC-supervised institution. An advanced 
approaches FDIC-supervised institution must calculate the exposure 
amount for all its derivative contracts using the SA-CCR in Sec.  
324.132(c). An advanced approaches FDIC-supervised institution must 
apply the treatment of cleared transactions under Sec.  324.133 to its 
derivative contracts that are cleared transactions.
    (b) Current exposure methodology exposure amount--(1) Single OTC 
derivative contract. Except as modified by paragraph (c) of this 
section, the exposure amount for a single OTC derivative contract that 
is not subject to a qualifying master netting agreement is equal to the 
sum of the FDIC-supervised institution's current credit exposure and 
potential future credit exposure (PFE) on the OTC derivative contract.
    (i) Current credit exposure. The current credit exposure for a 
single OTC derivative contract is the greater of the fair value of the 
OTC derivative contract or zero.
    (ii) PFE. (A) The PFE for a single OTC derivative contract, 
including an OTC derivative contract with a negative fair value, is 
calculated by multiplying the notional principal amount of the OTC 
derivative contract by the appropriate conversion factor in Table 1 to 
of this section.
    (B) For purposes of calculating either the PFE under this paragraph 
(b) or the gross PFE under paragraph (b)(2) of this section for 
exchange rate contracts and other similar contracts in which the 
notional principal amount is equivalent to the cash flows, notional 
principal amount is the net receipts to each party falling due on each 
value date in each currency.
    (C) For an OTC derivative contract that does not fall within one of 
the specified categories in Table 1 to this section, the PFE must be 
calculated using the appropriate ``other'' conversion factor.
    (D) A FDIC-supervised institution must use an OTC derivative 
contract's effective notional principal amount (that is, the apparent 
or stated notional principal amount multiplied by any multiplier in the 
OTC derivative contract) rather than the apparent or stated notional 
principal amount in calculating PFE.
    (E) The PFE of the protection provider of a credit derivative is 
capped at the net present value of the amount of unpaid premiums.

                                     Table 1 to Sec.   324.34--Conversion Factor Matrix for Derivative Contracts \1\
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                              Credit       Credit (non-
                                                              Foreign       (investment     investment-                      Precious
         Remaining maturity \2\            Interest rate   exchange rate       grade           grade          Equity      metals (except       Other
                                                             and gold        reference       reference                         gold)
                                                                            asset) \3\        asset)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
One year or less........................            0.00            0.01            0.05            0.10            0.06            0.07            0.10
Greater than one year and less than or             0.005            0.05            0.05            0.10            0.08            0.07            0.12
 equal to five years....................
Greater than five years.................           0.015           0.075            0.05            0.10            0.10            0.08            0.15
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ For a derivative contract with multiple exchanges of principal, the conversion factor is multiplied by the number of remaining payments in the
  derivative contract.
\2\ For an OTC derivative contract that is structured such that on specified dates any outstanding exposure is settled and the terms are reset so that
  the fair value of the contract is zero, the remaining maturity equals the time until the next reset date. For an interest rate derivative contract
  with a remaining maturity of greater than one year that meets these criteria, the minimum conversion factor is 0.005.
\3\ A FDIC-supervised institution must use the column labeled ``Credit (investment-grade reference asset)'' for a credit derivative whose reference
  asset is an outstanding unsecured long-term debt security without credit enhancement that is investment grade. A FDIC-supervised institution must use
  the column labeled ``Credit (non-investment-grade reference asset)'' for all other credit derivatives.

    (2) Multiple OTC derivative contracts subject to a qualifying 
master netting agreement. Except as modified by paragraph (c) of this 
section, the exposure amount for multiple OTC derivative contracts 
subject to a qualifying master netting agreement is equal to the sum of 
the net current credit exposure and the adjusted sum of the PFE amounts 
for all OTC derivative contracts subject to the qualifying master 
netting agreement.
    (i) Net current credit exposure. The net current credit exposure is 
the greater of the net sum of all positive and negative fair values of 
the individual OTC derivative contracts subject to the qualifying 
master netting agreement or zero.
    (ii) Adjusted sum of the PFE amounts. The adjusted sum of the PFE 
amounts,

[[Page 64718]]

Anet, is calculated as Anet = (0.4 x Agross) + (0.6 x NGR x Agross), 
where:
    (A) Agross = the gross PFE (that is, the sum of the PFE amounts as 
determined under paragraph (b)(1)(ii) of this section for each 
individual derivative contract subject to the qualifying master netting 
agreement); and
    (B) Net-to-gross Ratio (NGR) = the ratio of the net current credit 
exposure to the gross current credit exposure. In calculating the NGR, 
the gross current credit exposure equals the sum of the positive 
current credit exposures (as determined under paragraph (b)(1)(i) of 
this section) of all individual derivative contracts subject to the 
qualifying master netting agreement.
    (c) Recognition of credit risk mitigation of collateralized OTC 
derivative contracts. (1) A FDIC-supervised institution using the CEM 
under paragraph (b) of this section may recognize the credit risk 
mitigation benefits of financial collateral that secures an OTC 
derivative contract or multiple OTC derivative contracts subject to a 
qualifying master netting agreement (netting set) by using the simple 
approach in Sec.  324.37(b).
    (2) As an alternative to the simple approach, a FDIC-supervised 
institution using the CEM under paragraph (b) of this section may 
recognize the credit risk mitigation benefits of financial collateral 
that secures such a contract or netting set if the financial collateral 
is marked-to-fair value on a daily basis and subject to a daily margin 
maintenance requirement by applying a risk weight to the 
uncollateralized portion of the exposure, after adjusting the exposure 
amount calculated under paragraph (b)(1) or (2) of this section using 
the collateral haircut approach in Sec.  324.37(c). The FDIC-supervised 
institution must substitute the exposure amount calculated under 
paragraph (b)(1) or (2) of this section for [Sigma]E in the equation in 
Sec.  324.37(c)(2).
    (d) Counterparty credit risk for credit derivatives--(1) Protection 
purchasers. A FDIC-supervised institution that purchases a credit 
derivative that is recognized under Sec.  324.36 as a credit risk 
mitigant for an exposure that is not a covered position under subpart F 
of this part is not required to compute a separate counterparty credit 
risk capital requirement under Sec.  324.32 provided that the FDIC-
supervised institution does so consistently for all such credit 
derivatives. The FDIC-supervised institution must either include all or 
exclude all such credit derivatives that are subject to a qualifying 
master netting agreement from any measure used to determine 
counterparty credit risk exposure to all relevant counterparties for 
risk-based capital purposes.
    (2) Protection providers. (i) A FDIC-supervised institution that is 
the protection provider under a credit derivative must treat the credit 
derivative as an exposure to the underlying reference asset. The FDIC-
supervised institution is not required to compute a counterparty credit 
risk capital requirement for the credit derivative under Sec.  324.32, 
provided that this treatment is applied consistently for all such 
credit derivatives. The FDIC-supervised institution must either include 
all or exclude all such credit derivatives that are subject to a 
qualifying master netting agreement from any measure used to determine 
counterparty credit risk exposure.
    (ii) The provisions of this paragraph (d)(2) apply to all relevant 
counterparties for risk-based capital purposes unless the FDIC-
supervised institution is treating the credit derivative as a covered 
position under subpart F of this part, in which case the FDIC-
supervised institution must compute a supplemental counterparty credit 
risk capital requirement under this section.
    (e) Counterparty credit risk for equity derivatives. (1) A FDIC-
supervised institution must treat an equity derivative contract as an 
equity exposure and compute a risk-weighted asset amount for the equity 
derivative contract under Sec. Sec.  324.51 through 324.53 (unless the 
FDIC-supervised institution is treating the contract as a covered 
position under subpart F of this part).
    (2) In addition, the FDIC-supervised institution must also 
calculate a risk-based capital requirement for the counterparty credit 
risk of an equity derivative contract under this section if the FDIC-
supervised institution is treating the contract as a covered position 
under subpart F of this part.
    (3) If the FDIC-supervised institution risk weights the contract 
under the Simple Risk-Weight Approach (SRWA) in Sec.  324.52, the FDIC-
supervised institution may choose not to hold risk-based capital 
against the counterparty credit risk of the equity derivative contract, 
as long as it does so for all such contracts. Where the equity 
derivative contracts are subject to a qualified master netting 
agreement, a FDIC-supervised institution using the SRWA must either 
include all or exclude all of the contracts from any measure used to 
determine counterparty credit risk exposure.
    (f) Clearing member FDIC-supervised institution's exposure amount. 
The exposure amount of a clearing member FDIC-supervised institution 
using the CEM under paragraph (b) of this section for an OTC derivative 
contract or netting set of OTC derivative contracts where the FDIC-
supervised institution is either acting as a financial intermediary and 
enters into an offsetting transaction with a QCCP or where the FDIC-
supervised institution provides a guarantee to the QCCP on the 
performance of the client equals the exposure amount calculated 
according to paragraph (b)(1) or (2) of this section multiplied by the 
scaling factor 0.71. If the FDIC-supervised institution determines that 
a longer period is appropriate, the FDIC-supervised institution must 
use a larger scaling factor to adjust for a longer holding period as 
follows:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP17DE18.041

    Where H = the holding period greater than five days. Additionally, 
the FDIC may require the FDIC-supervised institution to set a longer 
holding period if the FDIC determines that a longer period is 
appropriate due to the nature, structure, or characteristics of the 
transaction or is commensurate with the risks associated with the 
transaction.
0
30. Section 324.35 is amended by adding paragraph (a)(3), revising 
paragraph (b)(4)(i), and adding paragraph (c)(3)(iii) to read as 
follows:


Sec.  324.35  Cleared transactions.

    (a) * * *
    (3) Alternate requirements. Notwithstanding any other provision of 
this section, an advanced approaches FDIC-supervised institution or a 
FDIC-supervised institution that is not an advanced approaches FDIC-
supervised institution and that has elected to use SA-CCR under Sec.  
324.34(a)(1) must apply Sec.  324.133 to its derivative contracts that 
are cleared transactions rather than this section Sec.  324.35.
    (b) * * *
    (4) * * *
    (i) Notwithstanding any other requirements in this section, 
collateral posted by a clearing member client FDIC-supervised 
institution that is held by a custodian (in its capacity as custodian) 
in a manner that is bankruptcy remote from the CCP, clearing member, 
and other clearing member clients of the clearing member, is not 
subject to a capital requirement under this section.
* * * * *
    (c) * * *
    (3) * * *
    (iii) Notwithstanding paragraphs (c)(3)(i) and (ii) of this 
section, a clearing member FDIC-supervised institution may apply a risk 
weight of

[[Page 64719]]

zero percent to the trade exposure amount for a cleared transaction 
with a CCP where the clearing member FDIC-supervised institution is 
acting as a financial intermediary on behalf of a clearing member 
client, the transaction offsets another transaction that satisfies the 
requirements set forth in Sec.  324.3(a), and the clearing member FDIC-
supervised institution is not obligated to reimburse the clearing 
member client in the event of the CCP default.
* * * * *
0
31. Section 324.37 is amended by revising paragraph (c)(3)(iii) to read 
as follows:


Sec.  324.37  Collateralized transactions.

* * * * *
    (c) * * *
    (3) * * *
    (iii) For repo-style transactions and cleared transactions, a FDIC-
supervised institution may multiply the standard supervisory haircuts 
provided in paragraphs (c)(3)(i) and (ii) of this section by the square 
root of \1/2\ (which equals 0.707107).
* * * * *


Sec. Sec.  324.134, 324.202, and 324.210   [Amended]

0
32. For each section listed in the following table, the footnote number 
listed in the ``Old footnote number'' column is redesignated as the 
footnote number listed in the ``New footnote number'' column as 
follows:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                           Old footnote    New footnote
                 Section                        No.             No.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
324.134(d)(3)...........................              30              31
324.202, paragraph (1) introductory text              31              32
 of the definition of ``Covered
 position''.............................
324.202, paragraph (1)(i) of the                      32              33
 definition of ``Covered position''.....
324.210(e)(1)...........................              33              34
------------------------------------------------------------------------

0
33. Section 324.132 is amended by:
0
a. Revising paragraphs (b)(2)(ii)(A)(3) through (5);
0
b. Adding paragraphs (b)(2)(ii)(A)(6) and (7);
0
c. Revising paragraphs (c) heading and (c)(1) and (2) and (5) through 
(8);
0
d. Adding paragraphs (c)(9) through (12);
0
e. Removing ``Table 3 to Sec.  324.132'' and adding in its place 
``Table 4 to this section'' in paragraphs (e)(5)(i)(A) and (H); and
0
f. Redesignating Table 3 to Sec.  324.132 as Table 4 to Sec.  324.132.
    The revisions and additions read as follows:


Sec.  324.132  Counterparty credit risk of repo-style transactions, 
eligible margin loans, and OTC derivative contracts.

* * * * *
    (b) * * *
    (2) * * *
    (ii) * * *
    (A) * * *
    (3) For repo-style transactions and cleared transactions, a FDIC-
supervised institution may multiply the supervisory haircuts provided 
in paragraphs (b)(2)(ii)(A)(1) and (2) of this section by the square 
root of \1/2\ (which equals 0.707107).
    (4) A FDIC-supervised institution must adjust the supervisory 
haircuts upward on the basis of a holding period longer than ten 
business days (for eligible margin loans) or five business days (for 
repo-style transactions), using the formula provide in paragraph 
(b)(2)(ii)(A)(6) of this section where the following conditions apply. 
If the number of trades in a netting set exceeds 5,000 at any time 
during a quarter, a FDIC-supervised institution must adjust the 
supervisory haircuts upward on the basis of a holding period of twenty 
business days for the following quarter (except when a FDIC-supervised 
institution is calculating EAD for a cleared transaction under Sec.  
324.133). If a netting set contains one or more trades involving 
illiquid collateral, a FDIC-supervised institution must adjust the 
supervisory haircuts upward on the basis of a holding period of twenty 
business days. If over the two previous quarters more than two margin 
disputes on a netting set have occurred that lasted more than the 
holding period, then the FDIC-supervised institution must adjust the 
supervisory haircuts upward for that netting set on the basis of a 
holding period that is at least two times the minimum holding period 
for that netting set.
    (5)(i) A FDIC-supervised institution must adjust the supervisory 
haircuts upward on the basis of a holding period longer than ten 
business days for collateral associated derivative contracts that are 
not cleared transactions using the formula provided in paragraph 
(b)(2)(ii)(A)(6) of this section where the following conditions apply. 
For collateral associated with a derivative contract that is within a 
netting set that is composed of more than 5,000 derivative contracts 
that are not cleared transactions, a FDIC-supervised institution must 
use a holding period of twenty business days. If a netting set contains 
one or more trades involving illiquid collateral or a derivative 
contract that cannot be easily replaced, a FDIC-supervised institution 
must use a holding period of twenty business days.
    (ii) Notwithstanding paragraph (b)(2)(ii)(A)(1) or (3) or 
(b)(2)(ii)(A)(5)(i) of this section, for collateral associated with a 
derivative contract that is subject to an outstanding dispute over 
variation margin, the holding period is twice the amount provide under 
paragraph (b)(2)(ii)(A)(1) or (3) or (b)(2)(ii)(A)(5)(i) of this 
section.
    (6) A FDIC-supervised institution must adjust the standard 
supervisory haircuts upward, pursuant to the adjustments provided in 
paragraphs (b)(2)(ii)(A)(4) and (5) of this section, using the 
following formula:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP17DE18.042

Where:

TM equals a holding period of longer than 10 business days for 
eligible margin loans and derivative contracts or longer than 5 
business days for repo-style transactions;
Hs equals the standard supervisory haircut; and
Ts equals 10 business days for eligible margin loans and derivative 
contracts or 5 business days for repo-style transactions.

    (7) If the instrument a FDIC-supervised institution has lent, sold 
subject to repurchase, or posted as collateral does not meet the 
definition of financial collateral, the FDIC-supervised institution 
must use a 25.0 percent haircut for market price volatility (Hs).
* * * * *
    (c) EAD for derivative contracts--(1) Options for determining EAD. 
A FDIC-supervised institution must determine the EAD for a derivative 
contract using SA-CCR under paragraph (c)(5) of this section or using 
the internal models methodology described in paragraph (d) of this 
section. If a FDIC-supervised institution elects to use SA-CCR for one

[[Page 64720]]

or more derivative contracts, the exposure amount determined under SA-
CCR is the EAD for the derivative contract or derivatives contracts. A 
FDIC-supervised institution must use the same methodology to calculate 
the exposure amount for all its derivative contracts and may change its 
election only with prior approval of the FDIC.
    (2) Definitions. For purposes of this paragraph (c), the following 
definitions apply:
    (i) Except as otherwise provided in paragraph (c) of this section, 
the end date means the last date of the period referenced by an 
interest rate or credit derivative contract or, if the derivative 
contract references another instrument, by the underlying instrument.
    (ii) Except as otherwise provided in paragraph (c) of this section, 
the start date means the first date of the period referenced by an 
interest rate or credit derivative contract or, if the derivative 
contract references the value of another instrument, by underlying 
instrument.
    (iii) Hedging set means:
    (A) With respect interest rate derivative contracts, all such 
contracts within a netting set that reference the same reference 
currency;
    (B) With respect to exchange rate derivative contracts, all such 
contracts within a netting set that reference the same currency pair;
    (C) With respect to credit derivative contract, all such contracts 
within a netting set;
    (D) With respect to equity derivative contracts, all such contracts 
within a netting set;
    (E) With respect to a commodity derivative contract, all such 
contracts within a netting set that reference one of the following 
commodity classes: Energy, metal, agricultural, or other commodities;
    (F) With respect to basis derivative contracts, all such contracts 
within a netting set that reference the same pair of risk factors and 
are denominated in the same currency; or
    (G) With respect to volatility derivative contracts, all such 
contracts within a netting set that reference one of interest rate, 
exchange rate, credit, equity, or commodity risk factors, separated 
according to the requirements under paragraphs (c)(2)(iii)(A) through 
(E) of this section.
    (H) If the risk of a derivative contract materially depends on more 
than one of interest rate, exchange rate, credit, equity, or commodity 
risk factors, the FDIC may require a FDIC-supervised institution to 
include the derivative contract in each appropriate hedging set under 
paragraph (c)(2)(iii)(A) through (E) of this section.
* * * * *
    (5) Exposure amount. The exposure amount of a netting set, as 
calculated under paragraph (c) of this section, is equal to 1.4 
multiplied by the sum of the replacement cost of the netting set, as 
calculated under paragraph (c)(6) of this section, and the potential 
future exposure of the netting set, as calculated under paragraph 
(c)(7) of this section, except that, notwithstanding the requirements 
of this paragraph (c)(5):
    (i) The exposure amount of a netting set subject to a variation 
margin agreement, excluding a netting set that is subject to a 
variation margin agreement under which the counterparty to the 
variation margin agreement is not required to post variation margin, is 
equal to the lesser of the exposure amount of the netting set and the 
exposure amount of the netting set calculated as if the netting set 
were not subject to a variation margin agreement; and
    (ii) The exposure amount of a netting set that consists of only 
sold options in which the premiums have been fully paid and that are 
not subject to a variation margin agreement is zero.
    (6) Replacement cost of a netting set--(i) Netting set subject to a 
variation margin agreement under which the counterparty must post 
variation margin. The replacement cost of a netting set subject to a 
variation margin agreement, excluding a netting set that is subject to 
a variation margin agreement under which the counterparty is not 
required to post variation margin, is the greater of:
    (A) The sum of the fair values (after excluding any valuation 
adjustments) of the derivative contracts within the netting set less 
the sum of the net independent collateral amount and the variation 
margin amount applicable to such derivative contracts;
    (B) The sum of the variation margin threshold and the minimum 
transfer amount applicable to the derivative contracts within the 
netting set less the net independent collateral amount applicable to 
such derivative contracts; or
    (C) Zero.
    (ii) Netting sets not subject to a variation margin agreement under 
which the counterparty must post variation margin. The replacement cost 
of a netting set that is not subject to a variation margin agreement 
under which the counterparty must post variation margin to the FDIC-
supervised institution is the greater of:
    (A) The sum of the fair values (after excluding any valuation 
adjustments) of the derivative contracts within the netting set less 
the net independent collateral amount and variation margin amount 
applicable to such derivative contracts; or
    (B) Zero.
    (iii) Multiple netting sets subject to a single variation margin 
agreement. Notwithstanding paragraphs (c)(6)(i) and (ii) of this 
section, the replacement cost for multiple netting sets subject to a 
single variation margin agreement must be calculated according to 
paragraph (c)(10)(i) of this section.
    (iv) Multiple netting sets subject to multiple variation margin 
agreements or a hybrid netting set. Notwithstanding paragraphs 
(c)(6)(i) and (ii) of this section, the replacement cost for a netting 
set subject to multiple variation margin agreements or a hybrid netting 
set must be calculated according to paragraph (c)(11)(i) of this 
section.
    (7) Potential future exposure of a netting set. The potential 
future exposure of a netting set is the product of the PFE multiplier 
and the aggregated amount.
    (i) PFE multiplier. The PFE multiplier is calculated according to 
the following formula:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP17DE18.019

Where:

V is the sum of the fair values (after excluding any valuation 
adjustments) of the derivative contracts within the netting set;
C is the sum of the net independent collateral amount and the 
variation margin amount applicable to the derivative contracts 
within the netting set; and
A is the aggregated amount of the netting set.

    (ii) Aggregated amount. The aggregated amount is the sum of all 
hedging set amounts, as calculated under paragraph (c)(8) of this 
section, within a netting set.

[[Page 64721]]

    (iii) Multiple netting sets subject to a single variation margin 
agreement. Notwithstanding paragraphs (c)(7)(i) and (ii) of this 
section and when calculating the PFE amount for purposes of total 
leverage exposure under Sec.  324.10(c)(4)(ii)(B), the potential future 
exposure for multiple netting sets subject to a single variation margin 
agreement must be calculated according to paragraph (c)(10)(ii) of this 
section.
    (iv) Multiple netting sets subject to multiple variation margin 
agreements or a hybrid netting set. Notwithstanding paragraphs 
(c)(7)(i) and (ii) of this section and when calculating the PFE amount 
for purposes of total leverage exposure under section 
324.10(c)(4)(ii)(B), the potential future exposure for a netting set 
subject to multiple variation margin agreements or a hybrid netting set 
must be calculated according to paragraph (c)(11)(ii) of this section.
    (8) Hedging set amount--(i) Interest rate derivative contracts. To 
calculate the hedging set amount of an interest rate derivative 
contract hedging set, a FDIC-supervised institution may use either of 
the formulas provided in paragraphs (c)(8)(i)(A) and (B) of this 
section:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP17DE18.044

    (ii) Exchange rate derivative contracts. For an exchange rate 
derivative contract hedging set, the hedging set amount equals the 
absolute value of the sum of the adjusted derivative contract amounts, 
as calculated under paragraph (c)(9) of this section, within the 
hedging set.

[[Page 64722]]

    (iii) Credit derivative contracts and equity derivative contracts. 
The hedging set amount of a credit derivative contract hedging set or 
equity derivative contract hedging set within a netting set is 
calculated according to the following formula:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP17DE18.045

Where:

k is each reference entity within the hedging set.
K is the number of reference entities within the hedging set.
AddOn(Refk) equals the sum of the adjusted derivative contract 
amounts, as determined under paragraph (c)(9) of this section, for 
all derivative contracts within the hedging set that reference 
reference entity k; and
[rho]k equals the applicable supervisory correlation factor, as 
provided in Table 2 to this section.


    (iv) Commodity derivative contracts. The hedging set amount of a 
commodity derivative contract hedging set within a netting set is 
calculated according to the following formula:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP17DE18.046

Where:

k is each commodity type within the hedging set.
K is the number of commodity types within the hedging set.
AddOn(Typek) equals the sum of the adjusted derivative contract 
amounts, as determined under paragraph (c)(9) of this section, for 
all derivative contracts within the hedging set that reference 
commodity type k.
[rho] equals the applicable supervisory correlation factor, as 
provided in Table 2 to this section.

    (v) Basis derivative contracts and volatility derivative contracts. 
Notwithstanding paragraphs (c)(8)(i) through (iv) of this section, a 
FDIC-supervised institution must calculate a separate hedging set 
amount for each basis derivative contract hedging set and each 
volatility derivative contract hedging set. A FDIC-supervised 
institution must calculate such hedging set amounts using one of the 
formulas under paragraphs (c)(8)(i) through (iv) that corresponds to 
the primary risk factor of the hedging set being calculated.
    (9) Adjusted derivative contract amount--(i) Summary. To calculate 
the adjusted derivative contract amount of a derivative contract, a 
FDIC-supervised institution must determine the adjusted notional amount 
of derivative contract, pursuant to paragraph (c)(9)(ii) of this 
section, and multiply the adjusted notional amount by each of the 
supervisory delta adjustment, pursuant to paragraph (c)(9)(iii) of this 
section, the maturity factor, pursuant to paragraph (c)(9)(iv) of this 
section, and the applicable supervisory factor, as provided in Table 2 
to this section.
    (ii) Adjusted notional amount. (A)(1) For an interest rate 
derivative contract or a credit derivative contract, the adjusted 
notional amount equals the product of the notional amount of the 
derivative contract, as measured in U.S. dollars using the exchange 
rate on the date of the calculation, and the supervisory duration, as 
calculated by the following formula:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP17DE18.047

Where:

S is the number of business days from the present day until the 
start date of the derivative contract, or zero if the start date has 
already passed; and
E is the number of business days from the present day until the end 
date of the derivative contract.

    (2) For purposes of paragraph (c)(9)(ii)(A)(1) of this section:
    (i) For an interest rate derivative contract or credit derivative 
contract that is a variable notional swap, the notional amount is equal 
to the time-weighted average of the contractual notional amounts of 
such a swap over the remaining life of the swap; and
    (ii) For an interest rate derivative contract or a credit 
derivative contract that is a leveraged swap, in which the notional 
amount of all legs of the derivative contract are divided by a factor 
and all rates of the derivative contract are multiplied by the same 
factor, the notional amount is equal to the notional amount of an 
equivalent unleveraged swap.
    (B)(1) For an exchange rate derivative contract, the adjusted 
notional amount is the notional amount of the non-U.S. denominated 
currency leg of the derivative contract, as measured in U.S. dollars 
using the exchange rate on the date of the calculation. If both legs of 
the exchange rate derivative contract are denominated in currencies 
other than U.S. dollars, the adjusted notional amount of the derivative 
contract is the largest leg of the derivative contract, as measured in 
U.S. dollars using the exchange rate on the date of the calculation.
    (2) Notwithstanding paragraph (c)(9)(i)(B)(1) of this section, for 
an exchange rate derivative contract with multiple exchanges of 
principal, the FDIC-supervised institution must set the adjusted 
notional amount of the derivative contract equal to the notional

[[Page 64723]]

amount of the derivative contract multiplied by the number of exchanges 
of principal under the derivative contract.
    (C)(1) For an equity derivative contract or a commodity derivative 
contract, the adjusted notional amount is the product of the fair value 
of one unit of the reference instrument underlying the derivative 
contract and the number of such units referenced by the derivative 
contract.
    (2) Notwithstanding paragraph (c)(9)(i)(C)(1) of this section, when 
calculating the adjusted notional amount for an equity derivative 
contract or a commodity derivative contract that is a volatility 
derivative contract, the FDIC-supervised institution must replace the 
unit price with the underlying volatility referenced by the volatility 
derivative contract and replace the number of units with the notional 
amount of the volatility derivative contract.
    (iii) Supervisory delta adjustments. (A) For a derivative contract 
that is not an option contract or collateralized debt obligation 
tranche, the supervisory delta adjustment is 1 if the fair value of the 
derivative contract increases when the value of the primary risk factor 
increases and -1 if the fair value of the derivative contract decreases 
when the value of the primary risk factor increases;
    (B)(1) For a derivative contract that is an option contract, the 
supervisory delta adjustment is determined by the following formulas, 
as applicable:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP17DE18.048

    (2) As used in the formulas in Table 3 to this section:
    (i) [phis] is the standard normal cumulative distribution function;
    (ii) P equals the current fair value of the instrument or risk 
factor, as applicable, underlying the option;
    (iii) K equals the strike price of the option;
    (iv) T equals the number of business days until the latest 
contractual exercise date of the option;
    (v) l equals zero for all derivative contracts except interest rate 
options for the currencies where interest rates have negative values. 
The same value of l must be used for all interest rate options that are 
denominated in the same currency. To determine the value of l for a 
given currency, a FDIC-supervised institution must find the lowest 
value L of P and K of all interest rate options in a given currency 
that the FDIC-supervised institution has with all counterparties. Then, 
l is set according to this formula: [lgr] = max{-L + 0.1%, 0{time} ; 
and
    (vi) [sigma] equals the supervisory option volatility, as provided 
in Table 2 to this section; and
    (C)(1) For a derivative contract that is a collateralized debt 
obligation tranche, the supervisory delta adjustment is determined by 
the following formula:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP17DE18.049

    (2) As used in the formula in paragraph (c)(9)(iii)(C)(1) of this 
section:
    (i) A is the attachment point, which equals the ratio of the 
notional amounts of all underlying exposures that are subordinated to 
the FDIC-supervised institution's exposure to the total notional amount 
of all underlying exposures, expressed as a decimal value between zero 
and one; \30\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \30\ In the case of a first-to-default credit derivative, there 
are no underlying exposures that are subordinated to the FDIC-
supervised institution's exposure. In the case of a second-or-
subsequent-to-default credit derivative, the smallest (n-1) notional 
amounts of the underlying exposures are subordinated to the FDIC-
supervised institution's exposure.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (ii) D is the detachment point, which equals one minus the ratio of 
the notional amounts of all underlying exposures that are senior to the 
FDIC-supervised institution's exposure to the total notional amount of 
all underlying exposures, expressed as a decimal value between zero and 
one; and
    (iii) The resulting amount is designated with a positive sign if 
the collateralized debt obligation tranche was purchased by the FDIC-
supervised institution and is designated with a negative sign if the 
collateralized debt obligation tranche was sold by the FDIC-supervised 
institution.
    (iv) Maturity factor. (A)(1) The maturity factor of a derivative 
contract that is subject to a variation margin agreement, excluding 
derivative contracts that are subject to a variation margin agreement 
under which the counterparty is not required to post variation margin, 
is determined by the following formula:

[[Page 64724]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP17DE18.050

    Where MPOR refers to the period from the most recent exchange of 
collateral covering a netting set of derivative contracts with a 
defaulting counterparty until the derivative contracts are closed out 
and the resulting market risk is re-hedged.
    (2) Notwithstanding paragraph (c)(9)(iv)(A)(1) of this section:
    (i) For a derivative contract that is not a cleared transaction, 
MPOR cannot be less than ten business days plus the periodicity of re-
margining expressed in business days minus one business day;
    (ii) For a derivative contract that is a cleared transaction, MPOR 
cannot be less than five business days plus the periodicity of re-
margining expressed in business days minus one business day; and
    (iii) For a derivative contract that is within a netting set that 
is composed of more than 5,000 derivative contracts that are not 
cleared transactions, MPOR cannot be less than twenty business days.
    (3) Notwithstanding paragraphs (c)(9)(iv)(A)(1) and (2) of this 
section, for a derivative contract subject to an outstanding dispute 
over variation margin, the applicable floor is twice the amount 
provided in (c)(9)(iv)(A)(1) and (2) of this section.
    (B) The maturity factor of a derivative contract that is not 
subject to a variation margin agreement, or derivative contracts under 
which the counterparty is not required to post variation margin, is 
determined by the following formula:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP17DE18.051

    Where M equals the greater of 10 business days and the remaining 
maturity of the contract, as measured in business days.
    (C) For purposes of paragraph (c)(9)(iv) of this section, 
derivative contracts with daily settlement are treated as derivative 
contracts not subject to a variation margin agreement and daily 
settlement does not change the end date of the period referenced by the 
derivative contract.
    (v) Derivative contract as multiple effective derivative contracts. 
A FDIC-supervised institution must separate a derivative contract into 
separate derivative contracts, according to the following rules:
    (A) For an option where the counterparty pays a predetermined 
amount if the value of the underlying asset is above or below the 
strike price and nothing otherwise (binary option), the option must be 
treated as two separate options. For purposes of paragraph 
(c)(9)(iii)(B) of this section, a binary option with strike K must be 
represented as the combination of one bought European option and one 
sold European option of the same type as the original option (put or 
call) with the strikes set equal to 0.95*K and 1.05*K so that the 
payoff of the binary option is reproduced exactly outside the region 
between the two strikes. The absolute value of the sum of the adjusted 
derivative contract amounts of the bought and sold options is capped at 
the payoff amount of the binary option.
    (B) For a derivative contract that can be represented as a 
combination of standard option payoffs (such as collar, butterfly 
spread, calendar spread, straddle, and strangle), each standard option 
component must be treated as a separate derivative contract.
    (C) For a derivative contract that includes multiple-payment 
options, (such as interest rate caps and floors) each payment option 
may be represented as a combination of effective single-payment options 
(such as interest rate caplets and floorlets).
    (10) Multiple netting sets subject to a single variation margin 
agreement--(i) Calculating replacement cost. Notwithstanding paragraph 
(c)(6) of this section, a FDIC-supervised institution shall assign a 
single replacement cost to multiple netting sets that are subject to a 
single variation margin agreement under which the counterparty must 
post variation margin, calculated according to the following formula:

Replacement Cost = max{[Sigma]NSmax{VNS; 0{time}  - max{CMA; 0{time} ; 
0{time}  + max{[Sigma]NSmin{VNS; 0{time}  - min{CMA; 0{time} ; 0{time} 

Where:

NS is each netting set subject to the variation margin agreement MA;
VNS is the sum of the fair values (after excluding any valuation 
adjustments) of the derivative contracts within the netting set NS;
CMAis the sum of the net independent collateral amount and the 
variation margin amount applicable to the derivative contracts 
within the netting sets subject to the single variation margin 
agreement.

    (ii) Calculating potential future exposure. Notwithstanding 
paragraph (c)(5) of this section, a FDIC-supervised institution shall 
assign a single potential future exposure to multiple netting sets that 
are subject to a single variation margin agreement under which the 
counterparty must post variation margin equal to the sum of the 
potential future exposure of each such netting set, each calculated 
according to paragraph (c)(7) of this section as if such nettings sets 
were not subject to a variation margin agreement.
    (11) Netting set subject to multiple variation margin agreements or 
a hybrid netting set--(i) Calculating replacement cost. To calculate 
replacement cost for either a netting set subject to multiple variation 
margin agreements under which the counterparty to each variation margin 
agreement must post variation margin, or a netting set composed of at 
least one derivative contract subject to variation margin agreement 
under which the counterparty must post variation margin and at least 
one derivative contract that is not subject to such a variation margin 
agreement, the calculation for replacement cost is provided under 
paragraph (c)(6)(ii) of this section, except that the variation margin 
threshold equals the sum of the variation margin thresholds of all 
variation margin agreements within the netting set and the minimum 
transfer amount equals the sum of the minimum transfer amounts of all 
the variation margin agreements within the netting set.
    (ii) Calculating potential future exposure. (A) To calculate 
potential future exposure for a netting set subject to multiple 
variation margin agreements under which the counterparty to each 
variation margin agreement must post variation margin, or a netting set 
composed of at least one derivative

[[Page 64725]]

contract subject to variation margin agreement under which the 
counterparty to the derivative contract must post variation margin and 
at least one derivative contract that is not subject to such a 
variation margin agreement, a FDIC-supervised institution must divide 
the netting set into sub-netting sets and calculate the aggregated 
amount for each sub-netting set. The aggregated amount for the netting 
set is calculated as the sum of the aggregated amounts for the sub-
netting sets. The multiplier is calculated for the entire netting set.
    (B) For purposes of paragraph (c)(11)(ii)(A) of this section, the 
netting set must be divided into sub-netting sets as follows:
    (1) All derivative contracts within the netting set that are not 
subject to a variation margin agreement or that are subject to a 
variation margin agreement under which the counterparty is not required 
to post variation margin form a single sub-netting set. The aggregated 
amount for this sub-netting set is calculated as if the netting set is 
not subject to a variation margin agreement.
    (2) All derivative contracts within the netting set that are 
subject to variation margin agreements in which the counterparty must 
post variation margin and that share the same value of the MPOR form a 
single sub-netting set. The aggregated amount for this sub-netting set 
is calculated as if the netting set is subject to a variation margin 
agreement, using the MPOR value shared by the derivative contracts 
within the netting set.
    (12) Treatment of cleared transactions. (i) A FDIC-supervised 
institution must apply the adjustments in paragraph (c)(12)(iii) of 
this section to the calculation of exposure amount under this paragraph 
(c) for a netting set that is composed solely of one or more cleared 
transactions.
    (ii) A FDIC-supervised institution that is a clearing member must 
apply the adjustments in paragraph (c)(12)(iii) of this section to the 
calculation of exposure amount under this paragraph (c) for a netting 
set that is composed solely of one or more exposures, each of which are 
exposures of the FDIC-supervised institution to its clearing member 
client where the FDIC-supervised institution is either acting as a 
financial intermediary and enters into an offsetting transaction with a 
CCP or where the FDIC-supervised institution provides a guarantee to 
the CCP on the performance of the client.
    (iii)(A) For purposes of calculating the maturity factor under 
paragraph (c)(9)(iv)(B) of this section, MPOR may not be less than 10 
business days;
    (B) For purposes of calculating the maturity factor under paragraph 
(c)(9)(iv)(B) of this section, the minimum MPOR under paragraph 
(c)(9)(iv)(A)(3) of this section does not apply if there are no 
outstanding disputed trades in the netting set, there is no illiquid 
collateral in the netting set, and there are no exotic derivative 
contracts in the netting set; and
    (C) For purposes of calculating the maturity factor under 
paragraphs (c)(9)(iv)(A) and (B) of this section, if the CCP collects 
and holds variation margin and the variation margin is not bankruptcy 
remote from the CCP, Mi may not exceed 250 business days.

  Table 2 to Sec.   324.132--Supervisory Option Volatility, Supervisory Correlation Parameters, and Supervisory
                                        Factors for Derivative Contracts
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                    Supervisory     Supervisory
              Asset class                       Subclass              option        correlation     Supervisory
                                                                  volatility (%)    factor (%)    factor \1\ (%)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Interest rate.........................  N/A.....................              50             N/A            0.50
Exchange rate.........................  N/A.....................              15             N/A             4.0
Credit, single name...................  Investment grade........             100              50             0.5
                                        Speculative grade.......             100              50             1.3
                                        Sub-speculative grade...             100              50             6.0
Credit, index.........................  Investment Grade........              80              80            0.38
                                        Speculative Grade.......              80              80            1.06
Equity, single name...................  N/A.....................             120              50              32
Equity, index.........................  N/A.....................              75              80              20
Commodity.............................  Energy..................             150              40              40
                                        Metals..................              70              40              18
                                        Agricultural............              70              40              18
                                        Other...................              70              40              18
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The applicable supervisory factor for basis derivative contract hedging sets is equal to one-half of the
  supervisory factor provided in this Table 2, and the applicable supervisory factor for volatility derivative
  contract hedging sets is equal to 5 times the supervisory factor provided in this Table 2.

* * * * *
0
34. Section 324.133 amended by revising paragraphs (a), (b)(1) through 
(3), (b)(4)(i), (c)(1) through (3), (c)(4)(i), and (d) to read as 
follows:


Sec.  324.133  Cleared transactions.

    (a) General requirements--(1) Clearing member clients. A FDIC-
supervised institution that is a clearing member client must use the 
methodologies described in paragraph (b) of this section to calculate 
risk-weighted assets for a cleared transaction.
    (2) Clearing members. A FDIC-supervised institution that is a 
clearing member must use the methodologies described in paragraph (c) 
of this section to calculate its risk-weighted assets for a cleared 
transaction and paragraph (d) of this section to calculate its risk-
weighted assets for its default fund contribution to a CCP.
    (b) * * *
    (1) Risk-weighted assets for cleared transactions. (i) To determine 
the risk-weighted asset amount for a cleared transaction, a FDIC-
supervised institution that is a clearing member client must multiply 
the trade exposure amount for the cleared transaction, calculated in 
accordance with paragraph (b)(2) of this section, by the risk weight 
appropriate for the cleared transaction, determined in accordance with 
paragraph (b)(3) of this section.
    (ii) A clearing member client FDIC-supervised institution's total 
risk-weighted assets for cleared transactions is the sum of the risk-
weighted asset amounts for all of its cleared transactions.
    (2) Trade exposure amount. (i) For a cleared transaction that is a 
derivative

[[Page 64726]]

contract or a netting set of derivative contracts, trade exposure 
amount equals the EAD for the derivative contract or netting set of 
derivative contracts calculated using the methodology used to calculate 
EAD for derivative contracts set forth in Sec.  324.132(c) or (d), plus 
the fair value of the collateral posted by the clearing member client 
FDIC-supervised institution and held by the CCP or a clearing member in 
a manner that is not bankruptcy remote. When the FDIC-supervised 
institution calculates EAD for the cleared transaction using the 
methodology in Sec.  324.132(d), EAD equals EADunstressed.
    (ii) For a cleared transaction that is a repo-style transaction or 
netting set of repo-style transactions, trade exposure amount equals 
the EAD for the repo-style transaction calculated using the methodology 
set forth in Sec.  324.132(b)(2) or (3) or (d), plus the fair value of 
the collateral posted by the clearing member client FDIC-supervised 
institution and held by the CCP or a clearing member in a manner that 
is not bankruptcy remote. When the FDIC-supervised institution 
calculates EAD for the cleared transaction under Sec.  324.132(d), EAD 
equals EADunstressed.
    (3) Cleared transaction risk weights. (i) For a cleared transaction 
with a QCCP, a clearing member client FDIC-supervised institution must 
apply a risk weight of:
    (A) 2 percent if the collateral posted by the FDIC-supervised 
institution to the QCCP or clearing member is subject to an arrangement 
that prevents any loss to the clearing member client FDIC-supervised 
institution due to the joint default or a concurrent insolvency, 
liquidation, or receivership proceeding of the clearing member and any 
other clearing member clients of the clearing member; and the clearing 
member client FDIC-supervised institution has conducted sufficient 
legal review to conclude with a well-founded basis (and maintains 
sufficient written documentation of that legal review) that in the 
event of a legal challenge (including one resulting from an event of 
default or from liquidation, insolvency or receivership proceedings) 
the relevant court and administrative authorities would find the 
arrangements to be legal, valid, binding and enforceable under the law 
of the relevant jurisdictions.
    (B) 4 percent, if the requirements of paragraph (b)(3)(i)(A) of 
this section are not met.
    (ii) For a cleared transaction with a CCP that is not a QCCP, a 
clearing member client FDIC-supervised institution must apply the risk 
weight applicable to the CCP under Sec.  324.32.
    (4) * * *
    (i) Notwithstanding any other requirement of this section, 
collateral posted by a clearing member client FDIC-supervised 
institution that is held by a custodian (in its capacity as a 
custodian) in a manner that is bankruptcy remote from the CCP, clearing 
member, and other clearing member clients of the clearing member, is 
not subject to a capital requirement under this section.
* * * * *
    (c) * * *
    (1) Risk-weighted assets for cleared transactions. (i) To determine 
the risk-weighted asset amount for a cleared transaction, a clearing 
member FDIC-supervised institution must multiply the trade exposure 
amount for the cleared transaction, calculated in accordance with 
paragraph (c)(2) of this section by the risk weight appropriate for the 
cleared transaction, determined in accordance with paragraph (c)(3) of 
this section.
    (ii) A clearing member FDIC-supervised institution's total risk-
weighted assets for cleared transactions is the sum of the risk-
weighted asset amounts for all of its cleared transactions.
    (2) Trade exposure amount. A clearing member FDIC-supervised 
institution must calculate its trade exposure amount for a cleared 
transaction as follows:
    (i) For a cleared transaction that is a derivative contract or a 
netting set of derivative contracts, trade exposure amount equals the 
EAD calculated using the methodology used to calculate EAD for 
derivative contracts set forth in Sec.  324.132(c) or (d), plus the 
fair value of the collateral posted by the clearing member FDIC-
supervised institution and held by the CCP in a manner that is not 
bankruptcy remote. When the clearing member FDIC-supervised institution 
calculates EAD for the cleared transaction using the methodology in 
Sec.  324.132(d), EAD equals EADunstressed.
    (ii) For a cleared transaction that is a repo-style transaction or 
netting set of repo-style transactions, trade exposure amount equals 
the EAD calculated under Sec.  324.132(b)(2) or (3) or (d), plus the 
fair value of the collateral posted by the clearing member FDIC-
supervised institution and held by the CCP in a manner that is not 
bankruptcy remote. When the clearing member FDIC-supervised institution 
calculates EAD for the cleared transaction under Sec.  324.132(d), EAD 
equals EADunstressed.
    (3) Cleared transaction risk weights. (i) A clearing member FDIC-
supervised institution must apply a risk weight of 2 percent to the 
trade exposure amount for a cleared transaction with a QCCP.
    (ii) For a cleared transaction with a CCP that is not a QCCP, a 
clearing member FDIC-supervised institution must apply the risk weight 
applicable to the CCP according to Sec.  324.32.
    (iii) Notwithstanding paragraphs (c)(3)(i) and (ii) of this 
section, a clearing member FDIC-supervised institution may apply a risk 
weight of zero percent to the trade exposure amount for a cleared 
transaction with a QCCP where the clearing member FDIC-supervised 
institution is acting as a financial intermediary on behalf of a 
clearing member client, the transaction offsets another transaction 
that satisfies the requirements set forth in Sec.  324.3(a), and the 
clearing member FDIC-supervised institution is not obligated to 
reimburse the clearing member client in the event of the QCCP default.
    (4) * * *
    (i) Notwithstanding any other requirement of this section, 
collateral posted by a clearing member client FDIC-supervised 
institution that is held by a custodian (in its capacity as a 
custodian) in a manner that is bankruptcy remote from the CCP, clearing 
member, and other clearing member clients of the clearing member, is 
not subject to a capital requirement under this section.
* * * * *
    (d) Default fund contributions--(1) General requirement. A clearing 
member FDIC-supervised institution must determine the risk-weighted 
asset amount for a default fund contribution to a CCP at least 
quarterly, or more frequently if, in the opinion of the FDIC-supervised 
institution or the FDIC, there is a material change in the financial 
condition of the CCP.
    (2) Risk-weighted asset amount for default fund contributions to 
nonqualifying CCPs. A clearing member FDIC-supervised institution's 
risk-weighted asset amount for default fund contributions to CCPs that 
are not QCCPs equals the sum of such default fund contributions 
multiplied by 1,250 percent, or an amount determined by the FDIC, based 
on factors such as size, structure and membership characteristics of 
the CCP and riskiness of its transactions, in cases where such default 
fund contributions may be unlimited.
    (3) Risk-weighted asset amount for default fund contributions to 
QCCPs. A clearing member FDIC-supervised institution's risk-weighted 
asset amount for default fund contributions to QCCPs equals the sum of 
its capital

[[Page 64727]]

requirement, KCM for each QCCP, as calculated under the 
methodology set forth in paragraph (e)(4) of this section.
    (i) EAD must be calculated separately for each clearing member's 
sub-client accounts and sub-house account (i.e., for the clearing 
member's propriety activities). If the clearing member's collateral and 
its client's collateral are held in the same default fund contribution 
account, then the EAD of that account is the sum of the EAD for the 
client-related transactions within the account and the EAD of the 
house-related transactions within the account. For purposes of 
determining such EADs, the independent collateral of the clearing 
member and its client must be allocated in proportion to the respective 
total amount of independent collateral posted by the clearing member to 
the QCCP.
    (ii) If any account or sub-account contains both derivative 
contracts and repo-style transactions, the EAD of that account is the 
sum of the EAD for the derivative contracts within the account and the 
EAD of the repo-style transactions within the account. If independent 
collateral is held for an account containing both derivative contracts 
and repo-style transactions, then such collateral must be allocated to 
the derivative contracts and repo-style transactions in proportion to 
the respective product specific exposure amounts, calculated, excluding 
the effects of collateral, according to Sec.  324.132(b) for repo-style 
transactions and to Sec.  324.132(c)(5) for derivative contracts.
    (4) Risk-weighted asset amount for default fund contributions to a 
QCCP. A clearing member FDIC-supervised institution's capital 
requirement for its default fund contribution to a QCCP (KCM) is equal 
to:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP17DE18.052

    (5) Hypothetical capital requirement of a QCCP. Where a QCCP has 
provided its KCCP, a FDIC-supervised institution must rely 
on such disclosed figure instead of calculating KCCP under 
this paragraph (d)(5), unless the FDIC-supervised institution 
determines that a more conservative figure is appropriate based on the 
nature, structure, or characteristics of the QCCP. The hypothetical 
capital requirement of a QCCP (KCCP), as determined by the FDIC-
supervised institution, is equal to:

KCCP = [Sigma]CMiEADi * 1.6 percent

Where:

CMi is each clearing member of the QCCP; and
EADi is the exposure amount of each clearing member of the QCCP to 
the QCCP, as determined under paragraph (d)(6) of this section.

    (6) EAD of a clearing member FDIC-supervised institution to a QCCP. 
(i) The EAD of a clearing member FDIC-supervised institution to a QCCP 
is equal to the sum of the EAD for derivative contracts determined 
under paragraph (d)(6)(ii) of this section and the EAD for repo-style 
transactions determined under paragraph (d)(6)(iii) of this section.
    (ii) With respect to any derivative contracts between the FDIC-
supervised institution and the CCP that are cleared transactions and 
any guarantees that the FDIC-supervised institution has provided to the 
CCP with respect to performance of a clearing member client on a 
derivative contract, the EAD is equal to the sum of:
    (A) The exposure amount for all such derivative contracts and 
guarantees of derivative contracts calculated under SA-CCR in Sec.  
324.132(c) using a value of

[[Page 64728]]

10 business days for purposes of Sec.  324.132(c)(9)(iv)(B);
    (B) The value of all collateral held by the CCP posted by the 
clearing member FDIC-supervised institution or a clearing member client 
of the FDIC-supervised institution in connection with a derivative 
contract for which the FDIC-supervised institution has provided a 
guarantee to the CCP; and
    (C) The amount of the prefunded default fund contribution of the 
FDIC-supervised institution to the CCP.
    (iii) With respect to any repo-style transactions between the FDIC-
supervised institution and the CCP that are cleared transactions, EAD 
is equal to:

EAD = max{EBRM-IM-DF; 0{time} 

Where:

EBRM is the sum of the exposure amounts of each repo-style 
transaction between the FDIC-supervised institution and the CCP as 
determined under Sec.  324.132(b)(2) and without recognition of any 
collateral securing the repo-style transactions;
IM is the initial margin collateral posted by the FDIC-supervised 
institution to the CCP with respect to the repo-style transactions; 
and
DF is the prefunded default fund contribution of the FDIC-supervised 
institution to the CCP.

0
35. Section 324.300 is amended by adding paragraph (f) to read as 
follows:


Sec.  324.300  Transitions.

* * * * *
    (f) SA-CCR. After giving prior notice to the FDIC, an advanced 
approaches FDIC-supervised institution may use CEM rather than SA-CCR 
to determine the exposure amount for purposes of Sec.  324.34 and the 
EAD for purposes of Sec.  324.132 for its derivative contracts until 
July 1, 2020. On July 1, 2020, and thereafter, an advanced approaches 
FDIC-supervised institution must use SA-CCR for purposes of Sec.  
324.34 and must use either SA-CCR or IMM for purposes of Sec.  324.132. 
Once an advanced approaches FDIC-supervised institution has begun to 
use SA-CCR, the advanced approaches FDIC-supervised institution may not 
change to use CEM.

    Dated: November 7, 2018.
Joseph M. Otting,
Comptroller of the Currency.
    By order of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System, November 6, 2018.
Ann E. Misback,
Secretary of the Board.
    Dated at Washington, DC, on October 17, 2018.

    By order of the Board of Directors.

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
Robert E. Feldman,
Executive Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2018-24924 Filed 12-14-18; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4810-33-6210-01;6714-01;P