[Federal Register Volume 83, Number 217 (Thursday, November 8, 2018)]
[Notices]
[Pages 55918-55922]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2018-24400]


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SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

[Release No. 34-84524; File No. SR-OCC-2018-014]


Self-Regulatory Organizations; The Options Clearing Corporation; 
Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change, as Modified by Partial 
Amendment No. 1, Related to The Options Clearing Corporation's Margin 
Methodology for Incorporating Variations in Implied Volatility

November 2, 2018.
    Pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
(``Exchange Act'' or ``Act''),\1\ and Rule 19b-4 thereunder,\2\ notice 
is hereby given that on October 22, 2018, The Options Clearing 
Corporation (``OCC'') filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(``SEC'' or ``Commission'') the proposed rule change as described in 
Items I, II, and III below, which Items have been prepared by OCC. On 
October 30, 2018, OCC filed Partial Amendment No. 1 to the proposed 
rule change.\3\ The Commission is publishing this notice to solicit 
comments on the proposed rule change from interested persons.
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    \1\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1).
    \2\ 17 CFR 240.19b-4.
    \3\ In Partial Amendment No. 1, OCC corrected errors in Exhibits 
1A and 5 without changing the substance of the proposed rule change.
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I. Clearing Agency's Statement of the Terms of Substance of the 
Proposed Rule Change

    The proposed rule change is filed in connection with proposed 
changes to enhance OCC's model for incorporating variations in implied 
volatility within OCC's margin methodology (``Implied Volatility 
Model''), the System for Theoretical Analysis and Numerical Simulations 
(``STANS'').\4\ The proposed changes to OCC's Margins Methodology 
document are contained in confidential Exhibit 5 of the filing. 
Material proposed to be added is marked by underlining and material 
proposed to be deleted is marked by strikethrough text. The proposed 
changes are described in detail in Item 3 below. The proposed rule 
change does not require any changes to the text of OCC's By-Laws or 
Rules. The proposed rule change is available on OCC's website at 
https://www.theocc.com/about/publications/bylaws.jsp. All terms with 
initial capitalization that are not otherwise defined herein have the 
same meaning as set forth in the OCC By-Laws and Rules.\5\
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    \4\ OCC also has filed an advance notice with the Commission in 
connection with the proposed changes. See SR-OCC-2018-804.
    \5\ OCC's By-Laws and Rules can be found on OCC's public 
website: http://optionsclearing.com/about/publications/bylaws.jsp.
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II. Clearing Agency's Statement of the Purpose of, and Statutory Basis 
for, the Proposed Rule Change

    In its filing with the Commission, OCC included statements 
concerning the purpose of and basis for the proposed rule change and 
discussed any comments it received on the proposed rule change. The 
text of these statements may be examined at the places specified in 
Item IV below. OCC has prepared summaries, set forth in sections (A), 
(B), and (C) below, of the most significant aspects of these 
statements.

(A) Clearing Agency's Statement of the Purpose of, and Statutory Basis 
for, the Proposed Rule Change

(1) Purpose
Background
STANS Overview
    STANS is OCC's proprietary risk management system for calculating 
Clearing Member margin requirements.\6\ The STANS methodology utilizes 
large-scale Monte Carlo simulations to forecast price and volatility 
movements in determining a Clearing Member's margin requirement.\7\ 
STANS margin requirements are calculated at the portfolio level of 
Clearing Member accounts with positions in marginable securities and 
consists of an estimate of two primary components: A base component and 
a stress test add-on component. The base component is an estimate of a 
99% expected shortfall \8\ over a two-day time horizon. The 
concentration/dependence stress test charge is obtained by considering 
increases in the expected margin shortfall for an account that would 
occur due to (i) market movements that are especially large and/or in 
which certain risk factors would exhibit perfect or zero correlations 
rather than correlations otherwise estimated using historical data or 
(ii) extreme and adverse idiosyncratic movements for individual risk 
factors to which the account is particularly exposed. The STANS 
methodology is used to measure the exposure of portfolios of options 
and futures cleared by OCC and cash instruments in margin 
collateral.\9\
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    \6\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 53322 (February 15, 
2006), 71 FR 9403 (February 23, 2006) (SR-OCC-2004-20). A detailed 
description of the STANS methodology is available at http://optionsclearing.com/risk-management/margins/.
    \7\ See OCC Rule 601.
    \8\ The expected shortfall component is established as the 
estimated average of potential losses higher than the 99% value at 
risk threshold. The term ``value at risk'' or ``VaR'' refers to a 
statistical technique that, generally speaking, is used in risk 
management to measure the potential risk of loss for a given set of 
assets over a particular time horizon.
    \9\ OCC notes that, pursuant to OCC Rule 601(e)(1), OCC also 
calculates initial margin requirements for segregated futures 
accounts using the Standard Portfolio Analysis of Risk Margin 
Calculation System (``SPAN''). No changes are proposed to OCC's use 
of SPAN because the proposed changes do not concern futures. See 
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 72331 (June 5, 2014), 79 FR 
33607 (June 11, 2014) (SR-OCC-2014-13).
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    The econometric models underlying STANS currently incorporate a 
number of risk factors. A ``risk factor'' within OCC's margin system is 
defined as a product or attribute whose historical data is used to 
estimate and simulate the risk for an associated product. The majority 
of risk factors utilized in the

[[Page 55919]]

STANS methodology are the returns on individual equity securities; 
however, a number of other risk factors may be considered, including, 
among other things, returns on implied volatility risk factors.\10\
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    \10\ In December 2015, the Commission approved a proposed rule 
change and issued a Notice of No Objection to an advance notice 
filing by OCC to its modify margin methodology by more broadly 
incorporating variations in implied volatility within STANS. See 
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 76781 (December 28, 2015), 81 FR 
135 (January 4, 2016) (SR-OCC-2015-016) and Securities Exchange Act 
Release No. 76548 (December 3, 2015), 80 FR 76602 (December 9, 2015) 
(SR-OCC-2015-804). As discussed further below, implied volatility 
risk factors in STANS are a set of chosen volatility pivot points 
per product, depending on the tenor of the option.
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Current Implied Volatility Model in STANS
    Generally speaking, the implied volatility of an option is a 
measure of the expected future volatility of the option's underlying 
security at expiration, which is reflected in the current option 
premium in the market. Using the Black-Scholes options pricing model, 
the implied volatility is the standard deviation of the underlying 
asset price necessary to arrive at the market price of an option of a 
given strike, time to maturity, underlying asset price and the current 
risk-free rate. In effect, the implied volatility is responsible for 
that portion of the premium that cannot be explained by the then-
current intrinsic value of the option (i.e., the difference between the 
price of the underlying and the exercise price of the option), 
discounted to reflect its time value. OCC considers variations in 
implied volatility within STANS to ensure that the anticipated cost of 
liquidating options positions in an account recognizes the possibility 
that implied volatility could change during the two-business day 
liquidation time horizon and lead to corresponding changes in the 
market prices of the options.
    OCC models the variations in implied volatility used to re-price 
options within STANS for substantially all option contracts \11\ 
available to be cleared by OCC that have a residual tenor \12\ of less 
than three years (``Shorter Tenor Options'').\13\ To address variations 
in implied volatility, OCC models a volatility surface \14\ for Shorter 
Tenor Options by incorporating into the econometric models underlying 
STANS certain risk factors (i.e., implied volatility pivot points) 
based on a range of tenors and option deltas.\15\ Currently, these 
implied volatility pivot points consist of three tenors of one month, 
three months and one year, and three deltas of 0.25, 0.5, and 0.75, 
resulting in nine implied volatility risk factors. These pivot points 
are chosen such that their combination allows the model to capture 
changes in level, skew, convexity and term structure of the implied 
volatility surface. OCC uses a GARCH model \16\ to forecast the 
volatility for each implied volatility risk factor at the nine pivot 
points.\17\ For each Shorter Tenor Option in the account of a Clearing 
Member, changes in its implied volatility are simulated using forecasts 
obtained from daily implied volatility market data according to the 
corresponding pivot point and the price of the option is computed to 
determine the amount of profit or loss in the account under the 
particular STANS price simulation. Additionally, OCC uses simulated 
closing prices for the assets underlying the options in the account of 
a Clearing Member that are scheduled to expire within the liquidation 
time horizon of two business days to compute the options' intrinsic 
value and uses those values to help calculate the profit or loss in the 
account.\18\
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    \11\ OCC's Implied Volatility Model excludes: (i) Binary 
options, (ii) options on commodity futures, (iii) options on U.S. 
Treasury securities, and (iv) Asians and Cliquets. These relatively 
new products were introduced as the implied volatility margin 
methodology changes were in the process of being completed by OCC, 
and OCC had de minimus open interest in those options. OCC therefore 
did not believe there was a substantive risk if those products were 
excluded from the implied volatility model. See id.
    \12\ The ``tenor'' of an option is the amount of time remaining 
to its expiration.
    \13\ OCC also incorporates variations in implied volatility as 
risk factors for certain options with residual tenors of at least 
three years (``Longer Tenor Options''); however, the proposed 
changes described herein would not apply to OCC's model for Longer 
Tenor Options. See Securities Exchange Act Release Nos. 68434 
(December 14, 2012), 77 FR 57602 (December 19, 2012) (SR-OCC-2012-
14); 70709 (October 18, 2013), 78 FR 63267 (October 23, 2013) (SR-
OCC-2013-16).
    \14\ The term ``volatility surface'' refers to a three-
dimensional graphed surface that represents the implied volatility 
for possible tenors of the option and the implied volatility of the 
option over those tenors for the possible levels of ``moneyness'' of 
the option. The term ``moneyness'' refers to the relationship 
between the current market price of the underlying interest and the 
exercise price.
    \15\ The ``delta'' of an option represents the sensitivity of 
the option price with respect to the price of the underlying 
security.
    \16\ The acronym ``GARCH'' refers to an econometric model that 
can be used to estimate volatility based on historical data. See 
generally Tim Bollerslev, ``Generalized Autoregressive Conditional 
Heteroskedasticity,'' Journal of Econometrics, 31(3), 307-327 
(1986).
    \17\ STANS relies on 10,000 price simulation scenarios that are 
based generally on a historical data period of 500 business days, 
which are updated daily to keep model results from becoming stale.
    \18\ For such Shorter Tenor Options that are scheduled to expire 
on the open of the market rather than the close, OCC uses the 
relevant opening price for the underlying assets.
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    OCC performed a number of analyses of its current Implied 
Volatility Model and to support development of the proposed model 
changes, including backtesting and impact analysis of the proposed 
model enhancements as well as comparison of OCC's current model 
performance against certain industry benchmarks.\19\ OCC's analysis 
demonstrated that one attribute of the current model is that the 
volatility changes forecasted by the GARCH model are extremely 
sensitive to sudden spikes in volatility, which can at times result in 
over reactive margin requirements that OCC believes are unreasonable 
and procyclical.\20\
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    \19\ OCC has provided results of these analyses to the 
Commission in confidential Exhibit 3 of the filing.
    \20\ A quality that is positively correlated with the overall 
state of the market is deemed to be ``procyclical.'' For example, 
procyclicality may be evidenced by increasing margin requirements in 
times of stressed market conditions and low margin requirements when 
markets are calm. Hence, anti-procyclical features in a model are 
measures intended to prevent risk-based models from fluctuating too 
drastically in response to changing market conditions.
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    For example, on February 5, 2018, the market experienced extreme 
levels of volatility, with the Cboe Volatility Index (``VIX'') \21\ 
moving from 17% up to 37%, representing a relative move of 116% (which 
is the largest relative daily jump in the history of the index). Under 
OCC's current model, OCC observed that the GARCH forecast SPX 
volatility for at-the-money implied volatility for a one-month tenor 
was approximately 4 times larger than the comparable market index, the 
Cboe VVIX Index, which is a volatility of volatility measure in that it 
represents the expected volatility of the 30-day forward price of the 
VIX. As a result, aggregated STANS margins jumped more than 80% 
overnight due to the GARCH model and margins for certain individual 
Clearing Members increased by a factor of 10.\22\
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    \21\ The VIX is an index designed to measure the 30-day expected 
volatility of the Standard & Poor's 500 index (``SPX'').
    \22\ For example, under the current model the total margin 
requirement calculated for one particular Clearing Member jumped 
from $120 million on February 2, 2018, to $1.78 billion on February 
5, 2018, representing a 14 times increase in the requirement.
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    In addition, volatility tends to be mean reverting; that is, 
volatility will quickly return to its long-run mean or average from an 
elevated level, so it is unlikely that volatility would continue to 
make big jumps immediately following a drastic increase. For example, 
based on the VIX history from 1990-2018, VIX levels jumped above 35 
(about the level observed on February 5,

[[Page 55920]]

2018) for approximately 293 days (i.e., 4% of the sample period). From 
the level of 35 or higher, the range of daily change on the VIX index 
was between 27% and -35%. However, the largest daily changes on one-
month at-the-money SPX implied volatility forecasted by OCC's current 
GARCH model on February 5, 2018, were far in excess of those historical 
realized amounts, which points to extreme procyclicality issues that 
need to be addressed in the current model.\23\
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    \23\ For example, OCC's current model resulted in a maximum 
variation of 1100% in the one-month at-the-money SPX implied 
volatility pivot when compared with a maximum 35% move in the VIX 
for VIX levels greater than 30. Additionally, the model-generated 
number is significantly higher than 116%, which is the largest 
realized historical move in the VIX that occurred on February 5, 
2018.
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    OCC also performed backtesting of the current model and proposed 
model enhancements to evaluate and compare the performance of each 
model from a margin coverage perspective. OCC's backtesting 
demonstrated that exceedance counts \24\ and overall coverage levels 
over the backtesting period using the proposed model enhancements were 
substantially similar to the results obtained from the current 
production model. As a result, OCC believes the current model tends to 
be overly conservative/reactive, and the proposed model is more 
appropriately commensurate with the risks presented by changes in 
implied volatility.
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    \24\ Exceedance counts here refer to instances where the actual 
loss on portfolio over the liquidation period of two business days 
exceeds the margin amounts generated by the model.
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    OCC believes that the sudden, extreme and unreasonable increases in 
margin requirements that may be experienced under its current Implied 
Volatility Model may stress certain Clearing Members' ability to obtain 
sufficient liquidity to meet these significantly increased margin 
requirements, particularly in periods of sudden, extreme volatility. 
OCC therefore is proposing changes to its Implied Volatility Model to 
limit procyclicality and produce margin requirements that OCC believes 
are more reasonable and are also commensurate with the risks presented 
by its cleared options products.
Proposed Changes
    OCC proposes to modify its Implied Volatility Model by introducing 
an exponentially weighted moving average \25\ for the daily forecasted 
volatility for implied volatility risk factors calculated using the 
GARCH model. Specifically, when forecasting the volatility for each 
implied volatility risk factor at each of the nine pivot points, OCC 
would use an exponentially weighted moving average of forecasted 
volatilities over a specified look-back period rather than using raw 
daily forecasted volatilities. The exponentially weighted moving 
average would involve the selection of a look-back period over which 
the data would be averaged and a decay factor (or weighting factor), 
which is a positive number between zero and one, that represents the 
weighting factor for the most recent data point.\26\ The look-back 
period and decay factor would be model parameters subject to monthly 
review,\27\ along with other model parameters that are reviewed by 
OCC's Model Risk Working Group (``MRWG'') \28\ in accordance with OCC's 
internal procedure for margin model parameter review and sensitivity 
analysis, and these parameters would be subject to change upon approval 
of the MRWG.
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    \25\ An exponentially weighted moving average is a statistical 
method that averages data in a way that gives more weight to the 
most recent observations using an exponential scheme.
    \26\ The lower the number the more weight is attributed to the 
more recent data (e.g., if the value is set to one, the 
exponentially weighted moving average becomes a simple average).
    \27\ OCC initially would use a look-back period of 22 days and 
an initial decay factor of 0.94 for the exponentially weighted 
moving average. OCC believes the 22-day look-back is an appropriate 
initial parameter setting as it would allow for close to monthly 
updates of the GARCH parameters used in the model. The decay factor 
value of 0.94 was selected based on the factor initially proposed by 
JP Morgan's RiskMetrics methodology (see JPMorgan/Reuters, 1996. 
``RiskMetrics--Technical Document'', Fourth edition).
    \28\ The MRWG is responsible for assisting OCC's Management 
Committee in overseeing and governing OCC's model-related risk 
issues and includes representatives from OCC's Financial Risk 
Management department, Quantitative Risk Management department, 
Model Validation Group, and Enterprise Risk Management department.
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    The proposed change is intended to reduce the oversensitivity of 
the current Implied Volatility Model to large, sudden shocks in market 
volatility and therefore result in margin requirements that are more 
stable and that remain commensurate with the risks presented during 
periods of sudden, extreme volatility.\29\ The proposed rule change is 
expected to produce margin requirements that are very similar to those 
generated using OCC's existing model during quiet, less volatile market 
periods; however, during more volatile periods, the proposed changes 
would result in a more measured initial response to increases in the 
volatility of volatility with margin requirements that may remain 
elevated for a longer period of time after the shock subsides than 
experienced under OCC's current model. The proposed changes are 
intended to reduce procyclicality in OCC's margin methodology across 
volatile market periods while continuing to capture changes in implied 
volatility and produce margin requirements that are commensurate with 
the risks presented by OCC's cleared options products. The proposed 
changes therefore would reduce the risk that a sudden, extreme increase 
in margin requirements may stress Clearing Members' ability to obtain 
liquidity to meet such increased requirements, particularly in periods 
of extreme volatility.
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    \29\ As noted above, OCC has performed analysis of the impact of 
the proposed changes, and OCC's backtesting of the proposed model 
demonstrates comparable exceedance counts and coverage levels to the 
current model during the most recent volatile period.
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Implementation Timeframe
    OCC expects to implement the proposed changes within thirty (30) 
days after the date that OCC receives all necessary regulatory 
approvals for the proposed changes. OCC will announce the 
implementation date of the proposed change by an Information Memorandum 
posted to its public website at least 2 weeks prior to implementation.
(2) Statutory Basis
    OCC believes that the proposed rule change is consistent with 
Section 17A of the Act \30\ and the rules and regulations thereunder 
applicable to OCC. Section 17A(b)(3)(F) of Act \31\ requires, in part, 
that the rules of a clearing agency be designed to promote the prompt 
and accurate clearance and settlement of securities transactions, and 
in general, to protect investors and the public interest. As described 
above, the volatility changes forecasted by OCC's current Implied 
Volatility Model are extremely sensitive to large, sudden spikes in 
volatility, which can at times result in over reactive margin 
requirements that OCC believes are unreasonable and procyclical (for 
the reasons set forth above). Such sudden, unreasonable increases in 
margin requirements may stress certain Clearing Members' ability to 
obtain liquidity to meet those requirements, particularly in periods of 
extreme volatility, and could result in a Clearing Member being delayed 
in meeting, or ultimately failing to meet, its daily settlement 
obligations to OCC. OCC notes that the proposed rule change is expected 
to produce margin requirements that are very similar to those generated 
using OCC's existing model during quiet, less volatile market periods. 
The proposed changes would, however, result in a

[[Page 55921]]

more measured initial response to increases in the volatility of 
volatility with margin requirements that may remain elevated for a 
longer period after the shock subsides than experienced under OCC's 
current model. The proposed changes are designed to reduce the 
likelihood that OCC's Implied Volatility Model would produce extreme, 
over reactive margin requirements that could strain the ability of 
certain Clearing Members to meet their daily margin requirements at OCC 
by reducing procyclicality in OCC's margin methodology and ensuring 
more stable and appropriate changes in margin requirements across 
volatile market periods while continuing to capture changes in implied 
volatility and produce margin requirements that are commensurate with 
the risks presented. As a result, OCC believes the proposed rule change 
is designed to promote the prompt and accurate clearance and settlement 
of securities transactions, and, in general, to protect investors and 
the public interest in accordance with Section 17A(b)(3)(F) of the 
Act.\32\
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    \30\ 15 U.S.C. 78q-1.
    \31\ 15 U.S.C. 78q-1(b)(3)(F).
    \32\ Id.
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    Rules 17Ad-22(e)(6)(i) and (v) \33\ require a covered clearing 
agency that provides central counterparty services to establish, 
implement, maintain and enforce written policies and procedures 
reasonably designed to cover its credit exposures to its participants 
by establishing a risk-based margin system that (1) considers, and 
produces margin levels commensurate with, the risks and particular 
attributes of each relevant product, portfolio, and market and (2) uses 
an appropriate method for measuring credit exposure that accounts for 
relevant product risk factors and portfolio effects across products. As 
noted above, OCC's current model for implied volatility demonstrates 
extreme sensitivity to sudden spikes in volatility, which can at times 
result in over reactive margin requirements that OCC believes are 
unreasonable and procyclical. The proposed changes are designed to 
reduce the oversensitivity of the model and produce margin requirements 
that are commensurate with the risks presented during periods of 
sudden, extreme volatility. The proposed model enhancements are 
expected to produce margin requirements that are very similar to those 
generated using OCC's existing model during quiet, less volatile market 
periods; however, the proposed changes would result in a more measured 
initial response to increases in the volatility of volatility with 
margin requirements that may remain elevated for a longer period of 
time after the shock subsides than experienced under OCC's current 
model. The proposed change would therefore reduce procyclicality in 
OCC's margin methodology and ensure more stable changes in margin 
requirements across volatile market periods while continuing to capture 
changes in implied volatility and produce margin requirements that are 
commensurate with the risks presented by OCC's cleared options. As a 
result, OCC believes that the proposed changes are reasonably designed 
to consider, and produce margin levels commensurate with, the risk 
presented by the implied volatility of OCC's cleared options and uses 
an appropriate method for measuring credit exposure that accounts for 
this product risk factor (i.e., implied volatility) in a manner 
consistent with Rules 17Ad-22(e)(6)(i) and (v).\34\
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    \33\ 17 CFR 240.17Ad-2(e)(6)(i) and (v).
    \34\ Id.
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    The proposed rule changes are not inconsistent with the existing 
rules of OCC, including any other rules proposed to be amended.

(B) Clearing Agency's Statement on Burden on Competition

    Section 17A(b)(3)(I) requires that the rules of a clearing agency 
do not impose any burden on competition not necessary or appropriate in 
furtherance of the purposes of Act.\35\ OCC does not believe the 
proposed rule change would impose a burden on competition. The proposed 
rule change is expected to produce margin requirements that are very 
similar to those generated using OCC's existing model during quiet, 
less volatile market periods. The proposed changes would, however, 
result in a more measured initial response to increases in the 
volatility of volatility with margin requirements that may remain 
elevated for a longer period after the shock subsides than experienced 
under OCC's current model. As a result, the proposed model may impact 
different accounts to a greater or lesser degree depending on the 
composition of positions in each account. For example, a portfolio 
containing products that demonstrate higher volatility exposures may 
see more significant reductions in margin requirements than portfolios 
containing less volatile products during periods of increased 
volatility. However, those portfolios seeing larger initial reductions 
in margin requirements would also tend to experience margin levels that 
remain elevated for a longer period than would otherwise be experienced 
under the current model. As a result, OCC does not believe that the 
proposed rule change would unfairly inhibit access to OCC's services or 
disadvantage or favor any particular user in relationship to another 
user. Accordingly, OCC believes that the proposed rule change would not 
impose any burden or impact on competition.
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    \35\ 15 U.S.C. 78q-1(b)(3)(I).
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    (C) Clearing Agency's Statement on Comments on the Proposed Rule 
Change Received From Members, Participants or Others
    Written comments on the proposed rule change were not and are not 
intended to be solicited with respect to the proposed rule change and 
none have been received.

III. Date of Effectiveness of the Proposed Rule Change and Timing for 
Commission Action

    Within 45 days of the date of publication of this notice in the 
Federal Register or within such longer period up to 90 days (i) as the 
Commission may designate if it finds such longer period to be 
appropriate and publishes its reasons for so finding or (ii) as to 
which the self-regulatory organization consents, the Commission will:
    (A) By order approve or disapprove the proposed rule change, or
    (B) institute proceedings to determine whether the proposed rule 
change should be disapproved.

IV. Solicitation of Comments

    Interested persons are invited to submit written data, views and 
arguments concerning the foregoing, including whether the proposed rule 
change is consistent with the Act. Comments may be submitted by any of 
the following methods:

Electronic Comments

     Use the Commission's internet comment form (http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml); or
     Send an email to [email protected]. Please include 
File Number SR-OCC-2018-014 on the subject line.

Paper Comments

     Send paper comments in triplicate to Secretary, Securities 
and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street NE, Washington, DC 20549-1090.

All submissions should refer to File Number SR-OCC-2018-014. This file 
number should be included on the subject line if email is used. To help 
the Commission process and review your comments more efficiently, 
please use only one method. The Commission will post all comments on 
the Commission's internet website (http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml). 
Copies of the submission, all subsequent amendments, all written 
statements

[[Page 55922]]

with respect to the proposed rule change that are filed with the 
Commission, and all written communications relating to the proposed 
rule change between the Commission and any person, other than those 
that may be withheld from the public in accordance with the provisions 
of 5 U.S.C. 552, will be available for website viewing and printing in 
the Commission's Public Reference Room, 100 F Street NE, Washington, DC 
20549, on official business days between the hours of 10:00 a.m. and 
3:00 p.m. Copies of such filing also will be available for inspection 
and copying at the principal office of OCC and on OCC's website at 
https://www.theocc.com/about/publications/bylaws.jsp.
    All comments received will be posted without change. Persons 
submitting comments are cautioned that we do not redact or edit 
personal identifying information from comment submissions. You should 
submit only information that you wish to make available publicly.
    All submissions should refer to File Number SR-OCC-2018-014 and 
should be submitted on or before November 29, 2018.

    For the Commission, by the Division of Trading and Markets, 
pursuant to delegated authority.\36\
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    \36\ 17 CFR 200.30-3(a)(12).
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Eduardo A. Aleman,
Assistant Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2018-24400 Filed 11-7-18; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 8011-01-P