[Federal Register Volume 83, Number 204 (Monday, October 22, 2018)]
[Notices]
[Pages 53317-53321]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2018-22986]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket No. 50-219; NRC-2018-0167]
Exelon Generation Company, LLC; Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating
Station Request for Exemptions Regarding Emergency Planning
Requirements
AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
ACTION: Exemption; issuance.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has issued
exemptions in response to a request from Exelon Generation Company, LLC
(Exelon or the licensee) regarding certain emergency planning (EP)
requirements. The exemptions eliminate the requirements to maintain an
offsite radiological emergency preparedness plan and reduce the scope
of onsite EP activities at the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station
(Oyster Creek), based on the reduced risks of accidents that could
result in an offsite radiological release at a decommissioning nuclear
power reactor.
DATES: The exemption was issued on October 16, 2018.
ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID NRC-2018-0167 when contacting the
NRC about the availability of information regarding this document. You
may obtain publicly-available information related to this document
using any of the following methods:
Federal Rulemaking Website: Go to http://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2018-0167. Address
questions about NRC dockets to Jennifer Borges; telephone: 301-287-
9127; email: [email protected]. For technical questions, contact
the individual listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section of
this document.
NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System
(ADAMS): You may obtain publicly-available documents online in the
ADAMS Public Documents collection at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To begin the search, select ``Begin Web-based ADAMS
Search.'' For problems with ADAMS, please contact the NRC's Public
Document Room (PDR) reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737, or
by email to [email protected]. The ADAMS accession number for each
document referenced (if it is available in ADAMS) is provided the first
time that it is mentioned in this document. In addition, for the
convenience of the reader, the ADAMS accession numbers are provided in
a table in the ``Availability of Documents'' section of this document.
NRC's PDR: You may examine and purchase copies of public
documents at the NRC's PDR, Room O1-F21, One White Flint North, 11555
Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: John G. Lamb, Office of Nuclear
Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC
20555-0001; telephone: 301-415-3100; email: [email protected].
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The text of the exemption is attached.
I. Availability of Documents
The documents identified in the following table are available for
public inspection through ADAMS, a public web page, or by using one of
the methods discussed in the ADDRESSES section of this document.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ADAMS accession no. or public web
Title Date page
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Exelon Generation Company, LLC, February 14, 2018.................... ML18045A084.
letter to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, ``Certification of
Permanent Cessation of Power
Operations for Oyster Creek
Nuclear Generating Station''.
Exelon Generation Company, LLC, August 22, 2017...................... ML17234A082.
letter to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, ``Request for
Exemptions from Portions of 10 CFR
50.47 and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix
E''.
Exelon Generation Company, LLC, December 6, 2017..................... ML17340A708.
letter to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, ``Response to Request
for Additional Information (RAI)
Regarding Request for Exemption
from Portions of 10 CFR 50.47 and
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E''.
Exelon Generation Company, LLC, January 23, 2018..................... ML18023A138.
letter to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, ``Supplement to
Request for Exemption from
Portions of 10 CFR 50.47 and 10
CFR Part 50, Appendix E''.
Exelon Generation Company, LLC, March 8, 2018........................ ML18067A087.
letter to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, ``Supplement to
Request for Exemption from
Portions of 10 CFR 50.47 and 10
CFR Part 50, Appendix E''.
Exelon Generation Company, LLC, March 19, 2018....................... ML18078A146.
letter to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, ``Response to Request
for Additional Information (RAI)
Related to Exemption Request from
Portions of 10 CFR 50.47 and 10
CFR Part 50, Appendix E''.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, August 1997.......................... ML082260098.
NUREG/CR-6451, ``A Safety and
Regulatory Assessment of Generic
BWR and PWR Permanently Shutdown
Nuclear Power Plants''.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, February 2001........................ ML010430066.
NUREG-1738, ``Technical Study of
Spent Fuel Pool Accident Risk at
Decommissioning Nuclear Power
Plants''.
Federal Emergency Management Agency November 2010........................ http://www.fema.gov/pdf/about/
Comprehensive Preparedness Guide divisions/npd/CPG_101_V2.pdf.
101, ``Developing and Maintaining
Emergency Operations Plans,''
Version 2.0.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, September 2014....................... ML14255A365.
NUREG-2161, ``Consequence Study of
a Beyond-Design-Basis Earthquake
Affecting the Spent Fuel Pool for
a U.S. Mark I Boiling Water
Reactor''.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, November 12, 2013.................... ML13329A918.
COMSECY-13-0030, ``Staff
Evaluation and Recommendation for
Japan Lessons-Learned Tier 3 Issue
on Expedited Transfer of Spent
Fuel''.
[[Page 53318]]
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, May 31, 2018......................... ML18030B359.
SECY-18-0062, ``Request by the
Exelon Generation Company, LLC for
Exemptions from Certain Emergency
Planning Requirements for the
Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating
Station''.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, July 17, 2018........................ ML18198A449.
``Staff Requirements--SECY-18-
0062, Request by the Exelon
Generation Company, LLC for
Exemptions from Certain Emergency
Planning Requirements for the
Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating
Station''.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, October 16, 2018..................... ML18220A980.
letter to Exelon Generation
Company, LLC ``Oyster Creek
Nuclear Generating Station--
Exemptions from Certain Emergency
Planning Requirements and Related
Safety Evaluation''.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, on October 17, 2018.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
John G. Lamb,
Senior Project Manager, Special Projects and Process Branch, Division
of Operating Reactor Licensing, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
Attachment--Exemption
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Docket No. 50-219
Exelon Generation Company, LLC
Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station
Exemption
I. Background.
Exelon Generation Company, LLC (Exelon or the licensee) is the
holder of Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR[dash]16 for
Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station (Oyster Creek). The license
provides, among other things, that the facility is subject to all
rules, regulations, and orders of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) now or hereafter in effect. The facility consists
of a boiling[dash]water reactor (BWR) located in Ocean County, New
Jersey.
By letter dated February 14, 2018 (Agencywide Documents Access
and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML18045A084), Exelon
submitted a certification to the NRC that it would permanently cease
power operations at Oyster Creek no later than October 31, 2018. On
September 17, 2018, Exelon permanently ceased power operations at
Oyster Creek. By letter dated September 25, 2018 (ADAMS Accession
No. ML18268A258), Exelon certified the permanent removal of fuel
from the Oyster Creek reactor vessel.
In accordance with Sec. 50.82(a)(2) of Title 10 of the Code of
Federal Regulations (10 CFR), the license for a power reactor
facility no longer authorizes operation of the reactor or
emplacement or retention of fuel into the reactor vessel upon the
docketing of the certifications for permanent cessation of
operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel.
The facility is still authorized to possess and store irradiated
(i.e., spent) nuclear fuel. Spent fuel is currently stored onsite in
the Oyster Creek spent fuel pool (SFP) and a dry cask independent
spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI) at the Oyster Creek
facility.
During normal power reactor operations, the forced flow of water
through the reactor coolant system removes heat generated by the
reactor. The reactor coolant system, operating at high temperatures
and pressures, transfers this heat through the steam generator tubes
converting non[dash]radioactive feedwater to steam, which then flows
to the main turbine generator to produce electricity. Many of the
accident scenarios postulated in the updated safety analysis reports
(USARs) for operating power reactors involve failures or
malfunctions of systems, which could affect the fuel in the reactor
core and, in the most severe postulated accidents, would involve the
release of large quantities of fission products. With the permanent
cessation of operations at Oyster Creek and the permanent removal of
the fuel from the reactor vessel, such accidents are no longer
possible. The reactor, reactor coolant system, and supporting
systems are no longer in operation and have no function related to
the storage of the spent fuel. Therefore, emergency planning (EP)
provisions for postulated accidents involving failure or malfunction
of the reactor, reactor coolant system, or supporting systems are no
longer applicable.
The EP requirements of 10 CFR 50.47, ``Emergency plans,'' and
Appendix E to 10 CFR part 50, ``Emergency Planning and Preparedness
for Production and Utilization Facilities,'' continue to apply to
nuclear power reactors that have permanently ceased operation and
have permanently removed all fuel from the reactor vessel. There are
no explicit regulatory provisions distinguishing EP requirements for
a power reactor that is permanently shut down and defueled from
those for a reactor that is authorized to operate. To reduce or
eliminate EP requirements that are no longer necessary due to the
decommissioning status of the facility, Exelon must obtain
exemptions from those EP regulations. Only then can Exelon modify
the Oyster Creek emergency plan to reflect the reduced risk
associated with the permanently shutdown and defueled condition of
Oyster Creek.
II. Request/Action.
By letter dated August 22, 2017 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML17234A082), Exelon requested exemptions from certain EP
requirements of 10 CFR part 50 for Oyster Creek. Specifically,
Exelon requested exemptions from certain planning standards in 10
CFR 50.47(b) regarding onsite and offsite radiological emergency
preparedness plans for nuclear power reactors, from certain
requirements in 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2) for establishment of plume
exposure and ingestion pathway emergency planning zones for nuclear
power reactors; and from certain requirements in 10 CFR part 50,
Appendix E, Section IV, which establishes the elements that make up
the content of emergency plans. In letters dated December 6, 2017,
and January 23, March 8, and March 19, 2018 (ADAMS Accession Nos.
ML17340A708, ML18023A138, ML18067A087, and ML18078A146,
respectively), Exelon provided supplemental information and
responses to the NRC staff's requests for additional information
concerning the proposed exemptions.
The information provided by Exelon included justifications for
each exemption requested. The exemptions requested by Exelon would
eliminate the requirements to maintain formal offsite radiological
emergency preparedness plans reviewed by the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) under the requirements of 44 CFR part 350
and would reduce the scope of onsite EP activities at Oyster Creek.
The licensee stated that the application of all of the standards and
requirements in 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c), and 10 CFR part
50, Appendix E is not needed for adequate emergency response
capability, based on the substantially lower onsite and offsite
radiological consequences of accidents still possible at the
permanently shutdown and defueled facility, as compared to an
operating facility. If offsite protective actions were needed for a
highly unlikely beyond-design-basis accident that could challenge
the safe storage of spent fuel at Oyster Creek, provisions exist for
offsite agencies to take protective actions using a comprehensive
emergency management plan (CEMP) under the National Preparedness
System to protect the health and safety of the public. A CEMP in
this context, also referred to as an emergency operations plan, is
addressed in FEMA's Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 101,
``Developing and Maintaining Emergency Operations Plans,'' which is
publicly available at http://www.fema.gov/pdf/about/divisions/npd/CPG_101_V2.pdf. Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 101 is the
foundation for State, territorial, Tribal, and local EP in the
United States. It promotes a common understanding of the
fundamentals of risk[dash]informed planning and decision[dash]making
and helps planners at all levels of government in their efforts to
develop and maintain viable, all[dash]hazards, all[dash]threats
emergency plans. An emergency operations plan is flexible enough for
use in all emergencies. It describes how people and property will be
protected; details who is responsible for carrying out specific
actions; identifies the personnel, equipment, facilities, supplies
and other resources
[[Page 53319]]
available; and outlines how all actions will be coordinated. A CEMP
is often referred to as a synonym for ``all[dash]hazards planning.''
III. Discussion.
In accordance with 10 CFR 50.12, ``Specific exemptions,'' the
Commission may, upon application by any interested person or upon
its own initiative, grant exemptions from the requirements of 10 CFR
part 50 when: (1) the exemptions are authorized by law, will not
present an undue risk to public health and safety, and are
consistent with the common defense and security; and (2) any of the
special circumstances listed in 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2) are present.
These special circumstances include, among other things, that the
application of the regulation in the particular circumstances would
not serve the underlying purpose of the rule or is not necessary to
achieve the underlying purpose of the rule.
As noted previously, the EP regulations contained in 10 CFR
50.47(b) and Appendix E to 10 CFR part 50 apply to both operating
and shutdown power reactors. The NRC has consistently acknowledged
that the risk of an offsite radiological release at a power reactor
that has permanently ceased operations and permanently removed fuel
from the reactor vessel is significantly lower, and the types of
possible accidents are significantly fewer, than at an operating
power reactor. However, the EP regulations do not recognize that
once a power reactor permanently ceases operation, the risk of a
large radiological release from credible emergency accident
scenarios is significantly reduced. The reduced risk for any
significant offsite radiological release is based on two factors.
One factor is the elimination of accidents applicable only to an
operating power reactor, resulting in fewer credible accident
scenarios. The second factor is the reduced short[dash]lived
radionuclide inventory and decay heat production due to radioactive
decay. Due to the permanently defueled status of the reactor, no new
spent fuel will be added to the SFP and the radionuclides in the
current spent fuel will continue to decay as the spent fuel ages.
The irradiated fuel will produce less heat due to radioactive decay,
increasing the available time to mitigate a loss of water inventory
from the SFP. The NRC's NUREG/CR-6451, ``A Safety and Regulatory
Assessment of Generic BWR [Boiling Water Reactor] and PWR
[Pressurized Water Reactor] Permanently Shutdown Nuclear Power
Plants,'' dated August 1997 (ADAMS Accession No. ML082260098), and
the NRC's NUREG[dash]1738, ``Technical Study of Spent Fuel Pool
Accident Risk at Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants,'' dated
February 2001 (ADAMS Accession No. ML010430066), confirmed that for
permanently shutdown and defueled power reactors that are bounded by
the assumptions and conditions in the report, the risk of offsite
radiological release is significantly less than for an operating
power reactor.
In the past, EP exemptions similar to those requested for Oyster
Creek, have been granted to permanently shutdown and defueled power
reactor licensees. However, the exemptions did not relieve the
licensees of all EP requirements. Rather, the exemptions allowed the
licensees to modify their emergency plans commensurate with the
credible site-specific risks that were consistent with a permanently
shutdown and defueled status. Specifically, the NRC's approval of
these prior exemptions was based on the licensee's demonstration
that: (1) the radiological consequences of design-basis accidents
would not exceed the limits of the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency's (EPA) early phase Protective Action Guides (PAGs) of one
roentgen equivalent man (rem) at the exclusion area boundary; and
(2) in the highly unlikely event of a beyond-design-basis accident
resulting in a loss of all modes of heat transfer from the fuel
stored in the SFP, there is sufficient time to initiate appropriate
mitigating actions, and if needed, for offsite authorities to
implement offsite protective actions using a CEMP approach to
protect the health and safety of the public.
With respect to design[dash]basis accidents at Oyster Creek, the
licensee provided an analysis demonstrating that 12 months (365
days) following permanent cessation of power operations, the
radiological consequences of the only remaining design[dash]basis
accident with potential for offsite radiological release (the fuel
handling accident in the Auxiliary Building, where the SFP is
located) will not exceed the limits of the EPA PAGs at the exclusion
area boundary.
With respect to beyond-design-basis accidents at Oyster Creek,
the licensee analyzed a drain down of the SFP water that would
effectively impede any decay heat removal. The analysis demonstrates
that at 12 months (365 days) after permanent cessation of power
operations, there would be 10 hours after the assemblies have been
uncovered until the limiting fuel assembly (for decay heat and
adiabatic heatup analysis) reaches 900 degrees Celsius ([deg]C), the
temperature used to assess the potential onset of fission product
release. The analysis conservatively assumed that the heat up time
starts when the SFP has been completely drained, although it is
likely that site personnel will start to respond to an incident when
drain down starts. The analysis also does not consider the period of
time from the initiating event causing loss of SFP water inventory
until cooling is lost.
The NRC reviewed the licensee's justification for the requested
exemptions against the criteria in 10 CFR 50.12(a) and determined,
as described below, that the criteria in 10 CFR 50.12(a) will be
met, and that the exemptions should be granted 365 days after Oyster
Creek has permanently defueled. An assessment of the Exelon EP
exemptions is described in SECY-18-0062, ``Request by the Exelon
Generation Company, LLC for Exemptions from Certain Emergency
Planning Requirements for the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating
Station,'' dated May 31, 2018 (ADAMS Accession No. ML18030B340). The
Commission approved the NRC staff's recommendation to grant the
exemptions in the staff requirements memorandum to SECY-18-0062,
dated July 17, 2018 (ADAMS Accession No. ML18198A449). Descriptions
of the specific exemptions requested by Exelon and the NRC staff's
basis for granting each exemption are provided in SECY-18-0062. The
NRC staff's detailed review and technical basis for the approval of
the specific EP exemptions requested by Exelon, are provided in the
NRC staff's safety evaluation associated with this exemption (ADAMS
Accession No. ML18220A980).
A. The Exemption is Authorized by Law.
The licensee has proposed exemptions from certain EP
requirements in 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR 50,
Appendix E, Section IV, that would allow Exelon to revise the Oyster
Creek Emergency Plan to reflect the permanently shutdown and
defueled condition of the facility. As stated above, in accordance
with 10 CFR 50.12, the Commission may, upon application by any
interested person or upon its own initiative, grant exemptions from
the requirements of 10 CFR part 50. The NRC staff has determined
that granting of the licensee's proposed exemptions will not result
in a violation of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, or the
NRC's regulations. Therefore, the exemptions are authorized by law.
B. The Exemption Presents No Undue Risk to Public Health and Safety.
As stated previously, Exelon provided an analysis that show that
the radiological consequences of design-basis accidents will not
exceed the limits of the EPA early phase PAGs at the exclusion area
boundary. Therefore, formal offsite radiological emergency
preparedness plans required under 10 CFR part 50 will no longer be
needed for protection of the public beyond the exclusion area
boundary, based on the radiological consequences of design-basis
accidents still possible at Oyster Creek 365 days after the plant
has permanently ceased power operations.
Although highly unlikely, there is one postulated beyond-design-
basis accident that might result in significant offsite radiological
releases. However, NUREG-1738 confirms that the risk of beyond-
design-basis accidents is greatly reduced at permanently shutdown
and defueled reactors. The NRC staff's analyses in NUREG-1738
conclude that the event sequences important to risk at permanently
shutdown and defueled power reactors are limited to large
earthquakes and cask drop events. For EP assessments, this is an
important difference relative to operating power reactors, where
typically a large number of different sequences make significant
contributions to risk. As described in NUREG-1738, relaxation of
offsite EP requirements in 10 CFR part 50 beyond a few months after
shutdown resulted in only a small change in risk. The report further
concludes that the change in risk due to relaxation of offsite EP
requirements is small because the overall risk is low, and because
even under current EP requirements for operating power reactors, EP
was judged to have marginal impact on evacuation effectiveness for
the severe earthquakes that dominate SFP risk. All other sequences
including cask drops (for which offsite radiological emergency
preparedness plans are expected to be more effective) are too low in
likelihood to have a significant impact on risk.
[[Page 53320]]
Therefore, granting exemptions to eliminate the requirements of
10 CFR part 50 to maintain offsite radiological emergency
preparedness plans and to reduce the scope of onsite EP activities
will not present an undue risk to the public health and safety.
C. The Exemption Is Consistent With the Common Defense and Security.
The requested exemptions only involve EP requirements under 10
CFR part 50 and will allow Exelon to revise the Oyster Creek
Emergency Plan to reflect the permanently shutdown and defueled
condition of the facility. Physical security measures at Oyster
Creek are not affected by the requested EP exemptions. The
discontinuation of formal offsite radiological emergency
preparedness plans and the reduction in scope of the onsite EP
activities at Oyster Creek will not adversely affect Exelon's
ability to physically secure the site or protect special nuclear
material. Therefore, the proposed exemptions are consistent with
common defense and security.
D. Special Circumstances.
Special circumstances, in accordance with 10 CFR
50.12(a)(2)(ii), are present whenever application of the regulation
in the particular circumstances is not necessary to achieve the
underlying purpose of the rule. The underlying purpose of 10 CFR
50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR part 50, Appendix E,
Section IV, is to provide reasonable assurance that adequate
protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a
radiological emergency, to establish plume exposure and ingestion
pathway emergency planning zones for nuclear power plants, and to
ensure that licensees maintain effective offsite and onsite
radiological emergency preparedness plans. The standards and
requirements in these regulations were developed by considering the
risks associated with operation of a power reactor at its licensed
full-power level. These risks include the potential for a reactor
accident with offsite radiological dose consequences.
As discussed previously in Section III, because Oyster Creek
will be permanently shut down and defueled, there will no longer be
a risk of a significant offsite radiological release from a design-
basis accident exceeding EPA early phase PAG at the exclusion area
boundary and the risk of a significant offsite radiological release
from a beyond-design-basis accident is greatly reduced when compared
to an operating power reactor. The NRC staff has confirmed the
reduced risks at Oyster Creek by comparing the generic risk
assumptions in the analyses in NUREG-1738 to site-specific
conditions at Oyster Creek and determined that the risk values in
NUREG-1738 bound the risks presented at Oyster Creek. As indicated
by the results of the research conducted for NUREG-1738, and more
recently for NUREG-2161, ``Consequence Study of a Beyond-Design-
Basis Earthquake Affecting the Spent Fuel Pool for a U.S. Mark I
Boiling Water Reactor,'' dated September 2014 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML14255A365), while other consequences can be extensive, accidents
from SFPs with significant decay time have little potential to cause
offsite early fatalities, even if the formal offsite radiological EP
requirements were relaxed. The licensee's analysis of a beyond-
design-basis accident involving a complete loss of SFP water
inventory, based on an adiabatic heatup analysis of the limiting
fuel assembly for decay heat, shows that within 12 months (365 days)
after permanent cessation of power operations, the time for the
limiting fuel assembly to reach 900 [deg]C is at least 10 hours
after the assemblies have been uncovered assuming a loss of all
cooling means.
The only analyzed beyond-design-basis accident scenario that
progresses to a condition where a significant offsite release might
occur, involves the highly unlikely event where the SFP drains in
such a way that all modes of cooling or heat transfer are assumed to
be unavailable, which is referred to as an adiabatic heatup of the
spent fuel. The licensee's analysis of this beyond-design-basis
accident shows that within 12 months (365 days) after permanent
cessation of power operations, at least 10 hours would be available
between the time that all cooling means are lost to the fuel (at
which time adiabatic heatup is conservatively assumed to begin),
until the fuel cladding reaches a temperature of 1652 degrees
Fahrenheit (900 [deg]C), which is the temperature associated with
rapid cladding oxidation and the potential for a significant
radiological release. This analysis conservatively does not include
the period of time from the initiating event causing a loss of SFP
water inventory until all cooling means are lost.
The NRC staff has verified Exelon's analyses and its
calculations. The analyses provide reasonable assurance that in
granting the requested exemptions to Exelon, there is no design-
basis accident that will result in an offsite radiological release
exceeding the EPA early phase PAGs at the exclusion area boundary.
In the highly unlikely event of a beyond-design-basis accident
affecting the SFP that results in a complete loss of heat removal
via all modes of heat transfer, there will be over 10 hours
available before an offsite release might occur and, therefore, at
least 10 hours to initiate appropriate mitigating actions to restore
a means of heat removal to the spent fuel. If a radiological release
were projected to occur under this highly unlikely scenario, a
minimum of 10 hours is considered sufficient time for offsite
authorities to implement protective actions using a CEMP approach to
protect the health and safety of the public.
Exemptions from the offsite EP requirements in 10 CFR Part 50
have previously been approved by the NRC when the site-specific
analyses show that at least 10 hours is available following a loss
of SFP coolant inventory accident with no air cooling (or other
methods of removing decay heat) until cladding of the hottest fuel
assembly reaches the rapid oxidation temperature. The NRC staff
concluded in its previously granted exemptions, as it does with
Exelon's requested EP exemptions, that if a minimum of 10 hours is
available to initiate mitigative actions consistent with plant
conditions, or if needed, for offsite authorities to implement
protective actions using a CEMP approach, then formal offsite
radiological emergency preparedness plans, required under 10 CFR
Part 50, are not necessary at permanently shutdown and defueled
facilities.
Additionally, Oyster Creek committed to maintaining SFP makeup
strategies in its letters to the NRC dated March 8 and 19, 2018. The
multiple strategies for providing makeup to the SFP include: using
existing plant systems for inventory makeup; an internal strategy
that relies on the fire protection system with redundant pumps (one
diesel-driven and electric motor-driven); and onsite diesel fire
truck that can take suction from the Barnegat Bay. These strategies
will continue to be required as condition 2.C.(8), ``Mitigation
Strategy License Condition,'' of renewed facility operating license
DPR-16 for Oyster Creek. Considering the very low probability of
beyond-design-basis accidents affecting the SFP, these diverse
strategies provide multiple methods to obtain additional makeup or
spray to the SFP before the onset of any postulated offsite
radiological release.
For all of the reasons stated above, the NRC staff finds that
the licensee's requested exemptions meet the underlying purpose of
all of the standards in 10 CFR 50.47(b), and requirements in 10 CFR
50.47(c)(2) and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, and satisfy the special
circumstances provision in 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii) in view of the
greatly reduced risk of offsite radiological consequences associated
with the permanently shutdown and defueled state of the Oyster Creek
facility 12 months (365 days) after permanent cessation of power
operations.
The NRC staff has concluded that the exemptions being granted by
this action will maintain an acceptable level of emergency
preparedness at Oyster Creek and, if needed, that there is
reasonable assurance that adequate offsite protective measures can
and will be taken by State and local government agencies using a
CEMP approach in the unlikely event of a radiological emergency at
Oyster Creek. Since the underlying purposes of the rules, as
exempted, would continue to be achieved, even with the elimination
of the requirements under 10 CFR Part 50 to maintain formal offsite
radiological emergency preparedness plans and the reduction in the
scope of the onsite emergency planning activities at Oyster Creek,
the special circumstances required by 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii) exist.
E. Environmental Considerations.
In accordance with 10 CFR 51.31(a), the Commission has
determined that the granting of this exemption will not have a
significant effect on the quality of the human environment as
discussed in the NRC staff's Finding of No Significant Impact and
associated Environmental Assessment published in the Federal
Register on August 13, 2018 (83 FR 40092).
IV. Conclusions.
Accordingly, the Commission has determined that, pursuant to 10
CFR 50.12, Exelon's request for exemptions from certain EP
requirements in 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR Part
50, Appendix E,
[[Page 53321]]
Section IV, and as summarized in Enclosure 2 to SECY-18-0062, are
authorized by law, will not present an undue risk to the public
health and safety, and are consistent with the common defense and
security. Also, special circumstances are present. Therefore, the
Commission hereby grants Exelon's exemptions from certain EP
requirements in 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR Part
50, Appendix E, Section IV, as discussed and evaluated in detail in
the NRC staff's safety evaluation associated with this exemption.
The exemptions are effective as of 12 months (365 days) after
permanent cessation of power operations.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 16th day of October 2018.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
/RA/
Kathryn M. Brock,
Deputy Director, Division of Operating Reactor Licensing, Office of
Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 2018-22986 Filed 10-19-18; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P