[Federal Register Volume 83, Number 67 (Friday, April 6, 2018)]
[Notices]
[Pages 14898-14901]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2018-07033]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50-285; NRC-2018-0067]


Omaha Public Power District; Fort Calhoun Station, Unit No. 1

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Exemption; issuance.

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SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has issued an 
exemption from the requirement to maintain a specified level of onsite 
property damage insurance in response to a request from Omaha Public 
Power District (OPPD or the licensee) dated April 28, 2017. 
Specifically, OPPD requested an exemption from the regulatory 
requirements to permit Fort Calhoun Station (FCS) to reduce its onsite 
insurance from $1.06 billion to $50 million.

DATES: The exemption was issued on March 29, 2018.

ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID NRC-2018-0067 when contacting the 
NRC about the availability of information regarding this document. You 
may obtain publicly-available information related to this document 
using any of the following methods:
     Federal Rulemaking Web Site: Go to http://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2018-0067. Address 
questions about NRC dockets to Jennifer Borges; telephone: 301-287-
9127; email: [email protected]. For technical questions, contact 
the individual listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section of 
this document.
     NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System 
(ADAMS): You may obtain publicly-available documents online in the 
ADAMS Public Documents collection at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To begin the search, select ``ADAMS Public Documents'' and 
then select ``Begin Web-based ADAMS Search.'' For problems with ADAMS, 
please contact the NRC's Public Document Room (PDR) reference staff at 
1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737, or by email to [email protected]. The 
ADAMS accession number for each document referenced (if it is available 
in ADAMS) is provided the first time that it is mentioned in this 
document.
     NRC's PDR: You may examine and purchase copies of public 
documents at the NRC's PDR, Room O1-F21, One White Flint North, 11555 
Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: James S. Kim, Office of Nuclear 
Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 
20555-0001; telephone: 301-415-4125, email: [email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The text of the exemption is attached.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 3rd day of April, 2018.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
James S. Kim,
Project Manager, Special Projects and Process Branch, Division of 
Operating Reactor Licensing, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

Attachment--Exemption

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Docket No. 50[dash]285

Omaha Public Power District

Fort Calhoun Station, Unit No. 1

Exemption

I. Background.

    The Fort Calhoun Station, Unit 1 (FCS) site is located midway 
between Fort Calhoun and Blair, Nebraska, on the west bank of the 
Missouri River. The FCS facility includes one Combustion Engineering 
pressurized water reactor licensed to operate at power levels not to 
exceed 1500 megawatts thermal. The distance from the reactor 
containment to the nearest site boundary is approximately 910 meters 
(.6 miles). Except for the city of Blair and the villages of Fort 
Calhoun and Kennard, the land use within the 10-mile radius of FCS 
is devoted to general farming.
    Omaha Public Power District (OPPD) is the holder of Renewed 
Facility Operating License No. DPR-40. The license provides, among 
other things, that the facility is subject to all rules, 
regulations, and orders of the NRC now or hereafter in effect.

[[Page 14899]]

    By letter dated June 24, 2016 (Agencywide Documents Access and 
Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML16176A213), OPPD submitted 
a certification pursuant to part 50 of title 10 of the Code of 
Federal Regulations (10 CFR) paragraph 50.82(a)(1)(i) to the NRC 
indicating that it would permanently shut down FCS by December 31, 
2016. On October 24, 2016, OPPD permanently ceased power operations 
at FCS. On November 13, 2016, OPPD submitted a certification 
pursuant to 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(ii) that it had permanently removed 
all fuel from the FCS reactor vessel and placed the fuel into the 
FCS spent fuel pool (SFP) (ADAMS Accession No. ML16319A254). 
Accordingly, upon docketing the certificates pursuant to 10 CFR 
50.82(a)(2), the FCS renewed facility operating license no longer 
authorized operation of the reactor or emplacement or retention of 
fuel in the reactor vessel. However, the licensee remains authorized 
to possess and store irradiated nuclear fuel. Irradiated fuel is 
currently being stored onsite in a SFP and in independent spent fuel 
storage installation (ISFSI) dry casks.

II. Request/Action.

    Under 10 CFR 50.12, ``Specific exemptions,'' OPPD has requested 
an exemption from 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) by a letter dated April 28, 
2017 (ADAMS Accession No. ML17118A337). The exemption from the 
requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) would permit OPPD to reduce its 
onsite property damage insurance to $50 million.
    The regulation in 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) requires each licensee to 
have and maintain onsite property damage insurance to stabilize and 
decontaminate the reactor and reactor site in the event of an 
accident. The onsite insurance coverage must be either $1.06 billion 
or whatever amount of insurance is generally available from private 
sources (whichever is less).
    The licensee stated that the risk of an accident at a 
permanently shutdown and defueled reactor is much less than the risk 
from an operating power reactor. Since the license no longer 
authorizes reactor operation or emplacement or retention of fuel in 
the reactor vessel at FCS, there are no events that would require 
the stabilization of reactor conditions after an accident. 
Similarly, the risk of an accident that would result in significant 
onsite contamination at FCS is also much lower than the risk of such 
an event at an operating reactor. Therefore, OPPD requested an 
exemption from 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) effective April 7, 2018, that 
would permit a reduction in its onsite property damage insurance 
from $1.06 billion to $50 million, commensurate with the reduced 
risk of an accident at the permanently shutdown and defueled FCS 
reactor.

III. Discussion.

    Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12, the Commission may, upon application 
by any interested person or upon its own initiative, grant 
exemptions from the requirements of 10 CFR part 50 when 1) the 
exemptions are authorized by law, will not present an undue risk to 
public health or safety, and are consistent with the common defense 
and security; and 2) any of the special circumstances listed in 10 
CFR 50.12(a)(2) are present.
    The financial protection limits of 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) were 
established after the Three Mile Island accident out of concern that 
licensees may be unable to financially cover onsite cleanup costs in 
the event of a major nuclear accident. The specified $1.06 billion 
coverage requirement was developed based on an analysis of an 
accident at a nuclear reactor operating at power, resulting in a 
large fission product release and requiring significant resource 
expenditures to stabilize the reactor conditions and ultimately 
decontaminate and cleanup the site.
    The NRC developed these cost estimates from the spectrum of 
postulated accidents for an operating nuclear reactor and the 
consequences of any associated release of radioactive material from 
the reactor. Although the risk of an accident at an operating 
reactor is very low, the consequences can be large. In an operating 
reactor, the high temperature and pressure of the reactor coolant 
system (RCS), as well as the inventory of relatively short-lived 
radionuclides, contribute to both the risk and consequences of an 
accident. With the permanent cessation of reactor operations at FCS 
and the permanent removal of the fuel from the reactor core, such 
accidents are no longer possible. As a result, the reactor, RCS, and 
supporting systems no longer operate and, therefore, have no 
function related to the storage of the irradiated fuel. Hence, 
postulated accidents involving failure or malfunction of the 
reactor, RCS, or supporting systems are no longer applicable.
    During reactor decommissioning, the principal radiological risks 
are associated with the storage of spent fuel onsite. In its 
December 16, 2016 (ADAMS Accession No. ML16356A578), exemption 
request, OPPD describes both design-basis and beyond-design-basis 
events involving irradiated fuel stored in the SFP. The staff 
independently evaluated the offsite consequences associated with 
various decommissioning activities, design basis accidents, and 
beyond design basis accidents at FCS, in consideration of its 
permanently shut down and defueled status. The possible design-basis 
and beyond design basis accident scenarios at FCS show that the 
radiological consequences of these accidents are greatly reduced at 
a permanently shut down and defueled reactor, in comparison to a 
fueled reactor. Further, the staff has used the offsite radiological 
release limits established by the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) early-phase Protective Action Guidelines (PAGs) of one 
roentgen equivalent man (rem) at the exclusion area boundary in 
determining that any possible radiological releases would be minimal 
and would not require precautionary protective actions (e.g., 
sheltering in place or evacuation).
    The staff evaluated the radiological consequences associated 
with various decommissioning activities, and design basis accidents 
at FCS, in consideration of permanently shut down and defueled 
status of FCS. The only design-basis accidents that could 
potentially result in an offsite radiological release at FCS, 
following its permanent shutdown and defueling, are the Fuel 
Handling Accident (FHA) and rupture of a large liquid radioactive 
waste tank. OPPD performed an analysis demonstrating that 10 days 
after shutdown, the radiological consequences of a FHA would not 
exceed the limits established by the EPA PAGs at the exclusion area 
boundary. In case of a rupture of a large liquid radioactive waste 
tank in the December 16, 2016 letter, the FCS radioactive waste 
disposal system is designed such that any spillage or leakage of 
radioactive waste would be retained within the facility. After 18 
months of decay, the only isotope remaining in significant amounts, 
among those postulated to be released from the gaseous release 
associated with a liquid waste tank failure (LWTF), would be Krypton 
85. The resulting skin dose from the release of Krypton 85 would 
make an insignificant contribution to the total effective dose 
equivalent, which is the parameter of interest in the determination 
of EPA PAGs for sheltering or evacuation. Accordingly, based on the 
time that FCS has been permanently shutdown (approximately 18 
months), the staff has determined that the possibility of an offsite 
radiological release from design-basis accidents that could exceed 
the EPA PAGs has been eliminated.
    The only beyond design-basis event that has the potential to 
lead to a significant radiological release at a permanently shut 
down and defueled (decommissioning) reactor is a zirconium fire. The 
zirconium fire scenario is a postulated, but highly unlikely, 
accident scenario that involves the loss of water inventory from the 
SFP, resulting in a significant heat-up of the spent fuel and 
culminating in substantial zirconium cladding oxidation and fuel 
damage. The probability of a zirconium fire scenario is related to 
the decay heat of the irradiated fuel stored in the SFP. Therefore, 
the risks from a zirconium fire scenario continue to decrease as a 
function of the time that FCS has been permanently shut down.
    The NRC previously determined that a lesser amount of onsite 
property damage insurance coverage can be authorized based on 
analysis of the zirconium fire risk. In response to SECY-96-256, 
``Changes to Financial Protection Requirements for Permanently 
Shutdown Nuclear Power Reactors, 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) and 10 CFR 
140.11,'' dated December 17, 1996 (ADAMS Accession No. ML15062A483), 
the Commission issued Staff Requirements Memorandum dated January 
28, 1997 (ADAMS Accession No. ML15062A454), and supported the 
staff's recommendation that, among other things, would allow 
permanently shutdown power reactor licensees to reduce commercial 
onsite property damage insurance coverage to $50 million when the 
licensee was able to demonstrate the technical criterion that the 
spent fuel could be air-cooled if the SFP was drained of water and 
to account for the postulated rupture of a large liquid radiological 
waste tank at the FCS site, should such an event occur. The staff 
has used this technical criterion to grant similar exemptions to 
other decommissioning

[[Page 14900]]

reactors (e.g., Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station, published in the 
Federal Register on January 19, 1999 (64 FR 2920); Zion Nuclear 
Power Station, published in the Federal Register on December 28, 
1999 (64 FR 72700), and Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station, 
published in the Federal Register on April 25, 2016 (81 FR 24136)).
    In SECY-00-0145, ``Integrated Rulemaking Plan for Nuclear Power 
Plant Decommissioning,'' dated June 28, 2000, and SECY-01-0100, 
``Policy Issues Related to Safeguards, Insurance, and Emergency 
Preparedness Regulations at Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants 
Storing Fuel in Spent Fuel Pools,'' dated June 4, 2001 (ADAMS 
Accession Nos. ML003721626 and ML011450420, respectively), the staff 
discussed additional information concerning SFP zirconium fire risks 
at decommissioning reactors and associated implications for onsite 
property damage insurance. Analyzing when the spent fuel stored in 
the SFP is capable of adequate air-cooling is one measure that 
demonstrates when the probability of a zirconium fire would be 
exceedingly low.
    The licensee's analyses referenced in its exemption request 
demonstrate that under conditions where the SFP water inventory has 
drained and only air-cooling of the stored irradiated fuel is 
available, there is reasonable assurance as of April 7, 2018, which 
is approximately 18 months after the permanent shutdown of the 
facility, that the FCS spent fuel will remain at temperatures far 
below those associated with the onset of zirconium cladding rapid 
oxidation. In addition, the licensee's adiabatic heat-up analyses 
demonstrate that as of April 7, 2018, there would be at least 10 
hours after the loss of all means of cooling (both air and/or 
water), before the spent fuel cladding would reach a temperature 
where the potential for a significant offsite radiological release 
could occur. The licensee maintains strategies and equipment to cool 
the spent fuel in the unlikely event coolant is lost, and the 10-
hour adiabatic heating time would provide sufficient time for 
personnel to respond with on-site equipment to restore a means of 
spent fuel cooling. In OPPD's letter dated December 16, 2016, the 
licensee furnished information concerning its SFP inventory makeup 
strategies, in the event of a loss of SFP coolant inventory. The 
multiple strategies for providing makeup to the SFP include: using 
existing plant systems for inventory makeup; an internal strategy 
that relies on the fire protection system with redundant pumps (one 
diesel-driven and electric motor-driven); and onsite diesel fire 
truck that can take suction from the Missouri River. These 
strategies are maintained by a license condition. The licensee also 
stated that, considering the very low-probability of beyond design-
basis accidents affecting the SFP, these diverse strategies provide 
defense-in-depth and time to mitigate and prevent a zirconium fire, 
using makeup or spray into the SFP before the onset of zirconium 
cladding rapid oxidation.
    By letter dated October 4, 2017 (ADAMS Accession No. 
ML17277B679), OPPD provided a response to an NRC staff request to 
address air-cooling of fuel in a drained pool. In the attachment to 
this letter, the licensee compared FCS fuel storage parameters with 
those used in NRC generic evaluations of fuel cooling included in 
the following documents:

 NUREG/CR-4982, ``Severe Accidents in Spent Fuel Pools in 
Support of Generic Safety Issue 82,'' June 1987; and
 NUREG/CR-6451, ``A Safety and Regulatory Assessment of 
Generic BWR [Boiling-Water Reactor] and PWR [Pressurized-Water 
Reactor] Permanently Shutdown Nuclear Power Plants,'' April 1997 
(ADAMS Accession No. ML082260098).

    The analysis described in NUREG/CR-6451 determined that natural 
air circulation would adequately cool fuel that has decayed for 17 
months after operation in a typical PWR. The licensee found that the 
FCS fuel assemblies have a 20 percent lower power density during 
operation at power, a 10 percent lower peak burnup, and lower 
uranium enrichment, resulting in a much lower decay heat rate per 
assembly than those used in the analysis described in NUREG/CR-6451. 
The licensee determined that the FCS spent fuel storage racks have a 
higher storage density than those used in the NUREG/CR-6451 
analysis. However, the licensee's analysis demonstrated that the 
lower decay heat will be sufficient to offset the higher storage 
density compared to the benchmark. The NRC staff reviewed this 
information and determined that the conclusion that the analysis 
presented in NUREG/CR-6451 would bound the fuel storage conditions 
at FCS was reasonable. Therefore, at 18 months after permanent 
shutdown, which will be reached by the requested effective date of 
April 7, 2018, the fuel stored at the FCS SFP would be adequately 
air-cooled in the unlikely event the pool completely drained.
    In the NRC staff's safety evaluation of the licensee's request 
for exemptions from certain emergency planning requirements dated 
December 11, 2017 (ADAMS Accession No. ML17263B198), the NRC staff 
assessed the OPPD accident analyses associated with the radiological 
risks from a zirconium fire at the permanently shut down and 
defueled FCS site. For the very unlikely beyond design-basis 
accident scenario where the SFP coolant inventory is lost in such a 
manner that all methods of heat removal from the spent fuel are no 
longer available, the staff found there will be a minimum of 10 
hours from the initiation of the accident until the cladding reaches 
a temperature where offsite radiological release might occur. The 
staff finds that 10 hours is sufficient time to support deployment 
of mitigation equipment, consistent with plant conditions, to 
prevent the zirconium cladding from reaching a point of rapid 
oxidation.
    Based on the above discussion and the basis provided in SECY-96-
256, the NRC staff determined $50 million is an adequate level of 
onsite property damage insurance for the FCS decommissioning 
reactor, once the spent fuel in the SFP is susceptible to 
exceedingly low probability of a zirconium fire due to adequate air-
cooling, is provided in SECY-96-256. The staff has postulated that 
there is still a potential for other radiological incidents at a 
decommissioning reactor that could result in significant onsite 
contamination besides a zirconium fire. In SECY-96-256, the NRC 
staff cited the rupture of a large contaminated liquid storage tank, 
causing soil contamination and potential groundwater contamination, 
as the most costly postulated event to decontaminate and remediate 
(other than a SFP zirconium fire). The postulated large liquid 
radiological waste storage tank rupture event was determined to have 
a bounding onsite cleanup cost of approximately $50 million. 
Therefore, the staff determined that the licensee's proposal to 
reduce onsite insurance to a level of $50 million would be 
consistent with the bounding cleanup and decontamination cost, as 
discussed in SECY-96-256, to account for the postulated rupture of a 
large liquid radiological waste tank at the FCS site, should such an 
event occur.

A. Authorized by Law.

    The regulation in 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) requires each licensee to 
have and maintain onsite property damage insurance of either $1.06 
billion or whatever amount of insurance is generally available from 
private sources, whichever is less. In accordance with 10 CFR 50.12, 
the Commission may grant exemptions from the regulations in 10 CFR 
part 50, as the Commission determines are authorized by law.
    As explained above, the NRC staff has determined that the 
licensee's proposed reduction in onsite property damage insurance 
coverage to a level of $50 million is adequate, consistent with the 
basis provided in SECY-96-256. Moreover, the staff concluded that as 
of April 7, 2018, sufficient irradiated fuel decay time will have 
elapsed at FCS to decrease the probability of an onsite and offsite 
radiological release from a postulated zirconium fire accident to 
negligible levels.
    The NRC staff has determined that granting of the licensee's 
proposed exemption will not result in a violation of the Atomic 
Energy Act of 1954, or other laws, as amended. Therefore, based on 
its review of OPPD's exemption request, as discussed above, and 
consistent with SECY-96-256, the NRC staff concludes that the 
exemption is authorized by law.

B. No Undue Risk to Public Health and Safety.

    The onsite property damage insurance requirements of 10 CFR 
50.54(w)(1) were established to provide financial assurance that 
following a significant nuclear accident, onsite reactor conditions 
could be stabilized and the site decontaminated. The requirements of 
10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) and the existing level of onsite insurance 
coverage for FCS are predicated on the assumption that the reactor 
is operating. However, FCS is a permanently shutdown and defueled 
facility. The permanently defueled status of the facility has 
resulted in a significant reduction in the number and severity of 
potential accidents, and correspondingly, a significant reduction in 
the potential for and severity of onsite property damage. The 
proposed reduction in the amount of onsite insurance coverage does 
not impact the probability or

[[Page 14901]]

consequences of potential accidents. The proposed level of insurance 
coverage is commensurate with the reduced consequences of credible 
nuclear accidents at FCS. Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that 
granting the requested exemption will not present an undue risk to 
the health and safety of the public.

C. Consistent with the Common Defense and Security.

    The proposed exemption would not eliminate any requirements 
associated with physical protection of the site and would not 
adversely affect OPPD's ability to physically secure the site or 
protect special nuclear material. Physical security measures at FCS 
are not affected by the requested exemption. Therefore, the proposed 
exemption is consistent with the common defense and security.

D. Special Circumstances.

    Under 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii), special circumstances are present 
if the application of the regulation in the particular circumstances 
would not serve the underlying purpose of the rule or is not 
necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the rule. The 
underlying purpose of 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) is to provide reasonable 
assurance that adequate funds will be available to stabilize reactor 
conditions and cover onsite cleanup costs associated with site 
decontamination, following an accident that results in the release 
of a significant amount of radiological material. Because FCS is 
permanently shut down and defueled, it is no longer possible for the 
radiological consequences of design-basis accidents or other 
credible events at FCS to exceed the limits of the EPA PAGs at the 
exclusion area boundary. The licensee has evaluated the consequences 
of highly unlikely, beyond-design-basis conditions involving a loss 
of coolant from the SFP. The analyses show that as of April 7, 2018, 
the likelihood of such an event leading to a large radiological 
release is negligible. The NRC staff's evaluation of the licensee's 
analyses confirm this conclusion.
    The NRC staff also finds that the licensee's proposed $50 
million level of onsite insurance is consistent with the bounding 
cleanup and decontamination cost, as discussed in the basis provided 
in SECY-96-256. Therefore, the staff concludes that the application 
of the current requirements in 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) to maintain $1.06 
billion in onsite insurance coverage is not necessary to achieve the 
underlying purpose of the rule for the permanently shutdown and 
defueled FCS reactor.
    Under 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(iii), special circumstances are present 
whenever compliance would result in undue hardship or other costs 
that are significantly in excess of those contemplated when the 
regulation was adopted, or that are significantly in excess of those 
incurred by others similarly situated.
    The NRC staff concludes that if the licensee was required to 
continue to maintain an onsite insurance level of $1.06 billion, the 
associated insurance premiums would be in excess of those necessary 
and commensurate with the radiological contamination risks posed by 
the site. In addition, such insurance levels would be significantly 
in excess of other decommissioning reactor facilities that have been 
granted similar exemptions by the NRC.
    The NRC staff finds that compliance with the existing rule would 
result in an undue hardship or other costs that are significantly in 
excess of those contemplated when the regulation was adopted and are 
significantly in excess of those incurred by others similarly 
situated.
    Therefore, the special circumstances required by 10 CFR 
50.12(a)(2)(ii) and 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(iii) exist.

E. Environmental Considerations.

    The requested exemption includes surety, insurance, or indemnity 
requirements, and belongs to a category of actions that the 
Commission, by rule or regulation, has declared to be a categorical 
exclusion, after first finding that the category of actions does not 
individually or cumulatively have a significant effect on the human 
environment. Specifically, the exemption is categorically excluded 
under 10 CFR 51.22(c)(25)(vi)(H). In addition, the NRC staff has 
determined that there would be no significant impacts to biota, 
water resources, historic properties, cultural resources, or 
socioeconomic conditions in the region. As such, there are no 
extraordinary circumstances present that would preclude reliance on 
this categorical exclusion. Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), 
no environmental impact statement need be prepared in connection 
with the approval of this exemption request.
    Under 10 CFR 51.22(c)(25), granting of an exemption from the 
requirements of any regulation of Chapter I to 10 CFR is a 
categorical exclusion provided that (i) there is no significant 
hazards consideration; (ii) there is no significant change in the 
types or significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that 
may be released offsite; (iii) there is no significant increase in 
individual or cumulative public or occupational radiation exposure; 
(iv) there is no significant construction impact; (v) there is no 
significant increase in the potential for or consequences from 
radiological accidents; and (vi) the requirements from which an 
exemption is sought involve: surety, insurance, or indemnity 
requirements.
    The Director, Division of Operating Reactor Licensing, Office of 
Nuclear Reactor Regulation, has determined that approval of the 
exemption request involves no significant hazards consideration 
because reducing the licensee's onsite property damage insurance for 
FCS does not 1) involve a significant increase in the probability or 
consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or 2) create the 
possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident 
previously evaluated; or 3) involve a significant reduction in a 
margin of safety. The exempted financial protection regulation is 
unrelated to the operation of FCS. Accordingly, there is no 
significant change in the types or significant increase in the 
amounts of any effluents that may be released offsite; and no 
significant increase in individual or cumulative public or 
occupational radiation exposure. The exempted regulation is not 
associated with construction, so there is no significant 
construction impact. The exempted regulation does not concern the 
source term (i.e., potential amount of radiation in an accident), 
nor mitigation. Therefore, there is no significant increase in the 
potential for, or consequences of, a radiological accident. In 
addition, there would be no significant impacts to biota, water 
resources, historic properties, cultural resources, or socioeconomic 
conditions in the region. The requirement for onsite property damage 
insurance involves surety, insurance, and indemnity matters. 
Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) and 51.22(c)(25), no 
environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be 
prepared in connection with the approval of this exemption request.

IV. Conclusions.

    Accordingly, the Commission has determined that, pursuant to 10 
CFR 50.12(a), the exemption is authorized by law, will not present 
an undue risk to the public health and safety, and is consistent 
with the common defense and security. Also, special circumstances 
are present. Therefore, the Commission hereby grants OPPD an 
exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1), to permit the 
licensee to reduce its onsite property damage insurance to a level 
of $50 million.
    The exemption is effective beginning April 7, 2018.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 29th day of March, 2018.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Joseph G. Giitter,

Director, Division of Operating Reactor Licensing, Office of Nuclear 
Reactor Regulation.

[FR Doc. 2018-07033 Filed 4-5-18; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 7590-01-P