[Federal Register Volume 83, Number 67 (Friday, April 6, 2018)]
[Notices]
[Pages 14898-14901]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2018-07033]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket No. 50-285; NRC-2018-0067]
Omaha Public Power District; Fort Calhoun Station, Unit No. 1
AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
ACTION: Exemption; issuance.
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SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has issued an
exemption from the requirement to maintain a specified level of onsite
property damage insurance in response to a request from Omaha Public
Power District (OPPD or the licensee) dated April 28, 2017.
Specifically, OPPD requested an exemption from the regulatory
requirements to permit Fort Calhoun Station (FCS) to reduce its onsite
insurance from $1.06 billion to $50 million.
DATES: The exemption was issued on March 29, 2018.
ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID NRC-2018-0067 when contacting the
NRC about the availability of information regarding this document. You
may obtain publicly-available information related to this document
using any of the following methods:
Federal Rulemaking Web Site: Go to http://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2018-0067. Address
questions about NRC dockets to Jennifer Borges; telephone: 301-287-
9127; email: [email protected]. For technical questions, contact
the individual listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section of
this document.
NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System
(ADAMS): You may obtain publicly-available documents online in the
ADAMS Public Documents collection at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To begin the search, select ``ADAMS Public Documents'' and
then select ``Begin Web-based ADAMS Search.'' For problems with ADAMS,
please contact the NRC's Public Document Room (PDR) reference staff at
1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737, or by email to [email protected]. The
ADAMS accession number for each document referenced (if it is available
in ADAMS) is provided the first time that it is mentioned in this
document.
NRC's PDR: You may examine and purchase copies of public
documents at the NRC's PDR, Room O1-F21, One White Flint North, 11555
Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: James S. Kim, Office of Nuclear
Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC
20555-0001; telephone: 301-415-4125, email: [email protected].
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The text of the exemption is attached.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 3rd day of April, 2018.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
James S. Kim,
Project Manager, Special Projects and Process Branch, Division of
Operating Reactor Licensing, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
Attachment--Exemption
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Docket No. 50[dash]285
Omaha Public Power District
Fort Calhoun Station, Unit No. 1
Exemption
I. Background.
The Fort Calhoun Station, Unit 1 (FCS) site is located midway
between Fort Calhoun and Blair, Nebraska, on the west bank of the
Missouri River. The FCS facility includes one Combustion Engineering
pressurized water reactor licensed to operate at power levels not to
exceed 1500 megawatts thermal. The distance from the reactor
containment to the nearest site boundary is approximately 910 meters
(.6 miles). Except for the city of Blair and the villages of Fort
Calhoun and Kennard, the land use within the 10-mile radius of FCS
is devoted to general farming.
Omaha Public Power District (OPPD) is the holder of Renewed
Facility Operating License No. DPR-40. The license provides, among
other things, that the facility is subject to all rules,
regulations, and orders of the NRC now or hereafter in effect.
[[Page 14899]]
By letter dated June 24, 2016 (Agencywide Documents Access and
Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML16176A213), OPPD submitted
a certification pursuant to part 50 of title 10 of the Code of
Federal Regulations (10 CFR) paragraph 50.82(a)(1)(i) to the NRC
indicating that it would permanently shut down FCS by December 31,
2016. On October 24, 2016, OPPD permanently ceased power operations
at FCS. On November 13, 2016, OPPD submitted a certification
pursuant to 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(ii) that it had permanently removed
all fuel from the FCS reactor vessel and placed the fuel into the
FCS spent fuel pool (SFP) (ADAMS Accession No. ML16319A254).
Accordingly, upon docketing the certificates pursuant to 10 CFR
50.82(a)(2), the FCS renewed facility operating license no longer
authorized operation of the reactor or emplacement or retention of
fuel in the reactor vessel. However, the licensee remains authorized
to possess and store irradiated nuclear fuel. Irradiated fuel is
currently being stored onsite in a SFP and in independent spent fuel
storage installation (ISFSI) dry casks.
II. Request/Action.
Under 10 CFR 50.12, ``Specific exemptions,'' OPPD has requested
an exemption from 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) by a letter dated April 28,
2017 (ADAMS Accession No. ML17118A337). The exemption from the
requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) would permit OPPD to reduce its
onsite property damage insurance to $50 million.
The regulation in 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) requires each licensee to
have and maintain onsite property damage insurance to stabilize and
decontaminate the reactor and reactor site in the event of an
accident. The onsite insurance coverage must be either $1.06 billion
or whatever amount of insurance is generally available from private
sources (whichever is less).
The licensee stated that the risk of an accident at a
permanently shutdown and defueled reactor is much less than the risk
from an operating power reactor. Since the license no longer
authorizes reactor operation or emplacement or retention of fuel in
the reactor vessel at FCS, there are no events that would require
the stabilization of reactor conditions after an accident.
Similarly, the risk of an accident that would result in significant
onsite contamination at FCS is also much lower than the risk of such
an event at an operating reactor. Therefore, OPPD requested an
exemption from 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) effective April 7, 2018, that
would permit a reduction in its onsite property damage insurance
from $1.06 billion to $50 million, commensurate with the reduced
risk of an accident at the permanently shutdown and defueled FCS
reactor.
III. Discussion.
Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12, the Commission may, upon application
by any interested person or upon its own initiative, grant
exemptions from the requirements of 10 CFR part 50 when 1) the
exemptions are authorized by law, will not present an undue risk to
public health or safety, and are consistent with the common defense
and security; and 2) any of the special circumstances listed in 10
CFR 50.12(a)(2) are present.
The financial protection limits of 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) were
established after the Three Mile Island accident out of concern that
licensees may be unable to financially cover onsite cleanup costs in
the event of a major nuclear accident. The specified $1.06 billion
coverage requirement was developed based on an analysis of an
accident at a nuclear reactor operating at power, resulting in a
large fission product release and requiring significant resource
expenditures to stabilize the reactor conditions and ultimately
decontaminate and cleanup the site.
The NRC developed these cost estimates from the spectrum of
postulated accidents for an operating nuclear reactor and the
consequences of any associated release of radioactive material from
the reactor. Although the risk of an accident at an operating
reactor is very low, the consequences can be large. In an operating
reactor, the high temperature and pressure of the reactor coolant
system (RCS), as well as the inventory of relatively short-lived
radionuclides, contribute to both the risk and consequences of an
accident. With the permanent cessation of reactor operations at FCS
and the permanent removal of the fuel from the reactor core, such
accidents are no longer possible. As a result, the reactor, RCS, and
supporting systems no longer operate and, therefore, have no
function related to the storage of the irradiated fuel. Hence,
postulated accidents involving failure or malfunction of the
reactor, RCS, or supporting systems are no longer applicable.
During reactor decommissioning, the principal radiological risks
are associated with the storage of spent fuel onsite. In its
December 16, 2016 (ADAMS Accession No. ML16356A578), exemption
request, OPPD describes both design-basis and beyond-design-basis
events involving irradiated fuel stored in the SFP. The staff
independently evaluated the offsite consequences associated with
various decommissioning activities, design basis accidents, and
beyond design basis accidents at FCS, in consideration of its
permanently shut down and defueled status. The possible design-basis
and beyond design basis accident scenarios at FCS show that the
radiological consequences of these accidents are greatly reduced at
a permanently shut down and defueled reactor, in comparison to a
fueled reactor. Further, the staff has used the offsite radiological
release limits established by the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) early-phase Protective Action Guidelines (PAGs) of one
roentgen equivalent man (rem) at the exclusion area boundary in
determining that any possible radiological releases would be minimal
and would not require precautionary protective actions (e.g.,
sheltering in place or evacuation).
The staff evaluated the radiological consequences associated
with various decommissioning activities, and design basis accidents
at FCS, in consideration of permanently shut down and defueled
status of FCS. The only design-basis accidents that could
potentially result in an offsite radiological release at FCS,
following its permanent shutdown and defueling, are the Fuel
Handling Accident (FHA) and rupture of a large liquid radioactive
waste tank. OPPD performed an analysis demonstrating that 10 days
after shutdown, the radiological consequences of a FHA would not
exceed the limits established by the EPA PAGs at the exclusion area
boundary. In case of a rupture of a large liquid radioactive waste
tank in the December 16, 2016 letter, the FCS radioactive waste
disposal system is designed such that any spillage or leakage of
radioactive waste would be retained within the facility. After 18
months of decay, the only isotope remaining in significant amounts,
among those postulated to be released from the gaseous release
associated with a liquid waste tank failure (LWTF), would be Krypton
85. The resulting skin dose from the release of Krypton 85 would
make an insignificant contribution to the total effective dose
equivalent, which is the parameter of interest in the determination
of EPA PAGs for sheltering or evacuation. Accordingly, based on the
time that FCS has been permanently shutdown (approximately 18
months), the staff has determined that the possibility of an offsite
radiological release from design-basis accidents that could exceed
the EPA PAGs has been eliminated.
The only beyond design-basis event that has the potential to
lead to a significant radiological release at a permanently shut
down and defueled (decommissioning) reactor is a zirconium fire. The
zirconium fire scenario is a postulated, but highly unlikely,
accident scenario that involves the loss of water inventory from the
SFP, resulting in a significant heat-up of the spent fuel and
culminating in substantial zirconium cladding oxidation and fuel
damage. The probability of a zirconium fire scenario is related to
the decay heat of the irradiated fuel stored in the SFP. Therefore,
the risks from a zirconium fire scenario continue to decrease as a
function of the time that FCS has been permanently shut down.
The NRC previously determined that a lesser amount of onsite
property damage insurance coverage can be authorized based on
analysis of the zirconium fire risk. In response to SECY-96-256,
``Changes to Financial Protection Requirements for Permanently
Shutdown Nuclear Power Reactors, 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) and 10 CFR
140.11,'' dated December 17, 1996 (ADAMS Accession No. ML15062A483),
the Commission issued Staff Requirements Memorandum dated January
28, 1997 (ADAMS Accession No. ML15062A454), and supported the
staff's recommendation that, among other things, would allow
permanently shutdown power reactor licensees to reduce commercial
onsite property damage insurance coverage to $50 million when the
licensee was able to demonstrate the technical criterion that the
spent fuel could be air-cooled if the SFP was drained of water and
to account for the postulated rupture of a large liquid radiological
waste tank at the FCS site, should such an event occur. The staff
has used this technical criterion to grant similar exemptions to
other decommissioning
[[Page 14900]]
reactors (e.g., Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station, published in the
Federal Register on January 19, 1999 (64 FR 2920); Zion Nuclear
Power Station, published in the Federal Register on December 28,
1999 (64 FR 72700), and Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station,
published in the Federal Register on April 25, 2016 (81 FR 24136)).
In SECY-00-0145, ``Integrated Rulemaking Plan for Nuclear Power
Plant Decommissioning,'' dated June 28, 2000, and SECY-01-0100,
``Policy Issues Related to Safeguards, Insurance, and Emergency
Preparedness Regulations at Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants
Storing Fuel in Spent Fuel Pools,'' dated June 4, 2001 (ADAMS
Accession Nos. ML003721626 and ML011450420, respectively), the staff
discussed additional information concerning SFP zirconium fire risks
at decommissioning reactors and associated implications for onsite
property damage insurance. Analyzing when the spent fuel stored in
the SFP is capable of adequate air-cooling is one measure that
demonstrates when the probability of a zirconium fire would be
exceedingly low.
The licensee's analyses referenced in its exemption request
demonstrate that under conditions where the SFP water inventory has
drained and only air-cooling of the stored irradiated fuel is
available, there is reasonable assurance as of April 7, 2018, which
is approximately 18 months after the permanent shutdown of the
facility, that the FCS spent fuel will remain at temperatures far
below those associated with the onset of zirconium cladding rapid
oxidation. In addition, the licensee's adiabatic heat-up analyses
demonstrate that as of April 7, 2018, there would be at least 10
hours after the loss of all means of cooling (both air and/or
water), before the spent fuel cladding would reach a temperature
where the potential for a significant offsite radiological release
could occur. The licensee maintains strategies and equipment to cool
the spent fuel in the unlikely event coolant is lost, and the 10-
hour adiabatic heating time would provide sufficient time for
personnel to respond with on-site equipment to restore a means of
spent fuel cooling. In OPPD's letter dated December 16, 2016, the
licensee furnished information concerning its SFP inventory makeup
strategies, in the event of a loss of SFP coolant inventory. The
multiple strategies for providing makeup to the SFP include: using
existing plant systems for inventory makeup; an internal strategy
that relies on the fire protection system with redundant pumps (one
diesel-driven and electric motor-driven); and onsite diesel fire
truck that can take suction from the Missouri River. These
strategies are maintained by a license condition. The licensee also
stated that, considering the very low-probability of beyond design-
basis accidents affecting the SFP, these diverse strategies provide
defense-in-depth and time to mitigate and prevent a zirconium fire,
using makeup or spray into the SFP before the onset of zirconium
cladding rapid oxidation.
By letter dated October 4, 2017 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML17277B679), OPPD provided a response to an NRC staff request to
address air-cooling of fuel in a drained pool. In the attachment to
this letter, the licensee compared FCS fuel storage parameters with
those used in NRC generic evaluations of fuel cooling included in
the following documents:
NUREG/CR-4982, ``Severe Accidents in Spent Fuel Pools in
Support of Generic Safety Issue 82,'' June 1987; and
NUREG/CR-6451, ``A Safety and Regulatory Assessment of
Generic BWR [Boiling-Water Reactor] and PWR [Pressurized-Water
Reactor] Permanently Shutdown Nuclear Power Plants,'' April 1997
(ADAMS Accession No. ML082260098).
The analysis described in NUREG/CR-6451 determined that natural
air circulation would adequately cool fuel that has decayed for 17
months after operation in a typical PWR. The licensee found that the
FCS fuel assemblies have a 20 percent lower power density during
operation at power, a 10 percent lower peak burnup, and lower
uranium enrichment, resulting in a much lower decay heat rate per
assembly than those used in the analysis described in NUREG/CR-6451.
The licensee determined that the FCS spent fuel storage racks have a
higher storage density than those used in the NUREG/CR-6451
analysis. However, the licensee's analysis demonstrated that the
lower decay heat will be sufficient to offset the higher storage
density compared to the benchmark. The NRC staff reviewed this
information and determined that the conclusion that the analysis
presented in NUREG/CR-6451 would bound the fuel storage conditions
at FCS was reasonable. Therefore, at 18 months after permanent
shutdown, which will be reached by the requested effective date of
April 7, 2018, the fuel stored at the FCS SFP would be adequately
air-cooled in the unlikely event the pool completely drained.
In the NRC staff's safety evaluation of the licensee's request
for exemptions from certain emergency planning requirements dated
December 11, 2017 (ADAMS Accession No. ML17263B198), the NRC staff
assessed the OPPD accident analyses associated with the radiological
risks from a zirconium fire at the permanently shut down and
defueled FCS site. For the very unlikely beyond design-basis
accident scenario where the SFP coolant inventory is lost in such a
manner that all methods of heat removal from the spent fuel are no
longer available, the staff found there will be a minimum of 10
hours from the initiation of the accident until the cladding reaches
a temperature where offsite radiological release might occur. The
staff finds that 10 hours is sufficient time to support deployment
of mitigation equipment, consistent with plant conditions, to
prevent the zirconium cladding from reaching a point of rapid
oxidation.
Based on the above discussion and the basis provided in SECY-96-
256, the NRC staff determined $50 million is an adequate level of
onsite property damage insurance for the FCS decommissioning
reactor, once the spent fuel in the SFP is susceptible to
exceedingly low probability of a zirconium fire due to adequate air-
cooling, is provided in SECY-96-256. The staff has postulated that
there is still a potential for other radiological incidents at a
decommissioning reactor that could result in significant onsite
contamination besides a zirconium fire. In SECY-96-256, the NRC
staff cited the rupture of a large contaminated liquid storage tank,
causing soil contamination and potential groundwater contamination,
as the most costly postulated event to decontaminate and remediate
(other than a SFP zirconium fire). The postulated large liquid
radiological waste storage tank rupture event was determined to have
a bounding onsite cleanup cost of approximately $50 million.
Therefore, the staff determined that the licensee's proposal to
reduce onsite insurance to a level of $50 million would be
consistent with the bounding cleanup and decontamination cost, as
discussed in SECY-96-256, to account for the postulated rupture of a
large liquid radiological waste tank at the FCS site, should such an
event occur.
A. Authorized by Law.
The regulation in 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) requires each licensee to
have and maintain onsite property damage insurance of either $1.06
billion or whatever amount of insurance is generally available from
private sources, whichever is less. In accordance with 10 CFR 50.12,
the Commission may grant exemptions from the regulations in 10 CFR
part 50, as the Commission determines are authorized by law.
As explained above, the NRC staff has determined that the
licensee's proposed reduction in onsite property damage insurance
coverage to a level of $50 million is adequate, consistent with the
basis provided in SECY-96-256. Moreover, the staff concluded that as
of April 7, 2018, sufficient irradiated fuel decay time will have
elapsed at FCS to decrease the probability of an onsite and offsite
radiological release from a postulated zirconium fire accident to
negligible levels.
The NRC staff has determined that granting of the licensee's
proposed exemption will not result in a violation of the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954, or other laws, as amended. Therefore, based on
its review of OPPD's exemption request, as discussed above, and
consistent with SECY-96-256, the NRC staff concludes that the
exemption is authorized by law.
B. No Undue Risk to Public Health and Safety.
The onsite property damage insurance requirements of 10 CFR
50.54(w)(1) were established to provide financial assurance that
following a significant nuclear accident, onsite reactor conditions
could be stabilized and the site decontaminated. The requirements of
10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) and the existing level of onsite insurance
coverage for FCS are predicated on the assumption that the reactor
is operating. However, FCS is a permanently shutdown and defueled
facility. The permanently defueled status of the facility has
resulted in a significant reduction in the number and severity of
potential accidents, and correspondingly, a significant reduction in
the potential for and severity of onsite property damage. The
proposed reduction in the amount of onsite insurance coverage does
not impact the probability or
[[Page 14901]]
consequences of potential accidents. The proposed level of insurance
coverage is commensurate with the reduced consequences of credible
nuclear accidents at FCS. Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that
granting the requested exemption will not present an undue risk to
the health and safety of the public.
C. Consistent with the Common Defense and Security.
The proposed exemption would not eliminate any requirements
associated with physical protection of the site and would not
adversely affect OPPD's ability to physically secure the site or
protect special nuclear material. Physical security measures at FCS
are not affected by the requested exemption. Therefore, the proposed
exemption is consistent with the common defense and security.
D. Special Circumstances.
Under 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii), special circumstances are present
if the application of the regulation in the particular circumstances
would not serve the underlying purpose of the rule or is not
necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the rule. The
underlying purpose of 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) is to provide reasonable
assurance that adequate funds will be available to stabilize reactor
conditions and cover onsite cleanup costs associated with site
decontamination, following an accident that results in the release
of a significant amount of radiological material. Because FCS is
permanently shut down and defueled, it is no longer possible for the
radiological consequences of design-basis accidents or other
credible events at FCS to exceed the limits of the EPA PAGs at the
exclusion area boundary. The licensee has evaluated the consequences
of highly unlikely, beyond-design-basis conditions involving a loss
of coolant from the SFP. The analyses show that as of April 7, 2018,
the likelihood of such an event leading to a large radiological
release is negligible. The NRC staff's evaluation of the licensee's
analyses confirm this conclusion.
The NRC staff also finds that the licensee's proposed $50
million level of onsite insurance is consistent with the bounding
cleanup and decontamination cost, as discussed in the basis provided
in SECY-96-256. Therefore, the staff concludes that the application
of the current requirements in 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) to maintain $1.06
billion in onsite insurance coverage is not necessary to achieve the
underlying purpose of the rule for the permanently shutdown and
defueled FCS reactor.
Under 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(iii), special circumstances are present
whenever compliance would result in undue hardship or other costs
that are significantly in excess of those contemplated when the
regulation was adopted, or that are significantly in excess of those
incurred by others similarly situated.
The NRC staff concludes that if the licensee was required to
continue to maintain an onsite insurance level of $1.06 billion, the
associated insurance premiums would be in excess of those necessary
and commensurate with the radiological contamination risks posed by
the site. In addition, such insurance levels would be significantly
in excess of other decommissioning reactor facilities that have been
granted similar exemptions by the NRC.
The NRC staff finds that compliance with the existing rule would
result in an undue hardship or other costs that are significantly in
excess of those contemplated when the regulation was adopted and are
significantly in excess of those incurred by others similarly
situated.
Therefore, the special circumstances required by 10 CFR
50.12(a)(2)(ii) and 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(iii) exist.
E. Environmental Considerations.
The requested exemption includes surety, insurance, or indemnity
requirements, and belongs to a category of actions that the
Commission, by rule or regulation, has declared to be a categorical
exclusion, after first finding that the category of actions does not
individually or cumulatively have a significant effect on the human
environment. Specifically, the exemption is categorically excluded
under 10 CFR 51.22(c)(25)(vi)(H). In addition, the NRC staff has
determined that there would be no significant impacts to biota,
water resources, historic properties, cultural resources, or
socioeconomic conditions in the region. As such, there are no
extraordinary circumstances present that would preclude reliance on
this categorical exclusion. Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b),
no environmental impact statement need be prepared in connection
with the approval of this exemption request.
Under 10 CFR 51.22(c)(25), granting of an exemption from the
requirements of any regulation of Chapter I to 10 CFR is a
categorical exclusion provided that (i) there is no significant
hazards consideration; (ii) there is no significant change in the
types or significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that
may be released offsite; (iii) there is no significant increase in
individual or cumulative public or occupational radiation exposure;
(iv) there is no significant construction impact; (v) there is no
significant increase in the potential for or consequences from
radiological accidents; and (vi) the requirements from which an
exemption is sought involve: surety, insurance, or indemnity
requirements.
The Director, Division of Operating Reactor Licensing, Office of
Nuclear Reactor Regulation, has determined that approval of the
exemption request involves no significant hazards consideration
because reducing the licensee's onsite property damage insurance for
FCS does not 1) involve a significant increase in the probability or
consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or 2) create the
possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident
previously evaluated; or 3) involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety. The exempted financial protection regulation is
unrelated to the operation of FCS. Accordingly, there is no
significant change in the types or significant increase in the
amounts of any effluents that may be released offsite; and no
significant increase in individual or cumulative public or
occupational radiation exposure. The exempted regulation is not
associated with construction, so there is no significant
construction impact. The exempted regulation does not concern the
source term (i.e., potential amount of radiation in an accident),
nor mitigation. Therefore, there is no significant increase in the
potential for, or consequences of, a radiological accident. In
addition, there would be no significant impacts to biota, water
resources, historic properties, cultural resources, or socioeconomic
conditions in the region. The requirement for onsite property damage
insurance involves surety, insurance, and indemnity matters.
Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) and 51.22(c)(25), no
environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be
prepared in connection with the approval of this exemption request.
IV. Conclusions.
Accordingly, the Commission has determined that, pursuant to 10
CFR 50.12(a), the exemption is authorized by law, will not present
an undue risk to the public health and safety, and is consistent
with the common defense and security. Also, special circumstances
are present. Therefore, the Commission hereby grants OPPD an
exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1), to permit the
licensee to reduce its onsite property damage insurance to a level
of $50 million.
The exemption is effective beginning April 7, 2018.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 29th day of March, 2018.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Joseph G. Giitter,
Director, Division of Operating Reactor Licensing, Office of Nuclear
Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 2018-07033 Filed 4-5-18; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P