[Federal Register Volume 83, Number 58 (Monday, March 26, 2018)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 12864-12881]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2018-06010]


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 Proposed Rules
                                                 Federal Register
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 This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER contains notices to the public of 
 the proposed issuance of rules and regulations. The purpose of these 
 notices is to give interested persons an opportunity to participate in 
 the rule making prior to the adoption of the final rules.
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  Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 58 / Monday, March 26, 2018 / 
Proposed Rules  

[[Page 12864]]



FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION

11 CFR Parts 100 and 110

[Notice 2018-06]


Internet Communication Disclaimers and Definition of ``Public 
Communication''

AGENCY: Federal Election Commission.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking.

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SUMMARY: The Federal Election Commission requests comment on two 
alternative proposals to amend its regulations concerning disclaimers 
on public communications on the internet that contain express advocacy, 
solicit contributions, or are made by political committees. The 
Commission is undertaking this rulemaking in light of technological 
advances since the Commission last revised its rules governing internet 
disclaimers in 2006, and questions from the public about the 
application of those rules to internet communications. The Commission's 
goal is to promulgate a rule that in its text and interpretation 
recognizes the paramount importance of providing the public with the 
clearest disclosure of the payor or sponsor of these public 
communications on the internet.
    Both proposals are intended to give the American public easy access 
to information about the persons paying for and candidates authorizing 
these internet communications, pursuant to the Federal Election 
Campaign Act. Both proposals would continue to require disclaimers for 
certain internet communications, and both would allow certain internet 
communications to provide disclaimers through alternative technology. 
The proposals differ, however, in their approach. The Commission 
requests comment on all elements of both proposals. The two proposals 
need not be considered as fixed alternatives; commenters are encouraged 
to extract the best elements of each, or suggest improvements or 
alternatives, to help the Commission fashion the best possible rule. 
The Commission also requests comment on proposed changes to the 
definition of ``public communication.'' The Commission has not made any 
final decisions on any of the issues or proposals presented in this 
rulemaking.

DATES: Comments must be received on or before May 25, 2018. The 
Commission will hold a public hearing on this notice on June 27, 2018. 
Anyone wishing to testify at such a hearing must file timely written 
comments and must include in the written comments a request to testify.

ADDRESSES: All comments must be in writing. Commenters are encouraged 
to submit comments electronically via the Commission's website at 
http://sers.fec.gov/fosers/rulemaking.htm?pid=74739. Alternatively, 
commenters may submit comments in paper form, addressed to the Federal 
Election Commission, Attn.: Neven F. Stipanovic, Acting Assistant 
General Counsel, 1050 First St. NE, Washington, DC 20463. Each 
commenter must provide, at a minimum, his or her first name, last name, 
city, and state; comments without this information will not be 
accepted. All properly submitted comments, including attachments, will 
become part of the public record, and the Commission will make comments 
available for public viewing on the Commission's website and in the 
Commission's Public Records Office. Accordingly, commenters should not 
provide in their comments any information that they do not wish to make 
public, such as a home street address, personal email address, date of 
birth, phone number, social security number, or driver's license 
number, or any information that is restricted from disclosure, such as 
trade secrets or commercial or financial information that is privileged 
or confidential.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr. Neven F. Stipanovic, Acting 
Assistant General Counsel, or Ms. Jessica Selinkoff, Attorney, (202) 
694-1650 or (800) 424-9530.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The Commission is proposing to revise its 
regulations at 11 CFR 100.26 and 110.11 regarding disclaimers on 
communications placed for a fee on the internet. The Commission may 
provide illustrative examples on the Commission's website during the 
comment period.

A. Rulemaking History

1. Definition of ``Public Communication''

    The Commission published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 
(``Technology NPRM'') in the Federal Register on November 2, 2016.\1\ 
The Technology NPRM comment period ended on December 2, 2016. The 
Commission received four comments in response to the Technology 
NPRM.\2\
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    \1\ Technological Modernization, 81 FR 76416 (Nov. 2, 2016).
    \2\ The Commission also received four comments in response an 
earlier stage of the technology rulemaking. See Technological 
Modernization, 78 FR 25635 (May 2, 2013). To review those proposals 
and other Commission rulemaking documents, including comments 
received, visit http://sers.fec.gov/fosers/rulemaking.htm?pid=84652.
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    One of the proposals in the Technology NPRM was to update the 
definition of ``public communication'' at 11 CFR 100.26. Section 100.26 
currently defines ``public communication'' as excluding all internet 
communications, ``other than communications placed for a fee on another 
person's website.'' When the Commission promulgated this definition in 
2006, it focused on websites because that was the predominant means of 
paid internet advertising at the time. The Commission analogized paid 
advertisements on websites to the forms of mass communication 
enumerated in the definition of ``public communication'' in the Federal 
Election Campaign Act, 52 U.S.C. 30101-46 (``the Act''), because ``each 
lends itself to distribution of content through an entity ordinarily 
owned or controlled by another person.'' internet Communications, 71 FR 
18589, 18594 (Apr. 12, 2006) (``2006 internet E&J''); 52 U.S.C. 
30101(22).
    The Commission proposed to update the definition by adding 
communications placed for a fee on another person's ``internet-enabled 
device or application.'' The purpose of the proposed change was to 
reflect post-2006 changes in internet technology \3\--

[[Page 12865]]

such as the development of mobile applications (``apps'') on 
smartphones and tablets, smart TV devices, interactive gaming 
dashboards, e-book readers, and wearable network-enabled devices such 
as smartwatches and headsets--and to make the regulatory text more 
adaptable to the development of future technologies. The Commission 
asked several questions about its proposed change, including whether 
the term ``internet-enabled device or application'' is a sufficiently 
clear and technically accurate way to refer to the various media 
through which paid internet communications can be sent and received; 
whether there is a better way to refer to them; and whether it would 
help to provide examples of such paid media.
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    \3\ See Amy Schatz, In Hot Pursuit of the Digital Voter, Wall 
St. J., Mar. 23, 2012, www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303812904577299820064048072 (showing screenshots of 
2012 presidential committee advertisements on Hulu and noting 
another campaign's purchase of advertisements on Pandora internet 
radio); Tanzina Vega, The Next Political Battleground: Your Phone, 
CNN (May 29, 2015, 6:44 a.m.), www.cnn.com/2015/05/29/politics/2016-presidential-campaigns-mobile-technology (noting that ``voters 
should expect more political ads as they scroll through their phones 
next year--much as they'll be bombarded with ads on television,'' 
including ads using geolocation to target ``potential voters who may 
have downloaded the candidate's app''). Indeed, a recent study has 
shown that 19% of Americans access the internet exclusively or 
mostly through their smartphones as opposed to desktop or laptop 
computers. See Pew Research Ctr., U.S. Smartphone Use in 2015, at 3 
(2015), www.pewinternet.org/files/2015/03/PI_Smartphones_0401151.pdf.
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    The Commission received only one comment in response to this aspect 
of the Technology NPRM.\4\ The comment generally supported the proposed 
revision to the definition of ``public communication'' in section 
100.26.\5\
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    \4\ See Campaign Legal Center and Democracy 21, Comment on REG 
2013-01 (Technological Modernization) (Dec. 2, 2016), http://sers.fec.gov/fosers/showpdf.htm?docid=354002.
    \5\ The comment also urged the Commission to amend 11 CFR 100.26 
``to make clear that any expenditure beyond a de minimis amount for 
internet communications is not exempt from the definition of `public 
communication.''' Id. at 2.
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    The Commission has decided to reintroduce the proposed change to 
the definition of ``public communication'' in this rulemaking for the 
limited purpose of determining whether the term ``internet-enabled 
device or application'' is a sufficiently clear and technically 
accurate way to refer to the various media through which paid internet 
communications can be sent and received. The term is closely tied to 
the internet communication disclaimer requirements.\6\
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    \6\ The definition of ``public communication'' is also relevant 
to the coordination rules, 11 CFR 109.21(c), and financing 
limitations, e.g., 11 CFR 100.24(b)(3), 300.32(a)(1)-(2), 300.71.
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2. Internet Communication Disclaimers

    On October 13, 2011, the Commission published in the Federal 
Register an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (``ANPRM'') 
soliciting comment on whether to modify disclaimer requirements at 11 
CFR 110.11 for certain internet communications, or to provide 
exceptions thereto, consistent with the Act.\7\ The Commission received 
eight comments in response. Six of the commenters agreed that the 
Commission should update the disclaimer rules through a rulemaking, 
though commenters differed on how the Commission should do so.
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    \7\ See internet Communication Disclaimers, 76 FR 63567 (Oct. 
13, 2011).
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    On October 18, 2016, the Commission solicited additional comment in 
light of legal and technological developments during the five years 
since the ANPRM was published.\8\ The Commission received six comments 
during the reopened comment period, all but one of which supported 
updating the disclaimer rules. Commenters, however, differed on whether 
the Commission should allow modified disclaimers for all online 
advertisements or exempt paid advertisements on social media platforms 
from the disclaimer requirements.
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    \8\ See internet Communication Disclaimers; Reopening of Comment 
Period and Notice of Hearing, 81 FR 71647 (Oct. 18, 2016). The 
Commission postponed the hearing announced in that notice because 
few commenters expressed interest in participating. As noted above, 
the Commission will hold a hearing on the proposals in this notice 
on June 27, 2018.
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    On October 10, 2017, the Commission again solicited additional 
comment in light of recent legal, factual, and technological 
developments.\9\ During this reopened comment period, the Commission 
received submissions from 149,772 commenters (including persons who 
signed on to others' comments), of which 147,320 indicated support for 
updating or strengthening the disclaimer rules or other government 
action; 2,262 indicated opposition to such efforts; and 190 did not 
indicate a discernable preference.\10\
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    \9\ See internet Communication Disclaimers; Reopening of Comment 
Period, 82 FR 46937 (Oct. 10, 2017); see also internet Communication 
Disclaimers; Extension of Comment Period, 82 FR 52863 (Nov. 15, 
2017) (explaining Commission's extension of comment period for one 
business day due to technological difficulties).
    \10\ Commission staff read and categorized each comment in one 
of three broad categories: Support, oppose, or neutral. ``Support'' 
included comments supporting more stringent disclaimer rules; 
favoring ``transparency''; opposing application of the small items 
or impracticable exceptions to online advertisements; opposing 
advertising by foreign nationals; opposing Russian interference in 
the 2016 election; or supporting the ``Honest Ads Act'' or any of 
its components. See S. 1989, 115th Cong. (2017). ``Oppose'' included 
comments opposing any rulemaking; opposing more stringent disclaimer 
rules; supporting application of the small items or impracticable 
exceptions to online advertising; supporting modified disclaimers in 
lieu of full disclaimers; opposing any restriction of speech, 
``infringement'' of constitutional rights, or ``censorship''; or 
reminding the Commission to read the Constitution. ``Neutral'' 
included comments recognizing the value of disclaimers, but noting 
the difficulty of providing disclaimers online; recommending 
modified disclaimers in some, but not all, circumstances; appearing 
to make contradictory statements in support or opposition; 
presenting unclear statements of preferred action, such as ``do the 
right thing''; or commenting off topic, such as on net neutrality. 
Comments addressing specific aspects of the current or proposed 
rules are discussed below, as appropriate.
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    After considering the comments from all three comment periods and 
additional deliberation, the Commission now seeks comment on the 
proposed changes described in this notice. Other than the issues 
specified in this notice, the Commission does not, in this rulemaking, 
propose changes to any other rules adopted by the Commission in the 
internet Communications rulemaking of 2006.

B. Current Statutory and Regulatory Framework Concerning Disclaimers

    A ``disclaimer'' is a statement that must appear on certain 
communications to identify who paid for it and, where applicable, 
whether the communication was authorized by a candidate. 52 U.S.C. 
30120(a); 11 CFR 110.11; see also Disclaimers, Fraudulent 
Solicitations, Civil Penalties, and Personal Use of Campaign Funds, 67 
FR 76962, 76962 (Dec. 13, 2002) (``2002 Disclaimer E&J''). The Supreme 
Court has recognized that disclaimer requirements may burden political 
speech, and thus must bear a substantial relation to a sufficiently 
important governmental interest. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 
310, 366-67 (2010) (``Citizens United'') (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 
U.S. 1, 64, 66 (1976) (``Buckley'')).
    The Court has found that the government's interest in mandating 
such disclaimers justifies the accompanying burden on political speech. 
For example, in approving the disclaimers at issue in Citizens United, 
the Court explained, ``[d]isclaimer and disclosure requirements may 
burden the ability to speak, but they impose no ceiling on campaign-
related activities and do not prevent anyone from speaking. The Court 
has subjected these requirements to exacting scrutiny, which requires a 
substantial relation between the disclosure requirement and a 
sufficiently important governmental interest.'' Id. (internal quotation 
marks and alterations removed). The Court also held that disclaimers 
``provide the electorate with information and insure that the voters 
are fully informed about the person or group who is speaking,'' and 
stated that identifying the sources of advertising enables people ``to 
evaluate the arguments to which they are being subjected.'' Id. at 368 
(internal quotations and alterations removed).

[[Page 12866]]

    With some exceptions, the Act and Commission regulations require 
disclaimers for public communications: (1) Made by a political 
committee; (2) that expressly advocate the election or defeat of a 
clearly identified federal candidate; or (3) that solicit a 
contribution. 52 U.S.C. 30120(a); 11 CFR 110.11(a). Under existing 
regulations, the term ``public communication'' does not include 
internet communications other than ``communications placed for a fee on 
another person's website.'' 11 CFR 100.26. In addition to these 
internet public communications, ``electronic mail of more than 500 
substantially similar communications when sent by a political committee 
. . . and all internet websites of political committees available to 
the general public'' also must have disclaimers. 11 CFR 110.11(a).
    The content of the disclaimer that must appear on a given 
communication depends on who authorized and paid for the communication. 
If a candidate, an authorized committee of a candidate, or an agent of 
either pays for and authorizes the communication, then the disclaimer 
must state that the communication ``has been paid for by the authorized 
political committee.'' 11 CFR 110.11(b)(l); see also 52 U.S.C. 
30120(a)(1). If a public communication is paid for by someone else, but 
is authorized by a candidate, an authorized committee of a candidate, 
or an agent of either, then the disclaimer must state who paid for the 
communication and that the communication is authorized by the 
candidate, an authorized committee of the candidate, or an agent of 
either. 11 CFR 110.11(b)(2); see also 52 U.S.C. 30120(a)(2). If the 
communication is not authorized by a candidate, an authorized committee 
of a candidate, or an agent of either, then the disclaimer must 
``clearly state the full name and permanent street address, telephone 
number, or World Wide Web address of the person who paid for the 
communication, and that the communication is not authorized by any 
candidate or candidate's committee.'' 11 CFR 110.11(b)(3); see also 52 
U.S.C. 30120(a)(3).
    Every disclaimer ``must be presented in a clear and conspicuous 
manner, to give the reader, observer, or listener adequate notice of 
the identity'' of the communication's sponsor. 11 CFR 110.11(c)(1). 
While the Act and Commission regulations impose specific requirements 
for communications that are ``printed'' or that appear on radio or 
television, they do not specify additional requirements for disclaimers 
on internet advertisements. Compare 11 CFR 110.11(c)(1) (general 
``clear and conspicuous'' requirement for all disclaimers), with 11 CFR 
110.11(c)(2)-(4) (additional requirements for printed, radio, and 
television disclaimers) and 52 U.S.C. 30120(c)-(d) (specifications for 
printed, radio, and television disclaimers).
    Commission regulations set forth limited exceptions to the general 
disclaimer requirements. For example, disclaimers are not required for 
communications placed on ``[b]umper stickers, pins, buttons, pens, and 
similar small items upon which the disclaimer cannot be conveniently 
printed.'' 11 CFR 110.11(f)(1)(i) (``small items exception''). Nor are 
disclaimers required for ``[s]kywriting, water towers, wearing apparel, 
or other means of displaying an advertisement of such a nature that the 
inclusion of a disclaimer would be impracticable.'' 11 CFR 
110.11(f)(1)(ii) (``impracticable exception'').

C. Application of the Disclaimer Requirements to Internet 
Communications

1. Development of Current Rule That Paid Internet Advertisements 
Require Disclaimers

    The Commission first addressed disclaimers on internet 
communications in two 1995 advisory opinions regarding the application 
of the Act to internet solicitations of campaign contributions. See 
Advisory Opinion 1995-35 (Alexander for President); Advisory Opinion 
1995-09 (NewtWatch PAC).\11\ The Commission determined that internet 
solicitations are ``general public political advertising'' \12\ and, as 
such, they ``are permissible under the [Act] provided that certain 
requirements, including the use of appropriate disclaimers, are met.'' 
Advisory Opinion 1995-35 (Alexander for President) at 2 (characterizing 
conclusion in Advisory Opinion 1995-09 (NewtWatch PAC)). Later that 
year, the Commission stated in a rulemaking that ``internet 
communications and solicitations that constitute general public 
political advertising require disclaimers,'' adding that ``[t]hese 
communications and others that are indistinguishable in all material 
aspects from those addressed in [Advisory Opinion 1995-09 (NewtWatch 
PAC)] will now be subject to'' the disclaimer requirement. See 
Communications Disclaimer Requirements, 60 FR 52069, 52071 (Oct. 5, 
1995).
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    \11\ Documents related to Commission advisory opinions are 
available on the Commission's website at www.fec.gov/data/legal/advisory-opinions/.
    \12\ At the time, 11 CFR 110.11 explicitly applied to ``general 
public political advertising.'' The current rule uses the term 
``public communication'' as defined at 11 CFR 100.26, which includes 
``general public political advertising.''
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    The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Public Law 107-155, 116 
Stat. 81 (2002) (``BCRA''), added specificity to the disclaimer 
requirements (including ``stand by your ad'' requirements for certain 
radio and television communications), expanded the scope of 
communications covered by the disclaimer requirements, and defined a 
new term, ``public communication,'' that did not reference the 
internet. See 52 U.S.C. 30101(22), 30120; see also 2002 Disclaimer E&J, 
67 FR at 76962. The Commission promulgated rules to implement BCRA's 
changes to the disclaimer provisions of the Act and the new statutory 
definition of ``public communication.'' See 2002 Disclaimer E&J, 67 FR 
at 76962; Prohibited and Excessive Contributions: Non-Federal Funds or 
Soft Money, 67 FR 49064, 49111 (July 29, 2002) (``Non-Federal Funds 
E&J''). The 2002 rules incorporated the term ``public communication'' 
to describe the general reach of the disclaimer rules and applied the 
disclaimer requirements to political committees' websites and 
distribution of more than 500 substantially similar unsolicited emails. 
Other than these two specific types of internet-based activities by 
political committees, however, internet communications were excluded 
from the regulatory definition of ``public communication'' and, 
therefore, outside the scope of the disclaimer requirements that apply 
to public communications. See 2002 Disclaimer E&J, 67 FR at 76963-64; 
Non-Federal Funds E&J, 67 FR at 49111.
    In 2006, after a court challenge to the regulatory definition of 
``public communication,'' the Commission revised its rules to include 
internet communications ``placed for a fee on another person's 
website'' in the definition of ``public communication'' and, therefore, 
within the scope of the disclaimer rule. See 2006 internet E&J, 71 FR 
at 18594; see also Shays v. FEC, 337 F. Supp. 2d 28 (D.D.C. 2004) 
(holding, among other things, that Commission could not wholly exclude 
internet activity from the definition of ``public communication''). The 
Commission explained that, under the revised definition, ``when someone 
such as an individual, political committee, labor organization or 
corporation pays a fee to place a banner, video, or pop-up 
advertisement on another person's website, the person paying makes a 
`public communication.''' 2006 internet E&J, 71 FR at 18593-94. 
Furthermore, the Commission explained that ``the

[[Page 12867]]

placement of advertising on another person's website for a fee includes 
all potential forms of advertising, such as banner advertisements, 
streaming video, popup advertisements, and directed search results.'' 
\13\ Id.; see also id. at 18608 n.52 (noting that, as used in a 
different context, ``terms `website' and `any internet or electronic 
publication' are meant to encompass a wide range of existing and 
developing technology'' including ``social networking software''). 
Thus, since 2006, Commission regulations have required disclaimer 
information to be included in certain paid internet advertisements.
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    \13\ But ``when the search results are displayed as a result of 
the normal function of a search engine, and not based on any payment 
for the display of a result, the search results are not forms of 
`general public political advertising,' '' and ``where a search 
engine returns a website hyperlink in its normal course, and 
features the same hyperlink separately as the result of a paid 
sponsorship arrangement, the latter is a `public communication' 
while the former is not.'' 2006 internet E&J, 71 FR at 18594 n.28.
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2. Application of Disclaimer Rule to ``Small'' Internet Communications

    The Commission has been asked on a number of occasions about the 
application of the disclaimer requirement to internet communications, 
including small, character- or space-limited internet communications 
such as banner advertisements; social media text, video, or image 
advertisements; and directed search results. The queries center on 
whether the communications are exempt from the disclaimer requirements 
under the impracticable or small items exceptions at 11 CFR 
110.11(f)(1) or whether they may incorporate technological 
modifications to satisfy the disclaimer requirements.\14\
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    \14\ See Advisory Opinion 2017-12 (Take Back Action Fund); 
Advisory Opinion 2010-19 (Google); see also Advisory Opinion 
Request, Advisory Opinion 2013-18 (Revolution Messaging) (Sept. 11, 
2013); Advisory Opinion Request, Advisory Opinion 2011-09 (Facebook) 
(Apr. 26, 2011). In addition to the advisory opinion requests 
concerning internet advertisements, another advisory opinion request 
asked the Commission to apply the impracticable exception in support 
of truncating a political committee's name in disclaimers on its 
mass emails and on its website. See Advisory Opinion 2013-13 
(Freshman Hold'em JFC et al.) at n.4.
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    The Commission has applied the small items exception to the general 
disclaimer requirements in situations where there are ``technological 
limitations on both the size and the length of information'' that can 
be contained based on the small physical size of the item or an 
external technological constraint. Advisory Opinion 2007-33 (Club for 
Growth PAC) at 3 (declining to extend small items exception to spoken 
disclaimer requirement); see also Advisory Opinion 1980-42 (Hart for 
Senate Campaign Committee) (applying the exception to concert tickets); 
Advisory Opinion 2002-09 (Target Wireless) (applying the exception to 
character-limited ``short message service,'' or SMS, communications 
distributed through a non-internet-based wireless telecommunications 
network); 11 CFR 110.11(f)(1)(i). In the Target Wireless advisory 
opinion, the Commission considered whether disclaimers were required on 
paid content distributed via SMS communications through a non-internet-
based wireless telecommunications network. At the time the Commission 
issued that advisory opinion, technology limited SMS content to 160 
text-only characters per message; SMS messages could not include 
images; wireless telephone carriers contractually required consumers to 
pay a flat fee for a certain number of SMS messages that consumers 
could receive; and content longer than 160 text characters would be 
sent over multiple messages, which might not be received consecutively. 
Advisory Opinion 2002-09 (Target Wireless) at 2. The Commission 
concluded that the small items exception applied to paid SMS messages, 
noting ``that the SMS technology places similar limits on the length of 
a political advertisement as those that exist with bumper stickers.'' 
Id. at 4.
    The Commission has not exempted any disclaimers under the small 
items exception in the 15 years since it issued the Target Wireless 
advisory opinion. The Commission discussed the small items exception in 
Advisory Opinion 2007-33 (Club for Growth PAC), which concerned whether 
an advertiser could ``dispense with'' or ``truncate'' the required 
disclaimers in 10- and 15-second television advertisements. The 
Commission concluded that the advertisements did not qualify for the 
small items exception.
    The related impracticable exception at 11 CFR 110.11(f)(1)(ii) 
exempts from the disclaimer requirement advertisements displayed via 
skywriting, water towers, and wearing apparel, as well as ``other means 
of displaying an advertisement of such a nature that the inclusion of a 
disclaimer would be impracticable.'' The list of communications in the 
rule is not exhaustive. The Commission has not, however, applied the 
impracticable exception to a situation beyond those listed in section 
110.11(f)(1)(ii). See Advisory Opinion 2007-33 (Club for Growth PAC) 
(determining that ``physical or technological limitations'' in 10- and 
15-second television advertisements do not qualify for impracticable 
exception); Advisory Opinion 2004-10 (Metro Networks) (determining that 
``live read'' traffic report sponsorship messages, delivered by 
reporters from mobile units and aircraft, did not present ``specific 
physical and technological limitations'' to qualify for impracticable 
exception); see also Advisory Opinion 2013-13 (Freshman Hold'em JFC et 
al.) at n.4 (concluding that ``emails and web pages . . . are not 
electronic communications in which the inclusion of disclaimers may be 
inherently impracticable.'').
    Nonetheless, in Advisory Opinion 2004-10 (Metro Networks), the 
Commission recognized that, although the ``physical and technological 
limitations'' of a communication medium may ``not make it impracticable 
to include a disclaimer at all,'' technological or physical limitations 
may extend to ``one particular aspect of the disclaimer'' requirements. 
Advisory Opinion 2004-10 (Metro Networks) at 3. In such circumstances, 
the Commission concluded that a disclaimer was required but permitted 
modifications or adaptations of the technologically or physically 
limited aspects of the communication medium. See id. at 3-4 (concluding 
that reporters reading sponsorship message live from aircraft or mobile 
units could read stand by your ad language, rather than candidate who 
was not physically present).
    The Commission was first asked to apply the small items exception 
or impracticable exception to text-limited internet advertisements in 
2010. Google proposed to sell AdWords search keyword advertisements 
limited to 95 text characters; the proposed advertisements would not 
include disclaimers but would link to a landing page (the purchasing 
political committee's website) on which users would see a disclaimer. 
See Advisory Opinion 2010-19 (Google). The Commission concluded that 
Google's proposed AdWords program ``under the circumstances described . 
. . [was] not in violation of the Act or Commission regulations,'' but 
the advisory opinion did not answer whether Google AdWords ads would 
qualify for the small items or impracticable exception. Id. at 2.
    In response to two subsequent advisory opinion requests concerning 
the possible application of the small items exception or impracticable 
exception to small internet advertisements, the Commission was unable 
to issue advisory opinions by the required four affirmative votes. See 
Advisory Opinion Request, Advisory Opinion 2011-09 (Facebook) (Apr. 26,

[[Page 12868]]

2011) (concerning application of exceptions to zero-to-160 text 
character ads with thumbnail size images); Advisory Opinion Request, 
Advisory Opinion 2013-18 (Revolution Messaging) (Sept. 11, 2013) 
(concerning application of exceptions to mobile banner ads).
    Finally, the Commission considered an advisory opinion request in 
2017 asking whether paid image and video ads on Facebook ``must . . . 
include all, some, or none of the disclaimer information specified by 
52 U.S.C. 30120(a).'' Advisory Opinion Request at 4, Advisory Opinion 
2017-12 (Take Back Action Fund) (Oct. 31, 2017). The Commission issued 
an opinion concluding that the proposed Facebook image and video 
advertisements ``must include all of the disclaimer information'' 
specified by the Act, but, in reaching this conclusion, Commissioners 
relied on two different rationales, neither of which garnered the 
required four affirmative votes. Advisory Opinion 2017-12 (Take Back 
Action Fund) at 1.

D. Proposed Revision to the Definition of ``Public Communication'' at 
11 CFR 100.26

    As discussed above, the Commission proposed in the Technology NPRM 
to revise the definition of ``public communication'' in 11 CFR 100.26 
to include communications placed for a fee on another person's 
``internet-enabled device or application,'' in addition to 
communications placed for a fee on another person's website. 
Disclaimers are required for any ``public communication'' that contains 
express advocacy or solicits a contribution, and for all public 
communications by political committees. The Commission wants to make 
sure that any change to the definition of ``public communication'' in 
11 CFR 100.26 is appropriate as applied in the disclaimer rule, given 
the complexities of internet advertising and the rapid pace of 
technological change.
    Commenters in this rulemaking have offered insight into, as one 
described it, the ``myriad of options for advertising via different 
media and different platforms online.'' \15\ Since the Commission's 
2006 internet rulemaking, the focus of internet activity has shifted 
from blogging, websites, and listservs \16\ to social media networks 
(Facebook, Twitter, and LinkedIn), media sharing networks (YouTube, 
Instagram, and Snapchat), streaming applications (Netflix, Hulu), and 
mobile devices and applications. Other significant developments include 
augmented and virtual reality \17\ and the ``Internet of Things'': 
Wearable devices (smart watches, smart glasses), home devices (Amazon 
Echo), virtual assistants (Siri, Alexa), smart TVs and other smart home 
appliances.\18\ One commenter noted, ``[a]s consumers move toward 
virtual and augmented reality services, wearable technology, screenless 
assistants, and other emerging technologies, there is every reason to 
predict that advertisers will demand the ability to reach voters and 
customers on those technologies, and, in turn, new advertising 
configurations that have not yet been imagined will be developed.'' 
\19\
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    \15\ Computer & Communications Industry Association, Comment at 
9 (Nov. 9, 2017), http://sers.fec.gov/fosers/showpdf.htm?docid=358503.
    \16\ 2006 Internet E&J at 18590-91; see also Asian Americans 
Advancing Justice, et al., Comment at 5 (Nov. 13, 2017), http://sers.fec.gov/fosers/showpdf.htm?docid=371144 (``In 2006, blogging 
was at its height, and it seemed as if everyone would have his or 
her own blog.'').
    \17\ See Computer & Communications Industry Association, Comment 
at 9.
    \18\ See Asian Americans Advancing Justice, et al., Comment at 7 
(also noting potential for political advertising on ``smart 
refrigerators'').
    \19\ Google, Comment at 4-5 (Nov. 9, 2017), http://sers.fec.gov/fosers/showpdf.htm?docid=358482.
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    Accordingly, the Commission is reopening the definition of ``public 
communication'' in 11 CFR 100.26 for the limited purpose of determining 
whether revising the definition to include communications placed for a 
fee on another person's ``internet-enabled device or application,'' in 
addition to communications placed for a fee on another person's 
website, would be a clear and technically accurate way to refer to the 
various media through which paid internet communications can be and 
will be sent and received. The Commission invites comment on this 
proposal. Is it clear from the proposed language that both the 
placement-for-a-fee requirement and the third-party requirement would 
apply to websites, internet-enabled devices, and internet applications? 
In this rulemaking, the Commission is not considering any change to the 
definition of ``public communication'' other than the terminology that 
should replace ``website'' as used in the definition.

E. Proposed Revision to the Disclaimer Rules at 11 CFR 110.11

    Technological developments over the past 15 years have rendered 
much current internet advertising distinguishable from the non-
internet-based SMS advertisements to which the Commission applied the 
small items exception in Advisory Opinion 2002-09 (Target Wireless) and 
from the internet advertisements the Commission considered in 
promulgating the disclaimer regulations in 2002. As Facebook explained 
in a comment on this rulemaking, ``[w]hen Facebook submitted its 
request for an advisory opinion in 2011, ads on Facebook were small and 
had limited space for text. Ad formats available on Facebook have 
expanded dramatically since that time.'' \20\ Indeed, many internet 
advertisements today include video, audio, and graphic components in 
addition to the text components considered in the Target Wireless 
advisory opinion. See, e.g., Advisory Opinion Request, Advisory Opinion 
2017-12 (Take Back Action Fund) (Oct. 31, 2017). Moreover, today, 
commercial internet advertisements are subject to other federal 
regulatory disclosure regimes.\21\ Are the different degrees of First 
Amendment protection afforded political speech as opposed to commercial 
speech relevant to any consideration of other agencies' disclosure 
regimes? \22\
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    \20\ Facebook noted that some of its ads ``continue to be 
limited in size, with text limitations or truncations based on 
format and placement of the ad,'' but that other formats ``allow for 
additional creative flexibility.'' Facebook, Comment at 3 (Nov. 13, 
2017), http://sers.fec.gov/fosers/showpdf.htm?docid=358468 (citing 
Facebook, Facebook Ads Guide, https://www.facebook.com/business/ads-guide (last visited Mar. 15, 2018)); see also Fidji Simo, An Update 
on Facebook Ads, Facebook Newsroom (June 6, 2013), https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2013/06/an-update-on-facebook-ads/ (announcing 
reconfiguration of ad products); Google, Comment at 3 (noting that 
the ``types and varieties of digital advertisements that political 
advertisers create and place throughout the web has grown 
exponentially since 2011.'').
    \21\ See CMPLY, Comment at 2 (Nov. 9, 2017), http://sers.fec.gov/fosers/showpdf.htm?docid=358493 (noting that regulatory 
disclaimer and disclosure requirements ``have been addressed in 
similar contexts for marketing, financial and pharmaceutical, 
without those regulators exempting disclosures in social media 
channels'').
    \22\ See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14 (``Discussion of public issues 
and debate on the qualifications of candidates are integral to the 
operation of the system of government established by our 
Constitution. The First Amendment affords the broadest protection to 
such political expression in order `to assure (the) unfettered 
interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social 
changes desired by the people.' '') (citation omitted); Sorrell v. 
IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 579 (2011) (``[G]overnment's 
legitimate interest in protecting consumers from `commercial harms' 
explains `why commercial speech can be subject to greater 
governmental regulation than noncommercial speech' '') (citations 
omitted); Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 329 (``[P]olitical speech . . 
. is central to the meaning and purpose of the First Amendment.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As noted above, the Commission's regulations have required 
disclaimer information to be included in certain paid internet 
advertisements since 2006. Spending on digital political advertising 
grew almost eightfold just between 2012 and 2016, from $159 million to 
$1.4

[[Page 12869]]

billion.\23\ Many commenters expressed the view that the need for 
internet communication disclaimers has grown along with spending on 
internet political advertising.\24\ As one commenter wrote, ``[T]he 
increasing prominence of online election expenditures makes the failure 
to update campaign finance laws to adequately cover the internet more 
dangerous with every cycle.'' \25\ The dramatic growth in political 
advertising on the internet highlights the need for regulatory clarity 
in this area. As one commenter noted, ``[w]hatever the challenges of 
applying the Constitution to ever-advancing technology, the basic 
principles of freedom of speech and the press, like the First 
Amendment's command, do not vary when a new and different medium for 
communication appears.'' \26\ Other commenters noted that the 
importance and value of political advertising disclaimers do not vary 
when new forms of communication emerge.\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \23\ See Borrell Associates, The Final Analysis: Political 
Advertising in 2016, https://www.borrellassociates.com/industry-papers/free-summaries/borrell-2016-political-advertising-analysis-exec-sum-jan-2017-detail (subscription required).
    \24\ See, e.g., Sunlight Foundation, Comment at 1 (Nov. 13, 
2017), http://sers.fec.gov/fosers/showpdf.htm?docid=360854 (``The 
FEC and Congress should act to ensure disclosures and disclaimers 
are neither discretionary nor uneven . . . [D]isclaimers and 
disclosures don't mean renouncing business or chilling speech, any 
more than has been the case for TV or radio stations.'').
    \25\ Brennan Center for Justice, Comment at 3 (Nov. 13, 2017), 
http://sers.fec.gov/fosers/showpdf.htm?docid=358487.
    \26\ Institute for Free Speech, Comment at 3 (Nov. 9, 2017), 
http://sers.fec.gov/fosers/showpdf.htm?docid=358495 (quoting Brown 
v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, 564 U.S. 786, 790 (2011)).
    \27\ See, e.g., BMore Indivisible, Comment at 5 (Nov. 9, 2017) 
http://sers.fec.gov/fosers/showpdf.htm?docid=358504 (stating that 
``[p]roviding disclaimers o[n] internet and app advertising is an 
extension of the role the FEC has historically performed for 
traditional media. Online media advertising transparency is 
increasingly essential as Americans turn to the internet as their 
primary source of information'').
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    Thus, the Commission is proposing to add regulatory provisions 
clarifying, for various types of paid internet public communications, 
the disclaimers required and, in certain circumstances, when a paid 
internet communication may employ a modified approach to the disclaimer 
requirements.
    As explained below, the Commission offers two proposals. They 
differ in approach.
    Alternative A proposes to apply the full disclaimer requirements 
that now apply to radio and television communications to public 
communications distributed over the internet with audio or video 
components. Alternative A also proposes to apply the type of disclaimer 
requirements that now apply to printed public communications to text 
and graphic public communications distributed over the internet. 
Finally, Alternative A would allow certain small text or graphic public 
communications distributed over the internet to satisfy the disclaimer 
requirements through an ``adapted disclaimer.''
    Alternative B proposes to treat internet communications differently 
from communications in traditional media. Alternative B would require 
disclaimers on internet communications to be clear and conspicuous and 
to meet the same general content requirement as other disclaimers, 
without imposing the additional disclaimer requirements that apply to 
print, radio, and television communications. Alternative B also 
proposes to allow certain paid internet advertisements to satisfy the 
disclaimer requirements through an adapted disclaimer, depending on the 
amount of space or time necessary for a clear and conspicuous 
disclaimer as a percentage of the overall advertisement. In the event 
that an advertisement could not provide a disclaimer even through a 
technological mechanism, Alternative B proposes to create an exception 
to the disclaimer requirement specifically for paid internet 
advertisements.
    The Commission requests comment on all elements of both proposals. 
The two proposals need not be considered as fixed alternatives; 
commenters are encouraged to extract the best elements of each, or 
suggest improvements or alternatives, to help the Commission fashion 
the best possible rule.

1. Proposed Disclaimer Requirements for Communications Distributed Over 
the Internet--Organization

    Both Alternative A and Alternative B propose to add new paragraph 
(c)(5) to 11 CFR 110.11. New paragraph (c)(5) in each proposal would 
provide specific disclaimer requirements for internet communications. 
This approach would be consistent with the current structure of the 
disclaimer rule at 11 CFR 110.11, which categorizes disclaimer 
requirements by the form of communication on which they appear.
    In the first paragraph of Alternative B's proposed section (c)(5), 
Alternative B proposes to define the term ``internet communications.'' 
Alternative A does not propose to introduce or define this term. 
Alternative B's proposed paragraph (c)(5)(i)(A) defines ``internet 
communications'' as email of more than 500 substantially similar 
communications when sent by a political committee; internet websites of 
political committees available to the general public; and ``internet 
public communications'' as defined in paragraph (c)(5)(i)(B). 
Alternative B's proposed paragraph (c)(5)(i)(B) defines ``internet 
public communication,'' in turn, as any communication placed for a fee 
on another person's website or internet-enabled device or application. 
Alternative B's proposed definition of ``internet communication'' is 
intended to capture all communications distributed via the internet 
that are subject to the disclaimer requirement. See 11 CFR 
110.11(a)(1)-(3). Alternative B's proposed definition of ``internet 
public communication'' is intended to capture all online ``public 
communications,'' as defined in 11 CFR 100.26. Are the proposed 
definitions sufficiently broad to encompass new technologies? Are they 
platform-neutral? Should the definition of ``internet public 
communication'' include a reference to virtual reality, social 
networking, or internet platforms?
    Both Alternative A and Alternative B propose to define additional 
terms: ``adapted disclaimer,'' ``technological mechanism,'' and 
``indicator.'' These terms are discussed below.

2. Disclaimer Requirements for Video and Audio Communications 
Distributed Over the Internet

    As described below, Alternative A proposes to extend the specific 
requirements for disclaimers on radio and television communications to 
public communications distributed over the internet with audio or video 
components. Under Alternative A, such audio and video internet public 
communications would also be required to satisfy the general 
requirements that apply to all public communications requiring 
disclaimers. Alternative B likewise proposes to require that radio and 
television communications distributed over the internet must satisfy 
the general requirements that apply to all public communications 
requiring disclaimers. Alternative B would not extend any additional 
disclaimer requirements to such communications.
a. Alternative A--Proposed 11 CFR 110.11(c)(5)(ii)
    As noted above, the Act and Commission regulations impose specific 
requirements for disclaimers on radio and television communications. 
See 52 U.S.C. 30120(d); 11 CFR 110.11(c)(3)-(4). These requirements 
vary, depending on whether a candidate or another person pays for or 
authorizes the communication.
    Radio communications paid for or authorized by a candidate must 
include

[[Page 12870]]

an audio statement spoken by the candidate, identifying the candidate 
and stating that the candidate has approved the communication. 11 CFR 
110.11(c)(3)(i). Radio communications that are not paid for or 
authorized by a candidate must include an audio statement identifying 
the person paying for the communication and that that person ``is 
responsible for the content of this advertising.'' 11 CFR 
110.11(c)(4)(i).
    Television, broadcast, cable, or satellite communications paid for 
or authorized by a candidate must include a statement by the candidate, 
identifying the candidate and stating that the candidate has approved 
the communication, either through a full-screen view of the candidate 
making the statement or by a voice-over accompanied by a ``clearly 
identifiable photographic or similar image'' of the candidate; these 
communications must also include a similar statement ``in clearly 
readable writing'' at the end of the communication. 11 CFR 
110.11(c)(3)(ii)-(iii). Television, broadcast, cable, or satellite 
communications that are not paid for or authorized by a candidate must 
include the audio statement required by 11 CFR 110.11(c)(4)(i) and 
conveyed by a ``full-screen view of a representative'' of the person 
making the statement or in a voice-over by such person; these 
communications must also include a similar statement ``in clearly 
readable writing'' at the end of the communication. 11 CFR 
110.11(c)(4)(ii)-(iii).\28\
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    \28\ The Commission previously extended the ``stand by your ad'' 
requirements to communications transmitted through broadcast, cable, 
or satellite transmission. See 2002 Disclaimer E&J, 67 FR at 76963 
(referring to ``the Commission's judgment that it would be 
unsupportable to require a disclaimer for a television communication 
that was broadcast, while not requiring a disclaimer for the same 
communication merely because it was carried on cable or 
satellite'').
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    As noted above, internet advertisements may be in the form of audio 
or video communications, or may incorporate audio or video 
elements.\29\ Alternative A is based on the premise that these 
advertisements are indistinguishable from offline advertisements that 
may be distributed on radio or television, broadcast, cable, or 
satellite in all respects other than the medium of distribution.\30\ 
Moreover, because the audio and video components of internet 
communications with these elements do not contain ``character'' 
restrictions, Alternative A proposes to apply parameters to such 
communications akin to the parameters in which disclaimers must appear 
on radio and television advertisements rather than the conditions that 
may constrain ``printed'' materials on which a disclaimer must appear.
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    \29\ See, e.g., 5 Advertising Trends from the 2016 Presidential 
Election, Pandora for Brands (Dec. 8, 2016), http://pandoraforbrands.com/insight/5-advertising-trends-from-the-2016-presidential-election (urging readers ``[t]o learn how Pandora can 
help amplify your next political campaign''); Amy Schatz, In Hot 
Pursuit of the Digital Voter, Wall St. J., Mar. 23, 2012, 
www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303812904577299820064048072 
(showing screenshots of 2012 presidential committee advertisements 
on Hulu and noting another campaign's purchase of advertisements on 
Pandora internet radio); see also Advisory Opinion Request at 4, 
Advisory Opinion 2017-12 (Take Back Action Fund) (Oct. 31, 2017).
    \30\ See, e.g., Electronic Privacy Information Center, Comment 
at 3 (Nov. 3, 2017), http://sers.fec.gov/fosers/showpdf.htm?docid=358477 (urging extension of broadcast 
communication disclaimer requirements to ``analogous'' communication 
online); Rep. John Sarbanes et al., Comment at 2 (Nov. 9, 2017), 
http://sers.fec.gov/fosers/showpdf.htm?docid=358505 (noting belief 
of 18 Members of Congress that ``it is past time for the Commission 
to take action to harmonize disclaimer requirements for paid 
internet communications, regardless of size, on internet platforms 
with advertisements served on other media, such as broadcast 
television or radio''); accord 2006 Internet E&J, 71 FR at 18609 
(``The Commission has consistently viewed online, internet-based 
dissemination of news stories, commentaries, and editorials to be 
indistinguishable from offline television and radio broadcasts, 
newspapers, magazines and periodical publications for the purposes 
of applying the media exemption under the Act''); but see Software 
and Information Industry Association, Comment at 3 (Nov. 13, 2017), 
http://sers.fec.gov/fosers/showpdf.htm?docid=358508 (``Digital 
advertising is inherently more diverse than a simple transition of 
similar content from print or broadcast television.'').
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    Accordingly, in Alternative A, the Commission proposes to provide 
that public communications distributed over the internet with audio or 
video components are treated, for purposes of the disclaimer rules, the 
same as ``radio'' or ``television'' communications. The Commission, in 
Alternative A, proposes to do so in proposed paragraph (c)(5)(ii), 
which would incorporate the existing requirements at 11 CFR 
110.11(c)(3) and (4) that apply to radio, television, broadcast, cable, 
and satellite communications, because those provisions have been in 
operation for 15 years and are, therefore, familiar to persons paying 
for, authorizing, and distributing communications. Moreover, by 
applying the specifications for radio and television communications to 
audio and video communications distributed over the internet, the 
proposed regulations would ensure that internet audio ads could air on 
radio and internet video ads could air on television without having to 
satisfy different disclaimer requirements.
    Alternative A's proposed paragraph (c)(5)(ii) would provide that a 
``public communication distributed over the internet with audio but 
without video, graphic, or text components'' must include the statement 
described in 11 CFR 110.11(c)(3)(i) and (iv) if authorized by a 
candidate, or the statement described in 11 CFR 110.11(c)(4) if not 
authorized by a candidate.
    Alternative A's proposals concerning audio communications (like 
Alternative A's proposals for video, text, and graphic internet 
communications discussed below) incorporate the term ``public 
communication,'' as it exists or may be amended, to make clear that 
these provisions neither expand nor contract the scope of the 
disclaimer rules set forth at 11 CFR 110.11(a). The proposed reference 
to ``a public communication distributed over the internet with an audio 
component but without video, graphic, or text components'' (like the 
reference to the ``internet'' in Alternative A's proposals for video, 
text, and graphic internet communications discussed below) is intended 
to encompass advertisements on websites as well as those distributed on 
other internet-enabled or digital devices or applications; for audio 
internet advertisements, these would include communications on 
podcasts, internet radio stations, or app channels.\31\ The proposed 
reference to a ``public communication distributed over the internet'' 
is not intended to alter the definition of ``public communication,'' as 
defined in 11 CFR 100.26. Is this clear, or should the Commission 
include a cross-reference in the regulatory text? Moreover, so as to 
hew most closely to the ``radio'' provisions that Alternative A 
incorporates, the proposed amendments regarding ``audio'' internet 
communications are intended to apply to those communications with only 
an audio component. The Commission proposes to address communications 
with any ``video, graphic, or text components'' separately, as 
explained below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \31\ See Software and Information Industry Association, Comment 
at 3 (``in-app advertising has become one of the fastest-growing 
mobile ad mediums'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Alternative A's proposed paragraph (c)(5)(ii) would also provide 
that a ``public communication distributed over the internet with a 
video component'' must include the statement described in 11 CFR 
110.11(c)(3)(ii)-(iv) if authorized by a candidate, or the statement 
described in 11 CFR 110.11(c)(4) if not authorized by a candidate.
    Because this proposal is intended to encompass video public 
communications on websites, apps, and streaming video services, 
Alternative A's proposed new paragraph (c)(5)(ii)

[[Page 12871]]

would apply to a video that a political committee pays to run as a 
``pre-roll'' video on the YouTube app or appear in a promoted 
YouTube.com search result, but would not apply to the same video posted 
for free on YouTube.com (since a communication not placed for a fee 
would not be a ``public communication'').\32\ Unlike traditional 
television, broadcast, cable, or satellite ads, however, video 
advertisements placed online may include non-video components such as 
separate text, or graphic fields. The proposed rule regarding internet 
video ads thus would differ from the existing television, broadcast, 
cable, and satellite provisions in that the proposed rule would apply 
even if the communication also included non-video components.
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    \32\ See Google, Comment at 3 (describing Google ad products on 
YouTube).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    This aspect of Alternative A would not explicitly address small 
audio or video internet ads. The Commission proposes to take this 
approach to hew Alternative A's proposed rules on audio and video ads 
as closely as possible to the existing disclaimer provisions for 
advertisements transmitted by radio, television, broadcast, cable, and 
satellite, which do not, in paragraphs (c)(3) or (4), account for 
``small'' advertisements. Should new technology develop that would 
render the provision of a disclaimer on a particular type of audio or 
video internet communication impracticable, the Commission anticipates 
that, as with current TV and radio ads, such circumstances could be 
addressed in an advisory opinion seeking to exempt such a communication 
from the disclaimer requirements.\33\
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    \33\ See 11 CFR 112.1 (describing advisory opinion requests); 
see also Advisory Opinion 2007-33 (Club for Growth PAC) (considering 
and rejecting request to apply small items exception to disclaimers 
in 10- and 15-second television advertisements).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission seeks comment as to whether these proposals 
accurately describe audio and video communications over the internet, 
regardless of the electronic or digital platforms on which they may be 
distributed. For example, does the Commission need to clarify or expand 
the term ``internet''? Similarly, does the Commission need to clarify 
the term ``video'' to address whether an advertisement with a GIF is a 
communication ``with a video component'' or one with a ``graphic'' 
component? Similarly, should the Commission expressly include or 
exclude from the term ``video'' static (i.e., non-moving) paid digital 
advertisements in dynamic (i.e., moving) environments such as 
``billboard'' ads inside interactive gaming systems, or virtual-reality 
and augmented-reality platforms? \34\
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    \34\ See, e.g., Steve Gorman, Obama Buys First Video Game 
Campaign Ads, Reuters, Oct. 17, 2008, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-politics-videogames/obama-buys-first-video-game-campaign-ads-idUSTRE49EAGL20081017 (showing example of static court-
side ad in dynamic basketball gaming environment).
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    The Commission also welcomes comment on any aspect of these 
proposals, including the approach towards the exceptions and, more 
generally, the advisability of treating audio and video internet 
communications in the manner that radio, television, broadcast, cable, 
and satellite communications are treated.
b. Alternative B--Proposed Paragraph (c)(5)(ii)
    The proposals in Alternative B are premised on the internet as a 
``unique medium of . . . communication[]'' \35\ that poses ``unique 
challenges with respect to advertising disclosures.'' \36\ Although 
advertisements on the internet may often look or sound like television 
or radio advertisements, several commenters focused on the differences 
between internet advertising and advertising on more traditional forms 
of media. As one stated, ``[d]igital advertising is inherently more 
diverse than a simple transition of similar content from print or 
broadcast television. It comes in many different formats presented 
across a wide range of technology platforms with screen size ranging 
from large to very small.'' \37\ Another commenter noted that, ``[i]n 
addition to character-limited ads that just feature text, there are 
banner ads with images and text, video ads with text, and audio ads 
that also feature a corresponding interactive image or video on an 
app.'' \38\ A third commented on the ``nearly infinite range . . . of 
possible combinations of hardware, software, add-ons, screen sizes and 
resolutions, individualized settings, and other factors . . . can 
affect the display of a political communication'' on the internet.\39\ 
``Content that is optimized for viewing on phones, tablets, and other 
mobile devices is distinct from content that appears on a desktop or 
laptop computer.'' \40\ The ``ways people physically interact with 
content also vary by medium (e.g., a user can `rollover' content on a 
desktop screen to see more information, but may not use a mouse or view 
rollovers on a mobile device).'' \41\ In addition, internet 
advertisements can vary significantly in duration. Internet ads can 
last for as little as ``fifteen seconds . . . or even shorter,'' and 
entire ad campaigns can last for as little as ``a few days or just a 
few hours for events like flash sales.'' \42\ Moreover, ``[p]aid 
advertising on the internet is constantly evolving in nature.'' \43\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \35\ Public Citizen and Free Speech for People, Comment at 3 
(Nov. 1, 2017), http://sers.fec.gov/fosers/showpdf.htm?docid=358485 
(expressing the view that ``disclaimers on all forms of on-line paid 
campaign advertising are practical and pose little inconvenience'' 
to sponsors or recipients); see also id. at 1 (referring to ``the 
unique medium of internet communications'' in urging Commission to 
proceed with rulemaking).
    \36\ Software & Information Industry Association, Comment at 3.
    \37\ Id.
    \38\ Computer & Communications Industry Association, Comment at 
9.
    \39\ Coolidge-Reagan Foundation, Comment at 5 (Nov. 8, 2017), 
http://sers.fec.gov/fosers/showpdf.htm?docid=358499.
    \40\ Facebook, Comment at 2.
    \41\ Id.
    \42\ Computer & Communications Industry Association, Comment at 
11.
    \43\ Public Citizen and Free Speech for People, Comment at 3; 
see also American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial 
Organizations, et al., Comment at 2 (Dec. 19, 2016), http://sers.fec.gov/fosers/showpdf.htm?docid=354341 (``Since the technology 
of the internet is rapidly changing, and will likely continue to do 
so indefinitely, the Commission's rules in this area must be 
sufficiently flexible and principle-focused so they do not become 
obsolete in short order.'').
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    Given the rapid pace of technological change and an inability to 
forecast the future, the revisions to the disclaimer rules proposed in 
Alternative B are intended to recognize the differences between the 
internet and traditional forms of media like newspapers, radio, and 
television.\44\ Thus, Alternative B's proposed paragraph (c)(5)(ii) 
would require disclaimers on internet communications to meet the 
general content requirements in 11 CFR 110.11(b) and the general 
``clear and conspicuous'' requirement of 11 CFR 110.11(c)(1), but not 
the additional ``stand by your ad'' requirements for radio and 
television communications.\45\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \44\ See Center for Competitive Politics, Comment at 3 (Dec. 19, 
2016), http://sers.fec.gov/fosers/showpdf.htm?docid=354344; see also 
Campaign Solutions, Comment at 1 (Nov. 9, 2017), http://sers.fec.gov/fosers/showpdf.htm?docid=365826 (``As new and 
disruptive technologies change the way we interact with technology 
and consume media, we are sometimes unable to anticipate the format 
of political advertising.''); Computer & Communications Industry 
Association, Comment at 13 (``Campaigns are constantly trying new 
methods to appeal to new voters, and political campaign 
communication and advertising methods change with every election 
cycle. As technology develops, new forms of advertising could become 
available.'').
    \45\ See Electronic Frontier Foundation, Comment at 2 (Nov. 9, 
2017), http://sers.fec.gov/fosers/showpdf.htm?docid=358498; see also 
Google, Comment at 4 (``unlike broadcast advertising, which involves 
an advertiser providing a static advertisement to the broadcaster 
that is the same ad every time it airs, digital ads can be 
dynamic''); Coolidge-Reagan Foundation, Comment at 4 (``Any 
internet-related regulations should afford speakers maximum 
flexibility in satisfying any applicable disclaimer requirements, 
rather than being tied to specific forms of communication that may 
become superseded or outmoded.''). But see supra n.30 and comments 
cited therein.

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[[Page 12872]]

    The Act requires all disclaimers to provide payment and 
authorization information, regardless of the form that the 
communication may take, but imposes additional ``stand by your ad'' 
requirements only on television and radio communications.\46\ Does the 
Commission have the legal authority to extend those requirements to 
internet communications? \47\ If so, should the Commission exercise 
that authority? Or, as a practical matter, do the differences between 
internet advertising and radio and television advertising make the 
``stand by your ad'' requirements a poor fit for audio and video public 
communications on the internet? Some commenters in this rulemaking 
indicated that the internet is a continuously evolving advertising 
medium with a wide range of platforms, formats, displays, duration, and 
interactivity. Are the ``stand by your ad'' requirements for television 
and radio communications overly inflexible by comparison? \48\ For 
example, television advertisements must have both spoken and written 
disclaimers. One commenter estimated that the spoken disclaimer can 
take five or more seconds to deliver,\49\ and the Act requires the 
written disclaimer to appear ``in a clearly readable manner . . . for a 
period of at least 4 seconds.'' \50\ Is it reasonable to impose these 
requirements on paid internet advertisements? \51\ Should audio or 
video internet ads that are very short be required to provide full 
``stand by your ad'' disclaimer information, as the Commission has 
decided in the television advertising context? \52\ Does requiring a 
candidate or other individual representing the payor to claim 
responsibility for a communication by image or voice-over (as is 
currently required for radio and television communications) impose an 
additional burden on the person making the communication? Is this the 
type of obligation that courts have approved in television and radio 
advertising? What additional information, if any, does this requirement 
convey to a reader, viewer, or listener about the source of the 
communication?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \46\ Compare 52 U.S.C. 30120(d) (imposing ``stand by your ad'' 
requirements on radio and television communications only) with 30104 
(requiring Commission to make disclosure reports publicly available 
on internet), 30112 (requiring Commission to maintain central site 
on internet).
    \47\ The recently introduced Honest Ads Act would amend the Act 
by requiring, among other things, disclaimers on internet 
communications to comply with the same ``stand by your ad'' 
requirements as radio and television communications. See S. 1989, 
115th Cong. Sec.  7(b) (2017).
    \48\ See, e.g., 52 U.S.C. 30120(d)(1)(B) (requiring television 
advertisement authorized by candidate to provide disclaimer through 
``unobscured, full-screen view of the candidate making the 
statement, or the candidate in voice-over, accompanied by a clearly 
identifiable photographic or similar image of the candidate,'' and 
``in writing at the end of the communication in a clearly readable 
manner with a reasonable degree of color contrast between the 
background and the printed statement, for a period of at least 4 
seconds''), 30120(d)(2) (requiring television advertisement not 
authorized by candidate to provide disclaimer ``conveyed by an 
unobscured, full-screen view of a representative of the political 
committee or other person making the statement, or by a 
representative of such political committee or other person in voice-
over, and shall also appear in a clearly readable manner with a 
reasonable degree of color contrast between the background and the 
printed statement, for a period of at least 4 seconds'').
    \49\ See Computer & Communications Industry Association, Comment 
at 11.
    \50\ 52 U.S.C. 30120(d)(1)(B)(ii), (d)(2) (emphasis added); see 
also 11 CFR 110.11(c)(3)(iii)(B), (c)(4)(iii)(B).
    \51\ See Computer & Communications Industry Association, Comment 
at 11 (stating that audio advertisements on internet ``could be 
fifteen seconds in length or even shorter'' and urging Commission to 
``avoid rigidly extending broadcast radio spoken-word disclaimer 
requirements for radio to online platforms'').
    \52\ See Advisory Opinion 2007-33 (Club for Growth PAC) 
(requiring full stand-by-your-ad disclaimers in 10- and 15-second 
television advertisements).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Disclaimer Requirements for Text and Graphic Communications 
Distributed Over the Internet

    As described below, Alternative A proposes to extend to text and 
graphic public communications distributed over the internet that lack 
any video component the specific requirements for disclaimers on 
printed public communications. Under Alternative A, such text and 
graphic public communications would also be required to satisfy the 
general requirements that apply to all public communications requiring 
disclaimers. Alternative B proposes to require all public 
communications distributed over the internet, including text and 
graphic public communications, to satisfy the general requirements that 
apply to all public communications requiring disclaimers, and does not 
propose to extend any additional disclaimer requirements to such 
communications.
a. Alternative A
i. Proposed 11 CFR 110.11(c)(5)(i)
    Internet advertisements may be in the form of text, image, and 
other graphic elements with audio but without video components; such 
advertisements come ``in all shapes and sizes.'' \53\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \53\ Google, Comment at 5 (describing ad products on the Google 
Display Network); see also Advisory Opinion Request 2017-12 (Take 
Back Action Fund) at 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Alternative A proposes to adapt the existing requirements at 11 CFR 
110.11(c)(2) that apply to printed communications because they have 
been in operation for 15 years and are, therefore, familiar to persons 
paying for, authorizing, and distributing communications.
    Alternative A's proposed new paragraph (c)(5)(i) would provide that 
a ``public communication distributed over the internet with text or 
graphic components but without any video component'' must contain a 
disclaimer that is of ``sufficient type size to be clearly readable by 
the recipient of the communication,'' a requirement adapted from 11 CFR 
110.11(c)(2)(i). Alternative A's proposed paragraph (c)(5)(i) would 
further specify this ``text size'' requirement by providing that a 
``disclaimer that appears in letters at least as large as the majority 
of the other text in the communication satisfies the size 
requirement.'' Finally, Alternative A's proposed paragraph (c)(5)(i) 
would require that a disclaimer be displayed ``with a reasonable degree 
of color contrast between the background and the text of the 
disclaimer,'' a requirement the proposal indicates would be satisfied 
if the disclaimer ``is displayed in black text on a white background or 
if the degree of color contrast between the background and the text of 
the disclaimer is no less than the color contrast between the 
background and the largest text used in the communication.'' These 
proposals are adapted from 11 CFR 110.11(c)(2)(iii).
ii. Text or Graphic Internet Communications With Video or Audio 
Components
    The proposal in Alternative A regarding a public communication 
distributed over the internet ``with text or graphic components but 
without any video component'' is intended to work in conjunction with 
Alternative A's video proposal discussed above; under the operation of 
both of these parts of Alternative A, an internet communication that 
contains both text or graphic elements and a video component would be 
subject only to the specific disclaimer rules applicable to television, 
broadcast, cable, and satellite communications that are incorporated 
into Alternative A's proposed paragraph (c)(5)(ii). The Commission 
seeks

[[Page 12873]]

comment on this proposal. In particular, the Commission seeks comment 
regarding how users interact with internet advertisements that contain 
both text or graphic and video elements. Is it common for users to view 
only the printed or video components of an internet advertisement that 
contains both? Should the Commission require that such communications 
include at least an adapted disclaimer, see below, on the face of the 
text or graphic element? Do such adapted disclaimers provide adequate 
transparency? How important is it for adapted disclaimers to provide 
information sufficient to identify the communication's payor on the 
communication's face? Would a hyperlink in a communication be a 
reliable way to identify the payor or could hyperlinks prove to be 
transient? Could an indicator be used to defeat disclosure by linking 
to, for example, goo.gl/nRk1H1 at publication and then, once a 
complaint is filed with the Commission, to an actual political 
committee's website? Should the Commission consider other approaches, 
such as allowing political committees to identify themselves in adapted 
disclaimers with their FEC Committee ID numbers? Should or could the 
Commission require the hyperlinks on the adapted disclaimers of 
political committees to connect to the committees' fec.gov pages? \54\ 
Should the Commission adopt rules that require a disclaimer to be 
included on either the text and graphic portion or the video portion of 
an internet advertisement, or on both portions, depending on the 
proportion of the advertisement that contains each type of content? 
Alternatively, should the rules allow an advertiser the choice between 
the ``television'' or ``text and graphic'' communication disclaimer 
rules for an internet communication that contains both video and text 
or graphic components?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \54\ For example: https://www.fec.gov/data/committee/C00580100/?tab=about-committee, where ``C00580100'' is the organization's 
Committee ID.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Similarly, under the operation of the ``text or graphic'' and audio 
proposals in Alternative A, an internet communication that contains 
both text and graphic elements and an audio, but not a video, 
component, would be subject to the specific disclaimer rules applicable 
only to text or graphic communications. Alternative A does not propose 
to include such communications in the proposed ``audio'' rules because 
such advertisements appear more like text or graphic communications 
than ``radio'' ones. The Commission seeks comment on this proposal. In 
particular, and as with the proposal above, the Commission seeks 
comment regarding how users interact with internet advertisements that 
contain both text or graphic and audio elements. Is it common for users 
only to view the printed components or listen to the audio components 
of an internet advertisement that contains both? Should the Commission 
instead consider such advertisements under the ``audio'' proposals 
discussed above? Should the Commission require that such communications 
include both ``radio'' and text or graphic disclaimers? Should the 
Commission adopt rules that require disclaimer to be included in either 
the ``text or graphic'' or audio portion of an internet advertisement, 
or on both portions, depending on the proportion of the advertisement 
that contains each type of content? Alternatively, should the rules 
allow an advertiser the choice between the ``radio'' or ``text or 
graphic'' communication disclaimer rules for an internet communication 
that contains both audio and text or graphic components?
iii. Text and Graphic Internet Communication Disclaimer Text Size Safe 
Harbor
    Alternative A proposes to establish a ``safe harbor'' provision 
identifying disclaimer text size--``letters at least as large as the 
majority of the other text in the communication''--that clearly 
satisfies the rule. This would track the current approach for 
``printed'' materials. See 2002 Disclaimer E&J, 67 FR 76965 (describing 
current 12-point type safe harbor for printed communication 
disclaimers); cf. Advisory Opinion 1995-09 (NewtWatch PAC) at 2 
(approving disclaimer on political committee's website that was 
``printed in the same size type as much of the body of the 
communication''). The Commission recognizes that some text or graphic 
internet communications may not have a ``majority'' text size. The 
possible diversity of text sizes in internet text and graphic 
communications is, in this respect, similar to text size diversity in 
printed communications currently addressed in 11 CFR 110.11(c)(2)(i). 
As the Commission explained when adopting the current safe harbor in 
lieu of a strict size requirement, ``the vast differences in the 
potential size and manner of display of larger printed communications 
would render fixed type-size examples ineffective and inappropriate.'' 
2002 Disclaimer E&J, 67 FR 76965. Thus, for internet communications 
with text or graphic components that are not included in the proposed 
text-size safe harbor, the intent behind Alternative A is that 
questions of whether a disclaimer is of sufficient type size to be 
clearly readable would be ``determined on a case-by-case basis, taking 
into account the vantage point from which the communication is intended 
to be seen or read as well as the actual size of the disclaimer text,'' 
as they are under the current rule for printed materials. Id. Would the 
use of metrics minimize the need for case-by-case determinations?
b. Alternative B--Proposed 11 CFR 110.11(c)(5)(ii)
    Alternative B proposes to treat graphic, text, audio, and video 
communications on the internet equally for disclaimer purposes. Under 
proposed paragraph (c)(5)(ii) in Alternative B, disclaimers for all 
such communications would have to meet the general content requirement 
of 11 CFR 110.11(b) and be ``clear and conspicuous'' under 11 CFR 
110.11(c)(1), including disclaimers for graphic and text communications 
on the internet. Thus, the disclaimers would have to be ``presented in 
a clear and conspicuous manner, to give the reader, observer, or 
listener adequate notice of the identity of the person or political 
committee that paid for and, where required, that authorized the 
communication,'' 11 CFR 110.11(c)(1). Under Alternative B, disclaimers 
could not be difficult to read or hear, and their placement could not 
be easily overlooked. Id. Is Alternative B's proposal to treat internet 
communications differently from print, radio, and TV communications for 
disclaimer purposes a reasonable approach to address current internet 
advertisements and future developments in internet communications?
    Alternative B does not propose to create any safe harbors. The 
intent behind Alternative B is to establish objective criteria that 
would cover all situations and minimize the need for case-by-case 
determinations. Would safe harbors nonetheless be helpful in 
interpreting and applying the proposed rule? Or do safe harbors tend to 
become the de facto legal standard applied in advisory opinions and 
enforcement actions?

4. Adapted Disclaimers for Public Communications Distributed Over the 
Internet

    Alternatives A and B both propose that some public communications 
distributed over the internet may satisfy

[[Page 12874]]

the disclaimer requirement by an ``adapted disclaimer,'' which includes 
an abbreviated disclaimer on the face of the communication in 
conjunction with a technological mechanism that leads to a full 
disclaimer, rather than by providing a full disclaimer on the face of 
the communication itself. Some aspects of both proposals are similar, 
and some are different, in ways highlighted below.
    The discussion in this section explains the Commission's 
alternative proposals for when a public communication distributed over 
the internet may utilize an adapted disclaimer. Alternative A allows 
the use of an adapted disclaimer when a full disclaimer cannot fit on 
the face of a text or graphic internet communication due to 
technological constraints. Alternative B allows the use of an adapted 
disclaimer when a full disclaimer would occupy more than a certain 
percentage of any internet public communication's available time or 
space. Under Alternative B, the first tier of an adapted disclaimer 
would require the identification of the payor plus an indicator on the 
face of the communication. Alternative B's second tier adapted 
disclaimer would require only an indicator on the face of the 
communication.
a. Alternative A--Proposed 11 CFR 110.11(c)(5)(i)(A): When a 
Communication May Use Technological Adaptations
    While current text and graphic internet advertisements are akin in 
many respects to analog printed advertisements, material differences 
between them remain. Most significant among these differences are the 
availability of ``micro'' sized text and graphic internet 
advertisements and the interactive capabilities of advertisements over 
the internet.\55\ To ensure the disclaimer rules remain applicable to 
new forms of internet advertising that may arise, while also reducing 
the need for serial revisions to Commission regulations in light of 
such developments, Alternative A proposes adopting a provision 
specifically addressing those text and graphic internet advertisements 
that cannot, due to external character or space constraints, 
practically include a full disclaimer on the face of the communication. 
See Advisory Opinion 2004-10 (Metro Networks) at 3 (concluding that 
modifications or adaptations to disclaimers may be permissible in light 
of technologically or physically limited aspects of a communication).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \55\ See Public Citizen and Free Speech for People, Comment at 3 
(noting that paid online communications by ``bots'' ``can be very 
short and seamlessly integrated into social conversations. Absent 
disclaimers, such messages are not likely to be perceived as paid 
messages''); see also Spot-On, Comment at 8 (Nov. 9, 2017), http://sers.fec.gov/fosers/showpdf.htm?docid=358480 (noting that ``all 
[online] ads link to some sort of web page or presence'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Accordingly, under Alternative A's proposed paragraph (c)(5)(i)(A), 
a ``public communication distributed over the internet with text or 
graphic components but without any video component'' that, ``due to 
external character or space constraints,'' cannot fit a required 
disclaimer must include an ``adapted disclaimer.'' This provision would 
explain the circumstances under which a communication may use 
technological adaptations, describe how the adaptations must be 
presented, and provide examples of the adaptations.
    Under Alternative A, the determination of whether a public 
communication distributed over the internet with text or graphic 
components but without any video component cannot fit a full disclaimer 
is intended to be an objective one. That is, the character or space 
constraints intrinsic to the technological medium are intended to be 
the relevant consideration, not the communication sponsor's subjective 
assessment of the ``difficulty'' or ``burden'' of including a full 
disclaimer. As the Supreme Court has held in the context of broadcast 
advertisements, the government's informational interest is sufficient 
to justify disclaimer requirements even when a speaker claims that the 
inclusion of a disclaimer ``decreases both the quantity and 
effectiveness of the group's speech.'' Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 
368. Alternative A is built upon the proposition that the informational 
interest relied upon by the Supreme Court with respect to broadcast 
communications is equally implicated in the context of text and graphic 
public communications distributed over the internet.
    Alternative A's reference to ``external character or space 
constraints'' is intended to codify the approach to those terms as the 
Commission has discussed them in the context of the small items and 
impracticable exceptions discussed above. See, e.g., Advisory Opinion 
2007-33 (Club for Growth PAC) at 3 (contrasting lack of ``physical or 
technological limitations'' constraining 10- and 15-second television 
advertisements with ``overall limit'' and ``internal limit'' on size or 
length of SMS ads); Advisory Opinion 2004-10 (Metro Networks) at 3 
(discussing ``physical and technological limitations'' of ad read live 
from helicopter). This approach to determining when a communication 
cannot fit a required disclaimer--rather than by the particular size of 
the communication as measured by pixels, number of characters, or other 
measurement--is intended to minimize the need for serial revisions to 
Commission regulations as internet technology may evolve. Should 
existing or newly developed internet advertising opportunities raise 
questions as to whether a particular communication may fit a 
disclaimer, the intent behind Alternative A is that such questions may 
be addressed in an advisory opinion context.\56\ Would this approach 
provide sufficient clarity about the application of the disclaimer 
requirement, and the disclaimer exceptions, to particular 
communications? Should Alternative A, if adopted, preclude the use of 
the small items and impracticable exceptions for internet public 
communications?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \56\ See 11 CFR 112.1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Does the ``external character or space constraints'' approach 
provide sufficiently clear guidance in light of existing technology or 
technological developments that may occur? Is it clear what ``cannot 
fit'' means in the proposed rule? Should the Commission adopt a safe 
harbor indicating that ads with particular pixel size, character limit, 
or other technological characteristic may use adapted disclaimers? Or 
do safe harbors tend to become the de facto legal standard in advisory 
opinions and enforcement actions? If the Commission were to adopt 
either a bright-line rule or a safe harbor based on pixel size, 
character limit, or other technological characteristic, what should 
those technological limits be? Does the ``external character or space 
constraints'' wording make clear that business decisions to sell small 
ads that are not constrained by actual technological limitations do not 
justify use of an adapted disclaimer? Are there circumstances under 
which requiring a full disclaimer to appear on the face of an internet 
ad would cause the speaker to curtail his or her message, or purchase a 
larger ad, or run the ad on a different platform? Are there 
circumstances under which such a requirement would discourage the 
speaker from running the ad at all? Is there anything about advertising 
on the internet that would warrant a different conclusion than courts 
have reached in upholding the Act's disclaimer requirements on 
political advertising in other media?

[[Page 12875]]

b. Alternative B--Proposed 11 CFR 110.11(c)(5)(ii)-(iv): When a 
Communication May Use Technological Adaptations
    In applying the disclaimer rules to internet public communications, 
Alternative B proposes to allow any form of paid internet 
advertisement--including audio and video ads--to utilize an adapted 
disclaimer under certain conditions.\57\ Alternative B proposes to 
establish a bright-line rule to help speakers determine for themselves 
when they may utilize an adapted disclaimer.\58\ The ``bright line'' is 
determined by the amount of time or space necessary to provide a full 
disclaimer in an internet public communication as a percentage of the 
overall communication.\59\ Proposed paragraph (c)(5)(iii) in 
Alternative B suggests ``ten percent of the time or space in an 
internet communication'' as the appropriate amount. If the amount of 
time or space necessary for a clear and conspicuous disclaimer exceeds 
ten percent, then the speaker may, under Alternative B, provide an 
adapted disclaimer. Is ten percent a reasonable figure, or is it too 
high or too low? \60\ Should the Commission adopt a different benchmark 
for allowing political speakers to use available technology to provide 
disclaimers for their internet public communications? Is Alternative 
B's proposed approach sufficiently clear to enable speakers to 
administer it for themselves rather than seek advisory opinions before 
engaging in political advertising online?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \57\ Neither Alternative proposes to allow political committees 
to provide disclaimers through a technological mechanism for their 
email of more than 500 substantially similar communications or their 
internet websites available to the general public.
    \58\ See, e.g., Facebook, Comment at 3 (encouraging ``a 
regulatory approach that provides advertisers flexibility to meet 
their disclaimer obligations in innovative ways that take full 
advantage of the technological advances in communication the 
internet makes possible''); Campaign Legal Center and Democracy 21, 
Comment at 2 (Nov. 14, 2011), http://sers.fec.gov/fosers/showpdf.htm?docid=98749 (``Innovation, not exemption, is the 
answer.''); American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial 
Organizations et al., Comment at 2 (``[R]ules in this area must be . 
. . flexible and principle-focused . . . . The challenge is to 
achieve both public informational goals and provide sufficient 
clarity to speakers about the rules so there is both informed 
compliance and predictable enforcement''); Computer & Communications 
Industry Association, Comment at 14 (``CCIA cautions against 
regulatory action that does not allow for flexible solutions''); 
Software & Information Industry Association, Comment at 4 (urging 
``a flexible and diverse set of transparency practices that evolve 
and innovate as digital content offerings and advertising profiles 
continue to evolve'').
    \59\ Commission regulations also apply a time-space approach to 
attributing expenditures for publications and broadcast 
communications to more than one candidate. See 11 CFR 106.1(a).
    \60\ Some commenters suggested different levels at which 
providing a disclaimer becomes unduly burdensome. See Cause of 
Action, Comment at 4-5 (Nov. 14, 2017), http://sers.fec.gov/fosers/showpdf.htm?docid=98750 (explaining that California's disclaimer 
requirement, ``while minimal, still takes around 15% of a Google 
advertisement,'' which ``carr[ies] a high cost of character space, 
even to the point of overshadowing the communication itself''); 
Center for Competitive Politics, Comment at 4 (urging the Commission 
to ``excuse disclaimers in any internet advertising product where 
the number of characters needed for a disclaimer would exceed 4% of 
the characters available in the advertising product, exclusive of 
those reserved for the ad's title'') (internal quotations omitted); 
Institute for Free Speech, Comment at 4 (same); see also American 
Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations, et 
al., Comment at 2 (``In no case should the disclaimer rules compel a 
diminution of the speaker's message itself in order to accommodate 
the disclaimer; and, that principle should determine whether or not 
an internet advertisement . . . may omit the full, statutorily 
required language, and instead link to a disclaimer as the routine 
solution.''). Certain aspects of Federal Communications Commission 
rules employ a bright line for certain political advertisement 
sponsorship statements. See, e.g., 47 CFR 73.1212 (requiring 
sponsors of political advertising broadcast via television to be 
identified with letters that are equal to or greater than 4% of the 
vertical picture height).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    To provide clarity in determining whether a speaker may utilize an 
adapted disclaimer, proposed paragraph (c)(5)(ii) in Alternative B also 
proposes objective standards for use in measuring time and space. For 
internet public communications consisting of text, graphics, or images, 
Alternative B proposes to use characters or pixels. For internet public 
communications consisting of audio and video, Alternative B proposes to 
use seconds. These proposals are based on the Commission's experience 
with such communications in the advisory opinion context.\61\ The 
Commission has limited expertise in the technical aspects of internet 
advertising, however. Are the proposed metrics of characters, pixels, 
and seconds a reasonable way to measure space and time in paid internet 
advertisements? If they are, then are they sufficiently flexible to 
remain relevant as technology changes, or are they likely to become 
obsolete? Should the rule, instead, specify a percentage of space or 
time without identifying the units of measurement? Would that provide 
sufficient clarity for speakers to be able to determine for themselves 
when they can utilize an adapted disclaimer? The Commission also seeks 
comment on how it should measure the time and space that a disclaimer 
occupies on an internet advertisement containing both text or graphic 
and audio or video elements. Should the Commission's disclaimer 
regulations explicitly address such advertisements? If so, how? 
Additionally, how should the Commission measure pixels, characters, and 
seconds in an advertisement that may expand or change, such as those 
with scrolling, frame, carousel, or similar features? Should the 
Commission incorporate in the rule specifications for these internet 
advertisement features?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \61\ See Advisory Opinion 2017-12 (Take Back Action Fund); 
Advisory Opinion Request 2013-18 (Revolution Messaging), Advisory 
Opinion Request 2011-09 (Facebook); Advisory Opinion 2010-19 
(Google).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

5. How Adaptations Must Be Presented on the Face of the Advertisement

    The discussion in this section explains the Commission's 
alternative proposals for what information must be included on the face 
of an advertisement that utilizes an adapted disclaimer. Both 
Alternatives A and B propose that an internet public communication that 
provides an adapted disclaimer must provide some information on the 
face of the advertisement, and both alternatives require such 
information to be clear and conspicuous and to provide notice that 
further disclaimer information is available through the technological 
mechanism. Alternative A proposes one method of presenting an adapted 
disclaimer, and Alternative B proposes two methods, in a tiered 
approach.
    Alternative A's approach would require, on the face of the 
advertisement, the payor's name plus an ``indicator'' that would give 
notice that further information is available. Alternative B proposes a 
two-tiered approach. Under its first tier, Alternative B would require, 
on the face of the advertisement, identification of the payor plus an 
``indicator.'' Tier one of Alternative B differs from Alternative A in 
only one material aspect: Alternative B would allow, in lieu of a 
payor's full name, for a payor to be identified by a clearly recognized 
identifier such as an abbreviation or acronym. Under its second tier, 
Alternative B would require, on the face of the advertisement, only an 
``indicator''; neither the payor's name nor an identifier would be 
required under tier two of Alternative B. Alternatives A and B use 
similar definitions of ``adapted disclaimer'' and ``indicator.''
a. Alternative A--One Tier: Name Plus Indicator
    Alternative A's proposed rule would explain that an ``adapted 
disclaimer'' means ``an abbreviated disclaimer on the face of a 
communication in conjunction with an indicator through which a reader 
can locate the full disclaimer required'' under 11 CFR

[[Page 12876]]

110.11(c)(5)(i). The proposal would further clarify that the adapted 
disclaimer ``must indicate the person or persons who paid for the 
communication in letters of sufficient size to be clearly readable by a 
recipient of the communication.''
    Alternative A is proposing that adapted disclaimers include a 
payor's name on the face of the communication for several reasons. 
First, the inclusion of such information would signal to a recipient 
that the communication is, indeed, a paid advertisement. This is 
especially important on the internet where paid content can be targeted 
to a particular user and appear indistinguishable from the unpaid 
content that user views, unlike traditional media like radio or 
television, where paid content is transmitted to all users in the same 
manner and is usually offset in some way from editorial content.\62\ 
Second, the inclusion of the payor's name would allow persons viewing 
the communication on any device, even if the recipient does not view 
the full disclaimer, to know ``the person or group who is speaking'' 
and could, therefore, assist voters in identifying the source of 
advertising so they are better ``able to evaluate the arguments to 
which they are being subjected.'' Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 368 
(internal quotations and alterations removed). Alternative A is based 
on the premise that a technological mechanism to reach a full 
disclaimer provided by shortened URL and without the payor's name would 
not provide, on the face of the communication, the same informational 
value.\63\ Third, some commenters suggested that the Commission and the 
public not rely on social media platforms' voluntary efforts \64\ to 
identify paid communications (such as by a tag that a communication is 
``paid,'' ``sponsored,'' or ``promoted'').\65\ As a preliminary matter, 
the Commission lacks any enforcement mechanism to ensure compliance 
with such voluntary efforts, which, by definition, may be modified or 
abandoned at any time. In addition, tags that identify whether an 
advertisement is ``paid,'' ``sponsored,'' or ``promoted,'' do not 
necessarily identify who paid, sponsored, or promoted the 
advertisement,\66\ and even that limited information may disappear when 
a paid communication is shared with other social media users.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \62\ See, e.g., Center for Digital Democracy, Comment at 2 (Nov. 
9, 2017), http://sers.fec.gov/fosers/showpdf.htm?docid=358502 
(noting that ``native advertising'' online ``purposefully blurs the 
distinctions between editorial content and advertising''); Twitter, 
Comment at 2 (Nov. 9, 2017), http://sers.fec.gov/fosers/showpdf.htm?docid=358496 (noting that, absent paid ``Promoted'' tag, 
Promoted Tweets ``look and act just like regular Tweets''); 
Electronic Privacy Information Center, Comment at 4 (``Online 
platforms use algorithms to target ads with a level of granularity 
that has not been possible before'').
    \63\ See Electronic Privacy Information Center, Comment at 3 
(explaining that ``URL shortening tools such as goo.gl and bit.ly 
can take lengthy hyperlinks and reduce them to just a few 
characters. This would allow an ad with character limitations to 
provide a URL that linked to a full disclaimer.'').
    \64\ See, e.g., BMore Indivisible, Comment at 5 (stating that 
``Given the history of technology and social media companies--and 
their nearly total reliance on advertising for corporate profits -- 
the American people and the FEC cannot rely on them to regulate 
themselves when it comes to disclosing the source of political 
advertisements. Legislative action is uncertain and may be 
incomplete. The FEC must act to fully regulate internet political 
advertising disclaimers''); Center for American Progress, Comment at 
2-3 (Nov. 9, 2017) http://sers.fec.gov/fosers/showpdf.htm?docid=358489 (stating that ``To some extent, these 
companies have already taken steps toward proving more transparency 
for online political ads. While we commend those efforts, they are 
no substitute for action by the FEC. Such efforts vary from one 
company to another, with no consistent mechanism for enforcement and 
no meaningful guidance for new entrants. Clear and consistent rules 
should be in place for all technology companies, to ensure adequate 
transparency both now and in the future'').
    \65\ See, e.g., Twitter, Comment at 2 (describing ``promoted'' 
tweet label); Rob Goldman, Update on Our Advertising Transparency 
and Authenticity Efforts, Facebook Newsroom (Oct. 27, 2017), https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2017/10/update-on-our-advertising-transparency-andauthenticity-efforts/ (indicating that, starting in 
summer 2018, Facebook ``advertisers will have to include a 
disclosure in their election-related ads, which reads: `Paid for 
by.' '').
    \66\ See Electronic Frontier Foundation, Comment at 4 (noting 
current ability to ``publish anonymous election related 
advertisements on Facebook via an advertising account linked to a 
pseudonymous Facebook page'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    To further help voters evaluate the message, Alternative A proposes 
to require that information about the payor be of a size to ``be 
clearly readable.'' As with the size requirements for text and graphic 
internet communications described above, Alternative A intends that 
questions of whether a disclaimer is of sufficient type size to be 
clearly readable would be ``determined on a case-by-case basis, taking 
into account the vantage point from which the communication is intended 
to be seen or read as well as the actual size of the disclaimer text,'' 
as they are under the current rule. 2002 Disclaimer E&J, 67 FR 76965. 
Would a case-by-case ``clearly readable'' standard provide sufficient 
guidance to advertisers regarding the necessary size of an adapted 
disclaimer?
    As a component of adapted disclaimers, Alternative A proposes to 
require the use of an ``indicator,'' which it defines in proposed 
paragraph (c)(5)(i)(B) as ``any visible or audible element of an 
internet communication that is presented in a clear and conspicuous 
manner, to give the reader, observer, or listener adequate notice that 
further disclaimer information is available by a technological 
mechanism. An indicator is not clear and conspicuous if it is difficult 
to see, read, or hear, or if the placement is easily overlooked.'' 
Alternative A adds in proposed paragraph (c)(5)(i)(B): ``[a]n indicator 
may take any form including, but not limited to, words, images, sounds, 
symbols, and icons.'' What are the advantages and disadvantages of this 
approach? What would be the advantages and disadvantages of the 
Commission's designing and promulgating a single indicator to be used 
across all media and platforms?
b. Alternative B--Two Tiers: Indicator Plus Payor Identification or 
Indicator-Only
    Alternative B's proposed paragraph (c)(5)(ii) would explain that an 
``adapted disclaimer'' means ``an abbreviated disclaimer on the face of 
the communication in conjunction with a technological mechanism by 
which a reader can locate the disclaimer satisfying the general 
requirements'' of 11 CFR 110.11(b) and (c)(1).
    Alternative B proposes a two-tiered approach to the information 
that must be presented on the face of an internet public communication 
utilizing an adapted disclaimer. Under Alternative B's first tier, in 
proposed paragraph (c)(5)(iii), an adapted disclaimer consists of an 
abbreviated disclaimer that includes an ``indicator'' and identifies 
the payor by full name or by ``a clearly recognized abbreviation, 
acronym, or other unique identifier by which the payor is commonly 
known,'' in lieu of the full name. Under Alternative B's second tier, 
in proposed paragraph (c)(5)(iv) described below, an adapted disclaimer 
consists of an abbreviated disclaimer that need include only an 
``indicator.'' Under both tiers--indicator-plus-payor identification 
and indicator-only--the internet public communication would have to 
provide a full disclaimer through a technological mechanism, described 
below.\67\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \67\ Given that Alternative B would allow payors to use a 
technological mechanism to provide disclaimers for any form of paid 
public communication on the internet, including audio and video 
communcations, it proposes to require the payor's name to be ``clear 
and conspicuous'' rather than ``clearly readable,'' as under 
Alternative A.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Under the first tier, described in proposed paragraph (c)(5)(iii), 
an advertisement could identify the payor by the payor's full name or 
by a clearly

[[Page 12877]]

recognized abbreviation, acronym, or other unique identifier by which 
the payor is commonly known. Thus, for example, if the Democratic 
Senatorial Campaign Committee were to pay for a Facebook advertisement, 
the advertisement could state that it was paid for by the DSCC, @DSCC, 
or DSCC.org, while providing the committee's full name in a disclaimer 
through a technological mechanism, as described below. This flexibility 
is intended to address internet public communications that might not 
otherwise conveniently or practicably accommodate the payor's name, 
such as character-limited ads, or where the payor's name is unusually 
lengthy, or where the payor wishes to use the ad to promote its social 
media brand.\68\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \68\ See, e.g., Advisory Opinion Request, Advisory Opinion 2010-
19 (Google) (Aug. 5, 2010) (asking to include URL to payor's website 
in lieu of disclaimer in severely character-limited internet ads, 
with disclaimer on landing page); Advisory Opinion Request, Advisory 
Opinion 2013-13 (Freshman Hold'Em JFC et al.) (Aug. 21, 2013) 
(asking to use shortened form of name and URL in disclaimer, where 
joint fundraising committee-payor's name included names of 18 
participating committees); Advisory Opinion Request, Advisory 
Opinion 2017-05 (Great America PAC, et al.) (June 2, 2017) (asking 
to use payor's Twitter handle in disclaimers).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    This proposal is modeled after a longstanding provision in the 
Commission's regulations that allows a separate segregated fund to 
include in its name a ``clearly recognized abbreviation or acronym by 
which [its] connected organization is commonly known.'' 11 CFR 
102.14(c). The Commission seeks comment on whether the proposal 
provides sufficient clarity for a payor to determine whether there is a 
``clearly recognized'' abbreviation, acronym, or other unique 
identifier by which the payor is ``commonly known.'' Should the 
Commission prescribe standards for use in making that determination? Is 
there a risk of confusion if two groups are commonly known by the same 
acronym, or does ready access to a full disclaimer (no more than one 
technological step away) help to alleviate any potential for confusion? 
Does the potential for confusion increase if the person viewing or 
listening to a political advertisement is unfamiliar with the person or 
group sponsoring the ad? If so, does ready access to the full 
disclaimer through a technological mechanism help to alleviate any such 
risk?
    Under the second tier, described in proposed paragraph (c)(5)(iv), 
Alternative B would allow a speaker to include only an ``indicator'' on 
the face of an internet public communication, if the space or time 
necessary for a clear and conspicuous tier-one adapted disclaimer under 
proposed paragraph (c)(5)(iii) would exceed a certain percentage of the 
overall communication, and provide the full disclaimer through a 
technological mechanism. Under Alternative B, the term ``indicator'' 
has the same meaning under both the first and second tiers, as 
described further below. Again, Alternative B's second tier proposes to 
use ten percent as the determining figure and to measure ``time or 
space'' in terms of characters, pixels, and seconds. Is ten percent a 
reasonable figure, or is it too high or too low? Are characters, 
pixels, and seconds reasonable metrics? How should characters, pixels, 
or seconds be determined when an internet public communication combines 
text, graphic, and video elements, such as an ad with text fields 
surrounding a video or a GIF?
    Alternative B's proposed paragraph (c)(5)(ii)(B) clarifies the 
``abbreviated disclaimer'' information aspect of the ``adapted 
disclaimer'' definition in proposed paragraph (c)(5)(ii). It would 
require the abbreviated disclaimer on the face of a communication to be 
presented in a clear and conspicuous manner. An abbreviated disclaimer 
would not be clear and conspicuous if it is difficult to see, read, or 
hear, or if the placement is easily overlooked.
    Proposed paragraph (c)(5)(i)(D) provides that an ``indicator'' is 
any visible or audible element of an internet public communication that 
gives notice to persons reading, observing, or listening to the 
communication that they may read, observe, or listen to a disclaimer 
satisfying the general requirements of 11 CFR 110.11(b) and (c)(1) 
through a technological mechanism.\69\ Under Alternative B, an 
indicator may take any form, including words (such as ``paid for by'' 
or ``sponsored by''), a website URL, or an image, sound, symbol, or 
icon. For example, under Alternative B a severely character-limited 
public internet communication could include an indicator stating ``Paid 
for by,'' ``Paid by,'' ``Sponsored by,'' ``Ad by,'' or providing the 
URL to the payor's website, if a reader could move his or her cursor 
over the words or link to a landing page and see the full 
disclaimer.\70\ Would this proposal promote disclosure and transparency 
by addressing extremely space- or time-constrained paid internet ads? 
Does an indicator alone provide sufficient guidance that the full 
disclaimer is available through a technological mechanism? Would this 
proposal help to ensure that voters have easy access to the full 
statutorily prescribed disclaimer for more online communications, while 
providing greater flexibility to political advertisers on the internet? 
Or would an indicator that takes the form of a hyperlink, for example, 
be prone to manipulation? Should the Commission require an indicator to 
take a specific form or to include specific language?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \69\ The proposed reference to the person ``observing'' an 
internet communication derives from the existing requirement that 
``[a] disclaimer . . . must be presented in a clear and conspicuous 
manner, to give the reader, observer, or listener adequate notice of 
the identify of the person or political committee that paid for and 
. . . authorized the communication.'' 11 CFR 110.11(c)(1) (emphasis 
added). As used in Alternative B, it is intended to be synonymous 
with ``viewer.''
    \70\ This provision is similar to the existing regulatory 
allowance for disclaimers on printed communications, which generally 
provides that ``[t]he disclaimer need not appear on the front or 
cover page of the communication as long as it appears within the 
communication.'' 11 CFR 110.11(c)(2)(iv).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In their comments on the ANPRM, Google and Twitter said that they 
intend to require each political advertisement on their platforms to 
bear a special designation that will allow viewers to obtain additional 
information about the sponsor of the ad.\71\ Should the Commission 
allow sponsors of extremely space- or time-limited paid internet 
advertisements to use platform-provided designations as their 
indicators, if such disclaimers meet all of the requirements for 
providing a disclaimer through a technological mechanism? Or do the 
limitations inherent in platform-provided designations, discussed 
above, argue against doing so? In any event, under Alternative B, the 
responsibility for ensuring that the disclaimer provided through a 
technological mechanism complies with the disclaimer requirement would 
remain with the person paying for the communication, and would not fall 
on the internet platform hosting it.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \71\ Google, Comment at 1, 6-7, 11-12 (explaining ``Why This 
Ad'' icon for election-related advertisements on Search, YouTube, 
and Display); Twitter, Comment at 4 (explaining ``political ad 
indicator'' for ``electioneering ads'' on Twitter); see also 
Facebook, Comment at 3 (``[A]llowing ads to include an icon or other 
obvious indicator that more information about an ad is available via 
quick navigation (like a single click) would give clear guidance on 
how to include disclaimers in new technologies as they are 
developed.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

6. Adaptations Utilizing One-Step Technological Mechanism

    Alternatives A and B both propose that a technological mechanism 
used to provide access to a full disclaimer must do so within one step.

[[Page 12878]]

a. Alternative A--Associated With ``Indicator'' in Advertisement
    Because the provision of an ad payor's name is necessary but not 
always sufficient to meet the Act's disclaimer requirement,\72\ 
Alternative A requires a mechanism to provide the additional required 
information. Alternative A's proposed paragraph (c)(5)(i)(A) would 
specify that the technological mechanism used to provide the full 
disclaimer must be ``associated with'' the indicator and allow a 
recipient of the communication to locate the full disclaimer ``by 
navigating no more than one step away from the adapted disclaimer.'' 
This means that the additional technological step should be apparent in 
the context of the communication and the disclaimer, once reached, 
should be ``clear and conspicuous'' and otherwise satisfy the full 
requirements of 11 CFR 110.11(c). Moreover, this proposed requirement 
is intended to notify a recipient of the communication that further 
information about or from the payor is available and that the recipient 
may find that information with minimal investment of additional 
effort.\73\ Thus, for example, a hyperlink underlying the ``paid for'' 
language would be ``associated with'' the full disclaimer at the 
landing page located one step away from the communication and to which 
the link leads. One commenter suggested that ``the Commission should 
allow people and entities subject to disclaimer requirements to satisfy 
them through any reasonable technological means'' rather than through a 
particular technology.\74\ Should the Commission explicitly include a 
requirement that a technological mechanism be ``reasonable'' or can the 
reasonableness requirement for such mechanisms be assumed?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \72\ See, e.g., 52 U.S.C. 30120(a) (requiring payment and 
authorization statements and, if not authorized by a candidate, a 
payor's street address, telephone number, or ``World Wide Web'' 
address); Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Privileges and Elections of 
the S. Comm. on Rules and Admin., 94th Cong. 141 (1976) (testimony 
of Antonin Scalia, Asst. Att'y Gen'l) (testifying, in response to 
question about proposal to amend Act to require payor name and 
authorization statement, that ``[t]he principle seems to me a good 
one'' that ``seems to me like a sensible provision'' to minimize 
risk that ``candidate's campaign can be run by somebody other than 
the candidate'').
    \73\ See, e.g., MCCI, Comment at 2 (Nov. 12, 2017), http://sers.fec.gov/fosers/showpdf.htm?docid=360063 (asking, rhetorically, 
``Who doesn't know how to click a link in an ad?'' in arguing for 
short word like ``ad'' or ``paid'' with hyperlink by which readers 
``will ultimately be able to track material back to its source'').
    \74\ Coolidge-Reagan Foundation, Comment at 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

b. Alternative B--Associated With Adapted Disclaimer
    Alternative B's proposed paragraph (c)(5)(i)(C) defines the term 
``technological mechanism'' as any use of technology that enables the 
person reading, observing, or listening to an internet public 
communication to read, observe, or listen to a disclaimer satisfying 
the general requirements of paragraphs (b) and (c)(1) without 
navigating more than one step away from the internet public 
communication, and is associated with an adapted disclaimer as provided 
in proposed 11 CFR 110.11(c)(5)(ii). Thus, by definition, the 
technological mechanism must be ``associated with'' the abbreviated 
disclaimer on the face of the internet communication itself, and must 
not require the person reading, observing, or listening to an internet 
communication to navigate more than one step away to read, observe, or 
listen to the disclaimer. The additional technological step under 
Alternative B should be apparent in the context of the communication, 
and the disclaimer provided through alternative technical means must be 
``clear and conspicuous'' under 11 CFR 110.11(c)(1). Should a 
technological mechanism be deemed to be ``associated with'' the 
abbreviated disclaimer on the face of an internet public communication 
if the person reading, observing, or listening to the communication can 
read, observe, or listen to a disclaimer by clicking anywhere on the 
communication? If a person can access the full disclaimer by clicking 
anywhere on a communication, should the abbreviated disclaimer even be 
required on the face of the communication? Are there circumstances 
where an adapted disclaimer would be preferable to a full disclaimer, 
even if the full disclaimer would take up ten percent or less of the 
time or space in the internet public communication?

7. Examples of Technological Mechanisms in Adapted Disclaimers

    Alternatives A and B provide similar lists of possible 
technological mechanisms.
a. Alternative A--Illustrative List of Mechanisms
    Alternative A provides a list of examples of ``technological 
mechanisms for the provision of the full disclaimer'' including, but 
not limited to, ``hover-over mechanisms, pop-up screens, scrolling 
text, rotating panels, or hyperlinks to a landing page with the full 
disclaimer.'' This illustrative list incorporates examples of one-step 
technological mechanisms the Commission has seen utilized by advisory 
opinion requestors and other federal and state agency disclosure 
regulations.\75\ The list is intended to provide guidance while 
retaining flexibility for advertisers to utilize other existing 
technological mechanisms or new mechanisms that may arise in the 
future.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \75\ See, e.g., Advisory Opinion 2010-19 (Google) (addressing 
proposal to provide disclaimer by hyperlink to landing page 
containing full disclaimer); Fed. Trade Comm'n, .com Disclosures: 
How to Make Effective Disclosures in Digital Advertising 10 (2013), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/plain-language/bus41-dot-com-disclosures-information-about-online-advertising.pdf (permitting 
disclosure to ``be provided by using a hyperlink''); id. at 12 
(allowing ``mouse-over'' display if effective on mobile devices); 
id. at 13-14 (allowing disclosures by pop ups and interstitial 
pages); id. at 16 (allowing scrolling text or rotating panels in 
space-constrained banner ad to present required disclosures); Cal. 
Code Regs. tit. 2, sec. 18450.4(b)(3)(G)(1) (permitting ``link to a 
web page with disclosure information''); id. at (b)(3)(G)(1) 
(allowing disclaimer ``displayed via rollover display''); Md. Code. 
Regs. 33.13.07(D)(2)(b)(i) (permitting ``viewer to click'' and be 
``taken to a landing or home page'' with disclaimer); see also First 
Gen. Counsel's Report at 5 n.19, MUR 6911 (Frankel) (noting 
respondent committee's claim that ``its Twitter profile contains a 
link to the campaign's website that contains a disclaimer''); 
Interactive Advertising Bureau, Comment at 3 (Nov. 10, 2017), http://sers.fec.gov/fosers/showpdf.htm?docid=358484 (advocating a rule 
allowing for flexibility in disclaimer provision, such as by click 
through links); CMPLY, Comment at 2-3 and 9-11 (describing several 
``short-form'' disclosure solutions within character-limited social 
media platforms).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Should the Commission allow advertisers to include different parts 
of a full disclaimer in different frames or components of text or 
graphic internet advertisements (such as a disclaimer split between two 
character-limited text fields, one above an image and one below)? 
Several commenters noted the importance of ensuring that disclaimers 
are visible across devices or platforms and expressed concern that some 
technological mechanisms may not be functional across all devices or 
platforms.\76\ Should the Commission incorporate into the rule a 
requirement that any technological mechanism used must be accessible by 
all recipients of that communication, including those

[[Page 12879]]

accessing the communication on mobile devices?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \76\ See, e.g., Asian Americans Advancing Justice, et al., 
Comment at 9-11 (presenting statistics showing that persons of color 
are more likely to consume information on internet than television 
and are more likely to do so via mobile devices than display 
(desktop) platforms); CMPLY, Comment at 2 (noting that `` `roll 
over' or `hover' disclosures . . . have significant limitations in 
social media platforms and . . . do not function within the user 
interfaces of mobile devices, where the majority of social media 
engagement takes place and where we have seen the largest increases 
in internet and broadband usage'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

b. Alternative B--Illustrative List of Mechanisms
    Alternative B's proposed paragraph (c)(5)(i)(C) provides the same 
examples of technological mechanisms as Alternative A, with two 
exceptions. First, because Alternative B does not limit the use of 
technological mechanisms to internet communications with text or 
graphic components and anticipates that technology will develop to 
enable speakers to provide future disclaimers in ways that might not be 
available today, it includes ``voice-over'' as an example. Second, 
Alternative B proposes to refer to ``mouse-over'' and ``roll-over'' as 
examples, in addition to ``hover-over.'' Are these additional 
references useful, or are they already subsumed under ``hover-over''? 
Should the list of examples be further expanded or refined?

8. Proposed Exceptions to Disclaimer Rules for Internet Public 
Communications

a. Alternative A
    No Proposal.
b. Alternative B
    Alternative B proposes to codify a preference for including full 
disclaimers in paid internet advertisements, with alternative 
approaches available utilizing technological mechanisms. Although 
Alternative B is intended to make it easier for internet communications 
to meet the disclaimer requirement, some internet public communications 
might not be able to comply with the disclaimer requirement, either now 
or as technology and advertising practices change. Thus, Alternative B 
proposes to exempt from the disclaimer requirement any internet public 
communication that can provide neither a disclaimer in the 
communication itself nor an adapted disclaimer as provided in proposed 
paragraph (c)(5).
    The proposed exception in Alternative B is intended to replace the 
small items and impracticable exceptions for internet public 
communication, so that the small items and impracticable exceptions 
would no longer apply to such communications. The small items and 
impracticable exceptions both predate the digital age, and the 
Commission has faced challenges in applying them to internet 
communications. Despite several requests, the Commission has issued 
only one advisory opinion in which a majority of Commissioners agreed 
that a disclaimer exception applied to digital communications. See 
Advisory Opinion 2002-09 (Target Wireless). Statements by individual 
Commissioners indicate a difference of opinion regarding the 
application of the exceptions to internet communications.\77\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \77\ See Advisory Opinion 2017-12 (Take Back Action Fund), 
Concurring Statement of Commissioner Ellen L. Weintraub (Dec. 21, 
2017), Concurring Statement of Vice Chair Caroline C. Hunter and 
Commissioners Lee E. Goodman and Matthew S. Petersen (Dec. 14, 
2017); Advisory Opinion Request 2013-18 (Revolution Messaging), 
Statement for the Record by Vice Chair Ann M. Ravel, Commissioner 
Steven T. Walther, and Commissioner Ellen L. Weintraub (Feb. 27, 
2014); Advisory Opinion 2010-19 (Google), Concurring Statement of 
Chairman Matthew S. Petersen (Dec. 30, 2010), Statement for the 
Record by Commissioner Caroline C. Hunter (Dec. 17, 2016), and 
Concurring Statement of Vice Chair Cynthia L. Bauerly, Commissioner 
Steven T. Walther, and Commissioner Ellen L. Weintraub (Dec. 16, 
2010).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Alternative B's proposed paragraph (f)(1)(iv) exempts from the 
disclaimer requirement any paid internet advertisement that cannot 
provide a disclaimer in the communication itself nor an adapted 
disclaimer under proposed paragraph (c)(5). Is the exception as 
currently proposed sufficiently clear? The proposed exception provides 
as an example static banner ads on small internet-enabled mobile 
devices that cannot link to a landing page controlled by the person 
paying for the communication.\78\ Do such ads exist? Should Alternative 
B's proposed exception apply to advertisements that technically can 
link to a website with a full disclaimer but do not do so? Does the 
Commission have statutory authority to adopt exceptions to the 
disclaimer requirements?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \78\ The Commission considered static banner ads on small 
internet-enabled mobile devices in Advisory Opinion Request 2013-18 
(Revolution Messaging). In that advisory opinion request, the 
requestor asked the Commission to recognize small (320 x 50 pixels) 
static banner ads on smartphones as exempt from the disclaimer 
requirement under the ``small items'' exception. The Commission did 
not approve a response by the required four affirmative votes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    If the Commission adopts either the single-tier adapted disclaimer 
approach of Alternative A or the two-tier approach of Alternative B, 
would there be a need to exempt any internet public communications from 
the disclaimer requirement? Or would the adaptations adequately address 
any technological limitations? Would adopting any new exception to the 
disclaimer requirement for internet public communications lead to 
manipulation and abuse of the exception? If so, what can the Commission 
do to minimize the risk of manipulation and abuse, and enhance 
disclosure? Conversely, if the Commission decides not to adopt a new 
exception for internet public communications, what effect would that 
decision have on political discourse on the internet? Could such a 
decision, coupled with uncertainty over the application of the existing 
exceptions to internet public communications, potentially chill 
political speech on the internet?

F. Conclusion

    The Commission welcomes comment on any aspect of Alternatives A and 
B. Additionally, the Commission seeks comment addressing how 
differences between online platforms, providers, and presentations may 
affect the application of any of the proposed disclaimer rules for 
text, graphic, video, and audio internet advertisements in Alternative 
A, or for internet public communications generally in Alternative B. 
Among other topics, the Commission seeks comment on whether the ability 
to zoom or otherwise expand the size of some digital communications 
affects any of these proposals. Similarly, the Commission seeks comment 
on the interaction between the proposed definition of ``public 
communication'' and the proposed disclaimer rules in Alternatives A and 
B. The Commission is particularly interested in comment detailing the 
challenges and opportunities persons have experienced in complying with 
(and receiving disclosure from) similar state and federal disclaimer or 
disclosure regimes. Given the development and proliferation of the 
internet as a mode of political communication, and the expectation that 
continued technological advances will further enhance the quantity of 
information available to voters online, the Commission welcomes comment 
on whether the proposed rules allow for flexibility to address future 
technological developments while honoring the important function of 
providing disclaimers to voters.

Certification of No Effect Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 605(b) (Regulatory 
Flexibility Act)

    The Commission certifies that the attached proposed rules, if 
adopted, would not have a significant economic impact on a substantial 
number of small entities. The proposed rules would clarify and update 
existing regulatory language, codify certain existing Commission 
precedent regarding internet communications, and provide political 
committees and other entities with more flexibility in meeting the 
Act's disclaimer requirements. The proposed rules would not impose new

[[Page 12880]]

recordkeeping, reporting, or financial obligations on political 
committees or commercial vendors. The Commission therefore certifies 
that the proposed rules, if adopted, would not have a significant 
economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.

List of Subjects

11 CFR Part 100

    Elections.

11 CFR Part 110

    Campaign funds, Political committees and parties.

    For the reasons set out in the preamble, the Federal Election 
Commission proposes to amend 11 CFR parts 100 and 110, as follows:

PART 100--SCOPE AND DEFINITIONS (52 U.S.C. 30101)

0
1. The authority citation for part 100 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 52 U.S.C. 30101, 30104, 30111(a)(8), and 30114(c).


Sec.  100.26  [Amended]

0
2. Amend Sec.  100.26 by removing ``website'' and adding in its place 
``website or internet-enabled device or application''.

PART 110--CONTRIBUTION AND EXPENDITURE LIMITATIONS AND PROHIBITIONS

0
3. The authority citation for part 110 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 52 U.S.C. 30101(8), 30101(9), 30102(c)(2), 
30104(i)(3), 30111(a)(8), 30116, 30118, 30120, 30121, 30122, 30123, 
30124, and 36 U.S.C. 510.

Alternative A

0
4. In Sec.  110.11, add paragraph (c)(5) to read as follows:


Sec.  110.11  Communications; advertising; disclaimers (52 U.S.C. 
30120).

* * * * *
    (c) * * *
    (5) Specific requirements for internet communications. In addition 
to the general requirements of paragraphs (b) and (c)(1) of this 
section, a disclaimer required by paragraph (a) of this section that 
appears on a public communication distributed over the internet must 
comply with the following:
    (i) A public communication distributed over the internet with text 
or graphic components but without any video component must contain a 
disclaimer that is of sufficient type size to be clearly readable by 
the recipient of the communication. A disclaimer that appears in 
letters at least as large as the majority of the other text in the 
communication satisfies the size requirement of this paragraph. A 
disclaimer under this paragraph must be displayed with a reasonable 
degree of color contrast between the background and the text of the 
disclaimer. A disclaimer satisfies the color contrast requirement of 
this paragraph if it is displayed in black text on a white background 
or if the degree of color contrast between the background and the text 
of the disclaimer is no less than the color contrast between the 
background and the largest text used in the communication.
    (A) A public communication distributed over the internet with text 
or graphic components but without any video component that, due to 
external character or space constraints, cannot fit a required 
disclaimer must include an adapted disclaimer. For purposes of this 
paragraph, an adapted disclaimer means an abbreviated disclaimer on the 
face of a communication in conjunction with an indicator through which 
a reader can locate the full disclaimer required by paragraph 
(c)(5)(i). The adapted disclaimer must indicate the person or persons 
who paid for the communication in letters of sufficient size to be 
clearly readable by a recipient of the communication. The technological 
mechanism in an adapted disclaimer must be associated with the 
indicator and must allow a recipient of the communication to locate the 
full disclaimer by navigating no more than one step away from the 
adapted disclaimer. Technological mechanisms for the provision of the 
full disclaimer include, but are not limited to, hover-over mechanisms, 
pop-up screens, scrolling text, rotating panels, or hyperlinks to a 
landing page with the full disclaimer.
    (B) As used in paragraph (c)(5), an indicator is any visible or 
audible element of an internet communication that is presented in a 
clear and conspicuous manner to give the reader, observer, or listener 
adequate notice that further disclaimer information is available by a 
technological mechanism. An indicator is not clear and conspicuous if 
it is difficult to see, read, or hear, or if the placement is easily 
overlooked. An indicator may take any form including, but not limited 
to, words, images, sounds, symbols, and icons.
    (ii) A public communication distributed over the internet with an 
audio component but without video, graphic, or text components must 
include the statement described in paragraphs (c)(3)(i) and (iv) of 
this section if authorized by a candidate, or the statement described 
in paragraph (c)(4) of this section if not authorized by a candidate. A 
public communication distributed over the internet with a video 
component must include the statement described in paragraphs 
(c)(3)(ii)-(iv) of this section if authorized by a candidate, or the 
statement described in paragraph (c)(4) of this section if not 
authorized by a candidate.
* * * * *

Alternative B

0
5. Amend Sec.  110.11 as follows:
0
a. Add paragraph (c)(5).
0
b. Add paragraph (f)(1)(iv).
    The additions read as follows:


Sec.  110.11  Communications; advertising; disclaimers (52 U.S.C. 
30120).

* * * * *
    (c) * * *
    (5) Specific requirements for internet communications. (i) For 
purposes of this section:
    (A) The term internet communication means electronic mail of more 
than 500 substantially similar communications when sent by a political 
committee; all internet websites of political committees available to 
the general public; and any internet public communication as defined in 
paragraph (c)(5)(i)(B) of this section;
    (B) The term internet public communication means any communication 
placed for a fee on another person's website or internet-enabled device 
or application;
    (C) The term technological mechanism refers to any use of 
technology that enables the person reading, observing, or listening to 
an internet public communication to read, observe, or listen to a 
disclaimer satisfying the general requirements of paragraphs (b) and 
(c)(1) of this section without navigating more than one step away from 
the internet public communication, and is associated with an adapted 
disclaimer as provided in paragraph (c)(5)(ii) of this section. A 
technological mechanism may take any form including, but not limited 
to, hover-over; mouse-over; voice-over; roll-over; pop-up screen; 
scrolling text; rotating panels; and click-through or hyperlink to a 
landing page; and
    (D) The term indicator refers to any visible or audible element of 
an internet public communication that gives notice to persons reading, 
observing, or listening to the internet public communication that they 
may read, observe, or listen to a disclaimer satisfying the general 
requirements of paragraphs (b) and (c)(1) of this section through a 
technological mechanism. An indicator may take any form including,

[[Page 12881]]

but not limited to, words such as ``Paid for by,'' ``Paid by,'' 
``Sponsored by,'' or ``Ad by''; website URL; image; sound; symbol; and 
icon.
    (ii) Every internet communication for which a disclaimer is 
required by paragraph (a) of this section must satisfy the general 
requirements of paragraphs (b) and (c)(1) of this section, except an 
internet public communication may include an adapted disclaimer under 
the circumstances described in paragraphs (c)(5)(iii)-(c)(5)(iv) of 
this section. For purposes of this paragraph, an adapted disclaimer 
means an abbreviated disclaimer on the face of the communication in 
conjunction with a technological mechanism by which a reader can locate 
the disclaimer satisfying the general requirements of paragraphs (b) 
and (c)(1) of this section. Any internet public communication that 
includes an adapted disclaimer must comply with the following:
    (A) The internet public communication must provide a disclaimer 
satisfying the general requirements of paragraphs (b) and (c)(1) of 
this section through a technological mechanism as described in 
paragraph (c)(5)(i)(C) of this section.
    (B) The internet public communication must present the abbreviated 
disclaimer on the face of the communication in a clear and conspicuous 
manner. An abbreviated disclaimer is not clear and conspicuous if it is 
difficult to read, hear, or observe, or if the placement is easily 
overlooked.
    (C) For an internet public communication consisting of text, 
graphics, or images, time or space must be measured in [characters or 
pixels].
    (D) For an internet public communication consisting of audio or 
video, time or space must be measured in [seconds].
    (iii) If the time or space required for a disclaimer satisfying the 
general requirements of paragraphs (b) and (c)(1) of this section would 
exceed [ten] percent of the time or space in an internet public 
communication, then the abbreviated disclaimer on the face of the 
communication must include an indicator and identify the person who 
paid for the internet public communication by the person's full name or 
by a clearly recognized abbreviation, acronym, or other unique 
identifier by which the person is commonly known.
    (iv) If the time or space required for an abbreviated disclaimer 
under paragraph (c)(5)(iii) of this section would exceed [ten] percent 
of the time or space in the internet public communication, then the 
abbreviated disclaimer on the face of the communication must include an 
indicator.
* * * * *
    (f) Exceptions.
    (1) * * *
    (iv) Any internet public communication that cannot provide a 
disclaimer on the face of the internet public communication itself nor 
an adapted disclaimer as provided in paragraph (c)(5) of this section, 
such as a static banner ad on a small internet-enabled device that 
cannot link to a landing page of the person paying for the internet 
public communication. The provisions of paragraph (f)(1)(i)-(iii) of 
this section do not apply to internet public communications.
* * * * *

    On behalf of the Commission,

    Dated: March 20, 2018.
 Caroline C. Hunter,
Chair, Federal Election Commission.
[FR Doc. 2018-06010 Filed 3-23-18; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6715-01-P