[Federal Register Volume 82, Number 245 (Friday, December 22, 2017)]
[Notices]
[Pages 60770-60773]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2017-27590]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket No. 50-285; NRC-2017-0223]
Omaha Public Power District; Fort Calhoun Station, Unit No. 1;
Requests for Exemptions Regarding Emergency Planning Requirements
AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
ACTION: Exemption; issuance.
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SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing
exemptions in response to a request from Omaha Public Power District
(OPPD or the licensee) regarding certain emergency planning (EP)
requirements. The exemptions will eliminate the requirements to
maintain an offsite radiological emergency plan and reduce the scope of
onsite EP activities at the Fort Calhoun Station, Unit No. 1 (FCS),
based on the reduced risks of accidents that could result in an offsite
radiological release at a decommissioning nuclear power reactor.
DATES: The exemption was issued on December 11, 2017.
ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID NRC-2017-0223 when contacting the
NRC about the availability of information regarding this document. You
may obtain publicly-available information related to this document
using any of the following methods:
Federal Rulemaking Website: Go to http://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2017-0223. Address
questions about NRC dockets to Carol Gallagher; telephone: 301-415-
3463; email: [email protected]. For technical questions, contact
the individual listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section of
this document.
NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System
(ADAMS): You may obtain publicly available documents online in the
ADAMS Public Documents collection at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To begin the search, select ``ADAMS Public Documents'' and
then select ``Begin Web-based ADAMS Search.'' For problems with ADAMS,
please contact the NRC's Public Document Room (PDR) reference staff at
1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737, or by email to [email protected]. The
ADAMS accession number for each document referenced (if it is available
in ADAMS) is provided the first time it is mentioned in this document.
NRC's PDR: You may examine and purchase copies of public
documents at
[[Page 60771]]
the NRC's PDR, Room O1-F21, One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville
Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: James Kim, Office of Nuclear Reactor
Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington DC 20555-
0001; telephone: 301-415-4125; email: [email protected].
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The text of the exemption is attached.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, on December 19, 2017.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
James S. Kim,
Project Manager, Special Projects and Process Branch, Division of
Operating Reactor Licensing, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
Attachment--Exemption
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Docket No. 50-285
Omaha Public Power District
Fort Calhoun Station, Unit No. 1
Exemption
I. Background
Omaha Public Power District (OPPD, the licensee) is the holder
of Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-40 for Fort Calhoun
Station, Unit No. 1 (FCS). The license provides, among other things,
that the facility is subject to all rules, regulations, and orders
of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) now or hereafter in
effect. The facility consists of a pressurized-water reactor located
in Washington County, Nebraska.
By letter dated August 25, 2016 (Agencywide Documents Access and
Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML16242A127), OPPD submitted
a certification to the NRC indicating it would permanently cease
power operations at FCS on October 24, 2016. On October 24, 2016,
OPPD permanently ceased power operation at FCS. On November 13, 2016
(ADAMS Accession No. ML16319A254), OPPD certified that it had
permanently defueled the FCS reactor vessel.
In accordance with Sec. 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii), and Sec.
50.82(a)(2) of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR),
the specific license for the facility no longer authorizes reactor
operation, or emplacement or retention of fuel in the respective
reactor vessel, after certifications of permanent cessation of
operations and of permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel
are docketed. The facility is still authorized to possess and store
irradiated (i.e., spent) nuclear fuel. The spent fuel is currently
being stored onsite in a spent fuel pool (SFP).
During normal power reactor operations, the forced flow of water
through the reactor coolant system removes heat generated by the
reactor. The reactor coolant system, operating at high temperatures
and pressures, transfers this heat through the steam generator tubes
converting non-radioactive feedwater to steam, which then flows to
the main turbine generator to produce electricity. Many of the
accident scenarios postulated in the updated safety analysis reports
(USARs) for operating power reactors involve failures or
malfunctions of systems, which could affect the fuel in the reactor
core and, in the most severe postulated accidents, would involve the
release of large quantities of fission products. With the permanent
cessation of reactor operations at FCS and the permanent removal of
the fuel from the reactor vessel, such accidents are no longer
possible. The reactor, reactor coolant system, and supporting
systems are no longer in operation and have no function related to
the storage of the spent fuel. Therefore, emergency planning (EP)
provisions for postulated accidents involving failure or malfunction
of the reactor, reactor coolant system, or supporting systems are no
longer applicable.
The EP requirements of 10 CFR 50.47, ``Emergency plans,'' and
Appendix E to 10 CFR part 50, ``Emergency Planning and Preparedness
for Production and Utilization Facilities,'' continue to apply to
nuclear power reactors that have permanently ceased operation and
have removed all fuel from the reactor vessel. There are no explicit
regulatory provisions distinguishing EP requirements for a power
reactor that is permanently shut down and defueled from those for a
reactor that is authorized to operate. To reduce or eliminate EP
requirements that are no longer necessary due to the decommissioning
status of the facility, OPPD must obtain exemptions from those EP
regulations. Only then can OPPD modify the FCS emergency plan to
reflect the reduced risk associated with the permanently shutdown
and defueled condition of FCS.
II. Request/Action
By letter dated December 16, 2016 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML16356A578), OPPD requested exemptions from certain EP requirements
of 10 CFR part 50 for FCS. More specifically, OPPD requested
exemptions from certain planning standards in 10 CFR 50.47(b)
regarding onsite and offsite radiological emergency plans for
nuclear power reactors; from certain requirements in 10 CFR
50.47(c)(2) that require establishment of plume exposure and
ingestion pathway emergency planning zones for nuclear power
reactors; and from certain requirements in 10 CFR 50, Appendix E,
Section IV, which establish the elements that make up the content of
emergency plans. In letters dated February 10, April 14, and April
20, 2017 (ADAMS Accession Nos. ML17041A443, ML17104A191, and
ML17111A857, respectively), OPPD provided responses to the NRC
staff's requests for additional information concerning the proposed
exemptions.
The information provided by OPPD included justifications for
each exemption requested. The exemptions requested by OPPD would
eliminate the requirements to maintain formal offsite radiological
emergency plans, reviewed by the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) under the requirements of 44 CFR part 350, and reduce the
scope of onsite EP activities. The licensee stated that the
application of all of the standards and requirements in 10 CFR
50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c), and 10 CFR part 50, Appendix E is not
needed for adequate emergency response capability, based on the
substantially lower onsite and offsite radiological consequences of
accidents still possible at the permanently shutdown and defueled
facility, as compared to an operating facility. If offsite
protective actions were needed for a very unlikely accident that
could challenge the safe storage of spent fuel at FCS, provisions
exist for offsite agencies to take protective actions using a
comprehensive emergency management plan (CEMP) under the National
Preparedness System to protect the health and safety of the public.
A CEMP in this context, also referred to as an emergency operations
plan (EOP), is addressed in FEMA's Comprehensive Preparedness Guide
101, ``Developing and Maintaining Emergency Operations Plans,''
which is publicly available at http://www.fema.gov/pdf/about/divisions/npd/CPG_101_V2.pdf. Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 101
is the foundation for State, territorial, Tribal, and local EP in
the United States. It promotes a common understanding of the
fundamentals of risk-informed planning and decision-making and helps
planners at all levels of government in their efforts to develop and
maintain viable, all-hazards, all-threats emergency plans. An EOP is
flexible enough for use in all emergencies. It describes how people
and property will be protected; details who is responsible for
carrying out specific actions; identifies the personnel, equipment,
facilities, supplies and other resources available; and outlines how
all actions will be coordinated. A CEMP is often referred to as a
synonym for ``all-hazards planning.''
III. Discussion
In accordance with 10 CFR 50.12, ``Specific exemptions,'' the
Commission may, upon application by any interested person or upon
its own initiative, grant exemptions from the requirements of 10 CFR
part 50 when: (1) the exemptions are authorized by law, will not
present an undue risk to public health or safety, and are consistent
with the common defense and security; and (2) any of the special
circumstances listed in 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2) are present. These
special circumstances include, among other things, that the
application of the regulation in the particular circumstances would
not serve the underlying purpose of the rule or is not necessary to
achieve the underlying purpose of the rule.
As noted previously, the current EP regulations contained in 10
CFR 50.47(b) and Appendix E to 10 CFR part 50 apply to both
operating and shutdown power reactors. The NRC has consistently
acknowledged that the risk of an offsite radiological release at a
power reactor that has permanently ceased operations and removed
fuel from the reactor vessel is significantly lower, and the types
of possible accidents are significantly fewer, than at an operating
power reactor. However, current EP regulations do not recognize that
once a power reactor permanently ceases operation, the risk of a
large radiological release from credible emergency accident
[[Page 60772]]
scenarios is significantly reduced. The reduced risk for any
significant offsite radiological release is based on two factors.
One factor is the elimination of accidents applicable only to an
operating power reactor, resulting in fewer credible accident
scenarios. The second factor is the reduced short-lived radionuclide
inventory and decay heat production due to radioactive decay. Due to
the permanently defueled status of the reactor, no new spent fuel
will be added to the SFP and the radionuclides in the current spent
fuel will continue to decay as the spent fuel ages. The irradiated
fuel will produce less heat due to radioactive decay, increasing the
available time to mitigate the SFP inventory loss. The NRC's NUREG/
CR-6451, ``A Safety and Regulatory Assessment of Generic BWR
[Boiling Water Reactor] and PWR [Pressurized Water Reactor]
Permanently Shutdown Nuclear Power Plants,'' dated August 31, 1997
(ADAMS Accession No. ML082260098) and the NRC's NUREG-1738,
``Technical Study of Spent Fuel Pool Accident Risk at
Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants,'' February 2001 (ADAMS
Accession No. ML010430066), confirmed that for permanently shutdown
and defueled power reactors that are bounded by the assumptions and
conditions in the report, the risk of offsite radiological release
is significantly less than for an operating power reactor.
In the past, EP exemptions similar to those requested by FCS,
have been granted to permanently shutdown and defueled power reactor
licensees. However, the exemptions did not relieve the licensees of
all EP requirements. Rather, the exemptions allowed the licensees to
modify their emergency plans commensurate with the credible site-
specific risks that were consistent with a permanently shutdown and
defueled status. Specifically, the NRC's approval of these prior
exemptions was based on the licensee's demonstration that: (1) the
radiological consequences of design-basis accidents would not exceed
the limits of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) Early
Phase Protective Action Guides (PAGs) of one roentgen equivalent man
(rem) at the exclusion area boundary; and (2) in the unlikely event
of a beyond-design-basis accident resulting in a loss of all modes
of heat transfer from the fuel stored in the SFP, there is
sufficient time to initiate appropriate mitigating actions, and if
needed, for offsite authorities to implement offsite protective
actions using a CEMP approach to protect the health and safety of
the public.
With respect to design-basis accidents at FCS, the licensee
provided analysis demonstrating that 10 days following permanent
shutdown, the radiological consequences of the only remaining
design-basis accident with potential for offsite radiological
release (the FHA in the Auxiliary Building, where the SFP is
located) will not exceed the limits of the EPA PAGs at the exclusion
area boundary. Therefore, because FCS has been permanently shutdown
for approximately 13 months, there is no longer any design-basis
accident that would warrant an offsite radiological emergency plan
meeting the requirements of 10 CFR part 50.
With respect to beyond design-basis accidents at FCS, the
licensee analyzed a drain down of the spent fuel pool water that
would effectively impede any decay heat removal. The analysis
demonstrates that at 530 days (1 year, 165 days) after shutdown,
there would be at least 10 hours after the assemblies have been
uncovered until the limiting fuel assembly (for decay heat and
adiabatic heatup analysis) reaches 900 degrees Celsius, the
temperature used to assess the potential onset of fission product
release. The analysis conservatively assumed the heat up time starts
when the spent fuel pool has been completely drained, although it is
likely that site personnel will start to respond to an incident when
drain down starts. The analysis also does not consider the period of
time from the initiating event causing loss of SFP water inventory
until cooling is lost.
The NRC staff reviewed the licensee's justification for the
requested exemptions against the criteria in 10 CFR 50.12(a) and
determined, as described below, that the criteria in 10 CFR 50.12(a)
are met, and that the exemptions should be granted. An assessment of
the OPPD EP exemptions is described in SECY-17-0080, ``Request by
the Omaha Public Power District for Exemptions from Certain
Emergency Planning Requirements for the Fort Calhoun Station, Unit
No. 1,'' dated August 10, 2017 (ADAMS Accession No. ML17116A430).
The Commission approved the NRC staff's recommendation to grant the
exemptions in the staff requirements memorandum to SECY-17-0080,
dated October 25, 2017 (ADAMS Accession No. ML17298A976).
Descriptions of the specific exemptions requested by OPPD and the
NRC staff's basis for granting each exemption are provided in SECY-
17-0080 and summarized in Table 1, ``Evaluation of Specific
Exemptions to EP Requirements,'' of the exemption issued December
11, 2017 (ADAMS Accession No. ML17263B191). The staff's detailed
review and technical basis for the approval of the specific EP
exemptions, requested by OPPD, are provided in the NRC staff's
safety evaluation dated December 11, 2017 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML17263B198).
A. Authorized by Law
The licensee has proposed exemptions from certain EP
requirements in 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR 50,
Appendix E, Section IV, that would allow OPPD to revise the FCS
Emergency Plan to reflect the permanently shutdown and defueled
condition of the station. As stated above, in accordance with 10 CFR
50.12, the Commission may, upon application by any interested person
or upon its own initiative, grant exemptions from the requirements
of 10 CFR part 50. The NRC staff has determined that granting of the
licensee's proposed exemptions will not result in a violation of the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, or the NRC's regulations.
Therefore, the exemptions are authorized by law.
B. No Undue Risk to Public Health and Safety
As stated previously, OPPD provided analyses that show the
radiological consequences of design-basis accidents will not exceed
the limits of the EPA early phase PAGs at the exclusion area
boundary. Therefore, formal offsite radiological emergency plans
required under 10 CFR part 50 are no longer needed for protection of
the public beyond the exclusion area boundary, based on the
radiological consequences of design-basis accidents still possible
at FCS.
Although very unlikely, there is one postulated beyond-design-
basis accident that might result in significant offsite radiological
releases. However, NUREG-1738 confirms that the risk of beyond-
design-basis accidents is greatly reduced at permanently shutdown
and defueled reactors. The NRC staff's analyses in NUREG-1738
concludes that the event sequences important to risk at permanently
shutdown and defueled power reactors are limited to large
earthquakes and cask drop events. For EP assessments, this is an
important difference relative to operating power reactors, where
typically a large number of different sequences make significant
contributions to risk. As described in NUREG-1738, relaxation of
offsite EP requirements in 10 CFR part 50, a few months after
shutdown resulted in only a small change in risk. The report further
concludes that the change in risk due to relaxation of offsite EP
requirements is small because the overall risk is low, and because
even under current EP requirements for operating power reactors, EP
was judged to have marginal impact on evacuation effectiveness in
the severe earthquakes that dominate SFP risk. All other sequences
including cask drops (for which offsite radiological emergency plans
are expected to be more effective) are too low in likelihood to have
a significant impact on risk.
Therefore, granting exemptions to eliminate the requirements of
10 CFR part 50 to maintain offsite radiological emergency plans and
to reduce the scope of onsite EP activities will not present an
undue risk to the public health and safety.
C. Consistent with the Common Defense and Security
The requested exemptions by OPPD only involve EP requirements
under 10 CFR part 50 and will allow OPPD to revise the FCS Emergency
Plan to reflect the permanently shutdown and defueled condition of
the facility. Physical security measures at FCS are not affected by
the requested EP exemptions. The discontinuation of formal offsite
radiological emergency plans and the reduction in scope of the
onsite emergency planning activities at FCS will not adversely
affect OPPD's ability to physically secure the site or protect
special nuclear material. Therefore, the proposed exemptions are
consistent with common defense and security.
D. Special Circumstances
Special circumstances, in accordance with 10 CFR
50.12(a)(2)(ii), are present whenever application of the regulation
in the particular circumstances is not necessary to achieve the
underlying purpose of the rule. The underlying purpose of 10 CFR
50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR part 50, Appendix E,
Section IV, is to provide reasonable assurance that adequate
protective measures can and will be taken in the event
[[Page 60773]]
of a radiological emergency, to establish plume exposure and
ingestion pathway emergency planning zones for nuclear power plants,
and to ensure that licensees maintain effective offsite and onsite
radiological emergency plans. The standards and requirements in
these regulations were developed by considering the risks associated
with operation of a power reactor at its licensed full-power level.
These risks include the potential for a reactor accident with
offsite radiological dose consequences.
As discussed previously in Section III, because FCS is
permanently shut down and defueled, there is no longer a risk of a
significant offsite radiological release from a design-basis
accident exceeding EPA early phase PAG at the exclusion area
boundary and the risk of a significant offsite radiological release
from a beyond-design-basis accident is greatly reduced when compared
to an operating power reactor. The NRC staff has confirmed the
reduced risks at FCS by comparing the generic risk assumptions in
the analyses in NUREG-1738 to site-specific conditions at FCS and
determined that the risk values in NUREG-1738 bound the risks
presented by FCS. As indicated by the results of the research
conducted for NUREG-1738 and more recently, for NUREG-2161,
``Consequence Study of a Beyond-Design-Basis Earthquake Affecting
the Spent Fuel Pool for a U.S. Mark I Boiling Water Reactor'' (ADAMS
Accession No. ML14255A365), while other consequences can be
extensive, accidents from SFPs with significant decay time have
little potential to cause offsite early fatalities, even if the
formal offsite radiological EP requirements were relaxed. The
licensee's analysis of a beyond-design-basis accident involving a
complete loss of SFP water inventory, based on an adiabatic heatup
analysis of the limiting fuel assembly for decay heat, shows that
within 530 days (1 year, 165 days) after shutdown, the time for the
limiting fuel assembly to reach 900 [deg]C is 10 hours after the
assemblies have been uncovered assuming a loss of air cooling.
The only analyzed beyond-design-basis accident scenario that
progresses to a condition where a significant offsite release might
occur, involves the very unlikely event where the SFP drains in such
a way that all modes of cooling or heat transfer are assumed to be
unavailable, which is referred to as an adiabatic heatup of the
spent fuel. The licensee's analysis of this beyond-design-basis
accident shows that within 530 days (1 year, 165 days) after
shutdown, more than 10 hours would be available between the time the
fuel is initially uncovered (at which time adiabatic heatup is
conservatively assumed to begin), until the fuel cladding reaches a
temperature of 1652 degrees Fahrenheit (900 [deg]C), which is the
temperature associated with rapid cladding oxidation and the
potential for a significant radiological release. This analysis
conservatively does not include the period of time from the
initiating event causing a loss of SFP water inventory until all
cooling means are lost.
The NRC staff has verified OPPD's analyses and its calculations.
The analyses provide reasonable assurance that in granting the
requested exemptions to OPPD, there is no design-basis accident that
will result in an offsite radiological release exceeding the EPA
early phase PAGs at the exclusion area boundary. In the unlikely
event of a beyond-design-basis accident affecting the SFP that
results in a complete loss of heat removal via all modes of heat
transfer, there will be well over 10 hours available before an
offsite release might occur and, therefore, at least 10 hours to
initiate appropriate mitigating actions to restore a means of heat
removal to the spent fuel. If a radiological release were projected
to occur under this unlikely scenario, a minimum of 10 hours is
considered sufficient time for offsite authorities to implement
protective actions using a CEMP approach to protect the health and
safety of the public.
Exemptions from the offsite EP requirements in 10 CFR part 50
have previously been approved by the NRC when the site-specific
analyses show that at least 10 hours is available following a loss
of SFP coolant inventory accident with no air cooling (or other
methods of removing decay heat) until cladding of the hottest fuel
assembly reaches the zirconium rapid oxidation temperature. The NRC
staff concluded in its previously granted exemptions, as it does
with the OPPD requested EP exemptions, that if a minimum of 10 hours
is available to initiate mitigative actions consistent with plant
conditions, or if needed, for offsite authorities to implement
protective actions using a CEMP approach, then formal offsite
radiological emergency plans, required under 10 CFR part 50, are not
necessary at permanently shutdown and defueled facilities.
Additionally, FCS committed to maintaining SFP makeup strategies
in its letter to the NRC dated December 16, 2016 (ADAMS Accession
No. ML16356A578). The multiple strategies for providing makeup to
the SFP include: using existing plant systems for inventory makeup;
an internal strategy that relies on the fire protection system with
redundant pumps (one diesel-driven and electric motor-driven); and
onsite diesel fire truck that can take suction from the Missouri
River. These strategies will continue to be required as license
condition 3.G, ``Mitigation Strategy License Condition.''
Considering the very low probability of beyond-design-basis
accidents affecting the SFP, these diverse strategies provide
multiple methods to obtain additional makeup or spray to the SFP
before the onset of any postulated offsite radiological release.
For all the reasons stated above, the NRC staff finds that the
licensee's requested exemptions to meet the underlying purpose of
all of the standards in 10 CFR 50.47(b), and requirements in 10 CFR
50.47(c)(2) and 10 CFR part 50, Appendix E, acceptably satisfy the
special circumstances in 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii) in view of the
greatly reduced risk of offsite radiological consequences associated
with the permanently shutdown and defueled state of the FCS
facility.
The NRC staff has concluded that the exemptions being granted by
this action will maintain an acceptable level of emergency
preparedness at FCS and, if needed, that there is reasonable
assurance that adequate offsite protective measures can and will be
taken by State and local government agencies using a CEMP approach
in the unlikely event of a radiological emergency at the FCS
facility. Since the underlying purposes of the rules, as exempted,
would continue to be achieved, even with the elimination of the
requirements under 10 CFR part 50 to maintain formal offsite
radiological emergency plans and reduction in the scope of the
onsite emergency planning activities at FCS, the special
circumstances required by 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii) exist.
E. Environmental Considerations
In accordance with 10 CFR 51.31(a), the Commission has
determined that the granting of this exemption will not have a
significant effect on the quality of the human environment as
discussed in the NRC staff's Finding of No Significant Impact and
associated Environmental Assessment published November 27, 2017 (82
FR 56060).
IV. Conclusions
Accordingly, the Commission has determined, pursuant to 10 CFR
50.12(a), that OPPD's request for exemptions from certain EP
requirements in 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR part
50, Appendix E, Section IV, and as summarized in Table 1 of the
exemption dated December 11, 2017, are authorized by law, will not
present an undue risk to the public health and safety, and are
consistent with the common defense and security. Also, special
circumstances are present. Therefore, the Commission hereby grants
OPPD's exemptions from certain EP requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b),
10 CFR 50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR part 50, Appendix E, Section IV, as
discussed and evaluated in detail in the staff's safety evaluation
dated December 11, 2017. The exemptions are effective as of April 7,
2018.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 11th day of December, 2017.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Kathryn M. Brock,
Acting Director, Division of Operating Reactor Licensing, Office of
Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 2017-27590 Filed 12-21-17; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P