[Federal Register Volume 82, Number 243 (Wednesday, December 20, 2017)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 60302-60303]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2017-27202]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 91

[Docket No.: FAA-2017-1194]


Change to Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast Services

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Notification of changes in ADS-B services.

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SUMMARY: This action announces changes in ADS-B services, including 
Traffic Information Service--Broadcast (TIS-B), for a small number of 
aircraft. The FAA is implementing a filter for certain ADS-B equipped 
aircraft

[[Page 60303]]

broadcasting erroneous or improper information when the broadcast 
information could affect the safe provision of air traffic services. 
Any aircraft subject to the filter will not have its ADS-B information 
sent to an air traffic control (ATC) facility nor will the aircraft be 
a client for TIS-B services. Affected aircraft will continue to receive 
ATC services within radar coverage using secondary radar information.

DATES: The action described herein is implemented January 2, 2018.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For technical questions concerning 
this action, contact: David E. Gray, Program Manager, Surveillance and 
Broadcast Services, AJM-232, Air Traffic Organization, Federal Aviation 
Administration, 600 Independence Ave. SW, Wilbur Wright Building, 
Washington, DC 20597; telephone: 202-267-3615; email: [email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Background

    In 2010, the FAA issued a final rule mandating equipage 
requirements and performance standards for Automatic Dependent 
Surveillance--Broadcast (ADS-B) Out avionics on aircraft operating in 
certain airspace after December 31, 2019. 75 FR 30160, May 28, 2010. 
Use of ADS-B Out will move air traffic control from a radar-based 
system to a satellite-derived aircraft location system and enhance 
aircraft surveillance by FAA and Department of Defense (DOD) air 
traffic controllers. Equipage with ADS-B avionics also provides 
aircraft operators with a platform for additional flight applications 
and services, including TIS-B,\1\ which improve a pilot's situational 
awareness in aircraft not equipped with a traffic alert and collision 
avoidance system (TCAS).
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    \1\ TIS-B uses secondary surveillance radars and multilateration 
systems to provide proximate traffic situational awareness, 
including position reports from aircraft not equipped with ADS-B 
Out. TIS-B data may not provide as much information as could be 
received directly from an aircraft's ADS-B Out broadcast, because of 
the required data processing. The TIS-B signal is an advisory 
service that is not designed for aircraft surveillance or 
separation, and cannot be used for either purpose.
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    In deploying the ADS-B surveillance infrastructure, the FAA 
implemented a capability to monitor compliance with Sec.  91.227 
requirements for aircraft operating within the U.S. National Airspace 
System (NAS). Over the past three years, this monitoring has identified 
some ADS-B Out aircraft with non-performing equipment (NPE) 
transmitting data used by ATC and ADS-B-In-equipped aircraft that 
present a potential safety hazard to NAS operations, including but not 
limited to: Unassigned/invalid 24-bit ICAO addresses; incorrect flight 
identification codes; erroneous position reports; improper avionics 
integrity and accuracy levels; and missing data required by applicable 
regulations.
    To reduce the potential hazard presented by NPE aircraft, the FAA 
is filtering individual 24-bit ICAO address codes (also known as Mode S 
codes) for certain aircraft from the FAA's operational ADS-B network. 
The FAA is implementing an ATC filtering capability on January 2, 2018. 
This filtering prevents processing of data transmitted by uniquely 
identified NPE aircraft within FAA air traffic control systems and by 
the FAA TIS-B service. ATC will continue to receive transponder replies 
to secondary radar interrogations and will be able to provide ATC 
services within radar coverage to aircraft subject to the filter, using 
secondary radar information. Also, any aircraft with a filtered ICAO 
address code will continue to appear as a ``target'' to nearby aircraft 
with ADS-B-In equipment.

Action

    The FAA will always filter ICAO address codes from aircraft that 
are transmitting the hexadecimal values ``000000'' and ``FFFFFF.'' Per 
ICAO technical standards which FAA surveillance systems meet, neither 
of these ICAO address codes should be used by any aircraft ADS-B Out 
transmitter or Mode S transponder. However, FAA ADS-B monitoring over 
the last three years indicates that approximately once per day, on 
average, there is a flight in the NAS using one of these incorrect ICAO 
address codes and indicating that the aircraft is equipped with an ADS-
B-In system. Because these non-compliant codes are not unique to a 
single aircraft, the potential for multiple aircraft to transmit the 
same code could create confusion inside ADS-B and TCAS avionics, Mode S 
interrogators, and ATC automation systems. This confusion could cause 
an aircraft's position to be incorrectly displayed or not displayed at 
all, thereby creating an unsafe condition in the NAS. To mitigate this 
risk and discourage violation of ICAO technical standards, the FAA will 
filter the ADS-B information from any aircraft transmitting a non-
compliant address code from the FAA's operational ATC systems. 
Therefore, aircraft broadcasting these incorrect ICAO address codes 
will be unable to receive TIS-B services.
    The FAA also intends to utilize the filter for other ICAO codes 
that are being improperly broadcast or for aircraft whose ADS-B Out 
equipment has exhibited erroneous position reports that could affect 
the safe provision of air traffic services. The FAA may also utilize 
the filter for aircraft that have a known issue that could reasonably 
result in erroneous ADS-B reports that could affect the safe provision 
of ATC services.
    The FAA has initiated the filtering capability described in this 
document for aircraft transmitting non-compliant codes. For other 
aircraft, the FAA intends when possible to provide individual notice to 
owners/operators prior to utilizing the filter. This notification would 
describe the reason for applying the filter and steps that must be 
taken before an aircraft may be removed from the filter. If an aircraft 
owner/operator does not respond to an FAA notice of finding regarding 
an ADS-B avionics issue, FAA at its option may subject that aircraft to 
the filter without further notice.
    Owners and operators can identify the ICAO address filtering status 
of their aircraft by requesting a Public ADS-B Performance Report 
(PAPR) at the following web address: https://adsbperformance.faa.gov/PAPRRequest.aspx. Owners and operators whose aircraft are affected by 
application of the ICAO address filter must contact the FAA Flight 
Standards Service ADS-B Focus Team at [email protected] for 
guidance on corrective actions and coordination for removal of aircraft 
from the ICAO address filter.
    Operators should check to insure that the ICAO address code (Mode S 
code) broadcast by their ADS-B equipment matches the assigned ICAO 
address code for their aircraft. This ICAO address code (Mode S code) 
can be found at: http://registry.faa.gov/aircraftinquiry/NNum_Inquiry.aspx. Operators can verify what ICAO address code is being 
broadcast by their aircraft by visiting: https://adsbperformance.faa.gov/PAPRRequest.aspx.\2\
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    \2\ For those aircraft transmitting an erroneous ICAO code, the 
PAPR software will search for the Flight ID matching the entered N-
registry number if it cannot locate the corresponding ICAO code.

    Issued in Washington, DC, on December 12, 2017.
Kristen G. Burnham,
Vice President, Program Management Organization, FAA Air Traffic 
Organization.
[FR Doc. 2017-27202 Filed 12-19-17; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 4910-13-P