[Federal Register Volume 82, Number 228 (Wednesday, November 29, 2017)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 56545-56560]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2017-25760]
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DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
Employee Benefits Security Administration
29 CFR Part 2550
[Application Number D-11712; D-11713; D-11850]
ZRIN 1210-ZA27
18-Month Extension of Transition Period and Delay of
Applicability Dates; Best Interest Contract Exemption (PTE 2016-01);
Class Exemption for Principal Transactions in Certain Assets Between
Investment Advice Fiduciaries and Employee Benefit Plans and IRAs (PTE
2016-02); Prohibited Transaction Exemption 84-24 for Certain
Transactions Involving Insurance Agents and Brokers, Pension
Consultants, Insurance Companies, and Investment Company Principal
Underwriters (PTE 84-24)
AGENCY: Employee Benefits Security Administration, Labor.
ACTION: Extension of the transition period for PTE amendments.
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SUMMARY: This document extends the special transition period under
sections II and IX of the Best Interest Contract Exemption and section
VII of the Class Exemption for Principal Transactions in Certain Assets
between Investment Advice Fiduciaries and Employee Benefit Plans and
IRAs for 18 months. This document also delays the applicability of
certain amendments to Prohibited Transaction Exemption 84-24 for the
same period. The primary purpose of the amendments is to give the
Department of Labor the time necessary to consider public comments
under the criteria set forth in the Presidential Memorandum of February
3, 2017, including whether possible changes and alternatives to these
exemptions would be appropriate in light of the current comment record
and potential input from, and action by, the Securities and Exchange
Commission and state insurance commissioners. The Department is
granting the delay because of its concern that, without a delay in the
applicability dates, consumers may face significant confusion, and
regulated parties may incur undue expense to comply with conditions or
requirements that the Department ultimately determines to revise or
repeal. The former transition period was from June 9, 2017, to January
1, 2018. The new transition period ends on July 1, 2019, rather than on
January 1, 2018. The amendments to these exemptions affect participants
and beneficiaries of plans, IRA owners and fiduciaries with respect to
such plans and IRAs.
DATES: This document extends the special transition period under
sections II and IX of the Best Interest Contract Exemption and section
VII of the Class Exemption for Principal Transactions in Certain Assets
between Investment Advice Fiduciaries and Employee Benefit Plans and
IRAs (82 FR 16902) to July 1, 2019, and delays the applicability of
certain amendments to Prohibited Transaction Exemption 84-24 from
January 1, 2018 (82 FR 16902) until July 1, 2019. See Section G of the
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section for a list of dates for the
amendments to the prohibited transaction exemptions.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Brian Shiker or Susan Wilker,
telephone (202) 693-8824, Office of Exemption Determinations, Employee
Benefits Security Administration.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
A. Procedural Background
ERISA & the 1975 Regulation
Section 3(21)(A)(ii) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974, as amended (ERISA), in relevant part provides that a person is
a fiduciary with respect to a plan to the extent he or she renders
investment advice for a fee or other compensation, direct or indirect,
with respect to any moneys or other property of such plan, or has any
authority or responsibility to do so. Section 4975(e)(3)(B) of the
Internal Revenue Code (``Code'') has a parallel
[[Page 56546]]
provision that defines a fiduciary of a plan (including an individual
retirement account or individual retirement annuity (IRA)). The
Department of Labor (``the Department'') in 1975 issued a regulation
establishing a five-part test under this section of ERISA. See 29 CFR
2510.3-21(c)(1) (2015).\1\ The Department's 1975 regulation also
applied to the definition of fiduciary in the Code.
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\1\ The 1975 Regulation was published as a final rule at 40 FR
50842 (Oct. 31, 1975).
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The New Fiduciary Rule & Related Exemptions
On April 8, 2016, the Department replaced the 1975 regulation with
a new regulatory definition (the ``Fiduciary Rule''). The Fiduciary
Rule defines who is a ``fiduciary'' of an employee benefit plan under
section 3(21)(A)(ii) of ERISA as a result of giving investment advice
to a plan or its participants or beneficiaries for a fee or other
compensation. The Fiduciary Rule also applies to the definition of a
``fiduciary'' of a plan in the Code pursuant to Reorganization Plan No.
4 of 1978, 5 U.S.C. App. 1, 92 Stat. 3790. The Fiduciary Rule treats
persons who provide investment advice or recommendations for a fee or
other compensation with respect to assets of a plan or IRA as
fiduciaries in a wider array of advice relationships than was true
under the 1975 regulation. On the same date, the Department published
two new administrative class exemptions from the prohibited transaction
provisions of ERISA (29 U.S.C. 1106) and the Code (26 U.S.C.
4975(c)(1)) (the Best Interest Contract Exemption (BIC Exemption) and
the Class Exemption for Principal Transactions in Certain Assets
Between Investment Advice Fiduciaries and Employee Benefit Plans and
IRAs (Principal Transactions Exemption)) as well as amendments to
previously granted exemptions (collectively referred to as ``PTEs,''
unless otherwise indicated). The Fiduciary Rule and PTEs had an
original applicability date of April 10, 2017.
Presidential Memorandum
By Memorandum dated February 3, 2017, the President directed the
Department to prepare an updated analysis of the likely impact of the
Fiduciary Rule on access to retirement information and financial
advice. The President's Memorandum was published in the Federal
Register on February 7, 2017, at 82 FR 9675. On March 2, 2017, the
Department published a notice of proposed rulemaking that proposed a
60-day delay of the applicability date of the Rule and PTEs. The
proposal also sought public comments on the questions raised in the
Presidential Memorandum and generally on questions of law and policy
concerning the Fiduciary Rule and PTEs.\2\ As of the close of the first
comment period on March 17, 2017, the Department had received nearly
200,000 comment and petition letters expressing a wide range of views
on the proposed 60-day delay. Approximately 650 commenters supported a
delay of 60 days or longer, with some requesting at least 180 days and
some up to 240 days or a year or longer (including an indefinite delay
or repeal); approximately 450 commenters opposed any delay. Similarly,
approximately 15,000 petitioners supported a delay and approximately
178,000 petitioners opposed a delay.
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\2\ 82 FR 12319.
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First Delay of Applicability Dates
On April 7, 2017, the Department promulgated a final rule extending
the applicability date of the Fiduciary Rule by 60 days from April 10,
2017, to June 9, 2017 (``April Delay Rule'').\3\ It also extended from
April 10 to June 9, the applicability dates of the BIC Exemption and
Principal Transactions Exemption and required investment advice
fiduciaries relying on these exemptions to adhere only to the Impartial
Conduct Standards as conditions of those exemptions during a transition
period from June 9, 2017, through January 1, 2018. The April Delay Rule
also delayed the applicability of amendments to an existing exemption,
Prohibited Transaction Exemption 84-24 (PTE 84-24), until January 1,
2018, other than the Impartial Conduct Standards, which became
applicable on June 9, 2017. Lastly, the April Delay Rule extended for
60 days, until June 9, 2017, the applicability dates of amendments to
other previously granted exemptions. The 60-day delay, including the
delay of the Impartial Conduct Standards in the BIC Exemption and
Principal Transactions Exemption, was considered appropriate by the
Department at that time. Compliance with other conditions for
transactions covered by these exemptions, such as requirements to make
specific disclosures and representations of fiduciary compliance in
written communications with investors, was postponed until January 1,
2018, by which time the Department intended to complete the examination
and analysis directed by the Presidential Memorandum.
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\3\ 82 FR 16902.
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Request for Information
On July 6, 2017, the Department published in the Federal Register a
Request for Information (RFI).\4\ The purpose of the RFI was to augment
some of the public commentary and input received in response to the
April Delay, and to request comments on issues raised in the
Presidential Memorandum. In particular, the RFI sought public input
that could form the basis of new exemptions or changes to the Rule and
PTEs. The RFI also specifically sought input regarding the advisability
of extending the January 1, 2018, applicability date of certain
provisions in the BIC Exemption, the Principal Transactions Exemption,
and PTE 84-24. Question 1 of the RFI specifically asked whether a delay
in the January 1, 2018, applicability date of the provisions in the BIC
Exemption, Principal Transactions Exemption and amendments to PTE 84-24
would benefit retirement investors by allowing for more efficient
implementation responsive to recent market developments and reduce
burdens on financial services providers. Comments relating to an
extension of the January 1, 2018, applicability date of certain
provisions were requested by July 21, 2017. All other comments were
requested by August 7, 2017. The Department received approximately
60,000 comment and petition letters expressing a wide range of views on
whether the Department should grant an additional delay and what should
be the duration of any such delay. Many commenters supported delaying
the January 1, 2018, applicability dates of these PTEs. Other
commenters disagreed, however, asserting that full application of the
Fiduciary Rule and PTEs is necessary to protect retirement investors
from conflicts of interests, that the original applicability dates
should not have been delayed from April, 2017, and that the January 1,
2018, date should not be further delayed. Still others stated their
view that the Fiduciary Rule and PTEs should be repealed and replaced,
either with the original 1975 regulation or with a substantially
revised rule. Among the commenters supporting a delay, some suggested a
fixed length of time and others suggested a more open-ended delay.
Supporters of a fixed-length delay did not express a consensus view on
the appropriate length, but the range generally was 1 to 2 years from
the current applicability date of January 1,
[[Page 56547]]
2018. Those commenters suggesting a more open-ended framework for
measuring the length of the delay generally recommended that the
applicability date be delayed for at least as long as it takes the
Department to finish the reexamination directed by the President. These
commenters suggested that the length of the delay should be measured
from the date the Department, after finishing the reexamination, either
announces that there will be no new amendments or exemptions or
publishes a new exemption or major revisions to the Fiduciary Rule and
PTEs.
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\4\ 82 FR 31278.
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B. Proposed Amendments--18-Month Delay
On August 31, 2017, the Department published a proposal (the August
31 Notice) to extend the current special transition period under
sections II and IX of the BIC Exemption and section VII of the
Principal Transactions Exemption from January 1, 2018, to July 1, 2019.
The Department also proposed in the August 31 Notice to delay the
applicability of certain amendments to PTE 84-24 for the same
period.\5\ Although proposing a date-certain delay (18 months), the
Department specifically asked for input on various alternative
approaches. The Department received approximately 145 comment letters.
Approximately 110 commenters support a delay of 18 months or longer;
and, by contrast, approximately 35 commenters oppose any delay.\6\ The
Department also received two petitions containing approximately 2,860
signatures or letters supporting the delay. These comment letters are
available for public inspection on EBSA's Web site. Specific views and
positions of commenters are discussed below in section C of this
document.
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\5\ 82 FR 41365 (entitled ``Extension of Transition Period and
Delay of Applicability Dates; Best Interest Contract Exemption (PTE
2016-01); Class Exemption for Principal Transactions in Certain
Assets Between Investment Advice Fiduciaries and Employee Benefit
Plans and IRAs (PTE 2016-02); Prohibited Transaction Exemption 84-24
for Certain Transactions Involving Insurance Agents and Brokers,
Pension Consultants, Insurance Companies, and Investment Company
Principal Underwriters (PTE 84-24)'').
\6\ The Department includes these counts only to provide a rough
sense of the scope and diversity of public comments. For this
purpose, the Department counted letters that do not expressly
support or oppose the proposed delay, but that express concerns or
general opposition to the Fiduciary Rule or PTEs, as supporting
delay. Similarly, letters that do not expressly support or oppose
the proposed delay, but that express general support for the Rule or
PTEs, were counted as opposing a delay.
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BIC Exemption (PTE 2016-01) and Principal Transactions Exemption (PTE
2016-02)
Although the Fiduciary Rule, BIC Exemption, and Principal
Transactions Exemption first became applicable on June 9, 2017, with
transition relief through January 1, 2018, the August 31 Notice
proposed to extend the Transition Period until July 1, 2019. During
this extended Transition Period, ``Financial Institutions'' and
``Advisers,'' as defined in the exemptions, would only have to comply
with the ``Impartial Conduct Standards'' to satisfy the exemptions'
requirements. In general, this means that Financial Institutions and
Advisers must give prudent advice that is in retirement investors' best
interest, charge no more than reasonable compensation, and avoid
misleading statements.\7\
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\7\ In the Principal Transactions Exemption, the Impartial
Conduct Standards specifically refer to the fiduciary's obligation
to seek to obtain the best execution reasonably available under the
circumstances with respect to the transaction, rather than to
receive no more than ``reasonable compensation.''
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The August 31 Notice proposed that the remaining conditions of the
BIC Exemption would not become applicable until July 1, 2019. Remaining
conditions include the requirement, for transactions involving IRA
owners, that the Financial Institution enter into an enforceable
written contract with the retirement investor. The contract would
include an enforceable promise to adhere to the Impartial Conduct
Standards, an express acknowledgement of fiduciary status, and a
variety of disclosures related to fees, services, and conflicts of
interest. IRA owners, who do not have statutory enforcement rights
under ERISA, would be able to enforce their contractual rights under
state law. Also, as of July 1, 2019, the exemption would require
Financial Institutions to adopt a substantial number of new policies
and procedures that meet specified conflict-mitigation criteria. In
particular, the policies and procedures must be reasonably and
prudently designed to ensure that Advisers adhere to the Impartial
Conduct Standards and must provide that neither the Financial
Institution nor (to the best of its knowledge) its affiliates or
related entities will use or rely on quotas, appraisals, performance or
personnel actions, bonuses, contests, special awards, differential
compensation, or other actions or incentives that are intended or would
reasonably be expected to cause advisers to make recommendations that
are not in the best interest of the retirement investor. Also as of
July 1, 2019, Financial Institutions entering into contracts with IRA
owners pursuant to the exemption would have to include a warranty that
they have adopted and will comply with the required policies and
procedures. Financial Institutions would also be required at that time
to provide disclosures, both to the individual retirement investor on a
transaction basis, and on a Web site.
Similarly, while the Principal Transactions Exemption is
conditioned solely on adherence to the Impartial Conduct Standards
during the Transition Period, the August 31 Notice also proposed that
its remaining conditions would become applicable on July 1, 2019. The
Principal Transactions Exemption permits investment advice fiduciaries
to sell to or purchase from plans or IRAs ``principal traded assets''
through ``principal transactions'' and ``riskless principal
transactions''--transactions involving the sale from or purchase for
the Financial Institution's own inventory. As of July 1, 2019, the
exemption would require a contract and a policies and procedures
warranty that mirror the requirements in the BIC Exemption. The
Principal Transactions Exemption also includes some conditions that are
different from the BIC Exemption, including credit and liquidity
standards for debt securities sold to plans and IRAs pursuant to the
exemption and additional disclosure requirements.
PTE 84-24
PTE 84-24, which applies to advisory transactions involving
insurance and annuity contracts and mutual fund shares, was most
recently amended in 2016 in conjunction with the development of the
Fiduciary Rule, BIC Exemption, and Principal Transactions Exemption.\8\
Among other changes, the amendments included new definitional terms,
added the Impartial Conduct Standards as requirements for relief, and
revoked relief for transactions involving fixed indexed annuity
contracts and variable annuity contracts, effectively requiring those
Advisers who receive conflicted compensation for recommending these
products to rely upon the BIC Exemption. However, except for the
Impartial Conduct Standards, which were applicable beginning June 9,
2017, the August 31 Notice proposed that the remaining amendments would
not be applicable until July 1, 2019. Thus, because the amendment
revoking the availability of PTE 84-24 for fixed indexed annuities
would not be not be applicable until July 1, 2019, affected parties
(including
[[Page 56548]]
insurance intermediaries) would be able to rely on PTE 84-24, subject
to the existing conditions of the exemption and the Impartial Conduct
Standards, for recommendations involving all annuity contracts during
the Transition Period.
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\8\ 81 FR 21147 (April 8, 2016).
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C. Comments and Decisions
Extension of the Transition Period
Based on its review and evaluation of the public comments, the
Department is adopting the proposed amendments without change. Thus,
the Transition Period in the BIC Exemption and Principal Transaction
Exemption is extended for 18 months until July 1, 2019, and the
applicability date of the amendments to PTE 84-24, other than the
Impartial Conduct Standards, is delayed for the same period.
Accordingly, the same rules and standards in effect between June 9,
2017, and December 31, 2017, will remain in effect throughout the
duration of the extended Transition Period. Consequently, Financial
Institutions and Advisers must continue to give prudent advice that is
in retirement investors' best interest, charge no more than reasonable
compensation, and avoid misleading statements. As the Department has
stated previously:
The Impartial Conduct Standards represent fundamental
obligations of fair dealing and fiduciary conduct. The concepts of
prudence, undivided loyalty and reasonable compensation are all
deeply rooted in ERISA and the common law of agency and trusts.
These longstanding concepts of law and equity were developed in
significant part to deal with the issues that arise when agents and
persons in a position of trust have conflicting loyalties, and
accordingly, are well-suited to the problems posed by conflicted
investment advice.\9\
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\9\ Best Interest Contract Exemption, 81 FR 21002, 21026 (April
8, 2016) (footnote omitted).
It is based on the continued adherence to these fundamental
protections that the Department, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. 1108 and 26
U.S.C. 4975, is making the necessary findings and granting the
extension until July 1, 2019.
A delay of the remaining conditions of the BIC Exemption and
Principal Transactions Exemption, and of the remaining amendments to
PTE 84-24, is necessary and appropriate for multiple reasons. To begin
with, the Department has not yet completed the reexamination of the
Fiduciary Rule and PTEs, as directed by the President on February 3,
2017. More time is needed to carefully and thoughtfully review the
substantial commentary received in response to the multiple
solicitations for comments in 2017 and to honor the President's
directive to take a hard look at any potential undue burden. Whether,
and to what extent, there will be changes to the Fiduciary Rule and
PTEs as a result of this reexamination is unknown until its completion.
The examination will help identify any potential alternative exemptions
or conditions that could reduce costs and increase benefits to all
affected parties, without unduly compromising protections for
retirement investors. The Department anticipates that it will have a
much clearer sense of the range of such alternatives only after it
completes a careful review of the responses to the RFI. The Department
also anticipates that it will propose in the near future a new
streamlined class exemption. However, neither such a proposal nor any
other changes or modifications to the Fiduciary Rule and PTEs, if any,
realistically could be finalized by the current January 1, 2018,
applicability date. Nor would that timeframe accommodate the
Department's desire to coordinate with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) and other regulators, such as the Financial Industry
Regulatory Authority (FINRA) and the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners (NAIC) in the development of any such proposal or
changes. The Chairman of the SEC has recently published a statement
seeking public comments on the standards of conduct for investment
advisers and broker-dealers, and has welcomed the Department's
invitation to engage constructively as the SEC moves forward with its
examination of the standards of conduct applicable to investment
advisers and broker-dealers, and related matters. Absent a delay,
however, Financial Institutions and Advisers would feel compelled to
ready themselves for the provisions that would become applicable on
January 1, 2018, despite the possibility of changes and alternatives on
the horizon. The 18-month delay avoids obligating financial services
providers to incur costs to comply with conditions, which may be
revised, repealed, or replaced. The delay also avoids attendant
investor confusion, ensuring that investors do not receive conflicting
and confusing statements from their financial advisors as the result of
any later revisions.
Not all commenters support this approach. As mentioned above, the
Department received approximately 145 comment letters on the proposed
18-month delay. As with earlier comments on the April Delay Rule, as
well as those received in response to Question 1 of the RFI, there is
no uniform consensus on whether a delay is appropriate, or on the
appropriate length of any delay. Some commenters supported the proposed
18-month delay, some commenters sought longer delays, and still other
commenters opposed any delay at all. However, a clear majority of
commenters support a delay of at least 18 months, with many supporting
a much longer delay.
The primary reason commenters cited in support of the delay was to
avoid unnecessary costs of compliance with provisions of the Fiduciary
Rule and PTEs that the commenters believed could be changed or
rescinded upon completion of the review under the Presidential
Memorandum.\10\ Other reasons cited by commenters were to provide time
for the Department to coordinate with the SEC and other regulators such
as FINRA and the NAIC; allow more time for industry to come into
compliance with the Fiduciary Rule and PTEs, including additional time
to develop disclosures and train employees; and to reduce the
possibility of client confusion resulting from attempts to comply with
provisions of the Fiduciary Rule and PTEs that may change following the
review pursuant to the President's Memorandum.\11\
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\10\ See, e.g., Comment Letter #42 (Western & Southern Financial
Group) (``only after the Fiduciary Regulation has been reviewed and
revisions to it have been proposed and finalized (all in accordance
with President Trump's February 3, 2017 memorandum) will WSF&G and
other similarly situated companies know with certainty what
conditions will be placed on providing investment advice to
retirement investors. Only then, can we appropriately design and
implement compliance structures, make investments in information
technology, and produce products and services that meet both the
revised Fiduciary Regulation requirements and the needs of
retirement investors.''); Comment Letter #76 (Groom Law Group, on
Behalf of Annuity and Insurance Company Clients) (``[i]n the absence
of the eighteen-month extension, financial service providers,
retirement plans, and individual savers would be subjected to
extreme market dislocations. The pricing of investment products and
services, the distribution models under which those services are
delivered and the job responsibilities of thousands of financial
services firm employees would be subject to severe dislocation as
new requirements take effect. In addition, retirement savers' access
to investment advice and the terms and conditions under which that
investment advice would be provided could change repeatedly and
dramatically as changes to the Fiduciary Rule are made and new FAQs
are issued.''); Comment Letter #79 (Investment Company Institute)
(``[a]bsent a delay, service providers will continue to spend
significant amounts preparing for January 1, 2018, the vast majority
of which will be spent implementing the more cumbersome and
technically complicated aspects of the BIC Exemption conditions.'').
\11\ See, e.g., Comment Letter #52 (Transamerica) (``to avoid
wasteful and duplicative compliance costs and business model
changes'' and ``to permit further time for coordination with the
SEC.''); Comment Letter #55 (Prudential Financial) (supporting the
proposed extension/delay as ``sufficient for the Department to
assess and develop needed Rule changes, engage in meaningful
coordination with the Securities and Exchange Commission, as well as
the states and other prudential regulators, and adopt those
changes'' and also to minimize ``confusion on the part of consumers
and brings certainty to the financial services industry.''); Comment
Letter #63 (Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company) (will
``benefit retirement investors by ensuring that their access to
products or advice is not needlessly restricted or reduced as a
result of . . . changes to business models . . . that may prove
unnecessary,'' and ``will provide time for the Department to
complete its review of the Fiduciary Rule pursuant to the
Presidential Memorandum,'' and ``to work with the Securities and
Exchange Commission and the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners.''); Comment Letter #88 (AXA US) (``will provide the
Department with sufficient time to work with other regulators to
develop a harmonized regulatory framework'' and also ``will allow
industry participants adequate time to comply with the Rule's final
requirements''); Comment Letter #375 (Stifel Financial Corp.) (July
25, 2017, response to RFI) (``Thus, with the Impartial Conduct
Standards already in place for retirement accounts, the DOL and SEC
should move together and conduct a proper and fulsome study of
whether additional requirements are needed to achieve appropriate
consumer protections while maintaining investor choice. As the DOL
and SEC study these issues, and to prevent further disruption to
Brokerage and Advisory business models, it is critical that the DOL
delay the January 1, 2018 implementation date for the additional
conditions of the Best Interest Contract Exemption, including the
contractual warranties, until a solution is determined.'').
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[[Page 56549]]
The primary reason commenters gave against the delay is that
investors will be economically harmed during the 18-month delay period
because, according to these commenters, there would not be any
meaningful enforcement mechanism in the PTEs without the contract,
warranty, disclosure and other enforcement and accountability
conditions.\12\ According to these commenters, there is no credible
basis to believe that significant numbers of Financial Institutions and
Advisers will actually comply with the Impartial Conduct Standards when
advising investors during the Transition Period without these
enforcement and accountability conditions. In the view of these
commenters, the Department's 2016 RIA supports their position that
compliance numbers will be low with the enforcement and accountability
conditions being delayed until July 1, 2019. If Financial Institutions
and Advisers do not adhere to the Impartial Conduct Standards, the
investor gains predicted in the Department's 2016 RIA for the
Transition Period will not remain intact, according to these
commenters, in which case the cost of the 18-month delay would exceed
its benefits. Assuming twenty-five, fifty, and seventy-five percent
compliance rates, one commenter estimates that delaying the enforcement
conditions an additional 18 months would cost retirement savers an
additional $5.5 billion (75 percent compliance) to $16.3 billion (25
percent compliance) over 30 years, with a middle estimate of $10.9
billion (50 percent compliance).\13\ To support adherence to the
Impartial Conduct Standards during the Transition Period, and thereby
preserve some predicted investor gains, several of these commenters
suggested that the Department, at a bare minimum, should add the
specific disclosure and representation of fiduciary compliance
conditions originally required for transition relief (but which were
delayed by the April Delay Rule).\14\ A subset of enforcement
conditions, less than the full set of conditions scheduled now for July
1, 2019, would increase the likelihood of greater levels of adherence
to the Impartial Conduct Standards during the Transition Period over
those levels of adherence likely if no enforcement conditions are
included, according to these commenters.
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\12\ See, e.g., Comment Letter #20 (Consumer Action) (``no real
evidence to believe that there will be compliance with the best-
interest rule without enforcement.''); Comment Letter #44 (Economic
Policy Institute) (``Delaying DOL enforcement an additional 18
months (from January 1, 2018 to July 1, 2019) would cost retirement
savers an additional $5.5 billion to $16.3 billion over 30 years,
with a middle estimate of $10.9 billion.''); Comment Letter #68
(AARP) (``every day the protections of the prohibited transactions
class exemptions are delayed the retirement security of hard working
Americans is put at risk, along with potential negative impacts on
the economy as a whole.''); Comment Letter #78 (Financial Planning
Coalition) (``Without the PTEs, consumers do not have access to
legally binding contracts on which they can rely to uphold their
right to conflict-free advice in their best interest.''); Comment
Letter #80 (Consumer Federation of America) (``Extending this
transition period will mean that the full protections and benefits
of the fiduciary rule won't be realized and retirement savers,
particularly IRA investors, will continue to suffer the harmful
consequences of conflicted advice.''); Comment Letter #81 (National
Employment Law Project) (``Without any meaningful enforcement
mechanism, which does not exist in the IRA market without the
Contract Condition, there is no basis to conclude--as the Department
erroneously does--that a significant number of investment-advice
fiduciaries will adhere to the ICSs when advising IRA owners during
the period of the proposed delay.''); Comment Letter #84 (Better
Markets) (``The long-term suspension of these accountability
conditions will remove an important deterrent against violations of
the Rule, resulting in conflicts of interest taking a greater toll
on IRA investors in particular and causing greater overall losses in
retirement savings, especially as they are compounded over time.'');
Comment Letter #91 (Public Investors Arbitration Bar Association)
(``If the PTEs are not permitted to be fully implemented on January
1, 2018, retirement investors will continue to be harmed by the same
conflicts of interests that made the Rule and PTEs necessary in the
first place.''); Comment Letter #120 (AFL-CIO) (``The Economic
Policy Institute estimates that this proposal will cost retirement
savers between $5.5 billion and $16.3 billion over thirty years--on
top of the estimated $2.0 billion to $5.9 billion losses resulting
from the Department's previous delay.''); Comment Letter #126
(Institute for Policy Integrity at New York University School of
Law) (``In sum, the Department's proposal that the benefits would
remain intact even with the postponement of the enforcement
provisions is at odds with its earlier analysis of the necessity of
these provisions.'').
\13\ Comment Letter #44 (Economic Policy Institute).
\14\ Comment Letter #20 (Consumer Action) (``we recommend that--
at a minimum--the Department require that by January 2018 firms and
advisers agree to abide by the impartial conduct standard to
acknowledge their fiduciary status.''); Comment Letter #80 (Consumer
Federation of America) (``at a bare minimum, the Department must
require firms and advisers to comply with the original transitional
requirements of the exemptions, as set forth in Section IX of the
BIC Exemption and Section VII of the Principal Transactions
Exemption, not just the Impartial Conduct Standards. These include:
(1) The minimal transition written disclosure requirements in which
firms acknowledge their fiduciary status and that of their advisers
with respect to their advice, state the Impartial Conduct Standards
and provide a commitment to adhere to them, and describe the firm's
material conflicts of interest and any limitations on product
offering; (2) the requirement that firms designate a person
responsible for addressing material conflicts of interest and
monitoring advisers' adherence to the Impartial Conduct Standards;
and (3) the requirement that firms maintain records necessary to
prove that the conditions of the exemption have been met.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Because the contract, warranty, disclosure and other enforcement
and accountability conditions in the PTEs are intended to support
adherence to the Impartial Conduct Standards, the Department
acknowledges that the 18-month delay may result in a deferral of some
of the estimated investor gains. As discussed below in the regulatory
impact analysis, the precise amount of such deferral is unknown because
the precise degree of adherence during the 18-month period also is
unknown. Many commenters strongly dispute the likelihood of any harm to
investors as result of the delay of the enforcement and accountability
conditions. These commenters emphatically believe that investors are
sufficiently protected by the imposition of the Impartial Conduct
Standards along with many applicable non-ERISA consumer
protections.\15\
[[Page 56550]]
Many of these industry commenters note that fiduciary advisers who do
not provide impartial advice as required by the Fiduciary Rule and PTEs
in the IRA market would violate the prohibited transaction rules of the
Code and become subject to the prohibited transaction excise tax. In
addition, comments received by the Department assert that many
financial institutions already have completed or largely completed work
to establish policies and procedures necessary to make many of the
business structure and practice shifts necessary to support compliance
with the Fiduciary Rule and Impartial Conduct Standards (e.g., drafting
and implementing training for staff, drafting client correspondence and
explanations of revised product and service offerings, negotiating
changes to agreements with product manufacturers as part of their
approach to compliance with the PTEs, changing employee and agent
compensation structures, and designing product offerings that mitigate
conflicts of interest).\16\ After review of these comments, and meeting
with stakeholders, the Department believes that many financial
institutions are using their compliance infrastructure to ensure that
they currently are meeting the requirements of the Impartial Conduct
Standards, which the Department believes will substantially protect the
investor gains estimated in the 2016 RIA. Additionally, the Department
believes that there are two enforcement mechanisms in place: The
imposition of excise taxes, and a statutorily-provided cause of action
for advice to ERISA plan assets, including advice concerning rollovers
of these assets.\17\ Given these conclusions, the Department declines
to add additional conditions to the PTEs during the Transition Period,
but will reevaluate this issue as part of the reexamination of the
Fiduciary Rule and PTEs and in the context of considering the
development of additional and more streamlined exemption approaches.
Accordingly, as the Department continues its reexamination, the
Department welcomes input and data from stakeholders demonstrating the
regulated community's implementation of the Impartial Conduct
Standards.
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\15\ See, e.g., Comment Letter #11 (Alternative and Direct
Investment Securities Association) (The Impartial Conduct Standards
requirement ``can and does go a long way toward ensuring that
retirement savers are provided with investment advice designed to
allow them to meet their goals for retirement and otherwise.'');
Comment Letter # 23 (Wells Fargo) (Because retirement investors will
continue to receive the protections of the Impartial Conduct
Standards, ``imposing additional compliance conditions in connection
with any extension is unnecessary.''); Comment letter #38 (Federal
Investors, Inc.) (``investor losses (if any) from extending the
transition period would be expected to be relatively small, and as
such, outweighed by the cost savings to firms by postponing changes
that may prove unnecessary, or may have to be revisited''); Comment
Letter #45 (Madison Securities) (``Because the Impartial Conduct
Standards remain in place . . . to protect consumers, it is
important for the Department to take the time necessary to address
applicable issues and for the financial services industry to build
adequate and appropriate systems to comply with any final rule.'');
Comment Letter #50 (Paul Hastings LLP on behalf of Advisors Excel)
(``with the Impartial Conduct Standards in place during the
evaluation period, the interests of Retirement Investors are
protected during the Department's review of the Rule.''); Comment
Letter #56 (Benjamin F. Edwards & Co.) (``Given that the Impartial
Conduct Standards are already in place and that there is an
additional existing and overlapping robust infrastructure of
regulations that are enforced by the SEC, FINRA, Treasury, and the
IRS, not to mention the Department, investors are well protected and
will continue to be well protected during any extension.''); Comment
Letter #57 (Pacific Life Insurance Company) (``Since advisers are
now required to adhere to the requirements set forth in the
Impartial Conduct Standards . . . the Rule's stated goal to
eliminate conflicted advice has been largely addressed and
procedures to avoid said conflicted advice will be thoroughly
engrained in advisers' practices during the delay.''); Comment
Letter #65 (Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association)
(``We would also use this opportunity to address the question of the
potential harm to investors if the Department was to move forward
with this delay. We would refer the Department back to our comment
letter of August 9, 2017. . . . In that letter we refute the
supposed harm to investors if the rule is delayed, while also
showing the harm if the Department actually moves forward with the
current rule unchanged. We were concerned then, and are even more
concerned now, that some of the changes that have taken effect in
order to comply with this rule, will make it even more difficult for
investors to save.''); Comment Letter #116 (Financial Services
Roundtable) (``Any concern that Retirement Investors will be harmed
by an extended transition period should be allayed because the
Impartial Conduct Standards will continue to protect them during the
extended transition period.'').
\16\ See, e.g., Comment Letter # 39 (Financial Services
Institute) (incorporating March 17, 2017, response to RFI) (``During
the transition period . . . financial institutions and financial
advisors relying on the Best Interest Contract Exemption (BICE) must
adhere to the Fiduciary Rule's Impartial Conduct Standards. These
Impartial Conduct Standards require financial institutions and
advisors to provide advice in the retirement investors' best
interest, charge no more than reasonable compensation for their
services and to avoid misleading statements. As a result, firms that
are relying on the BICE have already implemented procedures to
ensure that they are meeting these new obligations. These new
procedures may include changes to the firms' compensation
structures, restrictions on the availability of certain investment
products, reductions in the overall number of product and service
providers, improvements to their due diligence review of products
and service providers, additional surveillance efforts to monitor
the sales practices of their affiliated financial advisors for
compliance and the creation and maintenance of books and records
sufficient to demonstrate compliance with the Impartial Conduct
Standards. Thus, investors are already benefitting from stronger
protections since the Fiduciary Rule became partly applicable on
June 9, 2017. . . . As a result, we believe any harm to investors
caused by further delay of the additional requirements, to the
extent it exists, is greatly reduced by the application of the
Fiduciary Rule's Impartial Conduct Standards.''). But see Comment
Letter #141 (Consumer Federation of America) (October 10, 2017
Supplement) (noting a recent survey of broker-dealers in which 64%
of survey participants answered that they have not made any changes
in their product mix or internal compensation structures, and
concluding therefore that ``it is unreasonable for the Department to
believe that a significant percentage of firms have made efforts to
adhere to the rule and Impartial Conduct Standards. If the
Department does not factor this into its decisionmaking, it will
have failed to consider an important aspect of the problem.''). See
also the Department's Conflict of Interest FAQs, Transition Period
(Set 1), Q6 (``During the transition period, the Department expects
financial institutions to adopt such policies and procedures as they
reasonably conclude are necessary to ensure that advisers comply
with the impartial conduct standards'') available at https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/ebsa/about-ebsa/our-activities/resource-center/faqs/coi-transition-period-1.pdf.
\17\ 82 FR 16902, 16909 (April 7, 2017).
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In this regard, the Department notes that, despite the view of
several commenters, the duties of prudence and loyalty embedded in the
Impartial Conduct Standards provide protection to retirement investors
during the Transition Period, apart from the additional delayed
enforcement and accountability provisions. The Department previously
articulated the view that, during the Transition Period, it expects
that advisers and financial institutions will adopt prudent supervisory
mechanisms to prevent violations of the Impartial Conduct
Standards.\18\ Likewise, the Department also previously articulated its
view that the Impartial Conduct Standards require that fiduciaries,
during the Transition Period, exercise care in their communications
with investors, including a duty to fairly and accurately describe
recommended transactions and compensation practices.\19\
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\18\ 81 FR 21002, 21070 (April 8, 2016).
\19\ 82 FR 16902, 16909 (April 7, 2017) (recognizing fiduciary
duty to fairly and accurately describe recommended transactions and
compensation practices).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Authority To Delay PTE Conditions/Amendments
Some commenters questioned the Department's authority to delay the
PTE conditions and amendments as proposed. They focused their arguments
on section 705 of the APA (5 U.S.C. 705), which permits an agency to
postpone the effective date of an action, pending judicial review, if
the agency finds that justice so requires. These commenters say that
this provision is the only method by which a federal agency may delay
or stay the applicability or effective date of a rule, even if another
statute confers general rulemaking authority on that agency. Since the
PTEs were applicable to transactions occurring on or after June 9,
2017, the commenters argue that section 705 of the APA, by its terms,
is not available in this circumstance. In the absence of the
availability of section 705 of the APA, they assert, the Department
lacks authority to delay the applicability date of the PTE conditions
and amendments, as proposed. However, the Department disagrees that it
lacks authority to adopt the 18-month delay of the conditions and
amendments in this circumstance, where the Department is acting through
and in accordance with its ordinary notice and comment rulemaking
procedures for PTEs, pursuant to both the APA and 29 U.S.C. 1108. As
noted elsewhere in the document, the Department is granting
[[Page 56551]]
this delay pursuant to section 408 of ERISA.\20\ Under this provision,
the Secretary of Labor has discretionary authority to grant
administrative exemptions, with or without conditions, under ERISA and
the Code on an individual or class basis, if the Secretary finds that
the exemptions are (1) administratively feasible, (2) in the interests
of plans and their participants and beneficiaries and IRA owners, and
(3) protective of the rights of the participants and beneficiaries of
such plans and IRA owners. Having made these findings in this case
after reviewing the substantial public comments received in response to
the RFI and August 31 Notice, the Department is confident of its
authority to grant the 18-month delay. In the Department's view, it can
delay, modify or revoke, temporarily or otherwise, some or all of a
PTE, using notice and comment rulemaking, as long as--pursuant to the
appropriate procedures--the Department makes the required findings and
is not arbitrary or capricious in doing so. The Department has fully
satisfied those requirements in this case, just as it did when it
delayed applicability dates from June 9, 2017, through January 1, 2018.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ 29 U.S.C. 1108(a); see also 26 U.S.C. 4975(c)(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Length of Delay
Although the August 31 Notice proposed a fixed 18-month delay, the
proposal also specifically solicited comments on the benefit or harms
of two alternative delay approaches: (1) A contingent delay that ends a
specified period after the occurrence of a specific event, such as the
Department's completion of the reexamination ordered by the President
or the publication of changes to the Fiduciary Rule or PTEs; and (2) a
tiered approach postponing full applicability until the earlier of or
the later of (a) a time certain and (b) the end of a specified period
after the occurrence of a specific event. There was no consensus among
the commenters as to either the proper amount of time for a delay or
the best approach (time certain delay versus contingent or tiered
delays). Pros and cons were reported on all three approaches.
Many commenters supported the fixed 18-month delay in the proposal.
The proposed 18-month period would commence on January 1, 2018, and end
on July 1, 2019, regardless of exactly when the Department might
complete its reexamination or take any other action or actions. The
premise behind this approach is that, whatever action or actions may or
may not be taken by the Department, such actions would be completed
within the 18-month period. These commenters believe this approach
provides more certainty, to both industry stakeholders and investors,
as compared to the other approaches.\21\ This is these commenters'
view, even though many of them recognized that an additional delay
could be needed in the future, depending on the extent of future
changes to the Fiduciary Rule and PTEs, if any.\22\ These commenters
believe that certainty is needed for planning and implementation
purposes and that a flat delay of 18 to 24 months provides that
certainty.\23\ Even among the
[[Page 56552]]
commenters generally opposed to any delay, one commenter stated that,
as between a fixed 18-month delay and the more open-ended contingent or
tiered approaches, the fixed 18-month delay provides more certainty and
protection to consumers.\24\
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\21\ Comment Letter #38 (Federated Investors, Inc.) (``the time-
certain delay is the most appropriate and workable choice under the
circumstances, because it provides financial services firms, plan
sponsors, plan participants and beneficiaries, IRA owners with the
certainty of a clear target date. If the circumstances approaching
July 1, 2019, indicate the need for a further delay, we would expect
that the Department will, at that time, evaluate and provide what
would be a reasonable time period to come into compliance based on
the nature and extent of any changes to the existing regulation and
exemptions.''); Comment Letter #39 (Financial Services Institute)
(tiered delay or conditional delay ``would harm consumers by adding
uncertainty and confusion to the market, while providing
insufficient certainty to industry stakeholders.''); Comment Letter
#46 (American Bankers' Assoc.) (``fixed 18-month period would
minimize the costs that would be incurred by financial services
providers to comply with Fiduciary Rule and exemptions as currently
written. It would also allow the Department to measure the progress
of its regulatory review against a firm deadline. If, as the
deadline date approaches, it appears additional time might be needed
to complete its regulatory review, then the Department can consider
at that time whether to propose such additional time as may be
needed for completion.''); Comment Letter #51 (Morgan Stanley) (``A
delay solely based on a specific contingent future event (e.g., the
issuance of new exemptive relief) poses a host of problems for
financial institutions. . . . By enacting a time-certain delay of at
least eighteen months, financial institutions will be better able to
plan for and implement any changes that are necessary to comply with
new guidance and create or modify product and platform offerings. .
. . A `floating timeline' as suggested by the Department also poses
the risk of further confusing the retirement investors that the Rule
is intended to protect.''); Comment Letter #73 (Raymond James)
(``While there are benefits and drawbacks to any method chosen, we
feel that the 18-month period certain delay provides a level of
certainty which is beneficial to the Department's ongoing analysis
of the Rule and the retirement marketplace. Along with the
Department's continued analysis and potential rulemaking, please
consider that an 18-month delay may be insufficient to not only
complete the Department's work, but also the subsequent
implementation efforts firms will need to undertake. As a means to
maintain assurance in the marketplace and provide adequate time to
accomplish all relevant objectives, please consider during your
analysis whether it may be prudent to issue an additional delay
further in advance of the July 1, 2019 date.''); Comment Letter #82
(Standard Insurance Company, Standard Retirement Services) (``The
Department should not adopt a tiered delay approach. The other
methods proposed in the request for comments would only add further
confusion. A fixed time period will be in the best interests of
retirement investors because it will allow financial service
companies to be able to continue to provide advice, education and
services to retirement plan investors without uncertainty. Once any
changes to the Regulations and Exemptions are proposed and
finalized, the Department will be in a better position to evaluate
what, if any, additional time is needed to implement the changes. A
fixed time period for the Extensions will provide the industry and
retirement investors alike a more definite environment in which to
conduct business.''); Comment Letter #110 (Association for Advanced
Life Underwriting) (``Given the `lead' time required for compliance,
only the date certain approach provides necessary stability for
retirement investors and their financial professionals by removing
unnecessary and harmful regulatory uncertainty. The contingent event
approach and the tiered approach both introduce too much
uncertainty. Not only would the compliance deadline be vague and
undefined, based on when some future event may happen (and
accurately predicting when a Federal Agency may complete an action
is a notoriously difficult thing to achieve), but uncertainty would
also result from which contingent act is selected as the basis for
the end of the Transition Period.''); Comment Letter #116 (Financial
Services Roundtable) (``the Department should not adopt a tiered
transition period . . .'').
\22\ See, e.g., Comment Letter #75 (Groom Law Group--
Recordkeeping Clients) (``The Groom Group supports a fixed delay as
opposed to a tiered delay structure because the Department has
already evaluated the cost-benefit analysis of the Proposed
Extension and because the Department could always propose an
additional delay closer to July 1, 2019 if it determines that
additional time is needed. Right now, it is most important that the
Department finalize the Proposed Extension promptly. Evaluating
extensions of different lengths or with variable end points will
only prolong the amount of time it takes for the Department to
finalize the Proposed Extension.''); Comment Letter #7 (Tucker
Advisors) (``Should the Department determine that additional time is
necessary to complete its review or should the Department ultimately
propose changes, the Department can, at that time, propose an
additional extension to provide plan service providers sufficient
time to build out the systems necessary to comply with such
changes.''); Comment Letter #27 (State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Company) (``State Farm suggests that the Department
maintain a position of flexibility to the extent additional time is
needed to ensure the implementation of an effective, workable and
efficient rule.''); Comment Letter #57 (Pacific Life Insurance
Company) (``if the Department retains flexibility in this delay,
potentially revisiting when the revised final rule is released and
changes are actually known, then Pacific Life does not feel the
tiered-approach is a necessary method of delay.''); Comment Letter #
#69 (Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association of America-TIAA)
(``While an extension tied to completion of the Department's review
may offer some additional benefit, we believe it is more urgent that
Proposed Extension be finalized.''); Comment Letter #79 (Investment
Company Institute) (``The Department should clarify that it will
provide a period of at least one year following the finalization of
any modifications, and more time, depending on the nature of
modifications made and the resultant lead time required to meet any
attendant compliance requirements.'').
\23\ Comment Letter #115 (Bank of New York Mellon & Pershing,
LLC) (``we are supportive of an 18-month extension and delay to
allow the Department to complete its review and consider
modifications to the Rule and PTEs because it provides certainty
that the marketplace needs to minimize disruptions for retirement
investors. Whether the Department ultimately pursues a tiered
approach or a fixed duration approach with respect to the proposed
extension and delay period, once any modifications to the Rule and
PTEs are finalized, the Department will need to allow adequate time
for firms to comply with such modified Rule and PTEs. We expect any
changes proposed to the Rule and PTEs, or any newly proposed PTEs,
will be made available to the public for notice and comment with the
opportunity to review. Because we don't yet know the scope of these
proposed changes or when such changes would become applicable,
however, the need for additional potential transition period
extensions and applicability date delays with respect to the PTEs is
unavoidable.''); Comment Letter #112 (Northwestern Mutual Life
Insurance Company) (``Northwestern Mutual supports a minimum delay
of eighteen months as proposed by the Department and a further delay
if the Department concludes that changes should be made to the
Fiduciary Duty Rule or the Exemptions. . . . If, for example, the
Department determines that significant changes should be made to the
BIC, and those changes are made final in early 2019, then at least
an additional transition year should be provided from that date to
allow firms enough time to make the necessary changes to processes
and systems and to be able to communicate in an orderly manner with
their clients.''); Comment Letter #114 (BBVA Compass) (``In our
view, however, the proposed 18-month extension provides the minimum
period needed to allow the Department and other interested parties
to review the Rule and the accompanying Exemptions, make appropriate
determinations regarding what changes to the Rule are warranted and
afford financial institutions reasonable time to develop and
implement processes and systems changes necessary to conduct
activity in a compliant manner.'').
\24\ See, e.g., Comment Letter # 68 (AARP) (although generally
opposed to any delay, as between a fixed 18-month delay and a
contingent or tiered delay, the commenter stated it ``is concerned
that tiered compliance dates will exacerbate investor confusion and
will make it more difficult for Americans saving for retirement to
understand. A single compliance date would be preferred.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
By contrast, many commenters believe a contingent or tiered
approach is the better way forward.\25\ Of paramount importance to most
of these commenters is that they have sufficient time to ready
themselves for compliance with any changes to the requirements of the
Fiduciary Rule and PTEs, which they believe should be substantially
different than the current Fiduciary Rule and PTEs. These commenters
assert that it is improbable that the Department will complete the
directed reexamination within the proposed 18-month period, let alone
propose and finalize amendments to the Fiduciary Rule and PTEs and
provide adequate time to come into compliance with any such revisions--
all within that same 18-month period.\26\ They, therefore, identify the
contingent and tiered varieties as the better approaches because, in
their estimation, these approaches would ensure adequate time for
compliance with the Fiduciary Rule and PTEs, as revised, and thereby
more effectively avoid a scenario of consecutive or serial piecemeal
delays in the future.\27\ These commenters generally favored a range of
12 to 24 months following the Department's finalization of changes to
the Fiduciary Rule and PTEs or following the publication of a decision
that no changes are on the horizon.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\25\ See, e.g., Comment Letter #29 (American Retirement
Association) (Recommends a tiered approach in which the
applicability date is delayed until ``the later of January 1, 2019,
or a date that is at least 18-months from the date a revised
exemption or rule is promulgated.'').
\26\ See, e.g., Comment Letter #127 (Cetera Financial Group) (a
delay to July 1, 2019, or any other fixed date does not take into
account the possibility that the review itself takes more than 18
months, the additional time that it will take financial advisers to
digest any amendments to the rule and incorporate changes to their
own systems and processes after a final rule is published, and the
likelihood of confusion on the part of investors as to what
standards apply to advice they receive in connection with retirement
investments prior to publication of any amendments to the Fiduciary
Rule.).
\27\ See, e.g., Comment Letter #65 (Securities Industry and
Financial Markets Association) (``We believe that a tiered approach
extending the delay to the later of the 18-month period the
Department proposed and a period ending 24 months after the
completion of the review and publication of final rules will best
avoid the confusion, uncertainty and cost associated with continued
piecemeal delays.''); Comment Letter #97 (Insured Retirement
Institute) (``the tiered approach . . . would provide the greatest
level of certainty for our members and the customers they serve.
This structure would avoid the need for the Department to propose
additional delays in the future. . .'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As between the proposed 18-month fixed delay and the contingent and
tiered alternatives, the Department continues to believe that using a
date-certain approach, rather than one of the other alternatives, is
the best way to respond to and minimize concerns about uncertainty with
respect to the eventual application and scope of the Fiduciary Rule and
PTEs. Although the contingent and tiered approaches have the built-in
advantage of an automatic extension, if needed, it is difficult to
choose the appropriate triggering event before the Department completes
its reexamination of the Fiduciary Rule and PTEs. Interjecting
unnecessary uncertainty regarding the future applicability and scope of
the Fiduciary Rule and PTEs is harmful to all stakeholders. In
addition, the Department believes that the additional 18 months is
sufficient to complete review of the new information in the record and
to implement changes to the Fiduciary Rule and/or PTEs, if any,
including opportunity for notice and comment and coordination with
other regulatory agencies.
The proposal also solicited comments on whether to condition any
extension of the Transition Period on the behavior of the entity
seeking relief under the Transition Period. For example, the Department
specifically asked for comment on whether to condition the delay on a
Financial Institution's showing that it has, or a promise that it will,
take steps to harness recent innovations in investment products and
services, such as ``clean shares.'' All of the comments in response to
this question opposed this idea. Some commenters expressed their
concern that this approach would add confusion for Financial
Institutions, who would be forced to change their products and
services, and for retirement consumers, who would be forced to react to
such changes.\28\ Other commenters believed that this approach would
create an unlevel playing field by providing relief to select business
models and investments rather than providing more neutral relief to
many different business models and investments.\29\ Other
[[Page 56553]]
commenters are concerned that this approach would create uncertainty
and confusion as to whether a particular firm is being held to a
different legal standard than its peers, which would be detrimental to
clients, investors, and other stakeholders.\30\ One commenter indicated
that it is strongly opposed to this approach because essentially it
would be a new or different exemption, and not really an extension of
the current Transition Period.\31\ The Department is persuaded that
conditions of this type generally seem more relevant in the context of
considering the development of additional and more streamlined
exemption approaches that take into account recent marketplace
innovations, and less appropriate and germane in the context of a
decision whether to extend the Transition Period.
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\28\ See, e.g., Comment Letter #76 (Groom Law Group on Behalf of
Annuity and Insurance Company Clients) (``Not only would imposing
additional conditions reduce the benefit of the Proposed Extension,
but additional conditions would add confusion for Financial
Institutions, who would be forced to change their products and
services, and for retirement consumers, who would be forced to react
to such changes.''); Comment Letter #82 (Standard Life Insurance
Company, Standard Retirement Services) (``To condition a further
delay on certain steps toward `innovations' would only serve to
confuse investors and the retirement industry.'').
\29\ See, e.g., Comment Letter #62 (Lincoln Financial Group)
(``We continue to urge the Department to . . . hold fee-based
compensation and commissions to the same standard and process, so
that guaranteed lifetime income products can be made available to
consumers on a level playing field with other products.''); Comment
Letter #65 (Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association)
(``Further, we do not believe the Department should condition delays
upon adoption of any specific `innovations' by entities that rely on
the Transition Period. [E]xemptions should be generally applicable
to many different business models, and not simply the model that the
Department prefers.''); Comment Letter #48 (American Council of Life
Insurers) (``we strongly oppose a delay approach based on subjective
criteria. . . . A subjective delay approach, based on undefined and
ambiguous factors, such as whether firm has taken `concrete steps'
to `harness' market developments, would require the Department to
subjectively and inappropriately pick and choose among providers and
products based on vague factors. We question the constitutionality
and legality of such an approach.''); Comment Letter #53 (PSF
Investments/Primerica) (``Tying a delay to firms' adoption of
certain `innovations' or business models would only add further to
the perception or actuality that the government is favoring a
product, an industry, a business model or a compensation
structure.''); Comment Letter #109 (Fidelity Investments)
(``Finally, we agree with the Department that applicability of the
delay should not be conditioned on an advice provider engaging in
certain behavior, such as making a promise to harness recent
innovations in investment products and services. Such conditions
would unduly pressure advice providers to engage in whatever
behavior might be designated. Slanting advice in this manner,
however favorably the Department or any other person might view a
particular product or service or behavior, will necessarily
constrain choice and options to the detriment of retirement savers.
Making an advice provider's use of a specific product or service the
price of avoiding the needless costs and investor confusion
associated with the January 1 applicability date is not appropriate
or warranted.'').
\30\ See, e.g., Comment Letter #64 (BlackRock) (``The
uncertainty and confusion as to whether a particular firm is being
held to a different legal standard than its peers would be
detrimental to clients, investors and other stakeholders.''). See
also Comment Letter #103 (Committee of Annuity Insurers) (stated
that ``it could stifle innovation in product and advice models,''
that ``the Department should not substitute its own investment
preferences for the preferences and insights of advisers,'' and that
``the conditional relief contemplated in the Department's proposal
would be `too imprecise' for any firm seeking to avail themselves of
the potential relief.'').
\31\ Comment Letter #86 (Spark Institute) (``The circumstances
necessitating the existing Transition Period have not changed in any
way since its announcement in the spring. The Department has not
completed its examination and it has not announced whether, and how,
the Investment Advice Regulation will be amended. Until the
Department has completed both of those tasks, it should not alter
its existing Transition Period rules in any way, other than to
extend its expiration. Any contrary decision would result in
significant market disruptions, substantial confusion, and would be
difficult to monitor and administer.'').
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Miscellaneous
The Department rejects certain comments beyond the scope of this
rulemaking, whether such comments were received pursuant to the August
31 Notice or the RFI. For instance, one commenter urged the Department
to amend the Principal Transactions Exemption for the Transition Period
to remove the limits on products that can be traded on a principal
basis, and allow those products that have historically been traded in
the principal market to continue to be bought and sold by IRAs and
plans, including, but not limited to, foreign currency, municipal
bonds, and equity and debt IPOs. A different commenter requested that
the Department revise the ``grandfather'' exemption, in section VII of
the BIC Exemption, so that grandfathering treatment would apply to
recommendations made prior to the expiration of the extended Transition
Period (July 1, 2019).\32\ Inasmuch as amendments such as these were
not suggested in the August 31 Notice, the public did not have notice
or a full opportunity to comment on these issues and they are beyond
the scope of this final rule. The Department, however, is open to
further consideration of the merits of these requests, and the
submission of additional relevant information, as part of its ongoing
reexamination of the Fiduciary Rule and related exemptions.
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\32\ Due to the delay of certain exemption conditions as part of
the April Delay Rule, the standards applicable to grandfathered
assets and non-grandfathered assets during the Transition Period are
similar. For this reason, the Department sees no compelling reason
to extend grandfathering treatment through the Transition Period.
The primary purpose of the grandfathering exemption was to preserve
compensation for services rendered prior to the Fiduciary Rule and
to permit orderly transition from past arrangements, not to exempt
future advice and investments from important protections scheduled
to become applicable after the Transition Period. Nevertheless,
commenters are encouraged to supplement their comments on this point
during the reexamination period.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
D. Findings by Secretary of Labor
ERISA section 408(a) specifically authorizes the Secretary of Labor
to grant administrative exemptions from ERISA's prohibited transaction
provisions.\33\ Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1978 generally transferred
the authority of the Secretary of the Treasury to grant administrative
exemptions under Code section 4975(c)(2) to the Secretary of Labor.\34\
Regulations at 29 CFR 2570.30 to 2570.52 describe the procedures for
applying for an administrative exemption. Under these authorities, the
Secretary of Labor has discretionary authority to grant new or modify
existing administrative exemptions under ERISA and the Code on an
individual or class basis, if the Secretary finds that the exemptions
are (1) administratively feasible, (2) in the interests of plans and
their participants and beneficiaries and IRA owners, and (3) protective
of the rights of the participants and beneficiaries of such plans and
IRA owners. The Department has made such findings with respect to the
18-month extension of the Transition Period under the BIC and Principal
Transactions Exemptions and the 18-month delay in the applicability of
certain amendments to PTE 84-24. It is largely the continued imposition
of the Impartial Conduct Standards that enables the Department to grant
the delay under these standards, but other factors are also important
to these findings. For instance, it is in the interests of plans and
their participants and beneficiaries and IRA owners to avoid the cost
and confusion of a potentially disorderly transition to PTE conditions
that are under reexamination pursuant to a Presidential Executive Order
and that may change in the near future. In addition, to be protective
of the rights of participants, beneficiaries, and IRA owners, the
Department chose a time certain delay of 18 months, rather than a more
open-ended contingent or tiered alternative. These factors are
discussed further in the RIA section of this document.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\33\ 29 U.S.C. 1108(a).
\34\ 5 U.S.C. app at 214 (2000).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
E. Extension of Temporary Enforcement Relief--FAB 2017-02
On May 22, 2017, the Department issued a temporary enforcement
policy covering the transition period between June 9, 2017, and January
1, 2018, during which the Department will not pursue claims against
investment advice fiduciaries who are working diligently and in good
faith to comply with their fiduciary duties and to meet the conditions
of the PTEs, or otherwise treat those investment advice fiduciaries as
being in violation of their fiduciary duties and not compliant with the
PTEs. See Field Assistance Bulletin 2017-02 (May 22, 2017) (FAB 2017-
02). Comments were solicited on whether to extend this policy for the
same period covered by the proposed extension of the Transition Period.
Commenters supporting an extension of the Transition Period
overwhelmingly indicated their support for also extending the temporary
enforcement policy in FAB 2017-02, to align the two periods.\35\ These
[[Page 56554]]
commenters believe such an alignment will significantly help to avoid
market disruptions during the Transition Period. These commenters
strongly oppose adding any new conditions to the enforcement policy
during this period. They also request clarification that the relief
under FAB 2017-02 is conditioned on diligent and good faith efforts to
comply with the Fiduciary Rule and Impartial Conduct Standards, and
does not also require diligent and good faith efforts towards
implementing the delayed provisions of the PTEs.\36\
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\35\ See, e.g., Comment Letter #29 (American Retirement
Association) (``ARA would strongly recommend continuing the
temporary enforcement policy announced in Field Assistance Bulletin
2017-02. This would be consistent with the Department's announced
intention to assist (rather than citing violations and imposing
penalties on) plans, plan fiduciaries, financial institutions and
others who are working diligently and in good faith to understand
and come into compliance with the fiduciary duty rule and
exemptions. Further, if a Financial Institution acts in bad faith,
the Department could pursue an enforcement action.''); Comment
Letter #30 (Neuberger Berman Group) (``We unconditionally support
the common sense answer that the Temporary Enforcement Policy be
extended to line up with the final applicability dates in respect of
those originally scheduled for January 1, 2018.''); Comment Letter
#48 (American Council of Life Insurers) (``An extension of FAB 2017-
02's temporary enforcement policy is consistent with the
Department's stated `good faith' compliance approach to
implementation. . . .''); Comment Letter # 86 (Spark Institute)
(``SPARK strongly supports an extension of the Department's
temporary enforcement policy because of all of the uncertainty
surrounding the future of the Investment Advice Regulation. The
Department's proposal to extend the Transition Period notes that the
Department is considering an extension of the Transition Period
because it is still not known whether, and to what extent, there
will be changes to the Department's interpretation of ``investment
advice'' and the new and revised PTEs. Given this rationale, it
simply would not make any sense for the Department to start
enforcing portions of a regulation that is actively being
reconsidered.''); Comment Letter #92 (E*TRADE) (``any delay should
include a corresponding extension of Field Assistance Bulletin 2017-
02. As firms are already subject to the Impartial Conduct Standards
. . . we believe a corresponding extension of FAB 2017-02 will
benefit financial service providers without harming retirement
investors, while retaining enforcement powers for firms not
implementing requirements in good faith.''); Comment Letter #128
(U.S. Chamber of Commerce) (``The Chamber believes the Department
should extend the applicability of Field Assistance Bulletin 2017-02
from January 1, 2018, until the end of the Transition Period.'').
\36\ See, e.g., Comment Letter #28 (Empower Retirement) (``The
relief offered under FAB 2017-02 was conditioned on fiduciaries
working diligently and in good faith to comply with the fiduciary
rule and exemptions. The DOL should make clear that this does not
require continuing implementation efforts that would have been
required for the January 1, 2018 applicability date, but is based on
continued adherence to the Impartial Conduct Standards.''); Comment
Letter #41 (Great-West Financial) (``To avoid disruption in the
market, the DOL should refrain from adding new conditions but should
simultaneously announce that the non-enforcement policy announced in
FAB 2017-02 will be extended during the eighteen-month extension.
The relief offered under FAB 2017-02 was conditioned on fiduciaries
working diligently and in good faith to comply with the fiduciary
duty rule and exemptions. The DOL should make clear that this does
not require continuing implementation efforts that would have been
required for the January 1, 2018 applicability date, but is based on
continued adherence to the Impartial Conduct Standards.''). See also
Comment Letter #82 (Standard Insurance Company and Standard
Retirement Services, Inc.) (``we ask that The Department also extend
the temporary enforcement policy providing relief to investment
advice fiduciaries who are working in good faith to comply with the
Regulations. Adding subjective requirements like `taking steps
toward innovations' would only add further uncertainty and confusion
to the current situation.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Although the Department has a statutory responsibility and broad
authority to investigate or audit employee benefit plans and plan
fiduciaries to ensure compliance with the law, compliance assistance
for plan fiduciaries and other service providers is also a high
priority for the Department. The Department has repeatedly said that
its general approach to implementation will be marked by an emphasis on
assisting (rather than citing violations and imposing penalties on)
plans, plan fiduciaries, financial institutions, and others who are
working diligently and in good faith to understand and come into
compliance with the Fiduciary Rule and PTEs. Consistent with that
approach, the Department has determined that extended temporary
enforcement relief is appropriate and in the interest of plans, plan
fiduciaries, plan participants and beneficiaries, IRAs, and IRA owners.
Accordingly, during the phased implementation period from June 7, 2016,
to July 1, 2019, the Department will not pursue claims against
fiduciaries who are working diligently and in good faith to comply with
the Fiduciary Rule and applicable provisions of the PTEs, or treat
those fiduciaries as being in violation of the Fiduciary Rule and
PTEs.\37\ At the same time, however, the Department emphasizes, as it
has in the past, that firms and advisers should work ``diligently and
in good faith to comply'' \38\ with their fiduciary obligations during
the Transition Period. The ``basic fiduciary norms and standards of
fair dealing'' \39\ are still required of fiduciaries during the
Transition Period.
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\37\ On March 28, 2017, the Treasury Department and the IRS
issued IRS Announcement 2017-4 stating that the IRS will not apply
Sec. 4975 (which provides excise taxes relating to prohibited
transactions) and related reporting obligations with respect to any
transaction or agreement to which the Labor Department's temporary
enforcement policy described in FAB 2017-01, or other subsequent
related enforcement guidance, would apply. The Treasury Department
and the IRS have confirmed that, for purposes of applying IRS
Announcement 2017-4, the discussion in this document constitutes
``other subsequent related enforcement guidance.''
\38\ See Conflict of Interest FAQs (Transition Period), May
2017, p.11. (https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/ebsa/about-ebsa/our-activities/resource-center/faqs/coi-transition-period-1.pdf); see also FAB 2017-02 (``The Department has repeatedly said
that its general approach to implementation will be marked by an
emphasis on assisting (rather than citing violations and imposing
penalties on) plans, plan fiduciaries, financial institutions, and
others who are working diligently and in good faith to understand
and come into compliance with the fiduciary duty rule and
exemptions.'').
\39\ Conflict of Interest FAQs (Transition Period), May 2017,
p.3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Accordingly, as the Department reviews the compliance efforts of
firms and advisers during the Transition Period, it will focus on the
affirmative steps that firms have taken to comply with the Impartial
Conduct Standards and to reduce the scope and severity of conflicts of
interest that could lead to violations of those standards. The
Department recognizes that the development of effective, long-term
compliance solutions may take time, but it remains critically important
that firms take action to ensure that investment recommendations are
governed by the best interests of retirement investors, rather than the
potentially competing financial incentives of the firm or adviser.
As the Department explained in previous guidance, although firms
``retain flexibility to choose precisely how to safeguard compliance
with the Impartial Conduct Standards'' \40\ during the Transition
Period, they certainly may look to the specific provisions of the Best
Interest Contract Exemption and Principal Transactions Exemption for
guidance on ways to comply with the Impartial Conduct Standards. Thus,
for example, the Department noted: ``Section IV of the BIC Exemption
provides a detailed statement of how firms that limit adviser's
investment recommendations to proprietary products or to investments
that generate third party payments can comply with the best interest
standard.'' ``If the firm and the adviser meet the terms of Section IV.
. . they are `deemed' to satisfy the best interest standard.'' \41\
Thus, while firms are not required to rely on Section IV during the
Transition Period, such reliance would certainly constitute good faith
compliance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\40\ Id. at p.6.
\41\ Id. at p.6 n.4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Department also remains ``broadly available to discuss
compliance approaches and related issues with interested parties, and
would invite interested parties to contact the Department'' \42\ about
the compliance approaches they have adopted or plan to adopt. This
document accordingly supplements FAB 2017-02.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\42\ Id. at p.6.
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F. Regulatory Impact Analysis
The Department expects that the extension of the Transition Period
under the BIC and Principal Transactions Exemptions and the delay of
the amendments to PTE 84-24 (other than the Impartial Conduct
Standards) will
[[Page 56555]]
produce benefits that justify associated costs. These actions will
avert the possibility of a costly and disorderly transition from the
Impartial Conduct Standards to full compliance with the exemptions'
conditions that ultimately could be modified or repealed, and thereby
reduce some compliance costs. Similarly, it could avert the possibility
of unnecessary costs to consumers as a result of an unnecessarily
confusing or disruptive transition. As stated above, the Department
currently is engaged in the process of reviewing the Fiduciary Rule and
PTEs as directed in the Presidential Memorandum and reviewing comments
received in response to the RFI. The delay will allow the Department to
reexamine the Fiduciary Rule and PTEs and to update its economic
analysis. The Department's objective is to complete its review pursuant
to the President's Memorandum, analyze comments received in response to
the RFI, determine whether future changes to the Fiduciary Rule and
PTEs are necessary, and propose and finalize any changes to the
Fiduciary Rule or PTEs sufficiently before July 1, 2019, to provide
firms with sufficient time to design and implement an orderly
transition to any new requirements.
If the Department revises or repeals some aspects of the Fiduciary
Rule and PTEs in the future, the delay will allow affected firms to
avoid incurring significant implementation costs now which later might
turn out to be unnecessary. Furthermore, the delay will provide firms
with more time to develop new products and practices that can provide
long-term solutions for mitigating conflicts of interests. For example,
a commenter cited numerous logistical obstacles that must be surmounted
before using clean share classes in the market.\43\ The delay provides
firms with additional time to address these issues and successfully
launch products that benefit investors. The delay also will provide the
Department with time to consult further with other regulators including
the NAIC and the SEC. Such consultations may advance the development of
a regulatory framework that could promote market efficiency and
transparency, while reducing the burden to the financial sector and
associated consumer costs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\43\ Comment Letters #229 (Investment Company Institute) (dated
July 21, 2017), #442 (Morningstar, Inc.) (dated August 3, 2017), and
#594 (Fi360, Inc.) (dated August 7, 2017) (responding to RFI).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. Executive Order 12866 Statement
This final rule is an economically significant action within the
meaning of section 3(f)(1) of Executive Order 12866, because it would
likely have an effect on the economy of $100 million in at least one
year. Accordingly, the Department has considered the costs and benefits
of the final rule, which has been reviewed by the Office of Management
and Budget (OMB).
a. Investor Gains
Beginning on June 9, 2017, Financial Institutions and Advisers
generally were required to (1) make recommendations that are in their
client's best interest (i.e., recommendations that are prudent and
loyal), (2) avoid misleading statements, and (3) charge no more than
reasonable compensation for their services. If they fully adhere to
these requirements, the Department expects that affected investors will
generally receive impartial advice and accordingly a significant
portion of the gains it estimated in the 2016 RIA.\44\ However, because
the PTE conditions are intended to support and provide accountability
mechanisms for such adherence and remedies for lapses thereof (e.g.,
conditions requiring advisers to provide a written acknowledgement of
their fiduciary status and adherence to the Impartial Conduct Standards
and enter into enforceable contracts with IRA investors), the
Department acknowledges that the delay may result in the loss or
deferral of some of the estimated investor gains. On the other hand,
potential revisions to PTE conditions may reduce costs and thereby
yield additional investor gains.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\44\ The Department's baseline for this RIA includes all current
rules and regulations governing investment advice including those
that would become applicable on January 1, 2018, absent this delay.
The RIA did not quantify incremental gains by each particular aspect
of the rule and PTEs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Department received many comments on the question of whether
the delay would reduce investor gains. One group of commenters argued
that the delay would not cause any harms to investors, \45\ because the
Impartial Conduct Standards already are in place and provide sufficient
protection for investors.\46\ They asserted that investor gains would
be largely preserved during the extended transition period, because the
investor gains primarily are derived from the expanded fiduciary status
and the Impartial Conduct Standards, which already have taken effect,
and this rule simply delays the implementation of some other exemption
conditions.\47\ Furthermore, these commenters urged the Department to
weigh the harms to investors from not delaying the January 1, 2018,
applicability date. According to them, there is no evidence that
investors would be harmed by this delay, and because the Fiduciary Rule
already has negatively affected many investors, they would suffer more
harm if the remaining conditions of the PTEs were not delayed.\48\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\45\ See, e.g., Comment Letter #11 (Alternative and Direct
Securities Investment Association); Comment Letter #38 (Federated
Investors, Inc.); Comment Letter #65 (Securities Industry and
Financial Markets Association); Comment Letter #79 (Investment
Company Institute).
\46\ See, e.g., Comment Letter #11 (Alternative and Direct
Securities Investment Association).
\47\ See, e.g., Comment Letter #229 (Investment Company
Institute) to the RFI; Comment Letter #79 (Investment Company
Institute).
\48\ See, e.g., Comment Letter #65 (Securities Industry and
Financial Markets Association).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Another group of commenters argued that the delay would cause
significant losses to investors,\49\ because they found that many
financial services firms have preserved business models that the
commenters view as conflict-laden and not made meaningful changes to
root out conflicts of interest.\50\ They also asserted that many
financial services firms could flout the requirements of the Impartial
Conduct Standards due to the lack of a strong enforcement mechanism in
the retail IRA market and the Department's non-enforcement policy
during the extended transition period.\51\ To support their claims,
these commenters cited media reports that financial services firms are
not implementing further changes because they anticipate that the
Department will issue a lengthy delay of the transition period \52\ and
some pockets of industry suspended their implementation.\53\ One
commenter referenced a market survey of broker-dealers in which many
respondents reported that they have not yet made efforts to adhere to
the Fiduciary Rule and the Impartial Conduct Standards.\54\ For
example, about 64 percent of surveyed broker-dealers responded that
they have not
[[Page 56556]]
made any changes to the product mix; another 64 percent of broker-
dealers responded that they have not made changes to their internal
compensation arrangements to accommodate the Fiduciary Rule.\55\ (It is
unclear, however, whether the survey respondents accurately represent
the overall industry.) Another commenter urged the Department to
consider that the delay would unfairly harm firms that expended
resources for timely compliance with the Fiduciary Rule and create an
unlevel playing field with non-compliant firms.\56\ One commenter
estimated that an 18-month delay would cost investors about $10.9
billion over 30 years assuming a 50 percent compliance rate.\57\ Based
on this commenter's estimated investor losses, several commenters
claimed that the Department cannot justify the delay because investor
losses outweigh the estimated compliance cost savings.\58\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\49\ See, e.g., Comment Letter #44 (Economic Policy Institute);
Comment Letter #68 (AARP); Comment Letter #80 (Consumer Federation
of America); Comment Letter #84 (Better Markets); Comment Letter #91
(Public Investors Arbitration Bar Association); Comment Letter #108
(American Association for Justice); Comment Letter #126 (Institute
for Policy Integrity at New York University School of Law).
\50\ See, e.g., Comment Letter #80 (Consumer Federation of
America).
\51\ See, e.g., Comment Letter #80 (Consumer Federation of
America).
\52\ Greg Iacurici, Investment News, August 16, 2017,
``Anticipating delay to DOL fiduciary rule, broker-dealers and RIAs
change course.''
\53\ Diana Britton, Wealth Management.com, June 19, 2017, ``DOL
in the Real World.''
\54\ Comment Letter #141 (Consumer Federation of America).
\55\ John Crabb, International Financial Law Review, October
2017, ``The Fiduciary Rule Poll.''
\56\ Comment Letter #84 (Better Markets).
\57\ See Comment Letter #44 (Economic Policy Institute).
According to this comment, the investor losses over 30 years would
range from $5.5 billion (75 percent compliance rate) to $16.3
billion (25 percent compliance rate).
\58\ See, e.g., Comment Letter #80 (Consumer Federation of
America); Comment Letter #91 (Public Investors Arbitration Bar
Association); Comment Letter #120 (AFL-CIO); Comment Letter #126
(Institute for Policy Integrity at New York University School of
Law).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Department carefully reviewed and weighed these comments and
the referenced reports on potential investor losses caused by this
delay. Steps some firms already have taken toward compliance, if not
reversed, may limit investor losses. By some accounts, \59\ compliance
efforts may be most advanced among the larger firms that account for
the majority of the market, so the number of retirement investors
potentially benefiting from compliance efforts might be large. Firms
may be especially motivated to comply in connection with advice on
rollovers from ERISA-covered plans to IRAs, where they may face
liability for any fiduciary breaches under ERISA itself. Nonetheless,
gaps in compliance may subject investors to some potentially avoidable
losses, of uncertain incidence and magnitude.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\59\ John Crabb, International Financial Law Review, October
2017, ``The Fiduciary Rule Poll.'' According to this report, some
firms already adopted fiduciary standards for business reasons;
therefore, they would continue to comply with the rule using the
adopted changes during this transition period.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
These potential losses, however, must be weighed against the costs
that firms and investors would incur if the January 1, 2018
applicability date were not delayed. Absent delay, firms would be
forced to rush to comply with provisions that the Department may soon
revise or rescind. Notwithstanding whatever steps firms already have
taken toward compliance, it is likely that for many, such a rush to
comply would be costly, disruptive, and/or infeasible. Smaller firms,
which may be least prepared to comply fully, might be affected most.
The disruption also could adversely affect many investors. Some of the
costs incurred could turn out to be wasted if costly provisions are
later revised or rescinded--and subsequent implementation of revised
provisions might sow confusion and yield additional disruption. This
delay will avert such disruption along with the potentially wasted cost
of complying with provisions that the Department later revises or
rescinds. In addition, the Department notes that some commenters'
observations that investor losses from this delay may exceed associated
compliance cost savings do not reflect the totality of economic
considerations properly at hand. While some investor losses will
reflect decreases in overall social welfare, others will reflect
transfers from investors to the financial industry, which, while
undesirable, are not social costs per se. Compliance costs in turn
represent only some of the societal costs that may be averted by this
delay. Others include those attributable to the potential disruption
and confusion that could adversely affect both firms and investors.
The Department acknowledges uncertainty surrounding potential
investor losses from this delay. On balance, however, the Department
concludes that the delay is justified, insofar as avoiding the market
disruption that would occur if regulated parties incur costs to comply
quickly with conditions or requirements the Department subsequently
revises or repeals and the resultant significant consumer confusion
justifies any attendant investor losses.
b. Cost Savings
Some firms that are fiduciaries under the Fiduciary Rule may have
committed resources to implementing procedures to support compliance
with their fiduciary obligations. This may include changing their
compensation structures and monitoring the practices and procedures of
their advisers to ensure that conflicts of interest do not cause
violations of the Fiduciary Rule and Impartial Conduct Standards of the
PTEs, and maintaining sufficient records to corroborate that they are
complying with the Fiduciary Rule and PTEs. These firms have
considerable flexibility to choose precisely how they will achieve
compliance with the PTEs during the extended transition period.
According to some commenters, the majority of broker-dealers have not
yet made any changes to their internal compensation arrangements and
have not fully developed monitoring systems.\60\ The Department does
not have sufficient data to estimate such costs; therefore, they are
not quantified here.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\60\ See, e.g., Comment Letter #80 (Consumer Federation of
America); Greg Iacurici, Investment News, August 16, 2017,
``Anticipating delay to DOL fiduciary rule, broker-dealers and RIAs
change course.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Some commenters have asserted that the delay could result in cost
savings for firms compared to the costs that were estimated in the
Department's 2016 RIA to the extent that the requirements of the
Fiduciary Rule and PTE conditions are modified in a way that would
result in less expensive compliance costs. However, the Department
generally believes that start-up costs not yet incurred for
requirements previously scheduled to become applicable on January 1,
2018, should not be included, at this time, as a cost savings
associated with this rule because the rule would merely delay the full
implementation of certain conditions in the PTEs until July 1, 2019,
while the Department considers whether to propose changes and
alternatives to the exemptions. The Department would be required to
assume for purposes of this regulatory impact analysis that those
start-up costs that have not been incurred generally would be delayed
rather than avoided unless or until the Department acts to modify the
compliance obligations of firms and advisers to make them more
efficient. Nonetheless, even based on that assumption, there may be
some cost savings that could be quantified as arising from the delay
because some ongoing costs would not be incurred until July 1, 2019.
The Department has taken two approaches to quantifying the savings
resulting from the delay in incurring such ongoing costs: (1)
Quantifying the costs based on a shift in the time horizon of the costs
(i.e., comparing the present value of the costs of complying over a ten
year period beginning on January 1, 2018, with the costs of complying,
instead, over a ten year period beginning on July 1, 2019); and (2)
quantifying the reduced costs during the 18-month period of delay from
January 1, 2018, to July 1, 2019, during which time regulated parties
would otherwise have had to comply with the full conditions of the BIC
[[Page 56557]]
Exemption and Principal Transaction Exemption but for the delay.
The first of the two approaches reflects the time value of money
(i.e., the idea that money available at the present time is worth more
than the same amount of money in the future, because that money can
earn interest). The deferral of ongoing costs by 18 months will allow
the regulated community to use money they would have spent on ongoing
compliance costs for other purposes during that time period. The
Department estimates that the ten-year present value of the cost
savings arising from this 18 month deferral of ongoing compliance
costs, and the regulated community's resulting ability to use the money
for other purposes, is $551.6 million using a three percent discount
rate \61\ and $1.0 billion using a seven percent discount rate.\62\
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\61\ Annualized over ten years to $64.7 million per year or over
a perpetual time horizon, discounted back to 2016, to $15.6 million
per year.
\62\ Annualized over ten years to $143.9 million per year or
over a perpetual time horizon, discounted back to 2016, to $61.8
million per year.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The second of the two approaches simply estimates the expenses
foregone during the period from January 1, 2018, to July 1, 2019, as a
result of the delay. When the Department published the Fiduciary Rule
and accompanying PTEs, it calculated that the total ongoing compliance
costs of the Fiduciary Rule and PTEs were $1.5 billion annually.
Therefore, the Department estimates the ten-year present value of the
cost savings of firms not being required to incur ongoing compliance
costs during an 18 month delay would be approximately $2.2 billion
using a three percent discount rate \63\ and $2.0 billion using a seven
percent discount rate.\64\ \65\
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\63\ Annualized over ten years to $252.1 million per year or
over a perpetual time horizon, discounted back to 2016, to $57.3
million per year.
\64\ Annualized over ten years to $291.1 million per year or
over a perpetual time horizon, discounted back to 2016, to $109.2
million per year.
\65\ The Department notes that firms may be incurring some costs
to comply with the impartial conduct standards; however, it does not
have sufficient data to estimate these costs. The Department, as it
continues to update its analysis of the rule, solicits comments on
the costs of complying with the impartial conduct standards, and how
these costs interact with the costs of all other facets of
compliance with the conditions of the PTEs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Based on its progress thus far with the review and reexamination
directed by the President, however, the Department believes there may
be evidence supporting alternatives that reduce costs and increase
benefits to all affected parties, while maintaining protections for
retirement investors. The Department anticipates that it will have a
clearer sense of the range of such alternatives once it completes a
careful review of the data and evidence submitted in response to the
RFI.
The Department also cannot determine at this time the degree to
which the infrastructure that affected firms have already established
to ensure compliance with the Fiduciary Rule and PTEs exemptions would
be sufficient to facilitate compliance with the Fiduciary Rule and PTEs
conditions if they are modified in the future.
c. Alternatives Considered
While the Department considered several alternatives that were
informed by public comments, the Department's chosen alternative in
this final rule is likely to yield the most desirable outcome,
including avoidance of investor losses otherwise associated with costly
market disruptions. In weighing different options, the Department took
numerous factors into account. The Department's objective was to
facilitate orderly marketplace innovation and avoid unnecessary
confusion and uncertainty in the investment advice market and
associated expenses for America's workers and retirees.
The Department solicited comments at the proposed rule stage
regarding whether it should adopt an extension that would end (1) a
specified period after the occurrence of a specific event (a contingent
approach) or (2) on the earlier or the later of (a) a time certain and
(b) the end of a specified period after the occurrence of a specific
event (a tiered approach). Several commenters supported a contingent or
tiered approach,\66\ while others expressed concern that a potentially
indefinite delay might erode compliance with the Impartial Conduct
Standards. The Department decided not to adopt these approaches,
because they could inject too much uncertainty into the market and
cause investor confusion.
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\66\ See, e.g., Comment Letter #48 (American Council of Life
Insurers); Comment Letter #51 (Morgan Stanley); Comment Letter #57
(Pacific Life Insurance Company); Comment Letter #73 (Raymond James
Financial); Comment Letter #82 (Standard Insurance Company and
Standard Retirement Services, Inc.); Comment Letter #112
(Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Company); Comment Letter #121
(HSBC North America Holdings Inc.); Comment Letter #124 (Morgan,
Lewis & Bockius LLP).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As discussed above in this preamble, some commenters urged the
Department to require firms to comply with the original transitional
requirements of the exemptions, not just the Impartial Conduct
Standards.\67\ The Department declines this suggestion for now but
agrees to give the matter further consideration during the course of
the reexamination. The efficacy and effect of these transitional
requirements need to be considered very carefully as the Department
considers possible changes to the exemptions and their disclosure
requirements. The Department is concerned that after completing its
reexamination, it might change the disclosure requirements, the
implementation of which would have imposed approximately $50.4 million
of operational costs \68\ plus additional start-up costs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\67\ See, e.g. Comment Letter #80 (Consumer Federation of
America) (``at a bare minimum, the Department must require firms and
advisers to comply with the original transitional requirements of
the exemptions, as set forth in Section IX of the BIC Exemption and
Section VII of the Principal Transactions Exemption, not just the
Impartial Conduct Standards. These include: (1) The minimal
transition written disclosure requirements in which firms
acknowledge their fiduciary status and that of their advisers with
respect to their advice, state the Impartial Conduct Standards and
provide a commitment to adhere to them, and describe the firm's
material conflicts of interest and any limitations on product
offering; (2) the requirement that firms designate a person
responsible for addressing material conflicts of interest and
monitoring advisers' adherence to the Impartial Conduct Standards;
and (3) the requirement that firms maintain records necessary to
prove that the conditions of the exemption have been met.'').
\68\ Using the same methodology that was used to calculate the
burden of the transition disclosure that was originally envisioned
in the April 2016 final rule and exemptions, the Department
estimates that during the transition period, 34.2 million transition
disclosures would be produced to comply with the requirements of the
Best Interest Contract Exemption at a cost of $47.2 million, and 2.7
million transition disclosures would be produced to comply with the
requirements of the Principal Transactions Exemption at a cost of
$3.2 million. These estimates assume that all investment advice
clients receiving advice covered by the applicable exemptions
between January 1, 2018 and December 31, 2018 would receive the
transition disclosures and all new investment advice clients
receiving advice covered by the applicable exemptions between
January 1, 2019 and June 30, 2019 would receive the transition
disclosures.
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The Department also considered not extending the transition period,
which would mean that the remaining conditions in the PTEs would become
applicable on January 1, 2018. The Department rejected this alternative
because it would not provide sufficient time for the Department to
complete its ongoing review of, or propose and finalize any changes to
the Fiduciary Rule and PTEs. Moreover, absent the extended transition
period, Financial Institutions and Advisers would feel compelled to
prepare for full compliance with PTE conditions that become applicable
on January 1, 2018, despite the possibility that the Department might
identify and adopt more efficient alternatives or other significant
changes to the rule. This could lead to unnecessary compliance costs
and market disruptions. As compared to a shorter delay with the
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possibility of consecutive additional delays, if needed, the 18-month
delay provides more certainty for affected stakeholders because it sets
a firm date for full compliance, which allows for proper planning and
reliance.
2. Paperwork Reduction Act
The Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA) (44 U.S.C. 3501, et seq.)
prohibits federal agencies from conducting or sponsoring a collection
of information from the public without first obtaining approval from
the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). See 44 U.S.C. 3507.
Additionally, members of the public are not required to respond to a
collection of information, nor be subject to a penalty for failing to
respond, unless such collection displays a valid OMB control number.
See 44 U.S.C. 3512.
OMB has previously approved information collections contained in
the Fiduciary Rule and PTEs. The Department now is extending the
transition period for the full conditions of the PTEs associated with
its Fiduciary Rule until July 1, 2019. The Department is not modifying
the substance of the information collections at this time; however, the
current OMB approval periods of the information collection requests
(ICRs) expire before the new applicability date for the full conditions
of the PTEs as they currently exist. Therefore, many of the information
collections will remain inactive for the remainder of the current ICR
approval periods. The ICRs contained in the exemptions are discussed
below.
PTE 2016-01, the Best Interest Contract Exemption: The information
collections in PTE 2016-01, the BIC Exemption, are approved under OMB
Control Number 1210-0156 through June 30, 2019. The exemption requires
disclosure of material conflicts of interest and basic information
relating to those conflicts and the advisory relationship (Sections II
and III), contract disclosures, contracts and written policies and
procedures (Section II), pre-transaction (or point of sale) disclosures
(Section III(a)), web-based disclosures (Section III(b)), documentation
regarding recommendations restricted to proprietary products or
products that generate third-party payments (Section IV), notice to the
Department of a Financial Institution's intent to rely on the PTE, and
maintenance of records necessary to prove that the conditions of the
PTE have been met (Section V). Although the start-up costs of the
information collections as they are set forth in the current PTE may
not be incurred prior to June 30, 2019 due to uncertainty surrounding
the Department's ongoing consideration of whether to propose changes
and alternatives to the exemptions, they are reflected in the revised
burden estimate summary below. The ongoing costs of the information
collections will remain inactive through the remainder of the current
approval period.
For a more detailed discussion of the information collections and
associated burden of this PTE, see the Department's PRA analysis at 81
FR 21002, 21071.
PTE 2016-02, the Prohibited Transaction Exemption for Principal
Transactions in Certain Assets Between Investment Advice Fiduciaries
and Employee Benefit Plans and IRAs (Principal Transactions Exemption):
The information collections in PTE 2016-02, the Principal Transactions
Exemption, are approved under OMB Control Number 1210-0157 through June
30, 2019. The exemption requires Financial Institutions to provide
contract disclosures and contracts to Retirement Investors (Section
II), adopt written policies and procedures (Section IV), make
disclosures to Retirement Investors and on a publicly available Web
site (Section IV), maintain records necessary to prove they have met
the PTE conditions (Section V). Although the start-up costs of the
information collections as they are set forth in the current PTE may
not be incurred prior to June 30, 2019, due to uncertainty surrounding
the Department's ongoing consideration of whether to propose changes
and alternatives to the exemptions, they are reflected in the revised
burden estimate summary below. The ongoing costs of the information
collections will remain inactive through the remainder of the current
approval period.
For a more detailed discussion of the information collections and
associated burden of this PTE, see the Department's PRA analysis at 81
FR 21089, 21129.
Amended PTE 84-24: The information collections in Amended PTE 84-24
are approved under OMB Control Number 1210-0158 through June 30, 2019.
As amended, Section IV(b) of PTE 84-24 requires Financial Institutions
to obtain advance written authorization from an independent plan
fiduciary or IRA holder and furnish the independent fiduciary or IRA
holder with a written disclosure in order to receive commissions in
conjunction with the purchase of insurance and annuity contracts.
Section IV(c) of PTE 84-24 requires investment company Principal
Underwriters to obtain approval from an independent fiduciary and
furnish the independent fiduciary with a written disclosure in order to
receive commissions in conjunction with the purchase by a plan of
securities issued by an investment company Principal Underwriter.
Section V of PTE 84-24, as amended, requires Financial Institutions to
maintain records necessary to demonstrate that the conditions of the
PTE have been met.
The rule delays the applicability date of amendments to PTE 84-24
until July 1, 2019, except that the Impartial Conduct Standards became
applicable on June 9, 2017. The Department does not have sufficient
data to estimate that number of respondents that will use PTE 84-24
with the inclusion of Impartial Conduct Standards but delayed
applicability date of amendments. Therefore, the Department has not
revised its burden estimate.
For a more detailed discussion of the information collections and
associated burden of this PTE, see the Department's PRA analysis at 81
FR 21147, 21171.
These paperwork burden estimates, which comprise start-up costs
that will be incurred prior to the July 1, 2019, effective date (and
the June 30, 2019, expiration date of the current approval periods),
are summarized as follows:
Agency: Employee Benefits Security Administration, Department of
Labor.
Titles: (1) Best Interest Contract Exemption and (2) Final
Investment Advice Regulation.
OMB Control Number: 1210-0156.
Affected Public: Businesses or other for-profits; not for profit
institutions.
Estimated Number of Respondents: 19,890 over the three-year period;
annualized to 6,630 per year.
Estimated Number of Annual Responses: 34,046,054 over the three-
year period; annualized to 11,348,685 per year.
Frequency of Response: When engaging in exempted transaction.
Estimated Total Annual Burden Hours: 2,125,573 over the three-year
period; annualized to 708,524 per year.
Estimated Total Annual Burden Cost: $2,468,487,766 during the
three-year period; annualized to $822,829,255 per year.
Agency: Employee Benefits Security Administration, Department of
Labor.
Titles: (1) Prohibited Transaction Exemption for Principal
Transactions in Certain Assets between Investment Advice Fiduciaries
and Employee Benefit Plans and IRAs and (2) Final Investment Advice
Regulation.
OMB Control Number: 1210-0157.
Affected Public: Businesses or other for-profits; not for profit
institutions.
[[Page 56559]]
Estimated Number of Respondents: 6,075 over the three-year period;
annualized to 2,025 per year.
Estimated Number of Annual Responses: 2,463,802 over the three-year
period; annualized to 821,267 per year.
Frequency of Response: When engaging in exempted transaction;
Annually.
Estimated Total Annual Burden Hours: 45,872 over the three-year
period; annualized to 15,291 per year.
Estimated Total Annual Burden Cost: $1,955,369,661 over the three-
year period; annualized to $651,789,887 per year.
Agency: Employee Benefits Security Administration, Department of
Labor.
Titles: (1) Prohibited Transaction Exemption (PTE) 84-24 for
Certain Transactions Involving Insurance Agents and Brokers, Pension
Consultants, Insurance Companies and Investment Company Principal
Underwriters and (2) Final Investment Advice Regulation.
OMB Control Number: 1210-0158.
Affected Public: Businesses or other for-profits; not for profit
institutions.
Estimated Number of Respondents: 21,940.
Estimated Number of Annual Responses: 3,306,610.
Frequency of Response: Initially, Annually, When engaging in
exempted transaction.
Estimated Total Annual Burden Hours: 172,301 hours.
Estimated Total Annual Burden Cost: $1,319,353.
3. Regulatory Flexibility Act
The Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.) (RFA) imposes
certain requirements with respect to Federal Rules that are subject to
the notice and comment requirements of section 553(b) of the
Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. 551 et seq.) or any other laws.
Unless the head of an agency certifies that a final rule is not likely
to have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small
entities, section 604 of the RFA requires that the agency present a
final regulatory flexibility analysis (FRFA) describing the rule's
impact on small entities and explaining how the agency made its
decisions with respect to the application of the rule to small
entities. Small entities include small businesses, organizations and
governmental jurisdictions.
The final rule merely extends the transition period for the PTEs
associated with the Fiduciary Rule. The impact on small entities will
be determined when the Department issues future guidance after
concluding its review of the rule and exemption. Any future guidance
will be subject to notice and comment and contain a Regulatory
Flexibility Act analysis. Accordingly, pursuant to section 605(b) of
the RFA, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Employee Benefits
Security Administration hereby certifies that the final rule will not
have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small
entities.
4. Congressional Review Act
This final rule is subject to the Congressional Review Act (CRA)
provisions of the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of
1996 (5 U.S.C. 801 et seq.) and will be transmitted to Congress and the
Comptroller General for review. The final rule is a ``major rule'' as
that term is defined in 5 U.S.C. 804, because it is likely to result in
an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more.
5. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act
Title II of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 104-
4) requires each Federal agency to prepare a written statement
assessing the effects of any Federal mandate in a proposed or final
agency rule that may result in an expenditure of $100 million or more
(adjusted annually for inflation with the base year 1995) in any one
year by State, local, and tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by
the private sector. For purposes of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act,
as well as Executive Order 12875, this final rule does not include any
federal mandate that the Department expects would result in such
expenditures by State, local, or tribal governments, or the private
sector. The Department also does not expect that the delay will have
any material economic impacts on State, local or tribal governments, or
on health, safety, or the natural environment.
6. Executive Order 13771: Reducing Regulation and Controlling
Regulatory Costs
The impacts of this final rule are categorized consistently with
the analysis of the original Fiduciary Rule and PTEs, and the
Department has also concluded that the impacts identified in the RIA
accompanying the Fiduciary Rule may still be used as a basis for
estimating the potential impacts of this final rule. It has been
determined that, for purposes of E.O. 13771, the impacts of the
Fiduciary Rule that were identified in the 2016 analysis as costs, and
that are presently categorized as cost savings (or negative costs) in
this final rule, and impacts of the Fiduciary Rule that were identified
in the 2016 analysis as a combination of transfers and positive
benefits are categorized as a combination of (opposite-direction)
transfers and negative benefits in this final rule. Accordingly, OMB
has determined that this final rule is an E.O. 13771 deregulatory
action.
G. List of Amendments to Prohibited Transaction Exemptions
The Secretary of Labor has discretionary authority to grant
administrative exemptions under ERISA and the Code on an individual or
class basis, but only if the Secretary first finds that the exemptions
are (1) administratively feasible, (2) in the interests of plans and
their participants and beneficiaries and IRA owners, and (3) protective
of the rights of the participants and beneficiaries of such plans and
IRA owners. 29 U.S.C. 1108(a); see also 26 U.S.C. 4975(c)(2). The
Secretary of Labor has found that the delay finalized below is: (1)
Administratively feasible, (2) in the interests of plans and their
participants and beneficiaries and IRA owners, and (3) protective of
the rights of participants and beneficiaries of such plans and IRA
owners.
Under this authority, and based on the reasons set forth above, the
Department is amending the: (1) Best Interest Contract Exemption (PTE
2016-01); (2) Class Exemption for Principal Transactions in Certain
Assets Between Investment Advice Fiduciaries and Employee Benefit Plans
and IRAs (PTE 2016-02); and (3) Prohibited Transaction Exemption 84-24
(PTE 84-24) for Certain Transactions Involving Insurance Agents and
Brokers, Pension Consultants, Insurance Companies, and Investment
Company Principal Underwriters, as set forth below. These amendments
are effective on January 1, 2018.
1. The BIC Exemption (PTE 2016-01) is amended as follows:
A. The date ``January 1, 2018'' is deleted and ``July 1, 2019''
inserted in its place in the introductory DATES section.
B. Section II(h)(4)--Level Fee Fiduciaries provides streamlined
conditions for ``Level Fee Fiduciaries.'' The date ``January 1, 2018''
is deleted and ``July 1, 2019'' inserted in its place. Thus, for Level
Fee Fiduciaries that are robo-advice providers, and therefore not
eligible for Section IX (pursuant to Section IX(c)(3)), the Impartial
Conduct Standards in Section II(h)(2) are applicable June 9, 2017, but
the remaining conditions of Section II(h) are applicable July 1, 2019,
rather than January 1, 2018.
C. Section II(a)(1)(ii) provides for the amendment of existing
contracts by
[[Page 56560]]
negative consent. The date ``January 1, 2018'' is deleted where it
appears in this section, including in the definition of ``Existing
Contract,'' and ``July 1, 2019'' inserted in its place.
D. Section IX--Transition Period for Exemption. The date ``January
1, 2018'' is deleted and ``July 1, 2019'' inserted in its place. Thus,
the Transition Period identified in Section IX(a) is extended from June
9, 2017, to July 1, 2019, rather than June 9, 2017, to January 1, 2018.
2. The Class Exemption for Principal Transactions in Certain Assets
Between Investment Advice Fiduciaries and Employee Benefit Plans and
IRAs (PTE 2016-02), is amended as follows:
A. The date ``January 1, 2018'' is deleted and ``July 1, 2019''
inserted in its place in the introductory DATES section.
B. Section II(a)(1)(ii) provides for the amendment of existing
contracts by negative consent. The date ``January 1, 2018'' is deleted
where it appears in this section, including in the definition of
``Existing Contract,'' and ``July 1, 2019'' inserted in its place.
C. Section VII--Transition Period for Exemption. The date ``January
1, 2018'' is deleted and ``July 1, 2019'' inserted in its place. Thus,
the Transition Period identified in Section VII(a) is extended from
June 9, 2017, to July 1, 2019, rather than June 9, 2017, to January 1,
2018.
3. Prohibited Transaction Exemption 84-24 for Certain Transactions
Involving Insurance Agents and Brokers, Pension Consultants, Insurance
Companies, and Investment Company Principal Underwriters, is amended as
follows:
A. The date ``January 1, 2018'' is deleted where it appears in the
introductory DATES section and ``July 1, 2019'' inserted in its place.
Signed at Washington, DC, this 24th day of November 2017.
Jeanne Klinefelter Wilson,
Acting Assistant Secretary, Employee Benefits Security Administration,
Department of Labor.
[FR Doc. 2017-25760 Filed 11-27-17; 11:15 am]
BILLING CODE 4510-29-P