[Federal Register Volume 82, Number 228 (Wednesday, November 29, 2017)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 56630-56669]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2017-25529]
[[Page 56629]]
Vol. 82
Wednesday,
No. 228
November 29, 2017
Part II
Department of the Treasury
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
12 CFR Parts 3, 47 and 50
Mandatory Contractual Stay Requirements for Qualified Financial
Contracts; Final Rule
Federal Register / Vol. 82 , No. 228 / Wednesday, November 29, 2017 /
Rules and Regulations
[[Page 56630]]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
12 CFR Parts 3, 47 and 50
[Docket ID OCC-2016-0009]
RIN 1557-AE05
Mandatory Contractual Stay Requirements for Qualified Financial
Contracts
AGENCY: Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Treasury (OCC).
ACTION: Final rule.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: The OCC is adopting a final rule that adds a new part to its
rules to enhance the resilience and the safety and soundness of
federally chartered and licensed financial institutions by addressing
concerns relating to the exercise of default rights of certain
financial contracts that could interfere with the orderly resolution of
certain systemically important financial firms. Under the final rule, a
covered bank is required to ensure that a covered qualified financial
contract contains a contractual stay-and-transfer provision analogous
to the statutory stay-and-transfer provision imposed under Title II of
the Dodd-Frank, Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act and in
the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, and limits the exercise of default
rights based on the insolvency of an affiliate of the covered bank. In
addition, this final rule makes conforming amendments to the Capital
Adequacy Standards and the Liquidity Risk Measurement Standards in its
regulations. The requirements of this final rule are substantively
identical to those adopted in the final rules issued by the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System and by the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation.
DATES: This final rule is effective on January 1, 2018.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Valerie Song, Assistant Director,
Scott Burnett, Attorney, or Colby Mangels, Attorney, Bank Activities
and Structure Division, (202) 649-5500; Allison Hester-Haddad, Counsel,
or Ron Shimabukuro, Senior Counsel, Legislative and Regulatory
Activities Division, (202) 649-6282, 400 7th Street SW., Washington, DC
20219.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Table of Contents
I. Introduction
A. Shared Policy Concerns of the Federal Banking Agencies
B. Specific Policy Concerns Affecting National Banks, FSAs and
Federal Branches and Agencies
II. Background
A. Qualified Financial Contracts, Default Rights, and Financial
Stability
B. QFC Default Rights and GSIB Resolution Strategies
C. Default Rights and Relevant Resolution Laws
III. Discussion of the Final Rule
A. Overview, Purpose, and Authority
B. Covered Banks
C. Covered QFCs
1. General Definition
2. Definition of Counterparty
3. Exclusion of Cleared QFCs and Financial Market Utilities
4. Exclusion of Certain QFCs Under Foreign Bank Multi-Branch
Master Agreements
5. QFCs With Central Banks and Sovereign Entities
D. Definition of ``Default Right''
E. Required Contractual Provisions Related to U.S. Special
Resolution Regimes
F. Prohibited Cross-Default Rights
1. Definitions
2. General Prohibition
3. General Creditor Protections
4. Additional Creditor Protections for Supported QFCs
5. Creditor Protections Related to FDI Act Proceedings
6. Prohibited Terminations
7. Agency Transactions
8. Enforceability
9. Interaction With Other Regulatory Requirements
10. Compliance With the Universal Protocol
11. Compliance With the U.S. Protocol
G. Process for Approval of Enhanced Creditor Protections
1. Requests for Approval of Enhanced Creditor Protections
2. Compliance With the International Swaps and Derivatives
Association (ISDA) 2015 Universal Resolution Stay Protocol and U.S.
Protocol
H. Transition Periods
I. Revisions to Certain Definitions in the OCC's Capital and
Liquidity Rules
IV. Regulatory Analysis
I. Introduction
In the wake of the financial crisis of 2007-2008, U.S. and
international financial regulators have placed increased focus on
improving the resolvability of large, complex financial institutions
that operate in multiple jurisdictions, which are often referred to as
global systemically important banking organizations (GSIBs). In
connection with these ongoing efforts, the Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency (OCC) and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System (FRB) worked jointly to develop and issue two separate notice of
proposed rulemakings (NPRMs). The FRB issued an NPRM on May 3, 2016
(FRB Proposed Rule); the OCC issued an NPRM on August 19, 2017 (OCC
Proposed Rule).\1\ The FRB Proposed Rule and the OCC Proposed Rule were
substantively identical, with any differences generally relating to
differences in the types of entities supervised by the FRB and OCC--the
FRB Proposed Rule primarily addressed entities at the bank holding
company level, while the OCC Proposed Rule addressed entities at the
bank level (specifically, national banks, Federal savings associations
(FSAs), and Federal branches and agencies). The Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) issued an NPRM on October 26, 2016, which
paralleled the FRB Proposed Rule and the OCC Proposed Rule.\2\ The OCC,
FRB, and FDIC issued these NPRMs (hereinafter collectively referred to
as the ``Agencies' NPRMs'') as part of their ongoing efforts to improve
the resolvability of U.S. GSIBs and Foreign GSIBs that operate in the
United States.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ 81 FR 29169 (May 11, 2016) (Restrictions on Qualified
Financial Contracts of Systemically Important U.S. Banking
Organizations and the U.S. Operations of Systemically Important
Foreign Banking Organizations; Revisions to the Definition of
Qualifying Master Netting Agreement and Related Definitions) (FRB
Proposed Rule); 81 FR 55381 (August 19, 2017) (Mandatory Contractual
Stay Requirements for Qualified Financial Contracts) (OCC Proposed
Rule).
\2\ 81 FR 74326 (October 26, 2016) (Restrictions on Qualified
Financial Contracts of Certain FDIC-Supervised Institutions;
Revisions to the Definition of Qualifying Master Netting Agreement
and Related Definitions) (FDIC Proposed Rule).
\3\ While the focus of the discussion in this preamble is on the
impact of the OCC Proposed Rule specifically on national banks,
FSAs, Federal branches and agencies, and generally on the national
banking system, in light of the parallel nature of the OCC, FRB, and
FDIC NPRMs, portions of the discussion in this preamble may be
equally applicable to the FRB Proposed Rule and FDIC Proposed Rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The OCC received 21 comments on the proposed rule,\4\ representing
comments from banks and other financial institutions, trade
associations, and individuals. Most of the comments submitted to the
OCC were also submitted to the FRB and FDIC. As part of the effort to
coordinate development of the final rules, all comments were shared
among the Federal banking agencies (OCC, FRB, and FDIC).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Unless otherwise noted, any reference to the ``proposed
rule'' in this preamble is intended to refer to the OCC Proposed
Rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The OCC has carefully reviewed all of the comments received. The
proposed rule and the comments are discussed in Section III (Discussion
of the Final Rule) of the preamble. The OCC notes that many of the
comments submitted to the OCC also included attachments with the
comments submitted to the FRB and FDIC. The OCC further notes that to
the degree applicable, all comments submitted as attachments were
treated
[[Page 56631]]
as comments on the OCC Proposed Rule. As such, for discussion purposes
these comments may be recharacterized or otherwise paraphrased in this
preamble to reflect the points applicable to this final rule. In some
instances, however, the preamble may discuss a comment that is not
directly relevant to this final rule but illustrates the interaction
between this final rule and the final rules of the FRB and FDIC. This
is likely to be the case with respect to comments submitted to the FRB
that address broad policy issues, such as the systemic risk of GSIBs.
A. Shared Policy Concerns of the Federal Banking Agencies
At the most basic level, the collective purpose of Agencies' NPRMs
is to address a common supervisory concern raised by the resolvability
of large, complex financial institutions in the United States that
operate in multiple jurisdictions and that are subject to different
supervisory authorities.\5\ The Agencies' NPRMs reflected the
coordinated efforts by the Federal banking agencies to develop a
comprehensive U.S. regulatory framework, designed to be implemented by
the OCC, FRB, and FDIC to apply to all entities of a GSIB in the United
States to address the threat to financial stability posed by the
disorderly exercise of default rights contained in certain qualified
financial contracts (QFCs).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ This section is only intended to give a general overview of
the NPRMs issued by the OCC, FRB, and FDIC. Please refer to the
NPRMs and final rules of each of the Federal banking agencies for
any specific issues.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The threat to financial stability arises because all GSIBs are
interconnected with other financial firms, including other GSIBs,
through large volumes of QFCs. The failure of one entity within a GSIB
can trigger disruptive terminations of these contracts if the
counterparties of both the failed entity and its affiliates exercise
their contractual rights to terminate the contracts and liquidate
collateral. These terminations, especially if many counterparties lose
confidence in the GSIB quickly, can destabilize the financial system
and potentially spark a financial crisis through several channels. For
example, such terminations can destabilize the failed entity's
otherwise solvent affiliates, causing them to weaken or fail with
adverse consequences to their counterparties that can result in a chain
reaction that ripples through the financial system. They also may
result in ``fire sales'' of large volumes of financial assets, in
particular, the collateral that secures the contracts, which can in
turn weaken and cause stress for other firms by depressing the value of
similar assets that they hold.
The Agencies' NPRMs, generally would require banking organizations
that are covered by the NPRMs to ensure that their covered QFCs: (1)
Contain a contractual stay-and-transfer provision analogous to the
statutory stay-and-transfer provision imposed under Title II of the
Dodd-Frank, Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank
Act),\6\ and in the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (FDI Act),\7\ and (2)
limit the exercise of default rights based on the insolvency of an
affiliate of the financial firm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ 12 U.S.C. 5390(c)(9) (empowering the FDIC to transfer QFCs);
12 U.S.C. 5390(c)(10)(B)(i)(I) (providing for a temporary stay that
generally lasts until 5:00 p.m. eastern time on the business day
following the appointment of the FDIC as receiver).
\7\ See 12 U.S.C. 1821(e)(8)-(10).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the United States, the FDI Act and the Dodd-Frank Act create
special resolution frameworks for failed financial firms that provide
that the rights of a failed financial firm's counterparties to
terminate their QFCs are temporarily stayed when the financial firm
enters a resolution proceeding to allow for the transfer of the
relevant obligations under the QFC to a solvent entity. By requiring
covered QFCs to contain a contractual stay-and-transfer provision
analogous to the statutory stay-and-transfer provision imposed under
the FDI Act and Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act, the counterparties of
QFCs have essentially contractually opted into the FDI Act and Title II
of the Dodd-Frank Act temporary stay-and-transfer treatment. In this
way, the Agencies' NPRMs address the concern that the statutory stay-
and-transfer treatment would be challenged by a QFC counterparty, and
might not be enforced by a court in a foreign jurisdiction.
With respect to the default rights based on the insolvency of an
affiliate, the Agencies' NPRMs required covered QFCs to contain
mandatory contractual provisions that would prohibit the counterparties
of the QFCs from exercising default rights related, directly or
indirectly, to the entry into resolution of an affiliate of the banking
organizations covered by the NPRMs (cross-default rights), subject to
certain creditor protection exceptions.
B. Specific Policy Concerns Affecting National Banks, FSAs and Federal
Branches and Agencies
While the OCC shares many of the overall policy concerns discussed
in Section I-A with the FRB and FDIC with respect to the resolvability
of large, complex financial institutions in the United States, the
primary focus of this final rule is specifically on the safety and
soundness of national banks, FSAs, and Federal branches and agencies,
as well as the overall stability of the Federal banking system,\8\ as
posed by the disorderly exercise of default rights contained in QFCs.
As the primary regulator for national banks, FSAs, and Federal branches
and agencies (generally referred to as ``OCC-supervised
institutions''), the OCC has a strong safety and soundness interest in
preventing such a disorderly termination of QFCs upon a GSIB's entry
into resolution proceedings. QFCs are typically entered into by various
operating entities in the GSIB group, which will often include a large
depository institution that is subject to the OCC's supervision. These
OCC-supervised institutions typically are some of the largest entities
by asset size in the GSIB group, and often a party to large volumes of
QFCs, making these institutions highly interconnected with other large
financial firms.\9\ The exercise of default rights against an otherwise
healthy national bank, FSA, or Federal branch or agency resulting from
the failure of its affiliate, for example its top-tier U.S. holding
company, may cause it to weaken or fail, and in turn spread contagion
throughout the U.S. financial system, including the national banking
system, by causing a chain of failures by other financial
institutions--including other national banks, FSAs, or Federal branches
or agencies--that are its QFC counterparties. Furthermore, if an OCC-
supervised institution were to fail, it is imperative that the default
rights triggered by such an event are exercised in an orderly manner,
both by domestic and foreign counterparties, to ensure that financial
contagion does not spread to other federally chartered and licensed
institutions and beyond, throughout the Federal banking system.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ The term ``Federal banking system'' refers to all OCC-
supervised institutions, including national banks, FSAs, and Federal
branches and agencies.
\9\ 81 FR 29619, 29172 (``From the standpoint of financial
stability, the most important of these operating subsidiaries are
generally a U.S. insured depository institution, a U.S. broker-
dealer, and similar entities organized in other countries.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Accordingly, OCC-supervised institutions that are affiliates or
branches of U.S. GSIBs or Foreign GSIBs are exposed, through the
interconnectedness of their QFCs and the QFCs of their affiliates, to
destabilizing effects if their counterparties or the counterparties of
their affiliates exercise default rights upon the entry into resolution
of the
[[Page 56632]]
OCC-supervised institution or any affiliate of the OCC-supervised
institution. These potential destabilizing effects are best addressed
by requiring all GSIB entities to amend their QFCs to include
contractual provisions designed to avoid such destabilization. As the
primary supervisor of national banks, FSAs, and Federal branches and
agencies, the OCC has a significant interest in preventing or
mitigating these destabilizing effects on the safety and soundness of
not just the OCC-supervised institutions within a GSIB group, but to
all OCC-supervised institutions in the Federal banking system. Measures
to improve financial stability and the probability of a successful
resolution of a GSIB likely will affect the operations of the OCC-
supervised institutions that are within the GSIB group.
The OCC believes that each of the Federal banking agencies share a
collective interest to insure the orderly resolution of all entities
that make up a GSIB group. This final rule represents the OCC's effort
to help address this systemic issue with respect to OCC-supervised
institutions. Consequently, for the reasons discussed in this preamble,
the OCC is issuing this final rule, which imposes substantively
identical requirements on national banks, FSAs, and Federal branches
and agencies as those imposed by the FRB and FDIC final rules.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ ``Restrictions on Qualified Financial Contracts of
Systemically Important U.S. Banking Organizations and the U.S.
Operations of Systemically Important Foreign Banking Organizations;
Revisions to the Definition of Qualifying Master Netting Agreement
and Related Definitions,'' 82 FR 42882 (September 12, 2017) (FRB
Final Rule). See also 12 U.S.C. 5365(b)(4) (requiring the FRB to
consult with each Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC)
member that primarily supervises any subsidiary when any prudential
standard is likely to have a ``significant impact'' on such
subsidiary).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
II. Background
The following background discussion describes in detail the
financial contracts that are the subject of this final rule, the
default rights often contained in such contracts, and impacts on
financial stability resulting from the exercise of such default rights.
This section also provides in more detail background information on the
resolution strategies for GSIBs and how they fit within the resolution
frameworks in the United States.
A. Qualified Financial Contracts, Default Rights, and Financial
Stability
The final rule covers QFCs, which include swaps, other derivative
contracts, repurchase agreements (repos) and reverse repos, and
securities lending and borrowing agreements. GSIB entities enter into
QFCs to borrow money to finance their investments, to lend money, to
manage risk, to attempt to profit from market movements, and to enable
their clients and counterparties to perform these financial activities.
QFCs play a role in economically valuable financial intermediation
when markets are functioning normally. But they are also a major source
of financial interconnectedness, which may pose a threat to financial
stability in times of stress. The final rule focuses on one of the most
serious threats to both a global systemically important bank holding
company (BHC) and its covered banks' subsidiaries--the failure of a
GSIB that is party to large volumes of QFCs, which are likely to
include QFCs with counterparties that are themselves systemically
important. By contract, a party to a QFC generally has the right to
take certain actions if its counterparty defaults on the QFC (that is,
if it fails to meet certain contractual obligations). Common default
rights include the right to suspend performance of the non-defaulting
party's obligations, the right to terminate or accelerate the contract,
the right to set off amounts owed between the parties, and the right to
seize and liquidate the defaulting party's collateral. In general,
default rights allow a party to a QFC to reduce the credit risk
associated with the QFC by granting it the right to exit the QFC and
thereby reduce its exposure to its counterparty upon the occurrence of
a specified condition, such as its counterparty's entry into resolution
proceedings.
This final rule focuses on two distinct scenarios in which a non-
defaulting party to a QFC is commonly able to exercise default rights.
These two scenarios involve a default that occurs when either the
defaulting party to the QFC or an affiliate of that party enters a
resolution proceeding.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ This preamble uses phrases such as ``entering a resolution
proceeding'' and ``going into resolution'' to refer to the concept
of ``becoming subject to a receivership, insolvency, liquidation,
resolution, or similar proceeding.'' These phrases refer to
proceedings established by law to deal with a failed legal entity.
In the context of the failure of a global systemically important
BHC, the most relevant types of resolution proceeding include: (1)
For most US-based legal entities, the bankruptcy process established
by the U.S. Bankruptcy Code (Title 11, United States Code); (2) for
U.S. insured depository institutions, a receivership administered by
the FDIC under the FDI Act (12 U.S.C. 1821); (3) for companies whose
``resolution under otherwise applicable Federal or State law would
have serious adverse effects on the financial stability of the
United States,'' the Dodd-Frank Act's Orderly Liquidation Authority
(12 U.S.C. 5383(b)(2)); and, (4) for entities based outside the
United States, resolution proceedings created by foreign law.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The first scenario occurs when a legal entity that is itself a
party to the QFC enters a resolution proceeding. This final rule refers
to such a scenario as a ``direct default'' and refers to the
contractual default rights that arise from a direct default as ``direct
default rights.'' \12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ For convenience, this preamble uses the general term
``default'' to refer specifically to a default that occurs when a
QFC party or its affiliate enters a resolution proceeding.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The second scenario occurs when an affiliate of the legal entity
that is a direct party to the QFC (such as the direct party's parent
holding company) enters a resolution proceeding. This final rule refers
to such a scenario as a ``cross-default'' and refers to contractual
default rights that arise from a cross-default as ``cross-default
rights.'' For example, a GSIB parent entity might guarantee the
derivatives transactions of its subsidiaries and those derivatives
contracts could contain cross-default rights against a subsidiary of
the GSIB that would be triggered by the bankruptcy filing of the GSIB
parent entity even though the subsidiary continues to meet all of its
financial obligations.
Direct default rights and cross-default rights are referred to
collectively in this final rule as ``default rights.''
As noted in the OCC Proposed Rule, if a significant number of QFC
counterparties exercise their default rights precipitously and in a
manner that would impede an orderly resolution of a GSIB, all QFC
counterparties and the broader financial system, including institutions
supervised by the OCC, may potentially be worse off and less stable.
The destabilization can occur in several ways. First,
counterparties' exercise of default rights may drain liquidity from the
troubled GSIB, forcing it to sell off assets at depressed prices, both
because the sales must be done in a short timeframe and because the
elevated supply will push prices down. These asset ``fire sales'' may
cause or deepen balance-sheet insolvency at the GSIB, reducing the
amount that its other creditors can recover and thereby imposing losses
on those creditors and threatening their solvency (and, indirectly, the
solvency of their own creditors, and so on). The GSIB may also respond
by withdrawing liquidity that it had offered to other firms, forcing
them to engage in asset fire sales. Alternatively, if the GSIB's QFC
counterparty itself liquidates the QFC collateral at fire sale prices,
the effect will again be to weaken the GSIB's balance sheet, because
the debt satisfied by the liquidation would be less than
[[Page 56633]]
what the value of the collateral would have been outside the fire sale
context. The counterparty's set-off rights may allow it to further
drain the GSIB's capital and liquidity by withholding payments owed to
the GSIB. The GSIB may also have rehypothecated collateral that it
received from QFC counterparties, for instance in back-to-back repo or
securities lending transactions, in which case demands from those
counterparties for the early return of their rehypothecated collateral
could be especially disruptive.
The asset fire sales can also spread contagion throughout the
financial system by increasing volatility and by lowering the value of
similar assets held by other financial institutions, potentially
causing them to suffer diminished market confidence in their own
solvency, mark-to-market losses, margin calls, and creditor runs (which
could lead to further fire sales, thereby worsening the contagion).
Finally, the early terminations of derivatives upon which the
defaulting GSIB relied on to hedge its risks could leave major risks
unhedged, increasing the GSIB's probable losses going forward.
Where there are significant simultaneous terminations and these
effects occur contemporaneously, such as upon the failure of a GSIB
that is party to a large volume of QFCs, they may pose a substantial
risk to financial stability. In short, QFC continuity is important for
the orderly resolution of a GSIB so that the instability caused by
asset fire sales can be avoided.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ The FRB and the FDIC identified the exercise of default
rights in financial contracts as a potential obstacle to orderly
resolution in the context of resolution plans filed pursuant to
Sec. 165(d) of the Dodd-Frank Act, and accordingly, instructed the
most systemically important firms to demonstrate that they are
``amending, on an industry-wide and firm-specific basis, financial
contracts to provide for a stay of certain early termination rights
of external counterparties triggered by insolvency proceedings.''
FRB and FDIC, ``Agencies Provide Feedback on Second Round Resolution
Plans of 'First-Wave' Filers'' (August 5, 2014), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20140805a.htm. See
also FRB and FDIC, ``Agencies Provide Feedback on Resolution Plans
of Three Foreign Banking Organizations'' (March 23, 2015), available
at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20150323a.htm; FRB and FDIC, ``Guidance for 2013 165(d) Annual
Resolution Plan Submissions by Domestic Covered Companies that
Submitted Initial Resolution Plans in 2012'' 5-6 (April 15, 2013),
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/bcreg20130415c2.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As will be discussed further, the final rule is primarily concerned
only with default rights that run against a GSIB--that is, direct
default rights and cross-default rights that arise from the entry into
resolution of a GSIB. The final rule would not affect contractual
default rights that a GSIB (or any other entity) may have against a
counterparty that is not a GSIB. The OCC believes that this limited
scope is appropriate because the risk posed to financial stability by
the exercise of QFC default rights is greatest when the defaulting
counterparty is a GSIB.
B. QFC Default Rights and GSIB Resolution Strategies
Under the Dodd-Frank Act, many complex GSIBs are required to submit
resolution plans to the FRB and the FDIC, detailing how the company can
be resolved in a rapid and orderly manner in the event of material
financial distress or failure of the company. In response to these
requirements, these firms have developed resolution strategies that,
broadly speaking, fall into two categories: The single-point-of-entry
(SPOE) strategy and the multiple-point-of-entry (MPOE) strategy. As
noted in the FRB Proposed Rule, cross-default rights in QFCs pose a
potential obstacle to the implementation of either of these strategies.
In an SPOE resolution, only a single legal entity--the GSIB's top-
tier BHC--would enter a resolution proceeding. The losses that led to
the GSIB's failure would be passed up from the operating subsidiaries
that incurred the losses to the holding company and would then be
imposed on the equity holders and unsecured creditors of the holding
company through the resolution process. This strategy is designed to
help ensure that the GSIB's subsidiaries remain adequately capitalized.
An SPOE resolution could thereby prevent those operating subsidiaries
from failing or entering resolution themselves and allow them to
instead continue normal operations. The expectation that the holding
company's equity holders and unsecured creditors would absorb the
GSIB's losses in the event of failure would help to maintain the
confidence of the operating subsidiaries' creditors and counterparties
(including QFC counterparties), reducing their incentive to engage in
potentially destabilizing funding runs or margin calls and thus
lowering the risk of asset fire sales.
An SPOE proceeding can avoid the need for covered banks to be
placed into receivership or similar proceedings, as they would continue
to operate as going concerns, only if the parent's entry into
resolution proceedings does not trigger the exercise of cross-default
rights. Accordingly, this final rule, by limiting such cross-default
rights based on an affiliate's entry into resolution proceedings,
enables the SPOE strategy, and in turn, would assist in stabilizing
both the covered bank and the Federal banking system.
This final rule is also intended to yield benefits for resolution
under the MPOE strategy. Unlike the SPOE strategy, an MPOE strategy
involves several entities in the GSIB group entering proceedings. For
example, an MPOE strategy might involve a Foreign GSIB's U.S.
intermediate holding company going into resolution or a GSIB's U.S.
insured depository institution entering resolution under the FDI Act.
Similar to the benefits associated with the SPOE strategy, this final
rule would help support the continued operation of affiliates of an
entity experiencing resolution to the extent the affiliate continues to
perform on its QFCs.
C. Default Rights and Relevant Resolution Laws
In order to understand the connection between direct defaults,
cross-defaults, the SPOE and MPOE resolution strategies, and the
threats to financial stability discussed previously, it is necessary to
understand how QFCs, and the default rights contained therein, are
treated when an entity enters resolution. The following sections
discuss the treatment of QFCs in greater detail under three U.S.
resolution laws: The Bankruptcy Code, the Orderly Liquidation Authority
(OLA), and the FDI Act. As discussed in these sections, each of these
resolution laws has special provisions detailing the treatment of QFCs
upon an entity's entry into such proceedings.
U.S. Bankruptcy Code. While covered banks themselves are not
subject to resolution under the Bankruptcy Code, in general, if a BHC
were to fail, it would be resolved under the Bankruptcy Code. When an
entity goes into resolution under the Bankruptcy Code, attempts by the
creditors of the debtor to enforce their debts through any means other
than participation in the bankruptcy proceeding (for instance, by suing
in another court, seeking enforcement of a preexisting judgment, or
seizing and liquidating collateral) are generally blocked by the
imposition of an automatic stay, which generally persists throughout
the bankruptcy proceeding.\14\ A key purpose of the automatic stay, and
of bankruptcy law in general, is to maximize the value of the
bankruptcy estate and the creditors' ultimate recoveries by
facilitating an orderly liquidation or restructuring of the debtor. As
a result, the automatic stay addresses the collective action problem,
in which the creditors' individual incentives to race to recover as
much from the debtor as possible
[[Page 56634]]
before other creditors can do so, collectively cause a value-destroying
disorderly liquidation of the debtor.\15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ See 11 U.S.C. 362.
\15\ See, e.g., Aiello v. Providian Financial Corp., 239 F.3d
876, 879 (7th Cir. 2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Bankruptcy Code, however, largely exempts QFC counterparties of
the debtor from the automatic stay through special ``safe harbor''
provisions.\16\ Under these provisions, any contractual rights that a
QFC counterparty has to terminate the contract, set off obligations, or
liquidate collateral in response to a direct default or cross-default
are not subject to the stay and may be exercised at any time.\17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ The U.S. Bankruptcy Code does not use the term ``qualified
financial contract,'' but the set of transactions covered by its
safe harbor provisions closely tracks the set of transactions that
fall within the definition of ``qualified financial contract'' used
in Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act and in this final rule. See 11
U.S.C. 362(b)(6), (7), (17), (27), 362(o), 555, 556, 559, 560, and
561.
\17\ The Bankruptcy Code does not itself confer any default
rights upon QFC counterparties; it merely permits QFC counterparties
to exercise certain contractual rights that they have under the
terms of the QFC. This final rule does not restrict the exercise of
any default rights that fall within the Bankruptcy Code's safe
harbor provisions, which are described here to provide context.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Where the failed firm is a GSIB's holding company with covered
banks that are going concerns and are party to large volumes of QFCs,
the mass exercise of default rights under the QFCs based on the
affiliate default represents a significant impediment to the SPOE
resolution strategy.\18\ This is because the failure of a covered
bank's affiliate will trigger the mass exercise of cross-default rights
against the covered bank, which will not be stayed by the affiliate's
entry into bankruptcy proceedings. This can in turn lead to fire sales
that could threaten the ongoing viability of the covered bank and the
successful resolution of the particular GSIB--and thus could also pose
a threat to the Federal banking system and broader financial system.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ As noted previously, the MPOE strategy will similarly
benefit from the override of cross-defaults. The SPOE strategy is
used here for illustrative purposes only.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Special Resolution Regimes Under U.S. Law. For purposes of this
final rule, there are two special resolution regimes under U.S. law:
Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act and the Orderly Liquidation Authority
and the FDI Act. While these regimes both impose certain limitations on
the ability of counterparties to exercise default rights--thus
mitigating the potential for disorderly resolution due to the exercise
by counterparties of such default rights--these limitations may not be
applicable or clearly enforceable in certain contexts.
Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act and the Orderly Liquidation
Authority. Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act establishes an alternative
resolution framework intended ``to provide the necessary authority to
liquidate failing financial companies that pose a significant risk to
the financial stability of the United States in a manner that mitigates
such risk and minimizes moral hazard.'' \19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ 12 U.S.C. 5384(a) (section 204(a) of the Dodd-Frank Act).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As noted, although a failed BHC would generally be resolved under
the Bankruptcy Code, Congress recognized that a U.S. financial company
might fail under extraordinary circumstances, in which an attempt to
resolve it through the bankruptcy process would have serious adverse
effects on financial stability in the United States. Title II therefore
authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury, upon the recommendation of
other government agencies and a determination that several
preconditions are met, to place a U.S. financial company into a
receivership conducted by the FDIC as an alternative to bankruptcy.
Title II empowers the FDIC, when it acts as receiver in an OLA
resolution, to protect financial stability against the QFC-related
threats discussed previously. Title II addresses direct default rights
in a number of ways. Title II empowers the FDIC to transfer the QFCs to
a bridge financial company or some other financial company that is not
in a resolution proceeding and should therefore be capable of
performing under the QFCs.\20\ To give the FDIC time to effect this
transfer, Title II temporarily stays QFC counterparties of the failed
entity from exercising termination, netting, and collateral liquidation
rights ``solely by reason of or incidental to'' the failed entity's
entry into OLA resolution, its insolvency, or its financial
condition.\21\ Once the QFCs are transferred in accordance with the
statute, Title II permanently stays the exercise of those direct
default rights based on the prior event of default and
receivership.\22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ 12 U.S.C. 5390(c)(9).
\21\ 12 U.S.C. 5390(c)(10)(B)(i)(I). This temporary stay
generally lasts until 5:00 p.m. eastern time on the business day
following the appointment of the FDIC as receiver.
\22\ If the QFCs are transferred to a solvent third party before
the stay expires, the counterparty is permanently enjoined from
exercising such rights based upon the appointment of the FDIC as
receiver of the financial company (or the insolvency or financial
condition of the financial company), but is not stayed from
exercising such rights based upon other events of default. 12 U.S.C.
5390(c)(10)(B)(i)(II).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Title II addresses cross-default rights through a similar
procedure. It empowers the FDIC ``to enforce contracts of subsidiaries
or affiliates'' of the failed company that are guaranteed or otherwise
supported by or linked to the covered financial company,
notwithstanding any contractual right to cause the termination,
liquidation, or acceleration of such contracts based solely on the
insolvency, financial condition, or receivership of the failed company,
so long as, if such contracts are guaranteed or otherwise supported by
the covered financial company, the FDIC takes certain steps to protect
the QFC counterparty's interests by the end of the business day
following the company's entry into OLA resolution.\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ 12 U.S.C. 5390(c)(16); 12 CFR 380.12.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
These stay-and-transfer provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act go far to
mitigate the threat posed by QFC default rights by preventing mass
closeouts against the entity that has entered into OLA proceedings or
its going concern affiliates. At the same time, they allow for
appropriate protections for QFC counterparties of the failed financial
company. They only stay the exercise of default rights based on the
failed company's entry into resolution, the fact of its insolvency, or
its financial condition. Further, the stay period is brief, unless the
FDIC transfers the QFCs to another financial company that is not in
resolution and should therefore be capable of performing under the
QFCs.
Federal Deposit Insurance Act. Under the FDI Act, a failing insured
depository institution would generally enter a receivership
administered by the FDIC. The FDI Act addresses direct default rights
in the failed bank's QFCs with stay-and-transfer provisions that are
substantially similar to the provisions of Title II of the Dodd-Frank
Act as discussed.\24\ However, the FDI Act does not address cross-
default rights, leaving the QFC counterparties of the failed depository
institution's affiliates free to exercise any contractual rights they
may have to terminate, net, and liquidate collateral based on the
depository institution's entry into resolution.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\ See 12 U.S.C. 1821(e)(8)-(10).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
III. Discussion of the Final Rule
A. Overview, Purpose, and Authority
As discussed previously, the exercise of default rights by
counterparties of a failed GSIB can have a significant impact on
financial stability. This financial stability concern is necessarily
intertwined with the safety and soundness of covered banks and the
Federal banking system--the disorderly exercise of default rights can
produce a sudden, contemporaneous threat to the safety and soundness of
individual institutions throughout the system,
[[Page 56635]]
which in turn threatens the system as a whole. Accordingly, national
banks, FSAs, and Federal branches and agencies are affected by
financial instability--even if such instability is precipitated outside
the Federal banking system--and can themselves also be sources of
financial destabilization due to the interconnectedness of these
institutions to each other and to other entities within the financial
system. Thus, safety and soundness of individual national banks, FSAs,
and Federal branches and agencies, the Federal banking system, and
financial stability of the system as a whole are interconnected.
The purpose of this final rule is to enhance the safety and
soundness of covered banks and the Federal banking system, thereby also
bolstering financial stability generally, by addressing the two main
issues raised by covered QFCs with the orderly resolution of these
covered banks as generally previously described.
While Title II and the FDI Act empower the use of the QFC stay-and-
transfer provisions, a court in a foreign jurisdiction may decline to
enforce these important provisions. The final rule directly improves
the safety and soundness of covered banks by clarifying the
applicability of U.S. special resolution regimes to all counterparties,
whether they are foreign or domestic. Although domestic entities are
clearly subject to the temporary stay provisions of OLA and the FDI
Act, these stays may be difficult to enforce in a cross-border context.
As a result, domestic counterparties of a failed U.S. financial
institution may be disadvantaged relative to foreign counterparties, as
the domestic counterparties would be subject to the stay, and
accompanying potential market volatility, while if the stay was not
enforced by foreign authorities, foreign counterparties could close out
immediately. Furthermore, a mass close out by such foreign
counterparties would likely exacerbate market volatility, which in turn
would likely magnify harm to the stayed U.S. counterparties' positions,
which are likely to include other national banks and FSAs. This final
rule would eliminate the potential for these adverse consequences by
requiring covered banks to condition the exercise of default rights in
covered contracts on the stay provisions of OLA and the FDI Act.
In spite of the QFC stay-and-transfer provisions in Title II and
the FDI Act, the affiliates of a global systemically important BHC that
goes into resolution under the Bankruptcy Code may face disruptions to
their QFCs as their counterparties exercise cross-default rights. Thus,
a healthy covered bank whose parent BHC entered resolution proceedings
could fail due to its counterparties exercising cross-default rights.
This is both a safety and soundness concern for the otherwise healthy
covered bank, but it also has the additional negative effect of
defeating the orderly resolution of the GSIB, since a key element of
SPOE resolution in the United States is ensuring that critical
operating subsidiaries--such as covered banks--continue to operate on a
going concern basis. This final rule would address this issue by
generally restricting the exercise of cross-default rights by
counterparties against a covered bank.
Moreover, a disorderly resolution of the kind described could
jeopardize not just the covered bank and the orderly resolution of its
failed parent BHC, but all surviving counterparties, many of which are
likely to be other national banks and other FSAs, regardless of size or
interconnectedness, by harming the overall condition of the Federal
banking system and the financial system as a whole. A disorderly
resolution could result in additional defaults, fire sales of
collateral, and other consequences likely to amplify the systemic
fallout of the resolution of a covered bank.
The final rule is designed to minimize such disorder, and therefore
enhance the safety and soundness of all individual national banks,
FSAs, and Federal branches and agencies, the Federal banking system,
and the broader financial system. This is particularly important
because financial institutions are more sensitive than other firms to
the overall health of the financial system.\25\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\25\ The OCC, along with the FDIC and FRB, recently made this
point in the swap margin notice of proposed rulemaking. 79 FR 57348,
57361 (September 24, 2014) (``Financial firms present a higher level
of risk than other types of counterparties because the profitability
and viability of financial firms is more tightly linked to the
health of the financial system than other types of counterparties.
Because financial counterparties are more likely to default during a
period of financial stress, they pose greater systemic risk and risk
to the safety and soundness of the covered swap entity.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The final rule covers the OCC-supervised operations of foreign
banking organizations (FBOs) designated as systemically important,
including national bank and FSA subsidiaries, as well as Federal
branches and agencies, of these FBOs. As with a national bank or FSA
subsidiary of a U.S. global systemically important BHC, the OCC
believes that this final rule should apply to a national bank or FSA
subsidiary of a global systematically important FBO for essentially the
same reasons. While the national bank or FSA may not be considered
systemically important itself, as part of a GSIB, the disorderly
resolution of the covered national banks and FSAs could have a
significant negative impact on the Federal banking system and on the
U.S. financial system, in general.
Specifically, the final rule is designed to prevent the failure of
a global systemically important FBO from disrupting the ongoing
operations or orderly resolution of the covered bank by protecting the
healthy national bank or FSA from the mass triggering of default rights
by the QFC counterparties. Additionally, the application of this final
rule to the QFCs of these national bank and FSA subsidiaries should
avoid creating what may otherwise be an incentive for counterparties to
concentrate QFCs in these firms because they are subject to fewer
counterparty restrictions. Similarly, it is important to cover certain
QFCs entered into by any Federal branch or agency of a global
systemically important FBO in order to ensure the orderly resolution of
these entities if the parent FBO were to be placed into resolution in
its home jurisdiction.
The OCC is issuing this final rule under its authorities under the
National Bank Act (12 U.S.C. 1 et seq.), the Home Owners' Loan Act (12
U.S.C. 1461 et seq.), and the International Banking Act of 1978 (12
U.S.C. 3101 et seq.), including its general rulemaking authorities.\26\
The OCC views the final rule as consistent with its overall statutory
mandate of assuring the safety and soundness of entities subject to its
supervision, including national banks, FSAs, and Federal branches and
agencies.\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\ See 12 U.S.C. 93a, 1463(a)(2), and 3108(a).
\27\ See 12 U.S.C. 1. This primary responsibility is also
defined in various provisions throughout the OCC's express statutory
authorities with respect to each institution type under their
respective statutes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In developing this final rule, the OCC reviewed and carefully
considered all comments received on the OCC Proposed Rule as part of
the notice and comment process. In addition, in light of the closely
connected nature between BHC supervision and the supervision of
national banks, FSAs, and Federal branches and agencies, and in order
to maintain substantive consistency with the FRB Proposed Rule and FDIC
Proposed Rule, the OCC reviewed comments received by the FRB and FDIC
on their proposed rules to the degree such comments were relevant to
[[Page 56636]]
the substance of this final rule. In characterizing comments and the
OCC responses to the commenters in this preamble, the OCC may reference
and discuss comments received by the FRB and FDIC as comments to the
OCC to the extent applicable to the substance of the OCC final rule.
B. Covered Banks (Sec. 47.3(a), (b), and (c))
OCC Proposed Rule.\28\ The proposed rule applied to ``covered
banks.'' The term ``covered bank'' was defined to include (i) any
national bank or FSA that is a subsidiary of a global systemically
important BHC that has been designated pursuant to subpart I of 12 CFR
part 252 (FRB Regulation YY); or (ii) any national bank or FSA
subsidiary, or Federal branch or agency of a global systemically
important FBO that has been designated pursuant to subpart I of 12 CFR
part 252 (FRB Regulation YY).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\28\ References in this preamble to the ``proposed rule'' refer
to the OCC Proposed Rule unless otherwise specified.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The proposed rule defined global systemically important BHC and
global systemically important FBO by cross-reference to newly added
subpart I of 12 CFR part 252 of the FRB Proposed Rule. The list of
banking organizations that meet the methodology proposed in the FRB
Proposed Rule is currently the same set of banking organizations that
meet the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) definition of a
GSIB.\29\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\29\ In November 2015, the Financial Stability Board and BCBS
published a list of banks that meet the BCBS definition of a global
systemically important bank (BCBS G-SIB) based on year-end 2014
data. A list based on year-end 2014 data was published November 3,
2015 (available at http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/2015-update-of-list-of-global-systemically-important-banks-G-SIBs.pdf).
The U.S. top-tier BHCs that are currently identified as a BCBS G-SIB
are Bank of America Corporation, Bank of New York Mellon
Corporation, Citigroup Inc., Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., JP Morgan
Chase & Co., Morgan Stanley, State Street Corporation, and Wells
Fargo & Company.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Under the proposed rule, the term covered bank also included any
subsidiary of a national bank, FSA, or Federal branch or agency. The
definition of ``subsidiary of covered bank'' in the proposed rule was
intended to mirror the definition of subsidiary in the FRB Regulation
YY (12 CFR 252.82(b)(2) and (3)), and it was intended to be
substantially the same as the FRB definition with respect to a
subsidiary of a covered bank.\30\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\30\ The Bank Holding Company Act (BHC Act) definition of
control includes ownership, control or the power to vote 25 percent
of any class of voting securities; control in any manner of the
election of a majority of the directors or trustees of; or exercise
of a controlling influence over the management or policies. 12
U.S.C. 1841.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Comments. While commenters overall supported the purpose of the
proposed rule, a few commenters urged the OCC not to expand the scope
of covered banks to include non-GSIBs. The definition of covered bank
in the proposed rule only applied to a national bank, FSA, or Federal
branch or agency that is under a global systemically important BHC or
FBO as designated by the FRB final rule. However, the OCC requested
comment on whether an additional threshold should be added to the
definition of covered bank to cover a national bank or FSA that is not
under a BHC but may have total assets sufficiently large to require
application of the final rule. As discussed further in the following
section, the OCC has decided to add an additional provision to the
definition of covered bank to capture a national bank or FSA that has
more than $700 billion in total assets as reported on its most recent
Consolidated Reports of Condition and Income (Call Report).
A number of commenters urged the OCC to move to a financial
consolidation standard to define a ``subsidiary of a covered bank''
instead of the BHC Act control standard set forth in the FRB Regulation
YY.\31\ These commenters asserted that, under U.S. generally accepted
accounting principles (GAAP), a company generally would consolidate an
entity in which it holds a majority voting interest, or over which it
has the power to direct the most significant economic activities, to
the extent it also holds a variable interest in the entity. In
addition, commenters pointed out that financially consolidated
subsidiaries are often subject to operational control and generally
fully integrated into the parent's enterprise-wide governance,
policies, procedures, control frameworks, business strategies,
information technology systems, and management systems. These
commenters pointed out that the concept of BHC Act control was designed
to serve other policy purposes (e.g., separation between banking and
commercial activities). A number of commenters raised concerns that BHC
Act control may include an entity that is not under the day-to-day
operational control of the GSIB and over whom the GSIB does not have
the practical ability to require remediation of that entity's QFCs to
comply with the proposed rule. Moreover, commenters contended that
entities that are not consolidated with a GSIB for financial reporting
are unlikely to raise the types of concerns for the orderly resolution
of GSIBs targeted by the proposed rule. Commenters also noted that the
International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) master
agreements and Universal Protocol define ``affiliate'' by reference to
ownership of a majority of the voting power of an entity or person. For
these reasons, commenters urged the OCC to define the term
``subsidiary'' of a covered bank based on financial consolidation under
the final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\31\ Commenters generally expressed a similar view with respect
to the definition of ``affiliate'' of a covered bank as the term is
used in Sec. Sec. 47.4 and 47.5 of the proposed rule which was
likewise defined by reference to BHC Act control.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Commenters generally urged that regardless of whether financial
consolidation is adopted for the purpose of defining ``subsidiary,''
the final rule should exclude any entities over which the covered bank
does not exercise operational control. Specifically, with respect to
comments to the FRB Proposed Rule, commenters noted that such entities
could include merchant banking portfolio companies, section 2(h)(2)
companies, joint ventures, sponsored funds as distinct from their
sponsors or investment advisors, securitization vehicles, entities in
which the covered entity holds only a minority interest and does not
exert a controlling influence, and subsidiaries held pursuant to
provisions for debt previously contracted in good faith (DPC
subsidiaries).\32\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\32\ See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. 1842(a)(A)(ii), 1843(c)(2); 12 CFR
225.12(b), 225.22(d)(1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Similarly, OCC commenters also requested that covered banks should
exempt entities over which a covered bank does not exercise operational
control. The OCC notes that with respect to covered banks, such
entities would include DPC subsidiaries,\33\ as well as a covered
bank's investment in community development corporations (CDCs) or small
business investment corporations (SBICs).\34\ These entities
potentially present similar issues of operational control as in
merchant banking, sponsored funds, and joint ventures.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\33\ See 12 U.S.C. 29; 12 CFR 5.34; and 12 U.S.C. 1464 (FSA DPC
authority).
\34\ National banks may own or make controlling or minority
investments in SBICs as defined under 13 CFR 107.50, CDCs pursuant
to 12 U.S.C. 24(Eleventh), or other public welfare investments
pursuant to 12 U.S.C. 24(Seventh). FSAs may also make such
controlling or minority investments in SBICs and CDCs pursuant to
their general lending authority under 12 U.S.C. 1464(c).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In terms of foreign GSIBs, some commenters believed that FBO
subsidiaries for which the FBO has been given special relief by FRB
order not to hold the subsidiary under an intermediate holding company
(IHC) should not be included in the definition
[[Page 56637]]
of covered bank, even if such entities would be consolidated under
financial consolidation principles.\35\ These commenters asserted that
since neither the covered bank nor the Foreign GSIB parent would
provide credit support to these entities or name such entities in a
cross-default provision in a QFC or related agreement, the failure of
any of these types of entities would be unlikely to affect QFCs entered
into by the covered bank or any other affiliate. These commenters
further noted that the few such requests that have been granted by the
FRB often involved situations in which the FBO did not have sufficient
operational control over the entity to ensure its compliance.
Commenters also requested that U.S. Federal branches and agencies of
FBOs be excluded from the definition of ``covered bank'' where the
FBO's home country legal framework imposes similar requirements of the
final rule on the FBO and the Federal branch or agency. These
commenters asserted that the requirements of the final rule would be
duplicative of the requirements with respect to such Federal branches
and agencies if their QFCs are already subject to existing and
substantially equivalent resolution powers in the home country, without
a proportionate incremental benefit to their resolvability or reduction
in risk to U.S. financial stability.\36\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\35\ FRB orders granting such approvals to FBOs that have
requested such treatment can be found at Regulation YY Foreign
Banking Organization Requests, available at https://www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/regulation-yy-foreign-banking-organization-requests.htm.
\36\ In the alternative, these commenters requested that the
requirements only apply to U.S. Federal branches and agencies of
Foreign GSIBs insofar as the home resolution regime and group
resolution strategy would not adequately ensure that early
termination rights, including cross-default rights against the U.S.
IHC or subsidiaries, will not be triggered in resolution.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Final Rule. Under the final rule, a ``covered bank'' is generally
defined to include (1) a national bank or FSA not under a BHC and that
has more than $700 billion in total assets as reported on their most
recent Call Report, (2) a national bank or FSA that is a subsidiary of
a global systemically important BHC that has been designated pursuant
to subpart I of 12 CFR part 252 of this title (FRB Regulation YY); or
(3) is a national bank or FSA subsidiary, or Federal branch or agency
of a global systemically important FBO designated pursuant to subpart I
of 12 CFR part 252 of this title (FRB Regulation YY) that has been
designated pursuant to FRB Regulation YY.
The final rule generally adopts the definition of covered bank as
proposed with the exception of the addition of a provision to include a
national bank or FSA not under a BHC and that has more than $700
billion in total assets as reported on their most recent Call Report.
This provision is intended to address the OCC's concern that a national
bank or FSA, not under a BHC, with a sufficient number of large total
assets would be subject to the requirement of the final rule. While
currently a null set, the OCC believes that any national bank or FSA
that has total assets that exceed $700 billion would raise similar
concerns with respect to interconnectedness and financial contagion.
As in the proposed rule, a covered bank includes the OCC-regulated
subsidiaries of entities identified as U.S. GSIB top-tier holding
companies under the FRB GSIB surcharge rule.\37\ U.S. GSIBs generally
enter into QFCs through subsidiary legal entities rather than through
the top-tier holding company.\38\ Therefore, in order to increase GSIB
resilience and resolvability by addressing the potential obstacles to
orderly resolution posed by QFCs, it is necessary to apply the proposed
restrictions to the U.S. GSIBs' subsidiaries. In particular, to
facilitate the resolution of a GSIB under an SPOE strategy, in which
only the top-tier holding company would enter a resolution proceeding
while its subsidiaries would continue to meet their financial
obligations, or an MPOE strategy where an affiliate of an entity that
is otherwise performing under a QFC enters resolution, it is necessary
to ensure that those subsidiaries or affiliates do not enter into QFCs
that contain cross-default rights that the counterparty could exercise
based on the holding company's or an affiliate's entry into resolution
(or that any such cross-default rights are stayed when the holding
company enters resolution). Moreover, including U.S. and non-U.S.
entities of a U.S. GSIB as a covered bank should help ensure that such
cross-default rights do not affect the ability of performing and
solvent entities of a GSIB--regardless of jurisdiction--to remain
outside of resolution proceedings.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\37\ 12 CFR 217.402; 80 FR 49106 (Aug. 14, 2015). See the FRB
final rule Sec. 252.82(a)(1).
\38\ Under the clean holding company component of the FRB's
recent Total Loss-Absorbing Capacity (TLAC) final rule, the top-tier
holding companies of U.S. GSIBs would be prohibited from entering
into direct QFCs with third parties. See 82 FR 8266, 8298 (December
15, 2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The term ``subsidiary'' in the final rule continues to be defined
by reference to BHC Act control as does the definition of
``affiliate.'' \39\ The final rule does not define covered banks to
include only those subsidiaries of GSIBs that are financially
consolidated subsidiaries as requested by certain commenters. Defining
``subsidiary'' and ``affiliate'' by reference to BHC Act control is
consistent with the definitions of those terms in the FDI Act and Title
II of the Dodd-Frank Act. Specifically, Title II permits the FDIC, as
receiver of a covered financial company or a receiver for its
subsidiary, to enforce QFCs and other contracts of subsidiaries and
affiliates, defined by reference to the BHC Act, notwithstanding cross-
default rights based solely on the insolvency, financial condition, or
receivership of the covered financial company.\40\ Therefore,
maintaining consistent definitions of subsidiary and affiliate with
Title II should better ensure that QFC stays may be effected in a
resolution under a U.S. Special Resolution Regime. As covered banks, as
well as their subsidiaries and affiliates, are typically subsidiaries
of BHCs, which are in turn subject to the activity restrictions and
other requirements of the BHC Act, they should already know all of
their BHC Act controlled subsidiaries and be familiar with BHC Act
control principles.\41\ Moreover, GSIBs should be able to rely on
governance rights and other negotiated mechanisms to ensure that such
subsidiaries conform their QFCs to the final rule's requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\39\ See 12 CFR 252.2.
\40\ 12 U.S.C. 5390(c)(16).
\41\ For example, under the FRB final rule a covered entity may
own more than five percent (and less than 25 percent) of the voting
shares of a registered investment company for which the covered
entity provides investment advisory, administrative, and other
services and has a number of director and officer interlocks,
without controlling the fund for purposes of the BHC Act. See letter
to H. Rodgin Cohen, Esq., Sullivan & Cromwell (First Union Corp.),
from Jennifer J. Johnson, Secretary, Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System (June 24, 1999) (finding that a bank holding
company does not control a mutual fund for which it provides
investment advisory and other services and that complies with the
limitations of section 4(c)(7) of the BHC Act (12 U.S.C.
1843(c)(7)), so long as (i) the BHC reduces its interest in the fund
to less than 25 percent of the fund's voting shares after a six-
month period, and (ii) a majority of the fund's directors are
independent of the BHC and the BHC cannot select a majority of the
board); see also 12 CFR 225.86(b)(3) (authorizing a financial
holding company to organize, sponsor, and manage a mutual fund so
long as (i) the fund does not exercise managerial control over the
entities in which the fund invests, and (ii) the financial holding
company reduces its ownership in the fund, if any, to less than 25
percent of the equity of the fund within one year of sponsoring the
fund or such additional period as the FRB permits).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The final rule excludes from the scope of covered bank DPC
subsidiaries, portfolio companies held under the
[[Page 56638]]
Small Business Investment Act of 1956, and certain companies engaged in
the business of making public welfare investments. In general, there
are legal restrictions and other limitations on the involvement of the
GSIB in the operations of these kinds of subsidiaries. Moreover, it is
unlikely that the disorderly unwind of the QFCs of these subsidiaries
would impair the orderly resolution of the GSIB. Therefore, the impact
of these exclusions should be relatively small while responding to
commenter's concerns and reducing burden.
Finally, covered banks include almost all U.S. operations of
Foreign GSIBs--their national banks, Federal savings associations,
Federal branches, Federal agencies, or subsidiaries of such entities.
The final rule, like the proposed rule, covers only the U.S. operations
of Foreign GSIBs. To provide the same treatment for foreign GSIBs and
U.S. GSIBs, the final rule also excludes DPC subsidiaries, portfolio
companies held under the Small Business Investment Act of 1956, and
public welfare investments of foreign GSIBs.\42\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\42\ See final rule Sec. 47.3(b)(3)(ii)-(iv).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The final rule does not exempt U.S. Federal branches and agencies
of Foreign GSIBs or U.S. subsidiaries of Foreign GSIBs that are not
held under an IHC pursuant to a FRB order, as requested by certain
commenters. As with the coverage of subsidiaries of U.S. GSIBs,
coverage of the U.S. operations of foreign GSIBs will enhance the
prospects for an orderly resolution of the Foreign GSIB and its U.S.
operations. In particular, covering QFCs that involve any U.S.
subsidiary or Federal branch or agency of a Foreign GSIB will reduce
the potentially disruptive cancellation of those QFCs if the Foreign
GSIB or any of its subsidiaries enters resolution, including resolution
under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code or the U.S. Special Resolution
Regimes.\43\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\43\ The laws and regulations imposed in non-U.S. jurisdictions
that commenters noted were similar to the requirements of the
proposed rule do not address resolution under U.S. insolvency or the
U.S. Special Resolution Regimes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
C. Covered QFCs (Sections 47.4(a), 47.5(a), 47.7, and 47.8)
1. General Definition
Proposal. The proposed rule required covered banks to ensure that
each ``covered QFC'' conforms to the requirements of sections 47.4 and
47.5. These sections required that a covered QFC (1) contain
contractual stay-and-transfer provisions similar to those imposed under
Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act and the FDI Act, and (2) limit the
exercise of default rights based on the insolvency of an affiliate of
the covered bank. A ``covered QFC'' was generally defined as any QFC
that a covered bank enters, executes, or otherwise becomes party to. A
party to a QFC included a party acting as agent under the QFC.
``Qualified financial contract'' or ``QFC'' was defined to have the
same meaning as in Section 210(c)(8)(D) of Title II of the Dodd-Frank
Act and would include derivatives, swaps, repurchase, reverse
repurchase, and securities lending and borrowing transactions.\44\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\44\ 81 FR 55381, 55399 (August 19, 2016); 12 U.S.C.
5390(c)(8)(D).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Comments. The application of the proposed rule's requirements to a
``covered QFC'' was one of the most commented upon aspects of the
proposed rule. Certain commenters argued that the definition of QFC in
Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act was overly broad and imprecise and could
include agreements that market participants may not expect to be
subject to the stay-and-transfer provisions of the U.S. Special
Resolution Regimes. More generally, commenters argued that the proposed
definition of QFC was too broad and would capture contracts that do not
present any obstacles to an orderly resolution. Commenters urged the
OCC to exclude a variety of types of QFCs from the requirements of the
final rule. In particular, a number of commenters urged the OCC to
exclude QFCs that do not contain any transfer restrictions or default
rights, because these types of QFCs do not give rise to the risk that
counterparties will exercise their contractual rights in a manner that
is inconsistent with the provisions of the U.S. Special Resolution
Regimes.
Commenters named several examples of contracts that fall into this
category, including cash market securities transactions, certain spot
foreign exchange (FX) transactions (including securities conversion
transactions), retail brokerage agreements, retirement/Individual
Retirement Account (IRA) account agreements, margin agreements, options
agreements, FX forward master agreements, and delivery versus payment
client agreements. Commenters contended that these types of QFCs number
in the millions at some firms and that remediating these contracts to
include the express provisions required by the final rule would require
an enormous client outreach effort that would be extremely burdensome
and costly while providing no meaningful resolution benefits. For
example, commenters pointed out that for certain types of transactions,
such as cash securities transactions, FX spot transactions, and retail
QFCs, such a requirement could require an overhaul of existing market
practice and documentation that affects hundreds of thousands, if not
millions, of transactions occurring on a daily basis and significant
education of the general market.
Commenters also urged the OCC to exclude QFCs that do not contain
any default or cross-default rights but that may contain transfer
restrictions. Commenters contended that examples of these types of
agreements included investment advisory account agreements with retail
customers, which contain transfer restrictions as required by Section
205(a)(2) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, but no direct default
or cross-default rights; underwriting agreements; \45\ and client
onboarding agreements. A few commenters provided prime brokerage or
margin loan agreements as examples of transactions that generally do
not have default or cross-default rights but may have transfer
restrictions. Another commenter also requested the exclusion of
securities market transactions that generally settle in the short term,
do not impose ongoing or continuing obligations on either party after
settlement, and do not typically include default rights.\46\ In these
cases, commenters contended that remediation of these agreements would
be burdensome with no meaningful resolution benefits.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\45\ However, some commenters noted that underwriting, purchase,
subscription, or placement agency agreements may contain rights that
could be construed as direct default rights or cross-default rights.
\46\ In the alternative, the commenter requested that such
securities market transactions be excluded to the extent they are
cleared, processed, and settled through (or subject to the rules of)
financial market utilities through expansion of the proposed
exemption for transactions with central counterparties. This aspect
of the comment is addressed in the subsequent section discussing
requests for expansion of the proposed exemption for transactions
with central counterparties.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Commenters also argued for the exclusion of a number of other types
of contracts from the definition of covered QFC in the final rule. In
particular, a number of commenters urged the OCC to exclude contracts
issued in the capital markets or related to a capital market issuance,
like warrants or a certificate representing a call option, typically on
a security or a basket of securities. Although warrants issued in
capital markets may contain direct default and cross-default rights as
well
[[Page 56639]]
as transfer restrictions, commenters argued that remediation of
outstanding warrant agreements would be difficult, if not impossible,
since remediation would require the affirmative vote of a substantial
number of separate voting groups of holders to amend the terms of the
instruments and that obtaining such consent could be expensive due to
``hold-out'' premiums. Commenters also argued that since these
instruments are traded in the markets, it is not possible for an issuer
to ascertain whether a particular investor in such instruments has also
entered into other QFCs with the dealer or any of its affiliates (or
vice versa) for purposes of complying with the proposed mechanism for
remediation of existing QFCs.
Commenters argued that issuers would be able to comply if the final
rule's requirements applied only on a prospective basis with respect to
new issuances, since new investors could be informed of the terms of
the warrant at the time of purchase and no after-the-fact consent would
be required, as is the case with existing outstanding warrants.
Commenters expressed the view that prospective application of the final
rule's requirements to warrants would allow time for firms to develop
new warrant agreements and warrant certificates, to engage in client
outreach efforts, and to make any appropriate public disclosures.
Commenters suggested that the requirements of the final rule should
only apply to such instruments issued after the effective date of the
final rule and that the compliance period for such new issuances be
extended to allow time to establish new issuance programs that comply
with the final rule's requirements. Other examples of contracts in this
category given by commenters include contracts with special purpose
vehicles that are multi-issuance note platforms, which commenters urged
would be difficult to remediate for similar reasons to warrants other
than on a prospective basis.
Commenters also urged the exclusion of contracts for the purchase
of commodities in the ordinary course of business (e.g., utility and
gas energy supply contracts) or physical delivery commodity contracts
more broadly.\47\ In general, commenters argued that exempting these
contracts would not increase systemic risk but would help ensure the
smooth operation of utilities and the physical commodities markets.\48\
Commenters indicated that failure to make commodity deliveries on time
can result in the accrual of damages and penalties beyond the accrual
of interest (e.g., demurrage and other fines in shipping) and that
counterparties may not be able to obtain appropriate compensation for
amendment of default rights due to the difficulty of pricing the risk
associated with an operational failure due to the failure to deliver a
commodity on time. Commenters also contended that agreements with power
operators governed by regulatory tariffs would be difficult, if not
impossible, to remediate.\49\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\47\ For example, some commenters urged the exclusion of all
contracts requiring physical delivery between commercial entities in
the course of regulatory business such as (i) contracts subject to a
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission-filed tariff; (ii) contracts
that are traded in markets overseen by independent system operators
or regional transmission operators; (iii) retail electric contracts;
(iv) contracts for storage or transportation of commodities; (v)
contracts for financial services with regulated financial entities
(e.g., brokerage agreements and futures account agreements); and
(vi) public utility contracts.
\48\ One commenter also argued that utility and gas supply
contracts are covered sufficiently in Section 366 of the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code. This section of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code places
restrictions on the ability of a utility to ``alter, refuse, or
discontinue service to, or discriminate against, the trustee or the
debtor solely on the basis of the commencement of a case under [the
U.S. Bankruptcy Code] or that a debt owed by the debtor to such
utility for service rendered before the order for relief was not
paid when due.'' 11 U.S.C. 366. The purpose and effect of Sec. 47.5
of the final rule and Section 366 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code are
different and therefore do not serve as substitutes. Section 366 of
the U.S. Bankruptcy Code does not address cross-defaults or provide
additional clarity regarding the application of the U.S. Special
Resolution Regimes. Similarly, Sec. 47.5 of the final rule does not
prevent a covered entity from entering into a covered QFC that
allows the counterparty to exercise default rights once a covered
entity that is a direct party either enters bankruptcy or fails to
pay or perform under the QFC.
\49\ One commenter also requested exclusion of overnight
transactions, particularly overnight repurchase agreements, arguing
that such transactions present little risk of creating negative
liquidity effects and that an express exclusion for such
transactions may increase the likelihood that such contracts would
remain viable funding sources in times of liquidity stress. Although
the final rule does not exempt overnight repo transactions, the
final rule may have limited if any effect on such transactions. As
described below, the final rule provides a number of exemptions that
may apply to overnight repo and similar transactions. Moreover, the
restrictions on default rights in Sec. 47.5 of the final rule do
not apply to any right under a contract that allows a party to
terminate the contract on demand or at its option at a specified
time, or from time to time, without the need to show cause. See
final rule Sec. 47.2 (defining ``default right''). Therefore, Sec.
47.5 does not restrict the ability of QFCs, including overnight
repos, to terminate at the end of the term of the contract.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Final Rule. The final rule applies to any ``covered QFC,'' which
generally is defined as any ``in-scope QFC'' that a covered entity
enters into, executes, or to which the covered entity otherwise becomes
a party.\50\ As under the proposed rule, ``qualified financial
contract'' or ``QFC'' is defined in the final rule as in Section
210(c)(8)(D) of Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act and includes swaps, repo
and reverse repo transactions, securities lending and borrowing
transactions, commodity contracts, and forward agreements.\51\ Parties
that enter into contracts with covered entities have been potentially
subject to the stay-and-transfer provisions of Title II of the Dodd-
Frank Act since its enactment. Consistent with Title II, the final rule
does not exempt QFCs involving physical commodities. However, as
explained below, the final rule responds to concerns regarding the
smooth operation of physical commodities end users and markets by
allowing counterparties to terminate QFCs based on the failure to pay
or perform.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\50\ See final rule Sec. 47.3(c).
\51\ See final rule Sec. 47.2. See also 12 U.S.C.
5390(c)(8)(D).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In response to concerns raised by commenters, the final rule
exempts QFCs that have no transfer restrictions or default rights, as
these QFCs have no provisions that the rule is intended to address. The
final rule effects this exemption by limiting the scope of QFCs
potentially subject to the rule to those QFCs that explicitly restrict
the transfer of a QFC from a covered bank or explicitly provide default
rights that may be exercised against a covered bank (in-scope
QFCs).\52\ This change addresses a major concern raised by commenters
regarding the overbreadth of the definition of ``covered QFC'' in the
proposed rule. The change also mitigates the burden of complying with
the proposed rule without undermining its purpose by not requiring
covered banks to conform contracts that do not contain the types of
default rights and transfer restrictions that the final rule is
intended to address. The OCC has declined, however, to exclude QFCs
that have transfer restrictions (but no default rights or cross-default
rights), as requested by certain commenters, as such QFCs would have
provisions (i.e., transfer restrictions) that are subject to the
requirements of the final rule and could otherwise impede the orderly
resolution of a covered entity or its affiliate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\52\ See final rule Sec. 47.3(d).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The final rule provides that a covered bank is not required to
conform certain investment advisory contracts described by commenters
(i.e., investment advisory contracts with retail advisory customers
\53\ of the covered bank that
[[Page 56640]]
only contain the transfer restrictions required by Section 205(a) of
the Investment Advisers Act). The final rule also exempts existing
warrants evidencing a right to subscribe or to otherwise acquire a
security of a covered bank or its affiliate.\54\ The final rule
excludes these types of agreements since there is persuasive evidence
that these types of contracts would be burdensome to conform and that
it is unlikely that excluding such contracts from the requirements of
the final rule would impair the orderly resolution of a GSIB.\55\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\53\ See final rule Sec. 47.8(c)(1). The final rule defines
retail customer or counterparty by reference to the Board's
Regulation WW. See 12 CFR 249.3; see also FR 2052a, https://www.federalreserve.gov/reportforms/forms/FR_2052a20161231_f.pdf.
Covered entities should be familiar with this definition and its
application.
\54\ See final rule Sec. 47.8(c)(2). Warrants issued after the
effective date of the final rule are not excluded from the
requirements of the final rule.
\55\ These exemptions are not interpretations of the definition
of QFC.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The final rule also provides the OCC with authority to exempt one
or more covered banks from conforming certain contracts or types of
contracts to the final rule after considering, in addition to any other
factor the OCC deems relevant, the burden the exemption would relieve
and the potential impact of the exemption on the resolvability of the
covered bank or its affiliates.\56\ Covered banks that request that the
OCC exempt additional contracts from the final rule should be prepared
to provide information in support of their requests. The OCC expects to
consult as appropriate with the FRB and FDIC during its consideration
of any such request.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\56\ See final rule Sec. 47.8(d).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. Definition of Counterparty
Proposal. As noted above, the proposed rule applied to any
``covered QFC,'' generally defined as a QFC that a covered entity
enters after the effective date and a QFC entered earlier, but only if
the covered entity or its affiliate enters a new QFC with the same
person or an affiliate of the same person.\57\ ``Affiliate'' in the
proposed rule was defined in the same manner as under the BHC Act to
mean any company that controls, is controlled by, or is under common
control with another company.\58\ As noted above, ``control'' under the
BHC Act means the power to vote 25 percent or more of any class of
voting securities; control in any manner the election of a majority of
the directors or trustees; or exercise of a controlling influence over
the management or policies.\59\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\57\ See proposed rule Sec. 47.4(a). For convenience, this
preamble generally refers to ``a covered entity's QFCs'' or ``QFCs
to which a covered entity is party'' as shorthand to encompass this
definition. [EDIT]
\58\ See 12 CFR 252.2 (defining ``affiliate'').
\59\ See 12 U.S.C. 1841(k).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Comments. Commenters argued that requiring remediation by a covered
bank of an existing QFC if any entity in the GSIB group entered into a
new QFC with an affiliate of the counterparty would make compliance
with the proposed rule overly burdensome.\60\ Commenters pointed out
that this requirement would demand that the GSIB and the covered bank
track each counterparty's organizational structure by relying on
information provided by counterparties, which would subject
counterparties to enhanced tracking and reporting burdens. Commenters
requested that the phrase ``or affiliate of the same person'' be
deleted from the definition of covered QFC and argued that such a
modification would not undermine the ultimate goals of the rule since
existing QFCs with the counterparty's affiliate would still have to be
remediated if the covered entity or its affiliate entered into a new
QFC with that counterparty affiliate. In the alternative, commenters
argued that an affiliate of a counterparty be established by reference
to financial consolidation principles rather than BHC Act control,
since counterparties may not be familiar with BHC Act control.
Commenters argued that many counterparties are not regulated BHCs and
would be unfamiliar with BHC Act control. Some commenters also argued
that a new QFC with one fund in a fund family should not result in
other funds in the fund family being required to conform their pre-
existing QFCs with the covered bank or an affiliate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\60\ One commenter believed that the burden of conforming
contracts with all affiliates of a counterparty would be too great,
whether defined in terms of BHC Act control or financial
consolidation principles, even though the burden would be reduced by
definition in terms of financial consolidation principles.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Final Rule. The final rule's definition of ``covered QFC'' has been
substantially modified to address the concerns raised by commenters
with respect to the remediation of existing QFCs. In particular, the
final rule provides that a covered QFC includes a QFC that the covered
bank entered, executed, or otherwise became a party to before January
1, 2019, if the covered bank or any affiliate that is a covered entity
(under the FRB final rule), covered bank, or covered FSI (under the
FDIC final rule) also enters, executes, or otherwise becomes a party to
a QFC with the same person or a consolidated affiliate of the same
person on or after January 1, 2019.\61\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\61\ See final rule Sec. 47.3(c).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
With respect to counterparties, the final rule has been changed to
define ``consolidated affiliate'' by reference to financial
consolidation principles, as generally reflected by U.S. GAAP or
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) \62\ instead of by
reference to the BHC Act. As commenters pointed out, counterparties
will already track and monitor financially consolidated affiliates
under either U.S. GAAP or IFRS. Moreover, exposures to a non-
consolidated affiliate may be captured as a separate counterparty
(e.g., when the non-consolidated affiliate enters a new QFC with the
covered bank or an affiliate of the covered bank that is either a
covered bank, covered entity under FRB final rule, or a covered FSI
under the FDIC final rule). As a consequence, modifying the coverage of
affiliates in this manner addresses concerns raised by commenters
regarding burden while still providing sufficient incentives to
remediate existing covered QFCs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\62\ See final rule Sec. 47.2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As discussed, the definition of ``covered QFC'' is intended to
limit the restrictions of the final rule to those financial
transactions whose disorderly unwind has substantial potential to
frustrate the orderly resolution of a GSIB. By adopting the Dodd-Frank
Act's definition of QFC, with the modifications described above, the
final rule generally extends stay-and-transfer protections to the same
types of transactions as Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act. In this way,
the final rule enhances the prospects for an orderly resolution in
bankruptcy and under the U.S. Special Resolution Regimes.
3. Exclusion of Cleared QFCs and Financial Market Utilities
Proposal. The proposed rule excluded from the definition of
``covered QFC'' all QFCs that are cleared through a central
counterparty (CCP). The proposed rule, however, did not exclude from
the definition of ``covered QFC'' QFCs that are cleared, processed, or
settled through the facilities of a financial market utility (FMU). The
proposed rule noted that the OCC was continuing to consider the
appropriate treatment of centrally cleared QFCs, in light of
differences between cleared and uncleared QFCs with respect to
contractual arrangements, counterparty credit risk, default management,
and supervision.
Comments. Commenters generally expressed support for the exclusion
of QFCs that are cleared through a CCP, but some commenters requested
that the OCC broaden this exclusion in the final rule. In particular, a
number of commenters urged the OCC to exclude the ``client-facing leg''
of a cleared swap
[[Page 56641]]
where a clearing member faces a CCP on one leg of the transaction and
faces the client on an otherwise identical offsetting transaction.\63\
One commenter requested the OCC confirm its understanding that ``FCM
agreements,'' which the commenter defined as futures and cleared swaps
agreements with a futures commission merchant (FCM), are excluded
because FCM agreements ``are only QFCs to the extent that they relate
to futures and swaps and, since futures and cleared swaps are excluded,
the FCM [a]greements are also excluded.'' \64\ The commenter requested,
in the alternative, that the final rule expressly exclude such
agreements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\63\ Commenters argued that, in the European-style principal-to-
principal clearing model, the clearing member faces the CCP on one
swap (the ``CCP-facing leg''), and the clearing member, frequently a
covered bank or covered entity (under the FRB Proposed Rule), faces
the client on an otherwise identical, offsetting swap (the ``client-
facing leg''). Under the proposed rule, only the CCP-facing leg of
the transaction was excluded, even though the client-facing leg is
necessary to the mechanics of clearing and is only entered into by
the clearing member to effectuate the cleared transaction.
Commenters argued that the proposed rule thus treated two pieces of
the same transaction differently, which could result in an imbalance
in insolvency or resolution and that the possibility of such an
imbalance for the clearing member could expose the clearing member
to unnecessary and undesired market risk. Commenters urged the OCC
to adopt the same approach taken under Sec. 2 of the Universal
Protocol, which allows the client-facing leg of the cleared swap
with the clearing member that is a covered bank or covered entity to
be closed out substantially contemporaneously with the CCP-facing
leg in the event the CCP were to take action to close out the CCP-
facing leg.
Some commenters requested clarification that transactions
between a covered bank or covered entity client and its clearing
member (as opposed to transactions where the covered bank or covered
entity is the clearing member) would be subject to the rule's
requirements, since this would be consistent with the Universal
Protocol. As explained in this section, the exemption in the final
rule regarding CCPs does not depend on whether the covered bank or
covered entity is a clearing member or a client. A covered QFC--
generally a QFC to which a covered bank or covered entity is a
party--is exempted from the requirements of the final rule if a CCP
is also a party.
\64\ Letter to Legislative and Regulatory Affairs Division,
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, from James M. Cain,
Sutherland Asbill & Brennan LLP, writing on behalf of the eleven
Federal Home Loan Banks, at 2-3 (October 18, 2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A few commenters requested that the OCC modify the definition of
``central counterparty,'' which was defined by reference to the FRB
Regulation YY \65\ to mean ``a counterparty (for example, a clearing
house) that facilitates trades between counterparties in one or more
financial markets by either guaranteeing trades or novating trades'' in
the proposed rule.\66\ These commenters argued that a CCP does far more
than ``facilitate'' or ``guarantee'' trades and that a CCP ``interposes
itself between counterparties to contacts traded in one or more
financial markets, becoming the buyer to every seller and the seller to
every buyer and thereby ensuring the performance of open contracts.''
\67\ As an alternative definition of CCP, these commenters suggested
the final rule should define CCP to mean: ``an entity (for example, a
clearinghouse or similar facility, system, or organization) that, with
respect to an agreement, contract, or transaction: (i) Enables each
party to the agreement contract, or transaction to substitute, through
novation or otherwise, the credit of the CCP for the credit of the
parties; and (ii) arranges or provides, on a multilateral basis, for
the settlement or netting of obligations resulting from such
agreements, contracts, or transactions executed by participants in the
CCP.'' \68\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\65\ In order to minimize the number of cross references in the
definition section, where feasible, the rule replaces cross
references with the actual text of the definition.
\66\ 12 CFR 217.2.
\67\ Letter to Legislative and Regulatory Activities Division,
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, from Walt L. Lukken,
President and CEO, Futures Industry Association, at 8 (October 17,
2016) (citing Principles of Financial Market Infrastructures (April
2012), published by the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems
and the International Organization of Securities Commissions, at 9).
\68\ Id. at 9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Commenters also urged the OCC to exclude from the requirements of
the final rule all QFCs that are cleared, processed, or settled through
the facilities of an FMU, as defined in Section 803(6) of the Dodd-
Frank Act,\69\ or that are entered into subject to the rules of an
FMU.\70\ For example, commenters argued that QFCs with FMUs, such as
the provision of an extension of credit by a central securities
depository (CSD) to a covered bank that is a member of the CSD in
connection with the settlement of securities transactions, should be
excluded from the requirements of the final rule. Commenters contended
that, similar to CCPs, the relationship between a covered entity and
FMU is governed by the rules of the FMU and that there are no market
alternatives to continuing to transact with FMUs. Commenters argued
that FMUs generally should be excluded for the same reasons as CCPs and
that a broader exemption to cover FMUs would serve to mitigate the
systemic risk of a GSIB in distress, an underlying objective of the
rule's requirements. Commenters contended that such an exclusion would
be consistent with the treatment of FMUs under regulation adopted by
the United Kingdom (U.K.) and Germany. Some commenters also requested
that related or underlying agreements to CCP-cleared QFCs and QFCs
entered into with other FMUs also be excluded, since such agreements
``form an integrated whole with [those] QFCs'' and such an exemption
would facilitate the continued expansion of the clearing and settlement
framework and the benefits of such a framework.\71\ One commenter urged
that the final rule should not in any manner restrict an FMU's ability
to close out a defaulting clearing member's portfolio, including
potential liquidation of cleared contracts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\69\ 12 U.S.C. 5462(6). In general, Title VIII of the Dodd-Frank
Act defines ``financial market utility'' to mean any person that
manages or operates a multilateral system for the purpose of
transferring, clearing, or settling payments, securities, or other
financial transactions among financial institutions or between
financial institutions and the person. Id.
\70\ As discussed, one commenter who recommended an exclusion of
securities market transactions that generally settle in the short
term, do not impose ongoing or continuing obligations on either
party after settlement, and do not typically include the default
rights targeted by the proposed rule, requested this treatment in
the alternative.
\71\ Letter to Legislative and Regulatory Affairs Division,
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, from Larry E. Thompson,
Vice Chairman and General Counsel, The Depository Trust & Clearing
Corporation, at 2 (October 17, 2016); Letter to Robert deV.
Frierson, Secretary, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, from Larry E. Thompson, Vice Chairman and General Counsel,
The Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation, at 6 (August 5, 2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Final Rule. The issues that the final rule is intended to address
with respect to non-cleared QFCs may also exist in the context of
centrally cleared QFCs. However, clearing through a CCP provides unique
benefits to the financial system while presenting unique issues related
to the cancellation of cleared contracts. Accordingly, the OCC
continues to believe it is appropriate to exclude centrally cleared
QFCs, in light of differences between cleared and non-cleared QFCs with
respect to contractual arrangements, counterparty credit risk, default
management, and supervision. The OCC has not extended the exclusion for
CCPs to the client-facing leg of a cleared transaction because
bilateral trades between a GSIB and a non-CCP counterparty are the
types of transactions that the final rule intends to address and
because nothing in the final rule would prohibit a covered entity
clearing member and a client from agreeing to terminate or novate a
trade to balance the clearing member's exposure. The final rule
continues to define central counterparty as a counterparty that
facilitates trades between counterparties in one or more financial
markets by either guaranteeing trades or novating contracts, which is a
broad definition used in the regulatory
[[Page 56642]]
capital rules \72\ that should be familiar to market participants.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\72\ See final rule Sec. 47.2. The proposed rule defined CCP by
cross reference to the definition in the FRB Proposed Rule, which in
turn cross referenced the definition in the FRB Regulation Q
(Capital Adequacy Regulations). The definition in Regulation Q (12
CFR 217.2) is the common definition of CCP also used in the OCC
capital adequacy rule (12 CFR 3.2). For ease of reference, the final
rule replaces these cross references with the text of the definition
of CCP used in 12 CFR 3.2 and 217.2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The final rule also makes clear that, if one or more FMUs are the
only counterparties to a covered QFC, the covered bank is not required
to conform the covered QFC to the final rule.\73\ Therefore, an FMU's
default rights and transfer restrictions under the covered QFC are not
affected by the final rule. However, this exclusion would not include a
covered QFC with a non-FMU counterparty, even if the QFC is settled by
an FMU or if the FMU is a party to such QFC, because the final rule is
intended to address default rights of non-FMU parties. For example, if
two covered banks engage in a bilateral QFC that is facilitated by an
FMU, and in the course of this facilitation each covered entity
maintains a QFC solely with the FMU, then the final rule would not
apply to each QFC between the FMU and each covered bank but the
requirements of the final rule would apply to the bilateral QFC between
the two covered banks. This approach ensures that QFCs that are
directly with FMUs are treated in a manner similar to transactions
between covered entities and CCPs, but also ensures that QFCs conducted
by covered banks that are related to the direct QFC with the FMU remain
subject to the final rule's requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\73\ See final rule Sec. 47.8(a)(2). In response to commenters,
the final rule uses the definition of FMU in Title VIII of the Dodd-
Frank Act and may apply, for purposes of the final rule, to entities
regardless of jurisdiction. The definition of FMU in the final rule
includes a broader set of entities, in addition to CCPs. However,
the definition in the final rule does not include depository
institutions that are engaged in carrying out banking-related
activities, including providing custodial services for tri-party
repurchase agreements. The definition also explicitly excludes
certain types of entities (e.g., registered futures associations,
swap data repositories) and other types of entities that perform
certain functions for or related to FMUs (e.g., FCMs).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The final rule does not explicitly exclude futures and cleared
swaps agreements with a FCM, as requested by a commenter. The nature
and scope of the requested exclusion is unclear, and therefore, it is
unclear whether the exclusion would be necessary, on the one hand, or
overbroad, on the other hand. However, the final rule makes a number of
other clarifications and exemptions that may help address the
commenter's concern regarding FCM agreements.
4. Exclusion of Certain QFCs Under Foreign Bank Multi-Branch Master
Agreements
Proposed Rule. To avoid imposing unnecessary restrictions on QFCs
that are not closely connected to the United States, the proposed rule
excluded from the definition of ``covered QFC'' certain QFCs of Foreign
GSIBs that lack a close connection to the Foreign GSIB's U.S.
operations.\74\ The proposed definition of ``QFC'' included master
agreements that apply to QFCs.\75\ Master agreements are contracts that
contain general terms that the parties wish to apply to multiple
transactions between them; having executed the master agreement, the
parties can then include those terms in future contracts through
reference to the master agreement. Moreover, the Dodd-Frank Act's
definition of ``qualified financial contract,'' which was proposed,
treats master agreements for QFCs together with all supplements to the
master agreement (including underlying transactions) as a single
QFC.\76\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\74\ See proposed rule Sec. 47.8.
\75\ See proposed rule Sec. 47.2.
\76\ 12 U.S.C. 5390(c)(8)(D)(viii); see also 12 U.S.C.
1821(e)(8)(D)(vii); 109 H. Rpt. 31, Prt. 1 (April 8, 2005)
(explaining that a ``master agreement for one or more securities
contracts, commodity contracts, forward contracts, repurchase
agreements or swap agreements will be treated as a single QFC under
the [FDI Act] or the [Federal Credit Union Act] (but only with
respect to the underlying agreements are themselves QFCs)'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Foreign GSIBs have master agreements that permit transactions to be
entered into both at a Federal branch or agency of the Foreign GSIB and
at a non-U.S. location of the Foreign GSIB (such as a foreign branch).
Notwithstanding the proposed rule's general treatment of a master
agreement and all QFCs thereunder as a single QFC, the proposed rule
would have excluded QFCs under such a ``multi-branch master agreement''
that are not booked at a covered bank and for which no payment or
delivery may be made at a covered bank.\77\ Under the proposed rule, a
multi-branch master agreement was a covered QFC with respect to QFC
transactions that are booked at a covered bank or for which payment or
delivery may be made at a covered bank.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\77\ See proposed rule Sec. 47.8. With respect to a Federal
branch or agency of a Foreign GSIB, a multi-branch master agreement
that is a covered QFC solely because the master agreement permits
agreements or transactions that are QFCs to be entered into at one
or more Federal branches or agencies of the Foreign GSIB was
considered a covered QFC for purposes of the proposed rule only with
respect to such agreements or transactions booked at such Federal
branches and agencies or for which a payment or delivery may be made
at such Federal branches or agencies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Comments. Commenters expressed support for this exclusion, but
requested that the requirement exclude from the definition of covered
QFC those transactions under master agreements where payments and
deliveries may be made by or to the Federal branch or agency so long as
the transactions or assets are not booked in the Federal branch or
agency. These commenters argued that the ability to make payments or
deliveries alone does not make a QFC sufficiently closely connected to
the United States to raise the concerns about resolution that the
proposed rule was intended to address. Commenters also argued that the
requirement to include new contractual terms in a QFC where payment or
delivery may occur in the United States would require Foreign GSIBs to
amend many additional QFCs booked abroad, many of which must also be
amended to comply with contractual stay requirements of the Foreign
GSIBs' home country regulatory regimes. Commenters argued that amending
such QFCs under multi-branch master agreements that are not booked in
the United States would require some Foreign GSIBs to amend thousands
of contracts at significant cost and would impose a disproportionate
burden on Foreign GSIBs as compared to U.S. GSIBs. These commenters
argued this would impose a significant burden on non-U.S. covered banks
with no benefit to U.S. financial stability, as these QFCs would not be
expected to be subject to a U.S. resolution regime.
One commenter also recommended that multi-branch master agreements
be treated as a single QFC, rather than requiring the application of
different requirements to different transactions thereunder, so as to
align the proposed rule's requirements with current industry-standard
documentation and to avoid additional implementation hurdles and costs.
The commenter recommended that the entirety of a multi-branch master
agreement and underlying transactions be a covered QFC if a new QFC
with the counterparty or its consolidated affiliates is booked to the
Federal branch or agency after the compliance date or if a new QFC is
entered into with an affiliate of the Federal branch or agency that is
also subject to the requirements.
Final Rule. The final rule has been modified to address the
concerns raised by commenters. In particular, the final rule is
modified to provide that, with respect to a Federal branch or agency of
a Foreign GSIB, a Foreign GSIB multi-branch master agreement that is a
[[Page 56643]]
covered QFC solely because the master agreement permits agreements or
transactions that are QFCs to be entered into at one or more Federal
branches or agencies of the Foreign GSIB will be considered a covered
QFC for purposes of this final rule only with respect to such
agreements or transactions booked at such Federal branches and
agencies.\78\ The final rule does not provide that such an agreement
will be a covered QFC solely because payment or delivery may be made at
such Federal branch or agency. These modifications will avoid imposing
unnecessary restrictions on QFCs that are not closely connected to the
United States and will mitigate burden and reduce costs on Foreign
GSIBs without undermining the purpose of the final rule. The purpose of
this exclusion is to help ensure that, where a Foreign GSIB has a
multi-branch master agreement, the Foreign GSIB will only have to
conform those QFCs entered into under the multi-branch master agreement
that could have the most direct effect on the covered Federal branch or
agency of the Foreign GSIB and that could therefore have the most
direct effect on the resolution of the Foreign GSIB and the financial
stability of the United States.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\78\ See final rule Sec. 47.7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The final rule does not, as requested by one commenter, deem the
entirety of a multi-branch master agreement to be a covered QFC if a
new QFC with the counterparty (or its consolidated affiliate) is booked
to the covered entity or its affiliate. Many commenters supported
excluding transactions from multi-branch master netting agreements that
are not closely connected to the United States. In contrast to the
proposed rule and these comments, the modification requested by this
commenter would require transactions that are not booked in the United
States or otherwise connected to the United States to be conformed to
the requirements of the final rule. The commenter's concerns regarding
costs associated with potentially breaking netting sets may nonetheless
be addressed through adherence to the Universal Protocol or the U.S.
Protocol, which are discussed below.
5. QFCs With Central Banks and Sovereign Entities
Proposed Rule. Section 47.7 of the proposed rule provided that a
covered bank would not be required to conform covered QFCs to which a
CCP was a party. However, central banks and sovereign entities are not
included in the proposed rule's definition of CCP consistent with Title
II of the Dodd-Frank Act and the FDI Act. Therefore, covered QFCs
entered into with sovereign entities and central banks would be
required to adhere to the conformance requirements of Sec. 47.6 of the
proposed rule.
Comments. Commenters urged the OCC to exclude QFCs with central
bank and sovereign counterparties from the final rule. Commenters
argued that sovereign entities might not be willing to agree to
limitations on their QFC default rights and noted that other countries'
measures, such as those of the United Kingdom and Germany, consistent
with their governing laws, exclude central banks and sovereign
entities. Commenters contended that central banks and sovereign
entities are sensitive to financial stability concerns and
resolvability goals, thus reducing the concern that they would exercise
default rights in a way that would undermine resolvability of a GSIB or
financial stability. Commenters indicated it was unclear whether
central banks or sovereign entities would be permitted under applicable
statutes to enter into QFCs with limited default rights, but did not
provide specific examples of such statutes.\79\ Commenters further
noted that these entities did not participate in the development of the
Universal Protocol and that the Universal Protocol does not provide a
viable mechanism for compliance with the final rule by these entities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\79\ These commenters argued that, to the extent central banks
and sovereign entities are unable or unwilling to agree to
limitations on their QFC default rights, application of the proposed
rule's requirements to QFCs with these entities creates a
significant disincentive for these entities to enter into QFCs with
covered banks, resulting in the loss of valuable counterparties in a
way that will hinder market liquidity and covered entity risk
management.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Final Rule. The OCC continues to believe that covering QFCs with
sovereign entities and central banks under the final rule is an
important requirement and has not modified the final rule to address
the requests made by commenters. Excluding QFCs with sovereign entities
and central banks would be inconsistent with Title II of the Dodd-Frank
Act and the FDI Act. Moreover, the mass termination of such QFCs has
the potential to undermine the resolution of a GSIB and the financial
stability of the United States. The final rule provides covered banks
two years to conform covered QFCs with sovereign entities and central
banks (as well as certain other counterparties, as discussed below).
This additional time should provide covered banks sufficient time to
develop separate conformance mechanisms for sovereign entities and
central banks, if necessary.
D. Definition of ``Default Right''
Proposed Rule. As discussed previously, a party to a QFC generally
has a number of rights that it can exercise if its counterparty
defaults on the QFC by failing to meet certain contractual obligations.
These rights are generally, but not always, contractual in nature. One
common default right is a setoff right which is the right to reduce the
total amount that the non-defaulting party must pay by the amount that
its defaulting counterparty owes. A second common default right is the
right to liquidate pledged collateral and use the proceeds to pay the
defaulting party's net obligation to the non-defaulting party. Other
common rights include the ability to suspend or delay the non-
defaulting party's performance under the contract or to accelerate the
obligations of the defaulting party.
Finally, the non-defaulting party typically has the right to
terminate the QFC, meaning that the parties would not make payments
that would have been required under the QFC in the future. The phrase
``default right'' in Sec. 47.2 of the proposed rule was broadly
defined to include these common rights as well as ``any similar
rights.'' Additionally, the definition included all such rights
regardless of source, including rights existing under contract,
statute, or common law.
However, the proposed definition excluded two rights that are
typically associated with the business-as-usual functioning of a QFC.
First, same-day netting that occurs during the life of the QFC in order
to reduce the number and amount of payments each party owes the other
was excluded from the definition of ``default right.'' \80\ Second,
contractual margin requirements that arise solely from the change in
the value of the collateral or the amount of an economic exposure were
also excluded from the definition.\81\ The effect of these exclusions
was to leave such rights unaffected by the proposed rule. The
exclusions were appropriate because the proposed rule is intended to
improve resolvability by addressing default rights that could disrupt
an orderly resolution, and not to interrupt the parties' business-as-
usual dealings under a QFC.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\80\ See Proposed Rule Sec. 47.2.
\81\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
However, certain QFCs are also commonly subject to rights that
would increase the amount of collateral or margin that the defaulting
party (or a guarantor) must provide upon an event
[[Page 56644]]
of default. The financial impact of such default rights on a covered
bank could be similar to the impact of the liquidation and acceleration
rights discussed previously. Therefore, the proposed definition of
``default right'' included such rights (with the exception discussed in
the previous paragraph for margin requirements based solely on the
value of collateral or the amount of an economic exposure).\82\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\82\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Finally, contractual rights to terminate without the need to show
cause, including rights to terminate on demand and rights to terminate
at contractually specified intervals, were excluded from the definition
of ``default right'' for purposes the proposed rule's restrictions on
cross-default rights (Sec. 47.5 of the proposed rule).\83\ This was
consistent with the proposed rule's objective of restricting only
default rights that are related, directly or indirectly, to the entry
into resolution of an affiliate of the covered bank, while leaving
other default rights unrestricted.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\83\ See Proposed Rule Sec. Sec. 47.2 and 47.5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Comments. Commenters expressed support for a number of aspects of
the definition of default rights. For example, a number of commenters
supported the proposed exclusion from the definition of ``default
right'' of contractual rights to terminate without the need to show
cause, noting that such rights exist for a variety of reasons and that
reliance on these rights is unlikely to result in a fire sale of assets
during a GSIB resolution. At least one commenter requested that this
exclusion be expanded to include force majeure events. Commenters also
expressed support for the exclusion for what commenters referred to as
``business-as-usual'' payments associated with a QFC. However, these
commenters requested clarification that certain ``business-as-usual''
actions would not be included in the definition of default right, such
as payment netting, posting and return of collateral, procedures for
the substitution of collateral and modification to the terms of the
QFC, and also requested clarification that the definition of ``default
right'' would not include off-setting transactions to third parties by
the non-defaulting counterparty. One commenter urged that, if the OCC's
goal is to provide that a party cannot enforce a provision that
requires more margin because of a credit downgrade but may demand more
margin for market price changes, the rule should state so explicitly.
Another commenter expressed concern that the definition of default
right in the proposed rule would permit a defaulting covered bank to
demand collateral from its QFC counterparty as margin due to a market
price change, but would not allow the non-covered counterparty to
demand collateral from the covered bank.
Final Rule. The final rule retains the same definition of ``default
right'' as that of the proposed rule.\84\ The OCC believes that the
definition of default right is sufficiently clear and that additional
modifications are not needed to address the concerns raised by
commenters. The final rule does not adopt a particular exclusion for
force majeure events, as requested by certain commenters, as it is not
clear--without reference to particular contractual provisions--what
this term would encompass. Moreover, it should be clear that events
typically considered to be captured by force majeure clauses (e.g.,
natural disasters) would not be related, directly or indirectly, to the
resolution of an affiliate.\85\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\84\ See final rule Sec. 47.2.
\85\ See final rule Sec. 47.5(b).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
``Business-as-usual'' rights regarding changes in collateral or
margin would not be included within the definition of default right to
the extent that the right or operation of a contractual provision
arises solely from either a change in the value of collateral or margin
or a change in the amount of an economic exposure. In response to
commenters' requests for clarification, this exception includes changes
in margin due to changes in market price, but does not include changes
due to counterparty credit risk (e.g., credit rating downgrades).
Therefore, the right of either party to a covered QFC to require margin
due to changes in market price would be unaffected by the definition of
default right. Moreover, default rights that arise before a covered
bank or its affiliate enters resolution, and that would not be affected
by the stay-and-transfer provisions of the U.S. Special Resolution
Regimes also would not be affected.
With respect to transactions with third parties, the final rule,
like the proposed rule, does not require covered banks to address
default rights in QFCs solely between parties that are not covered
banks (e.g., off-setting transactions to third parties by the non-
defaulting counterparty, to the extent none are covered banks).
E. Required Contractual Provisions Related to U.S. Special Resolution
Regimes (Sec. 47.4)
Proposed Rule. The proposed rule generally would have required a
covered QFC to explicitly provide both (a) that the transfer of the QFC
(and any interest or obligation in or under it and any property
collateralizing it) from the covered bank to a transferee would be
effective to the same extent as it would be under the U.S. Special
Resolution Regimes if the covered QFC were governed by the laws of the
United States or of a state of the United States and (b) that default
rights with respect to the covered QFC that could be exercised against
a covered bank could be exercised to no greater extent than they could
be exercised under the U.S. Special Resolution Regimes if the covered
QFC were governed by the laws of the United States or of a state of the
United States.\86\ The proposed rule would define the term ``U.S.
Special Resolution Regimes'' to mean the FDI Act \87\ and Title II of
the Dodd-Frank Act,\88\ along with regulations issued under those
statutes.\89\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\86\ See Proposed Rule Sec. 47.4.
\87\ 12 U.S.C. 1811-1835a.
\88\ 12 U.S.C. 5381-5394.
\89\ See Proposed Rule Sec. 47.2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Comments. A number of commenters noted that the wording of these
requirements in proposed Sec. 47.4 was confusing and could be read to
be inconsistent with the intent of the section. In response to these
comments, the final rule makes clearer that the substantive
restrictions apply only in the event the covered bank (or, in the case
of the requirement regarding default rights, its affiliate) becomes
subject to a proceeding under a U.S. Special Resolution Regime.\90\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\90\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A number of commenters argued that QFCs should be exempt from the
requirements of Sec. 47.4 of the proposed rule if the QFC is governed
by U.S. law. An example of such a QFC provided by commenters includes
the standard form repurchase and securities lending agreement published
by the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association. These
commenters argued that counterparties to such agreements are already
required to observe the stay-and-transfer provisions of the FDI Act and
Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act, as mandatory provisions of U.S. Federal
law, and that requiring an amendment of these types of QFCs to include
the express provisions required under Sec. 47.4 would be redundant and
would not provide any material resolution benefit, but would
significantly increase the remediation burden on covered banks.
Other commenters suggested a three-prong test of ``nexus with the
United States'' for purposes of recognizing an exclusion from the
express acknowledgment of the requirements of Sec. 47.4 of the
proposed rule. In
[[Page 56645]]
particular, these commenters argued that the presence of two factors,
in addition to the contract being governed by U.S. law, would provide
greater certainty that courts would apply the stay-and-transfer
provisions of the FDI Act and Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act: (1) If a
contract is entered into between entities organized in the United
States; and (2) to the extent the GSIB's obligations under the QFC are
collateralized, if the collateral is held with a U.S. custodian or
depository pursuant to an account agreement governed by U.S. law.\91\
Other commenters contended that only whether the contract is under U.S.
law, and not the location of the counterparty or the collateral, is
relevant to the analysis of whether the FDI Act and the Dodd-Frank Act
would govern the contract. Commenters also requested that if the first
additional factor (i.e., that the QFC be entered into between entities
organized in the United States) were to be included within the
exception, it should be broadened to include counterparties that have
principal places of business or that are otherwise domiciled in the
United States.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\91\ These commenters noted that it would be unlikely that any
court interpreting a QFC governed by U.S. law could have a
reasonable basis for disregarding the stay-and-transfer provisions
of the FDI Act or Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Commenters also argued that it would be more appropriate for
Congress to act to obtain cross-border recognition of U.S. Special
Resolution Regimes, rather than for the OCC to do so through this final
rule.
Final Rule. The requirements of the final rule seek to provide
certainty that all covered QFCs would be treated the same way in the
context of a resolution of a covered bank under the Dodd-Frank Act or
the FDI Act. The stay-and-transfer provisions of the U.S. Special
Resolution Regimes should be enforced with respect to all contracts of
any U.S. GSIB entity that enters resolution under a U.S. Special
Resolution Regime, as well as all transactions of the subsidiaries of
such an entity. Nonetheless, it is possible that a court in a foreign
jurisdiction would decline to enforce those provisions. In general, the
requirement that the effect of the statutory stay-and-transfer
provisions be incorporated directly into the QFC contractually helps to
ensure that a court in a foreign jurisdiction would enforce the effect
of those provisions, regardless of whether the court would otherwise
have decided to enforce the U.S. statutory provisions.\92\ Further, the
knowledge that a court in a foreign jurisdiction would reject the
purported exercise of default rights in violation of the required
contractual provisions would deter counterparties of covered banks,
covered entities (under the FRB final rule), or covered FSIs (under the
FDIC final rule), from attempting to exercise such rights.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\92\ See generally Financial Stability Board, ``Principles for
Cross-border Effectiveness of Resolution Actions'' (November 3,
2015), http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/Principles-for-Cross-border-Effectiveness-of-Resolution-Actions.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In response to comments, the final rule exempts from the
requirements of Sec. 47.4 a covered QFC that meets two
requirements.\93\ First, the covered QFC must state that it is governed
by the laws of the United States or a State of the United States.\94\
It has long been clear that the laws of the United States and the laws
of a State of the United States both include U.S. Federal law, such as
the U.S. Special Resolution Regimes.\95\ Therefore, this requirement
ensures that contracts that meet this exemption also contain language
that helps ensure that foreign courts will enforce the stay-and-
transfer provisions of the U.S. Special Resolution Regimes. Second, the
QFC counterparty to the covered bank must be organized under the laws
of the United States or a State,\96\ have its principal place of
business\97\ located in the United States, or be a Federal branch or
agency.\98\ Similarly, a counterparty that is an individual must be
domiciled in the United States.\99\ This requirement helps ensure that
the FDIC will be able to quickly and easily enforce the stay-and-
transfer provisions of the U.S. Special Resolution Regimes.\100\ This
exemption is expected to significantly reduce the burden associated
with complying with the final rule while continuing to provide
assurance that the stay-and-transfer provisions of the U.S. Special
Resolution Regimes may be enforced.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\93\ See final rule Sec. 47.4(a).
\94\ However, a contract that explicitly provides that one or
both of the U.S. Special Resolution Regimes, including a broader set
of laws that includes a U.S. Special Resolution Regime, is excluded
from the laws governing the QFC would not meet this exemption under
the final rule. For example, a covered QFC would not meet this
exemption if the contract stated that it was governed by the laws of
the state of New York but also stated that it was not governed by
U.S. Federal law. In contrast, a contract that stated that it was
governed by the laws of the state of New York but opted out of a
specific, non-mandatory Federal law (e.g., the Federal Arbitration
Act) would meet this exemption. Cf. Volt Info. Scis. v. Bd. of Trs.,
489 U.S. 468 (1989).
\95\ Although many QFCs only explicitly state that the contract
is governed by the laws of a specific State of the United States, it
has been made clear on numerous occasions that the laws of each
State include Federal law. See, e.g., Hauenstain v. Lynham, 100 U.S.
483, 490 (1979) (stating that federal law is ``as much a part of the
law of every State as its own local laws and the Constitution'');
Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 157
(1982) (same); Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 393 (1947) (``For the
policy of the federal Act is the prevailing policy in every
state.'').
\96\ The final rule defines ``State'' means any state,
commonwealth, territory, or possession of the United States, the
District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, American Samoa, Guam,
or the United States Virgin Islands. See final rule Sec. 47.2.
\97\ See Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77 (2010) (describing
the appropriate test for principal place of business).
\98\ See final rule Sec. 47.4(a).
\99\ See id.
\100\ See, e.g., Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014);
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915
(2011); Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77 (2010).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This section of the final rule is consistent with efforts by
regulators in other jurisdictions to address similar risks by requiring
that financial firms within their jurisdictions ensure that the effect
of the similar provisions under these foreign jurisdictions' respective
special resolution regimes would be enforced by courts in other
jurisdictions, including the United States. For example, the U.K.'s
Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) recently required certain
financial firms to ensure that their counterparties to newly created
obligations agree to be subject to stays on early termination that are
similar to those that would apply upon a U.K. firm's entry into
resolution if the financial arrangements were governed by U.K.
law.\101\ Similarly, the German parliament passed a law in November
2015 requiring German financial institutions to have provisions in
financial contracts that are subject to the law of a country outside of
the European Union that acknowledge the provisions regarding the
temporary suspension of termination rights and accept the exercise of
the powers regarding such temporary suspension under the German special
resolution regime.\102\ Additionally, the Swiss
[[Page 56646]]
Federal Council requires that banks ``ensure at both the individual
institution and group level that new agreements or amendments to
existing agreements which are subject to foreign law or envisage a
foreign jurisdiction are agreed only if the counterparty recognizes a
postponement of the termination of agreements in accordance with'' the
Swiss special resolution regime.\103\ Japan's Financial Services Agency
also revised its supervisory guidelines for major banks to require
those banks to ensure that the effect of the statutory stay decision
and statutory special creditor protections under Japanese resolution
regimes extends to contracts governed by foreign laws.\104\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\101\ See PRA Rulebook: CRR Firms and Non-Authorised Persons:
Stay in Resolution Instrument 2015, (November 12, 2015), http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/pra/Documents/publications/ps/2015/ps2515app1.pdf; see also Bank of England, Prudential Regulation
Authority, ``Contractual stays in financial contracts governed by
third-country law'' (PS25/15), (Nov. 2015), http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/pra/Documents/publications/ps/2015/ps2515.pdf. These PRA rules apply to PRA-authorized banks, building
societies, PRA-designated investment firms, and their qualifying
parent undertakings, including U.K. financial holding companies and
U.K. mixed financial holding companies.
\102\ See Gesetz zur Sanierung und Abwicklung von Instituten und
Finanzgruppen, Sanierungs-und Abwicklungsgesetz [SAG] [German Act on
the Reorganisation and Liquidation of Credit Institutions], December
10, 2014, Sec. 60a, https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bundesrecht/sag/gesamt.pdf, as amended by Gesetz zur Anpassung des nationalen
Bankenabwicklungsrechts an den Einheitlichen Abwicklungsmechanismus
und die europ[auml]ischen Vorgaben zur Bankenabgabe, November 2,
2015, Artikel 1(17).
\103\ See Verordnung [uuml]ber die Finanzmarktinfrastrukturen
und das Marktverhalten im Effekten- und Derivatehandel [FinfraV]
[Ordinance on Financial Market Infrastructures and Market Conduct in
Securities and Derivatives Trading] Nov. 25, 2015, amending
Bankenverordnung vom 30. April 2014 [BankV] [Banking Ordinance of 30
April 2014] April 30, 2014, SR 952.02, art. 12 paragraph 2bis,
translation at http://www.news.admin.ch/NSBSubscriber/message/attachments/42659.pdf; see also Erl[auml]uterungsbericht zur
Verordnung [uuml]ber die Finanzmarktinfrastrukturen und das
Marktverhalten im Effekten- und Derivatehandel (November 25, 2015)
(providing commentary).
\104\ See Section III-11 of Comprehensive Guidelines for
Supervision of Major Banks, etc., http://www.fsa.go.jp/common/law/guide/city.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As discussed in Section III.A. of this preamble, the OCC believes
it is appropriate to adopt this final rule in order to promote the
safety and soundness of the Federal banking system, and as a
consequence, U.S. financial stability, by improving the resolvability
and resilience of national banks, FSAs, and Federal branches and
agencies, pursuant to its existing statutory authorities. Because of
the current risk that the stay-and-transfer provisions of U.S. Special
Resolution Regimes may not be recognized under the laws of other
jurisdictions, Sec. 47.4 of the final rule requires similar
contractual recognition to help ensure that courts in foreign
jurisdictions will recognize these provisions.
This requirement advances the goal of the final rule of removing
QFC-related obstacles to the orderly resolution of covered banks, and
by extension their associated GSIBs. As discussed above, restrictions
on the exercise of QFC default rights are an important prerequisite for
an orderly GSIB resolution. Congress recognized the importance of such
restrictions when it enacted the stay-and-transfer provisions of the
U.S. Special Resolution Regimes. As demonstrated by the 2007-2009
financial crisis, the modern financial system is global in scope, and
covered banks are party to large volumes of QFCs with connections to
foreign jurisdictions. The stay-and-transfer provisions of the U.S.
Special Resolution Regimes would not achieve their purpose of
facilitating orderly resolution in the context of the failure of a GSIB
with large volumes of QFCs, if such QFCs could escape the effect of
those provisions. To remove doubt about the scope of coverage of these
provisions, the requirements of Sec. 47.4 of the final rule would
ensure that the stay-and-transfer provisions apply as a matter of
contract to all covered QFCs, wherever the transaction. This will
advance the resolvability goals of the Dodd-Frank Act and the FDI Act
and improve the resiliency of covered banks subject to the
requirements.
F. Prohibited Cross-Default Rights (Sec. 47.5)
1. Definitions
Proposed Rule and Final Rule. Section 47.5 of the final rule, like
the proposed rule, pertains to cross-default rights in QFCs between
covered banks and their counterparties, many of which are subject to
credit enhancements (such as guarantees) provided by an affiliate of
the covered bank. Because credit enhancements on QFCs are themselves
``qualified financial contracts'' under the Dodd-Frank Act's definition
of that term (which this final rule adopts), the final rule includes
the following additional definitions in order to precisely describe the
relationships to which this section applies. These definitions are the
same as under the proposed rule since no comments were received on
these definitions.
First, the final rule distinguishes between a credit enhancement
and a ``direct QFC,'' which is defined as any QFC that is not a credit
enhancement. The final rule also defines ``direct party'' to mean a
covered bank that itself is a party to the direct QFC, as distinct from
an entity that provides a credit enhancement. In addition, the final
rule defines ``affiliate credit enhancement'' to mean ``a credit
enhancement that is provided by an affiliate of the party to the direct
QFC that the credit enhancement supports,'' as distinct from a credit
enhancement provided by either the direct party itself or by an
unaffiliated party. Moreover, the final rule defines ``covered
affiliate credit enhancement'' to mean an affiliate credit enhancement
provided by a covered bank, or a covered entity under the FRB final
rule, and defines ``covered affiliate support provider'' to mean the
affiliate of the covered bank that provides the covered affiliate
credit enhancement. Finally, the final rule defines the term
``supported party'' to mean any party that is the beneficiary of the
covered affiliate support provider's obligations under a covered
affiliate credit enhancement (that is, the QFC counterparty of a direct
party, assuming that the direct QFC is subject to a covered affiliate
credit enhancement).
2. General Prohibition
Proposed Rule. Subject to certain exceptions discussed below, the
proposed rule generally prohibited a covered bank from being a party to
a covered QFC that allows for the exercise of any default right that is
related, directly or indirectly, to the entry into resolution of an
affiliate of the covered bank. The proposed rule also generally
prohibited a covered bank from being party to a covered QFC that would
prohibit the transfer of any credit enhancement applicable to the QFC
(such as another entity's guarantee of the covered bank's obligations
under the QFC), along with associated obligations or collateral, upon
the entry into resolution of an affiliate of the covered bank.\105\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\105\ This prohibition would be subject to an exception that
would allow supported parties to exercise default rights with
respect to a QFC if the supported party would be prohibited from
being the beneficiary of a credit enhancement provided by the
transferee under any applicable law, including the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 and the Investment Company
Act of 1940. This exception is substantially similar to an exception
to the transfer restrictions in section 2(f) of the ISDA 2014
Resolution Stay Protocol (2014 Protocol) and the ISDA 2015 Universal
Resolution Stay Protocol, which was added to address the concerns
expressed by asset managers during the drafting of the 2014
Protocol.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Comments. One commenter expressed strong support for these
provisions.\106\ Another commenter expressed support for this provision
as currently limited in scope under the proposed rule to prohibited
cross-default rights and requested that the scope not be expanded.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\106\ This commenter also expressed support for Congressional
amendment of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A number of commenters representing counterparties to covered banks
objected to Sec. 47.5 of the proposed rule and requested the
elimination of this provision. These commenters expressed concern about
limitations on counterparties' exercise of default rights during
insolvency proceedings and argued that rights should not be taken away
from contracting parties other than where limitation of such rights is
necessary for public policy reasons and the resolution process is
controlled by a
[[Page 56647]]
regulatory authority with particular expertise in the resolution of the
type of entity subject to the proceedings. Certain commenters argued
that eliminating cross-default termination rights undermines the
ability of QFC counterparties to effectively manage and mitigate their
exposure to market and credit risk to a GSIB and interferes with market
forces. One commenter similarly argued that, unless appropriate
measures to strengthen the financial condition and creditworthiness of
a failing GSIB during and after the temporary stay are taken, the stay
will only expose QFC counterparties to an additional 48 hours of credit
risk exposure without achieving the orderly resolution goals of the
proposed rule.
Another commenter argued that non-defaulting counterparties should
not be prevented from filing proofs of claim or other pleadings in a
bankruptcy case during the stay period, since bankruptcy deadlines
might pass and leave the counterparty unable to collect the unsecured
creditor dividend. Commenters contended that restrictions on cross-
default rights may lead to pro-cyclical behavior with asset managers
moving funds away from covered entities as soon as those entities show
signs of distress, and perhaps even in normal situations, and would
disadvantage non-GSIB parties (e.g., end users who rarely receive
initial margin from GSIB counterparties and are less well protected
against a GSIB default).\107\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\107\ One commenter stated that, to the extent the final rule
prevents an insurer from terminating QFC transactions upon the
credit rating downgrade of a GSIB counterparty, the insurer may be
in violation of State insurance laws that typically impose strict
counterparty credit rating guidelines and limits. This commenter did
not give any specific examples of such laws. Counterparties,
including insurance companies, should evaluate and comply with all
relevant applicable requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Some commenters argued that, if these rights must be restricted by
law, Congress should impose such restrictions and that the requirements
of the proposed rule circumvented the legislative process by creating a
de facto amendment to the U.S. Bankruptcy Code that forecloses
countless QFC counterparties from exercising their rights of cross-
default protection under Section 362 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. Some
of these commenters argued that parties cannot by contract alter the
U.S. Bankruptcy Code's provisions, such as the administrative priority
of a claim in bankruptcy, and one commenter suggested that non-covered
bank counterparties may challenge the legality of contractual stays on
the exercise of default rights if a GSIB becomes distressed. Certain
commenters also questioned the OCC's ability to rely on its authority
under the National Bank Act in imposing these requirements over QFC
counterparties not subject to its supervision and argued that making
Title II resolution possible under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code was not an
appropriate justification for the proposed rule. Other commenters,
however, argued that the provisions of the proposed rule were necessary
to address systemic risks posed by the exemption for QFCs in the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code.
As an alternative to eliminating the proposed rule's requirements
to remediate cross-default rights, these commenters expressed the view
that, if the OCC adopts the proposed rule as final, the final rule
should at least contain those minimum creditor protections established
by the Universal Protocol. Certain commenters also argued that this
provision in the proposed rule was overly broad in that it covered not
only U.S. Federal resolution and insolvency proceedings but also State
and foreign resolution and insolvency proceedings.\108\ Certain
commenters also urged the OCC to provide a limited exception to these
restrictions, if retained in the final rule, to help ensure the
continued functioning of physical commodities markets.\109\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\108\ Certain commenters also indicated that these provisions
should only apply to U.S. Special Resolution Regimes, which provide
certain protections for counterparties, or, at most, to U.S. Special
Resolution Regimes, resolution under the Securities Investor
Protection Act, and insolvency under Chapter 11 of the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code. That commenter noted that liquidation and
insolvency under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code do not seek to
preserve the GSIB as a viable entity, which is an objective of this
proposal. As discussed later, the rule seeks to facilitate the
resolution of a GSIB outside of U.S. Special Resolution Regimes,
including under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, and is intended to
facilitate other approaches to GSIB resolution. Therefore, the final
rule applies these provisions in the same way as the proposed rule.
In addition, the additional creditor protections for supported
parties under the final rule permit contractual requirements that
any transferee not be in bankruptcy proceedings and that the credit
support provider not be in bankruptcy proceedings other than a
Chapter 11 proceeding. See final rule Sec. 47.5(f).
\109\ In particular, these commenters requested that, when a
covered bank defaults on any physical delivery obligation to any
counterparty following the insolvency of an affiliate of a covered
bank, its counterparties with obligations to deliver or take
delivery of physical commodities within a short time frame after the
default should be able to immediately terminate all trades (both
physical and financial) with the covered bank. The final rule, like
the proposed rule, allows covered QFCs to permit a counterparty to
exercise its default rights under a covered QFC if the covered bank
has failed to pay or perform its obligations under the covered QFC.
See final rule Sec. 47.5(d). The final rule, like the proposed
rule, also allows covered QFCs to permit a counterparty to exercise
its default rights under a covered QFC if the covered bank has
failed to pay or perform on other contracts between the same parties
and the failure gives rise to a default right in the covered QFC.
See id. These exceptions should help reduce credit risk and ensure
the smooth operation of the physical commodities markets without
permitting one failure to pay or perform by a covered entity to
allow a potentially large number of its counterparties that are not
directly affected by the failure to exercise their default rights
and thereby endanger the viability of the covered bank.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Some commenters argued that the OCC should eliminate the stay on
default rights that are related ``indirectly'' to an affiliate of the
direct party becoming subject to insolvency proceedings, claiming it is
unclear what constitutes a right related ``indirectly'' to insolvency
and noting that any default right exercised by a counterparty after an
affiliate of that counterparty enters resolution could arguably be
motivated by the affiliate's entry into resolution.
Final Rule. The final rule retains the same scope as the proposed
rule. A primary purpose of the proposed restrictions is to facilitate
the resolution of a GSIB outside of Title II, including under the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code. As discussed in the Background section, the potential
for the mass exercise of QFC default rights is a major reason why the
failure of a global systemically important BHC could have a severe
negative impact on financial stability and on the Federal banking
system. In the context of an SPOE resolution, if the global
systemically important BHC's entry into resolution triggers the mass
exercise of cross-default rights by the subsidiaries' QFC
counterparties of the covered QFCs against the covered bank, then the
national bank or FSA could themselves experience financial distress or
failure. Moreover, the mass exercise of covered QFC default rights
would entail asset fire sales, which could affect other U.S. financial
companies and undermine financial stability of the U.S. financial
system. Similar disruptive results can occur with an MPOE resolution of
an affiliate of an otherwise performing covered bank that triggers
default rights on QFCs against the performing covered bank.
In an SPOE resolution, this damage can be avoided if actions of the
following two types are prevented: The exercise of direct default
rights against the top-tier holding company that has entered
resolution, and the exercise of cross-default rights against the
national bank and FSA subsidiaries and other operating subsidiaries
based on their parent BHC entry into resolution. Direct default rights
against the national bank or FSA subsidiary would not be exercisable,
because that subsidiary
[[Page 56648]]
would continue normal operations and would not enter resolution. In an
MPOE resolution, this damage occurs from the exercise of default rights
against a performing entity based on the failure of an affiliate.
Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act's stay-and-transfer provisions would
address both direct default rights and cross-default rights. But, as
explained in the Background section, no similar statutory provisions
would apply to a resolution under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. The final
rule attempts to address these obstacles to orderly resolution under
the U.S. Bankruptcy Code by extending the stay-and transfer-provisions
to any type of resolution. Similarly, the final rule would facilitate a
transfer of the GSIB parent's interests in its subsidiaries, along with
any credit enhancements it provides for those subsidiaries, to a
solvent financial company by prohibiting covered banks from having QFCs
that would allow the QFC counterparty to prevent such a transfer or to
use it as a ground for exercising default rights.
Accordingly, the final rule is intended to enhance the potential
for orderly resolution of a GSIB under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, the
FDI Act, or similar resolution proceedings. In doing so, the proposed
rule would advance the Dodd-Frank Act's goal of making the orderly
resolution of a covered bank workable under the U.S. Bankruptcy
Code.\110\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\110\ See 12 U.S.C. 5365(d).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Likewise, the final rule retains the prohibition against
contractual provisions that permit the exercise of default rights that
are indirectly related to the resolution of an affiliate. QFCs may
include a number of default rights triggered by an event that is not
the resolution of an affiliate but is caused by the resolution, such as
a credit rating downgrade in response to the resolution. A primary
purpose of the final rule is to prevent early terminations caused by
the resolution of an affiliate. A regulation that specifies each type
of early termination provision that should be stayed would be over-
inclusive, under-inclusive, and easy to evade. Similarly, a stay of
default rights that are only directly related to the resolution of an
affiliate could increase the likelihood of litigation to determine if
the relationship between the default right and the affiliate resolution
was sufficient to be considered ``directly'' related. The final rule
attempts to decrease such uncertainty and litigation risk by including
default rights that are related (i.e., directly or indirectly) to the
resolution of an affiliate.
Moreover, the final rule does not affect parties' rights under the
U.S. Bankruptcy Code. As explained above, the final rule does not
prohibit a covered QFC from permitting the exercise of default rights
against a covered entity that has entered bankruptcy proceedings.\111\
Therefore, counterparties to a covered entity in bankruptcy would be
able to exercise their existing contractual default rights to the full
extent permitted under any applicable safe harbor to the automatic stay
of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\111\ See final rule Sec. 47.5(d)(1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The final rule could also prevent the disorderly failure of the
national bank or FSA subsidiary and allow it to continue normal
operations. In addition, while it may be in the individual interest of
any given counterparty to exercise any available contractual rights to
run on the national bank or FSA subsidiary, the mass exercise of such
rights could harm the collective interest of all the counterparties by
causing the subsidiary to fail. Therefore, like the automatic stay in
bankruptcy, which also serves to maximize creditors' ultimate
recoveries by preventing a disorderly liquidation of the debtor, the
proposed rule would mitigate this collective action problem to the
benefit of the creditors and counterparties of covered banks by
preventing a disorderly resolution. And because many of these
counterparties and creditors are themselves covered banks, or other
systemically important financial firms, improving outcomes for these
creditors and counterparties would further protect the safety and
soundness of the Federal banking system and financial stability of the
United States.
3. General Creditor Protections
Proposed Rule and Final Rule. While the proposed restrictions would
facilitate orderly resolution, they would also have the effect of
diminishing the ability of the counterparties of the covered banks to
include protections for themselves in covered QFCs. In order to reduce
this effect, the final rule, like the proposed rule, includes several
significant exceptions to the proposed restrictions. These permitted
creditor protections are intended to allow creditors to exercise cross-
default rights outside of an orderly resolution of a GSIB, and
therefore would not be expected to undermine such a resolution.
First, in order to ensure that the proposed prohibitions would
apply only to cross-default rights (and not direct default rights), the
final rule would provide that a covered QFC may permit the exercise of
default rights based on the direct party's entry into a resolution
proceeding.\112\ This provision helps to ensure that, if the direct
party to a QFC were to enter bankruptcy, its QFC counterparties could
exercise any relevant direct default rights. Thus, direct QFC
counterparties of a covered bank's subsidiary or affiliate would not
risk the delay and expense associated with becoming involved in a
bankruptcy proceeding, and would be able to take advantage of default
rights that would fall within the U.S. Bankruptcy Code's safe harbor
provisions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\112\ See final rule Sec. 47.5(d)(1). The proposed rule
exempted from this creditor protection provision proceedings under a
U.S. or foreign special resolution regime. As explained in the
proposed rule, special resolution regimes typically stay direct
default rights, but may not stay cross-default rights. For example,
as discussed above, the FDI Act stays direct default rights, see 12
U.S.C. 1821(e)(10)(B), but does not stay cross-default rights,
whereas the Dodd-Frank Act's OLA stays direct default rights and
cross-defaults arising from a parent's receivership, see 12 U.S.C.
5390(c)(10)(B) and 5390(c)(16). The proposed exemption of special
resolution regimes from the creditor protection provisions was
intended to help ensure that special resolution regimes that do not
stay cross-defaults, such as the FDI Act, would not disrupt the
orderly resolution of a GSIB under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code or other
ordinary insolvency proceedings.
One commenter requested the OCC revise this provision to clarify
that default rights based on a covered bank or an affiliate entering
resolution under the FDI Act or Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act are
not prohibited but instead are merely subject to the terms of such
regimes. The commenter requested the OCC clarify that such default
rights are permitted so long as they are subject to the provisions
of the FDI Act or Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act as required under
Sec. 47.5. The final rule eliminates this proposed exemption for
special resolution regimes because the rule separately addresses
cross-defaults arising from the FDI Act and because foreign special
resolution regimes, along with efforts in other jurisdictions to
contractually recognize stays of default rights under those regimes,
should reduce the risk that such a regime should pose to the orderly
resolution of a GSIB under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code or other
ordinary insolvency proceedings.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The final rule also allows covered QFCs to permit the exercise of
default rights based on the failure of (1) the direct party, (2) a
covered affiliate support provider, or (3) a transferee that assumes a
credit enhancement to satisfy its payment or delivery obligations under
the direct QFC or credit enhancement. Moreover, the final rule would
allow covered QFCs to permit the exercise of a default right in one QFC
that is triggered by the direct party's failure to satisfy its payment
or delivery obligations under another contract between the same
parties. This exception takes appropriate account of the
interdependence that exists among the contracts in effect between the
same counterparties.
As explained in the proposed rule, the exceptions in the final rule
for the
[[Page 56649]]
creditor protections described are intended to help ensure that the
proposed rule permits a covered bank's QFC counterparties to protect
themselves from imminent financial loss and does not create a risk of
delivery gridlocks or daisy-chain effects, in which a covered bank's
failure to make a payment or delivery when due leaves its counterparty
unable to meet its own payment and delivery obligations. The daisy-
chain effect would be prevented because the covered bank's counterparty
would be permitted to exercise its default rights, such as by
liquidating collateral. These exceptions are generally consistent with
the treatment of payment and delivery obligations under the U.S.
Special Resolution Regimes.\113\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\113\ See 12 U.S.C. 1821(e)(8)(G)(ii), 5390(c)(8)(F)(ii)
(suspending payment and delivery obligations for one business day or
less).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
These exceptions also help to ensure that the counterparties of a
covered bank's subsidiaries or affiliates would not risk the delay and
expense associated with becoming involved in a bankruptcy proceeding,
since, unlike a typical creditor of an entity that enters bankruptcy,
the QFC counterparty would retain its ability under the U.S. Bankruptcy
Code's safe harbors to exercise direct default rights. This should
further reduce the counterparty's incentive to run. Reducing incentives
to run in the period leading up to resolution promotes orderly
resolution because a QFC creditor run (such as a mass withdrawal of
repo funding) could lead to a disorderly resolution and pose a threat
to financial stability.
4. Additional Creditor Protections for Supported QFCs
Proposed Rule and Final Rule. The final rule, like the proposed
rule, allows the inclusion of additional creditor protections for a
non-defaulting counterparty that is the beneficiary of a credit
enhancement from an affiliate of the covered bank that is also a
covered bank under the final rule or a covered entity under the FRB
final rule. The final rule would allow these creditor protections in
recognition of the supported party's interest in receiving the benefit
of its credit enhancement. The OCC, FRB, and FDIC believe that these
creditor protections would not undermine an SPOE resolution of a
GSIB.\114\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\114\ See 81 FR 29169 (May 11, 2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Where a covered QFC is supported by a covered affiliate credit
enhancement,\115\ the covered QFC and the credit enhancement would be
permitted to allow the exercise of default rights under the
circumstances after the expiration of a stay period. Under the final
rule, the applicable stay period would begin when the credit support
provider enters resolution and would end at the later of 5:00 p.m.
(eastern time) on the next business day and 48 hours after the entry
into resolution. This portion of the final rule is similar to the stay
treatment provided in a resolution under the OLA or the FDI Act.\116\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\115\ Note that the final rule would not apply with respect to
credit enhancements that are not covered affiliate credit
enhancements. In particular, it would not apply with respect to a
credit enhancement provided by a non-U.S. entity of a foreign GSIB,
which would not be a covered bank or covered entity.
\116\ See U.S.C. 1821(e)(10)(B)(I), 5390(c)(10)(B)(i),
5390(c)(16)(A). While the stay period is similar to the stay periods
that would be imposed by the U.S. Special Resolution Regimes, it
could run longer than those stay periods under some circumstances.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Under the final rule, contractual provisions may permit the
exercise of default rights at the end of the stay period if the covered
affiliate credit enhancement has not been transferred away from the
covered affiliate support provider and that support provider becomes
subject to a resolution proceeding other than a proceeding under
Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.\117\ Covered QFCs may also
permit the exercise of default rights at the end of the stay period if
the transferee (if any) of the credit enhancement enters a resolution
proceeding, protecting the supported party from a transfer of the
credit enhancement to a transferee that is unable to meet its financial
obligations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\117\ Chapter 11 (11 U.S.C. 1101-1174) is the portion of the
U.S. Bankruptcy Code that provides for the reorganization of the
failed company, as opposed to its liquidation, and, relative to
special resolution regimes, is generally well-understood by market
participants.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
QFCs may also permit the exercise of default rights at the end of
the stay period if the original credit support provider does not
remain, and no transferee becomes obligated to the same (or
substantially similar) extent as the original credit support provider
was obligated immediately prior to entering a resolution proceeding
(including a Chapter 11 proceeding) with respect to (a) the covered
affiliate credit enhancement, (b) all other covered affiliate credit
enhancements provided by the credit support provider on any other
covered QFCs between the same parties, and (c) all credit enhancements
provided by the credit support provider between the direct party and
affiliates of the direct party's QFC counterparty. Such creditor
protections are permitted to prevent the support provider or the
transferee from ``cherry picking'' by assuming only those QFCs of a
given counterparty that are favorable to the support provider or
transferee. Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act and the FDI Act contain
similar provisions to prevent cherry picking.
Finally, if the covered affiliate credit enhancement is transferred
to a transferee, then the non-defaulting counterparty could exercise
default rights at the end of the stay period unless either (a) all of
the support provider's ownership interests in the direct party are also
transferred to the transferee or (b) reasonable assurance is provided
that substantially all of the support provider's assets (or the net
proceeds from the sale of those assets) will be transferred to the
transferee in a timely manner. These conditions would help to assure
the supported party that the transferee generally would be at least as
financially capable of providing the credit enhancement as the covered
affiliate support provider.
Comments. Commenters generally expressed strong support for these
exclusions but also requested that these exclusions be broadened in a
number of ways. Some commenters urged the OCC to broaden the exclusions
to permit, after the trigger of the stay-and-transfer provisions, the
exercise of default rights by a counterparty against a direct
counterparty or covered support provider with respect to any default
right under the QFC (other than a default right explicitly based on the
failure of an affiliate) and not just with respect to defaults
resulting from payment or delivery failure or the direct party becoming
subject to certain resolution or insolvency proceedings (e.g., failure
to maintain a license or certain capital level, materially breaching
its representations under the QFC). Some commenters contended that, at
a minimum, the final rule should provide for creditor protections that
meet the minimum standards set forth by the Universal Protocol. One
commenter specifically identified three creditor protections found in
the Universal Protocol that it argued the OCC should include in Sec.
47.5: (1) Priority rights in a bankruptcy proceeding against the
transferee or original credit support provider (if the QFC providing
credit support was not transferred); (2) a right to submit claims in
the insolvency proceeding of the insolvent credit support provider if
the transferee becomes insolvent; and (3) the ability to declare a
default and close out of both the original QFC with the direct
counterparty as well as QFCs with the transferee if the transferee
defaults under the transferred QFC or under any other QFC with the non-
[[Page 56650]]
defaulting counterparty, subject to the contractual terms and
consistent with applicable law. Another commenter argued for creditor
protections not found in the Universal Protocol, including that the
transferee be required to be a U.S. person and be registered with and
licensed by the primary regulator of either the direct counterparty or
transferor entity.
The final rule does not include the additional creditor protections
of the Universal Protocol or other creditor protections requested by
commenters. As explained in the proposed rule and below, the additional
creditor protections of the Universal Protocol do not appear to
materially diminish the prospects for an orderly resolution of a GSIB
because the Universal Protocol includes a number of desirable features
that the final rule otherwise lacks.\118\ Providing additional
circumstances under which default rights may be exercised during and
immediately after the stay period, in the absence of any
counterbalancing benefits to resolution, would increase the risk of a
disorderly resolution of a GSIB in contravention of the purposes of
this final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\118\ See 81 FR 55381, 55394 (August 19, 2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
One commenter also argued that transfer should be limited to a
bridge bank under the FDI Act or a bridge financial company under Title
II of the Dodd-Frank Act to ensure that the transferee is more likely
to be able to satisfy the obligations of a credit support provider and
is subject to regulatory oversight. Section 47.5 of the final rule
permits QFCs to include provisions allowing a counterparty to exercise
its default rights against a direct party that enters resolution under
the FDI Act or Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act, other than the limited
case contemplated by Sec. 47.5(h) of the final rule. The OCC is not
adopting the proposed additional creditor protection because it would
defeat in large part the purpose of Sec. 47.5 and potentially create
confusion regarding the requirements and purposes of sections 47.4 and
47.5 of the final rule.\119\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\119\ To the extent the commenter's reference to ``bridge
financial company'' was not only to a bridge financial company under
Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act, the requested amendment would not
appear to provide a meaningful reduction in credit risk to
counterparties compared to the creditor protections permitted under
Sec. 47.5 of the final rule and those available under the Universal
Protocol and U.S. Protocol, discussed below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A few commenters expressed concern that the additional creditor
protections applied only to QFCs supported by a credit enhancement
provided by a ``covered affiliate support provider'' (i.e., an
affiliate that is a covered entity, covered bank, or covered FSI) and
noted that Foreign GSIBs often will have their QFCs supported by a non-
U.S. affiliate that is not a covered entity, covered bank, or covered
FSI. Such non-U.S. affiliate credit supporter providers would not be
able to rely on the additional creditor protections for supported QFCs.
As the FRB Proposed Rule explained, ``[s]uch credit enhancements [are]
excluded in order to help ensure that the resolution of a non-[U.S.]
entity would not negatively affect the financial stability of the
United States by allowing for the exercise of default rights against a
covered entity [or in the case of the OCC Proposed Rule, the covered
bank].'' \120\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\120\ 81 FR 29169, 29180 n.92 (May 11, 2016) (``Note that the
exception in Sec. 252.84(g) of the [FRB Proposed Rule] would not
apply with respect to credit enhancements that are not covered
affiliate credit enhancements. In particular, it would not apply
with respect to a credit enhancement provided by a non-U.S. entity
of a [F]oreign GSIB, which would not be a covered entity under the
proposal. Such credit enhancements would be excluded in order to
help ensure that the resolution of a non-U.S. entity would not
negatively affect the financial stability of the United States by
allowing for the exercise of default rights against a covered
entity.''). See also FRB final rule Sec. 252.84(f).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
One commenter requested clarification that the creditors of a non-
U.S. credit support provider are permitted to exercise any and all
rights against that non-U.S. credit support provider that they could
exercise under the non-U.S. resolution regime applicable to that non-
U.S. credit support provider. In general, covered banks may be entities
organized or operating in the United States or, with respect to U.S.
GSIBs, abroad. The final rule, like the proposed rule, is limited to
QFCs to which a covered bank is a party. Section 47.5 of the final rule
generally prohibits QFCs to which a covered bank is a party from
allowing the exercise of cross-default rights of the covered QFC,
regardless of whether the affiliate entering resolution and/or the
credit support provider is organized or operates in the United States.
Another commenter expressed concern that the proposed Sec.
47.5(g)(3) (Sec. 47.5(f)(3) of the final rule) would provide a right
without a remedy because, if the covered affiliate credit support
provider is no longer obligated and no transferee has taken on the
obligation, the non-covered entity counterparty may have only a breach
of contract claim against an entity that has transferred all of its
assets to a third party. The creditor protections of Sec. 47.5, if
triggered, permit contractual provisions allowing the exercise of
existing default rights against the direct party to the covered QFC, as
well as any existing rights against the credit enhancement provider.
Another commenter suggested revising proposed Sec. 47.5(g) (Sec.
47.5(f) of the final rule) to clarify that, for a covered direct QFC
supported by a covered affiliate credit enhancement, the covered direct
QFC and the covered affiliate credit enhancement may permit the
exercise of a default right after the stay period that is related,
directly or indirectly, to the covered affiliate support provider
entering into resolution proceedings. This reading is incorrect and
revising the final rule as requested would largely defeat the purpose
of Sec. 47.5 of the final rule by merely delaying QFC termination en
masse.
Some commenters also requested specific provisions related to
physical commodity contracts, including a provision that would allow
regulators to override a stay if necessary to avoid disruption of the
supply or prevent exacerbation of price movements in a commodity or a
provision that would allow the exercise of default rights of
counterparties delivering or taking delivery of physical commodities if
a covered bank defaults on any physical delivery obligation to any
counterparty. As noted above, QFCs may permit a counterparty to
exercise its default rights immediately, even during the stay period,
if the covered bank fails to pay or perform on the covered QFC with the
counterparty (or another contract between the same parties that gives
rise to a default under the covered QFC).
5. Creditor Protections Related to FDI Act Proceedings
Proposed Rule and Final Rules. In the case of a covered QFC that is
supported by a covered affiliate credit enhancement, both the covered
QFC and the credit enhancement would be permitted to allow the exercise
of default rights related to the credit support provider's entry into
resolution proceedings under the FDI Act \121\ only under the following
circumstances: (a) After the FDI Act stay period,\122\ if the credit
enhancement is not transferred under the relevant provisions of the FDI
Act \123\ and associated regulations, and (b) during the FDI Act stay
period, to the extent that the default right permits the supported
party to suspend performance under the covered QFC to the same
[[Page 56651]]
extent as that party would be entitled to do if the covered QFC were
with the credit support provider itself and were treated in the same
manner as the credit enhancement. This provision is intended to ensure
that a QFC counterparty of a subsidiary of a covered bank that goes
into FDI Act receivership can receive the same level of protection that
the FDI Act provides to QFC counterparties of the covered bank itself.
No comments were received on this aspect of the proposed rule, and the
final rule remains unchanged.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\121\ As discussed, the FDI Act stays direct default rights
against the failed depository institution but does not stay the
exercise of cross-default rights against its affiliates.
\122\ Under the FDI Act, the relevant stay period runs until
5:00 p.m. (eastern time) on the business day following the
appointment of the FDIC as receiver. 12 U.S.C. 1821(e)(10)(B)(I).
\123\ 12 U.S.C. 1821(e)(9)-(10).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
6. Prohibited Terminations
Proposed Rule. In case of a legal dispute as to a party's right to
exercise a default right under a covered QFC, the proposed rule
required that a covered QFC must provide that, after an affiliate of
the direct party has entered a resolution proceeding, (a) the party
seeking to exercise the default right shall bear the burden of proof
that the exercise of that right is indeed permitted by the covered QFC
and (b) the party seeking to exercise the default right must meet a
``clear and convincing evidence'' standard, a similar standard,\124\ or
a more demanding standard.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\124\ The reference to a ``similar'' burden of proof is intended
to allow covered QFCs to provide for the application of a standard
that is analogous to clear and convincing evidence in jurisdictions
that do not recognize that particular standard. A covered QFC would
not be permitted to provide for a lower standard.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This proposed requirement was intended to prevent QFC
counterparties from circumventing the limitations on resolution-related
default rights in this proposal by exercising other contractual default
rights in instances where such QFC counterparty cannot demonstrate that
the exercise of such other contractual default rights is unrelated to
the affiliate's entry into resolution.
Comments. A few commenters requested guidance on how to satisfy the
burden of proof of clear and convincing evidence so that they may avoid
seeking such clarity through litigation. Other commenters urged that
this standard was not appropriate and should be eliminated. In
particular, a number of commenters expressed concern that the burden of
proof requirements, which are more stringent than the burden of proof
requirements for typical contractual disputes adjudicated in a court,
unduly hamper the creditor protections of counterparties and impose a
burden directly on non-covered entities, who should be able to exercise
default rights if it is commercially reasonable in the context. One
commenter contended that this burden, combined with the stay on default
rights related ``indirectly'' to an affiliate entering insolvency
proceedings, effectively prohibits counterparties from exercising any
default rights during the stay period. These commenters argued that it
is inappropriate for the OCC by regulation to alter the burden of proof
for contractual disputes. One commenter suggested that, in a scenario
involving a master agreement with some transactions out of the money
and others in the money, the defaulting GSIB will have a lower burden
of proof for demonstrating that it is owed money than for demonstrating
that it owes money, should the non-GSIB counterparty exercise its
termination rights. Certain commenters suggested instead that the final
rule shift the burden and adopt a rebuttable presumption that the non-
defaulting counterparty's exercise of default rights is permitted under
the QFC unless the defaulting covered entity demonstrates otherwise.
One commenter requested that the burden of proof not apply to the
exercise of direct default rights.
Final Rule. The final rule retains the proposed burden of proof
requirements. The requirement is based on a primary goal of the final
rule--to avoid the disorderly termination of QFCs in response to the
failure of an affiliate of a GSIB. The requirement accomplishes this
goal by making clear that a party that exercises a default right when
an affiliate of its direct party enters receivership of insolvency
proceedings is unlikely to prevail in court unless there is clear and
convincing evidence that the exercise of the default right against a
covered entity is not related to the insolvency or resolution
proceeding. The requirement therefore should discourage the
impermissible exercise of default rights without prohibiting the
exercise of all default rights. Moreover, the burden of proof
requirement should not discourage the exercise of default rights after
or in response to a failure to satisfy a creditor protection provision
(e.g., direct default rights); such a failure should be easily
evidenced, even under a heightened burden of proof, such that
clarification through court proceedings should not be necessary.
7. Agency Transactions
Proposed Rule. In addition to entering into QFCs as principal,
GSIBs may engage in QFCs as agent for other principals. For example, a
GSIB subsidiary may enter into a master securities lending arrangement
with a foreign bank as agent for a U.S.-based pension fund. The GSIB
would document its role as agent for the pension fund, often through an
annex to the master agreement, and would generally provide to its
customer (the principal party) a securities replacement guarantee or
indemnification for any shortfall in collateral in the event of the
default of the foreign bank.\125\ A covered bank may also enter into a
QFC as principal where there is an agent acting on its behalf or on
behalf of its counterparty.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\125\ The definition of QFC under Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act
includes security agreements and other credit enhancements as well
as master agreements (including supplements). 12 U.S.C.
5390(c)(8)(D).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The proposed rule would have applied to a covered QFC regardless of
whether the covered bank or the covered bank's direct counterparty is
acting as a principal or as an agent. The proposed rule did not
distinguish between agents and principals with respect to default
rights or transfer restrictions applicable to covered QFCs. The
proposed rule would have limited default rights and transfer
restrictions that the principal and its agent may have against a
covered bank consistent with the U.S. Special Resolution Regimes. The
proposed rule would have ensured that, subject to the enumerated
creditor protections, neither the agent nor the principal could
exercise cross-default rights under the covered QFC against the covered
bank based on the resolution of an affiliate of the covered bank.\126\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\126\ Under the proposed rule, if a covered bank (acting as
agent) is a direct party to a covered QFC, then the general
prohibitions of Sec. 47.5(d) would only affect the substantive
rights of the agent's principal(s) to the extent that the covered
QFC provides default rights based directly or indirectly on the
entry into resolution of an affiliate of the covered bank (acting as
agent).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Comments. Commenters argued that the provisions of sections 47.4
and 47.5 that relate to transactions entered into by the covered bank
as agent should exclude QFCs where the covered bank or its affiliate
does not have any liability (including contingent liability) under or
in connection with the contract, or any payment or delivery obligations
with respect thereto. Commenters also argued that the proposed agent
provisions should not apply to circumstances where the covered bank
acts as agent for a counterparty whose transactions are excluded from
the requirements of the final rule.\127\ Commenters provided as an
example where an agent simply executes an agreement on behalf of the
principal but bears no liability thereunder, such as where an
[[Page 56652]]
investment manager signs an agreement on behalf of a client. Commenters
noted that such agreements could contain events of default relating to
the insolvency of the agent or an affiliate of the agent but that such
default rights would be difficult to track and that close-out of such
QFCs would not result in any loss or liquidity impact to the agent.
Rather, early termination under the agreements would subject the cash
and securities of the principals--not the agent--to realization and
liquidation. Therefore, the agent would not be exposed to the liquidity
and asset fire sale risks the proposed rule was intended to address.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\127\ Commenters argued this should be the case even where an
agent has entered an umbrella master agreement on behalf of more
than one principal, but only with respect to the contract of any
principals that are excluded counterparties.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Commenters contended that the requirement to conform QFCs with all
affiliates of a counterparty when an agent is acting on behalf of the
counterparty would be particularly burdensome, as the agent may not
have information about the counterparty's affiliates or their contracts
with covered entities. Commenters also requested clarification that
conformance is not required of contracts between a covered entity as
agent on behalf of a non-U.S. affiliate of a Foreign GSIB that would
not be a covered bank under the proposed rule, since default rights
related to the non-U.S. operations of Foreign GSIBs are not the focus
of the rule and do not bear a sufficient connection to U.S. financial
stability to warrant the burden and cost of compliance.
One commenter also urged that securities lending authorization
agreements (SLAAs) should be exempt from the final rule. The commenter
explained that SLAAs are banking services agreements that establish an
agency relationship with the lender of securities and an agent, and may
be considered credit enhancements for securities lending transactions
(and therefore QFCs) because the SLAAs typically require the agent to
indemnify the lender for any shortfall between the value of the
collateral and the value of the securities in the event of a borrower
default. The commenter explained that SLAAs typically do not contain
provisions that may impede the resolution of a GSIB, but may contain
termination rights or contractual restrictions on assignability.
However, the commenter argued that the beneficiaries under SLAAs lack
the incentive to contest the transfer of the SLAA to a bridge
institution in the event of GSIB insolvency.
Final Rule. To respond to concerns raised by commenters, the agency
provisions of the proposed rule have been modified in the final rule.
The final rule provides that a covered bank does not become a party to
a QFC solely by acting as agent to a QFC.\128\ Therefore, an in-scope
QFC would not be a covered QFC solely because a covered bank was acting
as the agent of a principal with respect to the QFC.\129\ For example,
the final rule would not require a covered bank to conform a master
securities lending arrangement (or the transactions under the
agreement) to the requirements of the final rule if the only
obligations of the covered bank under the agreement are to act as an
agent on behalf of one or more principals. This modification should
address many of the concerns raised by commenters.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\128\ See final rule Sec. 47.3(e)(1).
\129\ Such a QFC would nonetheless be a covered QFC with respect
to a principal that also was a covered entity. In response to
comments, the OCC notes that covered banks do not include non-U.S.
subsidiaries of a Foreign GSIB.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The final rule does not specifically exempt SLAAs because the
agreements provide the beneficiaries with contractual rights that may
hinder the orderly resolution of a GSIB and because it is unclear how
such beneficiaries would act in response to the failure of their agent.
More generally, the final rule does not exempt a QFC with respect to
which an agent also acts in another capacity, such as guarantor.
Continuing the example regarding the covered bank acting as agent with
respect to a master securities lending agreement, if the covered entity
also provided a SLAA that included the typical indemnification
provision discussed above, the agency exemption of the final rule would
not exclude the SLAA but would still exclude the master securities
lending agreement. This is because the covered bank is acting solely as
agent with respect to the master securities lending agreement but is
acting as agent and guarantor with respect to the SLAA. However, SLAAs
would be exempted under the final rule to the extent that they are not
``in-scope QFCs'' or otherwise meet the exemptions for covered QFCs of
the final rule.
8. Enforceability
Proposed Rule and Final Rule. Commenters also requested that the
final rule should clarify that obligations under a QFC would still be
enforceable even if its terms do not comply with the requirements of
the final rule, similar to assurances provided in respect of the U.K.
rule and German legislation. The enforceability of a contract is beyond
the scope of this final rule.
9. Interaction With Other Regulatory Requirements
Proposed Rule and Final Rule. Certain commenters requested
clarification that amending covered QFCs as required by this final rule
should not trigger other regulatory requirements for covered banks,
such as the swap margin requirements issued by the OCC, other
prudential regulators (FRB, FDIC, Farm Credit Administration, and
Federal Housing Financing Agency), and the U.S. Commodity Futures
Trading Commission (CFTC). In particular, commenters urged that
amending a swap to conform to this final rule should not jeopardize the
status of the swap as a legacy swap for purposes of the swap margin
requirements for non-cleared swaps.
These issues are outside the scope of this final rule as they
relate to the requirements of another rule issued by the OCC jointly
with the other prudential regulators, as well as a rule issued by the
CFTC. As commenters pointed out, addressing such issues may require
consultation with the other prudential regulators as well as the CFTC
and the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission to determine the impact
of the amendments required by this final rule for purposes of the
regulatory requirements under Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act. However,
as the proposed rule noted, the OCC is considering an amendment to the
definition of ``eligible master netting agreement'' to account for the
restrictions on covered QFCs and is consulting with the other
prudential regulators and the CFTC on this aspect of the final
rule.\130\ The OCC does not expect that compliance with this final rule
would trigger the swap margin requirements for non-cleared swaps.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\130\ See 81 FR 55381, 55396 (August 19, 2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
10. Compliance With the Universal Protocol
Proposed Rule. The proposed rule allowed covered banks to conform
covered QFCs to the requirements of the proposed rule through adherence
to the Universal Protocol. The Universal Protocol has two primary
operative provisions, Section 1 and Section 2. Under Section 1,
adhering parties essentially ``opt in'' to the U.S. Special Resolution
Regimes and certain other special resolution regimes. Therefore,
Section 1 is generally responsive to the concerns addressed in Sec.
47.4 of the proposed rule. Under Section 2, adhering parties
essentially forego, subject to the creditor protections of Section 2,
cross-default rights and
[[Page 56653]]
transfer restrictions on affiliate credit enhancements. Therefore,
Section 2 is generally responsive to the concerns addressed in Sec.
47.5 of the proposed rule.
The proposed rule noted that, while the scope of the stay-and-
transfer provisions of the Universal Protocol are narrower than the
stay-and-transfer provisions that would have been required under the
proposed rule, and the Universal Protocol provides a number of creditor
protection provisions that would not otherwise have been available
under the proposed rule, the Universal Protocol includes a number of
desirable features that the proposed rule lacked. The proposed rule
explained that ``when an entity (whether or not it is a covered bank)
adheres to the [Universal] Protocol, it necessarily adheres to the
[Universal] Protocol with respect to all covered entities that have
also adhered to the [Universal] Protocol rather than one or a subset of
covered entities (as the [proposed rule] may otherwise permit). . . .
By allowing for all covered QFCs to be modified by the same contractual
terms, this 'all-or-none' feature would promote transparency,
predictability and equal treatment with respect to default rights of
non-defaulting parties.'' \131\ This ``all-or-none'' feature is
referred to as ``universal adherence'' in the remainder of this
preamble. The proposed rule explained that the Universal Protocol
included other favorable features, which include that it amends all
existing transactions of adhering parties, does not provide the
counterparty with default rights in addition to those provided under
the underlying QFC, applies to all QFCs, and includes resolution under
bankruptcy as well as U.S. and certain non-U.S. Special Resolution
Regimes. Because the features of the Universal Protocol, considered
together, appeared to increase the likelihood that the resolution of a
GSIB under a range of scenarios could be carried out in an orderly
manner, the proposal stated that QFCs amended by the Universal Protocol
would have been consistent with the proposal, notwithstanding
differences from Sec. 47.5 of the proposed rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\131\ 81 FR 55381, 55394 (August 19, 2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Comments and Final Rule. Commenters generally supported the
proposed rule's provisions to allow covered banks to comply with the
requirements of the proposed rule through adherence to the Universal
Protocol. For the reasons discussed in this preamble and in the
proposed rule, the final rule continues to allow covered banks to
comply with the rule through adherence to the Universal Protocol and
makes other modifications to the proposed rule to address comments.
A few commenters requested that the final rule clarify two
technical aspects of adherence to the Universal Protocol. These
commenters requested confirmation that adherence to the Universal
Protocol would also satisfy the requirements of Sec. 47.4. The
commenters also requested confirmation that QFCs that incorporate the
terms of the Universal Protocol by reference also would be deemed to
comply with the terms of the proposed alternative method of
compliance.\132\ By clarifying Sec. 47.6(a), the final rule confirms
(1) that adherence to the Universal Protocol is deemed to satisfy the
requirements of Sec. 47.4 of the final rule (as well as Sec. 47.5)
and (2) that conformance of a covered QFC through the Universal
Protocol includes incorporation of the terms of the Universal Protocol
by reference by protocol adherents. This clarification also applies to
the U.S. Protocol, discussed below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\132\ ``As between two Adhering Parties, the [Universal
Protocol] only amends agreements between the Adhering Parties that
have been entered into as of the date that the Adhering Parties
adhere (as well as any subsequent transactions thereunder), but it
does not amend agreements that Adhering Parties enter into after
that date. . . . If Adhering Parties wish for their future
agreements to be subject to the terms of the [Universal Protocol] or
a Jurisdictional Module Protocol under the ISDA JMP, it is expected
that they would incorporate the terms of the [relevant protocol] by
reference into such agreements.'' Letter to Robert deV. Frierson,
Secretary, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, from
Katherine T. Darras, ISDA General Counsel, The International Swaps
and Derivatives Association, Inc., at 8-9 (August 5, 2016). This
commenter noted that incorporation by reference was consistent with
the proposed rule and asked that the text of the final rule be
clarified. Id. at 9. Given the OCC's intent to ensure that the
substantive requirements of its final rule are consistent with those
of the FRB and FDIC, the OCC has reviewed this letter to the extent
applicable to the OCC's final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
One commenter indicated that many non-covered entity counterparties
do not have ISDA master agreements for physically-settled forward and
commodity contracts and, therefore, compliance with the proposed rule's
requirements through adherence to the Universal Protocol would entail
substantial time and educational effort. As in the proposed rule, the
final rule simply permits adherence to the Universal Protocol as one
method of compliance with the final rule's requirements, and parties
may meet the final rule's requirements through bilateral negotiation,
if they choose. Moreover, the Securities Financing Transaction Annex
and Other Agreements Annex of the Universal Protocol, which are
specifically identified in the proposed and final rule, are designed to
amend QFCs that are not ISDA master agreements.
11. Compliance With the U.S. Protocol
Proposed Rule and Comments. In addition to the Universal Protocol,
many commenters argued that the final rule should allow compliance with
the final rule through a yet-to-be-created ``U.S. Jurisdictional Module
to the ISDA Resolution Stay Jurisdictional Modular Protocol'' (an
``approved U.S. JMP'') that is generally the same but narrower in scope
than the Universal Protocol.\133\ Many non-GSIB commenters argued that
they were not involved with the drafting of the Universal Protocol and
that an approved U.S. JMP would create a level playing field between
those that were involved in the drafting and those that were not. In
general, commenters identified two aspects of the Universal Protocol
that they argued should be narrowed in the approved U.S. JMP: The scope
of the special resolution regimes and the universal adherence feature
of the Universal Protocol.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\133\ Commenters argued that approval of the approved U.S. JMP
should not require satisfaction of the administrative requirements
of Sec. 47.6, since the OCC has already conducted that analysis in
deciding to provide a safe harbor for the Universal Protocol.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
With respect to the scope of the special resolution regimes of the
Universal Protocol, commenters' concern focused on the special
resolution regimes of ``Protocol-eligible Regimes.'' Some commenters
also expressed concern with the scope of ``Identified Regimes'' of the
Universal Protocol.
The Universal Protocol defines ``Identified Regimes'' as the
special resolution regimes of France, Germany, Japan, Switzerland, and
the United Kingdom, as well as the U.S. Special Resolution Regimes. The
Universal Protocol defines ``Protocol-eligible Regimes'' as resolution
regimes of other jurisdictions specified in the protocol that satisfies
the requirements of the Universal Protocol. The Universal Protocol
provides a ``Country Annex,'' which is a mechanism by which individual
adherents to the Universal Protocol may agree that a specific
jurisdiction satisfies the requirements of a ``Protocol-eligible
Regime.'' The Universal Protocol referred to in the proposed rule did
not include any Country Annex for any Protocol-eligible Regime.\134\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\134\ The proposed rule defined the Universal Protocol as the
``ISDA 2015 Universal Resolution Stay Protocol, including the
Securities Financing Transaction Annex and Other Agreements Annex,
published by the International Swaps and Derivatives Association,
Inc., as of May 3, 2016, and minor or technical amendments
thereto.'' See proposed rule Sec. 47.6(a). As of May 3, 2016, ISDA
had not published any Country Annex for a Protocol-eligible Regime
and such publication would not be a minor or technical amendment to
the Universal Protocol. Consistent with the proposed rule, the final
rule does not define the Universal Protocol to include any Country
Annex. However, the final rule does not penalize adherence to any
Country Annex. A covered QFC that is amended by the Universal
Protocol--but not a Country Annex--will be deemed to conform to the
requirements of the final rule. In addition, a covered QFC that is
amended by the Universal Protocol--including one or more Country
Annexes--is also deemed to conform to the requirements of the final
rule. See final rule Sec. 47.6(a)(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
[[Page 56654]]
Commenters requested the final rule include a safe harbor for an
approved U.S. JMP that does not include Protocol-eligible Regimes.
Commenters argued that many counterparties may not be able to adhere to
the Universal Protocol because they would not be able to adhere to a
Protocol-eligible Regime in the absence of law or regulation mandating
such adherence, as it would force counterparties to give up default
rights in jurisdictions where that is not yet legally required.\135\ In
support of their argument, commenters cited their fiduciary duties to
act in the best interests of their clients or shareholders. Commenters
also argued that an approved U.S. JMP should not include Identified
Regimes and noted that the other Identified Regimes have already
adopted measures to require contractual recognition of their special
resolution regimes.\136\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\135\ The Protocol-eligible Regime requirements of the Universal
Protocol do not include a requirement that a law or regulation, such
as the final rule, require parties to contractually opt in to the
regime.
\136\ One commenter requested clarification that a QFC of a
covered bank with a non-U.S. credit support provider for the covered
bank complies with the requirements of the final rule to the extent
the covered bank has adhered to the relevant jurisdictional modular
protocol for the jurisdiction of the non-U.S. credit support
provider. The jurisdictional modular protocols for other counties do
not satisfy the requirements of the final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
With respect to the universal adherence feature of the Universal
Protocol, commenters argued that universal adherence imposed
significant monitoring burdens since new adherents may join the
Universal Protocol at any time. To address this concern, some
commenters requested that an approved U.S. JMP allow a counterparty to
adhere on a firm-by-firm or entity-by-entity basis. Other commenters
suggested, or supported approval of, an approved U.S. JMP in which a
counterparty would adhere to all current covered entities under the
final rule (to be identified on a ``static list'') and would adhere to
new covered entities on an entity-by-entity basis. This static list,
commenters argued, would retain the ``universal adherence mechanics''
of the Universal Protocol and allow market participants to fulfill due
diligence obligations related to compliance. Commenters also argued
that universal adherence would be overbroad because the Universal
Protocol could amend QFCs to which a covered bank was not a party.
Certain commenters argued that adhering with respect to any
counterparty would also be inconsistent with their fiduciary duties.
Final Rule. In response to comments and to further facilitate
compliance, the final rule provides that covered QFCs amended through
adherence to the Universal Protocol or a new (and separate) protocol
(the ``U.S. Protocol'') would be deemed to conform the covered QFCs to
the requirements of the final rule.\137\ The U.S. Protocol may differ
(and is required to differ) from the Universal Protocol in certain
respects, as discussed below, but otherwise must be substantively
identical to the Universal Protocol.\138\ Therefore, the reasons for
deeming covered QFCs amended by the Universal Protocol to conform to
the final rule, discussed above and in the proposed rule, apply to the
U.S. Protocol.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\137\ The final rule also provides that the OCC may determine
otherwise based on specific facts and circumstances. See final rule
Sec. 47.6(a).
\138\ Commenters expressed support for having the U.S. Protocol
apply to both existing and future QFCs. One commenter requested that
an approved U.S. JMP should apply only to QFCs governed by non-U.S.
law because the U.S. Special Resolution Regimes already apply to
QFCs governed by U.S. law. As discussed, the final rule does not
exempt a QFC solely because the QFC explicitly states that it is
governed by U.S. law. Moreover, such a limited application would
reduce the desirable additional benefits of the Universal Protocol
as discussed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Consistent with the proposed rule \139\ and requests by commenters,
the U.S. Protocol may limit the application of the provisions the
Universal Protocol identifies as Section 1 and Section 2 to only
covered banks.\140\ As requested by commenters, this limitation on the
scope of the U.S. Protocol may ensure that the U.S. Protocol would only
amend covered QFCs under this final rule or the substantively identical
final rules issued by the FRB and FDIC, and not also QFCs outside the
scope of the final rules of the OCC, FRB, and FDIC (i.e., QFCs between
parties that are not covered entities, covered banks, or covered FSIs).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\139\ The proposed rule explained that a ``jurisdictional module
for the United States that is substantively identical to the
[Universal] Protocol in all respects aside from exempting QFCs
between adherents that are not covered entities or covered banks
would be consistent with the current proposal.''
\140\ The final rule does not require the U.S. Protocol to
retain the same section numbering as the Universal Protocol. The
final rule allows the U.S. protocol to have minor and technical
differences from the Universal Protocol. See final rule Sec.
47.6(a)(3)(ii)(E).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The final rule also provides that the U.S. Protocol is required to
include the U.S. Special Resolution Regimes and the other Identified
Regimes but is not required to include Protocol-eligible Regimes.\141\
As noted, the Universal Protocol, as defined in the proposed rule, did
not include any Country Annex for a Protocol-eligible Regime; the only
special resolution regimes specifically identified in the Universal
Protocol, as defined in the proposed rule, were the U.S. Special
Resolution Regimes and the other Identified Regimes. As explained in
the proposed rule, inclusion of the Identified Regimes should help
facilitate the resolution of a GSIB across a broader range of
circumstances. Inclusion of the Identified Regimes in the U.S. Protocol
also should support laws and regulations similar to the final rule and
help encourage GSIB entities in the United States to adhere to a
protocol that includes all Identified Regimes. However, the final rule
does not require the U.S. Protocol to include Protocol-eligible
Regimes, including definitions and adherence mechanisms related to
Protocol-eligible Regimes.\142\ Inclusion of only the Identified
Regimes in the U.S. Protocol, considered in light of the other benefits
to the resolution of GSIBs provided by the Universal Protocol and U.S.
Protocol as well as commenters' concerns with potential adherence to
Protocol-eligible Regimes, should sufficiently advance the objective of
the final rule to increase the likelihood that a resolution of a GSIB
could be carried out in an orderly manner under a range of scenarios.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\141\ See final rule Sec. 47.6(a)(3)(ii)(A). The U.S. Protocol
is likewise not required to include definitions and adherence
mechanisms related to Protocol-eligible Regimes. The final rule
allows the U.S. Protocol to include minor and technical differences
from the Universal Protocol and, similarly, differences necessary to
conform the U.S. Protocol to the substantive differences allowed or
required from the Universal Protocol. See final rule Sec.
47.6(a)(3)(ii)(E).
\142\ See final rule Sec. 47.6(a)(3)(ii)(A).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The final rule does not permit the U.S. Protocol to permit parties
to adhere on a firm-by-firm or entity-by-entity basis because such
adherence mechanisms requested by commenters would obviate one of the
primary benefits of the Universal Protocol: universal adherence.
Similarly, the final rule does not permit adherence to a ``static
list'' of all current covered entities, which other commenters
requested.\143\ Although the static list
[[Page 56655]]
would initially provide for universal adherence, the static list would
not provide for universal adherence with respect to entities that
became covered entities after the static list was finalized. To help
ensure that the additional creditor protections of the Universal
Protocol and U.S. Protocol continue to be justified, both protocols
must ensure that the desirable features of the protocols, including
universal adherence, continue to be present as GSIBs acquire
subsidiaries with existing QFCs and existing organizations become
designated as GSIBs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\143\ The final rule, however, does not prohibit the creation of
a dynamic list identifying all current ``Covered Parties,'' as would
be defined in the U.S. Protocol, to facilitate due diligence and
provide additional clarity to the market. See final rule Sec.
47.6(a)(3)(ii)(E) (allowing minor and technical differences from the
Universal Protocol).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The final rule also addresses provisions that allow an adherent to
elect that Section 1 and/or Section 2 of the Universal Protocol do not
apply to the adherent's contracts.\144\ The Universal Protocol refers
to these provisions as ``opt-outs.'' The proposed rule explained that
adherence to the Universal Protocol was an alternative method of
compliance with the proposed rule and that covered QFCs that were not
amended by the Universal Protocol must otherwise conform to the
proposed rule. In other words, the proposed rule would have required
that a covered QFC be conformed regardless of the method the covered
bank and counterparty chooses to conform the QFC.\145\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\144\ Section 4(b) of the Universal Protocol.
\145\ Under the final rule, if an adherent to the Universal
Protocol or U.S. Protocol exercises an available opt-out, covered
banks with covered QFCs affected by the exercise would be required
to otherwise conform the covered QFCs to the requirements of the
final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Consistent with the basic purposes of the final rule, the U.S.
Protocol must require that opt-outs exercised by its adherents will
only be effective to the extent that the affected covered QFCs
otherwise conform to the requirements of the final rule. Therefore, the
U.S. Protocol allows counterparties to exercise available opt-out
rights in a manner that also allows covered banks to ensure that their
covered QFCs continue to conform to the requirements of the final rule.
The final rule also provides that, under the U.S. Protocol, the
opt-out in Section 4(b)(i)(A) of the attachment to the Universal
Protocol (Sunset Opt-out) \146\ must not apply with respect to the U.S.
Special Resolution Regimes because the opt-out is no longer relevant
with respect to the U.S. Special Resolution Regimes. This final rule,
along with the substantively identical rules expected to be issued by
the FRB and FDIC, should prevent exercise of the Sunset Opt-out with
respect to the U.S. Special Resolution Regimes under the Universal
Protocol. Inapplicability of this opt-out with respect to U.S. Special
Resolution Regimes in the U.S. Protocol should provide additional
clarity to adherents that the U.S. Protocol will continue to provide
for universal adherence after January 1, 2018.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\146\ See Sec. 4(b)(i)(A) of the Universal Protocol.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The final rule also expressly addresses a provision in the
Universal Protocol that concerns the client-facing leg of a cleared
transaction. As discussed above, the final rule, like the proposed
rule, does not exempt the client-facing leg of a cleared transaction.
Therefore, the U.S. Protocol must not include the exemption in Section
2 of the Universal Protocol regarding the client-facing leg of the
transaction.\147\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\147\ Section 2 of the Universal Protocol provides an exemption
for any client-facing leg of a cleared transaction. See section 2(k)
of the Universal Protocol and the definition of ``Cleared Client
Transaction.'' The final rule does not amend the proposed rule's
treatment of QFCs that are ``Cleared Client Transactions'' under the
Universal Protocol, but requires that the provisions of that section
must not apply with respect to the U.S. Protocol. See final rule
Sec. 47.6(a)(3)(ii)(D).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
G. Process for Approval of Enhanced Creditor Protections (Sec. 47.6)
1. Requests for Approval of Enhanced Creditor Protections
Proposed Rule. As discussed previously, the proposed restrictions
would leave many creditor protections that are commonly included in
QFCs unaffected. The proposed rule would have also allowed any covered
bank to submit to the OCC a request to approve as compliant with the
proposed rule one or more QFCs that contain additional creditor
protections--that is, creditor protections that would be impermissible
under the proposed restrictions set forth previously. A covered bank
making such a request would have been required to explain how its
request is consistent with the purposes of the proposed rule, including
an analysis of the contractual terms for which approval is requested in
light of a range of factors that are laid out by the proposed rule and
intended to facilitate the OCC's consideration of whether permitting
the contractual terms would be consistent with the proposed
restrictions. The proposed rule noted that the OCC expected to consult
with the FDIC and FRB during its consideration of a request under this
section.
The first two factors concerned the potential impact of the
requested creditor protections on GSIB resilience and resolvability.
The next four concerned the scope of the covered bank's request:
Adoption on an industry-wide basis, coverage of existing and future
transactions, coverage of one or multiple QFCs, and coverage of some or
all covered banks. Creditor protections that may be applied on an
industry-wide basis may help to ensure that impediments to resolution
are addressed on a uniform basis, which could increase market
certainty, transparency, and equitable treatment. Creditor protections
that apply broadly to a range of QFCs and covered banks would increase
the chance that all of a GSIB's QFC counterparties would be treated the
same way during a resolution of that GSIB and may improve the prospects
for an orderly resolution of that GSIB. By contrast, covered bank
requests that would expand counterparties' rights beyond those afforded
under existing QFCs would conflict with the proposed rule's goal of
reducing the risk of mass unwinds of GSIB QFCs. The proposed rule also
included three factors that focus on the creditor protections specific
to supported parties. The proposed rule noted that the OCC may weigh
the appropriateness of additional protections for supported QFCs
against the potential impact of such provisions on the orderly
resolution of a GSIB.
In addition to analyzing the request under the enumerated factors,
a covered bank requesting that the OCC approve enhanced creditor
protections would have been required to submit a legal opinion stating
that the requested terms would be valid and enforceable under the
applicable law of the relevant jurisdictions, along with any additional
relevant information requested by the OCC.
Under the proposed rule, the OCC could have approved a request for
an alternative set of creditor protections if the terms of that QFC, as
compared to a covered QFC containing only the limited exceptions
discussed previously, would promote the orderly resolution of federally
chartered or licensed institutions or their affiliates, prevent or
mitigate risks to the financial stability of the United States or the
Federal banking system that could arise from the failure of a global
systemically important BHC or global systemically important FBO, and
protect the safety and soundness of covered banks to at least the same
extent. The proposed request-and-approval process improved flexibility
by allowing for an industry-proposed alternative to the set of creditor
protections permitted by the proposed rule while ensuring that any
[[Page 56656]]
approved alternative would serve the proposed rule's policy goals to at
least the same extent.
Comments. Commenters requested that this approval process be made
less burdensome and more flexible and urged for additional
clarifications on the process for submitting and approving such
requests (e.g., whether approvals would be published in the Federal
Register). For example, commenters requested the final rule include a
reasonable timeline (e.g., 180 days) by which the OCC would approve or
deny a request. Certain commenters urged that counterparties and trade
groups, in addition to covered banks, should be permitted to make such
requests. One commenter noted that the proposed rule's approval process
would have created a free-rider problem, where parties that submit
enhanced creditor protection conditions for OCC approval bear the full
cost of learning which remedies are available for creditors while other
parties will gain that information for free. Commenters contended that
the provision requiring a ``written legal opinion verifying the
proposed provisions and amendments would be valid and enforceable under
applicable law of the relevant jurisdictions'' should be eliminated as
unnecessary.\148\ Additionally, commenters urged that the provision
should be broadened to allow approvals of provisions not directly
related to enhanced creditor protections.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\148\ One commenter also suggested permitting amendments to QFCs
to be accomplished through a confirmation document for a new
agreement or by email instead of a formal amendment of the QFC
signed by the parties. The final rule does not prescribe a specific
method for amending covered QFCs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Final Rule. The final rule clarifies that the OCC could approve an
alternative proposal of additional creditor protections as compliant
with sections 47.4 and 47.5 of the final rule, but the OCC has not
otherwise modified these provisions of the proposal in response to
changes requested by commenters. The provisions contain flexibility and
guidance on the process for submitting and approving enhanced creditor
protections. The final rule directly places requirements only on
covered banks, and thus only covered banks are eligible to submit
requests pursuant to these provisions. In response to commenters'
concerns, the OCC notes that the final rule does not prevent multiple
covered banks from presenting one request and does not prevent covered
banks from seeking the input of counterparties when developing a
request. The final rule does not provide a maximum time to review
proposals because proposals could vary greatly in complexity and
novelty. The final rule also maintains the provision requiring a
written legal opinion, which helps ensure that proposed provisions are
valid and enforceable under applicable law. The final rule does not
expand the approval process beyond additional creditor protections;
however, revisions to aspects of the final rule may be made through the
rulemaking process.
2. Compliance With the International Swaps and Derivatives Association
(ISDA) 2015 Universal Resolution Stay Protocol and U.S. Protocol
Proposed Rule and Final Rule. In lieu of the process for the
approval of enhanced creditor protections that are described
previously, a covered bank would be permitted to comply with the
proposed rule by amending a covered QFC through adherence to the ISDA
2015 Universal Resolution Stay Protocol (including immaterial
amendments to the Protocol).\149\ The Protocol ``enables parties to
amend the terms of their financial contracts to contractually recognize
the cross-border application of special resolution regimes applicable
to certain financial companies and support the resolution of certain
financial companies under the [U.S.] Bankruptcy Code.'' \150\ The
Protocol amends ISDA Master Agreements, which are used for derivatives
transactions. Market participants also may amend their master
agreements for securities financing transactions by adhering to the
Securities Financing Transaction Annex \151\ to the Protocol and may
amend all other QFCs by adhering to the Other Agreements Annex. Thus, a
covered bank would be able to comply with the proposed rule with
respect to all of its covered QFCs through adherence to the Protocol
and the annexes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\149\ International Swaps and Derivatives Association, Inc.,
``ISDA 2015 Universal Resolution Stay Protocol'' (November 4, 2015),
available at http://assets.isda.org/media/ac6b533f-3/5a7c32f8-pdf/.
The Protocol was developed by a working group of member institutions
of the ISDA, in coordination with the FRB, the FDIC, the OCC, and
foreign financial supervisory agencies. ISDA is expected to
supplement the Protocol with ISDA Resolution Stay Jurisdictional
Modular Protocols for the United States and other jurisdictions. A
U.S. module that is the same in all respects to the Protocol aside
from exempting QFCs between adherents that are not covered banks
would be consistent with the current proposed rule.
\150\ Protocol Press Release at http://www2.isda.org/functional-areas/protocol-management/protocol/22.
\151\ The Securities Financing Transaction Annex was developed
by the International Capital Markets Association, the International
Securities Lending Association, and the Securities Industry and
Financial Markets Association, in coordination with the ISDA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Protocol has the same general objective as the proposed rule,
which is to make GSIB entities more resolvable by amending their
contracts to, in effect, contractually recognize the applicability of
special resolution regimes (including the OLA and the FDI Act) and to
restrict cross-default provisions to facilitate orderly resolution
under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. The provisions of the Protocol largely
track the requirements of the proposed rule.\152\ However, the Protocol
does have a narrower scope than the proposed rule,\153\ and it allows
for somewhat stronger creditor protections than would otherwise be
permitted under the proposed rule.\154\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\152\ For example, sections 2(a) and 2(b) of the Protocol impose
general prohibitions on cross-default rights based on the entry of
an affiliate of the direct party into the most common U.S.
resolution proceedings, including resolution under the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code. By allowing the exercise of ``Performance Default
Rights'' and ``Unrelated Default Rights,'' as those terms are
defined in Sec. 6 of the Protocol, sections 2(a) and 2(b) also
generally permit the creditor protections that would be allowed
under the proposed rule. Section 2(f) of the Protocol overrides
certain contractual provisions that would block the transfer of a
credit enhancement to a transferee entity. Section 2(i),
complemented by the Protocol's definition of the term ``Unrelated
Default Rights,'' provides that a party seeking to exercise
permitted default rights must bear the burden of establishing by
clear and convincing evidence that those rights may indeed be
exercised.
\153\ The restrictions on default rights imposed by section 2 of
the Protocol apply only when an affiliate of the direct party enters
``U.S. Insolvency Proceedings,'' which is defined to include
proceedings under Chapters 7 and 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, the FDI
Act, and the Securities Investor Protection Act. By contrast, Sec.
47.4 of the proposed rule would apply broadly to default rights
related to affiliates of the direct party ``becoming subject to a
receivership, insolvency, liquidation, resolution, or similar
proceeding,'' which encompasses proceedings under State and foreign
law.
\154\ For example, the Protocol allows a non-defaulting party to
exercise cross-default rights based on the entry of an affiliate of
the direct party into certain resolution proceedings if the direct
party's U.S. parent has not gone into resolution. See paragraph (b)
of the Protocol's definition of ``Unrelated Default Rights''; see
also sections 1 and 3(b) of the Protocol. As another example, if the
affiliate credit support provider that has entered bankruptcy
remains obligated under the credit enhancement, rather than
transferring it to a transferee, then the Protocol's restrictions on
the exercise of default rights continue to apply beyond the stay
period only if the Bankruptcy Court issues a ``Creditor Protection
Order.'' Such an order would, among other things, grant
administrative expense status to the non-defaulting party's claims
under the credit enhancement. See sections 2(b)(i)(B) and
2(b)(iii)(B) of the Protocol and the Protocol's definitions of
``Creditor Protection Order'' and ``DIP Stay Conditions.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Protocol also includes a feature, not included in the proposed
rule, that compensates for the Protocol's narrower scope and allowance
for stronger creditor protections: When an entity
[[Page 56657]]
(whether or not it is a covered bank) adheres to the Protocol, it
necessarily adheres to the Protocol with respect to all covered
entities that have also adhered to the Protocol.\155\ Thus, if all
covered banks adhere to the Protocol, any other entity that chooses to
adhere will simultaneously adhere with respect to all covered entities
and covered banks. By allowing for all covered QFCs to be modified by
the same contractual terms, this ``all-or-none'' feature would promote
transparency, predictability, and equal treatment with respect to
counterparties' default rights during the resolution of a GSIB entity
and thereby advance the proposed rule's objective of increasing the
likelihood that such a resolution could be carried out in an orderly
manner.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\155\ Under section 4(a) of the Protocol, the Protocol is
generally effective as between any two adhering parties, once the
relevant effective date has arrived. Under section 4(b)(ii), an
adhering party that is not a covered bank may choose to opt out of
section 2 of the Protocol with respect to its contracts with any
other adhering party that is also not a covered bank. However, the
Protocol will apply to relationships between any covered bank that
adheres and any other adhering party.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Like Sec. 47.5 of the proposed rule, Section 2 of the Protocol was
developed to increase GSIB resolvability under the Bankruptcy Code and
other U.S. insolvency regimes. The Protocol does allow for somewhat
broader creditor protections than would otherwise be permitted under
the proposed rule, but, consistent with the Protocol's purpose, those
additional creditor protections would not materially diminish the
prospects for the orderly resolution of a GSIB. And the Protocol
carries the desirable all-or-none feature, which would further increase
a GSIB entity's resolvability and which the proposed rule otherwise
lacks. For these reasons, and consistent with the broad policy
objective of enhancing the stability of the U.S. financial system by
increasing the resolvability of systemically important financial
companies in the United States, this provision of the proposed rule is
adopted by this final rule, to allow a covered bank to bring its
covered QFCs into compliance by amending them through adherence to the
Protocol (and, as relevant, the annexes to the Protocol).
H. Transition Periods (Sections 47.4 and 47.5)
Proposed Rule. Under the proposed rule, compliance would be
required on the first day of the first calendar quarter that begins at
least one year after the issuance of the final rule (effective
date).\156\ Moreover, the proposed rule required a covered bank to
bring preexisting covered QFCs entered into prior to the effective date
into compliance with the proposed rule no later than the first date on
or after the effective date on which the covered bank enters into a new
covered QFC with the counterparty to the preexisting covered QFC or
with an affiliate of that counterparty. Thus, under the proposed rule,
a covered bank would not be required to conform a preexisting QFC if
that covered bank (or any affiliate of that covered bank) does not
enter into any new QFCs with the same counterparty or an affiliate of
that counterparty on or after the effective date.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\156\ Under section 302(b) of the Riegle Community Development
and Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994, new regulations that impose
requirements on insured depository institutions generally must
``take effect on the first day of a calendar quarter which begins on
or after the date on which the regulations are published in final
form.'' 12 U.S.C. 4802(b).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Comments. A number of commenters urged the OCC to adopt a phased-in
approach to compliance that would extend the compliance deadline for
covered QFCs with certain types of counterparties in order to allow
time for necessary client outreach and education, especially for non-
GSIB counterparties that may be unfamiliar with the Universal Protocol
or the final rule's requirements. These commenters contended that the
original compliance period of one year should be limited to
counterparties that are banks, broker-dealers, swap dealers, security-
based swap dealers, major swap participants, and major security-based
swap participants. These commenters urged that the compliance period
for QFCs with asset managers, commodity pools, private funds, and other
entities that are predominantly engaged in activities that are
financial in nature within the meaning of Section 4(k) of the BHC Act
should be extended for six months after the date of the original
compliance period identified in the proposed rule. Finally, these
commenters argued that the compliance period for QFCs with all other
counterparties should be extended for 12 months after the date of the
original compliance period identified in the proposed rule as these
counterparties are likely to be least familiar with the requirements of
the final rule.
One commenter suggested that the final rule should take effect no
sooner than one year from the date that an approved U.S. JMP is
published and available for adherence, including any additional time it
might take to seek the OCC's approval of it. Certain commenters
requested that the compliance deadline for covered QFCs entered into by
an agent on behalf of a principal be extended by six months as well.
Other commenters, however, cautioned against an approach that would
impose different deadlines with respect to different classes of QFCs,
as opposed to counterparty types, since the main challenge in
connection with the remediation is the need for outreach to and
education of counterparties. These commenters contended that once a
counterparty has become familiar with the requirements of the rule and
the terms of the required amendments, it would be more efficient to
remediate all covered QFCs with the counterparty at the same time.
A number of commenters also requested that the OCC confirm that
entities that are acquired by a GSIB, and thereby become new covered
banks, have until the first day of the first calendar quarter
immediately following one year after becoming covered banks to conform
their existing QFCs. Commenters argued that this would allow the GSIB
to conform existing QFCs in an orderly fashion without impairing the
ability of covered bank and the affiliates of the covered bank to
engage in corporate activities. These commenters also requested
clarification that, during that conformance period, affiliates of
covered banks would not be prohibited from entering into new
transactions or QFCs with counterparties of the newly acquired entity
if the existing covered banks otherwise comply with the final rule's
requirements.
Some commenters urged the OCC to exclude existing contracts from
the final rule's requirements and only apply the rule on a prospective
basis. Certain commenters opposed application of the requirements of
the rule to existing QFCs, requesting instead that the final rule only
apply to QFCs entered into after the effective date of any final rule
and that all pre-existing QFCs not be subject to the rule's
requirements. Commenters suggested that end users of QFCs with GSIB
affiliates might not have entered into existing contracts without the
default rights prohibited in the proposed rule and that revising
existing QFCs would be time-consuming and expensive. Commenters pointed
out that this treatment would be consistent with the final rules in the
U.K. and the statutory requirements adopted by Germany.
Final Rule. The effective date for the final rule is January 1,
2018. However, in order to reduce the compliance burden of the final
rule, the OCC has adopted a phased-in compliance schedule, as requested
by commenters. The final rule provides that a covered bank must conform
a covered QFC to
[[Page 56658]]
the requirements of this final rule by the first day of the calendar
quarter immediately following one year from the January 1, 2018,
effective date of the final rule with respect to covered QFCs with
other covered entities, covered banks, or covered FSIs (referred to as
the ``first compliance date'' for the purposes of this preamble).\157\
This provision allows the counterparties that should be most familiar
with the requirements of the final rule over one year to conform with
the final rule's requirements. Moreover, this is a relatively small
number of counterparties that would need to modify their QFCs in the
first year following the January 1, 2018, effective date of the final
rule, and many covered entities, covered banks, and covered FSIs with
covered QFCs have already adhered to the Universal Protocol.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\157\ See final rule Sec. 47.3(f)(1)(i). The definition of
covered QFC of the final rule has been revised to make clear that,
consistent with the proposed rule, a covered QFC is a QFC that the
covered bank becomes a party to on or after the first day of the
calendar quarter immediately following one year from the January 1,
2018, effective date of this final rule. See final rule Sec.
47.3(c). As discussed above, a covered bank's in-scope QFC that is
entered into before this date may also be a covered QFC if the
covered bank or any affiliate that is a covered entity, covered
bank, or covered FSI also becomes a party to a QFC with the same
counterparty or a consolidated affiliate of the same counterparty on
or after the first compliance date. See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The final rule provides additional time for compliance with the
requirements for other types of counterparties. In particular, for
other types of financial counterparties \158\ (other than small
financial institutions),\159\ the final rule provides 18 months from
the January 1, 2018, effective date of the final rule for compliance
with its requirements, as requested by commenters.\160\ For community
banks and other non-financial counterparties, the final rule provides
two years from the January 1, 2018, effective date of the final rule
for compliance with its requirements, as requested by commenters.\161\
Adopting a phased-in compliance approach based on the type (and, in
some cases, size) of the counterparty will allow market participants
time to adjust to the new requirements and make required changes to
QFCs in an orderly manner. It will also give time for development of
the U.S. Protocol or any other protocol that would meet the
requirements of the final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\158\ See final rule Sec. 47.2 (defining ``financial
counterparty'').
\159\ The final rule defines small financial institution as an
insured bank, insured savings association, farm credit system
institution, or credit union with assets of $10,000,000,000 or less.
See final rule Sec. 47.2.
\160\ See final rule Sec. 47.3(f)(1)(ii).
\161\ See final rule Sec. 47.3(f)(1)(iii).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The OCC is giving this additional time for compliance to respond to
concerns raised by commenters. The OCC encourages covered banks to
start planning and outreach efforts early in order to come into
compliance with the final rule in the time frames provided. The OCC
believes that this additional time for compliance should also address
concerns raised by commenters regarding the burden of conforming
existing contracts by allowing firms additional time to conform all
covered QFCs to the requirements of the final rule.
Although the phased-in compliance period does not contain special
rules related to acting as an agent as requested by certain commenters,
the final rule has been modified as described above to clarify that a
covered bank does not become a party to a QFC solely by acting as agent
with respect to the QFC.\162\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\162\ See final rule Sec. 47.3(e)(1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
National banks, FSAs, and Federal branches and agencies that are
covered banks when the final rule is effective on January 1, 2018,
would be required to comply with the requirements of the final rule
beginning on the first compliance date. Thus, a covered bank would be
required to ensure that covered QFCs entered into on or after the first
compliance date comply with the final rule's requirements but would be
given more time to conform such covered QFCs with counterparties (or
other parties to the QFC) that are not a covered entity, covered bank,
or covered FSI.\163\ Moreover, a covered bank would be required to
bring an in-scope QFC entered into prior to the first compliance date
into compliance with the final rule no later than the applicable date
of the tiered compliance dates (discussed previously) if the covered
bank or an affiliate (that is also a covered entity, covered bank, or
covered FSI) enters into a new covered QFC with the counterparty to the
pre-existing covered QFC or a consolidated affiliate of the
counterparty on or after the first compliance date.\164\ Thus,
consistent with the proposed rule, a covered bank would not be required
to conform a pre-existing QFC if that covered bank and its affiliate
that is a covered entity, covered bank, or covered FSI do not enter
into any new QFCs with the same counterparty or its consolidated
affiliates on or after the first compliance date.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\163\ See final rule Sec. 47.3(c)(1) and (f)(1).
\164\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition, a national bank, FSA or Federal branch or agency that
becomes a covered bank after the January 1, 2018, effective date of the
final rule (referred to as a ``new covered bank'' for purposes of this
preamble) generally has the same period of time to comply as a national
bank, FSA, or Federal branch or agency that is a covered bank on the
January 1, 2018, effective date (i.e., compliance will phase in over a
two-year period based on the type of counterparty).\165\ The final rule
also clarifies that a covered QFC, with respect to a new covered bank,
means an in-scope QFC that the new covered bank becomes a party to (1)
on the date the covered bank first becomes a covered bank, and (2)
before that date, if the covered bank or one of its affiliates that is
a covered entity, covered bank, or covered FSI also enters, executes,
or otherwise becomes a party to a QFC with the same counterparty or a
consolidated affiliate of the counterparty after that date.\166\ Under
the final rule, a national bank, FSA, or Federal branch or agency that
is a covered bank on the January 1, 2018, effective date of the final
rule (referred to as an ``existing covered bank'' for purposes of this
preamble) and becomes an affiliate of a new covered bank generally must
conform any existing but non-conformed in-scope QFC that the existing
covered bank continues to have with a counterparty after the applicable
initial compliance date by the date the new covered bank enters a QFC
with the same counterparty (or any of its consolidated affiliates) or
within a reasonable period thereafter. Acquisitions of new entities are
planned in advance and should include preparing to comply with
applicable laws and regulations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\165\ See final rule Sec. 47.3(f)(2).
\166\ See final rule Sec. 47.3(c)(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The OCC does not believe it is appropriate to exclude all pre-
existing QFCs because of the current and future risk that existing
covered QFCs pose to the orderly resolution of a covered bank.
Moreover, application of different default rights to existing and
future transactions within a netting set could cause the netting set to
be broken, which commenters noted could increase burden to both parties
to the netting set.\167\ Therefore, the final rule requires an existing
QFC between a covered bank and a counterparty to be conformed to the
requirements of the final rule if the covered bank (or an affiliate
that is a covered entity, covered bank, or covered FSI) enters into
another QFC with the
[[Page 56659]]
counterparty or its consolidated affiliate on or after the first day of
the calendar quarter immediately following one year from the January 1,
2018, effective date of the final rule. Subject to any compliance date
applicable to the covered bank, the OCC expects a covered bank to
conform existing QFCs that become covered QFCs within a reasonable
period.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\167\ The requirements of the final rule, particularly those of
Sec. 47.5, may have a different impact on netting, including close-
out netting, than the U.K. and German requirements cited by
commenters.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
By permitting a covered bank to remain a party to noncompliant QFCs
entered into before the effective date unless the covered bank or any
affiliate (that is also a covered entity, covered bank, or covered FSI)
enters into new QFCs with the same counterparty or its affiliates, the
final rule strikes a balance between ensuring QFC continuity if the
GSIB were to fail and ensuring that covered banks and their existing
counterparties can manage any compliance costs and disruptions
associated with conforming existing QFCs by refraining from entering
into new QFCs. The requirement that a covered bank ensure that all
existing QFCs with a particular counterparty and its affiliates are
compliant before it or any affiliate of the covered bank (that is also
a covered entity, covered bank, or covered FSI) enters into a new QFC
with the same counterparty or its affiliates after the January 1, 2018,
effective date will provide covered banks with an incentive to seek the
modifications necessary to ensure that their QFCs with their most
important counterparties are compliant. Moreover, the volume of
noncompliant covered QFCs outstanding can be expected to decrease over
time and eventually to reach zero. In light of these considerations,
and to avoid creating potentially inappropriate compliance costs with
respect to existing QFCs with counterparties that, together with their
consolidated affiliates, do not enter into new covered QFCs with the
GSIB on or after the first day of the calendar quarter that is one year
from the January 1, 2018, effective date of the final rule, it would be
appropriate to permit a limited number of noncompliant QFCs to remain
outstanding, in keeping with the terms described above. Moreover, the
final rule also excludes existing warrants and retail investment
advisory agreements to address concerns raised by commenters and
mitigate burden.\168\ The OCC will monitor covered banks' levels of
noncompliant QFCs and evaluate the risk, if any, that they pose to the
safety and soundness of the Federal banking system, and indirectly, to
GSIBs or to U.S. financial stability.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\168\ See final rule Sec. 47.8(c).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
I. Revisions to Certain Definitions in the OCC's Capital and Liquidity
Rules
The regulatory capital rules, as implemented by the OCC, FRB, and
FDIC, permit a bank to measure exposure from certain types of financial
contracts on a net basis and recognize the risk-mitigating effect of
financial collateral for other types of exposures, provided that the
contracts are subject to a ``qualifying master netting agreement,'' a
collateral agreement, eligible margin loan, or repo-style transaction
(collectively referred to as netting agreements) that provides for
certain rights upon a counterparty default. With limited exception, to
qualify for netting treatment, a qualifying netting agreement must
permit a bank to terminate, apply close-out netting, and promptly
liquidate or set-off collateral upon an event of default of the
counterparty (default rights), thereby reducing its counterparty
exposure and market risks. Measuring the amount of exposure of these
contracts on a net basis, rather than a gross basis, results in a lower
measure of exposure, and thus, a lower capital requirement.
An exception to the immediate close-out requirement is made for the
stay of default rights if the financial company is in receivership,
conservatorship, or resolution under Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act, or
the FDI Act. Accordingly, transactions conducted under netting
agreements where default rights may be stayed under Title II of the
Dodd-Frank Act or the FDI Act would not be disqualified from netting
treatment.
On December 30, 2014, the OCC and the FRB issued a joint interim
final rule (effective January 1, 2015) that amended the definitions of
``qualifying master netting agreement,'' ``collateral agreement,''
``eligible margin loan,'' and ``repo-style transaction,'' in the OCC
and FRB regulatory capital rules, and ``qualifying master netting
agreement'' in the OCC and FRB liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) rules to
expand the exception to the immediate close-out requirement to ensure
that the current netting treatment under the regulatory capital,
liquidity, and lending limits rules \169\ for over-the-counter (OTC)
derivatives, repo-style transactions, eligible margin loans, and other
collateralized transactions would be unaffected by the adoption of
various foreign special resolution regimes through the ISDA Protocol.
In particular, the interim final rule amended these definitions to
provide that a relevant netting agreement or collateral agreement may
provide for a limited stay or avoidance of rights where the agreement
is subject by its terms to, or incorporates, certain resolution regimes
applicable to financial companies, including Title II of the Dodd-Frank
Act, the FDI Act, or any similar foreign resolution regime that
provides for limited stays substantially similar to the stay for
qualified financial contracts provided in Title II of the Dodd-Frank
Act or the FDI Act.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\169\ The impact of these amendments to these definition on the
legal lending limits requirements for national banks and FSAs is
indirect. The definition of qualifying master netting agreement used
in the legal lending limit rules is defined by cross-reference to
the definition in regulatoy capital requirements. See 12 CFR 32.2(u)
(Definition of ``qualifying master netting agreement'' cross-
referencing 12 CFR 3.2); see also 79 FR 78287, 78292 (December 30,
2014).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Section 47.4 of the proposed rule essentially limits the default
rights exercisable against a covered bank to the same stay-and-transfer
restrictions imposed under the U.S. Special Resolution Regime against a
direct counterparty. Section 47.4 of the proposed rule mirrors the
contractual stay-and-transfer restrictions reflected in the ISDA
Protocol with one notable difference. While adoption of the ISDA
Protocol is voluntary, covered banks subject to the proposed rule must
conform their covered QFCs to the stay-and-transfer restrictions in
Sec. 47.4.
With respect to limitations on cross-default rights in proposed
Sec. 47.5, the OCC proposed additional conforming amendments in order
to maintain the existing netting treatment for covered QFCs for
purposes of the regulatory capital, liquidity, and lending limits
rules. Specifically, the OCC is proposed to amend the definition of
``qualifying master netting agreement,'' as well as to make conforming
amendments to ``collateral agreement,'' ``eligible margin loan,'' and
``repo-style transaction,'' in the regulatory capital rules in part 3,
and ``qualifying master netting agreement'' in the LCR rules in part 50
to ensure that the regulatory capital, liquidity, and lending limits
treatment of OTC derivatives, repo-style transactions, eligible margin
loans, and other collateralized transactions would be unaffected by the
adoption of proposed Sec. 47.5. Without these proposed amendments,
covered banks that amend their covered QFCs to comply with this final
rule would no longer be permitted to recognize covered QFCs as subject
to a qualifying master netting agreement or satisfying the criteria
necessary for the current regulatory capital, liquidity, and lending
limits treatment, and would be required to measure exposure from these
contracts on a gross, rather than net,
[[Page 56660]]
basis. This result would undermine the proposed requirements in Sec.
47.5. The OCC does not believe that the disqualification of covered
QFCs from master netting agreements would accurately reflect the risk
posed by these OTC derivatives transactions.
Although the proposed rule reformats some of the definitions in
parts 3 and 50 to include the text from the interim final rule, the
proposed amendments did not alter the substance or effect of the prior
amendment adopted by the interim final rule.
The rule establishing margin and capital requirements for covered
swap entities (swap margin rule) defines the term ``eligible master
netting agreement'' in a manner similar to the definition of
``qualifying master netting agreement.'' Thus, it may also be
appropriate to amend the definition of ``eligible master netting
agreement'' to account for the proposed restrictions on covered
entities' QFCs.
IV. Regulatory Analysis
Effective Date
The APA requires that a substantive rule must be published not less
than 30 days before its effective date, unless, among other things, the
rule grants or recognizes an exemption or relieves a restriction.\170\
Section 302 of the Riegle Community Development and Regulatory
Improvement Act of 1994 (RCDRIA) requires that regulations imposing
additional reporting, disclosure, or other requirements on insured
depository institutions take effect on the first day of the calendar
quarter after publication of the final rule, unless, among other
things, the agency determines for good cause that the regulations
should become effective before such time.\171\ The January 1, 2018
effective date of this final rule meets both the APA and RCDRIA
effective date requirements, as it will take effect at least 30 days
after its publication date of November 29, 2017 and on the first day of
the calendar quarter following publication, January 1, 2018.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\170\ 5 U.S.C. 553(d)(1).
\171\ 12 U.S.C. 4802.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Section 302 of the RCDRIA also requires the OCC to consider,
consistent with principles of safety and soundness and the public
interest, any administrative burdens that such regulations would place
on depository institutions, including small depository institutions,
and customers of depository institutions, as well as the benefits of
such regulations.\172\ The OCC has considered comment on these matters
in other sections of this SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\172\ 12 U.S.C. 4802.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Paperwork Reduction Act
In accordance with section 3512 of the Paperwork Reduction Act
(PRA) of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501-3521) (as amended), the OCC may not
conduct or sponsor, and a respondent is not required to respond to, an
information collection unless it displays a currently valid Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) control number. Certain provisions of the
final rule contain ``collection of information'' requirements within
the meaning of the PRA. The information collection requirements
contained in this final rule were submitted to OMB for review at the
proposed rule stage. OMB instructed the OCC to (i) examine public
comment in response to the information collection requirements found in
the proposed rule; and (ii) describe in the supporting statement for
the final rule any public comments received and why any recommendations
were or were not incorporated. The OCC received no comments regarding
the information collection requirements contained in the proposed rule.
Comments continue to be invited on:
(a) Whether the collections of information are necessary for the
proper performance of the OCC's functions, including whether the
information has practical utility;
(b) The accuracy of the estimates of the burden of the information
collections, including the validity of the methodology and assumptions
used;
(c) Ways to enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of the
information to be collected;
(d) Ways to minimize the burden of the information collections on
respondents, including through the use of automated collection
techniques or other forms of information technology; and
(e) Estimates of capital or start-up costs and costs of operation,
maintenance, and purchase of services to provide information.
All comments will become a matter of public record. Comments are
solicited on aspects of this final rule that may affect reporting,
recordkeeping, or disclosure requirements and burden estimates. Because
paper mail in the Washington, DC area and at the OCC is subject to
delay, commenters are encouraged to submit comments by email, if
possible. Comments may be sent to: Legislative and Regulatory
Activities Division, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency,
Attention: 1557-0339, 400 7th Street SW., Suite 3E-218, Washington, DC
20219. In addition, comments may be sent by fax to (571) 465-4326 or by
electronic mail to [email protected]. You may personally inspect
and photocopy comments at the OCC, 400 7th Street SW., Washington, DC
20219. For security reasons, the OCC requires that visitors make an
appointment to inspect comments. You may do so by calling (202) 649-
6700 or, for persons who are deaf or hearing impaired, TTY, (202) 649-
5597. Upon arrival, visitors will be required to present valid
government-issued photo identification and submit to security screening
in order to inspect and photocopy comments.
All comments received, including attachments and other supporting
materials, are part of the public record and subject to public
disclosure. Do not include any information in your comment or
supporting materials that you consider confidential or inappropriate
for public disclosure.
Additionally, please send a copy of your comments by mail to: OCC
Desk Officer, 1557-0339, U.S. Office of Management and Budget, 725 17th
Street NW., #10235, Washington, DC 20503 or by email to:
[email protected].
Title of Information Collection: Mandatory Contractual Stay
Requirements for Qualified Financial Contracts.
Affected Public: Businesses or other for-profit.
Respondents: National banks or FSAs that have more than $700
billion in total assets as reported in their most recent Call Reports;
national banks or FSAs (including any subsidiary of a national bank or
FSA) that are subsidiaries of a global systemically important BHC that
has been designated pursuant to 252.82 of the FRB's Regulation YY;
national banks or FSAs (including any subsidiary of a national bank or
FSA) that are subsidiaries of a global systemically important FBO
designated pursuant to section 252.87 of the FRB's Regulation YY; and
Federal branches and agencies (including any U.S. subsidiary of a
Federal branch or agency) of a global systemically important FBO that
has been designated pursuant to section 252.87 of the FRB's Regulation
YY.
Abstract: Section 47.6(b)(1) provides that a covered bank may
request that the OCC approve as compliant with the requirements of
Sec. Sec. 47.4 and 47.5 provisions of one or more forms of covered
QFCs, or amendments to one or more forms of covered QFCs, with enhanced
creditor protection conditions. The request must include: (1) An
analysis of the proposal under each consideration of the relevance of
creditor protection provisions; (2) a
[[Page 56661]]
written legal opinion verifying that proposed provisions or amendments
would be valid and enforceable under applicable law of the relevant
jurisdictions, including, in the case of proposed amendments, the
validity and enforceability of the proposal to amend the covered QFCs;
and (3) any additional information relevant to its approval that the
OCC requests.
Burden Estimates:
Estimated Number of Respondents: 44.
Estimated Burden per Respondent: 40 hours.
Total Estimated Burden: 1,760 hours.
Regulatory Flexibility Act
Pursuant to the Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA), an agency must
prepare a regulatory flexibility analysis for all proposed and final
rules that describes the impact of the rule on small entities.\173\
Under section 605(b) of the RFA, this analysis is not required if the
head of the agency certifies that the rule will not have a significant
economic impact on a substantial number of small entities and publishes
its certification and a short explanatory statement in the Federal
Register along with its rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\173\ See 5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The OCC currently supervises approximately 956 small entities.\174\
The scope of the final rule is limited to large banks and their
affiliates (covered banks). Therefore, the final rule will not have a
direct impact on OCC-supervised small entities. The final rule may
indirectly have an impact on OCC-supervised small entities that are a
party to a QFC with a covered bank. The OCC expects that any costs
associated with this will be minimal. Therefore, the OCC certifies that
this final rule does not have a significant economic impact on a
substantial number of small entities supervised by the OCC.
Accordingly, a regulatory flexibility analysis is not required.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\174\ The OCC bases its estimate of the number of small entities
on the Small Business Administration's size thresholds for
commercial banks and savings institutions, and trust companies,
which are $550 million and $38.5 million, respectively. Consistent
with the General Principles of Affiliation 13 CFR 121.103(a), the
OCC counts the assets of affiliated financial institutions when
determining if the OCC should classify an OCC-supervised institution
as a small entity. The OCC uses December 31, 2016, to determine size
because a ``financial institution's assets are determined by
averaging the assets reported on its four quarterly financial
statements for the preceding year.'' See footnote 8 of the U.S.
Small Business Administration's Table of Size Standards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 Determination
The OCC has analyzed the final rule under the factors in the
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA).\175\ Under this analysis,
the OCC considered whether the final rule includes a Federal mandate
that may result in the expenditure by state, local, and tribal
governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector, of $100
million or more in any one year (adjusted annually for inflation). The
UMRA does not apply to regulations that incorporate requirements
specifically set forth in law.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\175\ 2 U.S.C. 1531 et seq.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The OCC finds that the rule does not trigger the UMRA cost
threshold because we estimate that the UMRA cost is less than $36
million. The OCC believes that the largest direct cost of implementing
the final rule is the cost of amending contracts without an ISDA master
agreement in place, which is estimated to range from approximately
$1.18 million to approximately $35.4 million. Accordingly, the OCC has
not prepared the written statement described in section 202 of the
UMRA.
List of Subjects
12 CFR Part 3
Administrative practice and procedure, Capital, Federal savings
associations, National banks, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements,
Risk.
12 CFR Part 47
Administrative practice and procedure, Banks and banking, Bank
resolution, Default rights, Federal savings associations, National
banks, Qualified financial contracts, Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements, Securities.
12 CFR Part 50
Administrative practice and procedure, Banks and banking,
Liquidity, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Savings
associations.
Authority and Issuance
For the reasons stated in the Supplementary Information, the Office
of the Comptroller of the Currency is amending 12 CFR part 3, adding 12
CFR part 47, and amending 12 CFR part 50 as follows:
PART 3--CAPITAL ADEQUACY STANDARDS
0
1. The authority citation for part 3 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 12 U.S.C. 93a, 161, 1462, 1462a, 1463, 1464, 1818,
1828(n), 1828 note, 1831n note, 1835, 3907, 3909, and 5412(b)(2)(B).
0
2. Section 3.2 is amended by:
0
a. Revising the definition of ``collateral agreement'';
0
b. Revising paragraph (1)(iii) of the definition of ``eligible margin
loan'';
0
c. Revising the definition of ``qualifying master netting agreement'';
and
0
d. Revising paragraph (3)(ii)(A) of the definition of ``repo-style
transaction''.
The revisions are set forth below:
Sec. 3.2 Definitions.
* * * * *
Collateral agreement means a legal contract that specifies the time
when, and circumstances under which, a counterparty is required to
pledge collateral to a national bank or Federal savings association for
a single financial contract or for all financial contracts in a netting
set and confers upon the national bank or Federal savings association a
perfected, first-priority security interest (notwithstanding the prior
security interest of any custodial agent), or the legal equivalent
thereof, in the collateral posted by the counterparty under the
agreement. This security interest must provide the national bank or
Federal savings association with a right to close-out the financial
positions and liquidate the collateral upon an event of default of, or
failure to perform by, the counterparty under the collateral agreement.
A contract would not satisfy this requirement if the national bank's or
Federal savings association's exercise of rights under the agreement
may be stayed or avoided:
(1) Under applicable law in the relevant jurisdictions, other than:
(i) In receivership, conservatorship, or resolution under the
Federal Deposit Insurance Act, Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act, or under
any similar insolvency law applicable to GSEs, or laws of foreign
jurisdictions that are substantially similar \4\ to the U.S. laws
referenced in this paragraph (1)(i) in order to facilitate the orderly
resolution of the defaulting counterparty;
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ The OCC expects to evaluate jointly with the Board and FDIC
whether foreign special resolution regimes meet the requirements of
this paragraph.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(ii) Where the agreement is subject by its terms to any of the laws
referenced in paragraph (1)(i) of this definition; or
(2) Other than to the extent necessary for the counterparty to
comply with the requirements of part 47, subpart I of part 252, and
part 382 of this title 12, as applicable.
* * * * *
Eligible margin loan * * *
(1) * * *
(iii) The extension of credit is conducted under an agreement that
provides the national bank or Federal
[[Page 56662]]
savings association the right to accelerate and terminate the extension
of credit and to liquidate or set-off collateral promptly upon an event
of default, including upon an event of receivership, insolvency,
liquidation, conservatorship, or similar proceeding, of the
counterparty, provided that, in any such case:
(A) Any exercise of rights under the agreement will not be stayed
or avoided under applicable law in the relevant jurisdictions, other
than in receivership, conservatorship, or resolution under the Federal
Deposit Insurance Act, Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act, or under any
similar insolvency law applicable to GSEs,\5\ or laws of foreign
jurisdictions that are substantially similar \6\ to the U.S. laws
referenced in this paragraph (1)(iii)(A) in order to facilitate the
orderly resolution of the defaulting counterparty; and
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ This requirement is met where all transactions under the
agreement are (i) executed under U.S. law and (ii) constitute
``securities contracts'' under section 555 of the Bankruptcy Code
(11 U.S.C. 555), qualified financial contracts under section
11(e)(8) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, or netting contracts
between or among financial institutions under sections 401-407 of
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act or the
Federal Reserve Board's Regulation EE (12 CFR part 231).
\6\ The OCC expects to evaluate jointly with the Board and FDIC
whether foreign special resolution regimes meet the requirements of
this paragraph.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(B) The agreement may limit the right to accelerate, terminate, and
close-out on a net basis all transactions under the agreement and to
liquidate or set-off collateral promptly upon an event of default of
the counterparty to the extent necessary for the counterparty to comply
with the requirements of part 47, subpart I of part 252, and part 382,
of this title 12, as applicable.
* * * * *
Qualifying master netting agreement means a written, legally
enforceable agreement provided that:
(1) The agreement creates a single legal obligation for all
individual transactions covered by the agreement upon an event of
default following any stay permitted by paragraph (2) of this
definition, including upon an event of receivership, conservatorship,
insolvency, liquidation, or similar proceeding, of the counterparty;
(2) The agreement provides the national bank or Federal savings
association the right to accelerate, terminate, and close-out on a net
basis all transactions under the agreement and to liquidate or set-off
collateral promptly upon an event of default, including upon an event
of receivership, conservatorship, insolvency, liquidation, or similar
proceeding, of the counterparty, provided that, in any such case:
(i) Any exercise of rights under the agreement will not be stayed
or avoided under applicable law in the relevant jurisdictions, other
than:
(A) In receivership, conservatorship, or resolution under the
Federal Deposit Insurance Act, Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act, or under
any similar insolvency law applicable to GSEs, or laws of foreign
jurisdictions that are substantially similar \7\ to the U.S. laws
referenced in this paragraph (2)(i)(A) in order to facilitate the
orderly resolution of the defaulting counterparty; or
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ The OCC expects to evaluate jointly with the Board and FDIC
whether foreign special resolution regimes meet the requirements of
this paragraph.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(B) Where the agreement is subject by its terms to, or
incorporates, any of the laws referenced in paragraph (2)(i)(A) of this
definition; and
(ii) The agreement may limit the right to accelerate, terminate,
and close-out on a net basis all transactions under the agreement and
to liquidate or set-off collateral promptly upon an event of default of
the counterparty to the extent necessary for the counterparty to comply
with the requirements of part 47, subpart I of part 252, and part 382,
of this title 12, as applicable.
* * * * *
Repo-style transaction * * *
(3) * * *
(ii) * * *
(A) The transaction is executed under an agreement that provides
the national bank or Federal savings association the right to
accelerate, terminate, and close-out the transaction on a net basis and
to liquidate or set-off collateral promptly upon an event of default,
including upon an event of receivership, insolvency, liquidation, or
similar proceeding, of the counterparty, provided that, in any such
case:
(1) Any exercise of rights under the agreement will not be stayed
or avoided under applicable law in the relevant jurisdictions, other
than in receivership, conservatorship, or resolution under the Federal
Deposit Insurance Act, Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act, or under any
similar insolvency law applicable to GSEs, or laws of foreign
jurisdictions that are substantially similar \8\ to the U.S. laws
referenced in this paragraph (3)(ii)(A)(1) in order to facilitate the
orderly resolution of the defaulting counterparty; and
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ The OCC expects to evaluate jointly with the Board and FDIC
whether foreign special resolution regimes meet the requirements of
this paragraph.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(2) The agreement may limit the right to accelerate, terminate, and
close-out on a net basis all transactions under the agreement and to
liquidate or set-off collateral promptly upon an event of default of
the counterparty to the extent necessary for the counterparty to comply
with the requirements of part 47, subpart I of part 252, and part 382,
of this title 12, as applicable; or
* * * * *
PART 47--MANDATORY CONTRACTUAL STAY REQUIREMENTS FOR QUALIFIED
FINANCIAL CONTRACTS
0
3. Add part 47 to read as follows:
PART 47--MANDATORY CONTRACTUAL STAY REQUIREMENTS FOR QUALIFIED
FINANCIAL CONTRACTS
Sec.
47.1 Authority and purpose.
47.2 Definitions.
47.3 Applicability.
47.4 U.S. special resolution regimes.
47.5 Insolvency proceedings.
47.6 Approval of enhanced creditor protection conditions.
47.7 Foreign bank multi-branch master agreements.
47.8 Exclusion of certain QFCs.
Authority: 12 U.S.C. 1, 93a, 481, 1462a, 1463, 1464, 1467a,
1818, 1828, 1831n, 1831o, 1831p-1, 1831w, 1835, 3102(b), 3108(a),
5412(b)(2)(B), (D)-(F).
Sec. 47.1 Authority and purpose.
(a) Authority. 12 U.S.C. 1, 93a, 1462a, 1463, 1464, 1467a, 1818,
1828, 1831n, 1831p-1, 1831w, 1835, 3102(b), 3108(a), 5412(b)(2)(B),
(D)-(F).
(b) Purpose. The purpose of this part is to promote the safety and
soundness of federally chartered or licensed institutions by mitigating
the potential destabilizing effects of the resolution of a global
systemically important banking entity on an affiliate that is a covered
bank (as defined by this part) by requiring covered banks to include in
financial contracts covered by this part certain mandatory contractual
provisions relating to stays on acceleration and close out rights and
transfer rights.
Sec. 47.2 Definitions.
As used in this part:
Affiliate means an affiliate as defined in 12 U.S.C. 1841(k) (Bank
Holding Company Act).
Central counterparty (CCP) means a counterparty (for example, a
clearing house) that facilitates trades between counterparties in one
or more financial markets by either guaranteeing trades or novating
contracts.
Chapter 11 proceeding means a proceeding under Chapter 11 of Title
11, United States Code (11 U.S.C. 1101-74).
[[Page 56663]]
Consolidated affiliate means an affiliate of another company that:
(1) Either consolidates the other company, or is consolidated by
the other company, on financial statements prepared in accordance with
U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, the International
Financial Reporting Standards, or other similar standards;
(2) Is, along with the other company, consolidated with a third
company on a financial statement prepared in accordance with principles
or standards referenced in paragraph (1) of this definition; or
(3) For a company that is not subject to principles or standards
referenced in paragraph (1) of this definition, if consolidation as
described in paragraph (1) or (2) of this definition would have
occurred if such principles or standards had applied.
Control has the same meaning as in 12 U.S.C. 1841 (Bank Holding
Company Act).
Covered entity has the same meaning as in Sec. 252.82(a) of this
title (Federal Reserve Board Regulation YY) (12 CFR 252.82).
Covered FSI has the same meaning as in Sec. 382.2(b) of this title
(Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation) (12 CFR 382.2(b)).
Default right (1) Means, with respect to a QFC, any:
(i) Right of a party, whether contractual or otherwise (including,
without limitation, rights incorporated by reference to any other
contract, agreement, or document, and rights afforded by statute, civil
code, regulation, and common law), to liquidate, terminate, cancel,
rescind, or accelerate such agreement or transactions thereunder, set
off or net amounts owing in respect thereto (except rights related to
same-day payment netting), exercise remedies in respect of collateral
or other credit support or property related thereto (including the
purchase and sale of property), demand payment or delivery thereunder
or in respect thereof (other than a right or operation of a contractual
provision arising solely from a change in the value of collateral or
margin or a change in the amount of an economic exposure), suspend,
delay, or defer payment or performance thereunder, or modify the
obligations of a party thereunder, or any similar rights; and
(ii) Right or contractual provision that alters the amount of
collateral or margin that must be provided with respect to an exposure
thereunder, including by altering any initial amount, threshold amount,
variation margin, minimum transfer amount, the margin value of
collateral, or any similar amount, that entitles a party to demand the
return of any collateral or margin transferred by it to the other party
or a custodian or that modifies a transferee's right to reuse
collateral or margin (if such right previously existed), or any similar
rights, in each case, other than a right or operation of a contractual
provision arising solely from a change in the value of collateral or
margin or a change in the amount of an economic exposure;
(2) With respect to Sec. 47.5, does not include any right under a
contract that allows a party to terminate the contract on demand or at
its option at a specified time, or from time to time, without the need
to show cause.
FDI Act proceeding means a proceeding that commences upon the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation being appointed as conservator or
receiver under section 11 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12
U.S.C. 1821).
FDI Act stay period means, in connection with an FDI Act
proceeding, the period of time during which a party to a QFC with a
party that is subject to an FDI Act proceeding may not exercise any
right that the party that is not subject to an FDI Act proceeding has
to terminate, liquidate, or net such QFC, in accordance with section
11(e) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. 1821(e)) and any
implementing regulations.
Financial counterparty means a person that is:
(1)(i) A bank holding company or an affiliate thereof; a savings
and loan holding company as defined in section 10(n) of the Home
Owners' Loan Act (12 U.S.C. 1467a(n)); a U.S. intermediate holding
company that is established or designated for purposes of compliance
with Sec. 252.153 of this title (Federal Reserve Board Regulation YY)
(12 CFR 252.153); or a nonbank financial company supervised by the
Federal Reserve Board under Title II of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act (12 U.S.C. 5323);
(ii) A depository institution as defined in section 3(c) of the
Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. 1813(c)); an organization that
is organized under the laws of a foreign country and that engages
directly in the business of banking outside the United States; a
Federal credit union or State credit union as defined in section 2 of
the Federal Credit Union Act (12 U.S.C. 1752(1) and (6)); an
institution that functions solely in a trust or fiduciary capacity as
described in section 2(c)(2)(D) of the Bank Holding Company Act (12
U.S.C. 1841(c)(2)(D)); an industrial loan company, an industrial bank,
or other similar institution described in section 2(c)(2)(H) of the
Bank Holding Company Act (12 U.S.C. 1841(c)(2)(H));
(iii) An entity that is state-licensed or registered as:
(A) A credit or lending entity, including a finance company, money
lender; installment lender; consumer lender or lending company;
mortgage lender, broker, or bank; motor vehicle title pledge lender;
payday or deferred deposit lender; premium finance company; commercial
finance or lending company; or commercial mortgage company; except
entities registered or licensed solely on account of financing the
entity's direct sales of goods or services to customers;
(B) A money services business, including a check casher; money
transmitter; currency dealer or exchange; or money order or traveler's
check issuer;
(iv) A regulated entity as defined in section 1303(20) of the
Federal Housing Enterprises Financial Safety and Soundness Act of 1992,
as amended (12 U.S.C. 4502(20)) or any entity for which the Federal
Housing Finance Agency or its successor is the primary federal
regulator;
(v) Any institution chartered in accordance with the Farm Credit
Act of 1971, as amended (12 U.S.C. 2002 et seq.), that is regulated by
the Farm Credit Administration;
(vi) Any entity registered with the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission as a swap dealer or major swap participant pursuant to the
Commodity Exchange Act of 1936 (7 U.S.C. 1 et seq.), or an entity that
is registered with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission as a
security-based swap dealer or a major security-based swap participant
pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78a et
seq.);
(vii) A securities holding company, with the meaning specified in
section 618 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act (12 U.S.C. 1850a); a broker or dealer as defined in
sections 3(a)(4) and 3(a)(5) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15
U.S.C. 78c(a)(4)-(5)); an investment adviser as defined in section
202(a) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80b-2(a)); an
investment company registered with the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission under the Investment Company Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80a-1 et
seq.); or a company that has elected to be regulated as a business
development company pursuant to section 54(a) of the Investment Company
Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80a-53(a));
[[Page 56664]]
(viii) A private fund as defined in section 202(a) of the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80-b-2(a)); an entity that
would be an investment company under section 3 of the Investment
Company Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80a-3) but for section 3(c)(5)(C); or an
entity that is deemed not to be an investment company under section 3
of the Investment Company Act of 1940 pursuant to Investment Company
Act Rule 3a-7 (17 CFR 270.3a-7) of the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission;
(ix) A commodity pool, a commodity pool operator, or a commodity
trading advisor as defined, respectively, in sections 1a(10), 1a(11),
and 1a(12) of the Commodity Exchange Act of 1936 (7 U.S.C. 1a(10),
1a(11), and 1a(12)); a floor broker, a floor trader, or introducing
broker as defined, respectively, in sections 1a(22), 1a(23) and 1a(31)
of the Commodity Exchange Act of 1936 (7 U.S.C. 1a(22), 1a(23), and
1a(31)); or a futures commission merchant as defined in section 1a(28)
of the Commodity Exchange Act of 1936 (7 U.S.C. 1a(28));
(x) An employee benefit plan as defined in paragraphs (3) and (32)
of section 3 of the Employee Retirement Income and Security Act of 1974
(29 U.S.C. 1002);
(xi) An entity that is organized as an insurance company, primarily
engaged in writing insurance or reinsuring risks underwritten by
insurance companies, or is subject to supervision as such by a State
insurance regulator or foreign insurance regulator; or
(xii) An entity that would be a financial counterparty described in
paragraphs (1)(i)-(xi) of this definition, if the entity were organized
under the laws of the United States or any state thereof.
(2) The term ``financial counterparty'' does not include any
counterparty that is:
(i) A sovereign entity;
(ii) A multilateral development bank; or
(iii) The Bank for International Settlements.
Financial market utility (FMU) means any person, regardless of the
jurisdiction in which the person is located or organized, that manages
or operates a multilateral system for the purpose of transferring,
clearing, or settling payments, securities, or other financial
transactions among financial institutions or between financial
institutions and the person, but does not include:
(1) Designated contract markets, registered futures associations,
swap data repositories, and swap execution facilities registered under
the Commodity Exchange Act (7 U.S.C. 1 et seq.), or national securities
exchanges, national securities associations, alternative trading
systems, security-based swap data repositories, and swap execution
facilities registered under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15
U.S.C. 78a et seq.), solely by reason of their providing facilities for
comparison of data respecting the terms of settlement of securities or
futures transactions effected on such exchange or by means of any
electronic system operated or controlled by such entities, provided
that the exclusions in paragraph (1) of this definition apply only with
respect to the activities that require the entity to be so registered;
or
(2) Any broker, dealer, transfer agent, or investment company, or
any futures commission merchant, introducing broker, commodity trading
advisor, or commodity pool operator, solely by reason of functions
performed by such institution as part of brokerage, dealing, transfer
agency, or investment company activities, or solely by reason of acting
on behalf of a FMU or a participant therein in connection with the
furnishing by the FMU of services to its participants or the use of
services of the FMU by its participants, provided that services
performed by such institution do not constitute critical risk
management or processing functions of the FMU.
Investment advisory contract means any contract or agreement
whereby a person agrees to act as investment adviser to or to manage
any investment or trading account of another person.
Master agreement means a QFC of the type set forth in section
210(c)(8)(D)(ii)(XI), (iii)(IX), (iv)(IV), (v)(V), or (vi)(V) of Title
II of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (12
U.S.C. 5390(c)(8)(D)(ii)(XI), (iii)(IX), (iv)(IV), (v)(V), or (vi)(V))
or a master agreement that the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
determines by regulation is a QFC pursuant to section 210(c)(8)(D)(i)
of Title II of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act (12 U.S.C. 5390(c)(8)(D)(i)).
Person includes an individual, bank, corporation, partnership,
trust, association, joint venture, pool, syndicate, sole
proprietorship, unincorporated organization, or any other form of
entity.
Qualified financial contract (QFC) has the same meaning as in
section 210(c)(8)(D) of Title II of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act (12 U.S.C. 5390(c)(8)(D)).
Retail customer or counterparty means a customer or counterparty
that is:
(1) An individual;
(2) A business customer, but solely if and to the extent that:
(i) The national bank, Federal savings association, or Federal
branch or agency manages its transactions with the business customer,
including deposits, unsecured funding, and credit facility and
liquidity facility transactions, in the same way it manages its
transactions with individuals;
(ii) Transactions with the business customer have liquidity risk
characteristics that are similar to comparable transactions with
individuals; and
(iii) The total aggregate funding raised from the business customer
is less than $1.5 million; or
(3) A living or testamentary trust that:
(i) Is solely for the benefit of natural persons;
(ii) Does not have a corporate trustee; and
(iii) Terminates within 21 years and 10 months after the death of
grantors or beneficiaries of the trust living on the effective date of
the trust or within 25 years, if applicable under state law.
Small financial institution means a company that:
(1) Is organized as a bank, as defined in section 3(a) of the
Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. 1813(a)), the deposits of
which are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation; a
savings association, as defined in section 3(b) of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. 1813(b)), the deposits of which are insured by
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation; a farm credit system
institution chartered under the Farm Credit Act of 1971 (12 U.S.C. 2002
et seq.); or an insured Federal credit union or State-chartered credit
union under the Federal Credit Union Act (12 U.S.C. 1751 et seq.); and
(2) Has total assets of $10,000,000,000 or less on the last day of
the company's most recent fiscal year.
State means any state, commonwealth, territory, or possession of
the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, American Samoa,
Guam, or the United States Virgin Islands.
Subsidiary of a covered bank means any operating subsidiary of a
national bank, Federal savings association, or Federal branch or agency
as defined in Sec. 5.34 of this chapter (national banks), or Sec.
5.38 of this chapter (Federal savings associations), or any other
entity owned or controlled by the covered bank that would be a
subsidiary under 12 U.S.C. 1841 (Bank Holding Company Act).
[[Page 56665]]
U.S. agency has the same meaning as the term ``agency'' in 12
U.S.C. 3101(1).
U.S. branch has the same meaning as the term ``branch'' in 12
U.S.C. 3101(3).
U.S. special resolution regimes means the Federal Deposit Insurance
Act (12 U.S.C. 1811-1835a) and regulations promulgated thereunder and
Title II of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act (12 U.S.C. 5381-5394) and regulations promulgated thereunder.
Sec. 47.3 Applicability.
(a) General requirement. A covered bank must ensure that each
covered QFC conforms to the requirements of Sec. Sec. 47.4 and 47.5.
(b) Covered bank--(1) Generally. For purposes of this part, a
covered bank is:
(i) A national bank or Federal savings association that has more
than $700 billion in total assets as reported on the national bank's or
Federal savings association's most recent Consolidated Reports of
Condition and Income (Call Report);
(ii) A national bank or Federal savings association that is a
subsidiary of a global systemically important bank holding company that
has been designated pursuant to Sec. 252.82 of this title (Federal
Reserve Board Regulation YY) (12 CFR 252.82);
(iii) A national bank or Federal savings association that is a
subsidiary of a global systemically important foreign banking
organization that has been designated pursuant to Sec. 252.87 of this
title (Federal Reserve Board Regulation YY) (12 CFR 252.87); or
(iv) A Federal branch or agency, as defined in subpart B of this
chapter (governing Federal branches and agencies), of a global
systemically important foreign banking organization that has been
designated pursuant to Sec. 252.87 of this title (Federal Reserve
Board Regulation YY) (12 CFR 252.87).
(2) Subsidiary of a covered bank. This part applies to a subsidiary
of a covered bank as provided under paragraph (b)(1) of this section.
Specifically, the covered bank is required to ensure that a covered QFC
to which the subsidiary of a covered bank is a party (as a direct
counterparty or a support provider) satisfies the requirements of
Sec. Sec. 47.4 and 47.5 in the same manner and to the same extent
applicable to the covered bank.
(3) Subsidiaries not included as covered banks. Notwithstanding
paragraphs (b)(1) and (2) of this section, a covered bank does not
include:
(i) A subsidiary that is owned by a covered bank in satisfaction of
debt previously contracted in good faith pursuant to section 5137 of
the Revised Statutes (12 U.S.C. 29) (national bank) or section 5(c) of
the Home Owners' Loan Act (12 U.S.C. 1464) (Federal savings
association);
(ii) A portfolio concern, as defined under 13 CFR 107.50, that is
controlled by a small business investment company, as defined in
section 103(3) of the Small Business Investment Act of 1958 (15 U.S.C.
662) (national banks), or under section 5(c) of the Home Owners' Loan
Act (12 U.S.C. 1464(c)) (Federal savings associations);
(iii) A subsidiary that is owned pursuant to paragraph (7) of
section 5136 of the Revised Statutes (12 U.S.C. 24(Seventh)), or
paragraph (11) of section 5136 of the Revised Statutes (12 U.S.C.
24(Eleventh)) (national banks), or Sec. 5.59 of this chapter (12 CFR
5.59) (Federal savings associations) designed primarily to promote the
public welfare, including the welfare of low- and moderate-income
communities or families (such as providing housing, services or jobs).
(c) Covered QFCs. For purposes of this part, a covered QFC is:
(1) With respect to a covered bank that is a covered bank on
January 1, 2018, an in-scope QFC that the covered bank:
(i) Enters, executes, or otherwise becomes a party to on or after
January 1, 2019; or
(ii) Entered, executed, or otherwise became a party to before
January 1, 2019, if the covered bank, or any affiliate that is a
covered entity, covered bank, or covered FSI, also enters, executes, or
otherwise becomes a party to a QFC with the same person or a
consolidated affiliate of the same person on or after January 1, 2019.
(2) With respect to a covered bank that becomes a covered bank
after January 1, 2018, an in-scope QFC that the covered bank:
(i) Enters, executes or otherwise becomes a party to on or after
the later of the date the covered bank first becomes a covered bank and
January 1, 2019; or
(ii) Entered, executed, or otherwise became a party to before the
date identified in paragraph (c)(2)(i) of this section with respect to
the covered bank, if the covered bank or any affiliate that is a
covered entity, covered bank, or covered FSI, also enters, executes, or
otherwise becomes a party to a QFC with the same person or consolidated
affiliate of the same person on or after the date identified in
paragraph (c)(2)(i) of this section with respect to the covered bank.
(d) In-scope QFCs. An in-scope QFC is a QFC that explicitly:
(1) Restricts the transfer of a QFC (or any interest or obligation
in or under, or any property securing, the QFC) from a covered bank; or
(2) Provides one or more default rights with respect to a QFC that
may be exercised against a covered bank.
(e) Rules of construction. For purposes of this part:
(1) A covered bank does not become a party to a QFC solely by
acting as agent with respect to the QFC; and
(2) The exercise of a default right with respect to a covered QFC
includes the automatic or deemed exercise of the default right pursuant
to the terms of the QFC or other arrangement.
(f) Initial applicability of requirements for covered QFCs. (1)
With respect to each of its covered QFCs, a covered bank that is a
covered bank on January 1, 2018, must conform the covered QFC to the
requirements of this part by:
(i) January 1, 2019, if each party to the covered QFC is a covered
entity, covered bank, or covered FSI;
(ii) July 1, 2019, if each party to the covered QFC (other than the
covered bank) is a financial counterparty that is not a covered entity,
covered bank, or covered FSI; or
(iii) January 1, 2020, if a party to the covered QFC (other than
the covered bank) is not described in paragraphs (f)(1)(i) or
(f)(1)(ii) of this section, or if, notwithstanding paragraph (f)(1)(ii)
of this section, a party to the covered QFC (other than the covered
bank) is a small financial institution.
(2) With respect to each of its covered QFCs, a covered bank that
is not a covered bank on January 1, 2018, must conform the covered QFC
to the requirements of this part by:
(i) The first day of the calendar quarter immediately following one
year after the date the covered bank first becomes a covered bank if
each party to the covered QFC is a covered entity, covered bank, or
covered FSI;
(ii) The first day of the calendar quarter immediately following 18
months from the date the covered bank first becomes a covered bank if
each party to the covered QFC (other than the covered bank) is a
financial counterparty that is not a covered entity, covered bank, or
covered FSI; or
(iii) The first day of the calendar quarter immediately following
two years from the date the covered bank first becomes a covered bank
if a party to the covered QFC (other than the covered bank) is not
described in paragraphs (f)(2)(i) or (f)(2)(ii) of this section, or if,
notwithstanding paragraph (f)(2)(ii) of this section, a party to the
covered QFC (other than the covered bank) is a small financial
institution.
[[Page 56666]]
Sec. 47.4 U.S. special resolution regimes.
(a) Covered QFCs not required to be conformed. (1) Notwithstanding
Sec. 47.3, a covered bank is not required to conform a covered QFC to
the requirements of this section if:
(i) The covered QFC designates, in the manner described in
paragraph (a)(2) of this section, the U.S. special resolution regimes
as part of the law governing the QFC; and
(ii) Each party to the covered QFC, other than the covered bank,
is:
(A) An individual that is domiciled in the United States, including
any State;
(B) A company that is incorporated in or organized under the laws
of the United States or any State;
(C) A company the principal place of business of which is located
in the United States, including any State; or
(D) A U.S. branch or U.S. agency.
(2) A covered QFC designates the U.S. special resolution regimes as
part of the law governing the QFC if the covered QFC:
(i) Explicitly provides that the covered QFC is governed by the
laws of the United States or a state of the United States; and
(ii) Does not explicitly provide that one or both of the U.S.
special resolution regimes, or a broader set of laws that includes a
U.S. special resolution regime, is excluded from the laws governing the
covered QFC.
(b) Provisions required. A covered QFC must explicitly provide
that:
(1) In the event the covered bank becomes subject to a proceeding
under a U.S. special resolution regime, the transfer of the covered QFC
(and any interest and obligation in or under, and any property
securing, the covered QFC) from the covered bank will be effective to
the same extent as the transfer would be effective under the U.S.
special resolution regime if the covered QFC (and any interest and
obligation in or under, and any property securing, the covered QFC)
were governed by the laws of the United States or a state of the United
States; and
(2) In the event the covered bank or an affiliate of the covered
bank becomes subject to a proceeding under a U.S. special resolution
regime, default rights with respect to the covered QFC that may be
exercised against the covered bank are permitted to be exercised to no
greater extent than the default rights could be exercised under the
U.S. special resolution regime if the covered QFC were governed by the
laws of the United States or a state of the United States.
(c) Relevance of creditor protection provisions. The requirements
of this section apply notwithstanding paragraphs (d), (f), and (h) of
Sec. 47.5.
Sec. 47.5 Insolvency proceedings.
(a) Covered QFCs not required to be conformed. Notwithstanding
Sec. 47.3, a covered bank is not required to conform a covered QFC to
the requirements of this section if the covered QFC:
(1) Does not explicitly provide any default right with respect to
the covered QFC that is related, directly or indirectly, to an
affiliate of the direct party becoming subject to a receivership,
insolvency, liquidation, resolution, or similar proceeding; and
(2) Does not explicitly prohibit the transfer of a covered
affiliate credit enhancement, any interest or obligation in or under
the covered affiliate credit enhancement, or any property securing the
covered affiliate credit enhancement to a transferee upon or following
an affiliate of the direct party becoming subject to a receivership,
insolvency, liquidation, resolution, or similar proceeding or would
prohibit such a transfer only if the transfer would result in the
supported party being the beneficiary of the credit enhancement in
violation of any law applicable to the supported party.
(b) General prohibitions. (1) A covered QFC may not permit the
exercise of any default right with respect to the covered QFC that is
related, directly or indirectly, to an affiliate of the direct party
becoming subject to a receivership, insolvency, liquidation,
resolution, or similar proceeding.
(2) A covered QFC may not prohibit the transfer of a covered
affiliate credit enhancement, any interest or obligation in or under
the covered affiliate credit enhancement, or any property securing the
covered affiliate credit enhancement to a transferee upon or following
an affiliate of the direct party becoming subject to a receivership,
insolvency, liquidation, resolution, or similar proceeding unless the
transfer would result in the supported party being the beneficiary of
the credit enhancement in violation of any law applicable to the
supported party.
(c) Definitions relevant to the general prohibitions--(1) Direct
party. Direct party means a covered entity, covered bank, or covered
FSI that is a party to the direct QFC.
(2) Direct QFC. Direct QFC means a QFC that is not a credit
enhancement, provided that, for a QFC that is a master agreement that
includes an affiliate credit enhancement as a supplement to the master
agreement, the direct QFC does not include the affiliate credit
enhancement.
(3) Affiliate credit enhancement. Affiliate credit enhancement
means a credit enhancement that is provided by an affiliate of a party
to the direct QFC that the credit enhancement supports.
(d) General creditor protections. Notwithstanding paragraph (b) of
this section, a covered direct QFC and covered affiliate credit
enhancement that supports the covered direct QFC may permit the
exercise of a default right with respect to the covered QFC that arises
as a result of:
(1) The direct party becoming subject to a receivership,
insolvency, liquidation, resolution, or similar proceeding;
(2) The direct party not satisfying a payment or delivery
obligation pursuant to the covered QFC or another contract between the
same parties that gives rise to a default right in the covered QFC; or
(3) The covered affiliate support provider or transferee not
satisfying a payment or delivery obligation pursuant to a covered
affiliate credit enhancement that supports the covered direct QFC.
(e) Definitions relevant to the general creditor protections--(1)
Covered direct QFC. Covered direct QFC means a direct QFC to which a
covered entity, covered bank, or covered FSI is a party.
(2) Covered affiliate credit enhancement. Covered affiliate credit
enhancement means an affiliate credit enhancement in which a covered
entity, covered bank, or covered FSI is the obligor of the credit
enhancement.
(3) Covered affiliate support provider. Covered affiliate support
provider means, with respect to a covered affiliate credit enhancement,
the affiliate of the direct party that is obligated under the covered
affiliate credit enhancement and is not a transferee.
(4) Supported party. Supported party means, with respect to a
covered affiliate credit enhancement and the direct QFC that the
covered affiliate credit enhancement supports, a party that is a
beneficiary of the covered affiliate support provider's obligation
under the covered affiliate credit enhancement.
(f) Additional creditor protections for supported QFCs.
Notwithstanding paragraph (b) of this section, with respect to a
covered direct QFC that is supported by a covered affiliate credit
enhancement, the covered direct QFC and the covered affiliate credit
enhancement may permit the exercise of a default right after the stay
period that is related, directly or indirectly, to the covered
affiliate support provider becoming subject to a receivership,
insolvency, liquidation, resolution, or similar proceeding if:
[[Page 56667]]
(1) The covered affiliate support provider that remains obligated
under the covered affiliate credit enhancement becomes subject to a
receivership, insolvency, liquidation, resolution, or similar
proceeding other than a Chapter 11 proceeding;
(2) Subject to paragraph (h) of this section, the transferee, if
any, becomes subject to a receivership, insolvency, liquidation,
resolution, or similar proceeding;
(3) The covered affiliate support provider does not remain, and a
transferee does not become, obligated to the same, or substantially
similar, extent as the covered affiliate support provider was obligated
immediately prior to entering the receivership, insolvency,
liquidation, resolution, or similar proceeding with respect to:
(i) The covered affiliate credit enhancement;
(ii) All other covered affiliate credit enhancements provided by
the covered affiliate support provider in support of other covered
direct QFCs between the direct party and the supported party under the
covered affiliate credit enhancement referenced in paragraph (f)(3)(i)
of this section; and
(iii) All covered affiliate credit enhancements provided by the
covered affiliate support provider in support of covered direct QFCs
between the direct party and affiliates of the supported party
referenced in paragraph (f)(3)(ii) of this section; or
(4) In the case of a transfer of the covered affiliate credit
enhancement to a transferee:
(i) All of the ownership interests of the direct party directly or
indirectly held by the covered affiliate support provider are not
transferred to the transferee; or
(ii) Reasonable assurance has not been provided that all or
substantially all of the assets of the covered affiliate support
provider (or net proceeds therefrom), excluding any assets reserved for
the payment of costs and expenses of administration in the
receivership, insolvency, liquidation, resolution, or similar
proceeding, will be transferred or sold to the transferee in a timely
manner.
(g) Definitions relevant to the additional creditor protections for
supported QFCs--(1) Stay period. Stay period means, with respect to a
receivership, insolvency, liquidation, resolution, or similar
proceeding, the period of time beginning on the commencement of the
proceeding and ending at the later of 5:00 p.m. (eastern time) on the
business day following the date of the commencement of the proceeding
and 48 hours after the commencement of the proceeding.
(2) Business day. Business day means a day on which commercial
banks in the jurisdiction the proceeding is commenced are open for
general business (including dealings in foreign exchange and foreign
currency deposits).
(3) Transferee. Transferee means a person to whom a covered
affiliate credit enhancement is transferred upon the covered affiliate
support provider entering a receivership, insolvency, liquidation,
resolution, or similar proceeding or thereafter as part of the
resolution, restructuring, or reorganization involving the covered
affiliate support provider.
(h) Creditor protections related to FDI Act proceedings.
Notwithstanding paragraphs (b), (d), and (f) of this section, with
respect to a covered direct QFC that is supported by a covered
affiliate credit enhancement, the covered direct QFC and the covered
affiliate credit enhancement may permit the exercise of a default right
that is related, directly or indirectly, to the covered affiliate
support provider becoming subject to FDI Act proceedings:
(1) After the FDI Act stay period, if the covered affiliate credit
enhancement is not transferred pursuant to section 11(e)(9)-(e)(10) of
Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. 1821(e)(9)-(e)(10)) and any
regulations promulgated thereunder; or
(2) During the FDI Act stay period, if the default right may only
be exercised so as to permit the supported party under the covered
affiliate credit enhancement to suspend performance with respect to the
supported party's obligations under the covered direct QFC to the same
extent as the supported party would be entitled to do if the covered
direct QFC were with the covered affiliate support provider and were
treated in the same manner as the covered affiliate credit enhancement.
(i) Prohibited terminations. A covered QFC must require, after an
affiliate of the direct party has become subject to a receivership,
insolvency, liquidation, resolution, or similar proceeding:
(1) The party seeking to exercise a default right to bear the
burden of proof that the exercise is permitted under the covered QFC;
and
(2) Clear and convincing evidence or a similar or higher burden of
proof to exercise a default right.
Sec. 47.6 Approval of enhanced creditor protection conditions.
(a) Protocol compliance. (1) Unless the OCC determines otherwise
based on the specific facts and circumstances, a covered QFC is deemed
to comply with this part if it is amended by the universal protocol or
the U.S. protocol.
(2) A covered QFC will be deemed to be amended by the universal
protocol for purposes of paragraph (a)(1) of this section
notwithstanding the covered QFC being amended by one or more Country
Annexes, as the term is defined in the universal protocol.
(3) For purposes of paragraphs (a)(1) and (2) of this section:
(i) The universal protocol means the ISDA 2015 Universal Resolution
Stay Protocol, including the Securities Financing Transaction Annex and
Other Agreements Annex, published by the International Swaps and
Derivatives Association, Inc., as of May 3, 2016, and minor or
technical amendments thereto;
(ii) The U.S. protocol means a protocol that is the same as the
universal protocol other than as provided in paragraphs (a)(3)(ii)(A)-
(F) of this section.
(A) The provisions of Section 1 of the attachment to the universal
protocol may be limited in their application to a covered entity,
covered bank, or covered FSI and may be limited with respect to
resolutions under the Identified Regimes, as those regimes are
identified by the universal protocol;
(B) The provisions of Section 2 of the attachment to the universal
protocol may be limited in their application to a covered entity,
covered bank, or covered FSI;
(C) The provisions of Section 4(b)(i)(A) of the attachment to the
universal protocol must not apply with respect to U.S. special
resolution regimes;
(D) The provision of Section 4(b) of the attachment to the
universal protocol may only be effective to the extent that the covered
QFC affected by an adherent's election thereunder would continue to
meet the requirements of this part;
(E) The provisions of Section 2(k) of the attachment to the
universal protocol must not apply; and
(F) The U.S. protocol may include minor and technical differences
from the universal protocol and differences necessary to conform the
U.S. protocol to the differences described in paragraphs (a)(3)(ii)(A)-
(E) of this section;
(iii) Amended by the universal protocol or the U.S. protocol, with
respect to covered QFCs between adherents to the protocol, includes
amendments through incorporation of the terms of the protocol (by
reference or otherwise) into the covered QFC; and
[[Page 56668]]
(iv) The attachment to the universal protocol means the attachment
that the universal protocol identifies as ``ATTACHMENT to the ISDA 2015
UNIVERSAL RESOLUTION STAY PROTOCOL.''
(b) Proposal of enhanced creditor protection conditions. (1) A
covered bank may request that the OCC approve as compliant with the
requirements of Sec. Sec. 47.4 and 47.5 proposed provisions of one or
more forms of covered QFCs, or proposed amendments to one or more forms
of covered QFCs, with enhanced creditor protection conditions.
(2) Enhanced creditor protection conditions means a set of limited
exemptions to the requirements of Sec. 47.5(b) that are different than
that of paragraphs (d), (f), and (h) of Sec. 47.5.
(3) A covered bank making a request under paragraph (b)(1) of this
section must provide:
(i) An analysis of the proposal that addresses each consideration
in paragraph (d) of this section;
(ii) A written legal opinion verifying that proposed provisions or
amendments would be valid and enforceable under applicable law of the
relevant jurisdictions, including, in the case of proposed amendments,
the validity and enforceability of the proposal to amend the covered
QFCs; and
(iii) Any other relevant information that the OCC requests.
(c) OCC approval. The OCC may approve, subject to any conditions or
commitments the OCC may set, a proposal by a covered bank under
paragraph (b) of this section if the proposal, as compared to a covered
QFC that contains only the limited exemptions in paragraphs of (d),
(f), and (h) of Sec. 47.5 or that is amended as provided under
paragraph (a) of this section, would promote the safety and soundness
of federally chartered or licensed institutions by mitigating the
potential destabilizing effects of the resolution of a global
significantly important banking entity that is an affiliate of the
covered bank, at least to the same extent.
(d) Considerations. In reviewing a proposal under this section, the
OCC may consider all facts and circumstances related to the proposal,
including:
(1) Whether, and the extent to which, the proposal would reduce the
resiliency of such covered banks during distress or increase the impact
on U.S. financial stability were one or more of the covered banks to
fail;
(2) Whether, and the extent to which, the proposal would materially
decrease the ability of a covered bank, or an affiliate of a covered
bank, to be resolved in a rapid and orderly manner in the event of the
financial distress or failure of the covered bank, or an affiliate of a
covered bank, that is required to submit a resolution plan;
(3) Whether, and the extent to which, the set of conditions or the
mechanism in which they are applied facilitates, on an industry-wide
basis, contractual modifications to remove impediments to resolution
and increase market certainty, transparency, and equitable treatment
with respect to the default rights of non-defaulting parties to a
covered QFC;
(4) Whether, and the extent to which, the proposal applies to
existing and future transactions;
(5) Whether, and the extent to which, the proposal would apply to
multiple forms of QFCs or multiple covered banks or an affiliates of
covered banks;
(6) Whether the proposal would permit a party to a covered QFC that
is within the scope of the proposal to adhere to the proposal with
respect to only one or a subset of covered banks or an affiliates of
covered banks;
(7) With respect to a supported party, the degree of assurance the
proposal provides to the supported party that the material payment and
delivery obligations of the covered affiliate credit enhancement and
the covered direct QFC it supports will continue to be performed after
the covered affiliate support provider enters a receivership,
insolvency, liquidation, resolution, or similar proceeding;
(8) The presence, nature, and extent of any provisions that require
a covered affiliate support provider or transferee to meet conditions
other than material payment or delivery obligations to its creditors;
(9) The extent to which the supported party's overall credit risk
to the direct party may increase if the enhanced creditor protection
conditions are not met and the likelihood that the supported party's
credit risk to the direct party would decrease or remain the same if
the enhanced creditor protection conditions are met; and
(10) Whether the proposal provides the counterparty with additional
default rights or other rights.
Sec. 47.7 Foreign bank multi-branch master agreements.
(a) Treatment of foreign bank multi-branch master agreements. With
respect to a Federal branch or agency of a global systemically
important foreign banking organization, a foreign bank multi-branch
master agreement that is a covered QFC solely because the master
agreement permits agreements or transactions that are QFCs to be
entered into at one or more Federal branches or agencies of the global
systemically important foreign banking organization will be considered
a covered QFC for purposes of this part only with respect to such
agreements or transactions booked at such Federal branches or agencies.
(b) Definition of foreign bank multi-branch master agreements. A
foreign bank multi-branch master agreement means a master agreement
that permits a Federal branch or agency and another place of business
of a foreign bank that is outside the United States to enter
transactions under the agreement.
Sec. 47.8 Exclusion of certain QFCs.
(a) Exclusion of QFCs with FMUs. Notwithstanding Sec. 47.3, a
covered bank is not required to conform to the requirements of this
part a covered QFC to which:
(1) A CCP is party; or
(2) Each party (other than the covered bank) is an FMU.
(b) Exclusion of certain covered entity and covered FSI QFCs. If a
covered QFC is also a covered QFC under part 382 or 252, subpart I, of
this title that an affiliate of the covered bank is also required to
conform pursuant to part 382 or 252, subpart I, of this title and the
covered bank is:
(1) The affiliate credit enhancement provider with respect to the
covered QFC, then the covered bank is required to conform the credit
enhancement to the requirements of this part but is not required to
conform the direct QFC to the requirements of this part; or
(2) The direct party to which the excluded bank is the affiliate
credit enhancement provider, then the covered bank is required to
conform the direct QFC to the requirements of this part but is not
required to conform the credit enhancement to the requirements of this
part.
(c) Exclusion of certain contracts. Notwithstanding Sec. 47.3, a
covered bank is not required to conform the following types of
contracts or agreements to the requirements of this part:
(1) An investment advisory contract that:
(i) Is with a retail customer or counterparty;
(ii) Does not explicitly restrict the transfer of the contract (or
any QFC entered into pursuant thereto or governed thereby, or any
interest or obligation in or under, or any property securing, any such
QFC or the contract) from the covered bank except as necessary to
comply with section 205(a)(2) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940
(15 U.S.C. 80b-5(a)(2)); and
[[Page 56669]]
(iii) Does not explicitly provide a default right with respect to
the contract or any QFC entered pursuant thereto or governed thereby.
(2) A warrant that:
(i) Evidences a right to subscribe to or otherwise acquire a
security of the covered bank or an affiliate of the covered bank; and
(ii) Was issued prior to January 1, 2018.
(d) Exemption by order. The OCC may exempt by order one or more
covered banks from conforming one or more contracts or types of
contracts to one or more of the requirements of this part after
considering:
(1) The potential impact of the exemption on the ability of the
covered bank, or affiliates of the covered bank, to be resolved in a
rapid and orderly manner in the event of the financial distress or
failure of the entity that is required to submit a resolution plan;
(2) The burden the exemption would relieve; and
(3) Any other factor the OCC deems relevant.
PART 50--LIQUIDITY RISK MEASUREMENT STANDARDS
0
4. The authority citation for part 50 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 12 U.S.C. 1 et seq., 93a, 481, 1818, and 1462 et
seq.
0
5. Section 50.3 is amended by revising the definition of ``qualifying
master netting agreement'' to read as follows:
Sec. 50.3 Definitions.
* * * * *
Qualifying master netting agreement means a written, legally
enforceable agreement provided that:
(1) The agreement creates a single legal obligation for all
individual transactions covered by the agreement upon an event of
default following any stay permitted by paragraph (2) of this
definition, including upon an event of receivership, conservatorship,
insolvency, liquidation, or similar proceeding, of the counterparty;
(2) The agreement provides the national bank or Federal savings
association the right to accelerate, terminate, and close-out on a net
basis all transactions under the agreement and to liquidate or set-off
collateral promptly upon an event of default, including upon an event
of receivership, conservatorship, insolvency, liquidation, or similar
proceeding, of the counterparty, provided that, in any such case:
(i) Any exercise of rights under the agreement will not be stayed
or avoided under applicable law in the relevant jurisdictions, other
than:
(A) In receivership, conservatorship, or resolution under the
Federal Deposit Insurance Act, Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act, or under
any similar insolvency law applicable to GSEs, or laws of foreign
jurisdictions that are substantially similar to the U.S. laws
referenced in this paragraph (2)(i)(A) in order to facilitate the
orderly resolution of the defaulting counterparty; or
(B) Where the agreement is subject by its terms to, or
incorporates, any of the laws referenced in paragraph (2)(i)(A) of this
definition; and
(ii) The agreement may limit the right to accelerate, terminate,
and close-out on a net basis all transactions under the agreement and
to liquidate or set-off collateral promptly upon an event of default of
the counterparty to the extent necessary for the counterparty to comply
with the requirements of part 47, subpart I of part 225, or part 382 of
this title, as applicable;
* * * * *
Dated: November 20, 2017.
Keith A. Noreika,
Acting Comptroller of the Currency.
[FR Doc. 2017-25529 Filed 11-28-17; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4810-33-P