[Federal Register Volume 82, Number 224 (Wednesday, November 22, 2017)]
[Notices]
[Pages 55702-55707]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2017-25228]


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SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

[Release No. 34-82099; File No. SR-NYSEARCA-2017-129]


Self-Regulatory Organizations; NYSE Arca, Inc.; Notice of Filing 
and Immediate Effectiveness of Proposed Rule Change To Amend the Fees 
for NYSE Arca BBO and NYSE Arca Trades To Lower the Enterprise Fee for 
Those Products

November 16, 2017.
    Pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) \1\ of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 (the ``Act'') \2\ and Rule 19b-4 thereunder,\3\ notice is hereby 
given that, on November 3, 2017, NYSE Arca, Inc. (the ``Exchange'' or 
``NYSE Arca'') filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the 
``Commission'') the proposed rule change as described in Items I, II, 
and III below, which Items have been prepared by the self-regulatory 
organization. The Commission is publishing this notice to solicit 
comments on the proposed rule change from interested persons.
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    \1\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1).
    \2\ 15 U.S.C. 78a.
    \3\ 17 CFR 240.19b-4.
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I. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Terms of Substance 
of the Proposed Rule Change

    The Exchange proposes to amend the fees for NYSE Arca BBO and NYSE 
Arca Trades to lower the Enterprise Fee for those products. The 
proposed rule change is available on the Exchange's Web site at 
www.nyse.com, at the principal office of the Exchange, and at the 
Commission's Public Reference Room.

[[Page 55703]]

II. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Purpose of, and 
Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule Change

    In its filing with the Commission, the self-regulatory organization 
included statements concerning the purpose of, and basis for, the 
proposed rule change and discussed any comments it received on the 
proposed rule change. The text of those statements may be examined at 
the places specified in Item IV below. The Exchange has prepared 
summaries, set forth in sections A, B, and C below, of the most 
significant parts of such statements.

A. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Purpose of, and the 
Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule Change

1. Purpose
    The Exchange proposes to amend the fees for NYSE Arca BBO and NYSE 
Arca Trades market data products,\4\ as set forth on the NYSE Arca 
Equities Proprietary Market Data Fee Schedule (``Fee Schedule''). 
Specifically, the Exchange proposes to lower the Enterprise Fee for 
those products. The Exchange proposes to make the fee change effective 
November 3, 2017.
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    \4\ See Securities Exchange Act Release Nos. 59308 (January 28, 
2009), 74 FR 5955 (February 3, 2009) (SR-NYSEArca-2009-05) (notice--
NYSE Arca Trades); 59598 (March 18, 2009), 74 FR 12919 (March 25, 
2009) (SR-NYSEArca-2009-05) (approval order--NYSE Arca Trades); 
61937 (April 16, 2010), 78 FR 21378 (April 23, 2010) (SR-NYSEArca-
2010-23) (notice--NYSE Arca BBO); and 62188 (May 27, 2010), 75 FR 
31484 (June 3, 2010) (SR-NYSEArca-2010-23) (approval order--NYSE 
Arca BBO).
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    The Exchange currently charges an enterprise fee of $34,500 per 
month for an unlimited number of professional and non-professional 
users for each of NYSE Arca BBO and NYSE Arca Trades.\5\ A single 
Enterprise Fee applies for clients receiving both NYSE Arca BBO and 
NYSE Arca Trades.\6\ The Exchange proposes to lower the enterprise fee 
to $22,000 per month.
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    \5\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 79310 (November 14, 
2016), 81 FR 81820 (November 18, 2016) (SR-NYSEArca-2016-142).
    \6\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 70213 (August 15, 
2013), 78 FR 51796 (August 21, 2013) (SR-NYSEArca-2013-81).
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    As an example, under the current fee structure for per user fees, 
if a firm had 10,000 professional users who each received NYSE Arca 
Trades at $4 per month and NYSE Arca BBO at $4 per month, without the 
Enterprise Fee, the firm would pay $80,000 per month in professional 
user fees. Under the current pricing structure, this firm would pay a 
capped fee of $34,500 and effective November 3, 2017 it would pay a 
capped fee of $22,000.
    Under the proposed reduced enterprise fee, the firm would pay a 
flat fee of $22,000 for an unlimited number of professional and non-
professional users for both products. As is the case currently, a data 
recipient that pays the enterprise fee would not have to report the 
number of such users on a monthly basis.\7\ However, upon request, a 
data recipient must provide the Exchange with a count of the total 
number of natural person users of each product, including both 
professional and non-professional users.
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    \7\ Professional users currently are subject to a per display 
device count. See Securities Act Release No. 73998 (January 6, 
2015), 80 FR 1549 (January 12, 2015) (SR-NYSEArca-2014-148).
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2. Statutory Basis
    The Exchange believes that the proposed rule change is consistent 
with the provisions of Section 6 of the Act,\8\ in general, and 
Sections 6(b)(4) and 6(b)(5) of the Act,\9\ in particular, in that it 
provides an equitable allocation of reasonable fees among users and 
recipients of the data and is not designed to permit unfair 
discrimination among customers, issuers, and brokers.
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    \8\ 15 U.S.C. 78f(b).
    \9\ 15 U.S.C. 78f(b)(4), (5).
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    The proposed fee change is also equitable and not unfairly 
discriminatory because it would apply to all data recipients that 
choose to subscribe to NYSE Arca BBO and NYSE Arca Trades.
    The proposed enterprise fees for NYSE Arca BBO and NYSE Arca Trades 
are reasonable because they will result in a fee reduction for data 
recipients with sufficiently large numbers of professional and non-
professional users, as described in the example above. If a data 
recipient has a smaller number of professional users of NYSE Arca BBO 
and/or NYSE Arca Trades, then it may continue to use the per user fee 
structure and the fees it pays will not change. By reducing prices for 
data recipients with a large number of professional and non-
professional users, the Exchange believes that more data recipients may 
choose to offer NYSE Arca BBO and NYSE Arca Trades, thereby expanding 
the distribution of this market data for the benefit of investors. The 
Exchange also believes that offering a reduced enterprise fee expands 
the range of options for offering NYSE Arca BBO and NYSE Arca Trades 
and allows data recipients greater choice in selecting the most 
appropriate level of data and fees for the professional and non-
professional users they are servicing.
    The Exchange notes that NYSE Arca BBO and NYSE Arca Trades are 
entirely optional. The Exchange is not required to make NYSE Arca BBO 
and NYSE Arca Trades available or to offer any specific pricing 
alternatives to any customers, nor is any firm required to purchase 
NYSE Arca BBO and NYSE Arca Trades. Firms that do purchase NYSE Arca 
BBO and NYSE Arca Trades do so for the primary goals of using them to 
increase revenues, reduce expenses, and in some instances compete 
directly with the Exchange (including for order flow); those firms are 
able to determine for themselves whether NYSE Arca BBO and NYSE Arca 
Trades or any other similar products are attractively priced or 
not.\10\
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    \10\ See, e.g., Proposing Release on Regulation of NMS Stock 
Alternative Trading Systems, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 
76474 (Nov. 18, 2015) (File No. S7-23-15). See also, ``Brokers 
Warned Not to Steer Clients' Stock Trades Into Slow Lane,'' 
Bloomberg Business, December 14, 2015 (Sigma X dark pool to use 
direct exchange feeds as the primary source of price data).
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    Firms that do not wish to purchase NYSE Arca BBO and NYSE Arca 
Trades have a variety of alternative market data products from which to 
choose,\11\ or if NYSE Arca BBO and NYSE Arca Trades do not provide 
sufficient value to firms as offered based on the uses those firms have 
or planned to make of it, such firms may simply choose to conduct their 
business operations in ways that do not use NYSE Arca BBO and NYSE Arca 
Trades or use them at different levels or in different configurations. 
The Exchange notes that broker-dealers are not required to purchase 
proprietary market data to comply with their best execution 
obligations.\12\
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    \11\ See Nasdaq Rule 7047 (Nasdaq Basic) and BZX Equities Rule 
11.22 (Top and Last Sale).
    \12\ See FINRA Regulatory Notice 15-46, ``Best Execution,'' 
November 2015.
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    The decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the District 
of Columbia Circuit in NetCoalition v. SEC, 615 F.3d 525 (D.C. Cir. 
2010), upheld reliance by the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(``Commission'') upon the existence of competitive market mechanisms to 
set reasonable and equitably allocated fees for proprietary market 
data:

    In fact, the legislative history indicates that the Congress 
intended that the market system `evolve through the interplay of 
competitive forces as unnecessary regulatory restrictions are 
removed' and that the SEC wield its regulatory power `in those 
situations where competition may not be sufficient,' such as in the 
creation of a `consolidated transactional reporting system.'


[[Page 55704]]


    Id. at 535 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 94-229 at 92 (1975), as reprinted 
in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 323). The court agreed with the Commission's 
conclusion that ``Congress intended that `competitive forces should 
dictate the services and practices that constitute the U.S. national 
market system for trading equity securities.' '' \13\
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    \13\ NetCoalition, 615 F.3d at 535.
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    As explained below in the Exchange's Statement on Burden on 
Competition, the Exchange believes that there is substantial evidence 
of competition in the marketplace for proprietary market data and that 
the Commission can rely upon such evidence in concluding that the 
reduced fees established in this filing are the product of competition 
and therefore satisfy the relevant statutory standards. In addition, 
the existence of alternatives to these data products, such as 
consolidated data and proprietary data from other sources, as described 
below, further ensures that the Exchange cannot set unreasonable fees, 
or fees that are unreasonably discriminatory, when vendors and 
subscribers can select such alternatives.
    As the NetCoalition decision noted, the Commission is not required 
to undertake a cost-of-service or ratemaking approach. The Exchange 
believes that, even if it were possible as a matter of economic theory, 
cost-based pricing for proprietary market data would be so complicated 
that it could not be done practically or offer any significant 
benefits.\14\
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    \14\ The Exchange believes that cost-based pricing would be 
impractical because it would create enormous administrative burdens 
for all parties and the Commission to cost-regulate a large number 
of participants and standardize and analyze extraordinary amounts of 
information, accounts, and reports. In addition, and as described 
below, it is impossible to regulate market data prices in isolation 
from prices charged by markets for other services that are joint 
products. Cost-based rate regulation would also lead to litigation 
and may distort incentives, including those to minimize costs and to 
innovate, leading to further waste. Under cost-based pricing, the 
Commission would be burdened with determining a fair rate of return, 
and the industry could experience frequent rate increases based on 
escalating expense levels. Even in industries historically subject 
to utility regulation, cost-based ratemaking has been discredited. 
As such, the Exchange believes that cost-based ratemaking would be 
inappropriate for proprietary market data and inconsistent with 
Congress's direction that the Commission use its authority to foster 
the development of the national market system, and that market 
forces will continue to provide appropriate pricing discipline. See 
Appendix C to NYSE's comments to the Commission's 2000 Concept 
Release on the Regulation of Market Information Fees and Revenues, 
which can be found on the Commission's Web site at http://www.sec.gov/rules/concept/s72899/buck1.htm.
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    For these reasons, the Exchange believes that the proposed fees are 
reasonable, equitable, and not unfairly discriminatory.

B. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement on Burden on Competition

    The Exchange does not believe that the proposed rule change will 
impose any burden on competition that is not necessary or appropriate 
in furtherance of the purposes of the Act. An exchange's ability to 
price its proprietary market data feed products is constrained by 
actual competition for the sale of proprietary market data products, 
the joint product nature of exchange platforms, and the existence of 
alternatives to the Exchange's proprietary data.
The Existence of Actual Competition
    The market for proprietary data products is currently competitive 
and inherently contestable because there is fierce competition for the 
inputs necessary for the creation of proprietary data and strict 
pricing discipline for the proprietary products themselves. Numerous 
exchanges compete with one another for listings and order flow and 
sales of market data itself, providing ample opportunities for 
entrepreneurs who wish to compete in any or all of those areas, 
including producing and distributing their own market data. Proprietary 
data products are produced and distributed by each individual exchange, 
as well as other entities, in a vigorously competitive market. Indeed, 
the U.S. Department of Justice (``DOJ'') (the primary antitrust 
regulator) has expressly acknowledged the aggressive actual competition 
among exchanges, including for the sale of proprietary market data. In 
2011, the DOJ stated that exchanges ``compete head to head to offer 
real-time equity data products. These data products include the best 
bid and offer of every exchange and information on each equity trade, 
including the last sale.'' \15\
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    \15\ Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice, Assistant 
Attorney General Christine Varney Holds Conference Call Regarding 
NASDAQ OMX Group Inc. and IntercontinentalExchange Inc. Abandoning 
Their Bid for NYSE Euronext (May 16, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/atr/speeches/2011/at-speech-110516.html; see 
also Complaint in U.S. v. Deutsche Borse AG and NYSE Euronext, Case 
No. 11-cv-2280 (D.C. Dist.) ] 24 (``NYSE and Direct Edge compete 
head-to-head . . . in the provision of real-time proprietary equity 
data products.'').
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    Moreover, competitive markets for listings, order flow, executions, 
and transaction reports provide pricing discipline for the inputs of 
proprietary data products and therefore constrain markets from 
overpricing proprietary market data. Broker-dealers send their order 
flow and transaction reports to multiple venues, rather than providing 
them all to a single venue, which in turn reinforces this competitive 
constraint. As a 2010 Commission Concept Release noted, the ``current 
market structure can be described as dispersed and complex'' with 
``trading volume . . . dispersed among many highly automated trading 
centers that compete for order flow in the same stocks'' and ``trading 
centers offer[ing] a wide range of services that are designed to 
attract different types of market participants with varying trading 
needs.'' \16\ More recently, SEC Chair Mary Jo White has noted that 
competition for order flow in exchange-listed equities is ``intense'' 
and divided among many trading venues, including exchanges, more than 
40 alternative trading systems, and more than 250 broker-dealers.\17\
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    \16\ Concept Release on Equity Market Structure, Securities 
Exchange Act Release No. 61358 (Jan. 14, 2010), 75 FR 3594 (Jan. 21, 
2010) (File No. S7-02-10). This Concept Release included data from 
the third quarter of 2009 showing that no market center traded more 
than 20% of the volume of listed stocks, further evidencing the 
dispersal of and competition for trading activity. Id. at 3598. Data 
available on ArcaVision show that from June 30, 2013 to June 30, 
2014, no exchange traded more than 12% of the volume of listed 
stocks by either trade or dollar volume, further evidencing the 
continued dispersal of and fierce competition for trading activity. 
See https://www.arcavision.com/Arcavision/arcalogin.jsp.
    \17\ Mary Jo White, Enhancing Our Equity Market Structure, 
Sandler O'Neill & Partners, L.P. Global Exchange and Brokerage 
Conference (June 5, 2014) (available on the Commission Web site), 
citing Tuttle, Laura, 2014, ``OTC Trading: Description of Non-ATS 
OTC Trading in National Market System Stocks,'' at 7-8.
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    If an exchange succeeds in competing for quotations, order flow, 
and trade executions, then it earns trading revenues and increases the 
value of its proprietary market data products because they will contain 
greater quote and trade information. Conversely, if an exchange is less 
successful in attracting quotes, order flow, and trade executions, then 
its market data products may be less desirable to customers in light of 
the diminished content and data products offered by competing venues 
may become more attractive. Thus, competition for quotations, order 
flow, and trade executions puts significant pressure on an exchange to 
maintain both execution and data fees at reasonable levels.
    In addition, in the case of products that are also redistributed 
through market data vendors, such as Bloomberg and Thompson Reuters, 
the vendors themselves provide additional price discipline for 
proprietary data products because they control the primary means of 
access to certain end users. These vendors impose price discipline 
based upon their business models. For

[[Page 55705]]

example, vendors that assess a surcharge on data they sell are able to 
refuse to offer proprietary products that their end users do not or 
will not purchase in sufficient numbers. Vendors will not elect to make 
available NYSE Arca BBO or NYSE Arca Trades unless their customers 
request it, and customers will not elect to pay the proposed fees 
unless NYSE Arca BBO and NYSE Arca Trades can provide value by 
sufficiently increasing revenues or reducing costs in the customer's 
business in a manner that will offset the fees. All of these factors 
operate as constraints on pricing proprietary data products.
Joint Product Nature of Exchange Platform
    Transaction execution and proprietary data products are 
complementary in that market data is both an input and a byproduct of 
the execution service. In fact, proprietary market data and trade 
executions are a paradigmatic example of joint products with joint 
costs.\18\ The decision of whether and on which platform to post an 
order will depend on the attributes of the platforms where the order 
can be posted, including the execution fees, data availability and 
quality, and price and distribution of data products. Without a 
platform to post quotations, receive orders, and execute trades, 
exchange data products would not exist.
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    \18\ See generally Pricing of Market Data Services, An Economic 
Analysis at vi (``Given the general structure of electronic order 
books and electronic order matching, it is not possible to provide 
transaction services without generating market data, and it is not 
possible to generate trade transaction--or market depth--data 
without also supplying a trade execution service. In economic terms, 
trade execution and market data are joint products.'') (Oxera 2014).
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    The costs of producing market data include not only the costs of 
the data distribution infrastructure, but also the costs of designing, 
maintaining, and operating the exchange's platform for posting quotes, 
accepting orders, and executing transactions and the cost of regulating 
the exchange to ensure its fair operation and maintain investor 
confidence. The total return that a trading platform earns reflects the 
revenues it receives from both products and the joint costs it incurs.
    Moreover, an exchange's broker-dealer customers generally view the 
costs of transaction executions and market data as a unified cost of 
doing business with the exchange. A broker-dealer will only choose to 
direct orders to an exchange if the revenue from the transaction 
exceeds its cost, including the cost of any market data that the 
broker-dealer chooses to buy in support of its order routing and 
trading decisions. If the costs of the transaction are not offset by 
its value, then the broker-dealer may choose instead not to purchase 
the product and trade away from that exchange.
    Other market participants have noted that proprietary market data 
and trade executions are joint products of a joint platform and have 
common costs.\19\ The Exchange agrees with and adopts those discussions 
and the arguments therein. The Exchange also notes that the economics 
literature confirms that there is no way to allocate common costs 
between joint products that would shed any light on competitive or 
efficient pricing.\20\
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    \19\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 72153 (May 12, 
2014), 79 FR 28575, 28578 n.15 (May 16, 2014) (SR-NASDAQ-2014-045) 
(``[A]ll of the exchange's costs are incurred for the unified 
purposes of attracting order flow, executing and/or routing orders, 
and generating and selling data about market activity. The total 
return that an exchange earns reflects the revenues it receives from 
the joint products and the total costs of the joint products.''). 
See also Securities Exchange Act Release No. 62907 (Sept. 14, 2010), 
75 FR 57314, 57317 (Sept. 20, 2010) (SR-NASDAQ-2010-110), and 
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 62908 (Sept. 14, 2010), 75 FR 
57321, 57324 (Sept. 20, 2010) (SR-NASDAQ-2010-111).
    \20\ See generally Mark Hirschey, Fundamentals of Managerial 
Economics, at 600 (2009) (``It is important to note, however, that 
although it is possible to determine the separate marginal costs of 
goods produced in variable proportions, it is impossible to 
determine their individual average costs. This is because common 
costs are expenses necessary for manufacture of a joint product. 
Common costs of production--raw material and equipment costs, 
management expenses, and other overhead--cannot be allocated to each 
individual by-product on any economically sound basis . . . . Any 
allocation of common costs is wrong and arbitrary.''). This is not 
new economic theory. See, e.g., F. W. Taussig, ``A Contribution to 
the Theory of Railway Rates,'' Quarterly Journal of Economics V(4) 
438, 465 (July 1891) (``Yet, surely, the division is purely 
arbitrary. These items of cost, in fact, are jointly incurred for 
both sorts of traffic; and I cannot share the hope entertained by 
the statistician of the Commission, Professor Henry C. Adams, that 
we shall ever reach a mode of apportionment that will lead to 
trustworthy results.'').
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    Analyzing the cost of market data product production and 
distribution in isolation from the cost of all of the inputs supporting 
the creation of market data and market data products will inevitably 
underestimate the cost of the data and data products because it is 
impossible to obtain the data inputs to create market data products 
without a fast, technologically robust, and well-regulated execution 
system, and system and regulatory costs affect the price of both 
obtaining the market data itself and creating and distributing market 
data products. It would be equally misleading, however, to attribute 
all of an exchange's costs to the market data portion of an exchange's 
joint products. Rather, all of an exchange's costs are incurred for the 
unified purposes of attracting order flow, executing and/or routing 
orders, and generating and selling data about market activity. The 
total return that an exchange earns reflects the revenues it receives 
from the joint products and the total costs of the joint products.
    As noted above, the level of competition and contestability in the 
market is evident in the numerous alternative venues that compete for 
order flow, including 12 equities self-regulatory organization 
(``SRO'') markets, as well as various forms of alternative trading 
systems (``ATSs''), including dark pools and electronic communication 
networks (``ECNs''), and internalizing broker-dealers. SRO markets 
compete to attract order flow and produce transaction reports via trade 
executions, and two FINRA-regulated Trade Reporting Facilities compete 
to attract transaction reports from the non-SRO venues.
    Competition among trading platforms can be expected to constrain 
the aggregate return that each platform earns from the sale of its 
joint products, but different trading platforms may choose from a range 
of possible, and equally reasonable, pricing strategies as the means of 
recovering total costs. For example, some platforms may choose to pay 
rebates to attract orders, charge relatively low prices for market data 
products (or provide market data products free of charge), and charge 
relatively high prices for accessing posted liquidity. Other platforms 
may choose a strategy of paying lower rebates (or no rebates) to 
attract orders, setting relatively high prices for market data 
products, and setting relatively low prices for accessing posted 
liquidity. For example, Bats Global Markets (``Bats'') and Direct Edge, 
which previously operated as ATSs and obtained exchange status in 2008 
and 2010, respectively, provided certain market data at no charge on 
their Web sites in order to attract more order flow, and used revenue 
rebates from resulting additional executions to maintain low execution 
charges for their users.\21\ In this environment, there is no economic 
basis for regulating maximum prices for one of the joint products in an 
industry in which suppliers face competitive

[[Page 55706]]

constraints with regard to the joint offering.
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    \21\ This is simply a securities market-specific example of the 
well-established principle that in certain circumstances more sales 
at lower margins can be more profitable than fewer sales at higher 
margins; this example is additional evidence that market data is an 
inherent part of a market's joint platform.
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Existence of Alternatives
    The large number of SROs, ATSs, and internalizing broker-dealers 
that currently produce proprietary data or are currently capable of 
producing it provides further pricing discipline for proprietary data 
products. Each SRO, ATS, and broker-dealer is currently permitted to 
produce and sell proprietary data products, and many currently do, 
including but not limited to the Exchange, New York Stock Exchange LLC, 
NYSE American LLC, NASDAQ, Bats, and Direct Edge.
    The fact that proprietary data from ATSs, internalizing broker-
dealers, and vendors can bypass SROs is significant in two respects. 
First, non-SROs can compete directly with SROs for the production and 
sale of proprietary data products. By way of example, Bats and NYSE 
Arca both published proprietary data on the Internet before registering 
as exchanges. Second, because a single order or transaction report can 
appear in an SRO proprietary product, a non-SRO proprietary product, or 
both, the amount of data available via proprietary products is greater 
in size than the actual number of orders and transaction reports that 
exist in the marketplace. Indeed, in the case of NYSE Arca BBO and NYSE 
Arca Trades, the data provided through these products appears both in 
(i) real-time core data products offered by the Securities Information 
Processors (SIPs) for a fee, and (ii) free SIP data products with a 15-
minute time delay, and finds a close substitute in similar products of 
competing venues.\22\ Because market data users can find suitable 
substitutes for most proprietary market data products, a market that 
overprices its market data products stands a high risk that users may 
substitute another source of market data information for its own.
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    \22\ See supra note 11 [sic].
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    Those competitive pressures imposed by available alternatives are 
evident in the Exchange's proposed pricing.
    In addition to the competition and price discipline described 
above, the market for proprietary data products is also highly 
contestable because market entry is rapid and inexpensive. The history 
of electronic trading is replete with examples of entrants that swiftly 
grew into some of the largest electronic trading platforms and 
proprietary data producers: Archipelago, Bloomberg Tradebook, Island, 
RediBook, Attain, TrackECN, BATS Trading and Direct Edge. A 
proliferation of dark pools and other ATSs operate profitably with 
fragmentary share of consolidated market volume.
    In determining the proposed changes to the fees for the NYSE Arca 
BBO and NYSE Arca Trades, the Exchange considered the competitiveness 
of the market for proprietary data and all of the implications of that 
competition. The Exchange believes that it has considered all relevant 
factors and has not considered irrelevant factors in order to establish 
fair, reasonable, and not unreasonably discriminatory fees and an 
equitable allocation of fees among all users. The existence of numerous 
alternatives to the Exchange's products, including proprietary data 
from other sources, ensures that the Exchange cannot set unreasonable 
fees, or fees that are unreasonably discriminatory, when vendors and 
subscribers can elect these alternatives or choose not to purchase a 
specific proprietary data product if the attendant fees are not 
justified by the returns that any particular vendor or data recipient 
would achieve through the purchase.

C. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement on Comments on the Proposed 
Rule Change Received From Members, Participants, or Others

    No written comments were solicited or received with respect to the 
proposed rule change.

III. Date of Effectiveness of the Proposed Rule Change and Timing for 
Commission Action

    The foregoing rule change is effective upon filing pursuant to 
Section 19(b)(3)(A) \23\ of the Act and subparagraph (f)(2) of Rule 
19b-4 \24\ thereunder, because it establishes a due, fee, or other 
charge imposed by the Exchange.
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    \23\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(3)(A).
    \24\ 17 CFR 240.19b-4(f)(2).
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    At any time within 60 days of the filing of such proposed rule 
change, the Commission summarily may temporarily suspend such rule 
change if it appears to the Commission that such action is necessary or 
appropriate in the public interest, for the protection of investors, or 
otherwise in furtherance of the purposes of the Act. If the Commission 
takes such action, the Commission shall institute proceedings under 
Section 19(b)(2)(B) \25\ of the Act to determine whether the proposed 
rule change should be approved or disapproved.
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    \25\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(2)(B).
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IV. Solicitation of Comments

    Interested persons are invited to submit written data, views, and 
arguments concerning the foregoing, including whether the proposed rule 
change is consistent with the Act. Comments may be submitted by any of 
the following methods:

Electronic Comments

     Use the Commission's Internet comment form (http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml); or
     Send an email to [email protected]. Please include 
File Number SR-NYSEARCA-2017-129 on the subject line.

Paper Comments

     Send paper comments in triplicate to Brent J. Fields, 
Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street NE., 
Washington, DC 20549-1090.

All submissions should refer to File Number SR-NYSEARCA-2017-129. This 
file number should be included on the subject line if email is used. To 
help the Commission process and review your comments more efficiently, 
please use only one method. The Commission will post all comments on 
the Commission's Internet Web site (http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml). Copies of the submission, all subsequent amendments, all 
written statements with respect to the proposed rule change that are 
filed with the Commission, and all written communications relating to 
the proposed rule change between the Commission and any person, other 
than those that may be withheld from the public in accordance with the 
provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552, will be available for Web site viewing and 
printing in the Commission's Public Reference Room, 100 F Street NE., 
Washington, DC 20549 on official business days between the hours of 
10:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m. Copies of the filing also will be available 
for inspection and copying at the principal office of the Exchange. All 
comments received will be posted without change. Persons submitting 
comments are cautioned that we do not redact or edit personal 
identifying information from comment submissions. You should submit 
only information that you wish to make available publicly. All 
submissions should refer to File Number SR-NYSEARCA-2017-129 and should 
be submitted on or before December 13, 2017.


[[Page 55707]]


    For the Commission, by the Division of Trading and Markets, 
pursuant to delegated authority.\26\
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    \26\ 17 CFR 200.30-3(a)(12).
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Eduardo A. Aleman,
Assistant Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2017-25228 Filed 11-21-17; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 8011-01-P