[Federal Register Volume 82, Number 207 (Friday, October 27, 2017)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 49984-50044]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2017-22093]



[[Page 49983]]

Vol. 82

Friday,

No. 207

October 27, 2017

Part III





Department of the Treasury





-----------------------------------------------------------------------





Office of the Comptroller of the Currency





-----------------------------------------------------------------------





12 CFR Part 3





Federal Reserve System





-----------------------------------------------------------------------

12 CFR Part 217





Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation





-----------------------------------------------------------------------

12 CFR Part 324





Simplifications to the Capital Rule Pursuant to the Economic Growth and 
Regulatory Paperwork Reduction Act of 1996; Proposed Rule

  Federal Register / Vol. 82 , No. 207 / Friday, October 27, 2017 / 
Proposed Rules  

[[Page 49984]]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

Office of the Comptroller of the Currency

12 CFR Part 3

[Docket ID OCC-2017-0018]
RIN 1557-AE10

FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM

12 CFR Part 217

[Regulation Q; Docket No. R-1576]
RIN 7100 AE-74

FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION

12 CFR Part 324

RIN 3064-AE59


Simplifications to the Capital Rule Pursuant to the Economic 
Growth and Regulatory Paperwork Reduction Act of 1996

AGENCY: Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Treasury; the Board 
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; and the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: In March 2017, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, 
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, and the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (collectively, the agencies) submitted a 
report to Congress pursuant to the Economic Growth and Regulatory 
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1996, in which they committed to 
meaningfully reduce regulatory burden, especially on community banking 
organizations. Consistent with that commitment, the agencies are 
inviting public comment on a notice of proposed rulemaking that would 
simplify compliance with certain aspects of the capital rule. A 
majority of the proposed simplifications would apply solely to banking 
organizations that are not subject to the advanced approaches capital 
rule (non-advanced approaches banking organizations). Specifically, the 
agencies are proposing that non-advanced approaches banking 
organizations apply a simpler regulatory capital treatment for: 
Mortgage servicing assets; certain deferred tax assets arising from 
temporary differences; investments in the capital of unconsolidated 
financial institutions; and capital issued by a consolidated subsidiary 
of a banking organization and held by third parties (minority 
interest). More generally, the proposal also includes revisions to the 
treatment of certain acquisition, development, or construction 
exposures that are designed to address comments regarding the current 
definition of high volatility commercial real estate exposure under the 
capital rule's standardized approach. Under the standardized approach, 
the proposed revisions to the treatment of acquisition, development, or 
construction exposures would not apply to existing exposures that are 
outstanding or committed prior to any final rule's effective date.
    In addition to the proposed simplifications, the agencies also are 
proposing various additional clarifications and technical amendments to 
the agencies' capital rule, which would apply to both non-advanced 
approaches banking organizations and advanced approaches banking 
organizations.

DATES: Comments must be received by December 26, 2017.

ADDRESSES: Comments should be directed to:

OCC: Because paper mail in the Washington, DC area and at the OCC is 
subject to delay, commenters are encouraged to submit comments through 
the Federal eRulemaking Portal or email, if possible. Please use the 
title ``Simplifications to the Capital Rule Pursuant to the Economic 
Growth and Regulatory Paperwork Reduction Act of 1996'' to facilitate 
the organization and distribution of the comments. You may submit 
comments by any of the following methods:
     Federal eRulemaking Portal--``regulations.gov'': Go to 
www.regulations.gov. Enter ``Docket ID OCC-2017-0018'' in the Search 
Box and click ``Search.'' Click on ``Comment Now'' to submit public 
comments.
     Click on the ``Help'' tab on the Regulations.gov home page 
to get information on using Regulations.gov, including instructions for 
submitting public comments.
     Email: [email protected].
     Mail: Legislative and Regulatory Activities Division, 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, 400 7th Street SW., Suite 
3E-218, Mail Stop 9W-11, Washington, DC 20219.
     Hand Delivery/Courier: 400 7th Street SW., Suite 3E-218, 
Mail Stop 9W-11, Washington, DC 20219.
     Fax: (571) 465-4326.
    Instructions: You must include ``OCC'' as the agency name and 
``Docket ID OCC-2017-0018'' in your comment. In general, the OCC will 
enter all comments received into the docket and publish them on the 
Regulations.gov Web site without change, including any business or 
personal information that you provide such as name and address 
information, email addresses, or phone numbers. Comments received, 
including attachments and other supporting materials, are part of the 
public record and subject to public disclosure. Do not include any 
information in your comment or supporting materials that you consider 
confidential or inappropriate for public disclosure.
    You may review comments and other related materials that pertain to 
this rulemaking action by any of the following methods:
     Viewing Comments Electronically: Go to 
www.regulations.gov. Enter ``Docket ID OCC-2017-0018'' in the Search 
box and click ``Search.'' Click on ``Open Docket Folder'' on the right 
side of the screen and then ``Comments.'' Comments can be filtered by 
clicking on ``View All'' and then using the filtering tools on the left 
side of the screen.
     Click on the ``Help'' tab on the Regulations.gov home page 
to get information on using Regulations.gov. Supporting materials may 
be viewed by clicking on ``Open Docket Folder'' and then clicking on 
``Supporting Documents.'' The docket may be viewed after the close of 
the comment period in the same manner as during the comment period.
    Viewing Comments Personally: You may personally inspect and 
photocopy comments at the OCC, 400 7th Street SW., Washington, DC 
20219. For security reasons, the OCC requires that visitors make an 
appointment to inspect comments. You may do so by calling (202) 649-
6700 or, for persons who are deaf or hearing impaired, TTY, (202) 649-
5597. Upon arrival, visitors will be required to present valid 
government-issued photo identification and submit to security screening 
in order to inspect and photocopy comments.
    Board: You may submit comments, identified by Docket No. R-1576; 
RIN 7100 AE-74, by any of the following methods:
     Agency Web site: http://www.federalreserve.gov. Follow the 
instructions for submitting comments at http://www.federalreserve.gov/generalinfo/foia/ProposedRegs.cfm.
     Federal eRulemaking Portal: http://www.regulations.gov. 
Follow the instructions for submitting comments.
     Email: [email protected]. Include docket 
number in the subject line of the message.
     Fax: (202) 452-3819 or (202) 452-3102.
     Mail: Ann E. Misback, Secretary, Board of Governors of the 
Federal

[[Page 49985]]

Reserve System, 20th Street and Constitution Avenue NW., Washington, DC 
20551. All public comments are available from the Board's Web site at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/generalinfo/foia/ProposedRegs.cfm as 
submitted, unless modified for technical reasons. Accordingly, comments 
will not be edited to remove any identifying or contact information. 
Public comments may also be viewed electronically or in paper form in 
Room 3515, 1801 K Street NW. (between 18th and 19th Streets NW.), 
Washington, DC 20006 between 9:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. on weekdays. FDIC: 
You may submit comments, identified by RIN 3064-AE59 by any of the 
following methods:
     Agency Web site: http://www.FDIC.gov/regulations/laws/federal/propose.html. Follow instructions for submitting comments on 
the Agency Web site.
     Mail: Robert E. Feldman, Executive Secretary, Attention: 
Comments/Legal ESS, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 550 17th 
Street NW., Washington, DC 20429.
     Hand Delivered/Courier: Comments may be hand-delivered to 
the guard station at the rear of the 550 17th Street Building (located 
on F Street) on business days between 7:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m.
     Email: [email protected]. Include the RIN 3064-AE59 on the 
subject line of the message.
     Public Inspection: All comments received must include the 
agency name and RIN 3064-AE66 for this rulemaking. All comments 
received will be posted without change to http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/federal/, including any personal information provided. 
Paper copies of public comments may be ordered from the FDIC Public 
Information Center, 3501 North Fairfax Drive, Room E-1002, Arlington, 
VA 22226 by telephone at (877) 275-3342 or (703) 562-2200.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 
    OCC: Mark Ginsberg, Senior Risk Expert (202) 649-6983; or Benjamin 
Pegg, Risk Expert (202) 649-7146, Capital and Regulatory Policy; or 
Carl Kaminski, Special Counsel, or Rima Kundnani, Attorney, Legislative 
and Regulatory Activities Division, (202) 649-5490, for persons who are 
deaf or hearing impaired, TTY, (202) 649-5597, Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency, 400 7th Street SW., Washington, DC 20219.
    Board: Constance M. Horsley, Deputy Associate Director, (202) 452-
5239; Juan Climent, Manager, (202) 872-7526; Elizabeth MacDonald, 
Manager, (202) 475-6316; Andrew Willis, Supervisory Financial Analyst, 
(202) 912-4323; Sean Healey, Supervisory Financial Analyst, (202) 912-
4611 or Matthew McQueeney, Senior Financial Analyst, (202) 452-2942, 
Division of Supervision and Regulation; or Benjamin McDonough, 
Assistant General Counsel (202) 452-2036; David W. Alexander, Counsel 
(202) 452-2877, or Mark Buresh, Senior Attorney (202) 452-5270, Legal 
Division, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 20th and C 
Streets NW., Washington, DC 20551. For the hearing impaired only, 
Telecommunication Device for the Deaf (TDD), (202) 263-4869.
    FDIC: Benedetto Bosco, Chief, Capital Policy Section; 
[email protected]; David Riley, Senior Policy Analyst, Capital Policy 
Section; [email protected]; Michael Maloney, Senior Policy Analyst, 
[email protected]; Stephanie Efron, Senior Policy Analyst, 
[email protected]; [email protected]; Capital Markets Branch, 
Division of Risk Management Supervision, (202) 898-6888; or Catherine 
Wood, Counsel, [email protected]; Rachel Ackmann, Counsel, 
[email protected]; Michael Phillips, Counsel, [email protected]; 
Supervision Branch, Legal Division, Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation, 550 17th Street NW., Washington, DC 20429.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Table of Contents

I. Introduction and Summary of the Proposed Simplifications of the 
Capital Rule
II. Proposed Simplifications of and Revisions to the Capital Rule
    A. HVADC Exposures
    1. Background
    2. Scope of the HVADC Exposure Definition
    3. Exemptions From the HVADC Exposure Definition
    a. Removal of the Contributed Capital Exemption Under HVADC 
Exposure
    b. One- to Four-Family Residential Properties
    c. Community Development Projects
    d. Agricultural Exposures
    4. Permanent Loans
    5. Risk Weight for HVADC Exposures
    6. Retaining the HVCRE Exposure Definition Under the Advanced 
Approaches Rule
    7. Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)
    B. MSAs, Temporary Difference DTAs, and Investments in the 
Capital of Unconsolidated Financial Institutions
    1. Background
    2. Simplifying the Capital Treatment for MSAs, Temporary 
Difference DTAs, and Investments in the Capital of Unconsolidated 
Financial Institutions
    a. MSAs and Temporary Difference DTAs
    b. Investments in the Capital of Unconsolidated Financial 
Institutions
    c. Regulatory Treatment for Advanced Approaches Banking 
Organizations
    C. Minority Interest
    1. Background
    2. Simplifying the Regulatory Capital Limitations for Minority 
Interest
III. Technical Amendments to the Capital Rule
IV. Abbreviations
V. Regulatory Analyses
    A. Paperwork Reduction Act
    B. Regulatory Flexibility Act Analysis
    C. Plain Language
    D. OCC Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 Determination
    E. Riegle Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act 
of 1994

I. Introduction and Summary of the Proposed Simplifications of the 
Capital Rule

    The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Board), and the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) (collectively, the agencies) are 
issuing this notice of proposed rulemaking (proposal or proposed rule) 
with the goal of reducing regulatory compliance burden, particularly on 
community banking organizations, by simplifying certain aspects of the 
agencies' rules revising their risk-based and leverage capital 
requirements (capital rule).\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ The Board and the OCC issued a joint final rule on October 
11, 2013 (78 FR 62018) and the FDIC issued a substantially identical 
interim final rule on September 10, 2013 (78 FR 55340). In April 
2014, the FDIC adopted the interim final rule as a final rule with 
no substantive changes. 79 FR 20754 (April 14, 2014).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In 2013, the agencies adopted the capital rule to address 
weaknesses that became apparent during the financial crisis of 2007-08. 
Principally, the capital rule strengthened the capital requirements 
applicable to banking organizations \2\ supervised by the agencies by 
improving both the quality and quantity of banking organizations' 
regulatory capital, and increasing the risk-sensitivity of the capital 
rule.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \2\ Banking organizations subject to the agencies' capital rule 
include national banks, state member banks, state nonmember banks, 
savings associations, and top-tier bank holding companies and 
savings and loan holding companies domiciled in the United States 
not subject to the Board's Small Bank Holding Company Policy 
Statement (12 CFR part 225, appendix C), but excluding certain 
savings and loan holding companies that are substantially engaged in 
insurance underwriting or commercial activities or that are estate 
trusts, and bank holding companies and savings and loan holding 
companies that are employee stock ownership plans.
    \3\ 12 CFR part 217 (Board); 12 CFR part 3 (OCC); 12 CFR part 
324 (FDIC).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The capital rule provides two methodologies for determining risk-
weighted assets: (i) The standardized approach and (ii) the advanced 
approaches, which include both the internal ratings-based approach and 
the advanced measurement approach (the

[[Page 49986]]

advanced approaches).\4\ The standardized approach applies to all 
banking organizations that are subject to the agencies' risk-based 
capital regulations, whereas the advanced approaches apply only to 
certain large or internationally active banking organizations (advanced 
approaches banking organizations).\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \4\ 12 CFR part 217, subparts D & E; 12 CFR part 3 (OCC), 
Subparts D & E; 12 CFR part 324, subparts D & E (FDIC).
    \5\ 12 CFR 217.1(c), 12 CFR 217.100(b) (Board); 12 CFR 3.1(c), 
12 CFR 3.100(b) (OCC); 12 CFR 324.1(c), 12 CFR 324.100(b) (FDIC). 
Those smaller and less complex banking organizations that do not 
apply the advanced approaches are referred to as ``non-advanced 
approaches banking organizations'' in this proposal.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The agencies have received numerous questions regarding various 
aspects of the capital rule since its adoption in 2013. In addition, in 
connection with the agencies' review under the Economic Growth and 
Regulatory Paperwork Reduction Act of 1996 (EGRPRA),\6\ for which the 
agencies sought comment through Federal Register notices published in 
2014 and 2015, the agencies received over 230 comment letters from 
insured depository institutions, trade associations, consumer and 
community groups, and other interested parties.\7\ The agencies also 
received numerous oral and written comments from panelists and the 
public at outreach meetings.\8\ Some of these comments were similar to 
the comments that the agencies had already received regarding the 
capital rule, including, for example, that the capital rule is unduly 
burdensome and complex. The agencies thoroughly reviewed these comments 
and issued a Joint Report to Congress: Economic Growth and Regulatory 
Paperwork Reduction Act (the 2017 EGRPRA report) in March 2017.\9\ In 
the 2017 EGRPRA report, the agencies highlighted their intent to 
meaningfully reduce regulatory burden, especially on community banking 
organizations, while at the same time maintaining safety and soundness 
and the quality and quantity of regulatory capital in the banking 
system.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \6\ EGRPRA requires that regulations prescribed by the agencies 
be reviewed at least once every 10 years. The purpose of this review 
is to identify, with input from the public, outdated or unnecessary 
regulations and consider how to reduce regulatory burden on insured 
depository institutions while, at the same time, ensuring their 
safety and soundness and the safety and soundness of the financial 
system. Public Law 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996).
    \7\ 79 FR 32172 (June 4, 2014); 80 FR 7980 (February 13, 2015); 
80 FR 32046 (June 5, 2015); and 80 FR 79724 (December 23, 2015).
    \8\ Comments received during the EGRPRA review process and 
transcripts of outreach meetings can be found at http://egrpra.ffiec.gov/.
    \9\ 82 FR 15900 (March 30, 2017).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In particular, the agencies indicated in the 2017 EGRPRA report 
that they would develop a proposed rule to simplify the capital rule by 
considering amendments to (i) replace the standardized approach's 
treatment of high volatility commercial real estate (HVCRE) exposures 
with a simpler treatment for most acquisition, development, or 
construction exposures; and, for non-advanced approaches banking 
organizations, to (ii) simplify the current regulatory capital 
treatment for mortgage servicing assets (MSAs), deferred tax assets 
(DTAs) arising from temporary differences that an institution could not 
realize through net operating loss carrybacks (temporary difference 
DTAs), and investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial 
institutions; and (iii) simplify the calculation for the amount of 
capital that can count toward regulatory requirements in cases in which 
a banking organization's consolidated subsidiary has issued capital 
that is held by third parties (minority interest).
    Consistent with the 2017 EGRPRA report, the agencies are proposing 
a number of modifications to the capital rule that are aimed at 
reducing regulatory burden. First, the agencies are proposing to 
replace the existing HVCRE exposure category as applied in the 
standardized approach with a newly defined exposure category called 
high volatility acquisition, development, or construction (HVADC) 
exposure. The proposed HVADC exposure definition is intended to be 
substantially simpler to implement as it removes the most complex 
exclusion contained in the current HVCRE exposure definition. In 
addition, the proposed rule simplifies and clarifies certain 
exemptions, and clarifies the scope of exposures captured by the HVADC 
exposure definition. While some of the simplifications and 
clarifications may increase the scope and others may decrease it, in 
the aggregate, it is likely that more acquisition, development, or 
construction loans would be captured under the proposed HVADC exposure 
definition than under the current HVCRE exposure definition. 
Accordingly, the agencies are proposing to apply a lower risk weight to 
the proposed HVADC exposure category. The proposed risk weight for 
HVADC exposures would be 130 percent, a reduction from the 150 percent 
risk weight that currently applies to HVCRE exposures under the capital 
rule's standardized approach. The new HVADC exposure definition would 
only apply to exposures originated on or after the final rule's 
effective date. As described further below, the proposed rule would not 
revise the treatment of HVCRE exposures for purposes of calculating the 
amount of capital required under the advanced approaches. However, for 
purposes of calculating their capital requirements going forward under 
the standardized approach, advanced approaches banking organizations 
would use the proposed HVADC exposure category.
    Second, the agencies are proposing to simplify the current 
regulatory capital treatment of MSAs, temporary difference DTAs, and 
investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial institutions for 
non-advanced approaches banking organizations. As explained further 
below, for these banking organizations, the proposal would eliminate 
(i) the capital rule's 10 percent common equity tier 1 capital 
deduction threshold that applies individually to MSAs, temporary 
difference DTAs, and significant investments in the capital of 
unconsolidated financial institutions in the form of common stock; (ii) 
the aggregate 15 percent common equity tier 1 capital deduction 
threshold that subsequently applies on a collective basis across such 
items; (iii) the 10 percent common equity tier 1 capital deduction 
threshold for non-significant investments in the capital of 
unconsolidated financial institutions; and (iv) the deduction treatment 
for significant investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial 
institutions not in the form of common stock.\10\ Under the proposal, 
for non-advanced approaches banking organizations, the capital rule 
would no longer have distinct treatments for significant and non-
significant investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial 
institutions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \10\ 12 CFR 217.22(c) and (d) (Board); 12 CFR 3.22(c) and (d) 
(OCC); 12 CFR 324.22 (c) and (d) (FDIC).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Instead of imposing these complex treatments for MSAs, temporary 
difference DTAs, and investments in the capital of unconsolidated 
financial institutions, the proposal would require that non-advanced 
approaches banking organizations deduct from common equity tier 1 
capital any amount of MSAs, temporary difference DTAs, and investments 
in the capital of unconsolidated financial institutions that 
individually exceeds 25 percent of common equity tier 1 capital (the 25 
percent common equity tier 1 capital deduction threshold). Consistent 
with the capital rule, under the proposal, a banking organization would 
continue to

[[Page 49987]]

apply a 250 percent risk weight to any MSAs or temporary DTAs not 
deducted.\11\ However, for investments in the capital of unconsolidated 
financial institutions that are not deducted, the proposal would 
require a banking organization to risk weight each non-deducted 
exposure according to the exposure category of the investment. Advanced 
approaches banking organizations, however, would be required to 
continue to apply the deduction and risk-weighting treatments in the 
capital rule for MSAs, temporary difference DTAs, and investments in 
the capital of unconsolidated financial institutions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \11\ The agencies note that they are not proposing to change the 
current treatment of DTAs arising from timing differences that could 
be realized through net operating loss carrybacks. Such DTAs are not 
subject to deduction and are assigned a 100 percent risk weight.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Third, the agencies are proposing a significantly simpler 
methodology for non-advanced approaches banking organizations to 
calculate minority interest limitations.\12\ The existing capital 
rule's limitations for common equity tier 1 minority interest, tier 1 
minority interest, and total capital minority interest are based on the 
capital requirements and capital ratios of each of a banking 
organization's consolidated subsidiaries that has issued capital 
instruments that are held by third parties. The proposal would require 
that non-advanced approaches banking organizations limit minority 
interest based on the banking organization's capital levels rather than 
on its subsidiaries' capital ratios. Specifically, a non-advanced 
approaches banking organization would be allowed to include common 
equity tier 1, tier 1, and total capital minority interest up to and 
including 10 percent of the banking organization's common equity tier 
1, tier 1, and total capital (before the inclusion of any minority 
interest), respectively. Advanced approaches banking organizations, 
however, would be required to continue to apply the treatment of 
minority interest provided in the existing capital rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \12\ 12 CFR 217.21(Board); 12 CFR 3.21 (OCC); 12 CFR 324.21 
(FDIC).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The agencies anticipate that the simplifications described above 
would lead to a reduction of regulatory reporting burden for non-
advanced approaches banking organizations. Following the publication of 
this proposed rule, the agencies would propose for public comment 
corresponding changes to regulatory reporting forms and instructions.
    The proposed rule would also make certain technical changes to the 
capital rule, including some changes to the advanced approaches rule, 
such as clarifying revisions, updating cross-references, and correcting 
typographical errors.
    In August 2017, in anticipation of this proposal, the agencies 
invited public comment on a proposed rule to extend the capital rule's 
transitional provisions for MSAs, temporary difference DTAs, and 
investments in the capital of consolidated financial institutions and 
certain minority interest requirements (transitions NPR).\13\ If the 
transitions NPR is finalized substantially as proposed, the capital 
treatment proposed in the transitions NPR would remain effective until 
such time as the changes proposed in this proposal would be finalized 
and become effective or the finalized transitions NPR is otherwise 
superseded.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \13\ 82 FR 40495 (August 25, 2017).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

II. Proposed Simplifications of and Revisions to the Capital Rule

A. HVADC Exposures

1. Background
    The capital rule currently defines an HVCRE exposure as any credit 
facility that, prior to conversion to permanent financing, finances or 
has financed the acquisition, development, or construction of real 
property, unless the facility finances one- to four-family residential 
properties, certain agricultural or community development exposures, or 
commercial real estate projects where the borrower meets certain 
contributed capital requirements and other prudential criteria. In the 
preamble to the capital rule, the agencies noted that their supervisory 
experience had demonstrated that these exposures, compared to other 
commercial real estate exposures, presented heightened risks for which 
banking organizations should hold additional capital, and accordingly 
adopted a 150 percent risk weight for HVCRE exposures under the 
standardized approach.
    Since the adoption of the capital rule, the agencies have received 
numerous questions regarding various aspects of the HVCRE exposure 
definition. Community banking organizations, in particular, have 
asserted that the definition is unclear, overly complex, burdensome to 
implement, and not applied consistently across banking organizations. 
For example, banking organizations submitted comments and questions to 
the agencies regarding the treatment of multi-purpose loan facilities 
under the HVCRE exposure definition, including loans used to finance 
both the purchase of equipment and the acquisition, development, or 
construction of real property. Banking organizations also asked for 
clarification regarding the various exemptions from the HVCRE exposure 
definition, including the exemptions for (i) one- to four-family 
residential properties, (ii) community development exposures, and (iii) 
exposures where borrowers met the contributed capital requirements (as 
discussed in more detail in section II.A.3.a. below).
    After evaluating the comments and questions from the industry 
following the publication of the capital rule, as well as the feedback 
from the public received during the review process leading to the 2017 
EGRPRA report, the agencies are proposing to amend the treatment in the 
standardized approach for credit facilities that finance acquisition, 
development, or construction activities, with the goal of simplifying 
the treatment of these exposures. The agencies are proposing to replace 
the HVCRE exposure category as applied in the standardized approach 
with a newly defined exposure category termed HVADC exposure that would 
apply to credit facilities that finance acquisition, development, or 
construction activities. As compared to the HVCRE exposure definition, 
the proposed HVADC exposure definition would not include the 
contributed capital exemption. Additionally, the proposed definition of 
HVADC exposure provides greater clarity on which acquisition, 
development, or construction exposures have relatively more risk and 
merit a higher risk weight than the current definition of HVCRE 
exposure by including a ``primarily finances'' test. The HVADC exposure 
definition also includes a definition of ``permanent loan'' to clearly 
articulate when an exposure ceases being an HVADC exposure under the 
propose rule. Both the ``primarily finances'' test and the definition 
of ``permanent loan'' are explained in more detail below. With the 
introduction of a ``primarily finances'' test and ``permanent loan'' 
definition, the scope of included or excluded exposures under the 
proposed HVADC exposure definition will likely be different from those 
captured under the current HVCRE exposure definition and will vary 
across individual banking organizations. In total, the agencies believe 
that the simpler HVADC exposure definition likely would capture more 
acquisition, development, or construction exposures than are currently 
captured by the definition of

[[Page 49988]]

HVCRE exposure. In recognition of the potentially expanded scope, the 
agencies are proposing to reduce the standardized approach risk weight 
for HVADC exposures, relative to the current risk weight for HVCRE 
exposures.
    Under the proposed rule, an HVADC exposure would receive a 130 
percent risk weight as opposed to the 150 percent risk weight assigned 
to HVCRE exposures under the existing standardized approach. The 
proposed rule would require higher risk weights for certain 
acquisition, development, or construction exposures and lower risk 
weights for others. Additionally, to mitigate the potential burden on 
banking organizations of having to re-evaluate all of their 
acquisition, development, or construction exposures against the new 
HVADC exposure definition, the proposal, under the standardized 
approach, would contain a grandfathering provision to retain the 
capital rule's treatment for acquisition, development, or construction 
exposures outstanding or committed as of the effective date of any 
final rule (as discussed in more detail in section II(A)(5)). The 
proposed revisions to the standardized approach are intended to be 
responsive to concerns about the difficulties of implementing the HVCRE 
exposure definition, while maintaining capital requirements 
commensurate with the risk profiles of different credit facilities that 
finance acquisition, development, or construction activities.
2. Scope of the HVADC Exposure Definition
    Under the proposed rule, the capital rule would define an HVADC 
exposure as a credit facility that primarily finances or refinances: 
(i) The acquisition of vacant or developed land; (ii) the development 
of land to prepare to erect new structures, including, but not limited 
to, the laying of sewers or water pipes and demolishing existing 
structures; or (iii) the construction of buildings or dwellings, or 
other improvements including additions or alterations to existing 
structures. Like the current HVCRE exposure definition, the proposed 
HVADC exposure definition is purpose-based. Therefore, an acquisition, 
development, or construction exposure that is not secured by real 
property could be considered an HVADC exposure if the purpose of the 
facility is primarily to finance any of the aforementioned activities. 
For purposes of the proposed HVADC exposure definition, an exposure 
would be classified as an HVADC exposure only if the lending facility 
``primarily finances'' acquisition, development, or construction 
activities, meaning that more than 50 percent of the funds (e.g., loan 
proceeds) will be used for acquisition, development, or construction 
activities. In order to make this determination, a banking organization 
would review the proposed use of the funds, and if more than 50 percent 
of the funds is intended for acquisition, development, or construction 
activities, then the facility would meet the ``primarily finances'' 
requirement and would fall within the scope of the HVADC exposure 
definition, unless one or more of the exemption criteria are met.
    For example, assume a borrower intends to use part of an $8 million 
loan to acquire and develop a tract of land for a real estate project. 
Of the $8 million total, $4.5 million will be disbursed for 
acquisition, development, or construction purposes (e.g., buying and 
developing the land and building the structure) and $3.5 million will 
be used to purchase equipment to be used in the completed structure. 
Because more than half of the funds are used for acquisition, 
development, or construction purposes, the loan would be considered an 
HVADC exposure. Any funds or land contributed by the borrower would not 
impact this determination, as the determination is based on the use of 
the loan proceeds. The agencies note that the inclusion of the 
``primarily finances'' test may also lead banking organizations to 
exclude certain multi-purpose credit facilities which finance 
construction and other activities, such as equipment financing, from 
the definition of an HVADC exposure. As a general matter, the agencies 
expect every acquisition, development, or construction transaction to 
be supported by the documentation of sources and uses of funds tailored 
to the specific project, and the agencies expect each banking 
organization to have a process in place to review the intended use of 
funds for an acquisition, development, or construction project, 
consistent with prudent underwriting practices.
    Question 1: The agencies seek comment on whether the scope of the 
HVADC exposure definition presents operational concerns and is clear. 
Specifically, what, if any, operational challenges would banking 
organizations expect when determining whether more than 50 percent of 
the loan proceeds will be used for acquisition, development, or 
construction purposes?
3. Exemptions From the HVADC Exposure Definition
a. Removal of the Contributed Capital Exemption Under HVADC Exposure
    Banking organizations have expressed concern regarding the 
contributed capital exemption under which exposures are not considered 
HVCRE exposures if (i) at the origination of the loan, the loan-to-
value (LTV) ratio is less than or equal to the relevant supervisory LTV 
ratio standard; \14\ (ii) before the advancement of funds, the borrower 
has contributed capital to the project in the form of cash (including 
cash paid for land) or readily marketable securities of at least 15 
percent of the real estate's ``as-completed'' market value; and (iii) 
any internally generated capital must be contractually required to stay 
in the project for the life of the project. Banking organizations have 
asserted that the conditions for meeting this exemption are unclear, 
complex, and burdensome to implement. Further, the agencies have 
received numerous questions from banking organizations on the minimum 
15 percent borrower capital contribution requirement, which is measured 
as a percentage of a project's ``as completed'' market value.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \14\ 12 CFR part 208, subpart J, Appendix C (Board); 12 CFR part 
34, subpart D, Appendix A (OCC); 12 CFR part 365, subpart A, 
Appendix A (FDIC).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    After considering comments from banking organizations regarding 
both the complexity of the contributed capital exemption, as well as 
the potential inconsistent application of the exemption that results, 
the agencies are proposing to not include a contributed capital 
exemption within the HVADC exposure definition. The agencies considered 
various means to clarify or modify the contributed capital exemption in 
a manner consistent with the goals of simplifying the capital rule. 
However, the agencies view the alternative approaches that retain the 
contributed capital exemption as comparably complex and inconsistent 
with the goal of simplifying the capital rule.
    Question 2: The agencies seek comment on the degree to which the 
proposed HVADC exposure definition would simplify and enhance 
consistency in the treatment for credit facilities financing real 
estate acquisition, development, or construction. What other 
simplifications should the agencies consider to improve the simplicity 
and consistent treatment of these credit facilities?

[[Page 49989]]

b. One- to Four-Family Residential Properties
    The proposed definition of an HVADC exposure would exempt credit 
facilities that finance the acquisition, development, or construction 
of one- to four-family residential properties, similar to the exemption 
in the HVCRE exposure definition. For purposes of both HVADC and HVCRE 
exposures, the financing of one- to four-family residential properties 
would include both loans to construct one- to four-family residential 
structures and loans that combine the land acquisition, development, or 
construction of one- to four-family structures, either with or without 
a sales contract, including lot development loans. Therefore, credit 
facilities financing the construction of one- to four-family 
residential structures for which no buyer has been identified would be 
included in the exemption for one- to four-family residential 
properties.
    In response to questions about whether the term ``residential 
properties'' for these purposes includes the acquisition, development, 
or construction of condominiums or cooperatives, the agencies are 
clarifying that, generally, a loan that finances the acquisition, 
development, or construction of condominiums and cooperatives would not 
qualify for the one- to four-family residential properties exemption, 
except in the instance where the project contains fewer than five 
individual dwelling units. Thus, condominiums, cooperatives, and 
apartment buildings would generally be treated as multifamily 
properties and would not qualify for the one- to four-family 
residential properties exemption. If each unit in a project is 
separated from other units by a dividing wall that extends from ground 
to roof (e.g., row houses or townhouses), then each unit would be 
considered a single family residential property and thus exempt from 
the HVADC exposure category. Further, the acquisition, development, or 
construction of multiple residential properties, each containing a one- 
to four-family dwelling unit (such as a loan to finance tract 
development), would qualify for the one- to four-family residential 
property exemption. Loans used solely to acquire undeveloped land would 
not, however, qualify for the one- to four-family residential property 
exemption.
    Question 3: The agencies request comment on whether the proposed 
exemption for one- to four-family residential properties in the HVADC 
exposure category is clear such that a banking organization could 
readily identify which residential loans would be exempt from the HVADC 
exposure category. What, if any, additional clarification would 
facilitate identifying one- to four-family residential properties for 
this purpose? The agencies also solicit comment on all aspects of the 
HVADC exposure category, including the proposed scope and exemptions.
c. Community Development Projects
    The HVCRE exposure definition exempts community development 
projects.\15\ The proposed HVADC exposure definition would continue to 
exempt community development projects. However, the agencies are 
proposing to simplify the definition by removing the reference to the 
broader statutory citations, 12 U.S.C. 24 (Eleventh) and 12 U.S.C. 
338a. Under the proposed rule, all credit facilities financing the 
acquisition, development, or construction of real property projects for 
which the primary purpose is community development, as defined by the 
agencies' Community Reinvestment Act rules, would be exempt from the 
HVADC exposure category. In addition, the agencies are proposing to 
remove the exception to the exemption for activities that promote 
economic development by financing businesses or farms that meet the 
size eligibility standards of the Small Business Administration's (SBA) 
Development Company or Small Business Investment Company programs (13 
CFR 121.301) or have gross annual revenues of $1 million or less, 
unless they meet another exemption in the rule. Such loans are required 
to have a community development purpose under interagency guidance. The 
proposed simplified exemption for community development projects is not 
intended to substantively alter the scope of the exemption for 
community development projects set forth in the current HVCRE exposure 
definition.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \15\ 12 CFR part 25 (national banks) (OCC); 12 CFR part 195 
(federal savings associations) (OCC); 12 CFR part 228 (Board); 12 
CFR part 345 (FDIC).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Question 4: The agencies seek comment on whether the proposed 
community development exemption is clear. What, if any, additional 
clarification would help banking organizations identify exposures that 
meet the community development exemption? Please describe any 
implementation challenges with the exemption.
d. Agricultural Exposures
    The proposed HVADC exposure definition would exclude credit 
facilities that finance the purchase or development of agricultural 
land and would not substantively modify the current exemption for 
agricultural land development set forth in the current HVCRE exposure 
definition.\16\ The agencies note that the term ``agricultural'' is 
broadly defined and would include, for example, timberland or fish 
farms. However, the term ``agricultural,'' as it is used here, would 
not include manufacturing or processing plants related to agricultural 
products, such as a dairy processing plant.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \16\ The proposed rule would make a minor clarification to the 
definition of HVCRE exposure by changing the term ``non-
agricultural'' to ``commercial or residential development.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

4. Permanent Loans
    The proposed HVADC exposure definition would exclude an exposure 
that is considered to be a permanent loan. In response to banking 
organizations' requests for clarification of the term ``permanent 
financing'' as it is used in the current HVCRE exposure definition, the 
proposed HVADC exposure definition includes a definition of ``permanent 
loan.'' A permanent loan for purposes of the proposed HVADC exposure 
definition would mean a prudently underwritten loan \17\ that has a 
clearly identified ongoing source of repayment sufficient to service 
amortizing principal and interest payments aside from the sale of the 
property. The proposed rule would not require that the current loan 
payments be amortizing in order for a loan to meet the definition of a 
permanent loan.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \17\ The agencies are clarifying that a loan is expected to be 
prudently underwritten in order to meet the definition of a 
permanent loan. The Interagency Guidelines for Real Estate Lending 
Policies provide standards for banking organizations in developing 
such written policies, limits, and standards. 12 CFR part 208, 
subpart J, Appendix C (Board); 12 CFR part 34, subpart D, Appendix A 
(OCC); 12 CFR part 365, subpart A, Appendix A (FDIC). Banking 
organizations are required to adopt and maintain written policies 
that establish appropriate limits and standards for extensions of 
credit related to real estate. 12 CFR 208.51 (Board); 12 CFR 34.62 
(OCC); 12 CFR 365.2 (FDIC).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    For many acquisition, development, or construction projects, the 
source of repayment will be derived from the property once the project 
is completed and tenants begin paying rent or the property otherwise 
begins to produce income. Additionally, the agencies recognize that for 
loans financing owner-occupied acquisition, development, or 
construction projects, the owner may have sufficient capacity at 
origination to repay the loan from ongoing operations, without relying 
on proceeds from the sale or lease of the

[[Page 49990]]

property, in which case the loan would be considered a permanent loan 
and thus excluded from the HVADC exposure definition, assuming it was 
prudently underwritten. For example, a prudently underwritten loan to a 
company that obtains financing to construct an additional facility that 
does not rely on the lease income from the facility to repay the loan, 
and instead relies on cash flows from other sources to cover amortizing 
principal and interest payments, may be considered a permanent loan and 
excluded from HVADC.
    The agencies are also clarifying that bridge loans generally would 
not qualify as permanent loans as the property is not generating 
sufficient revenue to make amortizing principal and interest payments. 
The agencies believe financing for bridge loans poses greater credit 
risk than permanent loans, and, therefore, should be subject to a 
higher risk weight.
    Finally, even if a credit facility does not meet the definition of 
a permanent loan at origination, it could subsequently meet the 
definition as the property generates additional revenue sufficient to 
service amortizing principal and interest payments. In such a case, the 
facility may become exempt from the HVADC exposure category, provided 
the loan was prudently underwritten at origination.
    Question 5: The agencies seek comment on the clarity of the 
exemption for permanent loans in the proposed HVADC exposure definition 
and the ease with which banking organizations can determine whether an 
exposure qualifies for this exemption. What, if any, additional 
clarification would help banking organizations identify exposures that 
meet the permanent loan exemption?
5. Risk Weight for HVADC Exposures
    Currently, under the standardized approach, an HVCRE exposure 
receives a 150 percent risk weight. Under the proposed rule, an HVADC 
exposure would receive a 130 percent risk weight. The agencies believe 
the reduced risk weight for HVADC exposures is appropriate in 
recognition of the potentially broader scope of the definition, and 
that this change would not result in a significant change in the 
aggregate minimum capital required under the capital rule. 
Specifically, by including exposures regardless of the amount of the 
borrower's contributed equity, some exposures that would be included in 
the HVADC exposure category may, while remaining riskier than other 
commercial real estate loans, have risk-reducing qualities, such as 
lower LTV ratios and higher borrower-contributed capital relative to 
exposures currently in the HVCRE exposures category.
    However, to mitigate the potential burden on banking organizations 
of having to re-evaluate all of their acquisition, development, or 
construction exposures against the new HVADC exposure definition, the 
proposal, under the standardized approach, would contain a 
grandfathering provision for outstanding acquisition, development, or 
construction exposures. The proposal, under the standardized approach, 
would retain the capital rule's HVCRE exposure definition and exposure 
category treatment for all outstanding acquisition, development, or 
construction exposures as of the effective date of any final rule. Only 
new acquisition, development, or construction exposures originated on 
or after the effective date of a final rule would need to be evaluated 
against the new HVADC exposure definition. Therefore, a banking 
organization would maintain an exposure's risk weight as determined 
prior to the effective date of a final rule under the HVCRE exposure 
definition. For example, if an outstanding acquisition, development, or 
construction exposure is classified as an HVCRE exposure under the 
capital rule, then the exposure would continue to have a 150 percent 
risk weight until the exposure is converted to permanent financing or 
is sold or paid in full. For the purposes of this grandfathering 
provision, permanent financing refers to the existing HVCRE exposure 
definition, which relies on a banking organization's underwriting 
criteria for long-term mortgage loans. If an outstanding acquisition, 
development, or construction exposure is exempt from the HVCRE exposure 
category under the capital rule, then the exposure would continue to 
receive its applicable risk weight under the capital rule (e.g., 100 
percent risk weight), assuming the exposure is not past due.
    Based upon data reported on the Consolidated Financial Statements 
for Holding Companies (FR Y-9C) and on Call Reports for insured 
depository institutions as of June 30, 2017, approximately 80 percent 
of banking organizations report holdings of acquisition, development, 
or construction exposures, excluding one- to four-family residential 
properties, and approximately 40 percent of banking organizations 
report some holdings of HVCRE exposures risk weighted at 150 percent. 
As highlighted above, the proposed treatment may result in a 130 
percent risk weight for certain future exposures that would have 
received either a 100 or a 150 percent risk weight under the capital 
rule's treatment. It may also result in certain loans that would have 
received a 150 percent risk weight under the current rule receiving a 
100 percent risk weight under the proposed rule. At the individual 
banking organization level, a banking organization currently with a 
higher proportion of HVCRE exposures relative to its total acquisition, 
development, or construction exposures may see a decrease in its 
capital requirements on new acquisition, development, or construction 
loans going forward. Conversely, a banking organization that currently 
has a higher proportion of acquisition, development, or construction 
exposures deemed to be excluded from the HVCRE exposure definition may 
see an increase in its capital requirements on new acquisition, 
development, or construction loans to the extent those exposures do not 
otherwise qualify for the exemptions under the proposed HVADC exposure 
definition going forward. Because of the lack of granular data on 
acquisition, development, or construction loans in the regulatory 
reports and since agencies cannot predict how banking organizations may 
structure such exposures in the future, the agencies cannot estimate 
with precision the future impact of the proposed HVADC exposure 
definition at an individual banking organization level. The agencies 
further note that the proposed grandfathering provision, which may 
lessen regulatory compliance burden by preventing banking organizations 
from having to re-evaluate their existing acquisition, development, or 
construction exposures under the new HVADC exposure definition, also 
would limit the potential impact of the treatment of acquisition, 
development, or construction exposures under the proposed HVADC 
exposures definition on banking organizations' regulatory capital.
    Although the agencies anticipate that the proposed rule may lead to 
the assignment of higher risk weights to certain acquisition, 
development, or construction exposures going forward, the agencies 
believe that the simplified definition for HVADC exposures may lead to 
a reduced regulatory compliance burden in classifying acquisition, 
development, or construction exposures. The agencies also expect that 
the revised definition would result in increased consistency in the 
treatment of acquisition, development, or construction exposures. The 
agencies

[[Page 49991]]

believe that the proposed definition strikes an appropriate balance 
between risk-sensitivity and complexity.
    Question 6: The agencies seek comment on the agencies' goal of 
achieving an appropriate balance between the proposed calibration and 
expanded scope of application for HVADC exposures. The agencies are 
interested in any additional data on the impact of the proposed rule's 
capital treatment of HVCRE exposures and the new capital treatment of 
HVADC exposures on bank holding companies, savings and loan holding 
companies, and insured depository institutions, both in the aggregate 
and on an individual banking organization level.
    Question 7: What are the pros and cons of the grandfathering 
provision and does it sufficiently mitigate the compliance burden of 
having to re-evaluate all acquisition, development, or construction 
exposures against the new HVADC exposure definition? Are there 
alternatives to the proposed grandfathering provision that the agencies 
should consider?
6. Retaining the HVCRE Exposure Definition Under the Advanced 
Approaches
    As noted above, the agencies are not proposing to make substantive 
revisions to the advanced approaches as part of this rulemaking. The 
proposed introduction of the HVADC exposure category would apply only 
to the calculation of risk-weighted assets under the standardized 
approach.
    The HVCRE exposure category was introduced in the standardized 
approach as part of the revisions to the capital rule to address the 
agencies' concern that such exposures had been insufficiently 
capitalized prior to and during the financial crisis of 2007-2008. 
Banking organizations have commented on and raised concerns about this 
exposure category and its corresponding 150 percent risk weight in the 
standardized approach since its introduction, and specifically during 
the 2017 EGRPRA process. Because concerns expressed by banking 
organizations regarding the HVCRE exposure definition emanated 
primarily from its implementation in the standardized approach, the 
agencies do not believe it is necessary to make corresponding changes 
to the definition in the advanced approaches. The advanced approaches 
do not rely on a single risk weight for HVCRE exposure, instead 
requiring banking organizations to categorize and assign risk 
parameters to these exposures, as well as subject them to higher 
capital requirements through an asset value correlation factor. Thus, 
treatment of this exposure category in the advanced approaches diverges 
substantially from its treatment in the standardized approach, and the 
agencies are not proposing to replace the existing HVCRE exposure 
definition under the advanced approaches. Accordingly, advanced 
approaches banking organizations would continue to use the HVCRE 
exposure definition to calculate their advanced approaches risk-
weighted assets, while using the HVADC exposure definition for the 
purpose of calculating their risk-weighted assets under the 
standardized approach.
    Question 8: The agencies request comment on whether it would be 
appropriate to replace the HVCRE exposure definition, as it is used in 
the advanced approaches, with the proposed HVADC exposure definition. 
What, if any, challenges do advanced approaches banking organizations 
face as a result of the agencies maintaining the existing HVCRE 
exposure definition for purposes of the advanced approaches while also 
proposing to adopt the more expansive HVADC exposure definition for 
purposes of the standardized approach? What, if any, changes should the 
agencies consider to address these challenges?
7. Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)
    The agencies have previously issued FAQs to provide clarity on the 
existing HVCRE exposure definition. If the agencies adopt the proposal 
as final, they will consider whether to revise or rescind some or all 
of the HVCRE exposure-related FAQs. As the agencies are considering 
comments received on this proposal, the agencies would consider whether 
to issue any updated guidance related to the HVCRE exposure definition 
as it pertains to its use in the advanced approaches.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \18\ ``Frequently Asked Questions on the Regulatory Capital 
Rule,'' OCC Bulletin 2015-23 (April 6, 2016), available at: https://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/bulletins/2015/bulletin-2015-23.html. 
``SR 15-6: Interagency Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) on the 
Regulatory Capital Rules'' (April 5, 2015), available at: https://www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/srletters/sr1506.htm; FDIC FIL 
16-2015, available at https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/financial/2015/fil15016.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

B. MSAs, Temporary Difference DTAs, and Investments in the Capital of 
Unconsolidated Financial Institutions

1. Background
    The capital rule currently requires that a banking organization 
deduct from common equity tier 1 capital the amounts of MSAs, temporary 
difference DTAs, and significant investments in the capital of 
unconsolidated financial institutions in the form of common stock that 
individually exceed 10 percent of the banking organization's common 
equity tier 1 capital.\19\ In addition, any amount not deducted as a 
result of the individual 10 percent common equity tier 1 capital 
deduction threshold must be deducted from a banking organization's 
common equity tier 1 capital if that amount exceeds 15 percent of the 
banking organization's common equity tier 1 capital. Beginning January 
1, 2018, any amount of these three items that a banking organization 
does not deduct from common equity tier 1 capital will be risk weighted 
at 250 percent (until that time, such items are risk weighted at 100 
percent).20 21
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \19\ A significant investment in the capital of an 
unconsolidated financial institution is defined as an investment in 
the capital of an unconsolidated financial institution where the 
banking organization owns more than 10 percent of the issued and 
outstanding common stock of the unconsolidated financial institution 
(significant investment in the capital of an unconsolidated 
financial institution). 12 CFR 217.2 (Board); 12 CFR 3.2 (OCC); 12 
CFR 324.2 (FDIC).
    \20\ Beginning on January 1, 2018, the calculation of the 
aggregate 15 percent common equity tier 1 capital deduction 
threshold for these items will become stricter as any amount above 
15 percent of common equity tier 1, less the amount of those items 
already deducted as a result of the 10 percent common equity tier 1 
capital deduction threshold, will be deducted from a banking 
organization's common equity tier 1. 12 CFR 217.22(d) (Board); 12 
CFR 3.22(d) (OCC); 12 CFR 324.22(d) (FDIC).
    \21\ See the agencies' notice of proposed rulemaking that was 
issued on August 25, 2017 (82 FR 40495).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The capital rule further requires deductions from regulatory 
capital if a banking organization holds (i) non-significant investments 
in the capital of an unconsolidated financial institution above a 
certain threshold \22\ or (ii) significant investments in the capital 
of an unconsolidated financial institution that are not in the form of 
common stock. Specifically, the capital rule requires that a banking 
organization deduct from its regulatory capital any amount of the 
organization's non-significant investments in the capital of 
unconsolidated financial institutions that exceeds 10 percent of the 
banking organization's common equity tier 1 capital (the 10 percent 
threshold for non-significant investments) \23\ in

[[Page 49992]]

accordance with the corresponding deduction approach of the capital 
rule.\24\ In addition, significant investments in the capital of 
unconsolidated financial institutions not in the form of common stock 
also must be deducted from regulatory capital in their entirety in 
accordance with the corresponding deduction approach.\25\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \22\ A non-significant investment in the capital of an 
unconsolidated financial institution is defined as an investment in 
the capital of an unconsolidated financial institution where the 
institution owns 10 percent or less of the issued and outstanding 
common stock of the unconsolidated financial institution (non-
significant investment in the capital of an unconsolidated financial 
institution). 12 CFR 217.2 (Board); 12 CFR 3.2 (OCC); 12 CFR 324.2 
(FDIC).
    \23\ 12 CFR 217.22(c)(4) (Board); 12 CFR 3.22(c)(4) (OCC); 12 
CFR 324.22(c)(4) (FDIC).
    \24\ 12 CFR 217.22(c)(2) (Board); 12 CFR 3.22(c)(2) (OCC); 12 
CFR 324.22(c)(2) (FDIC).
    \25\ 12 CFR 217.22(c)(5) (Board); 12 CFR 3.22(c)(5) (OCC); 12 
CFR 324.22(c)(5) (FDIC).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Simplifying the Capital Treatment for MSAs, Temporary Difference 
DTAs, and Investments in the Capital of Unconsolidated Financial 
Institutions
    As highlighted in numerous questions and comments received by the 
agencies through both the EGRPRA process and their respective 
supervisory processes, community banking organizations have indicated 
that they find the deduction approach for MSAs, temporary difference 
DTAs, and investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial 
institutions to be complex and burdensome. In addition, two banking 
organization commenters asserted in the public comment period for the 
EGRPRA process that the revisions to the treatment of MSAs in the 
capital rule were unduly restrictive for community banks.\26\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \26\ 82 FR 15908 (March 30, 2017).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The agencies are proposing changes applicable to MSAs, temporary 
difference DTAs, and investments in the capital of unconsolidated 
financial institutions to simplify their treatment while at the same 
time ensuring an appropriate regulatory capital treatment to address 
safety and soundness concerns. Specifically, and consistent with the 
agencies' statements in the 2017 EGRPRA report, the proposed rule 
would, for non-advanced approaches banking organizations, replace the 
capital rule's individual 10 percent common equity tier 1 capital 
deduction thresholds for MSAs, temporary difference DTAs, and 
significant investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial 
institutions in the form of common stock and eliminate the aggregate 15 
percent common equity tier 1 capital deduction threshold for such 
items. The proposal would require that a non-advanced approaches 
banking organization deduct from common equity tier 1 capital any 
amounts of MSAs, temporary difference DTAs, and investments in the 
capital of unconsolidated financial institutions that, individually, 
exceed 25 percent of the banking organization's common equity tier 1 
capital (after certain deductions and adjustments) (the 25 percent 
common equity tier 1 capital deduction threshold). The agencies believe 
that this change would appropriately balance risk-sensitivity and 
complexity for non-advanced approaches banking organizations. The 
imposition of the 25 percent common equity tier 1 capital deduction 
threshold is expected to avoid, in a simple manner, unsafe and unsound 
concentration levels of MSAs, temporary difference DTAs, and 
investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial institutions.
    Although the agencies expect that the proposed simplifications for 
the treatment of MSAs, temporary difference DTAs, and investments in 
the capital of unconsolidated financial institutions would reduce 
regulatory compliance burden, the agencies do not expect a significant 
impact on the capital ratios for most non-advanced approaches banking 
organizations as a result of these simplifications. Those non-advanced 
approaches banking organizations with relatively substantial holdings 
of MSAs or temporary difference DTAs could, however, experience a 
regulatory capital benefit as a result of the proposed simplifications.
a. MSAs and Temporary Difference DTAs
    In addition to the proposed 25 percent common equity tier 1 capital 
deduction threshold, any amounts of MSAs or temporary difference DTAs 
that are not deducted would be risk weighted at 250 percent, consistent 
with the capital rule. The agencies note that some banking 
organizations suggested in the public comments associated with the 
revisions to the capital rule that the deductions for MSAs and 
temporary difference DTAs were unnecessarily burdensome, and urged the 
agencies to eliminate the requirements altogether and revert to the 
treatment for these items under the capital framework that was 
applicable before 2013. Additionally, through the EGRPRA comment 
process, two commenters suggested raising the deduction threshold for 
MSAs from 10 percent to 100 percent of common equity tier 1 capital.
    The agencies have long limited the inclusion of intangible and 
higher-risk assets in regulatory capital due to the relatively high 
level of uncertainty regarding the ability of banking organizations to 
realize value from these assets, especially under adverse financial 
conditions. The agencies believe that it is therefore important to 
retain regulatory capital restrictions for MSAs and temporary 
difference DTAs. Temporary difference DTAs are assets from which 
banking organizations may not be able to realize value, especially 
under adverse financial conditions. A banking organization's ability to 
realize its temporary difference DTAs is dependent on future taxable 
income; thus, the proposed limitation would continue to protect against 
the possibility that the banking organization would need to establish 
or increase valuation allowances for DTAs during periods of financial 
stress. In the case of MSAs, the proposed treatment for MSAs would 
continue to protect banking organizations from sudden fluctuations in 
the value of MSAs and from the potential inability of such banking 
organizations to quickly divest of MSAs at their full estimated value 
during periods of financial stress.
    Under section 475 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
Improvement Act of 1991 (FDICIA) (12 U.S.C. 1828 note), the amount of 
readily marketable purchased mortgage servicing assets (PMSAs) that an 
insured depository institution may include in regulatory capital cannot 
be more than 90 percent of the PMSAs' fair value. Section 475 of FDICIA 
provides the agencies with the authority to remove the 90 percent 
limitation on PMSAs, subject to a joint determination by the agencies 
that its removal would not have an adverse effect on the deposit 
insurance fund or the safety and soundness of insured depository 
institutions. The agencies determined that the treatment of MSAs 
(including PMSAs) under the capital rule was consistent with a 
determination that the 90 percent limitation could be removed because 
the treatment under the capital rule (that is, applying a 250 percent 
risk weight to any non-deducted MSAs) was more conservative than the 
FDICIA fair value limitation and a 100 percent risk weight, which was 
the risk weight applied to MSAs under the regulatory capital framework 
prior to 2013.\27\ Because the proposed rule would require that MSAs 
above the 25 percent common equity tier 1 capital deduction threshold 
be deducted from common equity tier 1 capital and would maintain the 
250 percent risk weight for non-deducted MSAs (including PMSAs), the 
agencies believe that the treatment of MSAs under the proposed rule 
would be consistent with a determination that the 90 percent fair value 
limitation is not necessary.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \27\ 78 FR 62018, 62069-70 (October 13, 2013) (FRB, OCC); 78 FR 
55340, 55388-89 (September 10, 2013) (FDIC).

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 49993]]

b. Investments in the Capital of Unconsolidated Financial Institutions
    As mentioned above, the proposal would impose the 25 percent common 
equity tier 1 capital deduction threshold on investments in the capital 
of unconsolidated financial institutions. A banking organization would 
make any required deduction under the corresponding deduction approach. 
This proposed treatment removes, for non-advanced approaches banking 
organizations, the distinctions among different categories of 
investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial institutions in 
the capital rule (namely non-significant investments in the capital of 
unconsolidated financial institutions, significant investment in the 
capital of unconsolidated financial institutions that are in the form 
of common stock, and significant investments in the capital of 
unconsolidated financial institutions that are not in the form of 
common stock). In order to avoid added complexity and regulatory 
burden, the agencies are not proposing a specific methodology dictating 
which specific investments a non-advanced approaches banking 
organization must deduct and which it must risk weight in cases where 
the firm is exceeding the 25 percent common equity tier 1 capital 
deduction threshold for investments in the capital of unconsolidated 
financial institutions. The agencies believe that they can address any 
safety and soundness concerns that arise from this flexible treatment 
through the supervisory process. The agencies believe the proposed 
treatment for investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial 
institutions would reduce complexity while maintaining appropriate 
incentives to reduce interconnectedness among banking organizations.
    Under the proposed rule, non-advanced approaches banking 
organizations would be required to risk weight any investments in the 
capital of unconsolidated financial institutions that are not deducted 
according to the relevant treatment for the exposure category of the 
investment. For example, the appropriate risk weight for equity 
exposures would generally be either 300 or 400 percent, depending on 
whether the equity exposures are publicly traded, unless such exposures 
are assigned a preferential risk weight of 100 percent, as described 
below.\28\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \28\ 12 CFR 217.52 and 53 (Board); 12 CFR 3.52 and 53 (OCC); 12 
CFR 324.52 and 53 (FDIC).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The capital rule allows banking organizations to apply a 
preferential risk weight of 100 percent to the aggregated adjusted 
carrying value of equity exposures that do not exceed 10 percent of a 
banking organization's total capital (non-significant equity 
exposures). The application of this risk weight (i) requires a banking 
organization to follow an enumerated process for calculating adjusted 
carrying value and (ii) mandates the equity exposures that must be 
included first in determining whether the threshold has been reached. 
The capital rule currently excludes significant investments in the 
capital of unconsolidated financial institutions in the form of common 
stock from being eligible for a 100 percent risk weight. The proposal 
would eliminate this exclusion for non-advanced approaches banking 
organizations.\29\ The agencies believe that this revised approach 
would appropriately balance simplicity and risk-sensitivity for non-
advanced approaches banking organizations by applying a single 
definition of investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial 
institutions and consolidating the different deduction treatments for 
investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial institutions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \29\ Equity exposures that exceed, in the aggregate, 10 percent 
of a non-advanced approaches banking organization's total capital 
would then be assigned a risk weight based upon the approaches 
available in sections 52 and 53 of the capital rule. 12 CFR 217.52 
and 53 (Board); 12 CFR 3.52 and 53 (OCC); 12 CFR 324.52 and 53 
(FDIC).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

c. Regulatory Treatment for Advanced Approaches Banking Organizations
    Advanced approaches banking organizations would continue to apply 
the capital rule's current treatment for MSAs, temporary difference 
DTAs, and investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial 
institutions.\30\ The agencies believe that the more complex capital 
deduction treatments in the capital rule are appropriate for advanced 
approaches banking organizations, because their size, complexity, and 
international exposure warrant a risk-sensitive treatment that more 
aggressively reduces potential interconnectedness among such firms. 
Accordingly, advanced approaches banking organizations would be 
required to continue applying the individual 10 percent common equity 
tier 1 capital deduction thresholds, as well as the aggregate 15 
percent common equity tier 1 capital deduction threshold, for 
investments in MSAs, temporary difference DTAs, and significant 
investments in unconsolidated financial institutions in the form of 
common stock when calculating their capital requirements under the 
capital rule. Advanced approaches banking organizations would also 
continue to apply the capital rule's treatment for non-significant 
investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial institutions and 
significant investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial 
institutions that are not in the form of common stock.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \30\ The agencies are making nonsubstantive changes to the 
definitions of non-significant investment in the capital of an 
unconsolidated financial institution and significant investment in 
the capital of an unconsolidated financial institution in section 2 
of the capital rule in order to maintain the current treatment of 
these items for advanced approaches banking organizations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Question 9: What impact would the agencies' proposed changes to the 
treatment of MSAs, temporary difference DTAs, and investments in the 
capital of unconsolidated financial institutions for non-advanced 
approaches banking organizations have on (i) risks to the safety and 
soundness of the banking system and (ii) regulatory burden on non-
advanced approaches banking organizations? If possible, please provide 
relevant data to support comments.
    Question 10: What are the benefits and drawbacks of (i) the 
proposed elimination of the 250 percent risk weight for significant 
investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial institutions in 
the form of common stock and (ii) the proposed risk-weighting 
methodology for investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial 
institutions when such investments are in the form of equity exposures?
    Question 11: What, if any, operational challenges does the proposed 
treatment of MSAs, temporary difference DTAs, and investments in the 
capital of unconsolidated financial institutions pose? What, if any, 
modifications should the agencies consider to address such challenges?

C. Minority Interest

1. Background
    The capital rule limits the amount of capital issued by 
consolidated subsidiaries and not owned by the parent banking 
organization (minority interest) that a banking organization may 
include in regulatory capital. For example, tier 1 minority interest is 
created when a consolidated subsidiary of the banking organization 
issues tier 1 capital to third parties. Given that minority interest is 
generally not available to absorb losses at the banking organization's 
consolidated level, the agencies strongly believe that inclusion of 
minority interest in a banking organization's regulatory capital should 
be limited. The restrictions in the

[[Page 49994]]

capital rule relating to minority interest are currently based on the 
amount of capital held by the consolidated subsidiary relative to the 
amount of capital the subsidiary would need to hold to avoid any 
restrictions on capital distributions and discretionary bonus payments 
under the capital rule's capital conservation buffer framework. Many 
community banking organizations have asserted that the capital rule's 
current calculation of the minority interest limitation is complex and 
results in burdensome and confusing regulatory capital reporting 
instructions.
2. Simplifying the Regulatory Capital Limitations for Minority Interest
    Under the proposal, the agencies would replace for non-advanced 
approaches banking organizations the existing calculations limiting the 
inclusion of minority interest in regulatory capital with a simpler 
calculation. Specifically, the proposed rule would allow non-advanced 
approaches banking organizations to include: (i) Common equity tier 1 
minority interest up to 10 percent of the parent banking organization's 
common equity tier 1 capital; (ii) tier 1 minority interest up to 10 
percent of the parent banking organization's tier 1 capital; and (iii) 
total capital minority interest up to 10 percent of the parent banking 
organization's total capital. In each case, the parent banking 
organization's regulatory capital for purposes of these limitations 
would be measured before the inclusion of any minority interest and 
after the deductions from and adjustments to the regulatory capital of 
the parent banking organization described in sections 22(a) and (b) of 
the capital rule.\31\ The agencies believe that removing the current 
complex calculation for the amount of includable minority interest 
reduces regulatory burden without reducing the safety and soundness of 
non-advanced approaches banking organizations because the proposed 
minority interest limitations are simpler to calculate and still 
appropriately restrictive. The agencies do not expect a significant 
impact on the capital ratios for most non-advanced approaches banking 
organizations as a result of these simplifications.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \31\ 12 CFR 217.22(a) and (b) (Board); 12 CFR 3.22(a) and (b) 
(OCC); 12 CFR 324.22(a) and (b) (FDIC).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The agencies remain focused on ensuring that the capital 
requirements applied to banking organizations are appropriately 
tailored to an organization's size, complexity, and risk profile. 
Accordingly, the largest and most internationally active banking 
organizations should be required to comply with stricter or more 
complex regulations, where appropriate, commensurate with their size, 
complexity, and risk profile. The agencies are therefore not proposing 
to change the more risk-sensitive minority interest calculation for 
advanced approaches banking organizations. Given the potential 
complexity in the capital structure of the largest and most 
systemically important institutions, the agencies believe that 
maintaining the more risk-sensitive approach for these firms better 
ensures they do not overstate capital ratios at the consolidated level 
as a result of overcapitalized subsidiaries, thereby protecting the 
safety and soundness of the banking sector.
    Question 12: What would be (i) the benefits and drawbacks and (ii) 
effects on regulatory burden of the agencies' proposed revisions to the 
quantitative limits for including minority interests in regulatory 
capital for non-advanced approaches banking organizations? The agencies 
solicit comment on all aspects of the proposed changes to the inclusion 
of minority interests in regulatory capital for non-advanced approaches 
banking organizations. If possible, please provide relevant data to 
support comments.

III. Technical Amendments to the Capital Rule

    The proposed rule would make certain technical corrections and 
clarifications to the capital rule. The agencies have identified 
typographical and technical errors in several provisions of the capital 
rule that warrant clarification or updating. The agencies are, 
therefore, proposing to revise the capital rule as described below. 
Most of the proposed corrections or technical changes are self-
explanatory. In addition, there are several incorrect or imprecise 
cross-references that the agencies propose to change in an effort to 
better clarify the capital rule's requirements, as well as other 
changes to references necessary to implement the simplifications 
described previously in this preamble.
    In section 1, the proposed rule would clarify that the capital 
adequacy standards do not apply to Federal branches and agencies of 
foreign banks that are regulated by the OCC. The OCC regulates Federal 
branches and agencies of foreign banks.\32\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \32\ 12 U.S.C. 3101-3111.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In section 2, the proposed rule would correct an error in the 
definition of investment in the capital of an unconsolidated financial 
institution by changing the word ``and'' to ``or.'' This would clarify 
that an instrument qualifying for the definition can be either 
recognized as capital for regulatory purposes by a primary supervisor 
of an unconsolidated financial institution or can be part of the equity 
under U.S. generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) of an 
unconsolidated unregulated financial institution.
    The proposed rule would add ``the European Stability Mechanism'' 
and ``the European Financial Stability Facility'' to the capital rule 
with respect to (i) the definition of eligible guarantor in section 2, 
(ii) the list of entities eligible for a zero percent risk weight in 
section 32(b), (iii) the list of equity exposures eligible for a zero 
percent risk weight in section 52(b)(1), (iv) the list of entities 
eligible for assignment of a rating grade associated with a probability 
of default of less than 0.03 percent in section 131(d)(2), and (v) 
certain supranational entities and multilateral development bank debt 
positions eligible for assignment of a 0.0 percent specific risk 
weighting factor in section 210(b)(2)(ii). The proposed rule would also 
exclude such entities from the definition of (i) corporate exposure in 
section 2, (ii) private sector credit exposure in section 11, and (iii) 
corporate debt position in section 202. The agencies are making this 
change because the European Stability Mechanism and the European 
Financial Stability Facility were in early stages of operation and 
excluded from the capital rule when it was finalized in 2013. The 
proposal would update the list of entities included or excluded, as 
applicable, for these purposes in the standardized approach and 
advanced approaches of the capital rule and the market risk capital 
rule.
    The agencies are making technical amendments to section 11(a) of 
the capital rule, on the capital conservation buffer, to clarify the 
calculation of a banking organization's maximum payout amount for a 
specific calendar quarter. First, the proposal would clarify that the 
eligible retained income during a specific current calendar quarter is 
the banking organization's net income, calculated in accordance with 
the instructions for the Call Report or the FR Y-9C, as appropriate, 
for the four calendar quarters preceding the current calendar 
quarter.\33\ Second, the proposal would clarify that the key inputs for 
the calculation of a banking organization's capital conservation buffer 
during the current calendar quarter are the banking

[[Page 49995]]

organization's regulatory capital ratios as of the last day of the 
previous calendar quarter.\34\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \33\ 12 CFR 217.11(a)(2)(i); 12 CFR 3.11(a)(2)(i); and 12 CFR 
324.11(a)(2)(i).
    \34\ 12 CFR 217.11(a)(3)(i); 12 CFR 3.11(a)(3)(i); and 12 CFR 
324.11(a)(3)(i).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In section 20(d)(5) for the Board's and OCC's capital rule, the 
proposed rule would provide that the reference to AOCI opt-out election 
is section 22(b)(2) instead of section 20(b)(2).
    In section 20(c) of the capital rule, the OCC's and FDIC's 
regulations mistakenly provide that cash dividend payments on 
additional tier 1 capital instruments may not be subject to a ``limit'' 
imposed by the contractual terms governing the instrument. This 
requirement was intended to apply only to common equity tier 1 capital 
instruments, and not to additional tier 1 capital instruments. The 
proposed rule would harmonize the language of the agencies' capital 
rule in section 20(c) by removing this requirement for additional tier 
1 instruments.
    In a new section 20(f) of the Board's capital rule, for purposes of 
clarity and enforceability, the proposed rule would create a stand-
alone requirement that a Board-regulated banking organization may not 
repurchase or redeem any common equity tier 1 capital, additional tier 
1, or tier 2 capital instrument without the prior approval of the 
Board. This requirement already exists in the capital rule as a 
requirement for each definition of common equity tier 1, additional 
tier 1, and tier 2 capital instruments in sections 20(b)(iii), 
20(c)(iv), and 20(d)(x), respectively.
    In section 22(g) of the capital rule, the proposed rule would 
remove specific references to assets to exclude from risk weighting if 
already deducted from regulatory capital. The effect of this proposed 
change would be to exclude from standardized total risk-weighted assets 
and, as applicable, advanced approaches total risk-weighted assets any 
items deducted from capital, not only the items specifically 
enumerated.
    In section 22(h) of the capital rule, the proposed rule would 
replace inaccurate terminology with the properly defined terms 
``investment in the capital of an unconsolidated financial 
institution'' and ``investment in the [AGENCY]-regulated institution's 
own capital instrument,'' as described in section 2.
    The proposed rule would revise, for purposes of clarity, the 
capital rule's sections 32(d)(2)(iii) and (iv), and create a new 
section 32(d)(2)(v). The revised section 32(d)(2)(iii) would require 
banking organizations to ``assign a 20 percent risk weight to an 
exposure that is a self-liquidating, trade-related contingent item that 
arises from the movement of goods and that has a maturity of three 
months or less to a foreign bank whose home country has a CRC of 0, 1, 
2, or 3, or is an OECD member with no CRC.'' This requirement is 
currently embedded in section 32(d)(2)(iii) of the capital rule, 
together with rule text related to the risk weighting of exposures to a 
foreign bank whose home country is not a member of the OECD and does 
not have a CRC. This latter provision would become a stand-alone 
requirement in the revised section 32(d)(2)(iv) under the proposed 
rule. In addition, the proposed rule would reassign the current section 
32(d)(2)(iv) text as a new section 32(d)(2)(v).
    In sections 34(c)(1) and 34(c)(2)(i) of the capital rule, the 
proposed rule would provide that the counterparty credit risk capital 
requirement references subpart D of the capital rule in its entirety 
rather than just section 32 of subpart D.
    In sections 35(b)(3)(ii), 35(b)(4)(ii), 35(c)(3)(ii), 35(c)(4)(ii), 
36(c), 37(b)(2)(i), 38(e)(2), 42(j)(2)(ii)(A), 133(b)(3)(ii), and 
133(c)(3)(ii) of the capital rule, the proposed rule would provide that 
the risk weight substitution references subpart D in its entirety 
rather than just section 32 of subpart D.
    In section 61 of the capital rule, the proposed rule would clarify 
the requirement that a non-advanced approaches banking organization 
with $50 billion or more in total consolidated assets would need to 
complete the disclosure requirements described in sections 62 and 63, 
unless it is a consolidated subsidiary of a bank holding company, 
savings and loan holding company, or depository institution that is 
subject to the disclosure requirements of section 62, or a subsidiary 
of a non-U.S. banking organization that is subject to comparable public 
disclosure requirements in its home jurisdiction.
    Table 8 of section 63 of the capital rule describes information 
related to securitization exposures that banking organizations are 
required to disclose. The capital rule revised the risk-based capital 
treatment of these items, including the regulatory capital treatment of 
after-tax gain-on-sale resulting from a securitization and credit-
enhancing interest-only strips that do not constitute after-tax gain-
on-sale. Because Table 8 does not properly reflect these revisions, the 
agencies propose to update line (i)(2) under quantitative disclosures 
to appropriately reflect these revisions.
    In section 210(b)(2)(vii) of the Board's capital rule, the proposed 
rule would add references to U.S. intermediate holding companies to 
clarify for these firms how to calculate capital requirements related 
to securitization positions under the Board's market risk capital rule 
depending on whether they are using the advanced approaches to 
calculate risk-weighted assets.
    In table 4 of section 300 of the capital rule, the proposed rule 
would revise the title ``Transition adjustments'' to reference section 
22(b)(1)(iii) rather than section 22(b)(2).
    In section 300(c)(2) of the Board's capital rule, the proposed rule 
would clarify that the mergers and acquisitions that can potentially 
affect the inclusion of certain non-qualifying capital instruments in a 
Board-regulated banking organization's regulatory capital would have 
occurred after December 31, 2013.
    As discussed, the 2013 revisions to the capital rule required 
banking organizations to increase both the quality and quantity of 
regulatory capital. As a result, some items that previously were 
included in the calculation of regulatory capital became excluded, and 
the amounts of required regulatory capital relative to certain exposure 
types increased. As part of the capital rule rulemaking, the agencies 
established transition provisions to phase in many of these 
requirements over several years in order to give banking organizations 
sufficient time to adjust and adapt to the requirements of the rule. 
Many of the transition provisions continue to be in effect, and include 
ongoing phase-ins to the calculation of capital.
    During the development of this proposal, the agencies recognized 
the capital rule would automatically enact stricter treatments for 
items potentially impacted by this proposal on January 1, 2018, while 
the agencies are simultaneously working through the rulemaking process 
to provide burden relief to non-advanced approaches banking 
organizations for the very same items. To address this concern, in 
August 2017, the agencies invited public comment on a proposed rule to 
extend the current treatment under the transition provisions of the 
capital rule for certain regulatory capital deductions and risk weights 
and certain minority interest requirements.\35\ The comment

[[Page 49996]]

period for the transitions NPR expired on September 25, 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \35\ 82 FR 40495 (August 25, 2017). Items impacted by the 
transition NPR include, for non-advanced approaches banking 
institutions, (i) MSAs; (ii) temporary difference DTAs; (iii) 
significant investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial 
institutions in the form of common stock; (iv) non-significant 
investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial institutions; 
(v) significant investments in the capital of unconsolidated 
financial institutions that are not in the form of common stock; and 
(vi) common equity tier 1 minority interest, tier 1 minority 
interest, and total capital minority interest exceeding the 
limitations on minority interest in the capital rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In the transitions NPR, the agencies explained that the proposed 
extension was intended to limit burden on banking organizations by 
maintaining the transitions in effect for 2017 while the agencies 
developed potential simplifications to the treatment of affected items 
under the capital rule. The current proposal reflects the 
simplifications referenced by the agencies in the transitions NPR. If 
the transition extensions proposed in the transitions NPR are 
finalized, the scheduled recalibrations under the transition provisions 
of the capital rule would be halted for the affected items and the 
treatment in effect for 2017 would continue until further action by the 
agencies. As described in the transitions NPR, the agencies expect that 
the transition extensions would cease to be appropriate upon completion 
of the agencies' simplifications rulemaking process.
    If the transition extensions are not finalized, all the transition 
provisions currently in the capital rule would remain in effect, 
including a final, stricter recalibration to the treatment of items 
discussed in the transitions NPR beginning January 1, 2018, for all 
banking organizations covered by the agencies' capital rule. Thus, 
whether or not the transition extensions in the transitions NPR are 
implemented, the agencies believe that the transitions would cease to 
be appropriate upon the agencies' adoption of a final rule in 
conjunction with the rulemaking process for the proposed 
simplifications. Accordingly, in connection with this simplification 
proposal, the agencies propose to remove the transition provisions 
applicable to MSAs, temporary difference DTAs, investments in the 
capital of unconsolidated financial institutions, and minority 
interest, all of which are currently scheduled to end in 2018.
    Question 13: The agencies solicit comments on the proposed 
technical amendments to the capital rule. What, if any, potentially 
unintended consequences do the proposed changes pose and how should the 
agencies consider addressing such consequences? What, if any, 
additional technical amendments not already identified by the agencies 
in this proposed rule would be appropriate for the agencies to consider 
and why?
    Question 14: While the proposed rule addresses comments received 
during the EGRPRA review regarding the complexity of the risk based 
capital standards, the agencies seek comment on additional alternatives 
to simplify and streamline the regulatory capital rules. The agencies 
recognize the difficulties in achieving simplification of the risk 
based capital standards, particularly the burden related to their 
calculation and reporting, and the potential disparate impact to 
smaller and medium sized banks relative to their GSIB counterparts.
    Therefore, the agencies seek comment on whether they should 
consider a fundamental change to the manner in which banking 
organizations calculate and comply with minimum capital standards such 
as through the use of a simple U.S. GAAP based equity to assets ratio 
(leverage ratio) for non-GSIB banks. If so, what would be the 
appropriate definition and level for the ratio? Also, what relief 
should be realized upon implementation of this capital standard 
relative to changes in the call report and other reporting standards?
    Question 15: The agencies also seek comment on whether they should 
consider more comprehensive simplifications to the capital rule for 
small and medium-sized banking organizations by, for example, further 
simplifying risk-weighted assets and the definition of capital, or 
reducing the number of regulatory capital ratios, consistent with legal 
requirements. What specific simplifications should the agencies 
consider and why?

IV. Abbreviations

ADC Acquisition, Development, or Construction
BHC Bank Holding Company
CFR Code of Federal Regulations
CRC Country Risk Classification
DTA Deferred Tax Asset
EGRPRA Economic Growth and Regulatory Paperwork Reduction Act of 
1996
FAQ Frequently Asked Question
FR Federal Register
FDIC Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
FDICIA Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991
GAAP U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles
GSIB Global Systemically Important Bank Holding Company
HVADC High Volatility Acquisition, Construction, or Development
HVCRE High Volatility Commercial Real Estate
IHC U.S. Intermediate Holding Company
LTV Loan-to-Value
MDB Multilateral Development Bank
MSA Mortgage Servicing Asset
NPR Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
OCC Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OMB Office of Management and Budget
PD Probability of Default
PMSA Purchased Mortgage Servicing Asset
PRA Paperwork Reduction Act
RCDRIA Riegle Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act 
of 1994
RFA Regulatory Flexibility Act
RIN Regulation Identifier Number
SBA Small Business Administration
SLHC Savings and Loan Holding Company
SMB State Member Banks
UMRA Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995
U.S.C. United States Code

V. Regulatory Analyses

A. Paperwork Reduction Act

    Certain provisions of the proposed rule contain ``collection of 
information'' requirements within the meaning of the Paperwork 
Reduction Act (PRA) of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501-3521). In accordance with 
the requirements of the PRA, the agencies may not conduct or sponsor, 
and the respondent is not required to respond to, an information 
collection unless it displays a currently-valid Office of Management 
and Budget (OMB) control number. The revised disclosure requirements 
are found in section _.63 of the proposed rule. The OMB control number 
for the OCC is 1557-0318, Board is 7100-0313, and FDIC is 3064-0153. 
These information collections will be extended for three years, with 
revision. The information collection requirements contained in this 
proposed rulemaking have been submitted by the OCC and FDIC to OMB for 
review and approval under section 3507(d) of the PRA (44 U.S.C. 
3507(d)) and section 1320.11 of the OMB's implementing regulations (5 
CFR 1320). The Board reviewed the proposed rule under the authority 
delegated to the Board by OMB.
    Comments are invited on:
    a. Whether the collections of information are necessary for the 
proper performance of the Board's functions, including whether the 
information has practical utility;
    b. The accuracy or the estimate of the burden of the information 
collections, including the validity of the methodology and assumptions 
used;
    c. Ways to enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of the 
information to be collected;
    d. Ways to minimize the burden of the information collections on 
respondents, including through the use of automated collection 
techniques or other forms of information technology; and
    e. Estimates of capital or startup costs and costs of operation, 
maintenance,

[[Page 49997]]

and purchase of services to provide information.
    All comments will become a matter of public record. Comments on 
aspects of this notice that may affect reporting, recordkeeping, or 
disclosure requirements and burden estimates should be sent to the 
addresses listed in the ADDRESSES section of this document. A copy of 
the comments may also be submitted to the OMB desk officer by mail to 
U.S. Office of Management and Budget, 725 17th Street NW., #10235, 
Washington, DC 20503; facsimile to (202) 395-6974; or email to 
[email protected], Attention, Federal Banking Agency Desk 
Officer.
Proposed Information Collection
    Title of Information Collection: Recordkeeping and Disclosure 
Requirements Associated with Capital Adequacy.
    Frequency: Quarterly, annual.
    Affected Public: Businesses or other for-profit.
    Respondents:
    OCC: National banks, state member banks, state nonmember banks, and 
state and Federal savings associations.
    Board: State member banks (SMBs), bank holding companies (BHCs), 
U.S. intermediate holding companies (IHCs), savings and loan holding 
companies (SLHCs), and global systemically important bank holding 
companies (GSIBs).
    FDIC: State nonmember banks, state savings associations, and 
certain subsidiaries of those entities.
    Current Actions: Section _.63 of the proposed rule would (1) 
replace the standardized approach's treatment of high volatility 
commercial real estate (HVCRE) exposures with a simpler treatment for 
most high volatility acquisition, development, or construction (HVADC) 
exposures and (2) break out the disclosures in Table 8 to include (i) 
after-tax gain-on-sale on a securitization that has been deducted from 
common equity tier 1 capital and (ii) credit-enhancing interest-only 
strip that is assigned a 1,250 percent risk weight. There are no 
changes in burden associated with the proposed rulemaking. However, in 
order to be consistent across the agencies, the agencies are applying a 
conforming methodology for calculating the burden estimates. The 
agencies believe that any changes to the information collections 
associated with the proposed rule are the result of the conforming 
methodology and not the result of the proposed rule changes.
PRA Burden Estimates
OCC
    OMB control number: 1557-0318.
    Estimated number of respondents: 1,365.
    Estimated average hours per response:
Minimum Capital Ratios
    Recordkeeping (Ongoing)--16.
Standardized Approach
    Recordkeeping (Initial setup)--122.
    Recordkeeping (Ongoing)--20.
    Disclosure (Initial setup)--226.25.
    Disclosure (Ongoing quarterly)--131.25.
Advanced Approach
    Recordkeeping (Initial setup)--460.
    Recordkeeping (Ongoing)--540.77.
    Recordkeeping (Ongoing quarterly)--20.
    Disclosure (Initial setup)--280.
    Disclosure (Ongoing)--5.78.
    Disclosure (Ongoing quarterly)--35.
    Estimated annual burden hours: 1,088 hours initial setup, 64,513 
hours for ongoing.
Board
    Agency form number: FR Q.
    OMB control number: 7100-0313.
    Estimated number of respondents: 1,431.
    Estimated average hours per response:
Minimum Capital Ratios
    Recordkeeping (Ongoing)--16.
Standardized Approach
    Recordkeeping (Initial setup)--122.
    Recordkeeping (Ongoing)--20.
    Disclosure (Initial setup)--226.25.
    Disclosure (Ongoing quarterly)--131.25.
Advanced Approach
    Recordkeeping (Initial setup)--460.
    Recordkeeping (Ongoing)--540.77.
    Recordkeeping (Ongoing quarterly)--20.
    Disclosure (Initial setup)--280.
    Disclosure (Ongoing)--5.78.
    Disclosure (Ongoing quarterly)--35.
    Disclosure (Table 13 quarterly)--5.
Risk-based Capital Surcharge for GSIBs
    Recordkeeping (Ongoing)--0.5.
    Estimated annual burden hours: 1,088 hours initial setup, 78,183 
hours for ongoing.
FDIC
    OMB control number: 3064-0153.
    Estimated annual burden hours: 1,088 hours initial setup, 138,391 
hours for ongoing. Notably, the FDIC's estimated annual burden hours 
remain unchanged from its last OMB submission. A breakdown of the 
burden associated with the current information collection for 3064-0153 
is contained in the FDIC's notice published on July 26, 2017 (82 FR 
34668).
    The proposed rule will also require changes to the Consolidated 
Reports of Condition and Income (Call Reports) (FFIEC 031, FFIEC 041, 
and FFIEC 051; OMB No. 1557-0081, 7100-0036, and 3064-0052), 
Consolidated Financial Statements for Holding Companies (FR Y-9C; OMB 
No. 7100-0128), and Capital Assessments and Stress Testing (FR Y-14A 
and Q; OMB No. 7100-0341), which will be addressed in a separate 
Federal Register notice.

B. Regulatory Flexibility Act Analysis

    OCC: The Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. 601 et seq., (RFA), 
requires an agency, in connection with a proposed rule, to prepare an 
Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis describing the impact of the 
rule on small entities (defined by the Small Business Administration 
(SBA) for purposes of the RFA to include commercial banks and savings 
institutions with total assets of $550 million or less and trust 
companies with total assets of $38.5 million or less) or to certify 
that the proposed rule would not have a significant economic impact on 
a substantial number of small entities.
    As of June 30, 2017, the OCC supervises 907 small entities.\36\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \36\ The OCC calculated the number of small entities using the 
SBA's size thresholds for commercial banks and savings institutions, 
and trust companies, which are $550 million and $38.5 million, 
respectively. Consistent with the General Principles of Affiliation, 
13 CFR 121.103(a), the OCC counted the assets of affiliated 
financial institutions when determining whether to classify a 
national bank or Federal savings association as a small entity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The rule would apply to all OCC-supervised entities that are not 
subject to the advanced approaches risk-based capital rules, and thus 
potentially affects a substantial number of small entities. The OCC has 
determined that 153 such entities engage in affected activities to an 
extent that they would be impacted directly by the proposed rule. 
Although a substantial number of small entities would be impacted by 
the proposed rule, the OCC does not find that this impact is 
economically significant. To determine whether a proposed rule would 
have a significant effect, the OCC considers whether projected cost 
increases associated with the proposed rule are greater than or equal 
to either 5 percent of a small bank's total annual salaries and 
benefits or 2.5 percent of an OCC-supervised small entity's total non-
interest expense. The value of the change in capital

[[Page 49998]]

exceeded these thresholds for 1 of the 907 OCC-supervised small 
entities.
    Therefore, the OCC certifies that the proposed rule would not have 
a significant economic impact on a substantial number of OCC-supervised 
small entities.
    Board: The Board is providing an initial regulatory flexibility 
analysis with respect to this proposed rule. As discussed in the 
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION, the proposal would revise the treatment of 
certain assets under the capital rule and would also make various 
corrections and clarifications to the capital rule to address issues 
that have been identified since the rule was issued. The Regulatory 
Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. 601 et seq. (RFA), generally requires that an 
agency prepare and make available an initial regulatory flexibility 
analysis in connection with a notice of proposed rulemaking. Under 
regulations issued by the Small Business Administration, a small entity 
includes a bank, bank holding company, or savings and loan holding 
company with assets of $550 million or less (small banking 
organization).\37\ As of June 30, 2017, there were approximately 3,451 
small bank holding companies, 224 small savings and loan holding 
companies, and 566 small state member banks.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \37\ See 13 CFR 121.201. Effective July 14, 2014, the Small 
Business Administration revised the size standards for banking 
organizations to $550 million in assets from $500 million in assets. 
79 FR 33647 (June 12, 2014).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Aspects of the proposed rule would apply to all state member banks, 
as well as all bank holding companies and savings and loan holding 
companies that are subject to the Board's regulatory capital rule. 
Certain portions of the proposed rule would not apply to state member 
banks, bank holding companies, and savings and loan holding companies 
that are subject to the advanced approaches. In general, the Board's 
capital rule only applies to bank holding companies and savings and 
loan holding companies that are not subject to the Board's Small Bank 
Holding Company Policy Statement, which applies to bank holding 
companies and savings and loan holding companies with less than $1 
billion in total assets that also meet certain additional criteria.\38\ 
Thus, most bank holding companies and savings and loan holding 
companies that would be subject to the proposed rule exceed the $550 
million asset threshold at which a banking organization would qualify 
as a small banking organization.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \38\ See 12 CFR 217.1(c)(1)(ii) and (iii); 12 CFR part 225, 
appendix C; 12 CFR 238.9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Given that the proposed rule does not impact the recordkeeping and 
reporting requirements that affected small banking organizations are 
currently subject to, there would be no change to the information that 
small banking organizations must track and report. The agencies 
anticipate updating the relevant reporting forms at a later date to the 
extent necessary to align with the capital rule.
    For purposes of the standardized approach, the proposal would 
replace the exposure category HVCRE with the exposure category HVADC. 
HVADC exposure is expected to generally cover a broader range of 
exposures than HVCRE exposure. However, the proposal would assign a 130 
percent risk weight to HVADC exposures, as opposed to the 150 percent 
risk weight currently assigned to HVCRE exposures. Based upon data 
reported on the FR Y-9C and on Call Report information, as of June 30, 
2017, about 80 percent of small state member banks, small bank holding 
companies, and small savings and loan holding companies report holdings 
of acquisition, development, or construction exposures, excluding one- 
to four-family residential properties, and about 30 percent of state 
member banks, small bank holding companies, and small savings and loan 
holding companies report some holdings of HVCRE exposures risk weighted 
at 150 percent. The Board expects that the expanded scope and reduced 
risk-weight of HVADC exposure relative to HVCRE exposure would result 
in roughly equivalent capital requirements under the proposal as 
currently provided by the capital rule.
    For non-advanced approaches banking organizations, the proposal 
would revise the capital deductions for MSAs, temporary difference 
DTAs, and investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial 
institutions by raising the threshold at which such items must be 
deducted and simplifying the number and interaction of required 
deductions. The Board expects that the proposal would result in 
slightly lower capital requirements compared to the capital rule for a 
few small banking organizations that currently deduct MSAs, temporary 
difference DTAs, and/or investments in the capital of unconsolidated 
financial institutions. Because so few banking organizations are 
currently subject to these deductions, the number of affected banking 
organizations appears to be minimal.
    Also for non-advanced approaches banking organizations, the 
proposal would simplify the requirements related to the inclusion of 
minority interest of subsidiaries in capital. The Board expects that 
the proposal would generally result in more minority interest being 
includable in capital than is permitted under the current rule. 
However, only a few small banking organizations currently include 
minority interest in capital and minority interest represents a 
significant portion of capital for very few banking organizations. As a 
result, the impact of this portion of the proposal is not expected to 
be significant.
    The remaining proposed revisions to the capital rule consist of 
technical corrections and clarifications that have been identified 
since the rule was issued. None of these revisions constitutes a 
significant change to the capital rule and the impact of these 
revisions on banking organizations is expected to be immaterial.
    The Board does not believe that the proposed rule duplicates, 
overlaps, or conflicts with any other Federal rules. In addition, there 
are no significant alternatives to the proposed rule other than 
retention of the current rule. In light of the foregoing, the Board 
does not believe that the proposed rule, if adopted in final form, 
would have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of 
small entities. Nonetheless, the Board seeks comment on whether the 
proposed rule would impose undue burdens on, or have unintended 
consequences for, small organizations, and whether there are ways such 
potential burdens or consequences could be minimized in a manner 
consistent with the purpose of the proposed rule. A final regulatory 
flexibility analysis will be conducted after consideration of comments 
received during the public comment period.
    FDIC: The Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA) generally requires that, 
in connection with a notice of proposed rulemaking, an agency prepare 
and make available for public comment an initial regulatory flexibility 
analysis describing the impact of the proposed rule on small 
entities.\39\ The Small Business Administration has defined ``small 
entities'' to include banking organizations with total assets of less 
than or equal to $550 million.\40\ The FDIC is providing an initial 
regulatory flexibility analysis with respect to this proposed rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \39\ 5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.
    \40\ 13 CFR 121.201 (as amended, effective December 2, 2014).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The FDIC supervises 3,717 depository institutions,\41\ of which, 
2,990 are

[[Page 49999]]

defined as small banking entities by the terms of the RFA.\42\ This 
proposed rule would replace the existing HVCRE exposure category with a 
new HVADC exposure category that would receive a 130 percent risk 
weight. The proposed rule also would remove the individual and 
aggregate deduction thresholds and replace them with individual, higher 
deduction thresholds for: (i) MSAs; (ii) temporary differences DTAs; 
and (iii) investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial 
institutions. Finally, the proposed rule would amend the methodology 
that determines the amount of minority interest that is includable in 
regulatory capital. According to Call Report data as of June 30, 2017, 
2,589 FDIC-supervised small banking entities reported some amount of 
acquisition, development or construction loans, MSAs, DTAs, deductions 
related to investments in unconsolidated financial institutions, or 
minority interests that could be affected by this rule making.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \41\ FDIC-supervised institutions are set forth in 12 U.S.C. 
1813(q)(2).
    \42\ FDIC Call Report, June 30, 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

HVADC
    According to Call Report data as of June 30, 2017, there were 2,338 
FDIC-supervised small banking entities that reported approximately 
$14.4 billion of acquisition, development or construction loans 
excluding one- to four-family residential projects (non-residential ADC 
loans). Of these entities, 817 FDIC-supervised small banking entities 
reported that approximately $3.6 billion of these non-residential ADC 
loans would meet the current definition of an HVCRE exposure and would 
qualify for the 150 percent risk weight. We assume that the remainder 
of the non-residential ADC loans received a 100 percent risk weight as 
a result of meeting one or more of the currently available exemptions 
from the current definition of HVCRE. These exemptions relate to either 
the amount of contributed capital or because the exposure is an 
agricultural or farm loan, community development loan, or permanent 
financing. The FDIC is unable to determine the mix of exemptions from 
the HVCRE definition that FDIC-supervised small banking entities rely 
upon when assigning the 100 percent risk weight because of limitations 
in the Call Report data.
    Under the proposed rule some future non-residential ADC loans made 
by a small banking entity that are currently reported as an HVCRE 
exposure may receive a 100 percent risk weight or a 130 percent risk-
weight treatment instead of the 150 percent risk-weight treatment under 
the current rule. Concurrently, some future non-residential ADC loans 
made by a small banking entity may receive a 130 percent risk-weight 
treatment instead of the 100 percent risk-weight treatment under the 
contributed capital exemption. These loans also may continue to receive 
a 100 percent risk weight if they qualify under other exemptions of the 
proposed rule as an agricultural or farm loan, community development 
loan, a permanent loan as that term is clarified in the proposal, or a 
loan that is not ``primarily'' to finance non-residential ADC as 
defined in the proposal. As with the current rule, all acquisition, 
development, or construction loans related to one- to four-family 
residential properties would continue to receive a 100 percent risk 
weight.
    In the absence of Call Report information about the eligibility of 
current non-residential ADC loans for the various proposed exemptions 
or how the structure of future non-residential ADC loans will compare 
to current non-residential ADC loans, the FDIC estimates the maximum 
amount of capital that could be required under the proposed rule if it 
were applied to FDIC-supervised small banking entities' current 
portfolio of non-residential ADC loans (that is, ignoring the 
grandfathering provision and assuming FDIC-supervised small banking 
entities make no adjustments to their loan structures in response to 
the rule) and assuming that no non-residential ADC loans qualify for 
the exemptions as agricultural or farm loans, community development 
loans, or permanent loans, or are excluded due to the ``primarily 
finances'' test. Assuming that all currently held acquisition, 
development, or construction exposures excluding one- to four-family 
exposures, currently risk weighted at 100 percent will be risk-weighted 
at 130 percent (rather than remaining at 100 percent under potentially 
available exemptions), and that all HVCRE exposures risk weighted at 
150 percent will be risk weighted at 130 percent (rather than 100 
percent under potentially available exemptions), the FDIC estimates 
that there could be a maximum increase in risk weighted assets of 
approximately $2.6 billion, or less than one percent of the aggregate 
risk weighted assets for the 2,338 FDIC-supervised small banking 
entities. The FDIC believes that even this relatively small change to 
aggregate risk weighted assets is overstated because it is likely that 
a significant amount of small bank lending would meet one or more of 
the qualifying exemptions.\43\ As such, the FDIC believes that any 
change in capital requirements under the proposed HVADC treatment 
compared to the current HVCRE treatment would be modest.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \43\ For example, for as of June 30, 2017 Call Report data, for 
the 2,338 FDIC-supervised small banking entities included in this 
analysis, approximately 24% of all non-ADC commercial real estate 
loans were secured by Farmland and approximately 36% were secured by 
Owner Occupied Nonfarm, Nonresidential properties (a proxy in this 
analysis for permanent loans as defined in the HVADC definition). If 
the proportion of non-ADC lending related to these exposure 
categories were to be assumed consistent with the amount of non-
residential ADC lending to these exposure categories, then as much 
as 60% of all non-residential ADC loans would be excluded from the 
definition of HVADC solely based upon the agricultural and permanent 
loan exemptions alone.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Threshold Deductions
    The proposed rule would change the regulatory capital treatment of 
MSAs, temporary difference DTAs, and investments in the capital of 
unconsolidated financial institutions for FDIC-supervised small banking 
entities. It does so by removing the individual and aggregate deduction 
thresholds for these assets and by adopting a single 25 percent common 
equity tier 1 capital deduction threshold for each type of asset. 
According to June 30, 2017 Call Report data, at least 1,618 FDIC-
supervised small banking entities reported holding some MSAs, DTAs, and 
deductions due to investments in the capital of unconsolidated 
financial institutions. Only 45 small institutions reported deductions 
for holdings across these different assets. The FDIC estimates that the 
proposed rule would pose an immediate aggregated net benefit of $45.5 
million in the form of an increase in tier 1 capital to those 
institutions that currently have to calculate a deduction. The FDIC 
expects that the proposed rule would yield future benefits to affected 
FDIC-supervised small banking entities by reducing the likelihood of a 
regulatory capital deduction due to holding these asset types. In 
particular, the proposal would remove a significant capital constraint 
on FDIC-supervised small banking entities that specialize in mortgage 
servicing. The proposed increase in threshold deduction makes it less 
likely that a small banking entity would exit or reduce its activity in 
the mortgage servicing market.
Minority Interest
    The proposed rule would remove the capital rule's limitation on the 
inclusion of minority interest in regulatory capital. It does so by 
allowing FDIC-supervised small banking entities to

[[Page 50000]]

include minority interest up to 10 percent of the parent banking 
organization's common equity tier 1, tier 1, or total capital, not 
including the minority interest. The FDIC estimates that 16 FDIC-
supervised small banking entities would be affected by the proposed 
inclusion of minority interest in regulatory capital calculations. The 
FDIC estimates that these FDIC-supervised small banking entities will 
likely experience a net aggregated benefit of $2.5 million in the form 
of an increase in tier 1 capital due to the inclusion of minority 
interest. The FDIC expects that the proposed rule would yield future 
benefits for affected FDIC-supervised small banking entities by 
reducing the likelihood that minority interest would not be included in 
a small banking entity's regulatory capital.
Compliance Costs
    Finally, FDIC-supervised small banking entities are likely to incur 
some implementation costs in order to comply with the proposed rule. 
These costs would encompass changes to their systems designed to 
calculate, manage, and report risk-weighted assets and regulatory 
capital. Given the limited nature of the changes necessary to comply 
with the proposed rule, the implementation costs are expected to be 
minimal. Additionally, the FDIC believes that the proposed changes 
would help reduce some of the compliance costs associated with these 
regulations in the long-term by making them easier to apply.
    The proposed rule does not impact the recordkeeping and reporting 
requirements that affect FDIC-supervised small banking entities and 
there would be no change to the information that FDIC-supervised small 
banking entities must track and report. The FDIC anticipates updating 
the relevant reporting forms at a later date to the extent necessary to 
align with the capital rule.
    Question 1. For FDIC-supervised small banking entities, would the 
proposed rule reduce the compliance costs associated with the capital 
rules? If so, how?
Conclusion
    The threshold-deduction and minority-interest provisions of the 
proposed rule would increase the amount of eligible regulatory capital 
for a limited number of FDIC-supervised small banking entities 
currently subject to deductions or limitations on these items, as 
described above. The HVADC provisions of the proposed rules would 
affect far more FDIC-supervised small banking entities, with effects 
that will vary across institutions and are difficult to estimate. Risk 
weights for some new ADC exposures will be reduced from 150 percent 
under the current HVCRE treatment, to 130 percent or 100 percent under 
the proposed rule if certain exemptions apply. Risk weights for other 
new ADC exposures will either remain at the currently required 100 
percent (if available exemptions apply) or increase to 130 percent. 
However, the Call Reports do not provide data about the volumes of ADC 
loans currently eligible for HVCRE exemptions for agriculture, 
community development or permanent financing, or that would be eligible 
going forward under the proposed clarification of the permanent 
financing exemption or the proposed ``primarily finances'' test. As a 
result, the net effect on regulatory capital requirements of the 
proposed HVADC treatment is difficult to estimate with any precision. 
As noted earlier, however, the FDIC's upper bound estimate (that 
ignores the grandfathering provision and gives no credit for all the 
HVADC exemptions previously described) is that risk-weighted assets of 
the FDIC-supervised small banking entities affected by the rule would 
increase less than one percent. This upper bound estimate gives some 
comfort that the actual regulatory capital effects of the proposed 
HVADC treatment are likely to be modest. The FDIC welcomes comments or 
data from the institutions it supervises that would enhance our ability 
to more precisely estimate the net effects of the proposed rule on 
regulatory capital ratios.
    The FDIC does not believe that the proposed rule duplicates, 
overlaps, or conflicts with any other Federal rules. In addition, there 
does not appear to be any significant alternatives to the proposed rule 
other than retention of the current rule. In light of the foregoing 
discussion, the FDIC does not believe that the proposed rule, if 
adopted in final form, would have a significant economic impact on a 
substantial number of small entities. Nonetheless, the FDIC seeks 
comment on whether the proposed rule would impose undue burdens on, or 
have unintended consequences for, small organizations, and whether 
there are ways such potential burdens or consequences could be 
minimized in a manner consistent with the purpose of the proposed rule. 
A final regulatory flexibility analysis will be conducted after 
consideration of comments received during the public comment period.

C. Plain Language

    Section 722 of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act requires the Federal 
banking agencies to use plain language in all proposed and final rules 
published after January 1, 2000. The agencies have sought to present 
the proposed rule in a simple and straightforward manner, and invite 
comment on the use of plain language. For example:
     Have the agencies organized the material to suit your 
needs? If not, how could they present the proposed rule more clearly?
     Are the requirements in the proposed rule clearly stated? 
If not, how could the proposed rule be more clearly stated?
     Do the regulations contain technical language or jargon 
that is not clear? If so, which language requires clarification?
     Would a different format (grouping and order of sections, 
use of headings, paragraphing) make the regulation easier to 
understand? If so, what changes would achieve that?
     Would more, but shorter, sections be better? If so, which 
sections should be changed?
     What other changes can the agencies incorporate to make 
the regulation easier to understand?

D. OCC Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 Determination

    The OCC analyzed the proposed rule under the factors set forth in 
the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA) (2 U.S.C. 1532). Under 
this analysis, the OCC considered whether the proposed rule includes a 
Federal mandate that may result in the expenditure by State, local, and 
Tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector, of $100 
million or more in any one year (adjusted for inflation). The OCC has 
determined that this proposed rule would not result in expenditures by 
State, local, and Tribal governments, or the private sector, of $100 
million or more in any one year.\44\ Accordingly, the OCC has not 
prepared

[[Page 50001]]

a written statement to accompany this proposal.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \44\ The OCC estimates that proposed rule would lead to an 
aggregate increase in reported regulatory capital of $4.7 billion 
for national banks and Federal savings associations compared to the 
amount they would report if they were required to continue to apply 
the capital requirements. The OCC estimates that this increase in 
reported regulatory capital--which could allow banking organizations 
to increase their leverage and thus increase their tax deductions 
for interest paid on debt--would have a total aggregate value of 
approximately $112.8 million per year across all directly impacted 
OCC-supervised entities (that is, national banks and federal savings 
associations not subject to the advanced approaches risk-based 
capital rule).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

E. Riegle Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994

    The Riegle Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act of 
1994 (RCDRIA) requires that each Federal banking agency, in determining 
the effective date and administrative compliance requirements for new 
regulations that impose additional reporting, disclosure, or other 
requirements on insured depository institutions, consider, consistent 
with principles of safety and soundness and the public interest, any 
administrative burdens that such regulations would place on depository 
institutions, including small depository institutions, and customers of 
depository institutions, as well as the benefits of such regulations. 
In addition, new regulations and amendments to regulations that impose 
additional reporting, disclosures, or other new requirements on insured 
depository institutions generally must take effect on the first day of 
a calendar quarter that begins on or after the date on which the 
regulations are published in final form.\45\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \45\ 12 U.S.C. 4802.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The agencies note that comment on these matters has been solicited 
in other sections of this Supplementary Information section, and that 
the requirements of RCDRIA will be considered as part of the overall 
rulemaking process. In addition, the agencies also invite any other 
comments that further will inform the agencies' consideration of 
RCDRIA.

List of Subjects

12 CFR Part 3

    Administrative practice and procedure, Capital, National banks, 
Risk.

12 CFR Part 217

    Administrative practice and procedure, Banks, Banking, Capital, 
Federal Reserve System, Holding companies.

12 CFR Part 324

    Administrative practice and procedure, Banks, Banking, Capital 
adequacy, Savings associations, State non-member banks.

Office of the Comptroller of the Currency

    For the reasons set out in the joint preamble, the OCC proposes to 
amend 12 CFR part 3 as follows.

PART 3--CAPITAL ADEQUACY STANDARDS

Subpart A--General Provisions

0
1. The authority citation for part 3 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 12 U.S.C. 93a, 161, 1462, 1462a, 1463, 1464, 1818, 
1828(n), 1828 note, 1831n note, 1835, 3907, 3909, and 5412(b)(2)(B).

0
2. Section 3.1 is amended by revising paragraph (a) to read as follows:


Sec.  3.1   Purpose, applicability, reservation of authority, and 
timing.

    (a) Purpose. This part establishes minimum capital requirements and 
overall capital adequacy standards for national banks and Federal 
savings associations. This part does not apply to Federal branches and 
agencies of foreign banks. This part includes methodologies for 
calculating minimum capital requirements, public disclosure 
requirements related to the capital requirements, and transition 
provisions for the application of this part.
* * * * *
0
3. Section 3.2 is amended by revising the definitions of ``corporate 
exposure,'' ``eligible guarantor,'' ``high volatility commercial real 
estate (HVCRE) exposure,'' and ``International Lending Supervision 
Act,'' ``Investment in the capital of an unconsolidated financial 
institution,'' and ``Significant investment in the capital of an 
unconsolidated financial institution''; and adding in alphabetical 
order the definitions of ``high volatility acquisition, development, or 
construction (HVADC) exposure.'' and ``Nonsignificant investment in the 
capital of an unconsolidated financial institution,'' to read as 
follows:


Sec.  3.2   Definitions.

* * * * *
    Corporate exposure means an exposure to a company that is not:
    (1) An exposure to a sovereign, the Bank for International 
Settlements, the European Central Bank, the European Commission, the 
International Monetary Fund, the European Stability Mechanism, the 
European Financial Stability Facility, a multi-lateral development bank 
(MDB), a depository institution, a foreign bank, a credit union, or a 
public sector entity (PSE);
    (2) An exposure to a GSE;
    (3) A residential mortgage exposure;
    (4) A pre-sold construction loan;
    (5) A statutory multifamily mortgage;
    (6) A high volatility acquisition, development, or construction 
(HVADC) exposure or a high volatility commercial real estate (HVCRE) 
exposure;
    (7) A cleared transaction;
    (8) A default fund contribution;
    (9) A securitization exposure;
    (10) An equity exposure; or
    (11) An unsettled transaction.
    (12) A policy loan; or
    (13) A separate account.
* * * * *
    Eligible guarantor means:
    (1) A sovereign, the Bank for International Settlements, the 
International Monetary Fund, the European Central Bank, the European 
Commission, a Federal Home Loan Bank, Federal Agricultural Mortgage 
Corporation (Farmer Mac), the European Stability Mechanism, the 
European Financial Stability Facility, a multilateral development bank 
(MDB), a depository institution, a bank holding company, a savings and 
loan holding company, a credit union, a foreign bank, or a qualifying 
central counterparty; or
    (2) An entity (other than a special purpose entity):
    (i) That at the time the guarantee is issued or anytime thereafter, 
has issued and outstanding an unsecured debt security without credit 
enhancement that is investment grade;
    (ii) Whose creditworthiness is not positively correlated with the 
credit risk of the exposures for which it has provided guarantees; and
    (iii) That is not an insurance company engaged predominately in the 
business of providing credit protection (such as a monoline bond 
insurer or re-insurer).
* * * * *
    High volatility acquisition, development, or construction (HVADC) 
exposure means a credit facility that is originated on or after 
[effective date] and that:
    (1) Primarily finances or refinances the:
    (i) Acquisition of vacant or developed land;
    (ii) Development of land to prepare to erect new structures 
including, but not limited to, the laying of sewers or water pipes and 
demolishing existing structures; or
    (iii) Construction of buildings, dwellings, or other improvements 
including additions or alterations to existing structures; and
    (2) Is not a credit facility that finances or refinances:
    (i) One- to four-family residential properties;
    (ii) Real property projects that would have the primary purpose of 
``community development'' as defined under 12 CFR part 25 (national 
banks) and 12 CFR part 195 (Federal savings associations); or
    (iii) The purchase or development of agricultural land, including, 
but not

[[Page 50002]]

limited to, all land used or usable for agricultural purposes (such as 
crop and livestock production), provided that the valuation of the 
agricultural land is based on its value for agricultural purposes and 
the valuation does not take into consideration any potential use of the 
land for commercial or residential development; and
    (3) Is not a permanent loan. A permanent loan for purposes of this 
definition means a prudently underwritten loan that has a clearly 
identified ongoing source of repayment sufficient to service amortizing 
principal and interest payments aside from the sale of the property. 
For purposes of this section, a permanent loan does not include a loan 
that finances or refinances a stabilization period or unsold lots or 
units of for-sale projects.
    High volatility commercial real estate (HVCRE) exposure, for 
purposes of Subpart D, means a credit facility that is either 
outstanding or committed prior to [effective date] and, prior to 
conversion to permanent financing, finances or has financed the 
acquisition, development, or construction (ADC) of real property, 
unless the facility finances:
    (1) One- to four-family residential properties;
    (2) Real property that:
    (i) Would qualify as an investment in community development under 
12 U.S.C. 338a or 12 U.S.C. 24 (Eleventh), as applicable, or as a 
``qualified investment'' under 12 CFR part 25 (national bank), 12 CFR 
part 195 (Federal savings association) and
    (ii) Is not an ADC loan to any entity described in 12 CFR 
25.12(g)(3) (national banks) and 12 CFR 195.12(g)(3) (Federal savings 
associations), unless it is otherwise described in paragraph (1), 
(2)(i), (3) or (4) of this definition;
    (3) The purchase or development of agricultural land, which 
includes all land known to be used or usable for agricultural purposes 
(such as crop and livestock production), provided that the valuation of 
the agricultural land is based on its value for agricultural purposes 
and the valuation does not take into consideration any potential use of 
the land for non-agricultural commercial development or residential 
development; or
    (4) Commercial real estate projects in which:
    (i) The loan-to-value ratio is less than or equal to the applicable 
maximum supervisory loan-to-value ratio in the Board's real estate 
lending standards at 12 CFR part 34, subpart D (national banks) and 12 
CFR part 160, subparts A and B (Federal savings associations);
    (ii) The borrower has contributed capital to the project in the 
form of cash or unencumbered readily marketable assets (or has paid 
development expenses out-of-pocket) of at least 15 percent of the real 
estate's appraised ``as completed'' value; and
    (iii) The borrower contributed the amount of capital required by 
paragraph (4)(ii) of this definition before the Board-regulated 
institution advances funds under the credit facility, and the capital 
contributed by the borrower, or internally generated by the project, is 
contractually required to remain in the project throughout the life of 
the project. The life of a project concludes only when the credit 
facility is converted to permanent financing or is sold or paid in 
full. Permanent financing may be provided by the Board-regulated 
institution that provided the ADC facility as long as the permanent 
financing is subject to the Board-regulated institution's underwriting 
criteria for long-term mortgage loans.
* * * * *
    International Lending Supervision Act means the International 
Lending Supervision Act of 1983 (12 U.S.C. 3901 et seq.).
* * * * *
    Investment in the capital of an unconsolidated financial 
institution means a net long position calculated in accordance with 
Sec.  3.22(h) in an instrument that is recognized as capital for 
regulatory purposes by the primary supervisor of an unconsolidated 
regulated financial institution or is an instrument that is part of the 
GAAP equity of an unconsolidated unregulated financial institution, 
including direct, indirect, and synthetic exposures to capital 
instruments, excluding underwriting positions held by the national bank 
or Federal savings association for five or fewer business days.
* * * * *
    Non-significant investment in the capital of an unconsolidated 
financial institution means an investment by an advanced approaches 
national bank or Federal savings association in the capital of an 
unconsolidated financial institution where the advanced approaches 
national bank or Federal savings association owns 10 percent or less of 
the issued and outstanding common stock of the unconsolidated financial 
institution.
* * * * *
    Significant investment in the capital of an unconsolidated 
financial institution means an investment by an advanced approaches 
national bank or Federal savings association in the capital of an 
unconsolidated financial institution where the advanced approaches 
national bank or Federal savings association owns more than 10 percent 
of the issued and outstanding common stock of the unconsolidated 
financial institution.
* * * * *
0
4. Section 3.10 is amended by revising paragraph (c)(4)(ii)(H) to read 
as follows:


Sec.  3.10   Minimum capital requirements.

* * * * *
    (c) * * *
    (4) * * *
    (ii) * * *
    (H) The credit equivalent amount of all off-balance sheet exposures 
of the national bank or Federal savings association, excluding repo-
style transactions, repurchase or reverse repurchase or securities 
borrowing or lending transactions that qualify for sales treatment 
under U.S. GAAP, and derivative transactions, determined using the 
applicable credit conversion factor under Sec.  3.33(b), provided, 
however, that the minimum credit conversion factor that may be assigned 
to an off-balance sheet exposure under this paragraph is 10 percent; 
and
* * * * *
0
5. Section 3.11 is amended by revising paragraphs (a)(2)(i), 
(a)(2)(iv), (a)(3)(i), and Table 1 to read as follows:


Sec.  3.11   Capital conservation buffer and countercyclical capital 
buffer amount.

* * * * *
    (a) * * *
    (2) * * *
    (i) Eligible retained income. The eligible retained income of a 
national bank or Federal savings association is the national bank's or 
Federal savings association's net income, calculated in accordance with 
the instructions to the Call Report, for the four calendar quarters 
preceding the current calendar quarter, net of any distributions and 
associated tax effects not already reflected in net income.
* * * * *
    (iv) Private sector credit exposure. Private sector credit exposure 
means an exposure to a company or an individual that is not an exposure 
to a sovereign, the Bank for International Settlements, the European 
Central Bank, the European Commission, the European Stability 
Mechanism, the European Financial Stability Facility, the International 
Monetary Fund, a MDB, a PSE, or a GSE.
    (3) Calculation of capital conservation buffer. (i) A national 
bank's or Federal savings association's capital

[[Page 50003]]

conservation buffer is equal to the lowest of the following ratios, 
calculated as of the last day of the previous calendar quarter:
    (A) The national bank or Federal savings association's common 
equity tier 1 capital ratio minus the national bank or Federal savings 
association's minimum common equity tier 1 capital ratio requirement 
under Sec.  3.10;
    (B) The national bank or Federal savings association's tier 1 
capital ratio minus the national bank or Federal savings association's 
minimum tier 1 capital ratio requirement under Sec.  3.10; and
    (C) The national bank or Federal savings association's total 
capital ratio minus the national bank or Federal savings association's 
minimum total capital ratio requirement under Sec.  3.10; or
* * * * *

      Table 1 to Sec.   3.11--Calculation of Maximum Payout Amount
------------------------------------------------------------------------
           Capital conservation buffer             Maximum payout ratio
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Greater than 2.5 percent plus 100 percent of the  No payout ratio
 national bank's or Federal savings                limitation applies.
 association's applicable countercyclical
 capital buffer amount.
Less than or equal to 2.5 percent plus 100        60 percent.
 percent of the national bank's or Federal
 savings association's applicable
 countercyclical capital buffer amount, and
 greater than 1.875 percent plus 75 percent of
 the national bank's or Federal savings
 association's applicable countercyclical
 capital buffer amount.
Less than or equal to 1.875 percent plus 75       40 percent.
 percent of the national bank's or Federal
 savings association's applicable
 countercyclical capital buffer amount, and
 greater than 1.25 percent plus 50 percent of
 the national bank's or Federal savings
 association's applicable countercyclical
 capital buffer amount.
Less than or equal to 1.25 percent plus 50        20 percent.
 percent of the national bank's or Federal
 savings association's applicable
 countercyclical capital buffer amount, and
 greater than 0.625 percent plus 25 percent of
 the national bank's or Federal savings
 association's applicable countercyclical
 capital buffer amount.
Less than or equal to 0.625 percent plus 25       0 percent.
 percent of the national bank's or Federal
 savings association's applicable
 countercyclical capital buffer amount.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

* * * * *
0
6. Section 3.20 is amended by revising paragraphs (b)(4), (c)(1)(viii), 
(c)(2), (d)(2), and (5) as follows:


Sec.  3.20   Capital components and eligibility criteria for regulatory 
capital instruments.

* * * * *
    (b) * * *
    (4) Any common equity tier 1 minority interest, subject to the 
limitations in Sec.  3.21.
* * * * *
    (c) * * *
    (1) * * *
    (viii) Any cash dividend payments on the instrument are paid out of 
the national bank's or Federal savings association's net income or 
retained earnings.
* * * * *
    (2) Tier 1 minority interest, subject to the limitations in Sec.  
3.21, that is not included in the national bank's or Federal savings 
association's common equity tier 1 capital.
* * * * *
    (d) * * *
    (2) Total capital minority interest, subject to the limitations set 
forth in Sec.  3.21, that is not included in the national bank's or 
Federal savings association's tier 1 capital.
* * * * *
    (5) For a national bank or Federal savings association that makes 
an AOCI opt-out election (as defined in paragraph (b)(2) of Sec.  
3.22), 45 percent of pretax net unrealized gains on available-for-sale 
preferred stock classified as an equity security under GAAP and 
available-for-sale equity exposures.
* * * * *
0
7. Section 3.21 is revised to read as follows:


Sec.  3.21   Minority interest.

    (a) (1) Applicability. For purposes of Sec.  3.20, a national bank 
or Federal savings association that is not an advanced approaches 
national bank or Federal savings association is subject to the minority 
interest limitations in this paragraph (a) if a consolidated subsidiary 
of the national bank or Federal savings association has issued 
regulatory capital that is not owned by the national bank or Federal 
savings association.
    (2) Common equity tier 1 minority interest includable in the common 
equity tier 1 capital of the national bank or Federal savings 
association. The amount of common equity tier 1 minority interest that 
a national bank or Federal savings association may include in common 
equity tier 1 capital must be no greater than 10 percent of the sum of 
all common equity tier 1 capital elements of the national bank or 
Federal savings association (not including the common equity tier 1 
minority interest itself), less any common equity tier 1 capital 
regulatory adjustments and deductions in accordance with Sec.  3.22 (a) 
and (b).
    (3) Tier 1 minority interest includable in the tier 1 capital of 
the national bank or Federal savings association. The amount of tier 1 
minority interest that a national bank or Federal savings association 
may include in tier 1 capital must be no greater than 10 percent of the 
sum of all tier 1 capital elements of the national bank or Federal 
savings association (not including the tier 1 minority interest 
itself), less any tier 1 capital regulatory adjustments and deductions 
in accordance with Sec.  3.22 (a) and (b).
    (4) Total capital minority interest includable in the total capital 
of the national bank or Federal savings association. The amount of 
total capital minority interest that a national bank or Federal savings 
association may include in total capital must be no greater than 10 
percent of the sum of all total capital elements of the national bank 
or Federal savings association (not including the total capital 
minority interest itself), less any total capital regulatory 
adjustments and deductions in accordance with Sec.  3.22 (a) and (b).
    (b) (1) Applicability. For purposes of Sec.  3.20, an advanced 
approaches national bank or Federal savings association is subject to 
the minority interest limitations in this paragraph (b) if:
    (i) A consolidated subsidiary of the advanced approaches national 
bank or Federal savings association has issued regulatory capital that 
is not owned by the national bank or Federal savings association; and
    (ii) For each relevant regulatory capital ratio of the consolidated 
subsidiary, the ratio exceeds the sum of the subsidiary's minimum 
regulatory capital requirements plus its capital conservation buffer.
    (2) Difference in capital adequacy standards at the subsidiary 
level. For purposes of the minority interest

[[Page 50004]]

calculations in this section, if the consolidated subsidiary issuing 
the capital is not subject to capital adequacy standards similar to 
those of the advanced approaches national bank or Federal savings 
association, the advanced approaches national bank or Federal savings 
association must assume that the capital adequacy standards of the 
advanced approaches national bank or Federal savings association apply 
to the subsidiary.
    (3) Common equity tier 1 minority interest includable in the common 
equity tier 1 capital of the national bank or Federal savings 
association. For each consolidated subsidiary of an advanced approaches 
national bank or Federal savings association, the amount of common 
equity tier 1 minority interest the advanced approaches national bank 
or Federal savings association may include in common equity tier 1 
capital is equal to:
    (i) The common equity tier 1 minority interest of the subsidiary; 
minus
    (ii) The percentage of the subsidiary's common equity tier 1 
capital that is not owned by the advanced approaches national bank or 
Federal savings association, multiplied by the difference between the 
common equity tier 1 capital of the subsidiary and the lower of:
    (A) The amount of common equity tier 1 capital the subsidiary must 
hold, or would be required to hold pursuant to paragraph (b) of this 
section, to avoid restrictions on distributions and discretionary bonus 
payments under Sec.  3.11 or equivalent standards established by the 
subsidiary's home country supervisor; or
    (B)(1) The standardized total risk-weighted assets of the advanced 
approaches national bank or Federal savings association that relate to 
the subsidiary multiplied by
    (2) The common equity tier 1 capital ratio the subsidiary must 
maintain to avoid restrictions on distributions and discretionary bonus 
payments under Sec.  3.11 or equivalent standards established by the 
subsidiary's home country supervisor.
    (4) Tier 1 minority interest includable in the tier 1 capital of 
the advanced approaches national bank or Federal savings association. 
For each consolidated subsidiary of the advanced approaches national 
bank or Federal savings association, the amount of tier 1 minority 
interest the advanced approaches national bank or Federal savings 
association may include in tier 1 capital is equal to:
    (i) The tier 1 minority interest of the subsidiary; minus
    (ii) The percentage of the subsidiary's tier 1 capital that is not 
owned by the advanced approaches national bank or Federal savings 
association multiplied by the difference between the tier 1 capital of 
the subsidiary and the lower of:
    (A) The amount of tier 1 capital the subsidiary must hold, or would 
be required to hold pursuant to paragraph (b) of this section, to avoid 
restrictions on distributions and discretionary bonus payments under 
Sec.  3.11 or equivalent standards established by the subsidiary's home 
country supervisor, or
    (B)(1) The standardized total risk-weighted assets of the advanced 
approaches national bank or Federal savings association that relate to 
the subsidiary multiplied by
    (2) The tier 1 capital ratio the subsidiary must maintain to avoid 
restrictions on distributions and discretionary bonus payments under 
Sec.  3.11 or equivalent standards established by the subsidiary's home 
country supervisor.
    (5) Total capital minority interest includable in the total capital 
of the national bank or Federal savings association. For each 
consolidated subsidiary of the advanced approaches national bank or 
Federal savings association, the amount of total capital minority 
interest the advanced approaches national bank or Federal savings 
association may include in total capital is equal to:
    (i) The total capital minority interest of the subsidiary; minus
    (ii) The percentage of the subsidiary's total capital that is not 
owned by the advanced approaches national bank or Federal savings 
association multiplied by the difference between the total capital of 
the subsidiary and the lower of:
    (A) The amount of total capital the subsidiary must hold, or would 
be required to hold pursuant to paragraph (b) of this section, to avoid 
restrictions on distributions and discretionary bonus payments under 
Sec.  3.11 or equivalent standards established by the subsidiary's home 
country supervisor, or
    (B)(1) The standardized total risk-weighted assets of the advanced 
approaches national bank or Federal savings association that relate to 
the subsidiary multiplied by
    (2) The total capital ratio the subsidiary must maintain to avoid 
restrictions on distributions and discretionary bonus payments under 
Sec.  3.11 or equivalent standards established by the subsidiary's home 
country supervisor.
0
8. Section 3.22 is amended by revising paragraphs (a)(1), (c), (d), 
(g), and (h) to read as follows:


Sec.  3.22  Regulatory capital adjustments and deductions.

    (a) * * *
    (1)(i) Goodwill, net of associated deferred tax liabilities (DTLs) 
in accordance with paragraph (e) of this section; and
    (ii) For an advanced approaches national bank or Federal savings 
association, goodwill that is embedded in the valuation of a 
significant investment in the capital of an unconsolidated financial 
institution in the form of common stock (and that is reflected in the 
consolidated financial statements of the advanced approaches national 
bank or Federal savings association), in accordance with paragraph (d) 
of this section;
* * * * *
    (c) Deductions from regulatory capital related to investments in 
capital instruments \23\--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \23\ The national bank or Federal savings association must 
calculate amounts deducted under paragraphs (c) through (f) of this 
section after it calculates the amount of ALLL includable in tier 2 
capital under Sec.  3.20(d)(3).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (1) Investment in the national bank's or Federal savings 
association's own capital instruments. A national bank or Federal 
savings association must deduct an investment in the national bank's or 
Federal savings association's own capital instruments as follows:
    (i) A national bank or Federal savings association must deduct an 
investment in the national bank's or Federal savings association's own 
common stock instruments from its common equity tier 1 capital elements 
to the extent such instruments are not excluded from regulatory capital 
under Sec.  3.20(b)(1);
    (ii) A national bank or Federal savings association must deduct an 
investment in the national bank's or Federal savings association's own 
additional tier 1 capital instruments from its additional tier 1 
capital elements; and
    (iii) A national bank or Federal savings association must deduct an 
investment in the national bank's or Federal savings association's own 
tier 2 capital instruments from its tier 2 capital elements.
    (2) Corresponding deduction approach. For purposes of subpart C of 
this part, the corresponding deduction approach is the methodology used 
for the deductions from regulatory capital related to reciprocal cross 
holdings (as described in paragraph (c)(3) of this section), 
investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial institutions for 
a national bank or Federal savings

[[Page 50005]]

association that is not an advanced approaches national bank or Federal 
savings association (as described in paragraph (c)(4) of this section), 
non-significant investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial 
institutions for an advanced approaches national bank or Federal 
savings association (as described in paragraph (c)(5) of this section), 
and non-common stock significant investments in the capital of 
unconsolidated financial institutions for an advanced approaches 
national bank or Federal savings association (as described in paragraph 
(c)(6) of this section). Under the corresponding deduction approach, a 
national bank or Federal savings association must make deductions from 
the component of capital for which the underlying instrument would 
qualify if it were issued by the national bank or Federal savings 
association itself, as described in paragraphs (c)(2)(i)-(iii) of this 
section. If the national bank or Federal savings association does not 
have a sufficient amount of a specific component of capital to effect 
the required deduction, the shortfall must be deducted according to 
paragraph (f) of this section.
    (i) If an investment is in the form of an instrument issued by a 
financial institution that is not a regulated financial institution, 
the national bank or Federal savings association must treat the 
instrument as:
    (A) A common equity tier 1 capital instrument if it is common stock 
or represents the most subordinated claim in liquidation of the 
financial institution; and
    (B) An additional tier 1 capital instrument if it is subordinated 
to all creditors of the financial institution and is senior in 
liquidation only to common shareholders.
    (ii) If an investment is in the form of an instrument issued by a 
regulated financial institution and the instrument does not meet the 
criteria for common equity tier 1, additional tier 1 or tier 2 capital 
instruments under Sec.  3.20, the national bank or Federal savings 
association must treat the instrument as:
    (A) A common equity tier 1 capital instrument if it is common stock 
included in GAAP equity or represents the most subordinated claim in 
liquidation of the financial institution;
    (B) An additional tier 1 capital instrument if it is included in 
GAAP equity, subordinated to all creditors of the financial 
institution, and senior in a receivership, insolvency, liquidation, or 
similar proceeding only to common shareholders; and
    (C) A tier 2 capital instrument if it is not included in GAAP 
equity but considered regulatory capital by the primary supervisor of 
the financial institution.
    (iii) If an investment is in the form of a non-qualifying capital 
instrument (as defined in Sec.  3.300(c)), the national bank or Federal 
savings association must treat the instrument as:
    (A) An additional tier 1 capital instrument if such instrument was 
included in the issuer's tier 1 capital prior to May 19, 2010; or
    (B) A tier 2 capital instrument if such instrument was included in 
the issuer's tier 2 capital (but not includable in tier 1 capital) 
prior to May 19, 2010.
    (3) Reciprocal cross holdings in the capital of financial 
institutions. A national bank or Federal savings association must 
deduct investments in the capital of other financial institutions it 
holds reciprocally, where such reciprocal cross holdings result from a 
formal or informal arrangement to swap, exchange, or otherwise intend 
to hold each other's capital instruments, by applying the corresponding 
deduction approach.
    (4) Investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial 
institutions. A national bank or Federal savings association that is 
not an advanced approaches national bank or Federal savings association 
must deduct its investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial 
institutions (as defined in Sec.  3.2) that exceed 25 percent of the 
sum of the national bank's or Federal savings association's common 
equity tier 1 capital elements minus all deductions from and 
adjustments to common equity tier 1 capital elements required under 
paragraphs (a) through (c)(3) of this section by applying the 
corresponding deduction approach.\24\ The deductions described in this 
section are net of associated DTLs in accordance with paragraph (e) of 
this section. In addition, a national bank or Federal savings 
association that underwrites a failed underwriting, with the prior 
written approval of the OCC, for the period of time stipulated by the 
OCC, is not required to deduct an investment in the capital of an 
unconsolidated financial institution pursuant to this paragraph (c) to 
the extent the investment is related to the failed underwriting.\25\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \24\ With the prior written approval of the OCC, for the period 
of time stipulated by the OCC, a national bank or Federal savings 
association that is not an advanced approaches national bank or 
Federal savings association is not required to deduct an investment 
in the capital of an unconsolidated financial institution pursuant 
to this paragraph if the financial institution is in distress and if 
such investment is made for the purpose of providing financial 
support to the financial institution, as determined by the OCC.
    \25\ Any investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial 
institutions that do not exceed the 25 percent threshold for 
investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial institutions 
under this section must be assigned the appropriate risk weight 
under subparts D or F of this part, as applicable.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (5) Non-significant investments in the capital of unconsolidated 
financial institutions. (i) An advanced approaches national bank or 
Federal savings association must deduct its non-significant investments 
in the capital of unconsolidated financial institutions (as defined in 
Sec.  3.2) that, in the aggregate, exceed 10 percent of the sum of the 
advanced approaches national bank's or Federal savings association's 
common equity tier 1 capital elements minus all deductions from and 
adjustments to common equity tier 1 capital elements required under 
paragraphs (a) through (c)(3) of this section (the 10 percent threshold 
for non-significant investments) by applying the corresponding 
deduction approach.\26\ The deductions described in this section are 
net of associated DTLs in accordance with paragraph (e) of this 
section. In addition, an advanced approaches national bank or Federal 
savings association that underwrites a failed underwriting, with the 
prior written approval of the OCC, for the period of time stipulated by 
the OCC, is not required to deduct a non-significant investment in the 
capital of an unconsolidated financial institution pursuant to this 
paragraph (c) to the extent the investment is related to the failed 
underwriting.\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \26\ With the prior written approval of the OCC, for the period 
of time stipulated by the OCC, an advanced approaches national bank 
or Federal savings association is not required to deduct a non-
significant investment in the capital of an unconsolidated financial 
institution pursuant to this paragraph if the financial institution 
is in distress and if such investment is made for the purpose of 
providing financial support to the financial institution, as 
determined by the OCC.
    \27\ Any non-significant investments in the capital of 
unconsolidated financial institutions that do not exceed the 10 
percent threshold for non-significant investments under this section 
must be assigned the appropriate risk weight under subparts D, E, or 
F of this part, as applicable.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (ii) The amount to be deducted under this section from a specific 
capital component is equal to:
    (A) The advanced approaches national bank's or Federal savings 
association's non-significant investments in the capital of 
unconsolidated financial institutions exceeding the 10 percent 
threshold for non-significant investments, multiplied by
    (B) The ratio of the advanced approaches national bank's or Federal

[[Page 50006]]

savings association's non-significant investments in the capital of 
unconsolidated financial institutions in the form of such capital 
component to the advanced approaches national bank's or Federal savings 
association's total non-significant investments in unconsolidated 
financial institutions.
    (6) Significant investments in the capital of unconsolidated 
financial institutions that are not in the form of common stock. An 
advanced approaches national bank or Federal savings association must 
deduct its significant investments in the capital of unconsolidated 
financial institutions that are not in the form of common stock by 
applying the corresponding deduction approach.\28\ The deductions 
described in this section are net of associated DTLs in accordance with 
paragraph (e) of this section. In addition, with the prior written 
approval of the OCC, for the period of time stipulated by the OCC, an 
advanced approaches national bank or Federal savings association that 
underwrites a failed underwriting is not required to deduct a 
significant investment in the capital of an unconsolidated financial 
institution pursuant to this paragraph (c) if such investment is 
related to such failed underwriting.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \28\ With prior written approval of the OCC, for the period of 
time stipulated by the OCC, an advanced approaches national bank or 
Federal savings association is not required to deduct a significant 
investment in the capital instrument of an unconsolidated financial 
institution in distress which is not in the form of common stock 
pursuant to this section if such investment is made for the purpose 
of providing financial support to the financial institution as 
determined by the OCC.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (d) MSAs and certain DTAs subject to common equity tier 1 capital 
deduction thresholds.
    (1) A national bank or Federal savings association that is not an 
advanced approaches national bank or Federal savings association must 
make deductions from regulatory capital as described in this paragraph 
(d)(1).
    (i) The national bank or Federal savings association must deduct 
from common equity tier 1 capital elements the amount of each of the 
items set forth in this paragraph (d)(1) that, individually, exceeds 25 
percent of the sum of the national bank's or Federal savings 
association's common equity tier 1 capital elements, less adjustments 
to and deductions from common equity tier 1 capital required under 
paragraphs (a) through (c)(3) of this section (the 25 percent common 
equity tier 1 capital deduction threshold).\29\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \29\ The amount of the items in paragraph (d)(1) of this section 
that is not deducted from common equity tier 1 capital must be 
included in the risk-weighted assets of the national bank or Federal 
savings association and assigned a 250 percent risk weight.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (ii) The national bank or Federal savings association must deduct 
from common equity tier 1 capital elements the amount of DTAs arising 
from temporary differences that the national bank or Federal savings 
association could not realize through net operating loss carrybacks, 
net of any related valuation allowances and net of DTLs, in accordance 
with paragraph (e) of this section. A national bank or Federal savings 
association is not required to deduct from the sum of its common equity 
tier 1 capital elements DTAs (net of any related valuation allowances 
and net of DTLs, in accordance with Sec.  3.22(e)) arising from timing 
differences that the national bank or Federal savings association could 
realize through net operating loss carrybacks. The national bank or 
Federal savings association must risk weight these assets at 100 
percent. For a national bank or Federal savings association that is a 
member of a consolidated group for tax purposes, the amount of DTAs 
that could be realized through net operating loss carrybacks may not 
exceed the amount that the national bank or Federal savings association 
could reasonably expect to have refunded by its parent holding company.
    (iii) The national bank or Federal savings association must deduct 
from common equity tier 1 capital elements the amount of MSAs net of 
associated DTLs, in accordance with paragraph (e) of this section.
    (iv) For purposes of calculating the amount of DTAs subject to 
deduction pursuant to paragraph (d)(1) of this section, a national bank 
or Federal savings association may exclude DTAs and DTLs relating to 
adjustments made to common equity tier 1 capital under paragraph (b) of 
this section. A national bank or Federal savings association that 
elects to exclude DTAs relating to adjustments under paragraph (b) of 
this section also must exclude DTLs and must do so consistently in all 
future calculations. A national bank or Federal savings association may 
change its exclusion preference only after obtaining the prior approval 
of the OCC.
    (2) An advanced approaches national bank or Federal savings 
association must make deductions from regulatory capital as described 
in this paragraph (d)(2).
    (i) An advanced approaches national bank or Federal savings 
association must deduct from common equity tier 1 capital elements the 
amount of each of the items set forth in this paragraph (d)(2) that, 
individually, exceeds 10 percent of the sum of the advanced approaches 
national bank's or Federal savings association's common equity tier 1 
capital elements, less adjustments to and deductions from common equity 
tier 1 capital required under paragraphs (a) through (c) of this 
section (the 10 percent common equity tier 1 capital deduction 
threshold).
    (A) DTAs arising from temporary differences that the advanced 
approaches national bank or Federal savings association could not 
realize through net operating loss carrybacks, net of any related 
valuation allowances and net of DTLs, in accordance with paragraph (e) 
of this section. An advanced approaches national bank or Federal 
savings association is not required to deduct from the sum of its 
common equity tier 1 capital elements DTAs (net of any related 
valuation allowances and net of DTLs, in accordance with Sec.  3.22(e)) 
arising from timing differences that the advanced approaches national 
bank or Federal savings association could realize through net operating 
loss carrybacks. The advanced approaches national bank or Federal 
savings association must risk weight these assets at 100 percent. For a 
national bank or Federal savings association that is a member of a 
consolidated group for tax purposes, the amount of DTAs that could be 
realized through net operating loss carrybacks may not exceed the 
amount that the national bank or Federal savings association could 
reasonably expect to have refunded by its parent holding company.
    (B) MSAs net of associated DTLs, in accordance with paragraph (e) 
of this section.
    (C) Significant investments in the capital of unconsolidated 
financial institutions in the form of common stock, net of associated 
DTLs in accordance with paragraph (e) of this section.\30\ Significant 
investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial institutions in 
the form of common stock subject to the 10 percent common equity tier 1 
capital deduction threshold may be reduced by any goodwill embedded in 
the valuation of such investments deducted by the advanced approaches 
national bank or Federal savings association pursuant to

[[Page 50007]]

paragraph (a)(1) of this section. In addition, with the prior written 
approval of the OCC, for the period of time stipulated by the OCC, an 
advanced approaches national bank or Federal savings association that 
underwrites a failed underwriting is not required to deduct a 
significant investment in the capital of an unconsolidated financial 
institution in the form of common stock pursuant to this paragraph 
(d)(2) if such investment is related to such failed underwriting.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \30\ With the prior written approval of the OCC, for the period 
of time stipulated by the OCC, an advanced approaches national bank 
or Federal savings association is not required to deduct a 
significant investment in the capital instrument of an 
unconsolidated financial institution in distress in the form of 
common stock pursuant to this section if such investment is made for 
the purpose of providing financial support to the financial 
institution as determined by the OCC.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (ii) An advanced approaches national bank or Federal savings 
association must deduct from common equity tier 1 capital elements the 
items listed in paragraph (d)(2)(i) of this section that are not 
deducted as a result of the application of the 10 percent common equity 
tier 1 capital deduction threshold, and that, in aggregate, exceed 
17.65 percent of the sum of the advanced approaches national bank's or 
Federal savings association's common equity tier 1 capital elements, 
minus adjustments to and deductions from common equity tier 1 capital 
required under paragraphs (a) through (c) of this section, minus the 
items listed in paragraph (d)(2)(i) of this section (the 15 percent 
common equity tier 1 capital deduction threshold). Any goodwill that 
has been deducted under paragraph (a)(1) of this section can be 
excluded from the significant investments in the capital of 
unconsolidated financial institutions in the form of common stock.\31\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \31\ The amount of the items in paragraph (d)(2) of this section 
that is not deducted from common equity tier 1 capital pursuant to 
this section must be included in the risk-weighted assets of the 
advanced approaches national bank or Federal savings association and 
assigned a 250 percent risk weight.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (iii) For purposes of calculating the amount of DTAs subject to the 
10 and 15 percent common equity tier 1 capital deduction thresholds, an 
advanced approaches national bank or Federal savings association may 
exclude DTAs and DTLs relating to adjustments made to common equity 
tier 1 capital under paragraph (b) of this section. An advanced 
approaches national bank or Federal savings association that elects to 
exclude DTAs relating to adjustments under paragraph (b) of this 
section also must exclude DTLs and must do so consistently in all 
future calculations. An advanced approaches national bank or Federal 
savings association may change its exclusion preference only after 
obtaining the prior approval of the OCC.
* * * * *
    (g) Treatment of assets that are deducted. A national bank or 
Federal savings association must exclude from standardized total risk-
weighted assets and, as applicable, advanced approaches total risk-
weighted assets any item that is required to be deducted from 
regulatory capital.
    (h) Net long position. (1) For purposes of calculating an 
investment in the national bank's or Federal savings association's own 
capital instrument and an investment in the capital of an 
unconsolidated financial institution under this section, the net long 
position is the gross long position in the underlying instrument 
determined in accordance with paragraph (h)(2) of this section, as 
adjusted to recognize a short position in the same instrument 
calculated in accordance with paragraph (h)(3) of this section.
    (2) Gross long position. The gross long position is determined as 
follows:
    (i) For an equity exposure that is held directly, the adjusted 
carrying value as that term is defined in Sec.  3.51(b);
    (ii) For an exposure that is held directly and is not an equity 
exposure or a securitization exposure, the exposure amount as that term 
is defined in Sec.  3.2;
    (iii) For an indirect exposure, the national bank's or Federal 
savings association's carrying value of the investment in the 
investment fund, provided that, alternatively:
    (A) A national bank or Federal savings association may, with the 
prior approval of the Board, use a conservative estimate of the amount 
of its investment in the national bank's or Federal savings 
association's own capital instruments or its investment in the capital 
of an unconsolidated financial institution held through a position in 
an index; or
    (B) A national bank or Federal savings association may calculate 
the gross long position for investments in the national bank's or 
Federal savings association's own capital instruments or investments in 
the capital of an unconsolidated financial institution by multiplying 
the national bank's or Federal savings association's carrying value of 
its investment in the investment fund by either:
    (1) The highest stated investment limit (in percent) for 
investments in the national bank's or Federal savings association's own 
capital instruments or investments in the capital of unconsolidated 
financial institutions as stated in the prospectus, partnership 
agreement, or similar contract defining permissible investments of the 
investment fund; or
    (2) The investment fund's actual holdings of investments in the 
national bank's or Federal savings association's own capital 
instruments or investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial 
institutions.
    (iv) For a synthetic exposure, the amount of the national bank's or 
Federal savings association's loss on the exposure if the reference 
capital instrument were to have a value of zero.
    (3) Adjustments to reflect a short position. In order to adjust the 
gross long position to recognize a short position in the same 
instrument, the following criteria must be met:
    (i) The maturity of the short position must match the maturity of 
the long position, or the short position has a residual maturity of at 
least one year (maturity requirement); or
    (ii) For a position that is a trading asset or trading liability 
(whether on- or off-balance sheet) as reported on the national bank's 
or Federal savings association 's Call Report, if the national bank or 
Federal savings association has a contractual right or obligation to 
sell the long position at a specific point in time and the counterparty 
to the contract has an obligation to purchase the long position if the 
national bank or Federal savings association exercises its right to 
sell, this point in time may be treated as the maturity of the long 
position such that the maturity of the long position and short position 
are deemed to match for purposes of the maturity requirement, even if 
the maturity of the short position is less than one year; and
    (iii) For an investment in the national bank's or Federal savings 
association's own capital instrument under paragraph (c)(1) of this 
section or an investment in the capital of an unconsolidated financial 
institution under paragraphs (c) and (d):
    (A) A national bank or Federal savings association may only net a 
short position against a long position in an investment in the national 
bank's or Federal savings association's own capital instrument under 
paragraph (c) of this section if the short position involves no 
counterparty credit risk.
    (B) A gross long position in an investment in the national bank's 
or Federal savings association's own capital instrument or an 
investment in the capital of an unconsolidated financial institution 
resulting from a position in an index may be netted against a short 
position in the same index. Long and short positions in the same index 
without maturity dates are considered to have matching maturities.
    (C) A short position in an index that is hedging a long cash or 
synthetic position in an investment in the national bank's or Federal 
savings association's own capital instrument or an investment in the 
capital of an

[[Page 50008]]

unconsolidated financial institution can be decomposed to provide 
recognition of the hedge. More specifically, the portion of the index 
that is composed of the same underlying instrument that is being hedged 
may be used to offset the long position if both the long position being 
hedged and the short position in the index are reported as a trading 
asset or trading liability (whether on- or off-balance sheet) on the 
national bank's or Federal savings association's Call Report, and the 
hedge is deemed effective by the national bank's or Federal savings 
association 's internal control processes, which have not been found to 
be inadequate by the OCC.
0
9. Section 3.32 is amended by revising paragraphs (b), (d)(2), 
(d)(3)(ii), (j), (k), (l) to read as follows:


Sec.  3.32  General risk weights.

* * * * *
    (b) Certain supranational entities and multilateral development 
banks (MDBs). A national bank or Federal savings association must 
assign a zero percent risk weight to an exposure to the Bank for 
International Settlements, the European Central Bank, the European 
Commission, the International Monetary Fund, the European Stability 
Mechanism, the European Financial Stability Facility, or an MDB.
* * * * *
    (d) * * *
    (2) Exposures to foreign banks. (i) Except as otherwise provided 
under paragraphs (d)(2)(iii), (d)(2)(v) and (d)(3) of this section, a 
national bank or Federal savings association must assign a risk weight 
to an exposure to a foreign bank, in accordance with Table 2 to Sec.  
3.32, based on the CRC that corresponds to the foreign bank's home 
country or the OECD membership status of the foreign bank's home 
country if there is no CRC applicable to the foreign bank's home 
country.

   Table 2 to Sec.   3.32--Risk Weights for Exposures to Foreign Banks
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                            Risk weight
                                                           (in percent)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
CRC:
  0-1...................................................              20
  2.....................................................              50
  3.....................................................             100
  4-7...................................................             150
OECD Member with No CRC.................................              20
Non-OECD Member with No CRC.............................             100
Sovereign Default.......................................             150
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (ii) A national bank or Federal savings association must assign a 
20 percent risk weight to an exposure to a foreign bank whose home 
country is a member of the OECD and does not have a CRC.
    (iii) A national bank or Federal savings association must assign a 
20 percent risk-weight to an exposure that is a self-liquidating, 
trade-related contingent item that arises from the movement of goods 
and that has a maturity of three months or less to a foreign bank whose 
home country has a CRC of 0, 1, 2, or 3, or is an OECD member with no 
CRC.
    (iv) A national bank or Federal savings association must assign a 
100 percent risk weight to an exposure to a foreign bank whose home 
country is not a member of the OECD and does not have a CRC, with the 
exception of self-liquidating, trade-related contingent items that 
arise from the movement of goods, and that have a maturity of three 
months or less, which may be assigned a 20 percent risk weight.
    (v) A national bank or Federal savings association must assign a 
150 percent risk weight to an exposure to a foreign bank immediately 
upon determining that an event of sovereign default has occurred in the 
bank's home country, or if an event of sovereign default has occurred 
in the foreign bank's home country during the previous five years.
    (3) * * *
    (ii) A significant investment in the capital of an unconsolidated 
financial institution in the form of common stock pursuant to Sec.  
3.22(d)(2)(1)(c);
* * * * *
    (j)(1) High volatility acquisition, development, or construction 
(HVADC) exposures. A national bank or Federal savings association must 
assign a 130 percent risk weight to an HVADC exposure.
    (2) High-volatility commercial real estate (HVCRE) exposures. A 
national bank or Federal savings association must assign a 150 percent 
risk weight to an HVCRE exposure.
    (k) Past due exposures. Except for an exposure to a sovereign 
entity or a residential mortgage exposure or a policy loan, if an 
exposure is 90 days or more past due or on nonaccrual:
    (1) A national bank or Federal savings association must assign a 
150 percent risk weight to the portion of the exposure that is not 
guaranteed or that is unsecured;
    (2) A national bank or Federal savings association may assign a 
risk weight to the guaranteed portion of a past due exposure based on 
the risk weight that applies under Sec.  3.36 if the guarantee or 
credit derivative meets the requirements of that section; and
    (3) A national bank or Federal savings association may assign a 
risk weight to the collateralized portion of a past due exposure based 
on the risk weight that applies under Sec.  3.37 if the collateral 
meets the requirements of that section.
    (l) Other assets. (1)(i) A national bank or Federal savings 
association must assign a zero percent risk weight to cash owned and 
held in all offices of subsidiary depository institutions or in 
transit, and to gold bullion held in a subsidiary depository 
institution's own vaults, or held in another depository institution's 
vaults on an allocated basis, to the extent the gold bullion assets are 
offset by gold bullion liabilities.
    (ii) A national bank or Federal savings association must assign a 
zero percent risk weight to cash owned and held in all offices of the 
national bank or Federal savings association or in transit; to gold 
bullion held in the national bank's or Federal savings association's 
own vaults or held in another depository institution's vaults on an 
allocated basis, to the extent the gold bullion assets are offset by 
gold bullion liabilities; and to exposures that arise from the 
settlement of cash transactions (such as equities, fixed income, spot 
foreign exchange and spot commodities) with a central counterparty 
where there is no assumption of ongoing counterparty credit risk by the 
central counterparty after settlement of the trade and associated 
default fund contributions.
    (2) A national bank or Federal savings association must assign a 20 
percent risk weight to cash items in the process of collection.
    (3) A national bank or Federal savings association must assign a 
100 percent risk weight to DTAs arising from temporary differences that 
the national bank or Federal savings association could realize through 
net operating loss carrybacks.
    (4) A national bank or Federal savings association must assign a 
250 percent risk weight to the portion of each of the following items 
to the extent it is not deducted from common equity tier 1 capital 
pursuant to Sec.  3.22(d):
    (i) MSAs; and
    (ii) DTAs arising from temporary differences that the national bank 
or Federal savings association could not realize through net operating 
loss carrybacks.
    (5) A national bank or Federal savings association must assign a 
100 percent risk weight to all assets not specifically assigned a 
different risk weight under this subpart and that are not deducted from 
tier 1 or tier 2 capital pursuant to Sec.  3.22.
    (6) Notwithstanding the requirements of this section, a national 
bank or

[[Page 50009]]

Federal savings association may assign an asset that is not included in 
one of the categories provided in this section to the risk weight 
category applicable under the capital rules applicable to bank holding 
companies and savings and loan holding companies at 12 CFR part 217, 
provided that all of the following conditions apply:
    (i) The national bank or Federal savings association is not 
authorized to hold the asset under applicable law other than debt 
previously contracted or similar authority; and
    (ii) The risks associated with the asset are substantially similar 
to the risks of assets that are otherwise assigned to a risk weight 
category of less than 100 percent under this subpart.
* * * * *
0
10. Section 3.34 is amended by revising paragraph (c) to read as 
follows:


Sec.  3.34  OTC derivative contracts.

* * * * *
    (c) Counterparty credit risk for OTC credit derivatives. (1) 
Protection purchasers. A national bank or Federal savings association 
that purchases an OTC credit derivative that is recognized under Sec.  
3.36 as a credit risk mitigant for an exposure that is not a covered 
position under subpart F is not required to compute a separate 
counterparty credit risk capital requirement under this subpart D 
provided that the national bank or Federal savings association does so 
consistently for all such credit derivatives. The national bank or 
Federal savings association must either include all or exclude all such 
credit derivatives that are subject to a qualifying master netting 
agreement from any measure used to determine counterparty credit risk 
exposure to all relevant counterparties for risk-based capital 
purposes.
    (2) Protection providers. (i) A national bank or Federal savings 
association that is the protection provider under an OTC credit 
derivative must treat the OTC credit derivative as an exposure to the 
underlying reference asset. The national bank or Federal savings 
association is not required to compute a counterparty credit risk 
capital requirement for the OTC credit derivative under this subpart D, 
provided that this treatment is applied consistently for all such OTC 
credit derivatives. The national bank or Federal savings association 
must either include all or exclude all such OTC credit derivatives that 
are subject to a qualifying master netting agreement from any measure 
used to determine counterparty credit risk exposure.
    (ii) The provisions of this paragraph (c)(2) apply to all relevant 
counterparties for risk-based capital purposes unless the national bank 
or Federal savings association is treating the OTC credit derivative as 
a covered position under subpart F, in which case the national bank or 
Federal savings association must compute a supplemental counterparty 
credit risk capital requirement under this section.
* * * * *
0
11. Section 3.35 is amended by revising paragraph (b)(3)(ii), 
(b)(4)(ii), (c)(3)(ii), and (c)(4)(ii) to read as follows:


Sec.  3.35  Cleared transactions.

* * * * *
    (b) * * *
    (3) * * *
    (ii) For a cleared transaction with a CCP that is not a QCCP, a 
clearing member client national bank or Federal savings association 
must apply the risk weight appropriate for the CCP according to this 
subpart D.
* * * * *
    (4) * * *
    (ii) A clearing member client national bank or Federal savings 
association must calculate a risk-weighted asset amount for any 
collateral provided to a CCP, clearing member, or custodian in 
connection with a cleared transaction in accordance with the 
requirements under this subpart D.
    (c) * * *
    (3) * * *
    (ii) For a cleared transaction with a CCP that is not a QCCP, a 
clearing member national bank or Federal savings association must apply 
the risk weight appropriate for the CCP according to this subpart D.
* * * * *
    (4) * * *
    (ii) A clearing member national bank or Federal savings association 
must calculate a risk-weighted asset amount for any collateral provided 
to a CCP, clearing member, or a custodian in connection with a cleared 
transaction in accordance with requirements under this subpart D.
* * * * *
0
12. Section 3.36 is amend by revising paragraph (c) to read as follows:


Sec.  3.36   Guarantees and credit derivatives: Substitution treatment.

* * * * *
    (c) Substitution approach--(1) Full coverage. If an eligible 
guarantee or eligible credit derivative meets the conditions in 
paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section and the protection amount (P) of 
the guarantee or credit derivative is greater than or equal to the 
exposure amount of the hedged exposure, a national bank or Federal 
savings association may recognize the guarantee or credit derivative in 
determining the risk-weighted asset amount for the hedged exposure by 
substituting the risk weight applicable to the guarantor or credit 
derivative protection provider under this subpart D for the risk weight 
assigned to the exposure.
    (2) Partial coverage. If an eligible guarantee or eligible credit 
derivative meets the conditions in paragraphs (a) and (b) of this 
section and the protection amount (P) of the guarantee or credit 
derivative is less than the exposure amount of the hedged exposure, the 
national bank or Federal savings association must treat the hedged 
exposure as two separate exposures (protected and unprotected) in order 
to recognize the credit risk mitigation benefit of the guarantee or 
credit derivative.
    (i) The national bank or Federal savings association may calculate 
the risk-weighted asset amount for the protected exposure under this 
subpart D, where the applicable risk weight is the risk weight 
applicable to the guarantor or credit derivative protection provider.
    (ii) The national bank or Federal savings association must 
calculate the risk-weighted asset amount for the unprotected exposure 
under this subpart D, where the applicable risk weight is that of the 
unprotected portion of the hedged exposure.
    (iii) The treatment provided in this section is applicable when the 
credit risk of an exposure is covered on a partial pro rata basis and 
may be applicable when an adjustment is made to the effective notional 
amount of the guarantee or credit derivative under paragraphs (d), (e), 
or (f) of this section.
* * * * *
0
13. Section 3.37 is amended by revising paragraph (b)(2)(i) and the 
paragraph headings for paragraphs (b) and (b)(2) are being reprinted 
for reader reference to read as follows:


Sec.  3.37   Collateralized transactions.

* * * * *
    (b) The simple approach. * * *
    (2) Risk weight substitution. (i) A national bank or Federal 
savings association may apply a risk weight to the portion of an 
exposure that is secured by the fair value of financial collateral 
(that meets the requirements of paragraph (b)(1) of this section) based 
on the risk weight assigned to the collateral under this subpart D. For 
repurchase agreements, reverse repurchase agreements, and securities 
lending and borrowing transactions, the collateral is the instruments, 
gold, and cash the national bank or Federal savings association has 
borrowed,

[[Page 50010]]

purchased subject to resale, or taken as collateral from the 
counterparty under the transaction. Except as provided in paragraph 
(b)(3) of this section, the risk weight assigned to the collateralized 
portion of the exposure may not be less than 20 percent.
* * * * *
0
14. Section 3.38 is amended by revising paragraph (e)(2) to read as 
follows:


Sec.  3.38   Unsettled transactions.

* * * * *
    (e) * * *
    (2) From the business day after the national bank or Federal 
savings association has made its delivery until five business days 
after the counterparty delivery is due, the national bank or Federal 
savings association must calculate the risk-weighted asset amount for 
the transaction by treating the current fair value of the deliverables 
owed to the national bank or Federal savings association as an exposure 
to the counterparty and using the applicable counterparty risk weight 
under this subpart D.
* * * * *
0
15. Section 3.42 is amended by revising paragraph (j)(2)(ii)(A) to read 
as follows:


Sec.  3.42   Risk-weighted assets for securitization exposures.

* * * * *
    (j) * * *
    (2) * * *
    (ii) * * *
    (A) If the national bank or Federal savings association purchases 
credit protection from a counterparty that is not a securitization SPE, 
the national bank or Federal savings association must determine the 
risk weight for the exposure according to this subpart D.
* * * * *
0
16. Section 3.52 is amended by revising paragraphs (b)(1) and (4) to 
read as follows:


Sec.  3.52   Simple risk-weight approach (SRWA).

* * * * *
    (b) * * *
    (1) Zero percent risk weight equity exposures. An equity exposure 
to a sovereign, the Bank for International Settlements, the European 
Central Bank, the European Commission, the International Monetary Fund, 
the European Stability Mechanism, the European Financial Stability 
Facility, an MDB, and any other entity whose credit exposures receive a 
zero percent risk weight under Sec.  3.32 may be assigned a zero 
percent risk weight.
* * * * *
    (4) 250 percent risk weight equity exposures. Significant 
investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial institutions in 
the form of common stock that are not deducted from capital pursuant to 
Sec.  3.22(d)(2) are assigned a 250 percent risk weight.
* * * * *
0
17. Section 3.61 is amended to read as follows:


Sec.  3.61   Purpose and scope.

    Sections 3.61 through 3.63 of this subpart establish public 
disclosure requirements related to the capital requirements described 
in subpart B of this part for a national bank or Federal savings 
association with total consolidated assets of $50 billion or more as 
reported on the national bank's or Federal savings association's most 
recent year-end Call Report that is not an advanced approaches national 
bank or Federal savings association making public disclosures pursuant 
to Sec.  3.172. An advanced approaches national bank or Federal savings 
association that has not received approval from the OCC to exit 
parallel run pursuant to Sec.  3.121(d) is subject to the disclosure 
requirements described in Sec. Sec.  3.62 and 3.63. A national bank or 
Federal savings association with total consolidated assets of $50 
billion or more as reported on the national bank's or Federal savings 
association's most recent year-end Call Report that is not an advanced 
approaches national bank or Federal savings association making public 
disclosures subject to Sec.  3.172 must comply with Sec.  3.62 unless 
it is a consolidated subsidiary of a bank holding company, savings and 
loan holding company, or depository institution that is subject to the 
disclosure requirements of Sec.  3.62 or a subsidiary of a non-U.S. 
banking organization that is subject to comparable public disclosure 
requirements in its home jurisdiction. For purposes of this section, 
total consolidated assets are determined based on the average of the 
national bank's or Federal savings association 's total consolidated 
assets in the four most recent quarters as reported on the Call Report 
or the average of the national bank or Federal savings association's 
total consolidated assets in the most recent consecutive quarters as 
reported quarterly on the national bank's or Federal savings 
association 's Call Report if the national bank or Federal savings 
association has not filed such a report for each of the most recent 
four quarters.
0
18. Section 3.63 is amended by revising Table 3 and Table 8 to read as 
follows:


Sec.  3.63   Disclosures by national bank or Federal savings 
associations described in Sec.  3.61.

* * * * *

                                    Table 3 to Sec.   3.63--Capital Adequacy
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Qualitative disclosures................................  (a) A summary discussion of the national bank's or
                                                          Federal savings association's approach to assessing
                                                          the adequacy of its capital to support current and
                                                          future activities.
Quantitative disclosures...............................  (b) Risk-weighted assets for:
                                                            (1) Exposures to sovereign entities;
                                                            (2) Exposures to certain supranational entities and
                                                             MDBs;
                                                            (3) Exposures to depository institutions, foreign
                                                             banks, and credit unions;
                                                            (4) Exposures to PSEs;
                                                            (5) Corporate exposures;
                                                            (6) Residential mortgage exposures;
                                                            (7) Statutory multifamily mortgages and pre-sold
                                                             construction loans;
                                                            (8) HVADC exposures and HVCRE exposures;
                                                            (9) Past due loans;
                                                            (10) Other assets;
                                                            (11) Cleared transactions;
                                                            (12) Default fund contributions;
                                                            (13) Unsettled transactions;
                                                            (14) Securitization exposures; and
                                                            (15) Equity exposures.
                                                         (c) Standardized market risk-weighted assets as
                                                          calculated under subpart F of this part.
                                                         (d) Common equity tier 1, tier 1 and total risk-based
                                                          capital ratios:

[[Page 50011]]

 
                                                            (1) For the top consolidated group; and
                                                            (2) For each depository institution subsidiary.
                                                            Total standardized risk-weighted assets.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

* * * * *

                                     Table 8 to Sec.   3.63--Securitization
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Qualitative Disclosures................................  (a) The general qualitative disclosure requirement with
                                                          respect to a securitization (including synthetic
                                                          securitizations), including a discussion of:
                                                            (1) The national bank's or Federal savings
                                                             association 's objectives for securitizing assets,
                                                             including the extent to which these activities
                                                             transfer credit risk of the underlying exposures
                                                             away from the national bank or Federal savings
                                                             association to other entities and including the
                                                             type of risks assumed and retained with
                                                             resecuritization activity; \1\
                                                            (2) The nature of the risks (e.g. liquidity risk)
                                                             inherent in the securitized assets;
                                                            (3) The roles played by the national bank or Federal
                                                             savings association in the securitization process
                                                             \2\ and an indication of the extent of the national
                                                             bank's or Federal savings association 's
                                                             involvement in each of them;
                                                            (4) The processes in place to monitor changes in the
                                                             credit and market risk of securitization exposures
                                                             including how those processes differ for
                                                             resecuritization exposures;
                                                            (5) The national bank's or Federal savings
                                                             association's policy for mitigating the credit risk
                                                             retained through securitization and
                                                             resecuritization exposures; and
                                                            (6) The risk-based capital approaches that the
                                                             national bank or Federal savings association
                                                             follows for its securitization exposures including
                                                             the type of securitization exposure to which each
                                                             approach applies.
                                                         (b) A list of:
                                                            (1) The type of securitization SPEs that the
                                                             national bank or Federal savings association, as
                                                             sponsor, uses to securitize third-party exposures.
                                                             The national bank or Federal savings association
                                                             must indicate whether it has exposure to these
                                                             SPEs, either on- or off-balance sheet; and
                                                            (2) Affiliated entities:
                                                            (i) That the national bank or Federal savings
                                                             association manages or advises; and
                                                            (ii) That invest either in the securitization
                                                             exposures that the national bank or Federal savings
                                                             association has securitized or in securitization
                                                             SPEs that the national bank or Federal savings
                                                             association sponsors.\3\
                                                         (c) Summary of the national bank's or Federal savings
                                                          association's accounting policies for securitization
                                                          activities, including:
                                                            (1) Whether the transactions are treated as sales or
                                                             financings;
                                                            (2) Recognition of gain-on-sale;
                                                            (3) Methods and key assumptions applied in valuing
                                                             retained or purchased interests;
                                                            (4) Changes in methods and key assumptions from the
                                                             previous period for valuing retained interests and
                                                             impact of the changes;
                                                            (5) Treatment of synthetic securitizations;
                                                            (6) How exposures intended to be securitized are
                                                             valued and whether they are recorded under subpart
                                                             D of this part; and
                                                            (7) Policies for recognizing liabilities on the
                                                             balance sheet for arrangements that could require
                                                             the national bank or Federal savings association to
                                                             provide financial support for securitized assets.
                                                         (d) An explanation of significant changes to any
                                                          quantitative information since the last reporting
                                                          period.
Quantitative Disclosures...............................  (e) The total outstanding exposures securitized by the
                                                          national bank or Federal savings association in
                                                          securitizations that meet the operational criteria
                                                          provided in Sec.   3.41 (categorized into traditional
                                                          and synthetic securitizations), by exposure type,
                                                          separately for securitizations of third-party
                                                          exposures for which the bank acts only as sponsor.\4\
                                                         (f) For exposures securitized by the national bank or
                                                          Federal savings association in securitizations that
                                                          meet the operational criteria in Sec.   3.41:
                                                            (1) Amount of securitized assets that are impaired/
                                                             past due categorized by exposure type; \5\ and
                                                            (2) Losses recognized by the national bank or
                                                             Federal savings association during the current
                                                             period categorized by exposure type.\6\
                                                         (g) The total amount of outstanding exposures intended
                                                          to be securitized categorized by exposure type.
                                                         (h) Aggregate amount of:
                                                            (1) On-balance sheet securitization exposures
                                                             retained or purchased categorized by exposure type;
                                                             and
                                                            (2) Off-balance sheet securitization exposures
                                                             categorized by exposure type.
                                                         (i)(1) Aggregate amount of securitization exposures
                                                          retained or purchased and the associated capital
                                                          requirements for these exposures, categorized between
                                                          securitization and resecuritization exposures, further
                                                          categorized into a meaningful number of risk weight
                                                          bands and by risk-based capital approach (e.g., SSFA);
                                                          and
                                                            (2) Aggregate amount disclosed separately by type of
                                                             underlying exposure in the pool of any:
                                                            (i) After-tax gain-on-sale on a securitization that
                                                             has been deducted from common equity tier 1
                                                             capital; and
                                                            (ii) Credit-enhancing interest-only strip that is
                                                             assigned a 1,250 percent risk weight.
                                                         (j) Summary of current year's securitization activity,
                                                          including the amount of exposures securitized (by
                                                          exposure type), and recognized gain or loss on sale by
                                                          exposure type.
                                                         (k) Aggregate amount of resecuritization exposures
                                                          retained or purchased categorized according to:
                                                            (1) Exposures to which credit risk mitigation is
                                                             applied and those not applied; and

[[Page 50012]]

 
                                                            (2) Exposures to guarantors categorized according to
                                                             guarantor creditworthiness categories or guarantor
                                                             name.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The national bank or Federal savings association should describe the structure of resecuritizations in which
  it participates; this description should be provided for the main categories of resecuritization products in
  which the national bank or Federal savings association is active.
\2\ For example, these roles may include originator, investor, servicer, provider of credit enhancement,
  sponsor, liquidity provider, or swap provider.
\3\ Such affiliated entities may include, for example, money market funds, to be listed individually, and
  personal and private trusts, to be noted collectively.
\4\ ``Exposures securitized'' include underlying exposures originated by the national bank or Federal savings
  association, whether generated by them or purchased, and recognized in the balance sheet, from third parties,
  and third-party exposures included in sponsored transactions. Securitization transactions (including
  underlying exposures originally on the national bank's or Federal savings association's balance sheet and
  underlying exposures acquired by the national bank or Federal savings association from third-party entities)
  in which the originating bank does not retain any securitization exposure should be shown separately but need
  only be reported for the year of inception. National banks and Federal savings associations are required to
  disclose exposures regardless of whether there is a capital charge under this part.
\5\ Include credit-related other than temporary impairment (OTTI).
\6\ For example, charge-offs/allowances (if the assets remain on the national bank's or Federal savings
  association's balance sheet) or credit-related OTTI of interest-only strips and other retained residual
  interests, as well as recognition of liabilities for probable future financial support required of the
  national bank or Federal savings association with respect to securitized assets.

* * * * *
0
19. Section 3.101 is amended by adding to paragraph (b) in alphabetical 
order the definition of ``High volatility commercial real estate 
(HVCRE) exposure'' to read as follows:


Sec.  3.101   Definitions.

* * * * *
    (b) * * *
    High volatility commercial real estate (HVCRE) exposure, for 
purposes of Subpart E, means a credit facility that, prior to 
conversion to permanent financing, finances or has financed the 
acquisition, development, or construction (ADC) of real property, 
unless the facility finances:
    (1) One- to four-family residential properties;
    (2) Real property that:
    (i) Would qualify as an investment in community development under 
12 U.S.C. 338a or 12 U.S.C. 24 (Eleventh), as applicable, or as a 
``qualified investment'' under 12 CFR part 25 (national banks) and 195 
(Federal savings associations), and
    (ii) Is not an ADC loan to any entity described in 12 CFR 
25.12(g)(3) (national banks) and 12 CFR 195.12(g)(3) (Federal savings 
associations), unless it is otherwise described in paragraph (1), 
(2)(i), (3) or (4) of this definition;
    (3) The purchase or development of agricultural land, which 
includes all land known to be used or usable for agricultural purposes 
(such as crop and livestock production), provided that the valuation of 
the agricultural land is based on its value for agricultural purposes 
and the valuation does not take into consideration any potential use of 
the land for non-agricultural commercial development or residential 
development; or
    (4) Commercial real estate projects in which:
    (i) The loan-to-value ratio is less than or equal to the applicable 
maximum supervisory loan-to-value ratio in the OCC's real estate 
lending standards at 12 CFR part 34, subpart D (national banks) and 12 
CFR part 160 (Federal savings associations);
    (ii) The borrower has contributed capital to the project in the 
form of cash or unencumbered readily marketable assets (or has paid 
development expenses out-of-pocket) of at least 15 percent of the real 
estate's appraised ``as completed'' value; and
    (iii) The borrower contributed the amount of capital required by 
paragraph (4)(ii) of this definition before the national bank or 
Federal savings association advances funds under the credit facility, 
and the capital contributed by the borrower, or internally generated by 
the project, is contractually required to remain in the project 
throughout the life of the project. The life of a project concludes 
only when the credit facility is converted to permanent financing or is 
sold or paid in full. Permanent financing may be provided by the 
national bank or Federal savings association that provided the ADC 
facility as long as the permanent financing is subject to the national 
bank's or Federal savings association 's underwriting criteria for 
long-term mortgage loans.
* * * * *
0
20. Section 3.131 is amended by revising paragraph (d)(2) to read as 
follows:


Sec.  3.131  Mechanics for calculating total wholesale and retail risk-
weighted assets.

* * * * *
    (d) * * *
    (2) Floor on PD assignment. The PD for each wholesale obligor or 
retail segment may not be less than 0.03 percent, except for exposures 
to or directly and unconditionally guaranteed by a sovereign entity, 
the Bank for International Settlements, the International Monetary 
Fund, the European Commission, the European Central Bank, the European 
Stability Mechanism, the European Financial Stability Facility, or a 
multilateral development bank, to which the national bank or Federal 
savings association assigns a rating grade associated with a PD of less 
than 0.03 percent.
* * * * *
0
21. Section 3.133 is amended by revising paragraphs (b)(3)(ii) and 
(c)(3)(ii) to read as follows:


Sec.  3.133  Cleared transactions.

* * * * *
    (b) Clearing member client national banks or Federal savings 
associations
* * * * *
    (3) * * *
    (ii) For a cleared transaction with a CCP that is not a QCCP, a 
clearing member client national bank or Federal savings association 
must apply the risk weight applicable to the CCP under subpart D of 
this part.
* * * * *
    (c) * * *
    (3) * * *
    (ii) For a cleared transaction with a CCP that is not a QCCP, a 
clearing member national bank or Federal savings association must apply 
the risk weight applicable to the CCP according to subpart D of this 
part.
* * * * *
0
22. Section 3.152 is amended by revising paragraph (b)(5) and (6) to 
read as follows:


Sec.  3.152   Simple risk weight approach (SRWA).

* * * * *
    (b) * * *
    (5) 300 percent risk weight equity exposures. A publicly traded 
equity exposure (other than an equity exposure described in paragraph 
(b)(7) of this

[[Page 50013]]

section and including the ineffective portion of a hedge pair) is 
assigned a 300 percent risk weight.
    (6) 400 percent risk weight equity exposures. An equity exposure 
(other than an equity exposure described in paragraph (b)(7) of this 
section) that is not publicly traded is assigned a 400 percent risk 
weight.
* * * * *
0
23. Section 3.202 is amended by revising the definition of ``Corporate 
debt position'' in paragraph (b) to read as follows:


Sec.  3.202   Definitions.

* * * * *
    (b) * * *
    Corporate debt position means a debt position that is an exposure 
to a company that is not a sovereign entity, the Bank for International 
Settlements, the European Central Bank, the European Commission, the 
International Monetary Fund, the European Stability Mechanism, the 
European Financial Stability Facility, a multilateral development bank, 
a depository institution, a foreign bank, a credit union, a public 
sector entity, a GSE, or a securitization.
* * * * *
0
24. Section 3.210 is amended by revising paragraph (b)(2)(ii) to read 
as follows:


Sec.  3.210   Standardized measurement method for specific risk.

* * * * *
    (b) * * *
    (2) * * *
    (ii) Certain supranational entity and multilateral development bank 
debt positions. A national bank or Federal savings association may 
assign a 0.0 percent specific risk-weighting factor to a debt position 
that is an exposure to the Bank for International Settlements, the 
European Central Bank, the European Commission, the International 
Monetary Fund, the European Stability Mechanism, the European Financial 
Stability Facility, or an MDB.
* * * * *
0
25. Section 3.300 is amended by revising paragraphs (b) and (d) to read 
as follows:


Sec.  3.300   Transitions.

* * * * *
    (b) Regulatory capital adjustments and deductions. Beginning 
January 1, 2014 for an advanced approaches national bank or Federal 
savings association, and beginning January 1, 2015 for a national bank 
or Federal savings association that is not an advanced approaches 
national bank or Federal savings association, and in each case through 
December 31, 2017, a national bank or Federal savings association must 
make the capital adjustments and deductions in Sec.  3.22 in accordance 
with the transition requirements in this paragraph (b). Beginning 
January 1, 2018, a national bank or Federal savings association must 
make all regulatory capital adjustments and deductions in accordance 
with Sec.  3.22.
    (1) Transition deductions from common equity tier 1 capital. 
Beginning January 1, 2014 for an advanced approaches national bank or 
Federal savings association, and beginning January 1, 2015 for a 
national bank or Federal savings association that is not an advanced 
approaches national bank or Federal savings association, and in each 
case through December 31, 2017, a national bank or Federal savings 
association must make the deductions required under Sec.  3.22(a)(1)-
(7) from common equity tier 1 or tier 1 capital elements in accordance 
with the percentages set forth in Table 2 and Table 3 to Sec.  3.300.
    (i) A national bank or Federal savings association must deduct the 
following items from common equity tier 1 and additional tier 1 capital 
in accordance with the percentages set forth in Table 2 to Sec.  3.300: 
Goodwill (Sec.  3.22(a)(1)), DTAs that arise from net operating loss 
and tax credit carryforwards (Sec.  3.22(a)(3)), a gain-on-sale in 
connection with a securitization exposure (Sec.  3.22(a)(4)), defined 
benefit pension fund assets (Sec.  3.22(a)(5)), expected credit loss 
that exceeds eligible credit reserves (for advanced approaches national 
banks and Federal savings associations that have completed the parallel 
run process and that have received notifications from the OCC pursuant 
to Sec.  3.121(d) of subpart E) and financial subsidiaries (Sec.  
3.22(a)(7)), and nonincludable subsidiaries of a Federal savings 
association (Sec.  3.22(a)(8)).

                                             Table 2 to Sec.   3.300
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                      Transition deductions    Transition deductions under Sec.   3.22(a)(3)-(6)
                                     under Sec.   3.22(a)(1) ---------------------------------------------------
                                             and (7)
         Transition period         --------------------------     Percentage of the         Percentage of the
                                        Percentage of the      deductions from common    deductions from tier 1
                                     deductions from  common    equity tier 1 capital            capital
                                     equity  tier 1 capital
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Calendar year 2014................                      100                        20                        80
Calendar year 2015................                      100                        40                        60
Calendar year 2016................                      100                        60                        40
Calendar year 2017................                      100                        80                        20
Calendar year 2018, and thereafter                      100                       100                         0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (ii) A national bank or Federal savings association must deduct 
from common equity tier 1 capital any intangible assets other than 
goodwill and MSAs in accordance with the percentages set forth in Table 
3 to Sec.  3.300.
    (iii) A national bank or Federal savings association must apply a 
100 percent risk-weight to the aggregate amount of intangible assets 
other than goodwill and MSAs that are not required to be deducted from 
common equity tier 1 capital under this section.

[[Page 50014]]



                         Table 3 to Sec.   3.300
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                  Transition deductions
                                                under Sec.   3.22(a)(2)--
               Transition period                     percentage of the
                                                 deductions from common
                                                 equity  tier 1 capital
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Calendar year 2014............................                       20
Calendar year 2015............................                       40
Calendar year 2016............................                       60
Calendar year 2017............................                       80
Calendar year 2018, and thereafter............                      100
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (2) Transition adjustments to common equity tier 1 capital. 
Beginning January 1, 2014 for an advanced approaches national bank or 
Federal savings association, and beginning January 1, 2015 for a 
national bank or Federal savings association that is not an advanced 
approaches national bank or Federal savings association, and in each 
case through December 31, 2017, a national bank or Federal savings 
association must allocate the regulatory adjustments related to changes 
in the fair value of liabilities due to changes in the national bank's 
or Federal savings association's own credit risk (Sec.  
3.22(b)(1)(iii)) between common equity tier 1 capital and tier 1 
capital in accordance with the percentages set forth in Table 4 to 
Sec.  3.300.
    (i) If the aggregate amount of the adjustment is positive, the 
national bank or Federal savings association must allocate the 
deduction between common equity tier 1 and tier 1 capital in accordance 
with Table 4 to Sec.  3.300.
    (ii) If the aggregate amount of the adjustment is negative, the 
national bank or Federal savings association must add back the 
adjustment to common equity tier 1 capital or to tier 1 capital, in 
accordance with Table 4 to Sec.  3.300.

                                             Table 4 to Sec.   3.300
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                       Transition adjustments under Sec.
                                                             -------------------3.22(b)(1)(iii)-----------------
                                                                  Percentage of the
                      Transition period                         adjustment applied to       Percentage of the
                                                                common equity  tier 1     adjustment applied to
                                                                       capital               tier 1 capital
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Calendar year 2014..........................................                       20                        80
Calendar year 2015..........................................                       40                        60
Calendar year 2016..........................................                       60                        40
Calendar year 2017..........................................                       80                        20
Calendar year 2018, and thereafter..........................                      100                         0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (3) Transition adjustments to AOCI for an advanced approaches 
national bank or Federal savings association and a national bank or 
Federal savings association that has not made an AOCI opt-out election 
under Sec.  3.22(b)(2). Beginning January 1, 2014 for an advanced 
approaches national bank or Federal savings association, and beginning 
January 1, 2015 for a national bank or Federal savings association that 
is not an advanced approaches national bank or Federal savings 
association that has not made an AOCI opt-out election under Sec.  
3.22(b)(2), and in each case through December 31, 2017, a national bank 
or Federal savings association must adjust common equity tier 1 capital 
with respect to the transition AOCI adjustment amount (transition AOCI 
adjustment amount):
    (i) The transition AOCI adjustment amount is the aggregate amount 
of a national bank's or Federal savings association's:
    (A) Unrealized gains on available-for-sale securities that are 
preferred stock classified as an equity security under GAAP or 
available-for-sale equity exposures, plus
    (B) Net unrealized gains or losses on available-for-sale securities 
that are not preferred stock classified as an equity security under 
GAAP or available-for-sale equity exposures, plus
    (C) Any amounts recorded in AOCI attributed to defined benefit 
postretirement plans resulting from the initial and subsequent 
application of the relevant GAAP standards that pertain to such plans 
(excluding, at the national bank's or Federal savings association's 
option, the portion relating to pension assets deducted under section 
22(a)(5)), plus
    (D) Accumulated net gains or losses on cash flow hedges related to 
items that are reported on the balance sheet at fair value included in 
AOCI, plus
    (E) Net unrealized gains or losses on held-to-maturity securities 
that are included in AOCI.
    (ii) A national bank or Federal savings association must make the 
following adjustment to its common equity tier 1 capital:
    (A) If the transition AOCI adjustment amount is positive, the 
appropriate amount must be deducted from common equity tier 1 capital 
in accordance with Table 5 to Sec.  3.300.
    (B) If the transition AOCI adjustment amount is negative, the 
appropriate amount must be added back to common equity tier 1 capital 
in accordance with Table 5 to Sec.  3.300.

[[Page 50015]]



                         Table 5 to Sec.   3.300
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                    Percentage of the
                                                     transition AOCI
               Transition period                 adjustment amount to be
                                                applied to common equity
                                                     tier 1 capital
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Calendar year 2014............................                       80
Calendar year 2015............................                       60
Calendar year 2016............................                       40
Calendar year 2017............................                       20
Calendar year 2018 and thereafter.............                        0
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (iii) A national bank or Federal savings association may include in 
tier 2 capital the percentage of unrealized gains on available-for-sale 
preferred stock classified as an equity security under GAAP and 
available-for-sale equity exposures as set forth in Table 6 to Sec.  
3.300.

                         Table 6 to Sec.   3.300
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                Percentage of unrealized
                                                gains on  available-for-
                                                  sale preferred stock
                                                 classified as an equity
               Transition period                 security under GAAP and
                                                   available- for-sale
                                                  equity exposures that
                                                may be included in  tier
                                                        2 capital
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Calendar year 2014............................                       36
Calendar year 2015............................                       27
Calendar year 2016............................                       18
Calendar year 2017............................                        9
Calendar year 2018 and thereafter.............                        0
------------------------------------------------------------------------

* * * * *
    (d) Minority interest--(1) [Reserved]
    (2) Non-qualifying minority interest. Beginning January 1, 2014 for 
an advanced approaches national bank or Federal savings association, 
and beginning January 1, 2015 for a national bank or Federal savings 
association that is not an advanced approaches national bank or Federal 
savings association, and in each case through December 31, 2017, a 
national bank or federal savings association may include in tier 1 
capital or total capital the percentage of the tier 1 minority interest 
and total capital minority interest outstanding as of January 1, 2014 
that does not meet the criteria for additional tier 1 or tier 2 capital 
instruments in Sec.  3.20 (non-qualifying minority interest), as set 
forth in Table 10 to Sec.  3.300.

                        Table 10 to Sec.   3.300
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                Percentage of the amount
                                                   of surplus or non-
                                                   qualifying minority
               Transition period                  interest that can be
                                                 included in regulatory
                                                   capital during the
                                                    transition period
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Calendar year 2014............................                       80
Calendar year 2015............................                       60
Calendar year 2016............................                       40
Calendar year 2017............................                       20
Calendar year 2018 and thereafter.............                        0
------------------------------------------------------------------------


[[Page 50016]]

* * * * *

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

    For the reasons set out in the joint preamble, part 217 of chapter 
II of title 12 of the Code of Federal Regulations is proposed to be 
amended as follows:

PART 217--CAPITAL ADEQUACY OF BANK HOLDING COMPANIES, SAVINGS AND 
LOAN HOLDING COMPANIES, AND STATE MEMBER BANKS (REGULATION Q)

Subpart A--General Provisions

0
26. The authority citation for part 217 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 12 U.S.C. 248(a), 321-338a, 481-486, 1462a, 1467a, 
1818, 1828, 1831n, 1831o, 1831p-l, 1831w, 1835, 1844(b), 1851, 3904, 
3906-3909, 4808, 5365, 5368, 5371.

0
27. Section 217.2 is amended by (1) Removing the definitions of 
``corporate exposure,'' ``eligible guarantor,'' ``high volatility 
commercial real estate (HVCRE),'' ``investment in the capital of an 
unconsolidated financial institution,'' ``non-significant investment in 
the capital of an unconsolidated financial institution,'' and 
``significant investment in the capital of an unconsolidated financial 
institution,'' and (2) Adding the definitions of ``corporate 
exposure,'' ``eligible guarantor,'' ``high volatility acquisition, 
development, or construction (HVADC),'' ``high volatility commercial 
real estate (HVCRE),'' ``International Lending Supervision Act,'' 
``investment in the capital of an unconsolidated financial 
institution,'' ``non-significant investment in the capital of an 
unconsolidated financial institution,'' and ``significant investment in 
the capital of an unconsolidated financial institution'' as follows:


Sec.  217.2  Definitions.

* * * * *
    Corporate exposure means an exposure to a company that is not:
    (1) An exposure to a sovereign, the Bank for International 
Settlements, the European Central Bank, the European Commission, the 
International Monetary Fund, the European Stability Mechanism, the 
European Financial Stability Facility, a multi-lateral development bank 
(MDB), a depository institution, a foreign bank, a credit union, or a 
public sector entity (PSE);
    (2) An exposure to a GSE;
    (3) A residential mortgage exposure;
    (4) A pre-sold construction loan;
    (5) A statutory multifamily mortgage;
    (6) A high volatility acquisition, development, or construction 
(HVADC) exposure or a high volatility commercial real estate (HVCRE) 
exposure;
    (7) A cleared transaction;
    (8) A default fund contribution;
    (9) A securitization exposure;
    (10) An equity exposure; or
    (11) An unsettled transaction.
    (12) A policy loan; or
    (13) A separate account.
* * * * *
    Eligible guarantor means:
    (1) A sovereign, the Bank for International Settlements, the 
International Monetary Fund, the European Central Bank, the European 
Commission, a Federal Home Loan Bank, Federal Agricultural Mortgage 
Corporation (Farmer Mac), the European Stability Mechanism, the 
European Financial Stability Facility, a multilateral development bank 
(MDB), a depository institution, a bank holding company, a savings and 
loan holding company, a credit union, a foreign bank, or a qualifying 
central counterparty; or
    (2) An entity (other than a special purpose entity):
    (i) That at the time the guarantee is issued or anytime thereafter, 
has issued and outstanding an unsecured debt security without credit 
enhancement that is investment grade;
    (ii) Whose creditworthiness is not positively correlated with the 
credit risk of the exposures for which it has provided guarantees; and
    (iii) That is not an insurance company engaged predominately in the 
business of providing credit protection (such as a monoline bond 
insurer or re-insurer).
* * * * *
    High volatility acquisition, development, or construction (HVADC) 
exposure means a credit facility that is originated on or after 
[effective date] and that:
    (1) Primarily finances or refinances the:
    (i) Acquisition of vacant or developed land;
    (ii) Development of land to prepare to erect new structures 
including, but not limited to, the laying of sewers or water pipes and 
demolishing existing structures; or
    (iii) Construction of buildings, dwellings, or other improvements 
including additions or alterations to existing structures; and
    (2) Is not a credit facility that finances or refinances:
    (i) One- to four-family residential properties;
    (ii) Real property projects that would have the primary purpose of 
``community development'' as defined under [12 CFR part 25 (national 
bank), 12 CFR part 195 (Federal savings association) (OCC); 12 CFR part 
228 (Board); 12 CFR part 345 (FDIC)]; or
    (iii) The purchase or development of agricultural land, including, 
but not limited to, all land used or usable for agricultural purposes 
(such as crop and livestock production), provided that the valuation of 
the agricultural land is based on its value for agricultural purposes 
and the valuation does not take into consideration any potential use of 
the land for commercial or residential development; and
    (3) Is not a permanent loan. A permanent loan for purposes of this 
definition means a prudently underwritten loan that has a clearly 
identified ongoing source of repayment sufficient to service amortizing 
principal and interest payments aside from the sale of the property. 
For purposes of this section, a permanent loan does not include a loan 
that finances or refinances a stabilization period or unsold lots or 
units of for-sale projects.
    High volatility commercial real estate (HVCRE) exposure, for 
purposes of Subpart D, means a credit facility that is either 
outstanding or committed prior to [effective date] and, prior to 
conversion to permanent financing, finances or has financed the 
acquisition, development, or construction (ADC) of real property, 
unless the facility finances:
    (1) One- to four-family residential properties;
    (2) Real property that:
    (i) Would qualify as an investment in community development under 
12 U.S.C. 338a or 12 U.S.C. 24 (Eleventh), as applicable, or as a 
``qualified investment'' under 12 CFR part 228, and
    (ii) Is not an ADC loan to any entity described in 12 CFR 
208.22(a)(3) or 228.12(g)(3), unless it is otherwise described in 
paragraph (1), (2)(i), (3) or (4) of this definition;
    (3) The purchase or development of agricultural land, which 
includes all land known to be used or usable for agricultural purposes 
(such as crop and livestock production), provided that the valuation of 
the agricultural land is based on its value for agricultural purposes 
and the valuation does not take into consideration any potential use of 
the land for non-agricultural commercial development or residential 
development; or
    (4) Commercial real estate projects in which:
    (i) The loan-to-value ratio is less than or equal to the applicable 
maximum supervisory loan-to-value ratio in the Board's real estate 
lending standards at 12 CFR part 208, appendix C;

[[Page 50017]]

    (ii) The borrower has contributed capital to the project in the 
form of cash or unencumbered readily marketable assets (or has paid 
development expenses out-of-pocket) of at least 15 percent of the real 
estate's appraised ``as completed'' value; and
    (iii) The borrower contributed the amount of capital required by 
paragraph (4)(ii) of this definition before the Board-regulated 
institution advances funds under the credit facility, and the capital 
contributed by the borrower, or internally generated by the project, is 
contractually required to remain in the project throughout the life of 
the project. The life of a project concludes only when the credit 
facility is converted to permanent financing or is sold or paid in 
full. Permanent financing may be provided by the Board-regulated 
institution that provided the ADC facility as long as the permanent 
financing is subject to the Board-regulated institution's underwriting 
criteria for long-term mortgage loans.
* * * * *
    International Lending Supervision Act means the International 
Lending Supervision Act of 1983 (12 U.S.C. 3901 et seq.).
* * * * *
    Investment in the capital of an unconsolidated financial 
institution means a net long position calculated in accordance with 
Sec.  217.22(h) in an instrument that is recognized as capital for 
regulatory purposes by the primary supervisor of an unconsolidated 
regulated financial institution or is an instrument that is part of the 
GAAP equity of an unconsolidated unregulated financial institution, 
including direct, indirect, and synthetic exposures to capital 
instruments, excluding underwriting positions held by the Board-
regulated institution for five or fewer business days.
* * * * *
    Non-significant investment in the capital of an unconsolidated 
financial institution means an investment by an advanced approaches 
Board-regulated institution in the capital of an unconsolidated 
financial institution where the advanced approaches Board-regulated 
institution owns 10 percent or less of the issued and outstanding 
common stock of the unconsolidated financial institution.
* * * * *
    Significant investment in the capital of an unconsolidated 
financial institution means an investment by an advanced approaches 
Board-regulated institution in the capital of an unconsolidated 
financial institution where the advanced approaches Board-regulated 
institution owns more than 10 percent of the issued and outstanding 
common stock of the unconsolidated financial institution.
* * * * *
0
28. Section 217.10 is amended by revising paragraph (c)(4)(ii)(H) to 
read as follows:


Sec.  217.10   Minimum capital requirements.

* * * * *
    (c) * * *
    (4) * * *
    (ii) * * *
    (H) The credit equivalent amount of all off-balance sheet exposures 
of the Board-regulated institution, excluding repo-style transactions, 
repurchase or reverse repurchase or securities borrowing or lending 
transactions that qualify for sales treatment under U.S. GAAP, and 
derivative transactions, determined using the applicable credit 
conversion factor under Sec.  217.33(b), provided, however, that the 
minimum credit conversion factor that may be assigned to an off-balance 
sheet exposure under this paragraph is 10 percent; and
* * * * *
0
29. Section 217.11 is amended by revising paragraphs (a)(2)(i), 
(a)(2)(iv), (a)(3)(i), and revise Table 1 to read as follows:


Sec.  217.11  Capital conservation buffer, countercyclical capital 
buffer amount, and GSIB surcharge.

* * * * *
    (a) * * *
    (2) * * *
    (i) Eligible retained income. The eligible retained income of a 
Board-regulated institution is the Board-regulated institution's net 
income, calculated in accordance with the instructions to the Call 
Report or the FR Y-9C, as applicable, for the four calendar quarters 
preceding the current calendar quarter, net of any distributions and 
associated tax effects not already reflected in net income.
* * * * *
    (iv) Private sector credit exposure. Private sector credit exposure 
means an exposure to a company or an individual that is not an exposure 
to a sovereign, the Bank for International Settlements, the European 
Central Bank, the European Commission, the European Stability 
Mechanism, the European Financial Stability Facility, the International 
Monetary Fund, a MDB, a PSE, or a GSE.
    (3) * * * (i) A Board-regulated institution's capital conservation 
buffer is equal to the lowest of the following ratios, calculated as of 
the last day of the previous calendar quarter:
    (A) The Board-regulated institution's common equity tier 1 capital 
ratio minus the Board-regulated institution's minimum common equity 
tier 1 capital ratio requirement under Sec.  217.10;
    (B) The Board-regulated institution's tier 1 capital ratio minus 
the Board-regulated institution's minimum tier 1 capital ratio 
requirement under Sec.  217.10; and
    (C) The Board-regulated institution's total capital ratio minus the 
Board-regulated institution's minimum total capital ratio requirement 
under Sec.  217.10; or

     Table 1 to Sec.   217.11--Calculation of Maximum Payout Amount
------------------------------------------------------------------------
           Capital conservation buffer             Maximum payout ratio
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Greater than 2.5 percent plus 100 percent of the  No payout ratio
 Board-regulated institution's applicable          limitation applies.
 countercyclical capital buffer amount and 100
 percent of the Board-regulated institution's
 applicable GSIB surcharge.
Less than or equal to 2.5 percent plus 100        60 percent.
 percent of the Board-regulated institution's
 applicable countercyclical capital buffer
 amount and 100 percent of the Board-regulated
 institution's applicable GSIB surcharge, and
 greater than 1.875 percent plus 75 percent of
 the Board-regulated institution's applicable
 countercyclical capital buffer amount and 75
 percent of the Board-regulated institution's
 applicable GSIB surcharge.
Less than or equal to 1.875 percent plus 75       40 percent.
 percent of the Board-regulated institution's
 applicable countercyclical capital buffer
 amount and 75 percent of the Board-regulated
 institution's applicable GSIB surcharge, and
 greater than 1.25 percent plus 50 percent of
 the Board-regulated institution's applicable
 countercyclical capital buffer amount and 50
 percent of the Board-regulated institution's
 applicable GSIB surcharge.
Less than or equal to 1.25 percent plus 50        20 percent.
 percent of the Board-regulated institution's
 applicable countercyclical capital buffer
 amount and 50 percent of the Board-regulated
 institution's applicable GSIB surcharge, and
 greater than 0.625 percent plus 25 percent of
 the Board-regulated institution's applicable
 countercyclical capital buffer amount and 25
 percent of the Board-regulated institution's
 applicable GSIB surcharge.

[[Page 50018]]

 
Less than or equal to 0.625 percent plus 25       0 percent.
 percent of the Board-regulated institution's
 applicable countercyclical capital buffer
 amount and 25 percent of the Board-regulated
 institution's applicable GSIB surcharge.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

* * * * *
0
30. Section 217.20 is amended by revising paragraphs (b)(4), (c)(2), 
(d)(2), (5) and adding a new paragraph (f) to read as follows:


Sec.  217.20   Capital components and eligibility criteria for 
regulatory capital instruments.

* * * * *
    (b) * * *
    (4) Any common equity tier 1 minority interest, subject to the 
limitations in Sec.  217.21.
* * * * *
    (c) * * *
    (2) Tier 1 minority interest, subject to the limitations in Sec.  
217.21, that is not included in the Board-regulated institution's 
common equity tier 1 capital.
* * * * *
    (d) * * *
    (2) Total capital minority interest, subject to the limitations set 
forth in Sec.  217.21, that is not included in the Board-regulated 
institution's tier 1 capital.
* * * * *
    (5) For a Board-regulated institution that makes an AOCI opt-out 
election (as defined in paragraph (b)(2) of Sec.  217.22), 45 percent 
of pretax net unrealized gains on available-for-sale preferred stock 
classified as an equity security under GAAP and available-for-sale 
equity exposures.
* * * * *
    (f) A Board-regulated institution may not repurchase or redeem any 
common equity tier 1 capital, additional tier 1, or tier 2 capital 
instrument without the prior approval of the Board.
0
31. Section 217.21 is revised to reads as follows:


Sec.  217.21  Minority interest.

    (a)(1) Applicability. For purposes of Sec.  217.20, a Board-
regulated institution that is not an advanced approaches Board-
regulated institution is subject to the minority interest limitations 
in this paragraph (a) if a consolidated subsidiary of the Board-
regulated institution has issued regulatory capital that is not owned 
by the Board-regulated institution.
    (2) Common equity tier 1 minority interest includable in the common 
equity tier 1 capital of the Board-regulated institution. The amount of 
common equity tier 1 minority interest that a Board-regulated 
institution may include in common equity tier 1 capital must be no 
greater than 10 percent of the sum of all common equity tier 1 capital 
elements of the Board-regulated institution (not including the common 
equity tier 1 minority interest itself), less any common equity tier 1 
capital regulatory adjustments and deductions in accordance with Sec.  
217.22 (a) and (b).
    (3) Tier 1 minority interest includable in the tier 1 capital of 
the Board-regulated institution. The amount of tier 1 minority interest 
that a Board-regulated institution may include in tier 1 capital must 
be no greater than 10 percent of the sum of all tier 1 capital elements 
of the Board-regulated institution (not including the tier 1 minority 
interest itself), less any tier 1 capital regulatory adjustments and 
deductions in accordance with Sec.  217.22 (a) and (b).
    (4) Total capital minority interest includable in the total capital 
of the Board-regulated institution. The amount of total capital 
minority interest that a Board-regulated institution may include in 
total capital must be no greater than 10 percent of the sum of all 
total capital elements of the Board-regulated institution (not 
including the total capital minority interest itself), less any total 
capital regulatory adjustments and deductions in accordance with Sec.  
217.22 (a) and (b).
    (b)(1) Applicability. For purposes of Sec.  217.20, an advanced 
approaches Board-regulated institution is subject to the minority 
interest limitations in this paragraph (b) if:
    (i) A consolidated subsidiary of the advanced approaches Board-
regulated institution has issued regulatory capital that is not owned 
by the Board-regulated institution; and
    (ii) For each relevant regulatory capital ratio of the consolidated 
subsidiary, the ratio exceeds the sum of the subsidiary's minimum 
regulatory capital requirements plus its capital conservation buffer.
    (2) Difference in capital adequacy standards at the subsidiary 
level. For purposes of the minority interest calculations in this 
section, if the consolidated subsidiary issuing the capital is not 
subject to capital adequacy standards similar to those of the advanced 
approaches Board-regulated institution, the advanced approaches Board-
regulated institution must assume that the capital adequacy standards 
of the advanced approaches Board-regulated institution apply to the 
subsidiary.
    (3) Common equity tier 1 minority interest includable in the common 
equity tier 1 capital of the Board-regulated institution. For each 
consolidated subsidiary of an advanced approaches Board-regulated 
institution, the amount of common equity tier 1 minority interest the 
advanced approaches Board-regulated institution may include in common 
equity tier 1 capital is equal to:
    (i) The common equity tier 1 minority interest of the subsidiary; 
minus
    (ii) The percentage of the subsidiary's common equity tier 1 
capital that is not owned by the advanced approaches Board-regulated 
institution, multiplied by the difference between the common equity 
tier 1 capital of the subsidiary and the lower of:
    (A) The amount of common equity tier 1 capital the subsidiary must 
hold, or would be required to hold pursuant to paragraph (b) of this 
section, to avoid restrictions on distributions and discretionary bonus 
payments under Sec.  217.11 or equivalent standards established by the 
subsidiary's home country supervisor; or
    (B)(1) The standardized total risk-weighted assets of the advanced 
approaches Board-regulated institution that relate to the subsidiary 
multiplied by
    (2) The common equity tier 1 capital ratio the subsidiary must 
maintain to avoid restrictions on distributions and discretionary bonus 
payments under Sec.  217.11 or equivalent standards established by the 
subsidiary's home country supervisor.
    (4) Tier 1 minority interest includable in the tier 1 capital of 
the advanced approaches Board-regulated institution. For each 
consolidated subsidiary of the advanced approaches Board-regulated 
institution, the amount of tier 1 minority interest the advanced 
approaches Board-regulated institution may include in tier 1 capital is 
equal to:
    (i) The tier 1 minority interest of the subsidiary; minus
    (ii) The percentage of the subsidiary's tier 1 capital that is not 
owned by the advanced approaches Board-regulated

[[Page 50019]]

institution multiplied by the difference between the tier 1 capital of 
the subsidiary and the lower of:
    (A) The amount of tier 1 capital the subsidiary must hold, or would 
be required to hold pursuant to paragraph (b) of this section, to avoid 
restrictions on distributions and discretionary bonus payments under 
Sec.  217.11 or equivalent standards established by the subsidiary's 
home country supervisor, or
    (B)(1) The standardized total risk-weighted assets of the advanced 
approaches Board-regulated institution that relate to the subsidiary 
multiplied by
    (2) The tier 1 capital ratio the subsidiary must maintain to avoid 
restrictions on distributions and discretionary bonus payments under 
Sec.  217.11 or equivalent standards established by the subsidiary's 
home country supervisor.
    (5) Total capital minority interest includable in the total capital 
of the Board-regulated institution. For each consolidated subsidiary of 
the advanced approaches Board-regulated institution, the amount of 
total capital minority interest the advanced approaches Board-regulated 
institution may include in total capital is equal to:
    (i) The total capital minority interest of the subsidiary; minus
    (ii) The percentage of the subsidiary's total capital that is not 
owned by the advanced approaches Board-regulated institution multiplied 
by the difference between the total capital of the subsidiary and the 
lower of:
    (A) The amount of total capital the subsidiary must hold, or would 
be required to hold pursuant to paragraph (b) of this section, to avoid 
restrictions on distributions and discretionary bonus payments under 
Sec.  217.11 or equivalent standards established by the subsidiary's 
home country supervisor, or
    (B)(1) The standardized total risk-weighted assets of the advanced 
approaches Board-regulated institution that relate to the subsidiary 
multiplied by
    (2) The total capital ratio the subsidiary must maintain to avoid 
restrictions on distributions and discretionary bonus payments under 
Sec.  217.11 or equivalent standards established by the subsidiary's 
home country supervisor.
0
32. Section 217.22 is amended by revising paragraphs (a)(1)(i), 
paragraphs (c), (d), (g), and (h) to read as follows:


Sec.  217.22  Regulatory capital adjustments and deductions.

    (a) * * *
    (1) * * *
    (i) Goodwill, net of associated deferred tax liabilities (DTLs) in 
accordance with paragraph (e) of this section; and
    (ii) For an advanced approaches Board-regulated institution, 
goodwill that is embedded in the valuation of a significant investment 
in the capital of an unconsolidated financial institution in the form 
of common stock (and that is reflected in the consolidated financial 
statements of the advanced approaches Board-regulated institution), in 
accordance with paragraph (d) of this section;
* * * * *
    (c) Deductions from regulatory capital related to investments in 
capital instruments \23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \23\ The Board-regulated institution must calculate amounts 
deducted under paragraphs (c) through (f) of this section after it 
calculates the amount of ALLL includable in tier 2 capital under 
Sec.  217.20(d)(3).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (1) Investment in the Board-regulated institution's own capital 
instruments. A Board-regulated institution must deduct an investment in 
the Board-regulated institution's own capital instruments as follows:
    (i) A Board-regulated institution must deduct an investment in the 
Board-regulated institution's own common stock instruments from its 
common equity tier 1 capital elements to the extent such instruments 
are not excluded from regulatory capital under Sec.  217.20(b)(1);
    (ii) A Board-regulated institution must deduct an investment in the 
Board-regulated institution's own additional tier 1 capital instruments 
from its additional tier 1 capital elements; and
    (iii) A Board-regulated institution must deduct an investment in 
the Board-regulated institution's own tier 2 capital instruments from 
its tier 2 capital elements.
    (2) Corresponding deduction approach. For purposes of subpart C of 
this part, the corresponding deduction approach is the methodology used 
for the deductions from regulatory capital related to reciprocal cross 
holdings (as described in paragraph (c)(3) of this section), 
investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial institutions for 
a Board-regulated institution that is not an advanced approaches Board-
regulated institution (as described in paragraph (c)(4) of this 
section), non-significant investments in the capital of unconsolidated 
financial institutions for an advanced approaches Board-regulated 
institution (as described in paragraph (c)(5) of this section), and 
non-common stock significant investments in the capital of 
unconsolidated financial institutions for an advanced approaches Board-
regulated institution (as described in paragraph (c)(6) of this 
section). Under the corresponding deduction approach, a Board-regulated 
institution must make deductions from the component of capital for 
which the underlying instrument would qualify if it were issued by the 
Board-regulated institution itself, as described in paragraphs 
(c)(2)(i)-(iii) of this section. If the Board-regulated institution 
does not have a sufficient amount of a specific component of capital to 
effect the required deduction, the shortfall must be deducted according 
to paragraph (f) of this section.
    (i) If an investment is in the form of an instrument issued by a 
financial institution that is not a regulated financial institution, 
the Board-regulated institution must treat the instrument as:
    (A) A common equity tier 1 capital instrument if it is common stock 
or represents the most subordinated claim in liquidation of the 
financial institution; and
    (B) An additional tier 1 capital instrument if it is subordinated 
to all creditors of the financial institution and is senior in 
liquidation only to common shareholders.
    (ii) If an investment is in the form of an instrument issued by a 
regulated financial institution and the instrument does not meet the 
criteria for common equity tier 1, additional tier 1 or tier 2 capital 
instruments under Sec.  217.20, the Board-regulated institution must 
treat the instrument as:
    (A) A common equity tier 1 capital instrument if it is common stock 
included in GAAP equity or represents the most subordinated claim in 
liquidation of the financial institution;
    (B) An additional tier 1 capital instrument if it is included in 
GAAP equity, subordinated to all creditors of the financial 
institution, and senior in a receivership, insolvency, liquidation, or 
similar proceeding only to common shareholders; and
    (C) A tier 2 capital instrument if it is not included in GAAP 
equity but considered regulatory capital by the primary supervisor of 
the financial institution.
    (iii) If an investment is in the form of a non-qualifying capital 
instrument (as defined in Sec.  217.300(c)), the Board-regulated 
institution must treat the instrument as:
    (A) An additional tier 1 capital instrument if such instrument was 
included in the issuer's tier 1 capital prior to May 19, 2010; or

[[Page 50020]]

    (B) A tier 2 capital instrument if such instrument was included in 
the issuer's tier 2 capital (but not includable in tier 1 capital) 
prior to May 19, 2010.
    (3) Reciprocal cross holdings in the capital of financial 
institutions. A Board-regulated institution must deduct investments in 
the capital of other financial institutions it holds reciprocally, 
where such reciprocal cross holdings result from a formal or informal 
arrangement to swap, exchange, or otherwise intend to hold each other's 
capital instruments, by applying the corresponding deduction approach.
    (4) Investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial 
institutions. A Board-regulated institution that is not an advanced 
approaches Board-regulated institution must deduct its investments in 
the capital of unconsolidated financial institutions (as defined in 
Sec.  217.2) that exceed 25 percent of the sum of the Board-regulated 
institution's common equity tier 1 capital elements minus all 
deductions from and adjustments to common equity tier 1 capital 
elements required under paragraphs (a) through (c)(3) of this section 
by applying the corresponding deduction approach.\24\ The deductions 
described in this section are net of associated DTLs in accordance with 
paragraph (e) of this section. In addition, a Board-regulated 
institution that underwrites a failed underwriting, with the prior 
written approval of the Board, for the period of time stipulated by the 
Board, is not required to deduct an investment in the capital of an 
unconsolidated financial institution pursuant to this paragraph (c) to 
the extent the investment is related to the failed underwriting.\25\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \24\ With the prior written approval of the Board, for the 
period of time stipulated by the Board, a Board-regulated 
institution that is not an advanced approaches Board-regulated 
institution is not required to deduct an investment in the capital 
of an unconsolidated financial institution pursuant to this 
paragraph if the financial institution is in distress and if such 
investment is made for the purpose of providing financial support to 
the financial institution, as determined by the Board.
    \25\ Any investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial 
institutions that do not exceed the 25 percent threshold for 
investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial institutions 
under this section must be assigned the appropriate risk weight 
under subparts D or F of this part, as applicable.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (5) Non-significant investments in the capital of unconsolidated 
financial institutions. (i) An advanced approaches Board-regulated 
institution must deduct its non-significant investments in the capital 
of unconsolidated financial institutions (as defined in Sec.  217.2) 
that, in the aggregate, exceed 10 percent of the sum of the advanced 
approaches Board-regulated institution's common equity tier 1 capital 
elements minus all deductions from and adjustments to common equity 
tier 1 capital elements required under paragraphs (a) through (c)(3) of 
this section (the 10 percent threshold for non-significant investments) 
by applying the corresponding deduction approach.\26\ The deductions 
described in this section are net of associated DTLs in accordance with 
paragraph (e) of this section. In addition, an advanced approaches 
Board-regulated institution that underwrites a failed underwriting, 
with the prior written approval of the Board, for the period of time 
stipulated by the Board, is not required to deduct a non-significant 
investment in the capital of an unconsolidated financial institution 
pursuant to this paragraph (c) to the extent the investment is related 
to the failed underwriting.\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \26\ With the prior written approval of the Board, for the 
period of time stipulated by the Board, an advanced approaches 
Board-regulated institution is not required to deduct a non-
significant investment in the capital of an unconsolidated financial 
institution pursuant to this paragraph if the financial institution 
is in distress and if such investment is made for the purpose of 
providing financial support to the financial institution, as 
determined by the Board.
    \27\ Any non-significant investments in the capital of 
unconsolidated financial institutions that do not exceed the 10 
percent threshold for non-significant investments under this section 
must be assigned the appropriate risk weight under subparts D, E, or 
F of this part, as applicable.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (ii) The amount to be deducted under this section from a specific 
capital component is equal to:
    (A) The advanced approaches Board-regulated institution's non-
significant investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial 
institutions exceeding the 10 percent threshold for non-significant 
investments, multiplied by
    (B) The ratio of the advanced approaches Board-regulated 
institution's non-significant investments in the capital of 
unconsolidated financial institutions in the form of such capital 
component to the advanced approaches Board-regulated institution's 
total non-significant investments in unconsolidated financial 
institutions.
    (6) Significant investments in the capital of unconsolidated 
financial institutions that are not in the form of common stock. An 
advanced approaches Board-regulated institution must deduct its 
significant investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial 
institutions that are not in the form of common stock by applying the 
corresponding deduction approach.\28\ The deductions described in this 
section are net of associated DTLs in accordance with paragraph (e) of 
this section. In addition, with the prior written approval of the 
Board, for the period of time stipulated by the Board, an advanced 
approaches Board-regulated institution that underwrites a failed 
underwriting is not required to deduct a significant investment in the 
capital of an unconsolidated financial institution pursuant to this 
paragraph (c) if such investment is related to such failed 
underwriting.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \28\ With prior written approval of the Board, for the period of 
time stipulated by the Board, an advanced approaches Board-regulated 
institution is not required to deduct a significant investment in 
the capital instrument of an unconsolidated financial institution in 
distress which is not in the form of common stock pursuant to this 
section if such investment is made for the purpose of providing 
financial support to the financial institution as determined by the 
Board.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (d) MSAs and certain DTAs subject to common equity tier 1 capital 
deduction thresholds.
    (1) A Board-regulated institution that is not an advanced 
approaches Board-regulated institution must make deductions from 
regulatory capital as described in this paragraph (d)(1).
    (i) The Board-regulated institution must deduct from common equity 
tier 1 capital elements the amount of each of the items set forth in 
this paragraph (d)(1) that, individually, exceeds 25 percent of the sum 
of the Board-regulated institution's common equity tier 1 capital 
elements, less adjustments to and deductions from common equity tier 1 
capital required under paragraphs (a) through (c)(3) of this section 
(the 25 percent common equity tier 1 capital deduction threshold).\29\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \29\ The amount of the items in paragraph (d)(1) of this section 
that is not deducted from common equity tier 1 capital must be 
included in the risk-weighted assets of the Board-regulated 
institution and assigned a 250 percent risk weight.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (ii) The Board-regulated institution must deduct from common equity 
tier 1 capital elements the amount of DTAs arising from temporary 
differences that the Board-regulated institution could not realize 
through net operating loss carrybacks, net of any related valuation 
allowances and net of DTLs, in accordance with paragraph (e) of this 
section. A Board-regulated institution is not required to deduct from 
the sum of its common equity tier 1 capital elements DTAs (net of any 
related valuation allowances and net of DTLs, in accordance with Sec.  
217.22(e)) arising from timing differences that the Board-regulated 
institution could realize through net operating loss carrybacks. The 
Board-regulated institution must risk weight these assets at 100 
percent. For a state member bank that is a member of a consolidated 
group for tax purposes, the amount of DTAs that

[[Page 50021]]

could be realized through net operating loss carrybacks may not exceed 
the amount that the state member bank could reasonably expect to have 
refunded by its parent holding company.
    (iii) The Board-regulated institution must deduct from common 
equity tier 1 capital elements the amount of MSAs net of associated 
DTLs, in accordance with paragraph (e) of this section.
    (iv) For purposes of calculating the amount of DTAs subject to 
deduction pursuant to paragraph (d)(1) of this section, a Board-
regulated institution may exclude DTAs and DTLs relating to adjustments 
made to common equity tier 1 capital under paragraph (b) of this 
section. A Board-regulated institution that elects to exclude DTAs 
relating to adjustments under paragraph (b) of this section also must 
exclude DTLs and must do so consistently in all future calculations. A 
Board-regulated institution may change its exclusion preference only 
after obtaining the prior approval of the Board.
    (2) An advanced approaches Board-regulated institution must make 
deductions from regulatory capital as described in this paragraph 
(d)(2).
    (i) An advanced approaches Board-regulated institution must deduct 
from common equity tier 1 capital elements the amount of each of the 
items set forth in this paragraph (d)(2) that, individually, exceeds 10 
percent of the sum of the advanced approaches Board-regulated 
institution's common equity tier 1 capital elements, less adjustments 
to and deductions from common equity tier 1 capital required under 
paragraphs (a) through (c) of this section (the 10 percent common 
equity tier 1 capital deduction threshold).
    (A) DTAs arising from temporary differences that the advanced 
approaches Board-regulated institution could not realize through net 
operating loss carrybacks, net of any related valuation allowances and 
net of DTLs, in accordance with paragraph (e) of this section. An 
advanced approaches Board-regulated institution is not required to 
deduct from the sum of its common equity tier 1 capital elements DTAs 
(net of any related valuation allowances and net of DTLs, in accordance 
with Sec.  217.22(e)) arising from timing differences that the advanced 
approaches Board-regulated institution could realize through net 
operating loss carrybacks. The advanced approaches Board-regulated 
institution must risk weight these assets at 100 percent. For a state 
member bank that is a member of a consolidated group for tax purposes, 
the amount of DTAs that could be realized through net operating loss 
carrybacks may not exceed the amount that the state member bank could 
reasonably expect to have refunded by its parent holding company.
    (B) MSAs net of associated DTLs, in accordance with paragraph (e) 
of this section.
    (C) Significant investments in the capital of unconsolidated 
financial institutions in the form of common stock, net of associated 
DTLs in accordance with paragraph (e) of this section.\30\ Significant 
investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial institutions in 
the form of common stock subject to the 10 percent common equity tier 1 
capital deduction threshold may be reduced by any goodwill embedded in 
the valuation of such investments deducted by the advanced approaches 
Board-regulated institution pursuant to paragraph (a)(1) of this 
section. In addition, with the prior written approval of the Board, for 
the period of time stipulated by the Board, an advanced approaches 
Board-regulated institution that underwrites a failed underwriting is 
not required to deduct a significant investment in the capital of an 
unconsolidated financial institution in the form of common stock 
pursuant to this paragraph (d)(2) if such investment is related to such 
failed underwriting.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \30\ With the prior written approval of the Board, for the 
period of time stipulated by the Board, an advanced approaches 
Board-regulated institution is not required to deduct a significant 
investment in the capital instrument of an unconsolidated financial 
institution in distress in the form of common stock pursuant to this 
section if such investment is made for the purpose of providing 
financial support to the financial institution as determined by the 
Board.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (ii) An advanced approaches Board-regulated institution must deduct 
from common equity tier 1 capital elements the items listed in 
paragraph (d)(2)(i) of this section that are not deducted as a result 
of the application of the 10 percent common equity tier 1 capital 
deduction threshold, and that, in aggregate, exceed 17.65 percent of 
the sum of the advanced approaches Board-regulated institution's common 
equity tier 1 capital elements, minus adjustments to and deductions 
from common equity tier 1 capital required under paragraphs (a) through 
(c) of this section, minus the items listed in paragraph (d)(2)(i) of 
this section (the 15 percent common equity tier 1 capital deduction 
threshold). Any goodwill that has been deducted under paragraph (a)(1) 
of this section can be excluded from the significant investments in the 
capital of unconsolidated financial institutions in the form of common 
stock.\31\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \31\ The amount of the items in paragraph (d)(2) of this section 
that is not deducted from common equity tier 1 capital pursuant to 
this section must be included in the risk-weighted assets of the 
advanced approaches Board-regulated institution and assigned a 250 
percent risk weight.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (iii) For purposes of calculating the amount of DTAs subject to the 
10 and 15 percent common equity tier 1 capital deduction thresholds, an 
advanced approaches Board-regulated institution may exclude DTAs and 
DTLs relating to adjustments made to common equity tier 1 capital under 
paragraph (b) of this section. An advanced approaches Board-regulated 
institution that elects to exclude DTAs relating to adjustments under 
paragraph (b) of this section also must exclude DTLs and must do so 
consistently in all future calculations. An advanced approaches Board-
regulated institution may change its exclusion preference only after 
obtaining the prior approval of the Board.
* * * * *
    (g) Treatment of assets that are deducted. A Board-regulated 
institution must exclude from standardized total risk-weighted assets 
and, as applicable, advanced approaches total risk-weighted assets any 
item that is required to be deducted from regulatory capital.
    (h) Net long position. (1) For purposes of calculating an 
investment in the Board-regulated institution's own capital instrument 
and an investment in the capital of an unconsolidated financial 
institution under this section, the net long position is the gross long 
position in the underlying instrument determined in accordance with 
paragraph (h)(2) of this section, as adjusted to recognize a short 
position in the same instrument calculated in accordance with paragraph 
(h)(3) of this section.
    (2) Gross long position. The gross long position is determined as 
follows:
    (i) For an equity exposure that is held directly, the adjusted 
carrying value as that term is defined in Sec.  217.51(b);
    (ii) For an exposure that is held directly and is not an equity 
exposure or a securitization exposure, the exposure amount as that term 
is defined in Sec.  217.2;
    (iii) For an indirect exposure, the Board-regulated institution's 
carrying value of the investment in the investment fund, provided that, 
alternatively:
    (A) A Board-regulated institution may, with the prior approval of 
the Board, use a conservative estimate of the amount of its investment 
in the Board-

[[Page 50022]]

regulated institution's own capital instruments or its investment in 
the capital of an unconsolidated financial institution held through a 
position in an index; or
    (B) A Board-regulated institution may calculate the gross long 
position for investments in the Board-regulated institution's own 
capital instruments or investments in the capital of an unconsolidated 
financial institution by multiplying the Board-regulated institution's 
carrying value of its investment in the investment fund by either:
    (1) The highest stated investment limit (in percent) for 
investments in the Board-regulated institution's own capital 
instruments or investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial 
institutions as stated in the prospectus, partnership agreement, or 
similar contract defining permissible investments of the investment 
fund; or
    (2) The investment fund's actual holdings of investments in the 
Board-regulated institution's own capital instruments or investments in 
the capital of unconsolidated financial institutions.
    (iv) For a synthetic exposure, the amount of the Board-regulated 
institution's loss on the exposure if the reference capital instrument 
were to have a value of zero.
    (3) Adjustments to reflect a short position. In order to adjust the 
gross long position to recognize a short position in the same 
instrument, the following criteria must be met:
    (i) The maturity of the short position must match the maturity of 
the long position, or the short position has a residual maturity of at 
least one year (maturity requirement); or
    (ii) For a position that is a trading asset or trading liability 
(whether on- or off-balance sheet) as reported on the Board-regulated 
institution's Call Report, for a state member bank, or FR Y-9C, for a 
bank holding company or savings and loan holding company, as 
applicable, if the Board-regulated institution has a contractual right 
or obligation to sell the long position at a specific point in time and 
the counterparty to the contract has an obligation to purchase the long 
position if the Board-regulated institution exercises its right to 
sell, this point in time may be treated as the maturity of the long 
position such that the maturity of the long position and short position 
are deemed to match for purposes of the maturity requirement, even if 
the maturity of the short position is less than one year; and
    (iii) For an investment in the Board-regulated institution's own 
capital instrument under paragraph (c)(1) of this section or an 
investment in the capital of an unconsolidated financial institution 
under paragraphs (c) and (d):
    (A) A Board-regulated institution may only net a short position 
against a long position in an investment in the Board-regulated 
institution's own capital instrument under paragraph (c) of this 
section if the short position involves no counterparty credit risk.
    (B) A gross long position in an investment in the Board-regulated 
institution's own capital instrument or an investment in the capital of 
an unconsolidated financial institution resulting from a position in an 
index may be netted against a short position in the same index. Long 
and short positions in the same index without maturity dates are 
considered to have matching maturities.
    (C) A short position in an index that is hedging a long cash or 
synthetic position in an investment in the Board-regulated 
institution's own capital instrument or an investment in the capital of 
an unconsolidated financial institution can be decomposed to provide 
recognition of the hedge. More specifically, the portion of the index 
that is composed of the same underlying instrument that is being hedged 
may be used to offset the long position if both the long position being 
hedged and the short position in the index are reported as a trading 
asset or trading liability (whether on- or off-balance sheet) on the 
Board-regulated institution's Call Report, for a state member bank, or 
FR Y-9C, for a bank holding company or savings and loan holding 
company, as applicable, and the hedge is deemed effective by the Board-
regulated institution's internal control processes, which have not been 
found to be inadequate by the Board.
0
33. Section 217.32 is amended by revising paragraphs (b), (d)(2), 
(d)(3)(ii), (j), (k), (l) to read as follows:


Sec.  217.32   General risk weights.

* * * * *
    (b) Certain supranational entities and multilateral development 
banks (MDBs). A Board-regulated institution must assign a zero percent 
risk weight to an exposure to the Bank for International Settlements, 
the European Central Bank, the European Commission, the International 
Monetary Fund, the European Stability Mechanism, the European Financial 
Stability Facility, or an MDB.
* * * * *
    (d) * * *
    (2) Exposures to foreign banks. (i) Except as otherwise provided 
under paragraphs (d)(2)(iii), (d)(2)(v) and (d)(3) of this section, a 
Board-regulated institution must assign a risk weight to an exposure to 
a foreign bank, in accordance with Table 2 to Sec.  217.32, based on 
the CRC that corresponds to the foreign bank's home country or the OECD 
membership status of the foreign bank's home country if there is no CRC 
applicable to the foreign bank's home country.

  Table 2 to Sec.   217.32--Risk Weights for Exposures to Foreign Banks
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                            Risk weight
                                                           (in percent)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
CRC:
  0-1...................................................              20
  2.....................................................              50
  3.....................................................             100
  4-7...................................................             150
OECD Member with No CRC.................................              20
Non-OECD Member with No CRC.............................             100
Sovereign Default.......................................             150
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (ii) A Board-regulated institution must assign a 20 percent risk 
weight to an exposure to a foreign bank whose home country is a member 
of the OECD and does not have a CRC.
    (iii) A Board-regulated institution must assign a 20 percent risk-
weight to an exposure that is a self-liquidating, trade-related 
contingent item that arises from the movement of goods and that has a 
maturity of three months or less to a foreign bank whose home country 
has a CRC of 0, 1, 2, or 3, or is an OECD member with no CRC.
    (iv) A Board-regulated institution must assign a 100 percent risk 
weight to an exposure to a foreign bank whose home country is not a 
member of the OECD and does not have a CRC, with the exception of self-
liquidating, trade-related contingent items that arise from the 
movement of goods, and that have a maturity of three months or less, 
which may be assigned a 20 percent risk weight.
    (v) A Board-regulated institution must assign a 150 percent risk 
weight to an exposure to a foreign bank immediately upon determining 
that an event of sovereign default has occurred in the bank's home 
country, or if an event of sovereign default has occurred in the 
foreign bank's home country during the previous five years.
    (3) * * *
    (ii) A significant investment in the capital of an unconsolidated 
financial institution in the form of common stock pursuant to Sec.  
217.22(d)(2)(1)(c);
    (iii) and (iv) * * *
* * * * *
    (j)(1) High volatility acquisition, development, or construction 
(HVADC)

[[Page 50023]]

exposures. A Board-regulated institution must assign a 130 percent risk 
weight to an HVADC exposure.
    (2) High-volatility commercial real estate (HVCRE) exposures. A 
Board-regulated institution must assign a 150 percent risk weight to an 
HVCRE exposure.
    (k) Past due exposures. Except for an exposure to a sovereign 
entity or a residential mortgage exposure or a policy loan, if an 
exposure is 90 days or more past due or on nonaccrual:
    (1) A Board-regulated institution must assign a 150 percent risk 
weight to the portion of the exposure that is not guaranteed or that is 
unsecured;
    (2) A Board-regulated institution may assign a risk weight to the 
guaranteed portion of a past due exposure based on the risk weight that 
applies under Sec.  217.36 if the guarantee or credit derivative meets 
the requirements of that section; and
    (3) A Board-regulated institution may assign a risk weight to the 
collateralized portion of a past due exposure based on the risk weight 
that applies under Sec.  217.37 if the collateral meets the 
requirements of that section.
    (l) Other assets. (1)(i) A bank holding company or savings and loan 
holding company must assign a zero percent risk weight to cash owned 
and held in all offices of subsidiary depository institutions or in 
transit, and to gold bullion held in a subsidiary depository 
institution's own vaults, or held in another depository institution's 
vaults on an allocated basis, to the extent the gold bullion assets are 
offset by gold bullion liabilities.
    (ii) A state member bank must assign a zero percent risk weight to 
cash owned and held in all offices of the state member bank or in 
transit; to gold bullion held in the state member bank's own vaults or 
held in another depository institution's vaults on an allocated basis, 
to the extent the gold bullion assets are offset by gold bullion 
liabilities; and to exposures that arise from the settlement of cash 
transactions (such as equities, fixed income, spot foreign exchange and 
spot commodities) with a central counterparty where there is no 
assumption of ongoing counterparty credit risk by the central 
counterparty after settlement of the trade and associated default fund 
contributions.
    (2) A Board-regulated institution must assign a 20 percent risk 
weight to cash items in the process of collection.
    (3) A Board-regulated institution must assign a 100 percent risk 
weight to DTAs arising from temporary differences that the Board-
regulated institution could realize through net operating loss 
carrybacks.
    (4) A Board-regulated institution must assign a 250 percent risk 
weight to the portion of each of the following items to the extent it 
is not deducted from common equity tier 1 capital pursuant to Sec.  
217.22(d):
    (i) MSAs; and
    (ii) DTAs arising from temporary differences that the Board-
regulated institution could not realize through net operating loss 
carrybacks.
    (5) A Board-regulated institution must assign a 100 percent risk 
weight to all assets not specifically assigned a different risk weight 
under this subpart and that are not deducted from tier 1 or tier 2 
capital pursuant to Sec.  217.22.
    (6) Notwithstanding the requirements of this section, a state 
member bank may assign an asset that is not included in one of the 
categories provided in this section to the risk weight category 
applicable under the capital rules applicable to bank holding companies 
and savings and loan holding companies under this part, provided that 
all of the following conditions apply:
    (i) The Board-regulated institution is not authorized to hold the 
asset under applicable law other than debt previously contracted or 
similar authority; and
    (ii) The risks associated with the asset are substantially similar 
to the risks of assets that are otherwise assigned to a risk weight 
category of less than 100 percent under this subpart.
* * * * *
0
34. Section 217.34 is amended by revising paragraph (c) to read as 
follows:


Sec.  217.34   OTC derivative contracts.

* * * * *
    (c) Counterparty credit risk for OTC credit derivatives. (1) 
Protection purchasers. A Board-regulated institution that purchases an 
OTC credit derivative that is recognized under Sec.  217.36 as a credit 
risk mitigant for an exposure that is not a covered position under 
subpart F is not required to compute a separate counterparty credit 
risk capital requirement under this subpart D provided that the Board-
regulated institution does so consistently for all such credit 
derivatives. The Board-regulated institution must either include all or 
exclude all such credit derivatives that are subject to a qualifying 
master netting agreement from any measure used to determine 
counterparty credit risk exposure to all relevant counterparties for 
risk-based capital purposes.
    (2) Protection providers. (i) A Board-regulated institution that is 
the protection provider under an OTC credit derivative must treat the 
OTC credit derivative as an exposure to the underlying reference asset. 
The Board-regulated institution is not required to compute a 
counterparty credit risk capital requirement for the OTC credit 
derivative under this subpart D, provided that this treatment is 
applied consistently for all such OTC credit derivatives. The Board-
regulated institution must either include all or exclude all such OTC 
credit derivatives that are subject to a qualifying master netting 
agreement from any measure used to determine counterparty credit risk 
exposure.
    (ii) The provisions of this paragraph (c)(2) apply to all relevant 
counterparties for risk-based capital purposes unless the Board-
regulated institution is treating the OTC credit derivative as a 
covered position under subpart F, in which case the Board-regulated 
institution must compute a supplemental counterparty credit risk 
capital requirement under this section.
* * * * *
0
35. Section 217.35 is amended by revising paragraph (b)(3)(ii), 
(b)(4)(ii), (c)(3)(ii), and (c)(4)(ii) to read as follows:


Sec.  217.35   Cleared transactions.

* * * * *
    (b) * * *
    (3) * * *
    (ii) For a cleared transaction with a CCP that is not a QCCP, a 
clearing member client Board-regulated institution must apply the risk 
weight appropriate for the CCP according to this subpart D.
    (4) * * *
    (ii) A clearing member client Board-regulated institution must 
calculate a risk-weighted asset amount for any collateral provided to a 
CCP, clearing member, or custodian in connection with a cleared 
transaction in accordance with the requirements under this subpart D.
    (c) * * *
    (3) * * *
    (ii) For a cleared transaction with a CCP that is not a QCCP, a 
clearing member Board-regulated institution must apply the risk weight 
appropriate for the CCP according to this subpart D.
    (4) * * *
    (ii) A clearing member Board-regulated institution must calculate a 
risk-weighted asset amount for any collateral provided to a CCP, 
clearing member, or a custodian in connection with a cleared 
transaction in accordance with requirements under this subpart D.
* * * * *
0
36. Section 217.36 is amend by revising paragraph (c) to read as 
follows:

[[Page 50024]]

Sec.  217.36   Guarantees and credit derivatives: Substitution 
treatment.

* * * * *
    (c) Substitution approach--(1) Full coverage. If an eligible 
guarantee or eligible credit derivative meets the conditions in 
paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section and the protection amount (P) of 
the guarantee or credit derivative is greater than or equal to the 
exposure amount of the hedged exposure, a Board-regulated institution 
may recognize the guarantee or credit derivative in determining the 
risk-weighted asset amount for the hedged exposure by substituting the 
risk weight applicable to the guarantor or credit derivative protection 
provider under this subpart D for the risk weight assigned to the 
exposure.
    (2) Partial coverage. If an eligible guarantee or eligible credit 
derivative meets the conditions in paragraphs (a) and (b) of this 
section and the protection amount (P) of the guarantee or credit 
derivative is less than the exposure amount of the hedged exposure, the 
Board-regulated institution must treat the hedged exposure as two 
separate exposures (protected and unprotected) in order to recognize 
the credit risk mitigation benefit of the guarantee or credit 
derivative.
    (i) The Board-regulated institution may calculate the risk-weighted 
asset amount for the protected exposure under this subpart D, where the 
applicable risk weight is the risk weight applicable to the guarantor 
or credit derivative protection provider.
    (ii) The Board-regulated institution must calculate the risk-
weighted asset amount for the unprotected exposure under this subpart 
D, where the applicable risk weight is that of the unprotected portion 
of the hedged exposure.
    (iii) The treatment provided in this section is applicable when the 
credit risk of an exposure is covered on a partial pro rata basis and 
may be applicable when an adjustment is made to the effective notional 
amount of the guarantee or credit derivative under paragraphs (d), (e), 
or (f) of this section.
* * * * *
0
37. Section 217.37 is amended by revising paragraph (b)(2)(i) to read 
as follows:


Sec.  217.37   Collateralized transactions.

* * * * *
    (b) * * *
    (2) * * * (i) A Board-regulated institution may apply a risk weight 
to the portion of an exposure that is secured by the fair value of 
financial collateral (that meets the requirements of paragraph (b)(1) 
of this section) based on the risk weight assigned to the collateral 
under this subpart D. For repurchase agreements, reverse repurchase 
agreements, and securities lending and borrowing transactions, the 
collateral is the instruments, gold, and cash the Board-regulated 
institution has borrowed, purchased subject to resale, or taken as 
collateral from the counterparty under the transaction. Except as 
provided in paragraph (b)(3) of this section, the risk weight assigned 
to the collateralized portion of the exposure may not be less than 20 
percent.
* * * * *
0
38. Section 217.38 is amended by revising paragraph (e)(2) to read as 
follows:


Sec.  217.38   Unsettled transactions.

* * * * *
    (e) * * *
    (2) From the business day after the Board-regulated institution has 
made its delivery until five business days after the counterparty 
delivery is due, the Board-regulated institution must calculate the 
risk-weighted asset amount for the transaction by treating the current 
fair value of the deliverables owed to the Board-regulated institution 
as an exposure to the counterparty and using the applicable 
counterparty risk weight under this subpart D.
* * * * *
0
39. Section 217.42 is amended by revising paragraph (j)(2)(ii)(A) to 
read as follows:


Sec.  217.42   Risk-weighted assets for securitization exposures.

* * * * *
    (j) * * *
    (2) * * *
    (ii) * * *
    (A) If the Board-regulated institution purchases credit protection 
from a counterparty that is not a securitization SPE, the Board-
regulated institution must determine the risk weight for the exposure 
according to this subpart D.
* * * * *
0
40. Section 217.52 is amended by revising paragraphs (b)(1) and (4) to 
read as follows:


Sec.  217.52   Simple risk-weight approach (SRWA).

* * * * *
    (b) * * *
    (1) Zero percent risk weight equity exposures. An equity exposure 
to a sovereign, the Bank for International Settlements, the European 
Central Bank, the European Commission, the International Monetary Fund, 
the European Stability Mechanism, the European Financial Stability 
Facility, an MDB, and any other entity whose credit exposures receive a 
zero percent risk weight under Sec.  217.32 may be assigned a zero 
percent risk weight.
* * * * *
    (4) 250 percent risk weight equity exposures. Significant 
investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial institutions in 
the form of common stock that are not deducted from capital pursuant to 
Sec.  217.22(d)(2) are assigned a 250 percent risk weight.
    (5) through (7) (ii) * * *
* * * * *
0
41. Section 217.61 is revised to read as follows:


Sec.  217.61   Purpose and scope.

    Sections 217.61 through 217.63 of this subpart establish public 
disclosure requirements related to the capital requirements described 
in subpart B of this part for a Board-regulated institution with total 
consolidated assets of $50 billion or more as reported on the Board-
regulated institution's most recent year-end Call Report, for a state 
member bank, or FR Y-9C, for a bank holding company or savings and loan 
holding company, as applicable that is not an advanced approaches 
Board-regulated institution making public disclosures pursuant to Sec.  
217.172. An advanced approaches Board-regulated institution that has 
not received approval from the Board to exit parallel run pursuant to 
Sec.  217.121(d) is subject to the disclosure requirements described in 
Sec. Sec.  217.62 and 217.63. A Board-regulated institution with total 
consolidated assets of $50 billion or more as reported on the Board-
regulated institution's most recent year-end Call Report, for a state 
member bank, or FR Y-9C, for a bank holding company or savings and loan 
holding company, as applicable, that is not an advanced approaches 
Board-regulated institution making public disclosures subject to Sec.  
217.172 must comply with Sec.  217.62 unless it is a consolidated 
subsidiary of a bank holding company, savings and loan holding company, 
or depository institution that is subject to the disclosure 
requirements of Sec.  217.62 or a subsidiary of a non-U.S. banking 
organization that is subject to comparable public disclosure 
requirements in its home jurisdiction. For purposes of this section, 
total consolidated assets are determined based on the average of the 
Board-regulated institution's total consolidated assets in the four 
most recent quarters as reported on the Call Report, for a state member 
bank, or FR Y-9C, for a bank holding company or savings and loan 
holding company, as applicable; or

[[Page 50025]]

the average of the Board-regulated institution's total consolidated 
assets in the most recent consecutive quarters as reported quarterly on 
the Board-regulated institution's Call Report, for a state member bank, 
or FR Y-9C, for a bank holding company or savings and loan holding 
company, as applicable if the Board-regulated institution has not filed 
such a report for each of the most recent four quarters.
* * * * *
0
42. Section 217.63 is amended by revising Tables 3 and 8 to read as 
follows:


Sec.  217.63   Disclosures by Board-regulated institutions described in 
Sec.  217.61.

* * * * *

                                   Table 3 to Sec.   217.63--Capital Adequacy
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Qualitative disclosures................................  (a) A summary discussion of the Board-regulated
                                                          institution's approach to assessing the adequacy of
                                                          its capital to support current and future activities.
Quantitative disclosures...............................  (b) Risk-weighted assets for:
                                                            (1) Exposures to sovereign entities;
                                                            (2) Exposures to certain supranational entities and
                                                             MDBs;
                                                            (3) Exposures to depository institutions, foreign
                                                             banks, and credit unions;
                                                            (4) Exposures to PSEs;
                                                            (5) Corporate exposures;
                                                            (6) Residential mortgage exposures;
                                                            (7) Statutory multifamily mortgages and pre-sold
                                                             construction loans;
                                                            (8) HVADC exposures and HVCRE exposures;
                                                            (9) Past due loans;
                                                            (10) Other assets;
                                                            (11) Cleared transactions;
                                                            (12) Default fund contributions;
                                                            (13) Unsettled transactions;
                                                            (14) Securitization exposures; and
                                                            (15) Equity exposures
                                                         (c) Standardized market risk-weighted assets as
                                                          calculated under subpart F of this part.
                                                         (d) Common equity tier 1, tier 1 and total risk-based
                                                          capital ratios:
                                                            (1) For the top consolidated group; and
                                                            (2) For each depository institution subsidiary.
                                                         (e) Total standardized risk-weighted assets.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

* * * * *

                                    Table 8 to Sec.   217.63--Securitization
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Qualitative Disclosures................................  (a) The general qualitative disclosure requirement with
                                                          respect to a securitization (including synthetic
                                                          securitizations), including a discussion of:
                                                            (1) The Board-regulated institution's objectives for
                                                             securitizing assets, including the extent to which
                                                             these activities transfer credit risk of the
                                                             underlying exposures away from the Board-regulated
                                                             institution to other entities and including the
                                                             type of risks assumed and retained with
                                                             resecuritization activity; \1\
                                                            (2) The nature of the risks (e.g. liquidity risk)
                                                             inherent in the securitized assets;
                                                            (3) The roles played by the Board-regulated
                                                             institution in the securitization process \2\ and
                                                             an indication of the extent of the Board-regulated
                                                             institution's involvement in each of them;
                                                            (4) The processes in place to monitor changes in the
                                                             credit and market risk of securitization exposures
                                                             including how those processes differ for
                                                             resecuritization exposures;
                                                            (5) The Board-regulated institution's policy for
                                                             mitigating the credit risk retained through
                                                             securitization and resecuritization exposures; and
                                                            (6) The risk-based capital approaches that the Board-
                                                             regulated institution follows for its
                                                             securitization exposures including the type of
                                                             securitization exposure to which each approach
                                                             applies.
                                                         (b) A list of:
                                                            (1) The type of securitization SPEs that the Board-
                                                             regulated institution, as sponsor, uses to
                                                             securitize third-party exposures. The Board-
                                                             regulated institution must indicate whether it has
                                                             exposure to these SPEs, either on- or off-balance
                                                             sheet; and
                                                            (2) Affiliated entities:
                                                            (i) That the Board-regulated institution manages or
                                                             advises; and
                                                            (ii) That invest either in the securitization
                                                             exposures that the Board-regulated institution has
                                                             securitized or in securitization SPEs that the
                                                             Board-regulated institution sponsors.\3\
                                                         (c) Summary of the Board-regulated institution's
                                                          accounting policies for securitization activities,
                                                          including:
                                                            (1) Whether the transactions are treated as sales or
                                                             financings;
                                                            (2) Recognition of gain-on-sale;
                                                            (3) Methods and key assumptions applied in valuing
                                                             retained or purchased interests;
                                                            (4) Changes in methods and key assumptions from the
                                                             previous period for valuing retained interests and
                                                             impact of the changes;
                                                            (5) Treatment of synthetic securitizations;
                                                            (6) How exposures intended to be securitized are
                                                             valued and whether they are recorded under subpart
                                                             D of this part; and
                                                            (7) Policies for recognizing liabilities on the
                                                             balance sheet for arrangements that could require
                                                             the Board-regulated institution to provide
                                                             financial support for securitized assets.
                                                         (d) An explanation of significant changes to any
                                                          quantitative information since the last reporting
                                                          period.
Quantitative Disclosures...............................  (e) The total outstanding exposures securitized by the
                                                          Board-regulated institution in securitizations that
                                                          meet the operational criteria provided in Sec.
                                                          217.41 (categorized into traditional and synthetic
                                                          securitizations), by exposure type, separately for
                                                          securitizations of third-party exposures for which the
                                                          bank acts only as sponsor.\4\
                                                         (f) For exposures securitized by the Board-regulated
                                                          institution in securitizations that meet the
                                                          operational criteria in Sec.   217.41:

[[Page 50026]]

 
                                                            (1) Amount of securitized assets that are impaired/
                                                             past due categorized by exposure type; \5\ and
                                                            (2) Losses recognized by the Board-regulated
                                                             institution during the current period categorized
                                                             by exposure type.\6\
                                                         (g) The total amount of outstanding exposures intended
                                                          to be securitized categorized by exposure type.
                                                         (h) Aggregate amount of:
                                                            (1) On-balance sheet securitization exposures
                                                             retained or purchased categorized by exposure type;
                                                             and
                                                            (2) Off-balance sheet securitization exposures
                                                             categorized by exposure type.
                                                            (i) (1) Aggregate amount of securitization exposures
                                                             retained or purchased and the associated capital
                                                             requirements for these exposures, categorized
                                                             between securitization and resecuritization
                                                             exposures, further categorized into a meaningful
                                                             number of risk weight bands and by risk-based
                                                             capital approach (e.g., SSFA); and
                                                            (2) Aggregate amount disclosed separately by type of
                                                             underlying exposure in the pool of any:
                                                            (i) After-tax gain-on-sale on a securitization that
                                                             has been deducted from common equity tier 1
                                                             capital; and
                                                            (ii) Credit-enhancing interest-only strip that is
                                                             assigned a 1,250 percent risk weight.
                                                         (j) Summary of current year's securitization activity,
                                                          including the amount of exposures securitized (by
                                                          exposure type), and recognized gain or loss on sale by
                                                          exposure type.
                                                         (k) Aggregate amount of resecuritization exposures
                                                          retained or purchased categorized according to:
                                                            (1) Exposures to which credit risk mitigation is
                                                             applied and those not applied; and
                                                            (2) Exposures to guarantors categorized according to
                                                             guarantor creditworthiness categories or guarantor
                                                             name.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The Board-regulated institution should describe the structure of resecuritizations in which it participates;
  this description should be provided for the main categories of resecuritization products in which the Board-
  regulated institution is active.
\2\ For example, these roles may include originator, investor, servicer, provider of credit enhancement,
  sponsor, liquidity provider, or swap provider.
\3\ Such affiliated entities may include, for example, money market funds, to be listed individually, and
  personal and private trusts, to be noted collectively.
\4\ ``Exposures securitized'' include underlying exposures originated by the bank, whether generated by them or
  purchased, and recognized in the balance sheet, from third parties, and third-party exposures included in
  sponsored transactions. Securitization transactions (including underlying exposures originally on the bank's
  balance sheet and underlying exposures acquired by the bank from third-party entities) in which the
  originating bank does not retain any securitization exposure should be shown separately but need only be
  reported for the year of inception. Banks are required to disclose exposures regardless of whether there is a
  capital charge under this part.
\5\ Include credit-related other than temporary impairment (OTTI).
\6\ For example, charge-offs/allowances (if the assets remain on the bank's balance sheet) or credit-related
  OTTI of interest-only strips and other retained residual interests, as well as recognition of liabilities for
  probable future financial support required of the bank with respect to securitized assets.

* * * * *
0
43. Section 217.101 paragraph (b) is amended by adding a definition for 
``high volatility commercial real estate (HVCRE) exposure'' to read as 
follows:


Sec.  217.101   Definitions.

* * * * *
    (b) * * *
    High volatility commercial real estate (HVCRE) exposure, for 
purposes of Subpart E, means a credit facility that, prior to 
conversion to permanent financing, finances or has financed the 
acquisition, development, or construction (ADC) of real property, 
unless the facility finances:
    (1) One- to four-family residential properties;
    (2) Real property that:
    (i) Would qualify as an investment in community development under 
12 U.S.C. 338a or 12 U.S.C. 24 (Eleventh), as applicable, or as a 
``qualified investment'' under 12 CFR part 228, and
    (ii) Is not an ADC loan to any entity described in 12 CFR 
208.22(a)(3) or 228.12(g)(3), unless it is otherwise described in 
paragraph (1), (2)(i), (3) or (4) of this definition;
    (3) The purchase or development of agricultural land, which 
includes all land known to be used or usable for agricultural purposes 
(such as crop and livestock production), provided that the valuation of 
the agricultural land is based on its value for agricultural purposes 
and the valuation does not take into consideration any potential use of 
the land for non-agricultural commercial development or residential 
development; or
    (4) Commercial real estate projects in which:
    (i) The loan-to-value ratio is less than or equal to the applicable 
maximum supervisory loan-to-value ratio in the Board's real estate 
lending standards at 12 CFR part 208, appendix C;
    (ii) The borrower has contributed capital to the project in the 
form of cash or unencumbered readily marketable assets (or has paid 
development expenses out-of-pocket) of at least 15 percent of the real 
estate's appraised ``as completed'' value; and
    (iii) The borrower contributed the amount of capital required by 
paragraph (4)(ii) of this definition before the Board-regulated 
institution advances funds under the credit facility, and the capital 
contributed by the borrower, or internally generated by the project, is 
contractually required to remain in the project throughout the life of 
the project. The life of a project concludes only when the credit 
facility is converted to permanent financing or is sold or paid in 
full. Permanent financing may be provided by the Board-regulated 
institution that provided the ADC facility as long as the permanent 
financing is subject to the Board-regulated institution's underwriting 
criteria for long-term mortgage loans.
* * * * *
0
44. Section 217.131 is amended by revising paragraph (d)(2) to read as 
follows:


Sec.  217.131  Mechanics for calculating total wholesale and retail 
risk-weighted assets.

* * * * *
    (d) * * *
    (2) Floor on PD assignment. The PD for each wholesale obligor or 
retail segment may not be less than 0.03 percent, except for exposures 
to or directly and unconditionally guaranteed by a sovereign entity, 
the Bank for International Settlements, the International Monetary 
Fund, the European Commission, the European Central Bank, the European 
Stability Mechanism, the European Financial Stability Facility, or a 
multilateral development bank, to which the Board-regulated institution 
assigns a rating grade associated with a PD of less than 0.03 percent.
* * * * *
0
45. Section 217.133 is amended by revising paragraphs (b)(3)(ii) and 
(c)(3)(ii) to read as follows:

[[Page 50027]]

Sec.  217.133  Cleared transactions.

* * * * *
    (b) * * *
    (3) * * *
    (ii) For a cleared transaction with a CCP that is not a QCCP, a 
clearing member client Board-regulated institution must apply the risk 
weight applicable to the CCP under subpart D of this part.
* * * * *
    (c) * * *
    (3) * * *
    (ii) For a cleared transaction with a CCP that is not a QCCP, a 
clearing member Board-regulated institution must apply the risk weight 
applicable to the CCP according to subpart D of this part.
* * * * *
0
46. Section 217.152 is amended by revising paragraph (b)(5) and (6) to 
read as follows:


Sec.  217.152  Simple risk weight approach (SRWA).

* * * * *
    (b) * * *
    (5) 300 percent risk weight equity exposures. A publicly traded 
equity exposure (other than an equity exposure described in paragraph 
(b)(7) of this section and including the ineffective portion of a hedge 
pair) is assigned a 300 percent risk weight.
    (6) 400 percent risk weight equity exposures. An equity exposure 
(other than an equity exposure described in paragraph (b)(7) of this 
section) that is not publicly traded is assigned a 400 percent risk 
weight.
* * * * *
0
47. Section 217.202, paragraph (b) is amended by revising the 
definition of ``Corporate debt position'' to read as follows:


Sec.  217.202  Definitions.

* * * * *
    (b) * * *
    Corporate debt position means a debt position that is an exposure 
to a company that is not a sovereign entity, the Bank for International 
Settlements, the European Central Bank, the European Commission, the 
International Monetary Fund, the European Stability Mechanism, the 
European Financial Stability Facility, a multilateral development bank, 
a depository institution, a foreign bank, a credit union, a public 
sector entity, a GSE, or a securitization.
* * * * *
0
48. Section 217.210 is amended by revising paragraphs (b)(2)(ii) and 
(b)(2)(vii)(A) to read as follows:


Sec.  217.210  Standardized measurement method for specific risk.

* * * * *
    (b) * * *
    (2) * * *
    (ii) Certain supranational entity and multilateral development bank 
debt positions. A Board-regulated institution may assign a 0.0 percent 
specific risk-weighting factor to a debt position that is an exposure 
to the Bank for International Settlements, the European Central Bank, 
the European Commission, the International Monetary Fund, the European 
Stability Mechanism, the European Financial Stability Facility, or an 
MDB.
* * * * *
    (vii) * * * (A) General requirements. (1) A Board-regulated 
institution that is not an advanced approaches Board-regulated 
institution or is a U.S. intermediate holding company that is required 
to be established or designated pursuant to 12 CFR 252.153 and that is 
not calculating risk-weighted assets according to Subpart E must assign 
a specific risk-weighting factor to a securitization position using 
either the simplified supervisory formula approach (SSFA) in paragraph 
(b)(2)(vii)(C) of this section (and Sec.  217.211) or assign a specific 
risk-weighting factor of 100 percent to the position.
    (2) A Board-regulated institution that is an advanced approaches 
Board-regulated institution or is a U.S. intermediate holding company 
that is required to be established or designated pursuant to 12 CFR 
252.153 and that is calculating risk-weighted assets according to 
Subpart E must calculate a specific risk add-on for a securitization 
position in accordance with paragraph (b)(2)(vii)(B) of this section if 
the Board-regulated institution and the securitization position each 
qualifies to use the SFA in Sec.  217.143. A Board-regulated 
institution that is an advanced approaches Board-regulated institution 
or is a U.S. intermediate holding company that is required to be 
established or designated pursuant to 12 CFR 252.153 and that is 
calculating risk-weighted assets according to Subpart E with a 
securitization position that does not qualify for the SFA under 
paragraph (b)(2)(vii)(B) of this section may assign a specific risk-
weighting factor to the securitization position using the SSFA in 
accordance with paragraph (b)(2)(vii)(C) of this section or assign a 
specific risk-weighting factor of 100 percent to the position.
    (3) A Board-regulated institution must treat a short securitization 
position as if it is a long securitization position solely for 
calculation purposes when using the SFA in paragraph (b)(2)(vii)(B) of 
this section or the SSFA in paragraph (b)(2)(vii)(C) of this section.
* * * * *
0
49. Section 217.300 is amended by revising paragraphs (b), (c)(2), (3), 
and (d) to read as follows:


Sec.  217.300  Transitions.

* * * * *
    (b) Regulatory capital adjustments and deductions. Beginning 
January 1, 2014 for an advanced approaches Board-regulated institution, 
and beginning January 1, 2015 for a Board-regulated institution that is 
not an advanced approaches Board-regulated institution, and in each 
case through December 31, 2017, a Board-regulated institution must make 
the capital adjustments and deductions in Sec.  217.22 in accordance 
with the transition requirements in this paragraph (b). Beginning 
January 1, 2018, a Board-regulated institution must make all regulatory 
capital adjustments and deductions in accordance with Sec.  217.22.
    (1) Transition deductions from common equity tier 1 capital. 
Beginning January 1, 2014 for an advanced approaches Board-regulated 
institution, and beginning January 1, 2015 for a Board-regulated 
institution that is not an advanced approaches Board-regulated 
institution, and in each case through December 31, 2017, a Board-
regulated institution, must make the deductions required under Sec.  
217.22(a)(1)-(7) from common equity tier 1 or tier 1 capital elements 
in accordance with the percentages set forth in Table 2 and Table 3 to 
Sec.  217.300.
    (i) A Board-regulated institution must deduct the following items 
from common equity tier 1 and additional tier 1 capital in accordance 
with the percentages set forth in Table 2 to Sec.  217.300: Goodwill 
(Sec.  217.22(a)(1)), DTAs that arise from net operating loss and tax 
credit carryforwards (Sec.  217.22(a)(3)), a gain-on-sale in connection 
with a securitization exposure (Sec.  217.22(a)(4)), defined benefit 
pension fund assets (Sec.  217.22(a)(5)), expected credit loss that 
exceeds eligible credit reserves (for advanced approaches Board-
regulated institutions that have completed the parallel run process and 
that have received notifications from the Board pursuant to Sec.  
217.121(d) of subpart E) (Sec.  217.22(a)(6)), and financial 
subsidiaries (Sec.  217.22(a)(7)).

[[Page 50028]]



                                            Table 2 to Sec.   217.300
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                      Transition deductions    Transition deductions under Sec.   217.22(a)(3)-
                                           under Sec.        -------------------------(6)-----------------------
                                      217.22(a)(1)  and (7)
         Transition period         --------------------------     Percentage of the         Percentage of the
                                        Percentage of the      deductions from  common   deductions from tier  1
                                     deductions from  common    equity tier 1 capital            capital
                                      equity tier 1 capital
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Calendar year 2014................                      100                        20                        80
Calendar year 2015................                      100                        40                        60
Calendar year 2016................                      100                        60                        40
Calendar year 2017................                      100                        80                        20
Calendar year 2018, and thereafter                      100                       100                         0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (ii) A Board-regulated institution must deduct from common equity 
tier 1 capital any intangible assets other than goodwill and MSAs in 
accordance with the percentages set forth in Table 3 to Sec.  217.300.
    (iii) A Board-regulated institution must apply a 100 percent risk-
weight to the aggregate amount of intangible assets other than goodwill 
and MSAs that are not required to be deducted from common equity tier 1 
capital under this section.

                        Table 3 to Sec.   217.300
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                  Transition deductions
                                                       under Sec.
                                                     217.22(a)(2)--
               Transition period                    percentage of the
                                                 deductions from  common
                                                  equity tier 1 capital
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Calendar year 2014............................                       20
Calendar year 2015............................                       40
Calendar year 2016............................                       60
Calendar year 2017............................                       80
Calendar year 2018,...........................                      100
and thereafter................................
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (2) Transition adjustments to common equity tier 1 capital. 
Beginning January 1, 2014 for an advanced approaches Board-regulated 
institution, and beginning January 1, 2015 for a Board-regulated 
institution that is not an advanced approaches Board-regulated 
institution, and in each case through December 31, 2017, a Board-
regulated institution, must allocate the regulatory adjustments related 
to changes in the fair value of liabilities due to changes in the 
Board-regulated institution's own credit risk (Sec.  217.22(b)(1)(iii)) 
between common equity tier 1 capital and tier 1 capital in accordance 
with the percentages set forth in Table 4 to Sec.  217.300.
    (i) If the aggregate amount of the adjustment is positive, the 
Board-regulated institution must allocate the deduction between common 
equity tier 1 and tier 1 capital in accordance with Table 4 to Sec.  
217.300.
    (ii) If the aggregate amount of the adjustment is negative, the 
Board-regulated institution must add back the adjustment to common 
equity tier 1 capital or to tier 1 capital, in accordance with Table 4 
to Sec.  217.300.

                                            Table 4 to Sec.   217.300
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                       Transition adjustments under Sec.
                                                                               217.22(b)(1)(iii)
                                                             ---------------------------------------------------
                      Transition period                           Percentage of the
                                                                adjustment applied to       Percentage of the
                                                                common equity tier  1     adjustment applied to
                                                                       capital               tier 1 capital
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Calendar year 2014..........................................                       20                        80
Calendar year 2015..........................................                       40                        60
Calendar year 2016..........................................                       60                        40
Calendar year 2017..........................................                       80                        20
Calendar year 2018, and thereafter..........................                      100                         0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (3) Transition adjustments to AOCI for an advanced approaches 
Board-regulated institution and a Board-regulated institution that has 
not made an AOCI opt-out election under Sec.  217.22(b)(2). Beginning 
January 1, 2014 for an advanced approaches Board-regulated institution, 
and beginning January 1, 2015 for a Board-regulated institution that is 
not an advanced approaches Board-regulated institution that has not 
made an AOCI opt-out

[[Page 50029]]

election under Sec.  217.22(b)(2), and in each case through December 
31, 2017, a Board-regulated institution must adjust common equity tier 
1 capital with respect to the transition AOCI adjustment amount 
(transition AOCI adjustment amount):
    (i) The transition AOCI adjustment amount is the aggregate amount 
of a Board-regulated institution's:
    (A) Unrealized gains on available-for-sale securities that are 
preferred stock classified as an equity security under GAAP or 
available-for-sale equity exposures, plus
    (B) Net unrealized gains or losses on available-for-sale securities 
that are not preferred stock classified as an equity security under 
GAAP or available-for-sale equity exposures, plus
    (C) Any amounts recorded in AOCI attributed to defined benefit 
postretirement plans resulting from the initial and subsequent 
application of the relevant GAAP standards that pertain to such plans 
(excluding, at the Board-regulated institution's option, the portion 
relating to pension assets deducted under section 22(a)(5)), plus
    (D) Accumulated net gains or losses on cash flow hedges related to 
items that are reported on the balance sheet at fair value included in 
AOCI, plus
    (E) Net unrealized gains or losses on held-to-maturity securities 
that are included in AOCI.
    (ii) A Board-regulated institution must make the following 
adjustment to its common equity tier 1 capital:
    (A) If the transition AOCI adjustment amount is positive, the 
appropriate amount must be deducted from common equity tier 1 capital 
in accordance with Table 5 to Sec.  217.300.
    (B) If the transition AOCI adjustment amount is negative, the 
appropriate amount must be added back to common equity tier 1 capital 
in accordance with Table 5 to Sec.  217.300.

                        Table 5 to Sec.   217.300
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                    Percentage of the
                                                     transition AOCI
               Transition period                 adjustment amount to be
                                                    applied to common
                                                 equity  tier 1 capital
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Calendar year 2014............................                       80
Calendar year 2015............................                       60
Calendar year 2016............................                       40
Calendar year 2017............................                       20
Calendar year 2018 and thereafter.............                        0
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (iii) A Board-regulated institution may include in tier 2 capital 
the percentage of unrealized gains on available-for-sale preferred 
stock classified as an equity security under GAAP and available-for-
sale equity exposures as set forth in Table 6 to Sec.  217.300.

                        Table 6 to Sec.   217.300
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                Percentage of unrealized
                                                 gains on available-for-
                                                  sale preferred stock
                                                 classified as an equity
               Transition period                 security under GAAP and
                                                   available-for-sale
                                                  equity exposures that
                                                 may be included in tier
                                                        2 capital
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Calendar year 2014............................                       36
Calendar year 2015............................                       27
Calendar year 2016............................                       18
Calendar year 2017............................                        9
Calendar year 2018 and thereafter.............                        0
------------------------------------------------------------------------

* * * * *
    (c) * * *
    (2) Mergers and acquisitions. (i) A depository institution holding 
company of $15 billion or more that acquires after December 31, 2013 
either a depository institution holding company with total consolidated 
assets of less than $15 billion as of December 31, 2009 (depository 
institution holding company under $15 billion) or a depository 
institution holding company that is a 2010 MHC, may include in 
regulatory capital the non-qualifying capital instruments issued by the 
acquired organization up to the applicable percentages set forth in 
Table 8 to Sec.  217.300.
    (ii) If a depository institution holding company under $15 billion 
acquires after December 31, 2013 a depository institution holding 
company under $15 billion or a 2010 MHC, and the resulting organization 
has total consolidated assets of $15 billion or more as reported on the 
resulting organization's FR Y-9C for the period in which the 
transaction occurred, the resulting organization may include in 
regulatory capital non-qualifying instruments of the resulting 
organization up to the applicable percentages set forth in Table 8 to 
Sec.  217.300.

[[Page 50030]]



                        Table 8 to Sec.   217.300
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                   Percentage of non-
                                                   qualifying capital
                                                 instruments includable
                                                 in additional tier 1 or
      Transition period  (calendar year)          tier 2 capital for a
                                                 depository institution
                                                 holding  company of $15
                                                    billion  or more
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Calendar year 2014............................                       50
Calendar year 2015............................                       25
Calendar year 2016 and thereafter.............                        0
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (3) Depository institution holding companies under $15 billion and 
2010 MHCs. (i) Non-qualifying capital instruments issued by depository 
institution holding companies under $15 billion and 2010 MHCs prior to 
May 19, 2010, may be included in additional tier 1 or tier 2 capital if 
the instrument was included in tier 1 or tier 2 capital, respectively, 
as of January 1, 2014.
    (ii) Non-qualifying capital instruments includable in tier 1 
capital are subject to a limit of 25 percent of tier 1 capital 
elements, excluding any non-qualifying capital instruments and after 
applying all regulatory capital deductions and adjustments to tier 1 
capital.
    (iii) Non-qualifying capital instruments that are not included in 
tier 1 as a result of the limitation in paragraph (c)(3)(ii) of this 
section are includable in tier 2 capital.
* * * * *
    (d) * * *
    (1) [Reserved]
    (2) Non-qualifying minority interest. Beginning January 1, 2014 for 
an advanced approaches Board-regulated institution, and beginning 
January 1, 2015 for a Board-regulated institution that is not an 
advanced approaches Board-regulated institution, and in each case 
through December 31, 2017, a Board-regulated institution may include in 
tier 1 capital or total capital the percentage of the tier 1 minority 
interest and total capital minority interest outstanding as of January 
1, 2014 that does not meet the criteria for additional tier 1 or tier 2 
capital instruments in Sec.  217.20 (non-qualifying minority interest), 
as set forth in Table 10 to Sec.  217.300.

                       Table 10 to Sec.   217.300
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                Percentage of the amount
                                                   of surplus or non-
                                                   qualifying minority
               Transition period                  interest that can be
                                                 included in regulatory
                                                   capital during the
                                                    transition period
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Calendar year 2014............................                       80
Calendar year 2015............................                       60
Calendar year 2016............................                       40
Calendar year 2017............................                       20
Calendar year 2018 and thereafter.............                        0
------------------------------------------------------------------------

* * * * *

12 CFR Part 324

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation

    For the reasons set out in the joint preamble, the FDIC proposes to 
amend 12 CFR part 324 as follows.

PART 324--CAPITAL ADEQUACY OF FDIC-SUPERVISED INSTITUTIONS

Subpart A--General Provisions

0
50. The authority citation for part 324 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 12 U.S.C. 1815(a), 1815(b), 1816, 1818(a), 1818(b), 
1818(c), 1818(t), 1819(Tenth), 1828(c), 1828(d), 1828(i), 1828(n), 
1828(o), 1831o, 1835, 3907, 3909, 4808; 5371; 5412; Pub. L. 102-233, 
105 Stat. 1761, 1789, 1790 (12 U.S.C. 1831n note); Pub. L. 102-242, 
105 Stat. 2236, 2355, as amended by Pub. L. 103-325, 108 Stat. 2160, 
2233 (12 U.S.C. 1828 note); Pub. L. 102-242, 105 Stat. 2236, 2386, 
as amended by Pub. L. 102-550, 106 Stat. 3672, 4089 (12 U.S.C. 1828 
note); Pub. L. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1887 (15 U.S.C. 78o-7 note).

0
51. Section 324.2 is amended by removing the definitions of ``corporate 
exposure,'' ``eligible guarantor,'' ``high volatility commercial real 
estate (HVCRE) exposure,'' ``investment in the capital of an 
unconsolidated financial institution,'' ``non-significant investment in 
the capital of an unconsolidated financial institution,'' and 
``significant investment in the capital of an unconsolidated financial 
institution,'' and adding the definitions of ``corporate exposure,'' 
``eligible guarantor,'' ``high volatility acquisition, development, or 
construction (HVADC) exposure,'' ``high volatility commercial real 
estate (HVCRE) exposure,'' ``investment in the capital of an 
unconsolidated financial institution,'' ``non-significant investment in 
the capital of an unconsolidated financial institution,'' and 
``significant investment in the capital of an unconsolidated financial 
institution'' as follows:


Sec.  324.2  Definitions.

* * * * *
    Corporate exposure means an exposure to a company that is not:
    (1) An exposure to a sovereign, the Bank for International 
Settlements, the European Central Bank, the European Commission, the 
International Monetary Fund, the European Stability Mechanism, the 
European Financial Stability Facility, a multi-lateral development bank 
(MDB), a depository institution, a foreign bank, a credit union, or a 
public sector entity (PSE);
    (2) An exposure to a GSE;
    (3) A residential mortgage exposure;

[[Page 50031]]

    (4) A pre-sold construction loan;
    (5) A statutory multifamily mortgage;
    (6) A high volatility acquisition, development, or construction 
(HVADC) exposure or a high volatility commercial real estate (HVCRE) 
exposure;
    (7) A cleared transaction;
    (8) A default fund contribution;
    (9) A securitization exposure;
    (10) An equity exposure; or
    (11) An unsettled transaction.
* * * * *
    Eligible guarantor means:
    (1) A sovereign, the Bank for International Settlements, the 
International Monetary Fund, the European Central Bank, the European 
Commission, a Federal Home Loan Bank, Federal Agricultural Mortgage 
Corporation (Farmer Mac), the European Stability Mechanism, the 
European Financial Stability Facility, a multilateral development bank 
(MDB), a depository institution, a bank holding company, a savings and 
loan holding company, a credit union, a foreign bank, or a qualifying 
central counterparty; or
    (2) An entity (other than a special purpose entity):
    (i) That at the time the guarantee is issued or anytime thereafter, 
has issued and outstanding an unsecured debt security without credit 
enhancement that is investment grade;
    (ii) Whose creditworthiness is not positively correlated with the 
credit risk of the exposures for which it has provided guarantees; and
    (iii) That is not an insurance company engaged predominately in the 
business of providing credit protection (such as a monoline bond 
insurer or re-insurer).
* * * * *
    High-volatility acquisition, development, or construction (HVADC) 
exposure means a credit facility that is originated on or after 
[effective date] and that:
    (1) Primarily finances or refinances the:
    (i) Acquisition of vacant or developed land;
    (ii) Development of land to prepare to erect new structures 
including, but not limited to, the laying of sewers or water pipes and 
demolishing existing structures; or
    (iii) Construction of buildings, dwellings, or other improvements 
including additions or alterations to existing structures; and
    (2) Is not a credit facility that finances or refinances:
    (i) One- to four-family residential properties;
    (ii) Real property projects that would have the primary purpose of 
``community development'' as defined under 12 CFR part 25 (national 
bank), 12 CFR part 195 (Federal savings association) (OCC); 12 CFR part 
228 (Board); 12 CFR part 345 (FDIC); or
    (iii) The purchase or development of agricultural land, including, 
but not limited to, all land used or usable for agricultural purposes 
(such as crop and livestock production), provided that the valuation of 
the agricultural land is based on its value for agricultural purposes 
and the valuation does not take into consideration any potential use of 
the land for commercial or residential development; and
    (3) Is not a permanent loan. A permanent loan for purposes of this 
definition means a prudently underwritten loan that has a clearly 
identified ongoing source of repayment sufficient to service amortizing 
principal and interest payments aside from the sale of the property. 
For purposes of this section, a permanent loan does not include a loan 
that finances or refinances a stabilization period or unsold lots or 
units of for-sale projects.
    High volatility commercial real estate (HVCRE) exposure, for 
purposes of Subpart D, means a credit facility that is either 
outstanding or committed prior to [effective date] and, prior to 
conversion to permanent financing, finances or has financed the 
acquisition, development, or construction (ADC) of real property, 
unless the facility finances:
    (1) One- to four-family residential properties;
    (2) Real property that:
    (i) Would qualify as an investment in community development under 
12 U.S.C. 338a or 12 U.S.C. 24 (Eleventh), as applicable, or as a 
``qualified investment'' under 12 CFR part 345, and
    (ii) Is not an ADC loan to any entity described in 12 CFR 
345.12(g)(3), unless it is otherwise described in paragraph (1), 
(2)(i), (3) or (4) of this definition;
    (3) The purchase or development of agricultural land, which 
includes all land known to be used or usable for agricultural purposes 
(such as crop and livestock production), provided that the valuation of 
the agricultural land is based on its value for agricultural purposes 
and the valuation does not take into consideration any potential use of 
the land for non-agricultural commercial development or residential 
development; or
    (4) Commercial real estate projects in which:
    (i) The loan-to-value ratio is less than or equal to the applicable 
maximum supervisory loan-to-value ratio in the FDIC's real estate 
lending standards at 12 CFR part 365, subpart A (state non-member 
banks), 12 CFR 390.264 and 390.265 (state savings associations);
    (ii) The borrower has contributed capital to the project in the 
form of cash or unencumbered readily marketable assets (or has paid 
development expenses out-of-pocket) of at least 15 percent of the real 
estate's appraised ``as completed'' value; and
    (iii) The borrower contributed the amount of capital required by 
paragraph (4)(ii) of this definition before the FDIC-supervised 
institution advances funds under the credit facility, and the capital 
contributed by the borrower, or internally generated by the project, is 
contractually required to remain in the project throughout the life of 
the project. The life of a project concludes only when the credit 
facility is converted to permanent financing or is sold or paid in 
full. Permanent financing may be provided by the FDIC-supervised 
institution that provided the ADC facility as long as the permanent 
financing is subject to the FDIC-supervised institution's underwriting 
criteria for long-term mortgage loans.
* * * * *
    Investment in the capital of an unconsolidated financial 
institution means a net long position calculated in accordance with 
Sec.  324.22(h) in an instrument that is recognized as capital for 
regulatory purposes by the primary supervisor of an unconsolidated 
regulated financial institution or is an instrument that is part of the 
GAAP equity of an unconsolidated unregulated financial institution, 
including direct, indirect, and synthetic exposures to capital 
instruments, excluding underwriting positions held by the FDIC-
supervised institution for five or fewer business days.
* * * * *
    Non-significant investment in the capital of an unconsolidated 
financial institution means an investment by an advanced approaches 
FDIC-supervised institution in the capital of an unconsolidated 
financial institution where the advanced approaches FDIC-supervised 
institution owns 10 percent or less of the issued and outstanding 
common stock of the unconsolidated financial institution.
* * * * *
    Significant investment in the capital of an unconsolidated 
financial institution means an investment by an advanced approaches 
FDIC-supervised institution in the capital of an unconsolidated 
financial institution where the advanced approaches FDIC-supervised 
institution owns more than 10 percent of the issued and outstanding

[[Page 50032]]

common stock of the unconsolidated financial institution.
* * * * *
0
52. Section 324.10 is amended by revising paragraph (c)(4)(ii)(H) to 
read as follows:


Sec.  324.10  Minimum capital requirements.

* * * * *
    (c) * * *
    (4) * * *
    (ii) * * *
    (H) The credit equivalent amount of all off-balance sheet exposures 
of the FDIC-supervised institution, excluding repo-style transactions, 
repurchase or reverse repurchase or securities borrowing or lending 
transactions that qualify for sales treatment under U.S. GAAP, and 
derivative transactions, determined using the applicable credit 
conversion factor under Sec.  324.33(b), provided, however, that the 
minimum credit conversion factor that may be assigned to an off-balance 
sheet exposure under this paragraph is 10 percent; and
* * * * *
0
53. Section 324.11 is amended by revising paragraphs (a)(2)(i), 
(a)(2)(iv), (a)(3)(i), and Table 1 to read as follows:


Sec.  324.11  Capital conservation buffer and countercyclical capital 
buffer amount.

    (a) * * *
    (2) * * *
    (i) Eligible retained income. The eligible retained income of an 
FDIC-supervised institution is the FDIC-supervised institution's net 
income, calculated in accordance with the instructions to the Call 
Report, for the four calendar quarters preceding the current calendar 
quarter, net of any distributions and associated tax effects not 
already reflected in net income.
* * * * *
    (iv) Private sector credit exposure. Private sector credit exposure 
means an exposure to a company or an individual that is not an exposure 
to a sovereign, the Bank for International Settlements, the European 
Central Bank, the European Commission, the European Stability 
Mechanism, the European Financial Stability Facility, the International 
Monetary Fund, an MDB, a PSE, or a GSE.
    (3) Calculation of capital conservation buffer. (i) An FDIC-
supervised institution's capital conservation buffer is equal to the 
lowest of the following ratios, calculated as of the last day of the 
previous calendar quarter:
    (A) The FDIC-supervised institution's common equity tier 1 capital 
ratio minus the FDIC-supervised institution's minimum common equity 
tier 1 capital ratio requirement under Sec.  324.10;
    (B) The FDIC-supervised institution's tier 1 capital ratio minus 
the FDIC-supervised institution's minimum tier 1 capital ratio 
requirement under Sec.  324.10; and
    (C) The FDIC-supervised institution's total capital ratio minus the 
FDIC-supervised institution's minimum total capital ratio requirement 
under Sec.  324.10; or
* * * * *

     Table 1 to Sec.   324.11--Calculation of Maximum Payout Amount
------------------------------------------------------------------------
           Capital conservation buffer             Maximum payout ratio
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Greater than 2.5 percent plus 100 percent of the  No payout ratio
 FDIC-supervised institution's applicable          limitation applies.
 countercyclical capital buffer amount.
Less than or equal to 2.5 percent plus 100        60 percent.
 percent of the FDIC-supervised institution's
 applicable countercyclical capital buffer
 amount, and greater than 1.875 percent plus 75
 percent of the FDIC-supervised institution's
 applicable countercyclical capital buffer
 amount.
Less than or equal to 1.875 percent plus 75       40 percent.
 percent of the FDIC-supervised institution's
 applicable countercyclical capital buffer
 amount, and greater than 1.25 percent plus 50
 percent of the FDIC-supervised institution's
 applicable countercyclical capital buffer
 amount.
Less than or equal to 1.25 percent plus 50        20 percent.
 percent of the FDIC-supervised institution's
 applicable countercyclical capital buffer
 amount, and greater than 0.625 percent plus 25
 percent of the FDIC-supervised institution's
 applicable countercyclical capital buffer
 amount.
Less than or equal to 0.625 percent plus 25       0 percent.
 percent of the FDIC-supervised institution's
 applicable countercyclical capital buffer
 amount.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

* * * * *
0
54. Section 324.20 is amended by revising paragraphs (b)(4), 
(c)(1)(viii), (c)(2), and (d)(2) to read as follows:


Sec.  324.20  Capital components and eligibility criteria for 
regulatory capital instruments.

* * * * *
    (b) * * *
    (4) Any common equity tier 1 minority interest, subject to the 
limitations in Sec.  324.21.
* * * * *
    (c) * * *
    (1) * * *
    (viii) Any cash dividend payments on the instrument are paid out of 
the FDIC-supervised institution's net income or retained earnings. An 
FDIC-supervised institution must obtain prior FDIC approval for any 
dividend payment involving a reduction or retirement of capital stock 
in accordance with 12 CFR 303.241.
* * * * *
    (2) Tier 1 minority interest, subject to the limitations in Sec.  
324.21, that is not included in the FDIC-supervised institution's 
common equity tier 1 capital.
* * * * *
    (d) * * *
    (2) Total capital minority interest, subject to the limitations set 
forth in Sec.  324.21, that is not included in the FDIC-supervised 
institution's tier 1 capital.
* * * * *
0
55. Section 324.21 is revised to reads as follows:


Sec.  324.21  Minority interest.

    (a) (1) Applicability. For purposes of Sec.  324.20, an FDIC-
supervised institution that is not an advanced approaches FDIC-
supervised institution is subject to the minority interest limitations 
in this paragraph (a) if a consolidated subsidiary of the FDIC-
supervised institution has issued regulatory capital that is not owned 
by the FDIC-supervised institution.
    (2) Common equity tier 1 minority interest includable in the common 
equity tier 1 capital of the FDIC-supervised institution. The amount of 
common equity tier 1 minority interest that an FDIC-supervised 
institution may include in common equity tier 1 capital must be no 
greater than 10 percent of the sum of all common equity tier 1 capital 
elements of the FDIC-supervised institution (not including the common 
equity tier 1 minority interest itself), less any common equity tier 1 
capital

[[Page 50033]]

regulatory adjustments and deductions in accordance with Sec.  324.22 
(a) and (b).
    (3) Tier 1 minority interest includable in the tier 1 capital of 
the FDIC-supervised institution. The amount of tier 1 minority interest 
that an FDIC-supervised may include in tier 1 capital must be no 
greater than 10 percent of the sum of all tier 1 capital elements of 
the FDIC-supervised institution (not including the tier 1 minority 
interest itself), less any tier 1 capital regulatory adjustments and 
deductions in accordance with Sec.  324.22 (a) and (b).
    (4) Total capital minority interest includable in the total capital 
of the FDIC-supervised institution. The amount of total capital 
minority interest that an FDIC-supervised institution may include in 
total capital must be no greater than 10 percent of the sum of all 
total capital elements of the FDIC-supervised institution (not 
including the total capital minority interest itself), less any total 
capital regulatory adjustments and deductions in accordance with Sec.  
324.22 (a) and (b).
    (b) (1) Applicability. For purposes of Sec.  324.20, an advanced 
approaches FDIC-supervised institution is subject to the minority 
interest limitations in this paragraph (b) if:
    (i) A consolidated subsidiary of the advanced approaches FDIC-
supervised institution has issued regulatory capital that is not owned 
by the FDIC-supervised institution; and
    (ii) For each relevant regulatory capital ratio of the consolidated 
subsidiary, the ratio exceeds the sum of the subsidiary's minimum 
regulatory capital requirements plus its capital conservation buffer.
    (2) Difference in capital adequacy standards at the subsidiary 
level. For purposes of the minority interest calculations in this 
section, if the consolidated subsidiary issuing the capital is not 
subject to capital adequacy standards similar to those of the advanced 
approaches FDIC-supervised institution, the advanced approaches FDIC-
supervised institution must assume that the capital adequacy standards 
of the advanced approaches FDIC-supervised institution apply to the 
subsidiary.
    (3) Common equity tier 1 minority interest includable in the common 
equity tier 1 capital of the FDIC-supervised institution. For each 
consolidated subsidiary of an advanced approaches FDIC-supervised 
institution, the amount of common equity tier 1 minority interest the 
advanced approaches FDIC-supervised institution may include in common 
equity tier 1 capital is equal to:
    (i) The common equity tier 1 minority interest of the subsidiary; 
minus
    (ii) The percentage of the subsidiary's common equity tier 1 
capital that is not owned by the advanced approaches FDIC-supervised 
institution, multiplied by the difference between the common equity 
tier 1 capital of the subsidiary and the lower of:
    (A) The amount of common equity tier 1 capital the subsidiary must 
hold, or would be required to hold pursuant to paragraph (b) of this 
section, to avoid restrictions on distributions and discretionary bonus 
payments under Sec.  324.11 or equivalent standards established by the 
subsidiary's home country supervisor; or
    (B)(1) The standardized total risk-weighted assets of the advanced 
approaches FDIC-supervised institution that relate to the subsidiary 
multiplied by
    (2) The common equity tier 1 capital ratio the subsidiary must 
maintain to avoid restrictions on distributions and discretionary bonus 
payments under Sec.  324.11 or equivalent standards established by the 
subsidiary's home country supervisor.
    (4) Tier 1 minority interest includable in the tier 1 capital of 
the advanced approaches FDIC-supervised institution. For each 
consolidated subsidiary of the advanced approaches FDIC-supervised 
institution, the amount of tier 1 minority interest the advanced 
approaches FDIC-supervised institution may include in tier 1 capital is 
equal to:
    (i) The tier 1 minority interest of the subsidiary; minus
    (ii) The percentage of the subsidiary's tier 1 capital that is not 
owned by the advanced approaches FDIC-supervised institution multiplied 
by the difference between the tier 1 capital of the subsidiary and the 
lower of:
    (A) The amount of tier 1 capital the subsidiary must hold, or would 
be required to hold pursuant to paragraph (b) of this section, to avoid 
restrictions on distributions and discretionary bonus payments under 
Sec.  324.11 or equivalent standards established by the subsidiary's 
home country supervisor, or
    (B)(1) The standardized total risk-weighted assets of the advanced 
approaches FDIC-supervised institution that relate to the subsidiary 
multiplied by
    (2) The tier 1 capital ratio the subsidiary must maintain to avoid 
restrictions on distributions and discretionary bonus payments under 
Sec.  324.11 or equivalent standards established by the subsidiary's 
home country supervisor.
    (5) Total capital minority interest includable in the total capital 
of the FDIC-supervised institution. For each consolidated subsidiary of 
the advanced approaches FDIC-supervised institution, the amount of 
total capital minority interest the advanced approaches FDIC-supervised 
institution may include in total capital is equal to:
    (i) The total capital minority interest of the subsidiary; minus
    (ii) The percentage of the subsidiary's total capital that is not 
owned by the advanced approaches FDIC-supervised institution multiplied 
by the difference between the total capital of the subsidiary and the 
lower of:
    (A) The amount of total capital the subsidiary must hold, or would 
be required to hold pursuant to paragraph (b) of this section, to avoid 
restrictions on distributions and discretionary bonus payments under 
Sec.  324.11 or equivalent standards established by the subsidiary's 
home country supervisor, or
    (B)(1) The standardized total risk-weighted assets of the advanced 
approaches FDIC-supervised institution that relate to the subsidiary 
multiplied by
    (2) The total capital ratio the subsidiary must maintain to avoid 
restrictions on distributions and discretionary bonus payments under 
Sec.  324.11 or equivalent standards established by the subsidiary's 
home country supervisor.

0
56. Section 324.22 is amended by revising paragraphs (a)(1), (c), (d), 
(g), and (h) to read as follows:


Sec.  324.22   Regulatory capital adjustments and deductions.

    (a) * * *
    (1)(i) Goodwill, net of associated deferred tax liabilities (DTLs) 
in accordance with paragraph (e) of this section; and
    (ii) For an advanced approaches FDIC-supervised institution, 
goodwill that is embedded in the valuation of a significant investment 
in the capital of an unconsolidated financial institution in the form 
of common stock (and that is reflected in the consolidated financial 
statements of the advanced approaches FDIC-supervised institution), in 
accordance with paragraph (d) of this section;
* * * * *
    (c) Deductions from regulatory capital related to investments in 
capital instruments \23\--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \23\ The FDIC-supervised institution must calculate amounts 
deducted under paragraphs (c) through (f) of this section after it 
calculates the amount of ALLL includable in tier 2 capital under 
Sec.  324.20(d)(3).

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 50034]]

    (1) Investment in the FDIC-supervised institution's own capital 
instruments. An FDIC-supervised institution must deduct an investment 
in the FDIC-supervised institution's own capital instruments as 
follows:
    (i) An FDIC-supervised institution must deduct an investment in the 
FDIC-supervised institution's own common stock instruments from its 
common equity tier 1 capital elements to the extent such instruments 
are not excluded from regulatory capital under Sec.  324.20(b)(1);
    (ii) An FDIC-supervised institution must deduct an investment in 
the FDIC-supervised institution's own additional tier 1 capital 
instruments from its additional tier 1 capital elements; and
    (iii) An FDIC-supervised institution must deduct an investment in 
the FDIC-supervised institution's own tier 2 capital instruments from 
its tier 2 capital elements.
    (2) Corresponding deduction approach. For purposes of subpart C of 
this part, the corresponding deduction approach is the methodology used 
for the deductions from regulatory capital related to reciprocal cross 
holdings (as described in paragraph (c)(3) of this section), 
investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial institutions for 
an FDIC-supervised institution that is not an advanced approaches FDIC-
supervised institution (as described in paragraph (c)(4) of this 
section), non-significant investments in the capital of unconsolidated 
financial institutions for an advanced approaches FDIC-supervised 
institution (as described in paragraph (c)(5) of this section), and 
non-common stock significant investments in the capital of 
unconsolidated financial institutions for an advanced approaches FDIC-
supervised institution (as described in paragraph (c)(6) of this 
section). Under the corresponding deduction approach, an FDIC-
supervised institution must make deductions from the component of 
capital for which the underlying instrument would qualify if it were 
issued by the FDIC-supervised institution itself, as described in 
paragraphs (c)(2)(i)-(iii) of this section. If the FDIC-supervised 
institution does not have a sufficient amount of a specific component 
of capital to effect the required deduction, the shortfall must be 
deducted according to paragraph (f) of this section.
    (i) If an investment is in the form of an instrument issued by a 
financial institution that is not a regulated financial institution, 
the FDIC-supervised institution must treat the instrument as:
    (A) A common equity tier 1 capital instrument if it is common stock 
or represents the most subordinated claim in liquidation of the 
financial institution; and
    (B) An additional tier 1 capital instrument if it is subordinated 
to all creditors of the financial institution and is senior in 
liquidation only to common shareholders.
    (ii) If an investment is in the form of an instrument issued by a 
regulated financial institution and the instrument does not meet the 
criteria for common equity tier 1, additional tier 1 or tier 2 capital 
instruments under Sec.  324.20, the FDIC-supervised institution must 
treat the instrument as:
    (A) A common equity tier 1 capital instrument if it is common stock 
included in GAAP equity or represents the most subordinated claim in 
liquidation of the financial institution;
    (B) An additional tier 1 capital instrument if it is included in 
GAAP equity, subordinated to all creditors of the financial 
institution, and senior in a receivership, insolvency, liquidation, or 
similar proceeding only to common shareholders; and
    (C) A tier 2 capital instrument if it is not included in GAAP 
equity but considered regulatory capital by the primary supervisor of 
the financial institution.
    (iii) If an investment is in the form of a non-qualifying capital 
instrument (as defined in Sec.  324.300(c)), the FDIC-supervised 
institution must treat the instrument as:
    (A) An additional tier 1 capital instrument if such instrument was 
included in the issuer's tier 1 capital prior to May 19, 2010; or
    (B) A tier 2 capital instrument if such instrument was included in 
the issuer's tier 2 capital (but not includable in tier 1 capital) 
prior to May 19, 2010.
    (3) Reciprocal cross holdings in the capital of financial 
institutions. An FDIC-supervised institution must deduct investments in 
the capital of other financial institutions it holds reciprocally, 
where such reciprocal cross holdings result from a formal or informal 
arrangement to swap, exchange, or otherwise intend to hold each other's 
capital instruments, by applying the corresponding deduction approach.
    (4) Investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial 
institutions. An FDIC-supervised institution that is not an advanced 
approaches FDIC-supervised institution must deduct its investments in 
the capital of unconsolidated financial institutions (as defined in 
Sec.  324.2) that exceed 25 percent of the sum of the FDIC-supervised 
institution's common equity tier 1 capital elements minus all 
deductions from and adjustments to common equity tier 1 capital 
elements required under paragraphs (a) through (c)(3) of this section 
by applying the corresponding deduction approach.\24\ The deductions 
described in this section are net of associated DTLs in accordance with 
paragraph (e) of this section. In addition, an FDIC-supervised 
institution that underwrites a failed underwriting, with the prior 
written approval of the FDIC, for the period of time stipulated by the 
FDIC, is not required to deduct an investment in the capital of an 
unconsolidated financial institution pursuant to this paragraph (c) to 
the extent the investment is related to the failed underwriting.\25\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \24\ With the prior written approval of the FDIC, for the period 
of time stipulated by the FDIC, an FDIC-supervised institution that 
is not an advanced approaches FDIC-supervised institution is not 
required to deduct an investment in the capital of an unconsolidated 
financial institution pursuant to this paragraph if the financial 
institution is in distress and if such investment is made for the 
purpose of providing financial support to the financial institution, 
as determined by the FDIC.
    \25\ Any investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial 
institutions that do not exceed the 25 percent threshold for 
investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial institutions 
under this section must be assigned the appropriate risk weight 
under subparts D or F of this part, as applicable.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (5) Non-significant investments in the capital of unconsolidated 
financial institutions. (i) An advanced approaches FDIC-supervised 
institution must deduct its non-significant investments in the capital 
of unconsolidated financial institutions (as defined in Sec.  324.2) 
that, in the aggregate, exceed 10 percent of the sum of the advanced 
approaches FDIC-supervised institution's common equity tier 1 capital 
elements minus all deductions from and adjustments to common equity 
tier 1 capital elements required under paragraphs (a) through (c)(3) of 
this section (the 10 percent threshold for non-significant investments) 
by applying the corresponding deduction approach.\26\ The deductions 
described in this section are net of associated DTLs in accordance with 
paragraph (e) of this section. In addition, an advanced approaches 
FDIC-supervised institution that underwrites a failed underwriting,

[[Page 50035]]

with the prior written approval of the FDIC, for the period of time 
stipulated by the FDIC, is not required to deduct a non-significant 
investment in the capital of an unconsolidated financial institution 
pursuant to this paragraph (c) to the extent the investment is related 
to the failed underwriting.\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \26\ With the prior written approval of the FDIC, for the period 
of time stipulated by the FDIC, an advanced approaches FDIC-
supervised institution is not required to deduct a non-significant 
investment in the capital of an unconsolidated financial institution 
pursuant to this paragraph if the financial institution is in 
distress and if such investment is made for the purpose of providing 
financial support to the financial institution, as determined by the 
FDIC.
    \27\ Any non-significant investments in the capital of 
unconsolidated financial institutions that do not exceed the 10 
percent threshold for non-significant investments under this section 
must be assigned the appropriate risk weight under subparts D, E, or 
F of this part, as applicable.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (ii) The amount to be deducted under this section from a specific 
capital component is equal to:
    (A) The advanced approaches FDIC-supervised institution's non-
significant investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial 
institutions exceeding the 10 percent threshold for non-significant 
investments, multiplied by
    (B) The ratio of the advanced approaches FDIC-supervised 
institution's non-significant investments in the capital of 
unconsolidated financial institutions in the form of such capital 
component to the advanced approaches FDIC-supervised institution's 
total non-significant investments in unconsolidated financial 
institutions.
    (6) Significant investments in the capital of unconsolidated 
financial institutions that are not in the form of common stock. An 
advanced approaches FDIC-supervised institution must deduct its 
significant investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial 
institutions that are not in the form of common stock by applying the 
corresponding deduction approach.\28\ The deductions described in this 
section are net of associated DTLs in accordance with paragraph (e) of 
this section. In addition, with the prior written approval of the FDIC, 
for the period of time stipulated by the FDIC, an advanced approaches 
FDIC-supervised institution that underwrites a failed underwriting is 
not required to deduct a significant investment in the capital of an 
unconsolidated financial institution pursuant to this paragraph (c) if 
such investment is related to such failed underwriting.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \28\ With prior written approval of the FDIC, for the period of 
time stipulated by the FDIC, an advanced approaches FDIC-supervised 
institution is not required to deduct a significant investment in 
the capital instrument of an unconsolidated financial institution in 
distress which is not in the form of common stock pursuant to this 
section if such investment is made for the purpose of providing 
financial support to the financial institution as determined by the 
FDIC.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (d) MSAs and certain DTAs subject to common equity tier 1 capital 
deduction thresholds.
    (1) An FDIC-supervised institution that is not an advanced 
approaches FDIC-supervised institution must make deductions from 
regulatory capital as described in this paragraph (d)(1).
    (i) The FDIC-supervised institution must deduct from common equity 
tier 1 capital elements the amount of each of the items set forth in 
this paragraph (d)(1) that, individually, exceeds 25 percent of the sum 
of the FDIC-supervised institution's common equity tier 1 capital 
elements, less adjustments to and deductions from common equity tier 1 
capital required under paragraphs (a) through (c)(3) of this section 
(the 25 percent common equity tier 1 capital deduction threshold).\29\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \29\ The amount of the items in paragraph (d)(1) of this section 
that is not deducted from common equity tier 1 capital must be 
included in the risk-weighted assets of the FDIC-supervised 
institution and assigned a 250 percent risk weight.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (ii) The FDIC-supervised institution must deduct from common equity 
tier 1 capital elements, as set forth in (d)(1), the amount of DTAs 
arising from temporary differences that the FDIC-supervised institution 
could not realize through net operating loss carrybacks, net of any 
related valuation allowances and net of DTLs, in accordance with 
paragraph (e) of this section. An FDIC-supervised institution is not 
required to deduct from the sum of its common equity tier 1 capital 
elements DTAs (net of any related valuation allowances and net of DTLs, 
in accordance with Sec.  324.22(e)) arising from timing differences 
that the FDIC-supervised institution could realize through net 
operating loss carrybacks. The FDIC-supervised institution must risk 
weight these assets at 100 percent. For an FDIC-supervised institution 
that is a member of a consolidated group for tax purposes, the amount 
of DTAs that could be realized through net operating loss carrybacks 
may not exceed the amount that the FDIC-supervised institution could 
reasonably expect to have refunded by its parent holding company.
    (iii) The FDIC-supervised institution must deduct from common 
equity tier 1 capital elements the amount of MSAs net of associated 
DTLs, in accordance with paragraph (e) of this section.
    (iv) For purposes of calculating the amount of DTAs subject to 
deduction pursuant to paragraph (d)(1) of this section, an FDIC-
supervised institution may exclude DTAs and DTLs relating to 
adjustments made to common equity tier 1 capital under paragraph (b) of 
this section. An FDIC-supervised institution that elects to exclude 
DTAs relating to adjustments under paragraph (b) of this section also 
must exclude DTLs and must do so consistently in all future 
calculations. An FDIC-supervised institution may change its exclusion 
preference only after obtaining the prior approval of the FDIC.
    (2) An advanced approaches FDIC-supervised institution must make 
deductions from regulatory capital as described in this paragraph 
(d)(2).
    (i) An advanced approaches FDIC-supervised institution must deduct 
from common equity tier 1 capital elements the amount of each of the 
items set forth in this paragraph (d)(2) that, individually, exceeds 10 
percent of the sum of the advanced approaches FDIC-supervised 
institution's common equity tier 1 capital elements, less adjustments 
to and deductions from common equity tier 1 capital required under 
paragraphs (a) through (c) of this section (the 10 percent common 
equity tier 1 capital deduction threshold).
    (A) DTAs arising from temporary differences that the advanced 
approaches FDIC-supervised institution could not realize through net 
operating loss carrybacks, net of any related valuation allowances and 
net of DTLs, in accordance with paragraph (e) of this section. An 
advanced approaches FDIC-supervised institution is not required to 
deduct from the sum of its common equity tier 1 capital elements DTAs 
(net of any related valuation allowances and net of DTLs, in accordance 
with Sec.  324.22(e)) arising from timing differences that the advanced 
approaches FDIC-supervised institution could realize through net 
operating loss carrybacks. The advanced approaches FDIC-supervised 
institution must risk weight these assets at 100 percent. For an FDIC-
supervised institution that is a member of a consolidated group for tax 
purposes, the amount of DTAs that could be realized through net 
operating loss carrybacks may not exceed the amount that the FDIC-
supervised institution could reasonably expect to have refunded by its 
parent holding company.
    (B) MSAs net of associated DTLs, in accordance with paragraph (e) 
of this section.
    (C) Significant investments in the capital of unconsolidated 
financial institutions in the form of common stock, net of associated 
DTLs in accordance with paragraph (e) of this section.\30\ Significant 
investments in the

[[Page 50036]]

capital of unconsolidated financial institutions in the form of common 
stock subject to the 10 percent common equity tier 1 capital deduction 
threshold may be reduced by any goodwill embedded in the valuation of 
such investments deducted by the advanced approaches FDIC-supervised 
institution pursuant to paragraph (a)(1) of this section. In addition, 
with the prior written approval of the FDIC, for the period of time 
stipulated by the FDIC, an advanced approaches FDIC-supervised 
institution that underwrites a failed underwriting is not required to 
deduct a significant investment in the capital of an unconsolidated 
financial institution in the form of common stock pursuant to this 
paragraph (d)(2) if such investment is related to such failed 
underwriting.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \30\ With the prior written approval of the FDIC, for the period 
of time stipulated by the FDIC, an advanced approaches FDIC-
supervised institution is not required to deduct a significant 
investment in the capital instrument of an unconsolidated financial 
institution in distress in the form of common stock pursuant to this 
section if such investment is made for the purpose of providing 
financial support to the financial institution as determined by the 
FDIC.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (ii) An advanced approaches FDIC-supervised institution must deduct 
from common equity tier 1 capital elements the items listed in 
paragraph (d)(2)(i) of this section that are not deducted as a result 
of the application of the 10 percent common equity tier 1 capital 
deduction threshold, and that, in aggregate, exceed 17.65 percent of 
the sum of the advanced approaches FDIC-supervised institution's common 
equity tier 1 capital elements, minus adjustments to and deductions 
from common equity tier 1 capital required under paragraphs (a) through 
(c) of this section, minus the items listed in paragraph (d)(2)(i) of 
this section (the 15 percent common equity tier 1 capital deduction 
threshold). Any goodwill that has been deducted under paragraph (a)(1) 
of this section can be excluded from the significant investments in the 
capital of unconsolidated financial institutions in the form of common 
stock.\31\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \31\ The amount of the items in paragraph (d)(2) of this section 
that is not deducted from common equity tier 1 capital pursuant to 
this section must be included in the risk-weighted assets of the 
advanced approaches FDIC-supervised institution and assigned a 250 
percent risk weight.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (iii) For purposes of calculating the amount of DTAs subject to the 
10 and 15 percent common equity tier 1 capital deduction thresholds, an 
advanced approaches FDIC-supervised institution may exclude DTAs and 
DTLs relating to adjustments made to common equity tier 1 capital under 
paragraph (b) of this section. An advanced approaches FDIC-supervised 
institution that elects to exclude DTAs relating to adjustments under 
paragraph (b) of this section also must exclude DTLs and must do so 
consistently in all future calculations. An advanced approaches FDIC-
supervised institution may change its exclusion preference only after 
obtaining the prior approval of the FDIC.
* * * * *
    (g) Treatment of assets that are deducted. An FDIC-supervised 
institution must exclude from standardized total risk-weighted assets 
and, as applicable, advanced approaches total risk-weighted assets any 
item that is required to be deducted from regulatory capital.
    (h) Net long position. (1) For purposes of calculating an 
investment in the FDIC-supervised institution's own capital instrument 
and an investment in the capital of an unconsolidated financial 
institution under this section, the net long position is the gross long 
position in the underlying instrument determined in accordance with 
paragraph (h)(2) of this section, as adjusted to recognize a short 
position in the same instrument calculated in accordance with paragraph 
(h)(3) of this section.
    (2) Gross long position. The gross long position is determined as 
follows:
    (i) For an equity exposure that is held directly, the adjusted 
carrying value as that term is defined in Sec.  324.51(b);
    (ii) For an exposure that is held directly and is not an equity 
exposure or a securitization exposure, the exposure amount as that term 
is defined in Sec.  324.2;
    (iii) For an indirect exposure, the FDIC-supervised institution's 
carrying value of the investment in the investment fund, provided that, 
alternatively:
    (A) An FDIC-supervised institution may, with the prior approval of 
the FDIC, use a conservative estimate of the amount of its investment 
in the FDIC-supervised institution's own capital instruments or its 
investment in the capital of an unconsolidated financial institution 
held through a position in an index; or
    (B) An FDIC-supervised institution may calculate the gross long 
position for investments in the FDIC-supervised institution's own 
capital instruments or investments in the capital of an unconsolidated 
financial institution by multiplying the FDIC-supervised institution's 
carrying value of its investment in the investment fund by either:
    (1) The highest stated investment limit (in percent) for 
investments in the FDIC-supervised institution's own capital 
instruments or investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial 
institutions as stated in the prospectus, partnership agreement, or 
similar contract defining permissible investments of the investment 
fund; or
    (2) The investment fund's actual holdings of investments in the 
FDIC-supervised institution's own capital instruments or investments in 
the capital of unconsolidated financial institutions.
    (iv) For a synthetic exposure, the amount of the FDIC-supervised 
institution's loss on the exposure if the reference capital instrument 
were to have a value of zero.
    (3) Adjustments to reflect a short position. In order to adjust the 
gross long position to recognize a short position in the same 
instrument, the following criteria must be met:
    (i) The maturity of the short position must match the maturity of 
the long position, or the short position has a residual maturity of at 
least one year (maturity requirement); or
    (ii) For a position that is a trading asset or trading liability 
(whether on- or off-balance sheet) as reported on the FDIC-supervised 
institution's Call Report if the FDIC-supervised institution has a 
contractual right or obligation to sell the long position at a specific 
point in time and the counterparty to the contract has an obligation to 
purchase the long position if the FDIC-supervised institution exercises 
its right to sell, this point in time may be treated as the maturity of 
the long position such that the maturity of the long position and short 
position are deemed to match for purposes of the maturity requirement, 
even if the maturity of the short position is less than one year; and
    (iii) For an investment in the FDIC-supervised institution's own 
capital instrument under paragraph (c)(1) of this section or an 
investment in the capital of an unconsolidated financial institution 
under paragraphs (c) and (d):
    (A) An FDIC-supervised institution may only net a short position 
against a long position in an investment in the FDIC-supervised 
institution's own capital instrument under paragraph (c) of this 
section if the short position involves no counterparty credit risk.
    (B) A gross long position in an investment in the FDIC-supervised 
institution's own capital instrument or an investment in the capital of 
an unconsolidated financial institution resulting from a position in an 
index may be netted against a short position in the same index. Long 
and short positions in the same index without maturity dates are 
considered to have matching maturities.
    (C) A short position in an index that is hedging a long cash or 
synthetic

[[Page 50037]]

position in an investment in the FDIC-supervised institution's own 
capital instrument or an investment in the capital of an unconsolidated 
financial institution can be decomposed to provide recognition of the 
hedge. More specifically, the portion of the index that is composed of 
the same underlying instrument that is being hedged may be used to 
offset the long position if both the long position being hedged and the 
short position in the index are reported as a trading asset or trading 
liability (whether on- or off-balance sheet) on the FDIC-supervised 
institution's Call Report and the hedge is deemed effective by the 
FDIC-supervised institution's internal control processes, which have 
not been found to be inadequate by the FDIC.
* * * * *
0
58. Section 324.32 is amended by revising paragraphs (b), (d)(2), 
(d)(3)(ii), (j), (k), and (l) to read as follows:


Sec.  324.32  General risk weights.

* * * * *
    (b) Certain supranational entities and multilateral development 
banks (MDBs). An FDIC-supervised institution must assign a zero percent 
risk weight to an exposure to the Bank for International Settlements, 
the European Central Bank, the European Commission, the International 
Monetary Fund, the European Stability Mechanism, the European Financial 
Stability Facility, or an MDB.
* * * * *
    (d) * * *
    (2) Exposures to foreign banks. (i) Except as otherwise provided 
under paragraphs (d)(2)(iii), (d)(2)(v) and (d)(3) of this section, an 
FDIC-supervised institution must assign a risk weight to an exposure to 
a foreign bank, in accordance with Table 2 to Sec.  324.32, based on 
the CRC that corresponds to the foreign bank's home country or the OECD 
membership status of the foreign bank's home country if there is no CRC 
applicable to the foreign bank's home country.

  Table 2 to Sec.   324.32--Risk Weights for Exposures to Foreign Banks
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                            Risk weight
                                                           (in percent)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
CRC:
    0-1.................................................              20
    2...................................................              50
    3...................................................             100
    4-7.................................................             150
OECD Member with No CRC.................................              20
Non-OECD Member with No CRC.............................             100
Sovereign Default.......................................             150
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (ii) An FDIC-supervised institution must assign a 20 percent risk 
weight to an exposure to a foreign bank whose home country is a member 
of the OECD and does not have a CRC.
    (iii) An FDIC-supervised institution must assign a 20 percent risk-
weight to an exposure that is a self-liquidating, trade-related 
contingent item that arises from the movement of goods and that has a 
maturity of three months or less to a foreign bank whose home country 
has a CRC of 0, 1, 2, or 3, or is an OECD member with no CRC.
    (iv) An FDIC-supervised institution must assign a 100 percent risk 
weight to an exposure to a foreign bank whose home country is not a 
member of the OECD and does not have a CRC, with the exception of self-
liquidating, trade-related contingent items that arise from the 
movement of goods, and that have a maturity of three months or less, 
which may be assigned a 20 percent risk weight.
    (v) An FDIC-supervised institution must assign a 150 percent risk 
weight to an exposure to a foreign bank immediately upon determining 
that an event of sovereign default has occurred in the bank's home 
country, or if an event of sovereign default has occurred in the 
foreign bank's home country during the previous five years.
    (3) * * *
    (ii) A significant investment in the capital of an unconsolidated 
financial institution in the form of common stock pursuant to Sec.  
324.22(d)(2)(i)(c);
* * * * *
    (j)(1) High-volatility acquisition, development, or construction 
(HVADC) exposures. An FDIC-supervised institution must assign a 130 
percent risk weight to an HVADC exposure.
    (2) High-volatility commercial real estate (HVCRE) exposures. A 
FDIC-supervised institution must assign a 150 percent risk weight to an 
HVCRE exposure
    (k) Past due exposures. Except for an exposure to a sovereign 
entity or a residential mortgage exposure, if an exposure is 90 days or 
more past due or on nonaccrual:
    (1) An FDIC-supervised institution must assign a 150 percent risk 
weight to the portion of the exposure that is not guaranteed or that is 
unsecured;
    (2) An FDIC-supervised institution may assign a risk weight to the 
guaranteed portion of a past due exposure based on the risk weight that 
applies under Sec.  324.36 if the guarantee or credit derivative meets 
the requirements of that section; and
    (3) An FDIC-supervised institution may assign a risk weight to the 
collateralized portion of a past due exposure based on the risk weight 
that applies under Sec.  324.37 if the collateral meets the 
requirements of that section.
    (l) Other assets. (1) An FDIC-supervised institution must assign a 
zero percent risk weight to cash owned and held in all offices of the 
FDIC-supervised institution or in transit; to gold bullion held in the 
FDIC-supervised institution's own vaults or held in another depository 
institution's vaults on an allocated basis, to the extent the gold 
bullion assets are offset by gold bullion liabilities; and to exposures 
that arise from the settlement of cash transactions (such as equities, 
fixed income, spot foreign exchange and spot commodities) with a 
central counterparty where there is no assumption of ongoing 
counterparty credit risk by the central counterparty after settlement 
of the trade and associated default fund contributions.
    (2) An FDIC-supervised institution must assign a 20 percent risk 
weight to cash items in the process of collection.
    (3) An FDIC-supervised institution must assign a 100 percent risk 
weight to DTAs arising from temporary differences that the FDIC-
supervised institution could realize through net operating loss 
carrybacks.
    (4) An FDIC-supervised institution must assign a 250 percent risk 
weight to the portion of each of the following items to the extent it 
is not deducted from common equity tier 1 capital pursuant to Sec.  
324.22(d):
    (i) MSAs; and
    (ii) DTAs arising from temporary differences that the FDIC-
supervised institution could not realize through net operating loss 
carrybacks.
    (5) An FDIC-supervised institution must assign a 100 percent risk 
weight to all assets not specifically assigned a different risk weight 
under this subpart and that are not deducted from tier 1 or tier 2 
capital pursuant to Sec.  324.22.
    (6) Notwithstanding the requirements of this section, an FDIC-
supervised institution may assign an asset that is not included in one 
of the categories provided in this section to the risk weight category 
applicable under the capital rules applicable to bank holding companies 
and savings and loan holding companies under 12 CFR part 217, provided 
that all of the following conditions apply:
    (i) The FDIC-supervised institution is not authorized to hold the 
asset under applicable law other than debt previously contracted or 
similar authority; and
    (ii) The risks associated with the asset are substantially similar 
to the risks of assets that are otherwise assigned to a

[[Page 50038]]

risk weight category of less than 100 percent under this subpart.
* * * * *
0
59. Section 324.34 is amended by revising paragraph (c) to read as 
follows:


Sec.  324.34  OTC derivative contracts.

* * * * *
    (c) Counterparty credit risk for OTC credit derivatives. (1) 
Protection purchasers. An FDIC-supervised institution that purchases an 
OTC credit derivative that is recognized under Sec.  324.36 as a credit 
risk mitigant for an exposure that is not a covered position under 
subpart F is not required to compute a separate counterparty credit 
risk capital requirement under this subpart D provided that the FDIC-
supervised institution does so consistently for all such credit 
derivatives. The FDIC-supervised institution must either include all or 
exclude all such credit derivatives that are subject to a qualifying 
master netting agreement from any measure used to determine 
counterparty credit risk exposure to all relevant counterparties for 
risk-based capital purposes.
    (2) Protection providers. (i) An FDIC-supervised institution that 
is the protection provider under an OTC credit derivative must treat 
the OTC credit derivative as an exposure to the underlying reference 
asset. The FDIC-supervised institution is not required to compute a 
counterparty credit risk capital requirement for the OTC credit 
derivative under this subpart D, provided that this treatment is 
applied consistently for all such OTC credit derivatives. The FDIC-
supervised institution must either include all or exclude all such OTC 
credit derivatives that are subject to a qualifying master netting 
agreement from any measure used to determine counterparty credit risk 
exposure.
    (ii) The provisions of this paragraph (c)(2) apply to all relevant 
counterparties for risk-based capital purposes unless the FDIC-
supervised institution is treating the OTC credit derivative as a 
covered position under subpart F, in which case the FDIC-supervised 
institution must compute a supplemental counterparty credit risk 
capital requirement under this section.
* * * * *
0
60. Section 324.35 is amended by revising paragraph (b)(3)(ii), 
(b)(4)(ii), (c)(3)(ii), and (c)(4)(ii) to read as follows:


Sec.  324.35  Cleared transactions.

* * * * *
    (b) * * *
    (3) * * *
    (ii) For a cleared transaction with a CCP that is not a QCCP, a 
clearing member client FDIC-supervised institution must apply the risk 
weight appropriate for the CCP according to this subpart D.
* * * * *
    (4) * * *
    (ii) A clearing member client FDIC-supervised institution must 
calculate a risk-weighted asset amount for any collateral provided to a 
CCP, clearing member, or custodian in connection with a cleared 
transaction in accordance with the requirements under this subpart D.
* * * * *
    (c) * * *
    (3) * * *
    (ii) For a cleared transaction with a CCP that is not a QCCP, a 
clearing member FDIC-supervised institution must apply the risk weight 
appropriate for the CCP according to this subpart D.
* * * * *
    (4) * * *
    (ii) A clearing member FDIC-supervised institution must calculate a 
risk-weighted asset amount for any collateral provided to a CCP, 
clearing member, or a custodian in connection with a cleared 
transaction in accordance with requirements under this subpart D.
* * * * *
0
61. Section 324.36 is amended by revising paragraph (c) to read as 
follows:


Sec.  324.36  Guarantees and credit derivatives: Substitution 
treatment.

* * * * *
    (c) Substitution approach--(1) Full coverage. If an eligible 
guarantee or eligible credit derivative meets the conditions in 
paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section and the protection amount (P) of 
the guarantee or credit derivative is greater than or equal to the 
exposure amount of the hedged exposure, an FDIC-supervised institution 
may recognize the guarantee or credit derivative in determining the 
risk-weighted asset amount for the hedged exposure by substituting the 
risk weight applicable to the guarantor or credit derivative protection 
provider under this subpart D for the risk weight assigned to the 
exposure.
    (2) Partial coverage. If an eligible guarantee or eligible credit 
derivative meets the conditions in paragraphs (a) and (b) of this 
section and the protection amount (P) of the guarantee or credit 
derivative is less than the exposure amount of the hedged exposure, the 
FDIC-supervised institution must treat the hedged exposure as two 
separate exposures (protected and unprotected) in order to recognize 
the credit risk mitigation benefit of the guarantee or credit 
derivative.
    (i) The FDIC-supervised institution may calculate the risk-weighted 
asset amount for the protected exposure under this subpart D, where the 
applicable risk weight is the risk weight applicable to the guarantor 
or credit derivative protection provider.
    (ii) The FDIC-supervised institution must calculate the risk-
weighted asset amount for the unprotected exposure under this subpart 
D, where the applicable risk weight is that of the unprotected portion 
of the hedged exposure.
    (iii) The treatment provided in this section is applicable when the 
credit risk of an exposure is covered on a partial pro rata basis and 
may be applicable when an adjustment is made to the effective notional 
amount of the guarantee or credit derivative under paragraphs (d), (e), 
or (f) of this section.
* * * * *
0
62. Section 324.37 is amended by revising paragraph (b)(2)(i) to read 
as follows:


Sec.  324.37  Collateralized transactions.

* * * * *
    (b) * * *
    (2) Risk weight substitution. (i) An FDIC-supervised institution 
may apply a risk weight to the portion of an exposure that is secured 
by the fair value of financial collateral (that meets the requirements 
of paragraph (b)(1) of this section) based on the risk weight assigned 
to the collateral under this subpart D. For repurchase agreements, 
reverse repurchase agreements, and securities lending and borrowing 
transactions, the collateral is the instruments, gold, and cash the 
FDIC-supervised institution has borrowed, purchased subject to resale, 
or taken as collateral from the counterparty under the transaction. 
Except as provided in paragraph (b)(3) of this section, the risk weight 
assigned to the collateralized portion of the exposure may not be less 
than 20 percent.
* * * * *
0
63. Section 324.38 is amended by revising paragraph (e)(2) to read as 
follows:


Sec.  324.38  Unsettled transactions.

* * * * *
    (e) * * *
    (2) From the business day after the FDIC-supervised institution has 
made its delivery until five business days after the counterparty 
delivery is due, the FDIC-supervised institution must calculate the 
risk-weighted asset amount for the transaction by treating the current 
fair value of the deliverables owed to the FDIC-supervised institution 
as an exposure to the counterparty and

[[Page 50039]]

using the applicable counterparty risk weight under this subpart D.
* * * * *
0
64. Section 324.42 is amended by revising paragraph (j)(2)(ii)(A) to 
read as follows:


Sec.  324.42  Risk-weighted assets for securitization exposures.

* * * * *
    (j) * * *
    (2) * * *
    (ii) * * *
    (A) If the FDIC-supervised institution purchases credit protection 
from a counterparty that is not a securitization SPE, the FDIC-
supervised institution must determine the risk weight for the exposure 
according to this subpart D.
* * * * *
0
65. Section 324.52 is amended by revising paragraphs (b)(1) and (4) to 
read as follows:


Sec.  324.52  Simple risk-weight approach (SRWA).

* * * * *
    (b) * * *
    (1) Zero percent risk weight equity exposures. An equity exposure 
to a sovereign, the Bank for International Settlements, the European 
Central Bank, the European Commission, the International Monetary Fund, 
the European Stability Mechanism, the European Financial Stability 
Facility, an MDB, and any other entity whose credit exposures receive a 
zero percent risk weight under Sec.  324.32 may be assigned a zero 
percent risk weight.
* * * * *
    (4) 250 percent risk weight equity exposures. Significant 
investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial institutions in 
the form of common stock that are not deducted from capital pursuant to 
Sec.  324.22(d)(2) are assigned a 250 percent risk weight.
* * * * *
0
66. Section 324.61 is revised to read as follows:


Sec.  324.61  Purpose and scope.

    Sections 324.61 through 324.63 of this subpart establish public 
disclosure requirements related to the capital requirements described 
in subpart B of this part for an FDIC-supervised institution with total 
consolidated assets of $50 billion or more as reported on the FDIC-
supervised institution's most recent year-end Call Report that is not 
an advanced approaches FDIC-supervised institution making public 
disclosures pursuant to Sec.  324.172. An advanced approaches FDIC-
supervised institution that has not received approval from the FDIC to 
exit parallel run pursuant to Sec.  324.121(d) is subject to the 
disclosure requirements described in Sec. Sec.  324.62 and 324.63. An 
FDIC-supervised institution with total consolidated assets of $50 
billion or more as reported on the FDIC-supervised institution's most 
recent year-end Call Report that is not an advanced approaches FDIC-
supervised institution making public disclosures subject to Sec.  
324.172 must comply with Sec.  324.62 unless it is a consolidated 
subsidiary of a bank holding company, savings and loan holding company, 
or depository institution that is subject to the disclosure 
requirements of Sec.  324.62 or a subsidiary of a non-U.S. banking 
organization that is subject to comparable public disclosure 
requirements in its home jurisdiction. For purposes of this section, 
total consolidated assets are determined based on the average of the 
FDIC-supervised institution's total consolidated assets in the four 
most recent quarters as reported on the Call Report; or the average of 
the FDIC-supervised institution's total consolidated assets in the most 
recent consecutive quarters as reported quarterly on the FDIC-
supervised institution's Call Report if the FDIC-supervised institution 
has not filed such a report for each of the most recent four quarters.
* * * * *
0
67. Section 324.63 is amended by revising Table 3 and Table 8 to read 
as follows:


Sec.  324.63  Disclosures by FDIC-supervised institutions described in 
Sec.  324.61.

* * * * *

                                   Table 3 to Sec.   324.63--Capital Adequacy
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Qualitative disclosures................................  (a) A summary discussion of the FDIC-supervised
                                                          institution's approach to assessing the adequacy of
                                                          its capital to support current and future activities.
Quantitative disclosures...............................  (b) Risk-weighted assets for:
                                                            (1) Exposures to sovereign entities;
                                                            (2) Exposures to certain supranational entities and
                                                             MDBs;
                                                            (3) Exposures to depository institutions, foreign
                                                             banks, and credit unions;
                                                            (4) Exposures to PSEs;
                                                            (5) Corporate exposures;
                                                            (6) Residential mortgage exposures;
                                                            (7) Statutory multifamily mortgages and pre-sold
                                                             construction loans;
                                                            (8) HVADC loans;
                                                            (9) Past due loans;
                                                            (10) Other assets;
                                                            (11) Cleared transactions;
                                                            (12) Default fund contributions;
                                                            (13) Unsettled transactions;
                                                            (14) Securitization exposures; and
                                                            (15) Equity exposures.
                                                         (c) Standardized market risk-weighted assets as
                                                          calculated under subpart F of this part.
                                                         (d) Common equity tier 1, tier 1 and total risk-based
                                                          capital ratios:
                                                            (1) For the top consolidated group; and
                                                            (2) For each depository institution subsidiary.
                                                         (e) Total standardized risk-weighted assets.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

* * * * *

[[Page 50040]]



                                    Table 8 to Sec.   324.63--Securitization
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Qualitative Disclosures................................  (a) The general qualitative disclosure requirement with
                                                          respect to a securitization (including synthetic
                                                          securitizations), including a discussion of:
                                                            (1) The FDIC-supervised institution's objectives for
                                                             securitizing assets, including the extent to which
                                                             these activities transfer credit risk of the
                                                             underlying exposures away from the FDIC-supervised
                                                             institution to other entities and including the
                                                             type of risks assumed and retained with
                                                             resecuritization activity; \1\
                                                            (2) The nature of the risks (e.g. liquidity risk)
                                                             inherent in the securitized assets;
                                                            (3) The roles played by the FDIC-supervised
                                                             institution in the securitization process \2\ and
                                                             an indication of the extent of the FDIC-supervised
                                                             institution's involvement in each of them;
                                                            (4) The processes in place to monitor changes in the
                                                             credit and market risk of securitization exposures
                                                             including how those processes differ for
                                                             resecuritization exposures;
                                                            (5) The FDIC-supervised institution's policy for
                                                             mitigating the credit risk retained through
                                                             securitization and resecuritization exposures; and
                                                            (6) The risk-based capital approaches that the FDIC-
                                                             supervised institution follows for its
                                                             securitization exposures including the type of
                                                             securitization exposure to which each approach
                                                             applies.
                                                         (b) A list of:
                                                            (1) The type of securitization SPEs that the FDIC-
                                                             supervised institution, as sponsor, uses to
                                                             securitize third-party exposures. The FDIC-
                                                             supervised institution must indicate whether it has
                                                             exposure to these SPEs, either on- or off-balance
                                                             sheet; and
                                                            (2) Affiliated entities:
                                                            (i) That the FDIC-supervised institution manages or
                                                             advises; and
                                                            (ii) That invest either in the securitization
                                                             exposures that the FDIC-supervised institution has
                                                             securitized or in securitization SPEs that the FDIC-
                                                             supervised institution sponsors.\3\
                                                         (c) Summary of the FDIC-supervised institution's
                                                          accounting policies for securitization activities,
                                                          including:
                                                            (1) Whether the transactions are treated as sales or
                                                             financings;
                                                            (2) Recognition of gain-on-sale;
                                                            (3) Methods and key assumptions applied in valuing
                                                             retained or purchased interests;
                                                            (4) Changes in methods and key assumptions from the
                                                             previous period for valuing retained interests and
                                                             impact of the changes;
                                                            (5) Treatment of synthetic securitizations;
                                                            (6) How exposures intended to be securitized are
                                                             valued and whether they are recorded under subpart
                                                             D of this part; and
                                                            (7) Policies for recognizing liabilities on the
                                                             balance sheet for arrangements that could require
                                                             the FDIC-supervised institution to provide
                                                             financial support for securitized assets.
                                                         (d) An explanation of significant changes to any
                                                          quantitative information since the last reporting
                                                          period.
Quantitative Disclosures...............................  (e) The total outstanding exposures securitized by the
                                                          FDIC-supervised institution in securitizations that
                                                          meet the operational criteria provided in Sec.
                                                          324.41 (categorized into traditional and synthetic
                                                          securitizations), by exposure type, separately for
                                                          securitizations of third-party exposures for which the
                                                          bank acts only as sponsor.\4\
                                                         (f) For exposures securitized by the FDIC-supervised
                                                          institution in securitizations that meet the
                                                          operational criteria in Sec.   324.41:
                                                            (1) Amount of securitized assets that are impaired/
                                                             past due categorized by exposure type; \5\ and
                                                            (2) Losses recognized by the FDIC-supervised
                                                             institution during the current period categorized
                                                             by exposure type.\6\
                                                         (g) The total amount of outstanding exposures intended
                                                          to be securitized categorized by exposure type.
                                                         (h) Aggregate amount of:
                                                            (1) On-balance sheet securitization exposures
                                                             retained or purchased categorized by exposure type;
                                                             and
                                                            (2) Off-balance sheet securitization exposures
                                                             categorized by exposure type.
                                                         (i) (1) Aggregate amount of securitization exposures
                                                          retained or purchased and the associated capital
                                                          requirements for these exposures, categorized between
                                                          securitization and resecuritization exposures, further
                                                          categorized into a meaningful number of risk weight
                                                          bands and by risk-based capital approach (e.g., SSFA);
                                                          and
                                                            (2) Aggregate amount disclosed separately by type of
                                                             underlying exposure in the pool of any:
                                                            (i) After-tax gain-on-sale on a securitization that
                                                             has been deducted from common equity tier 1
                                                             capital; and
                                                            (ii) Credit-enhancing interest-only strip that is
                                                             assigned a 1,250 percent risk weight.
                                                         (j) Summary of current year's securitization activity,
                                                          including the amount of exposures securitized (by
                                                          exposure type), and recognized gain or loss on sale by
                                                          exposure type.
                                                         (k) Aggregate amount of resecuritization exposures
                                                          retained or purchased categorized according to:
                                                            (1) Exposures to which credit risk mitigation is
                                                             applied and those not applied; and
                                                            (2) Exposures to guarantors categorized according to
                                                             guarantor creditworthiness categories or guarantor
                                                             name.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The FDIC-supervised institution should describe the structure of resecuritizations in which it participates;
  this description should be provided for the main categories of resecuritization products in which the FDIC-
  supervised institution is active.
\2\ For example, these roles may include originator, investor, servicer, provider of credit enhancement,
  sponsor, liquidity provider, or swap provider.
\3\ Such affiliated entities may include, for example, money market funds, to be listed individually, and
  personal and private trusts, to be noted collectively.
\4\ ``Exposures securitized'' include underlying exposures originated by the FDIC-supervised institution,
  whether generated by them or purchased, and recognized in the balance sheet, from third parties, and third-
  party exposures included in sponsored transactions. Securitization transactions (including underlying
  exposures originally on the FDIC-supervised institution's balance sheet and underlying exposures acquired by
  the FDIC-supervised institution from third-party entities) in which the originating bank does not retain any
  securitization exposure should be shown separately but need only be reported for the year of inception. FDIC-
  supervised institutions are required to disclose exposures regardless of whether there is a capital charge
  under this part.

[[Page 50041]]

 
\5\ Include credit-related other than temporary impairment (OTTI).
\6\ For example, charge-offs/allowances (if the assets remain on the FDIC-supervised institution's balance
  sheet) or credit-related OTTI of interest-only strips and other retained residual interests, as well as
  recognition of liabilities for probable future financial support required of the FDIC-supervised institution
  with respect to securitized assets.

* * * * *
0
68. Section 324.101 is amended by revising paragraph (b) adding a 
definition for ``high volatility commercial real estate (HVCRE) 
exposure'' to read as follows:


Sec.  324.101  Definitions.

* * * * *
    (b) * * *
    High volatility commercial real estate (HVCRE) exposure, for 
purposes of Subpart E, means a credit facility that, prior to 
conversion to permanent financing, finances or has financed the 
acquisition, development, or construction (ADC) of real property, 
unless the facility finances:
    (1) One- to four-family residential properties;
    (2) Real property that:
    (i) Would qualify as an investment in community development under 
12 U.S.C. 338a or 12 U.S.C. 24 (Eleventh), as applicable, or as a 
``qualified investment'' under 12 CFR part 345, and
    (ii) Is not an ADC loan to any entity described in 12 CFR 
345.12(g), unless it is otherwise described in paragraph (1), (2)(i), 
(3) or (4) of this definition;
    (3) The purchase or development of agricultural land, which 
includes all land known to be used or usable for agricultural purposes 
(such as crop and livestock production), provided that the valuation of 
the agricultural land is based on its value for agricultural purposes 
and the valuation does not take into consideration any potential use of 
the land for non-agricultural commercial development or residential 
development; or
    (4) Commercial real estate projects in which:
    (i) The loan-to-value ratio is less than or equal to the applicable 
maximum supervisory loan-to-value ratio in the FDIC's real estate 
lending standards at 12 CFR part 365, appendix C;
    (ii) The borrower has contributed capital to the project in the 
form of cash or unencumbered readily marketable assets (or has paid 
development expenses out-of-pocket) of at least 15 percent of the real 
estate's appraised ``as completed'' value; and
    (iii) The borrower contributed the amount of capital required by 
paragraph (4)(ii) of this definition before the FDIC-supervised 
institution advances funds under the credit facility, and the capital 
contributed by the borrower, or internally generated by the project, is 
contractually required to remain in the project throughout the life of 
the project. The life of a project concludes only when the credit 
facility is converted to permanent financing or is sold or paid in 
full. Permanent financing may be provided by the FDIC-supervised 
institution that provided the ADC facility as long as the permanent 
financing is subject to the FDIC-supervised institution's underwriting 
criteria for long-term mortgage loans.
* * * * *
0
69. Section 324.131 is amended by revising paragraph (d)(2) to read as 
follows:


Sec.  324.131  Mechanics for calculating total wholesale and retail 
risk-weighted assets.

* * * * *
    (d) * * *
    (2) Floor on PD assignment. The PD for each wholesale obligor or 
retail segment may not be less than 0.03 percent, except for exposures 
to or directly and unconditionally guaranteed by a sovereign entity, 
the Bank for International Settlements, the International Monetary 
Fund, the European Commission, the European Central Bank, the European 
Stability Mechanism, the European Financial Stability Facility, or a 
multilateral development bank, to which the FDIC-supervised institution 
assigns a rating grade associated with a PD of less than 0.03 percent.
* * * * *
0
70. Section 324.133 is amended by revising paragraphs (b)(3)(ii) and 
(c)(3)(ii) to read as follows:


Sec.  324.133  Cleared transactions.

* * * * *
    (b) * * *
    (3) * * *
    (ii) For a cleared transaction with a CCP that is not a QCCP, a 
clearing member client FDIC-supervised institution must apply the risk 
weight applicable to the CCP under subpart D of this part.
* * * * *
    (c) * * *
    (3) * * *
    (ii) For a cleared transaction with a CCP that is not a QCCP, a 
clearing member FDIC-supervised institution must apply the risk weight 
applicable to the CCP according to subpart D of this part.
* * * * *
0
71. Section 324.152 is amended by revising paragraph (b)(5) and (6) to 
read as follows:


Sec.  324.152  Simple risk weight approach (SRWA).

* * * * *
    (b) * * *
    (5) 300 percent risk weight equity exposures. A publicly traded 
equity exposure (other than an equity exposure described in paragraph 
(b)(7) of this section and including the ineffective portion of a hedge 
pair) is assigned a 300 percent risk weight.
    (6) 400 percent risk weight equity exposures. An equity exposure 
(other than an equity exposure described in paragraph (b)(7) of this 
section) that is not publicly traded is assigned a 400 percent risk 
weight.
* * * * *
0
72. Section 324.202 is amended by revising paragraph (b) the definition 
of ``Corporate debt position'' to read as follows:


Sec.  324.202  Definitions.

* * * * *
    (b) * * *
    Corporate debt position means a debt position that is an exposure 
to a company that is not a sovereign entity, the Bank for International 
Settlements, the European Central Bank, the European Commission, the 
International Monetary Fund, the European Stability Mechanism, the 
European Financial Stability Facility, a multilateral development bank, 
a depository institution, a foreign bank, a credit union, a public 
sector entity, a GSE, or a securitization.
* * * * *
0
73. Section 324.210 is amended by revising paragraph (b)(2)(ii) to read 
as follows:


Sec.  324.210  Standardized measurement method for specific risk.

* * * * *
    (b) * * *
    (2) * * *
    (ii) Certain supranational entity and multilateral development bank 
debt positions. An FDIC-supervised institution may assign a 0.0 percent 
specific risk-weighting factor to a debt position that is an exposure 
to the Bank for International Settlements, the European Central Bank, 
the European Commission, the International Monetary Fund, the European 
Stability Mechanism, the European Financial Stability Facility, or an 
MDB.
* * * * *

[[Page 50042]]

0
74. Section 324.300 is amended by revising paragraphs (b) and (d) to 
read as follows:


Sec.  324.300  Transitions.

* * * * *
    (b) Regulatory capital adjustments and deductions. Beginning 
January 1, 2014 for an advanced approaches FDIC-supervised institution, 
and beginning January 1, 2015 for an FDIC-supervised institution that 
is not an advanced approaches FDIC-supervised institution, and in each 
case through December 31, 2017, an FDIC-supervised institution must 
make the capital adjustments and deductions in Sec.  324.22 in 
accordance with the transition requirements in this paragraph (b). 
Beginning January 1, 2018, an FDIC-supervised institution must make all 
regulatory capital adjustments and deductions in accordance with Sec.  
324.22.
    (1) Transition deductions from common equity tier 1 capital. 
Beginning January 1, 2014 for an advanced approaches FDIC-supervised 
institution, and beginning January 1, 2015 for an FDIC-supervised 
institution that is not an advanced approaches FDIC-supervised 
institution, and in each case through December 31, 2017, an FDIC-
supervised institution, must make the deductions required under Sec.  
324.22(a)(1)-(7) from common equity tier 1 or tier 1 capital elements 
in accordance with the percentages set forth in Table 2 and Table 3 to 
Sec.  324.300.
    (i) An FDIC-supervised institution must deduct the following items 
from common equity tier 1 and additional tier 1 capital in accordance 
with the percentages set forth in Table 2 to Sec.  324.300: Goodwill 
(Sec.  324.22(a)(1)), DTAs that arise from net operating loss and tax 
credit carryforwards (Sec.  324.22(a)(3)), a gain-on-sale in connection 
with a securitization exposure (Sec.  324.22(a)(4)), defined benefit 
pension fund assets (Sec.  324.22(a)(5)), expected credit loss that 
exceeds eligible credit reserves (for advanced approaches FDIC-
supervised institutions that have completed the parallel run process 
and that have received notifications from the FDIC pursuant to Sec.  
324.121(d) of subpart E) (Sec.  324.22(a)(6)), and financial 
subsidiaries (Sec.  324.22(a)(7)).

                                            Table 2 to Sec.   324.300
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                      Transition deductions    Transition deductions under Sec.   324.22(a)(3)-
                                           under Sec.        -------------------------(6)-----------------------
                                      324.22(a)(1), (a)(7),
                                       (a)(8), and (a)(9)
         Transition period         --------------------------     Percentage of the         Percentage of the
                                        Percentage of the      deductions from  common   deductions from tier  1
                                     deductions from  common   equity tier  1 capital            capital
                                     equity tier  1 capital
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Calendar year 2014................                      100                        20                        80
Calendar year 2015................                      100                        40                        60
Calendar year 2016................                      100                        60                        40
Calendar year 2017................                      100                        80                        20
Calendar year 2018, and thereafter                      100                       100                         0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (ii) An FDIC-supervised institution must deduct from common equity 
tier 1 capital any intangible assets other than goodwill and MSAs in 
accordance with the percentages set forth in Table 3 to Sec.  324.300.
    (iii) An FDIC-supervised institution must apply a 100 percent risk-
weight to the aggregate amount of intangible assets other than goodwill 
and MSAs that are not required to be deducted from common equity tier 1 
capital under this section.

                        Table 3 to Sec.   324.300
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                  Transition deductions
                                                       under Sec.
                                                324.22(a)(2)--percentage
               Transition period                 of the  deductions from
                                                  common equity tier  1
                                                         capital
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Calendar year 2014............................                       20
Calendar year 2015............................                       40
Calendar year 2016............................                       60
Calendar year 2017............................                       80
Calendar year 2018, and thereafter............                      100
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (2) Transition adjustments to common equity tier 1 capital. 
Beginning January 1, 2014 for an advanced approaches FDIC-supervised 
institution, and beginning January 1, 2015 for an FDIC-supervised 
institution that is not an advanced approaches FDIC-supervised 
institution, and in each case through December 31, 2017, an FDIC-
supervised institution, must allocate the regulatory adjustments 
related to changes in the fair value of liabilities due to changes in 
the FDIC-supervised institution's own credit risk (Sec.  
324.22(b)(1)(iii)) between common equity tier 1 capital and tier 1 
capital in accordance with the percentages set forth in Table 4 to 
Sec.  324.300.
    (i) If the aggregate amount of the adjustment is positive, the 
FDIC-supervised institution must allocate the deduction between common 
equity tier 1 and tier 1 capital in accordance with Table 4 to Sec.  
324.300.
    (ii) If the aggregate amount of the adjustment is negative, the 
FDIC-supervised institution must add back

[[Page 50043]]

the adjustment to common equity tier 1 capital or to tier 1 capital, in 
accordance with Table 4 to Sec.  324.300.

                                            Table 4 to Sec.   324.300
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                       Transition adjustments under Sec.
                                                                               324.22(b)(1)(iii)
                                                             ---------------------------------------------------
                      Transition period                           Percentage of the
                                                                adjustment applied to       Percentage of the
                                                                common equity tier  1     adjustment applied to
                                                                       capital               tier 1 capital
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Calendar year 2014..........................................                       20                        80
Calendar year 2015..........................................                       40                        60
Calendar year 2016..........................................                       60                        40
Calendar year 2017..........................................                       80                        20
Calendar year 2018, and thereafter..........................                      100                         0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (3) Transition adjustments to AOCI for an advanced approaches FDIC-
supervised institution and an FDIC-supervised institution that has not 
made an AOCI opt-out election under Sec.  324.22(b)(2). Beginning 
January 1, 2014 for an advanced approaches FDIC-supervised institution, 
and beginning January 1, 2015 for an FDIC-supervised institution that 
is not an advanced approaches FDIC-supervised institution and that has 
not made an AOCI opt-out election under Sec.  324.22(b)(2), and in each 
case through December 31, 2017, an FDIC-supervised institution must 
adjust common equity tier 1 capital with respect to the transition AOCI 
adjustment amount (transition AOCI adjustment amount):
    (i) The transition AOCI adjustment amount is the aggregate amount 
of an FDIC-supervised institution's:
    (A) Unrealized gains on available-for-sale securities that are 
preferred stock classified as an equity security under GAAP or 
available-for-sale equity exposures, plus
    (B) Net unrealized gains or losses on available-for-sale securities 
that are not preferred stock classified as an equity security under 
GAAP or available-for-sale equity exposures, plus
    (C) Any amounts recorded in AOCI attributed to defined benefit 
postretirement plans resulting from the initial and subsequent 
application of the relevant GAAP standards that pertain to such plans 
(excluding, at the FDIC-supervised institution's option, the portion 
relating to pension assets deducted under Sec.  324.22(a)(5)), plus
    (D) Accumulated net gains or losses on cash flow hedges related to 
items that are reported on the balance sheet at fair value included in 
AOCI, plus
    (E) Net unrealized gains or losses on held-to-maturity securities 
that are included in AOCI.
    (ii) An FDIC-supervised institution must make the following 
adjustment to its common equity tier 1 capital:
    (A) If the transition AOCI adjustment amount is positive, the 
appropriate amount must be deducted from common equity tier 1 capital 
in accordance with Table 5 to Sec.  324.300.
    (B) If the transition AOCI adjustment amount is negative, the 
appropriate amount must be added back to common equity tier 1 capital 
in accordance with Table 5 to Sec.  324.300.

                        Table 5 to Sec.   324.300
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                    Percentage of the
                                                     transition AOCI
               Transition period                 adjustment amount to be
                                                    applied to common
                                                  equity tier 1 capital
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Calendar year 2014............................                       80
Calendar year 2015............................                       60
Calendar year 2016............................                       40
Calendar year 2017............................                       20
Calendar year 2018 and thereafter.............                        0
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (iii) An FDIC-supervised institution may include in tier 2 capital 
the percentage of unrealized gains on available-for-sale preferred 
stock classified as an equity security under GAAP and available-for-
sale equity exposures as set forth in Table 6 to Sec.  324.300.

[[Page 50044]]



                        Table 6 to Sec.   324.300
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                Percentage of unrealized
                                                 gains on available-for-
                                                  sale preferred stock
                                                 classified as an equity
               Transition period                 security under GAAP and
                                                   available-for-sale
                                                  equity exposures that
                                                may be included in  tier
                                                        2 capital
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Calendar year 2014............................                       36
Calendar year 2015............................                       27
Calendar year 2016............................                       18
Calendar year 2017............................                        9
Calendar year 2018 and thereafter.............                        0
------------------------------------------------------------------------

* * * * *
    (d) Minority interest--
    (1) [Reserved]
    (2) Non-qualifying minority interest. Beginning January 1, 2014 for 
an advanced approaches FDIC-supervised institution, and beginning 
January 1, 2015 for an FDIC-supervised institution that is not an 
advanced approaches FDIC-supervised institution, and in each case 
through December 31, 2017, an FDIC-supervised institution may include 
in tier 1 capital or total capital the percentage of the tier 1 
minority interest and total capital minority interest outstanding as of 
January 1, 2014 that does not meet the criteria for additional tier 1 
or tier 2 capital instruments in Sec.  324.20 (non-qualifying minority 
interest), as set forth in Table 9 to Sec.  324.300.

                        Table 9 to Sec.   324.300
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                Percentage of the amount
                                                   of surplus or non-
                                                   qualifying minority
               Transition period                  interest that can be
                                                 included in regulatory
                                                   capital during the
                                                    transition period
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Calendar year 2014............................                       80
Calendar year 2015............................                       60
Calendar year 2016............................                       40
Calendar year 2017............................                       20
Calendar year 2018 and thereafter.............                        0
------------------------------------------------------------------------


    Dated: September 26, 2017.
Keith A. Noreika,
Acting Comptroller of the Currency.

    By order of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System, September 27, 2017.
Ann E. Misback,
Secretary of the Board.

    Dated at Washington, DC, this 27th day of September, 2017.

    By order of the Board of Directors.

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
Robert E. Feldman,
Executive Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2017-22093 Filed 10-26-17; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE P