[Federal Register Volume 82, Number 154 (Friday, August 11, 2017)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 37554-37555]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2017-16775]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA-2016-6417; Product Identifier 2015-NM-134-AD]
RIN 2120-AA64


Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing Company Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of 
Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Proposed rule; withdrawal.

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SUMMARY: The FAA withdraws a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) that 
published on May 10, 2016. Since the NPRM was issued, we have 
determined that the identified unsafe condition is adequately addressed 
by existing actions. Accordingly, the NPRM is withdrawn.

DATES:  As of August 11, 2017, the proposed rule, which was published 
in the Federal Register on May 10, 2016 (81 FR 28770), is withdrawn.

ADDRESSES: You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at http://www.regulations.gov by searching for and locating Docket No. FAA-2016-
6417; or in person at the Docket Management Facility between 9 a.m. and 
5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket 
contains this AD action, the NPRM (81 FR 28770, May 10, 2016) (``the 
NPRM''), the regulatory evaluation, any comments received, and other 
information. The address for the Docket Office (telephone 800-647-5527) 
is the Docket Management Facility, U.S. Department of Transportation, 
Docket Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 
New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Serj Harutunian, Aerospace Engineer, 
Propulsion Section, FAA, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office 
(ACO) Branch, 3960 Paramount Boulevard, Lakewood, CA 90712-4137; phone: 
562-627-5254; fax: 562-627-5210; email: [email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Discussion

    We proposed to amend part 39 of the Federal Aviation Regulations 
(14 CFR part 39) with an NPRM for a new AD for all The Boeing Company 
Model DC-10-10 and DC-10-10F airplanes, Model DC-10-15 airplanes, Model 
DC-10-30 and DC-10-30F (KC-10A and KDC-10) airplanes, Model DC-10-40 
and DC-10-40F airplanes, Model MD-10-10F and MD-10-30F airplanes, and 
Model MD-11 and MD-11F airplanes. The NPRM published in the Federal 
Register on May 10, 2016 (81 FR 28770). The proposed AD would have 
required replacement of the fuel pump housing electrical connector or 
replacement of the fuel pump housing; repetitive inspections for proper 
operation of the fuel pump, and corrective actions if necessary; and 
revising the maintenance or inspection program to incorporate new 
airworthiness limitations. The proposed AD also would have required, 
for certain airplanes, a general visual inspection of the protective 
cap and replacement if necessary. The NPRM was prompted by results from 
fuel system reviews conducted by the manufacturer and multiple reports 
of fuel pump housing electrical connector failures related to ingress 
of airplane fluids. The proposed actions were intended to prevent 
failure of the fuel pump housing electrical connector, which could 
result in a potential ignition source in a fuel tank and consequent 
fire or explosion.

Actions Since the NPRM Was Issued

    Since we issued the NPRM, we have determined that the identified 
unsafe condition is adequately addressed by existing actions.

Comments

    We gave the public the opportunity to participate in considering 
the NPRM. The following presents the comments received on the proposal 
and the FAA's response to each comment. Multiple commenters (Boeing, 
FedEx, United Parcel Service (UPS), and Lufthansa Cargo) requested 
certain changes to the NPRM that are considered moot in light of this 
withdrawal.

Requests To Withdraw the NPRM

    UPS stated that the unsafe condition identified in the NPRM is 
addressed by Boeing Service Bulletin MD11-28-145, dated July 15, 2014 
(installation of sealed terminal lugs on the existing GEN 1 fuel pump 
connector), in combination with repetitive inspections, which 
accomplishes the same intent as having installed the GEN 4 fuel pump 
connector. UPS stated that AD 2016-04-16, Amendment 39-18410 (81 FR 
12806, dated March 11, 2016) (``AD 2016-04-16''), also addresses issues 
with the fuel system. UPS concluded that sealing of the current GEN 1 
fuel pump connector via Boeing Service Bulletin MD11-28-145, dated July 
15, 2014, in conjunction with the installation of the fault current 
detectors installed via Boeing Alert Service Bulletin MD11-28A133, 
dated June 5, 2014 (referenced as an appropriate source of service 
information in AD 2016-04-16), including a repetitive 24-month 
inspection of the connectors as required by paragraph (j) of AD 2016-
04-16, addresses the unsafe condition described by the NPRM. UPS stated 
that, furthermore, the installation of the ``uncommanded on'' system 
via Boeing Service Bulletin MD11-28-137, dated June 24, 2014 
(referenced as an appropriate source of service information in AD 2016-
04-16), provides an additional level of safety in all pump positions 
where the tanks normally empty and can potentially support a 
combustible environment. UPS stated that the other pump positions on 
the airplane remain submerged in fuel, thus not providing a combustible 
environment.
    FedEx stated that according to the fire pyramid or fire triangle, 
three elements--oxygen, fuel (jet fuel), and heat (ignition)--are 
needed in order to have fire or explosion. FedEx noted that all of the 
main fuel pumps on MD11/DC10 airplanes are covered by fuel during all 
flight phases. FedEx stated that these pumps do not meet the 
aforementioned condition where fuel vapors are present surrounding the 
pump. FedEx remarked that only pumps in fuel tanks that become empty 
during flights, i.e., auxiliary tanks and tail tanks, should be 
affected by the proposed AD. Based on this logic, FedEx concluded that 
the proposed AD should mandate the replacement of only the connector 
assemblies in any fuel tank that might normally be empty during flight. 
FedEx noted that AD 2016-04-16 has already addressed this safety 
concern and required the installation of fault current detectors in all 
fuel pumps. FedEx also noted that AD 2002-13-10, Amendment 39-12798 (67 
FR 45053, dated July 8, 2002), requires repetitive inspections until a 
new connector assembly is certified.
    We infer that FedEx and UPS are requesting we withdraw the NRPM 
because those commenters stated that the identified unsafe condition is 
already addressed.
    We agree to withdraw the NPRM because the identified unsafe 
condition is adequately addressed by existing actions. When we issued 
the NPRM, we

[[Page 37555]]

had determined that the NPRM was necessary to comply with the 
regulation titled ``Transport Airplane Fuel Tank System Design Review, 
Flammability Reduction and Maintenance and Inspection Requirements'' 
(66 FR 23086, May 7, 2001). In addition to new airworthiness standards 
for transport airplanes and new maintenance requirements, this rule 
included Special Federal Aviation Regulation No. 88 (``SFAR 88,'' 
Amendment 21-78, and subsequent Amendments 21-82 and 21-83).
    Subsequently, we have determined the fuel pump connector redesign/
improvement issue is adequately addressed by the actions required by AD 
2016-04-16. The risk of the unsafe condition developing during the 
remaining life of the airplanes identified in the applicability of the 
proposed AD (e.g., the TriJet fleet) has been greatly reduced by the 
installation of additional ignition prevention design features such as 
fault current detectors, automatic pump shutoff, and uncommanded dry 
running detection systems, which are mandated by AD 2016-04-16. The 
risk of a fuel tank explosion in a Trijet airplane with low 
flammability exposure time fuel tanks is not foreseeable.
    We are considering further rulemaking to revise AD 2016-04-16 to 
include an optional replacement, i.e., installing the new connectors 
introduced in Boeing Service Bulletin DC10-28-264, dated May 15, 2015, 
and Boeing Service Bulletin MD11-28-146, dated May 15, 2015, as 
specified in the NPRM. Accomplishing this option would end the 24-month 
repetitive inspections required by paragraph (j) of AD 2016-04-16 for 
that airplane.

FAA's Conclusions

    Upon further consideration, we have determined that the NPRM is not 
necessary to address the identified safety concern. Accordingly, the 
NPRM is withdrawn.
    Withdrawal of the NPRM does not preclude the FAA from issuing 
another related action or commit the FAA to any course of action in the 
future.

Regulatory Impact

    Since this action only withdraws an NPRM, it is neither a proposed 
nor a final rule and therefore is not covered under Executive Order 
12866, the Regulatory Flexibility Act, or DOT Regulatory Policies and 
Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979).

Authority for This Rulemaking

    This withdrawal of an NPRM is issued in accordance with authority 
delegated by the Executive Director, Aircraft Certification Service, as 
authorized by FAA Order 8000.51C. In accordance with that order, 
issuance of ADs is normally a function of the Compliance and 
Airworthiness Division, but during this transition period, the 
Executive Director has delegated the authority to issue ADs applicable 
to transport category airplanes to the Director of the System Oversight 
Division.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

    Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by 
reference, Safety.

The Withdrawal

    Accordingly, we withdraw the NPRM, Docket No. FAA-2016-6417, 
Product Identifier 2015-NM-134-AD, which was published in the Federal 
Register on May 10, 2016 (81 FR 28770).

    Issued in Renton, Washington, on August 2, 2017.
Jeffrey E. Duven,
Director, System Oversight Division, Aircraft Certification Service.
[FR Doc. 2017-16775 Filed 8-10-17; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 4910-13-P