[Federal Register Volume 82, Number 143 (Thursday, July 27, 2017)]
[Notices]
[Pages 34934-34937]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2017-15810]


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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Office of the Secretary

[Transmittal No. 16-84]


Arms Sales Notification

AGENCY: Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Department of Defense.

ACTION: Arms sales notice.

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SUMMARY: The Department of Defense is publishing the unclassified text 
of a section 36(b)(1) arms sales notification.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Pamela Young, (703) 697-9107, 
[email protected] or Kathy Valadez, (703) 697-9217, 
[email protected]; DSCA/DSA-RAN.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This 36(b)(1) arms sales notification is 
published to fulfill the requirements of section 155 of Public Law 104-
164 dated July 21, 1996. The following is a copy of a letter to the 
Speaker of the House of Representatives, Transmittal 16-84 with 
attached Policy Justification and Sensitivity of Technology.

    Dated: July 24, 2017.
Aaron Siegel,
Alternate OSD Federal Register Liaison Officer, Department of Defense.
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Transmittal No. 16-84
Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to Section 
36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, as Amended
    (i) Prospective Purchaser: Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
    (ii) Total Estimated Value:

Major Defense Equipment *................  $482 million
Other....................................  $180 million
                                          ------------------------------
    Total................................  $662 million
 

    (iii) Description and Quantity or Quantities of Articles or 
Services under Consideration for Purchase:
    Major Defense Equipment (MDE):

Twenty-six (26) each AN/TPQ-53(V) Radar Systems to include Solid State 
Phased Array Radar with KN-4083 Selective Availability Anti-Spoofing 
Module (SAASM) enhanced Land/Sea Inertial Navigation System (INS) and 
automatic leveling system
Eight hundred and forty (840), M931 Full Range Training Round, 120mm 
Projectiles with M781 fuzes (for live fire exercise)
Two thousand, two hundred and forty (2,240), M107, 155MM Projectiles 
with M557 fuzes (for live fire exercise)

    Non-MDE includes:
    Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio Systems (SINCGARS) and 
accessories; Defense Advanced Global Positioning System (GPS) Receiver 
(DAGR) equipment and accessories; Miltope laptops and accessories; 
Medium Tactical Vehicles FMTV M1092 5-ton trucks/chassis with support 
and accessories; software support; support equipment; classroom 
simulators; government furnished equipment; technical manuals and 
publications; essential spares and repair parts; consumables; live fire 
exercise and ammunition; tools and test equipment; training; 
transportation; U.S. Government technical support and logistic support; 
contractor technical support; repair and return support; quality 
assurance teams; in-country

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Field Service Representative (FSR) and other associated equipment and 
services.
    (iv) Military Department: Army (ZAI)
    (v) Prior Related Cases, if any: None
    (vi) Sales Commission, Fee, etc., Paid, Offered, or Agreed to be 
Paid: None
    (vii) Sensitivity of Technology Contained in the Defense Article or 
Defense Services Proposed to be Sold: See Annex Attached
    (viii) Date Report Delivered to Congress: June 5, 2017
    * as defined in Section 47(6) of the Arms Export Control Act.

POLICY JUSTIFICATION

Kingdom of Saudi Arabia--AN/TPQ-53(V) Radar Systems and Related Support

    The Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has requested a 
possible sale of twenty-six (26) AN/TPQ-53(V) Radar Systems to include 
Solid State Phased Array Radar with KN-4083 Selective Availability 
Anti-Spoofing Module (SAASM) enhanced Land/Sea Inertial Navigation 
System (INS) and automatic leveling system; Eight hundred and forty 
(840), M931, 120mm Projectiles with M781 fuzes (for live fire 
exercise); Two thousand, two hundred and forty (2,240), M107, 155MM 
Projectiles with M557 fuzes (for live fire exercise); Single Channel 
Ground and Airborne Radio Systems (SINCGARS) and accessories; Defense 
Advanced Global Positioning System (GPS) Receiver (DAGR) equipment and 
accessories; Miltope laptops and accessories; Medium Tactical Vehicles 
FMTV M1092 5-ton trucks/chassis with support and accessories; software 
support; support equipment; classroom simulators; government furnished 
equipment; technical manuals and publications; essential spares and 
repair parts; consumables; live fire exercise and ammunition; tools and 
test equipment; training; transportation; U.S. Government technical 
support and logistic support; contractor technical support; repair and 
return support; quality assurance teams; in-country Field Service 
Representative (FSR) and other associated equipment and services. The 
total estimated program cost is $662 million.
    This proposed sale will contribute to the foreign policy and 
national security objectives of the United States by helping to improve 
the security of an important partner which has been and continues to be 
a leading contributor of political stability and economic growth in the 
Middle East.
    Saudi Arabia intends to use these radars to support its border 
security requirements and modernize its armed forces with a more 
current capability to locate and counter the source of incoming 
ballistic artillery, rockets, and mortars. This will contribute to 
Saudi Arabia's goal to update its military capability while further 
enhancing greater interoperability among Saudi Arabia, the United 
States and other allies. Saudi Arabia will have no difficulty absorbing 
this equipment into its armed forces.
    The proposed sale of this equipment and support will not alter the 
basic military balance in the region.
    The Lockheed Martin Corporation, Liverpool, New York, is the 
principal contractor for the AN/TPQ-53 (V) Radars. There are no known 
offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale.
    Implementation of this proposed sale will require U.S. Government 
or contractor representatives to travel to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
for a period of four (4) months for in- processing/fielding, system 
checkout and new equipment training, as well as providing the support 
of two in-country FSRs for two years.
    There will be no adverse impact on U.S. defense readiness as a 
result of the proposed sale.
Transmittal No. 16-84
Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to Section 
36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act
Annex
Item No. vii
    (vii) Sensitivity of Technology:
    1. The AN/TPQ-53(V) radar system is a highly mobile radar that 
automatically detects, classifies, tracks, and locates the point of 
origin of projectiles fired from mortar, artillery and rocket systems 
with sufficient accuracy for first round fire for effect. It mitigates 
close combat radar coverage gaps and replaces the AN/TPQ-36 and AN/TPQ-
37 Firefinder Radars; fully supporting Brigade Combat Teams (BCT), 
Division Artilleries (DIVARTYs), and Field Artillery (FA) Brigades. 
Designed to be transported by ship, trucks, train, or aircraft, it is 
capable of deploying as part of the counter-rocket, artillery, and 
mortar system of systems to provide a sense and warn capability for 
fixed and semi-fixed sites. The AN/TPQ-53(V) provides a net ready 
system with increased range and accuracy throughout a 90 degree search 
sector (stare mode) as well as 360-degree coverage (rotating).
    a. The Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) hardware design 
of the AN/TPQ-53(V) is UNCLASSIFIED. Foreign source systems of similar 
design and capability are available in advanced industrial nations such 
as Sweden and Israel.
    b. The AN/TPQ-53(V) software gives it an enhanced capability in 
terms of target detection and classification in an Electronic 
Countermeasure (ECM) environment. Release of detailed knowledge of the 
software code or test data could aid an adversary trying to identify 
ways of countering the detection capabilities of the AN/TPQ-53(V) or 
improve the performance of their own radar systems. Although the 
detection, classification technology, and concept used in the AN/TPQ-
53(V) has been utilized for more than a decade, the ability to 
incorporate such technology on a solid state air cooled radar would be 
a major technological improvement. The software is UNCLASSIFIED. The 
system is classified SECRET when employed in a theater of operations.
    c. The Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS) 
is a tactical radio providing secure jam-resistant voice and data 
communications of command, control, targeting, and technical 
information for the AN/TPQ-53(V) radar system. The spread-spectrum 
frequency hopping Electronic Counter-Counter Measures (ECCM) technology 
resident in the radio is sensitive but UNCLASSIFIED. While sensitive, 
the frequency-hopping algorithms used to generate the ECCM waveform are 
unique to the country of ownership and cannot be manipulated by 
potential adversaries for use or interference with other countries 
possessing SINCGARS technology. Should a potential adversary come into 
possession of one of these radios, they would have the potential to 
intercept operational command, control, and targeting information. This 
potential problem is mitigated by the fact that the customer can secure 
information passed over the radio network using a commercial grade 
security capability equivalent to an AES 256-bit encryption system 
whose keys are controlled by the customer country.
    d. The Defense Advanced Global Positioning System (GPS) Receiver 
(DAGR) is a handheld GPS location device with map background displaying 
the user's location. Unlike commercial grade GPS receivers capable of 
receiving Standard Positioning Signals (SPS) from GPS satellites, the 
DAGR is capable of receiving Precise Positioning Signals (PPS). PPS 
satellite signals provide significantly more accurate location data 
than do SPS signals. This capability within DAGR is possible due to the 
Selective Availability Anti-Spoofing Module (SAASM). The SAASM is an

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encrypted device permitting both receipt of PPS signals and the benefit 
of preventing potential adversaries from spoofing the system to display 
incorrect location information. The SAASM capability within the DAGR is 
sensitive but UNCLASSIFIED. The SAASM capabilities are sensitive due to 
the system's ability to access restricted PPS GPS satellite signals and 
to prevent spoofing. While sensitive, the ability of potential 
adversaries to exploit the system are limited. The SAASM chip goes 
through a special process of loading encryption signals and unique 
access codes keyed to the customer country. These processes are 
strictly controlled by the US Air Force. If the DAGR is compromised, 
the US Air Force can cut off the device access to PPS signals and the 
anti-spoofing capability.
    e. The same SAASM capabilities resident in the DAGR are also 
resident in the AN/TPQ-53(V) KN-4083 Inertial Navigation System (INS). 
The KN-4083 is a SAASM enhanced INS capability with a 3-axis Monolithic 
Ring Laser Gyro allowing extremely accurate location as well as 3-axis 
accelerometer to provide angular information regarding the radar 
position (i.e. pitch, roll, and azimuth data). While inertial 
navigation and accelerometer capabilities are well-known, the SAASM 
capability within the system makes it sensitive but UNCLASSIFIED. As 
with the DAGR, the US Air Force can cut off access to PPS signals and 
anti-spoofing capabilities, minimizing impacts should a potential 
adversary obtain the system.
    2. If a technologically advanced adversary were to obtain knowledge 
of the specific radar hardware and software elements, the information 
could be used to identify ways of countering the detection capabilities 
of the AN/TPQ-53(V) Radar System or improve the performance of their 
radar systems. Testing and identification of methods to defeat the AN/
TPQ-53(V) ECCM capabilities would lead to improvements in the overall 
effectiveness of an adversary's system and improve their survivability.
    3. A determination has been made that Saudi Arabia can provide 
substantially the same degree of protection for the technology being 
released as the U.S. Government. This sale is necessary in furtherance 
of the U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives outlined in 
the Policy Justification.
    4. All defense articles and services listed in this transmittal 
have been authorized for release and export to the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia.

[FR Doc. 2017-15810 Filed 7-26-17; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 5001-06-P