[Federal Register Volume 82, Number 124 (Thursday, June 29, 2017)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 29670-29690]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2017-12988]



[[Page 29669]]

Vol. 82

Thursday,

No. 124

June 29, 2017

Part III





National Transportation Safety Board





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49 CFR Part 831





Investigation Procedures; Final Rules

  Federal Register / Vol. 82 , No. 124 / Thursday, June 29, 2017 / 
Rules and Regulations  

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NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

49 CFR Part 831

[Docket No. NTSB-GC-2012-0002]
RIN 3147-AA01


Investigation Procedures

AGENCY: National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB).

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: This final rule adopts revisions to the NTSB's regulations 
regarding its investigative procedures. The intent of these revisions 
is to reorganize, clarify and update the regulations to reflect the 
last 20 years of NTSB's experience in conducting transportation 
investigations. These regulations affect investigations of 
transportation accidents within the NTSB's statutory authority, except 
marine casualty investigations.

DATES: This rule is effective July 31, 2017.

ADDRESSES: A copy of this Final Rule, published in the Federal Register 
(FR), is available for inspection and copying in the NTSB's public 
reading room, located at 490 L'Enfant Plaza SW., Washington, DC 20594-
2003. Alternatively, a copy is available on the government-wide Web 
site on regulations at http://www.regulations.gov (Docket ID Number 
NTSB-GC-2012-0002).

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Ann Gawalt, Deputy General Counsel, 
(202) 314-6088.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

I. Abbreviations and Acronyms Used in This Document

ARSA--Aeronautical Repair Station Association
AIA--Aerospace Industries Association
ALPA--Air Line Pilots Association, International
ATSAP--Air Traffic Safety Action Program
AOPA--Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association
A4A--Airlines for America
AAJ--American Association for Justice
ATA--American Trucking Associations
AAR/ASLRRA--Association of American Railroads and American Short 
Line and Regional Railroad Association
ASAP--Aviation Safety Action Program
Aidyn--Aidyn Corporation
Boeing--The Boeing Company
CPUC/RTSB--California Public Utilities Commission, Rail Transit 
Safety Branch
CVR--Cockpit voice recorder
DHHS--Department of Health and Human Services
DOT--Department of Transportation
DOT OAs--Department of Transportation Operating Administrations
EAR--Export Administration Regulations
FAA--Federal Aviation Administration
FAA COS--Federal Aviation Administration Continued Operational 
Safety
FDR--Flight data recorder
FOQA--Flight Operational Quality Assurance
FOIA--Freedom of Information Act
GE--GE Aviation
GAMA--General Aviation Manufacturers Association
HIPAA--Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996
HAI--Helicopter Association International
IPA--Independent Pilots Association
ICAO--International Civil Aviation Organization
ITAR--International Traffic in Arms Regulations
IIC--Investigator-in-charge
Kettles--The Kettles Law Firm, PLLC
NADAF--National Air Disaster Alliance/Foundation
NATCA--National Air Traffic Controllers Association
NBAA--National Business Aviation Association
NTSB--National Transportation Safety Board
NJASAP--Net Jets Association of Shared Aircraft Pilots
RMA--Rubber Manufacturers Association
Sikorsky--Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation
SWAPA--Southwest Airlines Pilots' Association
Textron--Textron Aviation
United--United Airlines
USCG or Coast Guard--United States Coast Guard
VSI--Voluntarily submitted information

II. Background

    In June 2012, the NTSB published a proposed rule stating the 
agency's intent to review its regulations (77 FR 37865, June 25, 2012). 
That review was undertaken in response to Executive Order 13579, 
``Regulation and Independent Regulatory Agencies'' (76 FR 41587, July 
14, 2011). That Order sought to ensure that all independent regulatory 
agencies address the key principles of Executive Order 13563, 
``Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review'' (76 FR 3821, January 21, 
2011). Together, the Executive Orders encourage agencies to review 
their regulations with an eye to promoting public participation in 
rulemaking, improving integration and innovation, promoting flexibility 
and freedom of choice, and ensuring scientific integrity during the 
rulemaking process in order to create a regulatory system that protects 
public health, welfare, safety, and the environment while also 
promoting economic growth, innovation, competitiveness, and job 
creation. In undertaking its review, the NTSB stated that it is 
committed to updating its regulations and incorporating these 
principles. The NTSB proposed rule also described NTSB's commitment to 
reviewing, in particular, 49 CFR part 831, titled ``Investigative 
Practices and Procedures,''
    The previous revision to part 831 of the NTSB's regulations on 
accident investigation procedures was published in 1997 (62 FR 3806, 
January 27, 1997). In August 2014, the NTSB published an NPRM proposing 
substantive changes to and reorganization of 49 CFR part 831, (79 FR 
47064, August 12, 2014). In this revision to part 831, the NTSB sought 
to reorganize its investigative rules to reflect its authority to 
investigate accidents that occur in different modes of transportation, 
and to update those regulations based on its investigative experience 
of the previous 20 years.

III. Reorganization and Reformatting

    The 2014 NPRM proposed various changes to the organizational 
structure of the investigative rules and sought to present a set of 
regulations applicable to all modes of transportation (Subpart A) and 
individual subparts that address matters specific to modes of 
transportation (subparts B, C and D). In view of the unique nature of 
the NTSB's relationship with the USCG in conducting marine casualty 
investigations, as codified in statute, the NTSB will address its 
marine casualty investigative procedures in a separate rulemaking. New 
Subpart E of part 831 appears as an interim final rule published 
elsewhere in this issue of the Federal Register.
    In this final rule, the regulations in part 831 reflect this 
separation of transportation modes by subpart. This final rule also 
reformats several sections to make them easier to read, understand and 
reference. The reformatting was not intended to introduce any 
substantive change not addressed in the disposition of comments below.

IV. Comments Received

    The NTSB received 38 comments in response to the August 12, 2014 
NPRM. Commenters included organizations from various sectors of the 
transportation industry, nonprofit organizations, law firms, 
individuals, two Federal Government agencies, and one state government 
agency.
    The USCG submitted a comprehensive comment on the regulations as 
they relate to marine casualties within its jurisdiction. The NTSB has 
a unique relationship with the USCG as evidenced by the NTSB's 
statutory authority (49 U.S.C. 1131(a)(1)(E)), its joint marine 
casualty regulations with the Coast Guard (codified at 49 CFR part 850 
for the NTSB and at 46 CFR subpart 4.40 for the Coast Guard), and a 
Memorandum of

[[Page 29671]]

Understanding outlining cooperation and coordination between the two 
agencies when conducting marine casualty investigations. The NTSB 
determined that it is appropriate to exclude the USCG from the general 
investigative rules of subpart A of part 831, and instead include the 
rules applicable to marine investigations in a new subpart E of part 
831 to be titled ``Marine Investigations.'' Therefore, the language 
proposed in August 2014 as sections 831.50 and 831.51 has been stricken 
from this rule. As mentioned above, the NTSB is publishing an interim 
final rule containing these changes and additions to subpart E 
concurrent with this final rule.

IV. Analysis of Issues

A. Section 831.1 and the Term ``Event''

    The NTSB proposed adoption of the more general term ``event'' when 
referencing the various types of accidents and incidents that it has 
the authority to investigate. The new term was proposed to function as 
a general descriptor and eliminate the need for reference to a laundry 
list of mode-specific terms such as collision, crash, mishap, or 
rupture in sections that apply across modes.
    Commenters almost universally expressed concern that a change to 
the broader term ``event'' could be viewed as an attempt to expand the 
NTSB's investigative authority. The DOT suggested inclusion of the 
phrase ``consistent with statutory authority'' in the regulatory text 
to prevent this perception. Aviation industry commenters noted that the 
NTSB's regulations already define ``accident'' and ``incident'' in part 
830, concluding that the term ``event'' might later be distinguished 
from these widely understood terms used by the aviation industry. The 
commenters also noted the proposed rule did not include a definition of 
event, raising question of how that term might differ from the well-
known definitions of accident and incident.
    Based on these comments, we are not adopting the term event in this 
final rule. In its place, we are adopting the term ``accident'' as a 
general descriptor. Section 831.1(b) includes a list of transportation 
events that are the responsibility of the NTSB to investigate, as well 
as a statement that the use of the term ``accident'' in part 831 
subparts A through D is intended to include all such listed events in 
the NTSB's authority.
    Section 831.1(a) contains a more general reference to the NTSB's 
statutory authority. A new paragraph (c) was added to address the use 
of the abbreviation ``IIC'' (for ``Investigator-in-charge) throughout 
the part.

B. Section 831.2 Responsibility of the NTSB

    This final rule adopts a different format for Sec.  831.2 than was 
proposed. The section was reformatted to better identify the subject of 
the new modal subparts. No substantive changes were made, and the 
section is otherwise adopted as proposed.
    ATA requested that the agency develop a definition for of the term 
``catastrophic'' outside of the rail and aviation modes. We did not 
propose language to define catastrophic in this rulemaking and decline 
to do so at this time. What is considered a catastrophic accident can 
vary by mode of transportation and the circumstances surrounding the 
accident. Our statute leaves it to the discretion of the Board to 
determine whether to investigate ``any other [catastrophic] accident 
related to the transportation of individuals or property'' as specified 
in 49 U.S.C. 1131(a)(1)(F).

C. Section 831.3 Authority of Directors

    This section was revised for grammatical content only. It is 
otherwise adopted as proposed.

D. Section 831.4 Nature of Investigation

    We proposed retention of the regulatory text that describes the 
characteristics and purposes of the NTSB's investigations, including 
the statement that investigations are fact-finding proceedings in which 
the NTSB does not attempt to determine the rights or liabilities of any 
person or entity. The section also states that the NTSB determines the 
probable cause of the accident after gathering all necessary 
information. We proposed adding that the NTSB also ``causes 
investigations to be conducted,'' because other Federal agencies gather 
records and other evidence and provide information to the NTSB in 
furtherance of an investigation. We noted the phrase ``on behalf of'' 
and ``authorized representatives of the [NTSB]'' already appear 
throughout various sections of part 831. We also proposed adding a 
phrase indicating that one of the goals of our investigations is to 
mitigate the effects of future accidents. New subparagraphs in Sec.  
831.4 were proposed to identify the phases of investigations, including 
preliminary and formal. In the preamble to the NPRM, we explained that 
we may upgrade or downgrade investigations between these categories as 
we proceed with each investigation. We received several comments on 
these proposed changes.
1. ``Causes Investigations To Be Conducted'' and ``Mitigate the Effects 
of''
    DOT opposed inclusion of the phrase ``causes investigations to be 
conducted'' since DOT modal agencies ``have their own 
responsibilities'' and do not perform work on behalf of the NTSB. GE 
suggested we reference ``authorized representative'' in the description 
of ``on-scene investigation'' in proposed Sec.  831.4(b)(3)(i).
    The CPUC/RTSB, the state agency charged with oversight of rail 
transit system safety in California, agreed with including the phrase 
``mitigate the effects of'' any future occurrences. Since the NTSB 
shares investigative information with parties, the CPUC/RTSB concluded 
that including this phrase may help in its own information gathering 
and the mitigation of effects of similar future accidents.
    This final rule adopts the phrase ``conducts investigations'' to 
reflect the NTSB's statutory authority.\1\ This final rule includes the 
phrase ``mitigate the effects of.'' The NTSB acknowledges the 
independent authority of other agencies and the assistance they provide 
to the NTSB following an accident.
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    \1\ 49 U.S.C. 1131(a)(1), requires the NTSB to ``investigate or 
have investigated (in detail the Board prescribes) and establish the 
facts, circumstances, and cause or probable cause of'' the accidents 
listed in section 1131(a)(1)(A)-(F).
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2. ``Preliminary and Formal Investigations'' and ``Manner of 
Investigations''
    The majority of commenters, including Boeing, HAI, Airbus 
Helicopters, GAMA, United, and Textron, found the proposed description 
of the phases of investigation (``preliminary'' and ``formal'') to be 
unnecessary or requiring more clarification than was provided in the 
proposed rule. Several commenters also stated that including these 
terms raised new questions of the exact timing of when one phase ends 
and the next begins, whether and how the NTSB would inform parties of 
the relevant phase as an investigation proceeds, and when the NTSB 
might downgrade an investigation from formal to preliminary. Boeing 
suggested we retain flexibility with all investigations and refrain 
from adopting a ``one-size-fits-all approach,'' especially for formal 
investigations. Commenters, including GE and NBAA, also recommended 
that we clarify whether activities listed in the proposed rule text 
(e.g., visiting the site of an accident, interviewing

[[Page 29672]]

witnesses, conducting testing, extracting data, gathering 
documentation, or engaging in any other activities), are simply 
examples or are to be considered exhaustive.
    We are not adopting the proposed descriptions of and distinctions 
between preliminary and formal investigations. While the NPRM sought to 
explain the activities we conduct in a typical investigation, in 
reality, investigative activities may vary widely from case to case. 
Decisions by NTSB investigators at the site of an accident are often 
made immediately, without reference to a formalized determination of 
status of the investigation. In some cases, the NTSB may choose to 
forego a preliminary investigation and immediately launch a full 
investigative staff. In some cases, a Board Member may accompany staff. 
In other cases, we may review records and other evidence, choose not to 
travel to the site of an accident or incident, and close the 
investigation following a review of all information collected. Since 
most of these decisions and actions are internal to the NTSB based on 
the unique circumstances of an accident, we have determined that 
formalized discussions of the status of an investigation are not 
necessary or appropriate for regulatory text. Similarly, we are 
removing the list describing the manner of and activities associated 
with investigations. Since the list may be too restrictive or the 
descriptions not applicable across transportation modes, we are placing 
this information in the mode-specific new subparts that address them, 
as described in Sec.  831.2.
3. Cost-Benefit Analysis for Recommendations
    In its comment, ATA suggested we include cost-benefit analyses in 
reports that contain safety recommendations. ATA stated that because 
regulatory agencies ``cannot promulgate regulatory standards that fail 
a cost-benefit test, recommendations with costs that exceed benefits 
are exceedingly unlikely to be adopted,'' limiting the effectiveness of 
recommendations. The ATA concluded that agencies may fail to enact NTSB 
recommendations that are cost beneficial because they become ``lost'' 
in a ``growing list of perpetually open recommendations'' that do not 
get cost-benefit analyses.
    The NTSB is sensitive to the reality of safety recommendations that 
are not feasible for regulatory agencies to adopt because of their 
cost. As a result, the NTSB often recommends non-regulatory actions, 
such as promulgating guidance, conducting evaluations, or exploring the 
feasibility of various other actions to improve safety. Further, 
various sectors of the transportation industry may find value in NTSB 
recommendations and may choose to develop means to implement them as 
good business practice even when not required by regulation.
    There are several reasons the NTSB does not perform the type of 
cost-benefit analyses undertaken by regulatory agencies. NTSB 
recommendations are often articulated broadly, while agency regulations 
implementing them may necessarily be very specific and require 
specialized knowledge of equipment, practices, and industry economics 
to be implemented effectively. Recommendations are not always issued 
specific to certain equipment or certain operations, while estimated 
costs must be described specifically. Cost-benefit analyses are 
resource and time intense using specialized staff, and could result in 
delayed issuance of safety critical recommendations. Cost benefit 
analyses are often modified by the information gained during the 
rulemaking process, possibly rendering any initial cost-benefit 
analytical efforts by the NTSB of little value. The timely 
accomplishment of a cost-benefit analysis is best left to the 
regulatory agencies subject to the standards for their completion at 
the time a specific solution is proposed by the agency. A duplicative 
or untimely product by the NTSB would not serve the public interest in 
advancing transportation safety.

E. Section 831.5 Priority of NTSB Investigations

    In the NPRM, the NTSB proposed reorganizing Sec.  831.5 into two 
paragraphs and revising the text to address how the NTSB will exercise 
its priority over other Federal investigations when other Federal 
agencies seek to interview witnesses and gather evidence. In the 
preamble to the NPRM, we stated the proposed regulatory language sought 
to balance our need to conduct investigative activities while remaining 
cognizant of the need for other agencies to fulfill their statutory 
mandates, such as rulemaking and enforcement.
    We described one proposed change as stating that other Federal 
agencies must conduct their work in a manner consistent with our 
statutorily granted priority.\2\ To carry out this objective, we 
proposed: (1) Employees of other Federal agencies who are involved in 
parallel activities contact the NTSB IIC prior to questioning a 
witness, gathering records or other evidence, or otherwise obtaining 
any type of information relevant to the non-NTSB investigation; (2) 
Federal agencies communicate with us about the information they collect 
relevant to an investigation; and (3) Federal agencies inform us of 
corrective or mitigating actions they are taking during the course of 
an investigation.
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    \2\ For all investigations except major marine casualty 
investigations, 49 U.S.C. 1131(a)(2)(A) provides that the NTSB's 
investigation has priority over other federal agencies' 
investigation. The NTSB must provide for the ``appropriate 
participation'' of other agencies in its investigation. Nonetheless, 
determining the probable cause of an accident is exclusively the 
duty and responsibility of the NTSB. See also 49 U.S.C. 1135(a) 
(requiring the Secretary of the Department of Transportation to 
respond to NTSB safety recommendations within 90 days of the 
issuance of such recommendations).
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    In their comments, other government entities generally expressed 
concern that the NTSB was overstating its authority and had proposed 
language that could result in interference with investigations 
conducted by other agencies. We have redrafted Sec.  831.5 to reflect 
these concerns by more closely tracking the language of our statutory 
authorization, primarily that found in 49 U.S.C. 1131(a)(2)(A). It was 
apparent that not all commenters were familiar with the several 
provisions in that section regarding the priority of NTSB 
investigations and the participation of other Federal agencies. We 
address some of the particular issued raised below.
1. NTSB Authority To Exercise Priority Over Other Federal 
Investigations
    In its comment, DOT recognized that the NTSB ``certainly'' has 
priority in investigations, but stated ``[h]owever, this `priority' 
does not authorize the Board to exercise `exclusive' authority to 
determine how all information is gathered by another agency, nor does 
it confer the Board with `advance approval' authority over other 
agencies' investigations.'' DOT stated that these requirements could 
interfere with a DOT operating administration's exercise of its own 
authority.\3\ DOT indicated that our proposal stating we have 
``exclusive authority'' to decide when, and the manner in which, 
testing, extraction of data, and examination of evidence will occur is 
``precisely what 49 U.S.C. Section 1131(a)(3) appears to prohibit.'' 
DOT noted that the statute ``makes it clear that the NTSB's authorities 
`do not affect' the authority of another agency from investigating 
matters within its jurisdiction.'' DOT feared the language could serve 
to ``undermine transportation safety'' by

[[Page 29673]]

restricting agencies with expertise from making ``independent and 
timely safety determinations.'' DOT also noted that the authority 
granted to its operating administrations to address imminent hazards 
may mean that they arrive on site before NTSB investigators arrive, 
``or may otherwise need to commence an investigation while evidence is 
still present, with an eye towards taking potential immediate 
corrective action.'' DOT stated that the proposed requirement to obtain 
IIC approval before collecting evidence could impair the effectiveness 
of its investigations, and possibly delay or prevent ``immediate 
corrective action'' taken through DOT orders.
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    \3\ DOT listed the authorities of the Federal Railroad 
Administration, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety 
Administration, and the Federal Transit Administration. Later in its 
comment on this issue, DOT mentioned the Federal Motor Carrier 
Safety Administration and the FAA.
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    The NBAA was concerned that the proposed priority language might 
adversely affect FAA continued operational safety (COS) activities. 
They also raised concern with the requirement that other agencies 
coordinate with the IIC regarding fact-gathering, which could delay 
investigations, particularly when the IIC is ``resource constrained.''
    United stated it appreciated the efforts of the NTSB and FAA to 
reach agreement concerning FAA access to COS information during an NTSB 
investigation [known as the Ashburn agreement, included in the public 
docket for this rulemaking].
    United recommended inclusion of provisions of the policy agreement 
in Sec.  831.5 as appropriate. United stated that the FAA may obtain 
information while participating in NTSB investigations, and may use 
that information to carry out ``COS responsibilities, which also 
frequently migrate into disciplinary actions against individual 
certificated employees or the company involved in the event.'' United 
suggested that when the FAA is going to use such information obtained 
through an investigation, the FAA inform the IIC and the company so 
that appropriate internal actions can be taken.
    The CPUC/RTSB noted that although the NTSB's authorizing 
legislation, provides for investigative priority when other Federal 
agencies are involved, the language does not include priority over 
state agencies. CPUC/RTSB stated that when a state agency is a party to 
an NTSB investigation, the state agency should be granted concurrent 
access in reviewing evidence as long as it does not release or publish 
such information.
    CPUC/RTSB also expressed concern regarding NTSB's priority over 
other agencies' investigations. CPUC/RTSB recognized the ``importance 
of keeping NTSB investigators informed of all actions of state and/or 
local regulators,'' but remained concerned that the NTSB investigation 
could hamper a state agency's ability to take corrective action as a 
regulator. CPUC/RTSB stated that it has encountered delays in 
collecting or gaining access to evidence or information that have 
``limited [its] abilities to take timely action to address identified 
concerns.''
    We have reviewed the considerable concerns and suggestions made by 
commenters regarding proposed Sec.  831.5. As stated above, we realized 
that some commenters may not have fully distinguished the different 
statutory provisions related to the scope and priority of the NTSB's 
investigations. We have redrafted that section to more closely track 
the language of the statute regarding investigative priority, right of 
first access, and the relationship between the NTSB and other 
authorities investigating transportation accidents.
    The legislative history concerning NTSB's priority establishes 
that, since 1981, Congress intended the NTSB to have ``first priority'' 
for its accident investigations. H.R. Rep. No. 97-108, pt. 1, 1981 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1729, 1730. This priority was established ``to reduce 
duplicate Federal accident investigations,'' to prevent ``waste,'' and 
to eliminate unnecessary ``burdens'' associated with duplicative 
investigations by multiple agencies. Id. ``[I]it is desirable to have 
one Federal agency responsible for coordinating accident 
investigations. Designating a lead agency will help prevent duplicate 
investigations and unnecessary disputes over jurisdiction.'' \4\ The 
statutory priority ``protects the legitimate roles of other agencies,'' 
given that ``participation by these agencies in the Board's 
investigations shall be assured.'' Id. The Committee further stated, 
``all appropriate information obtained or developed by the Board . . . 
shall be exchanged in a timely manner with other Federal agencies.'' 
Id. The Committee reasoned Federal agencies should obtain substantial 
information through participating in NTSB investigations, reducing the 
need for those agencies to conduct their own parallel investigations.
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    \4\ H.R. Rep. No. 97-108, pt. 2, 1981 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1734, 1736. 
This is from a report of the House of Representatives' Committee on 
Public Works and Transportation, the predecessor of the current 
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, which exercises 
primary oversight jurisdiction in the U.S. House of Representatives 
with respect to the NTSB.
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    This priority is critical to the conduct of independent, 
comprehensive investigations that the Congress has tasked the NTSB with 
completing. The NTSB is aware that Congress intended that it share 
information with other agencies in a timely manner while remaining 
independent of enforcement and other regulatory activities intrinsic to 
those agencies.
    This final rule adopts the term ``priority'' to indicate the status 
of the NTSB's investigation of an accident in which another Federal 
agency has a significant role. Pursuant to its statutory 
responsibility, the NTSB will provide for the participation of other 
Federal agencies. Notwithstanding its responsibility to share 
information with other Federal agencies, the NTSB exercises its 
authority to gain first access to witnesses, wreckage, and other 
evidence. The NTSB considers this a fair reading of the statute, while 
remaining mindful of the requirement other government entities may have 
to investigate and take action after accidents. We will continue our 
long-held practices that provide the opportunity for Federal, state, 
and local agencies participating in an investigation to receive the 
information that we collect in a timely manner, and avoid the need for 
duplicative requests.
    For example, in a recent rail investigation, another Federal agency 
participating in the investigation informed the NTSB IIC of the 
agency's need to provide information to additional employees within 
that agency. After coordinating with the IIC, the NTSB accommodated the 
other agency's request by permitting its employees who were not party 
participants to obtain the necessary factual information. Similarly, 
when an operator who is a party in an investigation sends records or 
information to the NTSB via email or in some electronic format, we 
generally do not oppose the operator sending a copy to another Federal 
agency. While we maintain that we have priority in an investigation, we 
appreciate that the timely sharing of information is a best practice 
for all agencies involved in investigating a transportation accident.
    As to the meeting we held with the FAA in January 2014, we consider 
the resulting policy letter to be a step forward in cooperation between 
the agencies. However, such policy was negotiated only with the FAA, 
and the content of the letter is not appropriate for inclusion in a 
more general regulation. We used our experience with that negotiation 
in drafting this final rule, and believe that the spirit of that 
agreement is reflected in the regulations we are adopting here.
    Regarding our relationships with state agencies, we intend to 
continue working with them in a manner similar to our practices with 
Federal agencies. We often rely on the local knowledge

[[Page 29674]]

intrinsic to state agencies following an accident, and usually 
coordinate with them concerning the timing of certain investigative 
activities and releases of information to ensure we do not impede a 
state agency's contemplated enforcement or other activities.
    Each investigation presents challenges we must review on a case-by-
case basis, and investigators in each NTSB safety office may vary its 
activities in response to the needs of the investigation. We are 
adopting language that indicates the expectation that other Federal 
agencies will coordinate their investigative efforts, and remain 
cognizant of the priority and authority granted to the NTSB by 
Congress. The language of Sec.  831.5 must remain sufficiently general 
to encompass our interactions with other agencies in all types of 
investigations.
2. Authority of Other Federal Agencies
    We have included language suggested by DOT that states nothing in 
our regulations limits the authority of other Federal agencies to 
conduct their own investigations.
    We recognize that other agencies have separate, distinct 
responsibilities. The FAA and other agencies within DOT assist the NTSB 
during investigations as parties. As with other parties, we will ask 
DOT agencies for assistance and expertise. We are not adopting the term 
``authorized representative'' as proposed, since commenters interpreted 
it as the NTSB authorizing other agencies to act for it. Since that has 
never been true, we are eliminating that term from the final rule.
3. Testing
    As discussed previously, some commenters questioned the NTSB's 
authority to determine the manner and method of testing. In reviewing 
the comments, it appeared that several commenters may not be aware of 
the specific language of 49 U.S.C. 1134(d), titled ``Exclusive 
authority of the Board,'' which states ``Only the Board has the 
authority to decide on the way in which testing under this section will 
be conducted.'' The commenters were concerned with the use of the word 
exclusive, but none explained a perceived difference between it and 
word ``only'' when used in the context of testing. This exclusive 
authority has been upheld by the courts. See, Thomas Brooks Chartered 
v. Burnett, 920 F.2d 634, 647 (10th Cir. 1990); Graham v. Teledyne-
Continental Motors, 805 F.2d 1386, 1389 (9th Cir. 1986); Miller v. 
Rich, 723 F.Supp. 505 (C.D. Cal. 1989). Commenters may have interpreted 
the exclusive testing language to mean the NTSB was asserting a broader 
exclusive authority to investigate an accident. That was not intended. 
The NTSB continues to acknowledge that other agencies may be authorized 
to conduct other investigations.
4. Provision of Information Relating to Other Federal Agencies' 
Activities
    We proposed a requirement that other Federal agencies coordinate 
and communicate with the NTSB about their activities to avoid 
duplication and to ensure more efficient Federal investigations.
    Commenters objected to the proposal that Federal agencies provide 
the results of their investigations to us when such investigations are 
for purposes of remedial action or safety improvement. The proposed 
language stated, ``[i]n general, this requirement will not apply to 
enforcement records or enforcement investigation results.'' The DOT 
requested that the NTSB clarify the circumstances under which we might 
demand enforcement records or enforcement investigation results. DOT 
recommended that we clarify whether we would seek such records upon 
request, or in every instance, and noted that a request in every 
instance would be unduly burdensome.
    We are adopting language in Sec.  831.5(b)(3) stating that the NTSB 
may request the results of any reviews undertaken by other Federal 
agencies aimed at safety improvements or remedial action. Examples of 
these results might be copies of reviews that result in advisory 
materials, rulemaking actions, or interpretive guidance. We will not 
routinely request enforcement investigation reports or results.
    We anticipate that we might need to request documents that reflect 
another Federal agency's preliminary deliberations, and we understand 
that these documents would be exempt from public disclosure under 
Exemption 5 of the FOIA. If the NTSB received a FOIA request regarding 
such deliberative documents, we would refer the request to the 
submitting agency to make a public release determination. This approach 
is consistent with standard practice among government agencies.
    We note that we had proposed language in this section indicating 
the NTSB may take possession of wreckage or other evidence. Boeing 
commented that this language was unnecessary given NTSB statutory 
authority, or in the alternative, that such language is more 
appropriately placed in Sec.  831.9, which addresses NTSB authority 
during investigations. We agree with Boeing that the language is more 
appropriately included in section 831.9, and thus have moved it to that 
section.

F. Section 831.6 Request To Withhold Information

    In the NPRM, the NTSB proposed changes to Sec.  831.6 that include 
reformatting the section into different paragraphs and adding language 
that differentiates treatment of information in domestic accidents and 
international accidents.
    Proposed provisions regarding the non-release of commercial 
information under the Trade Secrets Act and the FOIA generated 
significant comments. Boeing stated that the NTSB should conform its 
practice ``more closely to the statutory requirement'' with regard to 
the Trade Secrets Act. Boeing noted that 49 U.S.C. 1114(b)(1) allows 
disclosure only in four limited circumstances, one of which is to 
protect health and safety after providing the entity notice of the 
planned release and an opportunity to comment.\5\ Boeing asserted that 
the NTSB has in recent years read more broadly the health and safety 
exception that allows release to the public. Boeing stated that this 
position may lead to the disclosure of ``a broad range of Boeing trade 
secrets to the public'' while the connection of the information to 
public health and safety is ``attenuated at best.'' Boeing suggested 
limiting the scope of the exception ``to the disclosure of data 
necessary to prevent imminent risks to the traveling public'' to 
``better comport with the Congressional intent of ensuring strong 
trade-secret protections subject only to carefully defined 
exceptions.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \5\ Boeing notes the remaining three exceptions that permit 
release other than to the general public are narrow, with a minimal 
risk of public disclosure. The three exceptions permit release to 
other government agencies for official use, to a committee of 
Congress that has jurisdiction over the subject matter to which the 
information is related, or in judicial proceedings pursuant to a 
court order that preserves the confidentiality of the information. 
49 U.S.C. 1114(b)(1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Textron stated that while it will continue to provide proprietary 
data relevant to an investigation, it is concerned that the proposed 
language in Sec.  831.6 ``potentially inhibits the free flow of 
information during an investigation.'' GAMA requested that we establish 
a consistent process to ensure the continued protection of proprietary 
data.
1. Confidential Business Information
    We have reformatted Sec.  831.6. The NTSB retains the authorization 
to disclose ``information related to a trade secret,'' as defined by 18 
U.S.C. 1905, without the consent of the owner when

[[Page 29675]]

necessary to ``to protect public health and safety'' under 49 U.S.C. 
1114(b)(1)(D). We interpret this to mean disclosure is necessary to 
support a key finding, a safety recommendation, or the NTSB's statement 
of probable cause of an accident or incident.
    When we release information related to a trade secret or 
confidential commercial information without consent, we do so in a 
manner designed to preserve confidentiality.\6\ We interpret this to 
require that the agency minimize the scope and extent of information 
released. The NTSB is also subject to the limitations on disclosure in 
FOIA Exemption 4 (5 U.S.C. 552(b)(4)), and relevant case law, when a 
FOIA request is made that requests disclosure of trade secrets or 
confidential commercial information.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \6\ 49 U.S.C. 1114(b)(2).
    \7\ Exemption states ``trade secrets and commercial or financial 
information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential'' 
are exempt from disclosure under the FOIA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In Sec.  831.6(c), we set out the procedure for informing the owner 
of the subject information under consideration for disclosure. When a 
party has identified information as a trade secret that the NTSB 
believes needs to be disclosed to protect public health and safety, we 
engage in a process of negotiation to limit the disclosure while still 
meeting the agency's needs to explain the accident or issue safety 
recommendations. NTSB investigative staff makes initial decisions about 
what to include in its reports based on investigative needs and 
understandings of company confidentiality concerns obtained by working 
with the party representatives. When submitters of information to the 
NTSB claim information is confidential and should be withheld from 
public disclosure, such as in the public docket, the NTSB Office of 
General Counsel will address these issues with the submitter's counsel. 
A submitter must identify in writing information it objects to 
releasing. The NTSB Office of General Counsel discusses the submitter's 
objections internally (with NTSB report writers and investigative 
staff) to understand whether and why the identified information is 
necessary to support a finding, safety recommendations, or probable 
cause statement. The NTSB Office of the General Counsel will generally 
negotiate with the submitter's counsel until an agreement regarding 
release of the material can be reached.
    If the submitter and the NTSB cannot reach agreement, the NTSB will 
notify the submitter in writing of the NTSB's intent to release the 
information under its statutory authority. This written notification 
will provide at least 10 days' advance notice of the NTSB's intent to 
disclose the information.
    Confidential business information material considered for release 
is reviewed using the same analytical framework as the agency employs 
in determining whether submitted information is subject to withholding 
in accordance with FOIA Exemption 4. If the agency could not withhold 
information in response to a FOIA request, we will use it in agency 
reports as desired. If an Exemption 4 analysis concludes that 
information should be withheld, we will consider whether release is 
necessary and release the information only as is consistent with NTSB 
statutory authority.
    We proposed limiting the applicability of Sec.  831.6 to domestic 
matters, and considering information we receive regarding international 
aviation investigations under proposed Sec.  831.23 (now renumbered as 
Sec.  831.22). We also stated we would not release information from an 
international investigation if the information would be protected by 
the Trade Secrets Act. Our statements regarding this change raised 
questions of ambiguity of our intent. For example, an accident or 
incident occurring in U.S. territory will often involve both foreign 
and domestic entities. As a recent example, these questions arose in 
the context of the Asiana Flight 214 investigation (involving a foreign 
operator) and the Boeing 787 Battery Fire investigation (involving 
foreign component manufacturers).
    There is no practical difference in our process or authority for 
treating trade secrets or confidential commercial information based on 
identifying the source of the information as domestic or foreign, even 
though the foreign entities participate as advisors to accredited 
representatives in accordance with ICAO Annex 13 (``Aircraft Accident 
and Incident Investigation''). The Trade Secrets Act does not 
differentiate between information received from domestic or foreign 
companies. See 18 U.S.C. 1905. Similarly, FOIA Exemption 4 applies to 
information ``obtained from a person,'' which is read broadly to 
include both foreign and domestic entities. See, e.g., Maryland Dep't 
of Human Resources v. Dep't of Health and Human Serv., 763 F.2d 1441, 
1445 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (citing, Stone v. Export-Import Bank, 552 
F.2d 132, 136 (5th Cir. 1977).
    Accordingly, we are not adopting the domestic vs. foreign 
distinction in this final rule. We will continue to treat information 
from both domestic and foreign sources consistently for purposes of 
determining whether disclosure of information related to a trade secret 
or confidential commercial information is authorized.
    The NTSB's release of investigative information from a foreign 
accident investigation is limited by statute (49 U.S.C. 1114(f)) and by 
these regulations. We have included this information in Sec.  831.22.
2. Voluntarily Submitted Information (VSI)
    We specifically requested comments concerning the protection of VSI 
from disclosure. In the NPRM, we proposed language that more closely 
replicates 49 U.S.C. 1114(b)(3).\8\ We recognize this topic is of 
significant interest to the transportation industry and other 
government agencies, and specifically invited comments on the issue of 
the NTSB's disclosure of VSI.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \8\ Section 1114(b)(3) describes the conditions under which the 
NTSB, or any agency receiving VSI from the NTSB, is prohibited from 
disclosing VSI.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The agency will issue interpretative guidance to more fully explain 
the process for the NTSB's use and protection of VSI. In the interim, 
the language adopted in Sec.  831.6(d) represents the need of the NTSB 
to access such information and protect that information from public 
release.
    A4A, which had previously submitted a comment on this issue in 
response to our plan for retrospective review of our regulations in 
2012, reiterated its view that we should protect all VSI. In its 
comment in response to our NPRM, A4A stated the NTSB's ``supposition 
that the collection and dissemination of such information that may be 
used in a Board investigation cannot be protected is wrong and is not 
in the public interest.'' A4A emphasizes the importance of protecting 
VSI, and states the success of the effectiveness of VSI systems 
``depends on participants' confidence that inappropriate disclosure 
will not occur.'' A4A further stated that the NTSB's protection of such 
information will not inhibit the conduct of our investigations or our 
ability to disclose ``relevant information and conclusions to the 
public.'' A4A concluded that the NTSB ``should adopt a policy of 
invoking Exemption 4'' to deny release of any voluntarily submitted 
safety information. A4A also suggested the NTSB publish a ``non-
exclusive list of categories of information that it will not publicly 
disclose,'' and pursue legislation to provide assurance it may need to 
do so. HAI also urged us to explore a statutory exemption ``or any 
other possible

[[Page 29676]]

methods to safeguard the disclosure of safety-related proprietary data 
and trade secrets.'' HAI stated that protection of safety information 
is critical to the effectiveness of safety risk management and the 
development of effective safety recommendations.
    RMA and ARSA also raised FOIA exemption 4 as a basis for 
maintaining the confidentiality of information submitted to us 
voluntarily. As with the other commenters, the RMA stated that 
strengthening our protections for VSI will ``remove potential barriers 
for companies providing such information voluntarily.''
    Boeing, NATCA, and AAR/ASLRRA suggested removing the term ``in 
general'' from proposed Sec.  831.6(b)(1) and (2), which they read as a 
misstatement of the statutory prohibition. Boeing states 49 U.S.C. 
1114(b)(3) ``flatly prohibits the release of such information, if the 
NTSB `finds that the disclosure of the information would inhibit the 
voluntary provisions of that type of information.' ''
3. Comments Adverse to Greater Protections for VSI
    The NTSB received comments from attorneys who oppose greater 
protection of VSI. The Chair of the Aviation Section of AAJ stated 
``manufacturer-parties have the expanded capability of hiding evidence 
in a civil case by turning it over to the NTSB as `voluntarily-provided 
safety information' and then seeking protection from disclosure of such 
evidence based on their party status.''
    We found commenters' suggestions regarding our access to, and use 
of, VSI to be worthy of more careful consideration. To that end, and as 
mentioned previously in this preamble, the NTSB will issue separate 
guidance to further explain its use and treatment of VSI. For the 
purposes of this Final Rule, we adopt the language we proposed for 
Sec.  831.6, with one revision. We find that the language proposed is 
sufficiently broad for the NTSB to accept information received as 
voluntarily submitted under 49 U.S.C. 1114(b)(3). We decline to adopt 
the phrase ``in general'' because this phrase is not consistent with 
our statutory authority.
    We disagree with commenters' concerns that our proposed text sought 
to inhibit a free flow of information. We do not seek to frustrate any 
agency's practices regarding the acquisition and safeguarding of VSI. 
To the extent we believe we may access such information, we will only 
do so when 49 U.S.C. 1114(b)(3) applies to the information.
    We did not propose any regulatory text regarding information 
covered by ITAR and/or EAR. While we appreciate commenters' feedback 
concerning this type of information, we decline to add any specific 
text.
4. Objections To Release of Other Information
    Original paragraph (b) of Sec.  831.6 addresses objection to public 
disclosure of other information that does not qualify for protection as 
trade secret or confidential commercial information under Sec.  
831.6(a). It has been retained as new paragraph (e), with a revision to 
note that interview summaries and transcripts are examples of documents 
that could be the subject of such an objection, if the requirements of 
the paragraph are met.

G. Section 831.7 Witness Interviews

    In the NPRM, we proposed to: (1) Retain regulatory text that 
permits a witness to be accompanied by a representative; (2) permit 
NTSB investigators to remove a representative who is disruptive; and 
(3) add text stating NTSB will release interview transcripts or notes 
with the witness's name.
    The proposed rule included the title ``Witness Interviews'' for 
this section, but the content was in actuality more limited. This final 
rule is adopted with the section title revised to ``Representation 
During an Interview'' to more accurately describe the material in the 
section. We have also reformatted the material into list form to make 
it easier to understand. The following issues with the proposed rule 
were raised by commenters.
1. More Than One Representative
    Five commenters, including A4A, urged us to permit more than one 
representative to be present. A4A stated that when a witness is both an 
employee and a member of a labor union, the witness is occupying 
distinctly different roles. As a result, witnesses should be able to be 
accompanied by representatives from both the employer and the union. 
Comments from IPA, NJASAP, ATA, AAR/ASLRRA, and ATA agreed with A4A's.
    We decline to adopt the commenters' recommendation to permit each 
witness to be accompanied by more than one representative during an 
interview. Three commenters agreed with our rationale.
    We recognize the concerns expressed by the five commenters and the 
perceived benefit of having more than one representative accompany a 
witness. While we understand that a representative from the employer 
and a representative from a labor union have different interests, the 
purpose of representation is to provide counsel to the individual in 
the safety investigation, not to ensure various interests are 
represented in the course of witness interviews. Witness interviews are 
a means of gaining factual information. They are not part of an 
adjudicatory proceeding, and are not a means to support questions of 
future employee discipline or employer liability. Further, multiple 
representatives could give conflicting advice to an interviewee, 
complicating the process, confusing the interviewee, and delaying the 
collection of data without benefitting the investigation. This final 
rule retains the limit on one representative at an interview.
2. Exclusion of Representatives or Parties
    We proposed to allow an interviewer to exclude a witness's 
representative if the representative becomes disruptive. NATCA found 
this provision too subjective, and requested that we adopt a clear 
standard to apply to such exclusions. GE suggested that we add language 
indicating that if a representative is excluded for disruptive conduct, 
the witness may elect to be accompanied by another representative.
    This final rule allows an NTSB investigator to exclude a disruptive 
witness representative. Disruptive behavior might come in the form of 
repeatedly interrupting questions or the interviewee's answers, or 
arguing excessively with NTSB investigators or party members. We will 
not attempt to list all possible disruptive behaviors. Witness 
interviews are often critical to obtaining factual information 
following an accident, and disruptive behavior may unnecessarily delay 
and complicate the gathering of time-sensitive information. Further, we 
do not find a need to specify that an alternate representative may 
accompany a witness during an interview. Any attempt to list the 
alternatives that might occur in a given situation suggests all 
situations can be foreseen and that list would be inclusive. A 
determination of how to handle the removal and possible replacement of 
a representative is best left to the discretion of the IIC to assess 
under the circumstances of the investigation.
3. Roles of Individuals Present at Interviews
    Airbus Helicopters requested that we ``clarify the role of parties 
and technical advisors participating in witness interviews.'' It also 
stated that party and

[[Page 29677]]

technical advisor participation in witness interviews can add 
considerable value to an investigation.
    We appreciate the suggestion, but do not find that such 
clarification would be proper for regulatory text. We will consider 
this suggestion in the development of guidance for investigators in 
relating the role of each party member and any technical advisors 
participating in an interview.
4. Release of Transcripts or Summaries of Interviews
    We proposed to place the transcripts or summaries of witness 
interview in a public docket for an investigation. Commenters opposed 
this proposal. Boeing noted that the international standard, Paragraph 
5.12 of ICAO Annex 13, prohibits making available, for purposes other 
than the investigation, statements authorities took from a person in 
the course of the investigation unless the appropriate authority 
determines disclosure outweighs the possible adverse impact on that or 
future investigations. Other commenters urged that we adopt the same 
practice, both to protect the flow of information and to remain 
consistent with international standards. SWAPA suggested releasing the 
full transcript of an interview only when a consensus of all parties 
finds release to be appropriate.
    The NTSB is retaining its discretion to release any part of an 
interview transcript, including the name of the witness, when we find 
it is appropriate to an investigation. The NTSB filed a formal 
difference with ICAO on this point, indicating in part that ``The laws 
of the United States require the determination and public reporting of 
the facts, circumstances, and cause(s) or probable cause(s) of every 
civil aviation accident. This requirement does not confine the 
disclosure of such information to an accident investigation or 
report.'' \9\ By not including the text of paragraph 5.12 of Annex 13 
in our regulation regarding disclosure of any specific information, we 
maintain our discretion to release or withhold certain information, 
including names, from interviews depending on relevant circumstances; 
attempts to categorize information are not appropriate for regulatory 
text.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \9\ See Annex 13, Section 5.12.1, citing 49 U.S.C. 1114.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Because we have changed the title of Sec.  831.7 to 
``Representation during an interview'', we have moved this provision on 
disclosure in a docket to Sec.  831.6(e) and included the right of any 
person to object to the public disclosure of information in the same 
paragraph so that the two are not unnecessarily separated.

H. Section 831.8 Investigator-in-Charge

    In our NPRM, we included a reference to Sec.  800.27 of the NTSB 
regulations in describing the IIC's authority to sign and issue 
subpoenas, administer oaths and affirmations, and take or order 
depositions in furtherance of an investigation. We stated such a 
reference ensures the public and participants in NTSB investigations 
are aware of an IIC's authority. In addition, we proposed removing the 
word ``considerable'' from the final sentence in Sec.  831.8, because 
we believed it was unnecessary.
    Comments from DOT, Textron, and Airbus Helicopters supported 
adoption of our proposed changes to Sec.  831.8. DOT believes the 
changes will enhance the clarity of the IIC's role and authority.
    This final rule adopts a different format for this information by 
more clearly providing the authority in a list format. We have moved 
the description of the role of a Board Member to Sec.  831.13(c)(1)(ii) 
as the official spokesperson who may release investigative information 
in coordination with the IIC; the role of a Board Member is not related 
to the scope of authority of the IIC. No substantive change was made to 
the proposed description of the IIC's authority or to the role of the 
Board Member when that provision was moved.

I. Section 831.9 Authority of NTSB Representatives

    Proposed Sec.  831.9 generally discussed the NTSB's authority to 
inspect and collect evidence. We first proposed using the term 
authorized representative of the NTSB in lieu of ``employee'' because 
we may request the assistance of the FAA, law enforcement agencies, or 
other party representatives to inspect or photograph the site of an 
accident or to collect evidence. We also proposed language to reflect 
accurately the NTSB's authority to obtain health and medical 
information as a ``public health authority'' and to collect data and 
records from electronic and wireless devices. The proposed rule 
recognized the use of electronic devices from which the NTSB would need 
to extract and analyze data.
1. Authorized Representatives
    The joint comment we received from six railroad labor organizations 
supported our proposed amendments and recognizes our need for text 
concerning authorized representatives of the NTSB. Other commenters, 
including GAMA, requested further clarification of proposed changes to 
Sec.  831.9. Textron and Airbus Helicopters requested an explanation of 
whether our use of the term ``any other party representative,'' could 
be a manufacturer's representative, union representative, or operator 
whom we could consider, at any time, to be an authorized representative 
of the NTSB when we direct such a person to conduct or oversee testing. 
Textron and Airbus Helicopters were concerned we could designate a 
person or entity as an ``authorized representative of the NTSB'' to 
inspect or gather evidence when ``the person or entity has no 
background in transportation accident investigation.'' GAMA also noted 
the NTSB relies on salvage companies to gather wreckage, and asks 
whether individuals from salvage companies would be ``authorized 
representative[s] of the NTSB'' under the proposed rule.
    As indicated in the discussion of Sec.  831.4, we have determined 
that the term ``authorized representative'' is confusing and we have 
not included it in this final rule. Instead, the rule title has been 
changed to ``Authority during investigations'', and sets out the 
authority and discretion of NTSB investigators (including the IIC) to 
direct the gathering of information by others.
2. Medical and Personal Records
    Several commenters addressed our proposed access to medical records 
for investigative purposes. ALPA opposed our proposed language over 
concern that personal health information could be made available to the 
public, either as part of a pubic docket or in response to a FOIA 
request to the NTSB for the information. ALPA, IPA and A4A noted our 
current subpoena process already affords important protections. ALPA 
stated the process ``provides for independent judicial review of 
requests for information and therefore provides checks and balances to 
minimize inappropriate access to private information.''
    Commenters, including A4A, also disagreed with the finding that the 
NTSB has the status of a ``public health authority'' under the 
HIPAA.\10\ ALPA noted that the NTSB's authorizing legislation ``makes 
no reference to activities as neither a public health authority nor 
does its authorized budget provide for such activity.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \10\ Public Law 104-191, 100 Stat. 2548 (Aug. 21, 1996).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We disagree. The NTSB may need to obtain and review medical records 
in

[[Page 29678]]

furtherance of a complete investigation. The agency is authorized to 
require production of necessary evidence. 49 U.S.C. 1113(a)(1). 
Historically, the NTSB has obtained records containing medical 
information from hospitals and healthcare providers using our statutory 
subpoena authority and our status as a public health authority under 
the HIPAA, and we will continue to use both as circumstances require. 
We have reworded Sec.  831.9(b)(2) to include the basis for our 
authority and clarify that we may receive medical and health 
information from HIPAA ``covered entities'' without the prior written 
authorization of the subject of the records. We note that the NTSB 
employs well-qualified medical and public health professionals to 
address medical and survivability issues in transportation accidents. 
These issues include whether operators were affected by medication or 
medical conditions. The DHHS regulation addressing disclosures to 
public health authorities does not attempt to list all known public 
health authorities, but describes them functionally, to include 
agencies that seek to prevent injuries, disability, or deaths. (See 45 
CFR 164.512(b)(1)(i)) Moreover, in the preamble to the NPRM 
promulgating that regulation, DHHS included the NTSB as an example of 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
this functional description:

    Other government agencies and entities carry out public health 
activities in the course of their missions. For example, the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration, the Mine Safety and 
Health Administration, and the National Institute for Occupational 
Safety and Health conduct public health investigations related to 
occupational health and safety. The National Transportation Safety 
Board investigates airplane and train crashes in an effort to reduce 
mortality and injury by making recommendations for safety 
improvements.

Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 
64 FR 59918, 59956 (Nov. 3, 1999). We discussed this language in a 
notice advising the public that we exercise status as a public health 
authority under HIPAA. Notice of National Transportation Safety Board 
Public Health Authority Status, 79 FR 28970 (May 20, 2014). This final 
rule reiterates this NTSB authority by including it in our regulations.

3. Examination of the Evidence
    As we noted in the discussion of Sec.  831.5, some commenters 
disagreed with the proposed language regarding the exclusive authority 
of the NTSB to decide when and in what manner evidence will be examined 
and data extracted. The same comments were reiterated for proposed 
Sec.  831.9 in reference to whether this interpretation of our 
authority to oversee or conduct testing or extract data will impinge on 
another agency's authority to pursue its own enforcement or other 
responsibilities. Commenters also stated that we appear to have 
asserted the authority to extract data even when we do not launch a 
formal investigation.
    Sikorsky suggested that we include language that we will provide 
``copies of the extracted data as soon as possible to the technical 
advisers for the purpose of directing potential immediate safety 
actions.'' Sikorsky also stated that such data should be used for 
safety purposes only; and should be restricted from any legal use(s).
    In the reformatted Sec.  831.9, paragraph (c) was redrafted to cite 
to our statutory authority to decide on the manner and method of 
testing, including the phrase ``extraction of data,'' since the 
distinction appeared unclear to some commenters. Our analysis of any 
type of data recorder requires us to extract data, and the language now 
reflects our standard practice.
    The commenters that stated the NTSB might use the proposed language 
to determine the manner and method of tests performed in furtherance of 
another regulatory agency's administrative action, or even when the 
NTSB does not decide to launch a formal investigation, are incorrect. 
The language of our regulation cannot extend our authority beyond that 
granted for the investigation of transportation accidents and cannot be 
validly read to do so. We did not add language to indicate this 
limitation as it is inherent in our statutory authority and each 
regulation that implements it.
    To prevent any confusion regarding this authority, we state it 
primarily in Sec.  831.9(c) and reference that paragraph in Sec.  
831.5(a)(4).
    The regulation is adopted with these changes.

J. Section 831.10 Autopsies and Postmortem Testing

    This section was redrafted to more clearly state its content. No 
substantive changes were made from the proposed text. The regulation is 
adopted with these changes.

K. Section 831.11 Parties to the Investigation

    In the NPRM, we proposed adoption of the term ``technical advisor'' 
in lieu of ``party.'' We noted that with the exception of the statutory 
inclusion of the FAA in aviation accidents (49 U.S.C. 106(g)(1)(A)), no 
individual or organization has a right to party status. We proposed 
that participants in an investigation ``should, to the extent 
practicable, be personnel who had no direct involvement in the event 
under investigation'' to help ensure independence from the accident 
under investigation; this restriction would also apply to employees of 
Federal entities. We have often requested that party participants also 
engaged in enforcement activities erect a figurative ``wall'' between 
their agency's enforcement and investigative duties, especially when 
the same person must serve in both roles. Because our investigations 
vary significantly, we found it impracticable to propose a regulatory 
prohibition on the participation of individuals with enforcement 
duties.
    Our proposed language included the NTSB maintaining the discretion 
to disclose party representatives' names, and that information might be 
shared among parties for purposes of the investigation. We also 
indicated we would preserve confidentiality, to the extent possible, of 
information gained in the course of an investigation, and adhere to our 
statutory authority to disclose and use information (49 U.S.C. 
1114(b)). We indicated that we would not share confidential information 
between parties without considerable analysis of the need to do so. We 
also indicated that we would consider a party's requests for imposing 
limits on sharing certain information. We proposed that employees of 
other Federal agencies would not be required to sign the Statement of 
Party Representatives.
    Regarding party inquiries and reviews, we proposed that parties 
that conduct reviews or audits based on a transportation accident (1) 
inform the IIC in a timely manner of such reviews or audits; (2) obtain 
IIC approval to conduct a post-accident activity that overlaps with the 
NTSB's work or anticipated work; and (3) provide the NTSB with a copy 
of the results of the separate audit, inquiry, or other review. We 
indicated that a party that engages in such activities without the 
prior approval of the IIC, or without disclosing the results of its 
reviews, may lose party status.
1. Use of the Term ``Party''
    Several commenters, including HAI, United, Textron, ALPA, and 
NATCA, opposed the adoption of the term ``technical advisor'' stating 
it was confusing, and preferred we continue to use the term ``party.'' 
Commenters concluded that the public might interpret a ``technical 
advisor'' to be someone who maintains technical

[[Page 29679]]

expertise on a certain subject matter related to technology, while the 
term ``party,'' reflects the many duties of the participants that are 
broader than technical expertise.
    Some commenters, including Sikorsky, supported the use of both 
terms since the term ``technical advisor'' would be consistent with the 
terminology of ICAO Annex 13. The joint comment we received from six 
railroad labor organizations stated they did not strongly oppose our 
use of the term ``technical advisor,'' but suggested we refer to a 
party representative as an `authorized technical advisor' as a more 
proper name for a party representative based on their relationship to 
the NTSB investigation process.
    The CPUC/RTSB supported a change to ``technical advisor'' as being 
a more suitable description of a participant's role. ``[I]n CPUC 
parlance,'' it noted, the term ``party'' has ``a specific meaning.'' 
Such change could minimize confusion for its ``staff and decision-
makers.''
    After assessing all the comments, we are retaining the term 
``party.'' The word ``advisor'' seemed to provide the most concern, 
since ICAO Annex 13 defines ``adviser'' as a person assisting the 
``accredited representative.'' A party, however, provides assistance 
under the authority of the IIC, not another representative. Since the 
two systems differ in approach, we decline to add confusion by 
eliminating a term already understood in the transportation community. 
We have included a more detailed discussion of international aviation 
investigations as part of Sec.  831.22 below.
2. Right to Party Status and Party Agreement
    A4A, IPA and SWAPA recommended we not exempt other Federal agencies 
from signing the party statement. These organizations contend that 
signing the statement reminds each party of its responsibilities during 
the investigation, and all parties need the benefit of this reminder.
    Textron expressed concern about our proposed language that we 
``will provide for the participation of the [FAA] in the investigation 
of an aircraft accident when participation is necessary to carry out 
the duties and powers of the FAA.'' Textron suggested this statement 
potentially limits the FAA's involvement, and therefore could create a 
``contentious relationship'' between the NTSB and FAA. Other commenters 
were concerned that such a limit on the FAA's involvement could hinder 
COS programs. The commenters suggested that any decision of the FAA's 
involvement rest with FAA.
    The ATA stated its concern how we might enforce our proposal that 
parties should refrain from having the same participant who is involved 
in our safety investigation also be involved in enforcement action 
arising out of the accident we are investigating. ATA stated that 
``enforcement personnel should, to the extent possible, be personnel 
who have no direct enforcement role regarding the accident under 
investigation. Such a provision would clarify that the NTSB's 
investigation covers safety outcomes only.'' ATA recommended we ``adopt 
language that limits enforcement personnel just as it does private 
sector parties.''
    The CPUC/RTSB agreed that we should not expressly prohibit 
employees with enforcement duties from participating in NTSB 
investigations. CPUC/RTSB stated it ``has its own team of experts in 
its Safety and Enforcement Division to investigate rail incidents on 
both railroad and public rail fixed guideway systems,'' while it is 
``involved in the safety oversight of rail public guideway system 
operations . . . and railroads,'' as well as the enforcement of CPUC 
General Orders and provisions.
    We have carefully considered these comments. First, we have a 
statutory requirement to provide for the appropriate participation of 
other Federal agencies in NTSB investigations found at 49 U.S.C. 
1131(a)(2)(A). We are merely reiterating that language in our 
regulation. We are also required to cooperate with states in highway 
investigations (49 U.S.C. 1131(a)(1)(B)), and we remain mindful of our 
relationship as an equal partner with the USCG in marine investigations 
(49 U.S.C. 1131(a)(1)(E),46 U.S.C. Chapters 61 and 63, and 14 U.S.C. 
141). However, using the term ``party'' to describe other Federal 
agencies in all investigations may not always be accurate. As discussed 
in the context of Sec.  831.5, other Federal agencies may have 
statutory obligations in addition to participation in NTSB accident 
investigations, and the NTSB cannot ignore the duties and roles of 
other agencies, which distinguishes them from private-sector parties. 
Our proposed text that included the language of our authorizing statute 
was not intended to suggest that other Federal agencies would not 
participate in NTSB investigations, but rather a statement of the 
relationship we have with other Federal agencies when we conduct the 
investigation of a transportation accident.
    Our general practice is for the NTSB IIC to inform a Federal 
agency's representative of his or her responsibilities and obligations 
when participating in an NTSB accident investigation. We have found 
this to be sufficient notice to Federal agencies, and it is consistent 
with SWAPA's suggestion that ``at minimum, if the representatives from 
other Federal agencies are not required to sign, they should be given a 
copy of the Statement, instructed by the NTSB IIC that they are 
obligated to abide by the Statement and the IIC record that such 
instruction and copy of the Statement was given.'' Section 831.11(a) 
and (c) are adopted as proposed, with non-substantive revisions that 
are consistent with the section as reformatted.
3. Removal of Parties
    Both A4A and United recommended we provide a formal process for the 
removal of a designated party. A4A ``recognizes [our] authority in this 
regard,'' but stated that removal is a serious action after ``senior 
representatives from the NTSB, the FAA and the air carrier have 
discussed the matter.''
    United recommended we create a process that allows for removal of a 
party only after ``a hearing by third party, such as a Federal district 
judge,'' to maintain the integrity of our party procedures. United 
further recommended we not release media statements until the hearing 
process is complete, and consider sanctions, in lieu of removal, 
``against a party for an activity that has been identified to be 
contrary to party rules.''
    Several commenters requested the NTSB adopt a formal procedure when 
removal of a party is found necessary.
    This final rule does not include a formal removal procedure nor, in 
our view, is removal of a party a deprivation of a significant property 
interest that implicates due process rights that would necessitate a 
hearing. See, Cleveland Bd. Of Educ. V. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 
(1985). Removal is a tool of last resort that the NTSB has found to be 
rarely necessary. Further, any number of actions might precipitate 
removal. The NTSB's Certification of Party Representative addresses the 
possibility of removal, stating: ``I understand that as a party 
participant, I and my organization shall be responsive to the direction 
of NTSB personnel and may lose party status for conduct that is 
prejudicial to the investigation or inconsistent with NTSB policies or 
instructions.'' If a party continues to fail to abide by NTSB rules, we 
inform the party that the agency may exercise its removal authority. 
Each investigation is unique, and the exact course of action

[[Page 29680]]

will vary depending on the facts and circumstances. Adopting a formal 
procedure in a regulation that would apply to all circumstances would 
be so general as to be no more informative than the statements in the 
Certification document and in the regulation as adopted. Removal 
remains an option available to the IIC when no other solution has 
worked.
4. Internal, Independent Reviews
    Commenters, including A4A, Boeing, Textron, GE, and DOT, expressed 
concerns with the proposal the IIC be informed of a party's internal 
review. Specifically, Textron found a discrepancy in the NPRM, stating 
that the preamble to our NPRM said that parties should seek approval 
from the IIC before undertaking an internal review, while the proposed 
regulatory text stated parties ``shall inform the [IIC] in a timely 
manner of the nature of its inquiry or review to coordinate such 
efforts with the NTSB's investigation.''
    DOT suggested we add ``consistent with applicable law'' to the end 
of Sec.  831.11(d)of the NPRM since some internal reviews may involve 
personnel investigations or attorney-client privileged communications. 
DOT cited the example of an aviation accident necessitating a ``prompt 
evaluation by the FAA of the Government's civil liability exposure,'' 
which would consist of attorney work product and information subject to 
attorney-client privilege. GE requested we clarify that nothing in 
Sec.  831.11(d) of the NPRM would require a party to inform the IIC of 
a review to which attorney-client or work product privileges would 
apply. In general, the commenters requested we further define the scope 
of materials to which this provision would apply. The NBAA questioned 
whether we have the authority to enforce such a requirement.
    Boeing, Textron and GE expressed concern about the impact of the 
proposed regulation on their operations, and suggested that if 
companies have to obtain approval to conduct a review, safety 
improvements could be delayed. Textron noted ``this new level of 
approval/rejection authority over post-accident activity would create a 
new arm of regulatory oversight and control that even the FAA does not 
have.'' Textron acknowledged that our ``concern about so-called 
`parallel' or `rogue' investigations is legitimate,'' but Sec.  
831.11(d)of the NPRM should not obstruct a party's ``continuous, daily 
operation'' or normal business processes.
    Commenters requested that we clarify what information from internal 
reviews we would seek, indicating that the receipt of irrelevant data 
and information could hinder our investigation. Commenters also 
expressed concern about this proposal in the context of voluntary 
disclosure reporting programs. Commenters asserted that our definition 
may be too broad and may inhibit the utilization of voluntary safety 
programs such as ASAP and FOQA.
    The Families of Continental Flight 3407 submitted a comment 
expressing support for our proposed requirement to ensure parties 
inform us of ongoing internal reviews that may overlap with our 
investigations, stating ``[t]o our group, this section perfectly 
illustrates the importance of requiring complete transparency on the 
part of all parties to the investigation in the interest of safety over 
all other considerations.''
    Similarly, NADAF supported broad disclosure of information we might 
collect from parties. NADAF stated we should disclose ``all names of 
those participating in the party process, who they are representing, 
and breakdown of who is serving on which sub-groups or sub-committees, 
and when the sub-groups met, who was in attendance, and who chaired the 
individual working group meetings, and who wrote the summary of those 
meetings.'' NADAF added that we should consider including, as party 
participants, individuals who represent ``a family member organization, 
an incorporated 501(c)(3) non-profit public interest organization with 
long term credentials in promoting aviation safety and security.'' 
These participants, NADAF stated, should be considered ``technical 
experts'' whose participation would counter the perception that a 
``conflict of interest'' exists ``with the party process, dominated by 
industry representatives who have a strong economic interest in the 
outcomes'' of NTSB investigations. To this end, NADAF recommended we 
remove the proposed phrase ``only those'' from the proposed description 
of party participants, to broaden the availability of party status to 
anyone who may have been involved in the accident or who can offer 
experience and expertise to the investigation. NADAF characterized our 
proposed language as an attempt to ``limit participation in disaster 
investigation, but in conflict with allowing each member to include a 
wide range of others from his/her company.'' NADAF recommended we 
permit family member organizations to take part in our investigations, 
because ``[a]n air crash investigation can be a long process, and 
family member representatives could be helpful in assuring victims' 
families that a thorough investigation is working for them.''
    We recognize that organizations that have participated in our 
investigations as parties believe the proposed text could create an 
impediment to their internal reviews or act as a barrier to their 
taking actions to improve safety of their products or operations. We 
strongly support all actions to make safety improvements and will not 
hinder such improvements based on information in internal reviews or 
audits. We have no intention of preventing parties from the conducting 
such reviews, nor will we in any way impede communications parties have 
with other Federal agencies in the course of making safety 
improvements.
    In this final rule, Sec.  831.11(a)(4) has been redesignated as 
Sec.  831.11(b) and Sec. Sec.  831.11(b),(c), and (d) in the NPRM have 
been redesignated as Sec. Sec.  831.11(c),(d), and (e), respectively. 
Section 831.11(e)(1) states that a party conducting or authorizing an 
inquiry or review of its own processes and procedures as a result of a 
transportation accident the NTSB is investigating must inform the NTSB 
IIC in a timely manner of the nature of its inquiry or review as a 
means of coordinating such efforts with the NTSB's investigation, and 
must provide the IIC with the findings of such review.
    Our awareness of such internal reviews and/or audits is important 
for ensuring we remain abreast of all information that could impact our 
investigation. The NTSB's goal is to assure coordination of concurrent 
efforts while an investigation is ongoing. Accordingly, Sec.  831.11(e) 
refers to such coordination, and gives more specific meaning to the 
statement already present in the party certification document.\11\ The 
regulation now clearly states that signing the agreement means the 
party agrees to provide information regarding any internal reviews to 
the IIC.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \11\ The party agreement includes the statements ``No 
information pertaining to the accident, or in any manner relevant to 
the investigation, may be withheld from the NTSB by any party or 
party participant,'' and ``[T]his includes, but is not limited to, 
the provisions of 49 CFR 831.11 and 831.13, which, respectively, 
specify certain criteria for participation in NTSB investigations 
and limitations on the dissemination of investigation information.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The NTSB is generally not interested in obtaining information that 
would be considered privileged in litigation as it would usually have 
no purpose in an investigation. Paragraph (d)(2) instructs parties on 
how to inform the IIC that material being submitted contains privileged 
information, such that it may be properly reviewed for whether it is

[[Page 29681]]

even relevant to the investigation. If it is not relevant, it will be 
excluded from the submission. If included in the submission, it will 
also be evaluated against the need for disclosure beyond the NTSB 
(referencing Sec.  831.6).
    Paragraph 831.11(d)(4) states that investigations performed by 
other Federal agencies are addressed in Sec.  831.5.
    The NTSB recognizes NADAF's concerns regarding the needs of victims 
and their families for information following an accident. The agency 
has a division whose responsibility is to ensure victims and family 
members are aware of factual developments in investigations, the 
overall status of the investigation, and other relevant information. 
However, we disagree with NADAF that representatives from family-member 
organizations and 501(c)(3) charitable organizations should be 
considered technical experts as that term is understood in our 
investigations. We also disagree that there is a conflict of interest 
in the party process. NTSB investigations are factual and not 
adversarial, and no legal consequences result from an NTSB 
investigation. NTSB parties participate in the fact gathering process, 
but the analysis and determination of probable cause are NTSB 
responsibilities.


L. Section 831.12 Access to and Release of Wreckage, Records, Mail and 
Cargo

    In the NPRM, we proposed removing from Sec.  831.12 the reference 
to a specific form that the NTSB completes upon the return of wreckage 
to its owner. We determined that reference to a specific form number 
was unnecessary.
    We also discussed a comment previously received from A4A that 
suggested we revise Sec.  831.12 to allow for remote read-outs of 
digital flight data recorders and cockpit voice recorders as a means to 
preclude the need for transporting recorders to NTSB Headquarters. A4A 
also recommended we ``establish a firm deadline for returning 
[recorders] to the [air] carrier.'' We did not propose any language as 
a result of this comment, having found that no regulatory change was 
necessary to adopt any specific procedures related to our possession, 
review of data from recorders, or release of wreckage. We reiterate 
that such suggested changes are more appropriate for internal agency 
policies and procedures and will be reviewed in that context.

1. Wreckage
    Several commenters suggested we adopt a standardized practice of 
providing documentation when we obtain material, components, and parts 
from parties, and when we return such items to parties. United 
suggested language directing investigators ``to always provide 
receipting for material obtained and returned'' and that ``the 
receipting should clearly document from whom the items were received or 
returned as well as clear description of the material including part/
serial number when appropriate.''
    Commenters disagreed with our proposed removal of the reference to 
the Release of Wreckage form. Textron stated it had experienced cases 
which NTSB investigators have not communicated the release of wreckage 
to owners or operators. Textron stated that use of the form could 
specify such release has occurred, and that if confusion exists about 
whether wreckage has been released, ``critical safety evidence could be 
obscured or lost if the wreckage is disturbed prior to the appropriate 
phase of the investigation.'' Comments support retaining the sentence.
    Commenters who mentioned our procedures for releasing wreckage 
recommended we formally indicate our release of wreckage via NTSB Form 
6120.15 as standard practice.
    Elimination of the reference to a specific form should not be 
interpreted as indicating the NTSB intends to not use some type of form 
to confirm release of wreckage. Our practice is to document release of 
wreckage, though our specific procedures or form may change. We have 
added a statement that recipients of released wreckage must sign a form 
provided by the NTSB, but we must retain flexibility regarding the 
process and the form itself as investigations vary considerably and the 
information needed on forms evolves.
2. Return of Recorders
    We did not propose any regulatory language that changed how 
recorders are obtained, the data extracted, or recorders returned. A4A, 
however, suggested we adopt a remote readout program for flight 
recorders that would eliminate the need to physically remove the 
recorders and transport them. A4A stated that ``most operators'' have 
established readout capability networks, some of which work in 
conjunction with information submitted via FOQA programs, that a chain 
of custody of the data could be documented, that remotely reading out 
the data would not jeopardize its integrity, and that data on the 
recorder remains on the device until it is replaced. These factors, 
they contend, counsel in favor of the NTSB adopting a practice of 
``assuring speedy access to the [digital flight data recorder] 
uniformly occurs.'' A4A recommended the NTSB work with air carriers to 
establish a protocol permitting such readouts. The IPA disagreed with 
A4A's suggestions concerning the processes for examining and testing 
equipment such as FDRs and CVRs. The IPA states the NTSB ``has a highly 
talented and experienced group of engineers in the NTSB Recorder 
Labs,'' and the NTSB maintains ``processes, procedures and protocol 
(controls)'' to handle sensitive information. The IPA ``strongly 
opposes'' using different technologies to provide remote readouts of 
flight data from FDRs, and suggests that bypassing NTSB procedures and 
facilities would be simply for an air carrier's convenience or economic 
gain. The IPA also believes the current language of Sec.  831.12 as it 
applies to release of recorders is adequate, and states we should not 
release such items prior to the conclusion of the investigation.
    We have reviewed the commenters' concerns regarding recorder 
readouts. While immediate readouts and timely return of recorders are 
important issues, we cannot find that recorder handling procedures 
belong in our regulations. Rather, such matters are better placed in 
NTSB practice manuals where they can be fine-tuned to the needs of a 
particular investigation. Moreover, the NTSB did not propose to include 
recorder readouts at the scene of an accident as an option. The 
suggested change would be beyond the scope of the NPRM to include in a 
rulemaking, and might require changes to companion regulations by other 
Federal agencies.

M. Section 831.13 Flow and Dissemination of Investigative Information

    Our proposed revisions to this section included edits such as 
removing the reference to a ``field investigation,'' and substantive 
proposals addressing the circumstances when a party may share and 
release investigative information. We also proposed including a 
statement that Sec.  831.13 applies from the time an investigation 
commences until the NTSB completes its investigation.
    Regarding the release of investigative information, we stated that 
we need to remain the sole disseminator of that information. We remain 
concerned that a premature release of information during an 
investigation could result in the release of incorrect or incomplete 
information requiring additional effort

[[Page 29682]]

to correct, possibly impeding the progress of an investigation, and 
eroding public confidence in the credibility of an investigation.
    The NPRM also addressed that a party may need to share information 
with another Federal agency in response to that agency's need. We 
stated we would not prohibit or seek to impede the sharing of such 
information while noting that the IIC should be informed when records 
and information are provided to another agency and should be included 
in communications concerning the existence of records or information 
relevant to the investigation. We stated we will work with other 
agencies to share information obtained in the course of the NTSB 
investigation to minimize duplicative requests to NTSB parties and 
others for information.
1. Definition of ``Investigative Information''
    Sikorsky suggested we add the phrase ``relevant to the 
investigation'' in both Sec.  831.13(b) and (c), as follows ``[a]ll 
information relevant to the investigation obtained by any person or 
organization during the investigation, as described in paragraph (a) of 
this section, must be provided to the NTSB,'' and ``Parties are 
prohibited from publicly releasing information relevant to the 
investigation obtained. . . .'' Sikorsky stated these suggested 
additions would clarify that we are intending paragraphs (b) and (c) to 
apply to the investigative information, as defined in paragraph (a).
    Other comments suggested our proposed definition of investigative 
information is too broad. SWAPA's comment stated our proposed text 
might be interpreted to include ``reports submitted through codified 
and established voluntary safety programs including, but not limited 
to, ASAP and FOQA.'' SWAPA is concerned with the disclosure of such 
information because the NTSB does not have the authority the FAA has to 
protect the information from disclosure. SWAPA stated that this lack of 
protection ``compromises the integrity of these programs.'' As a 
result, SWAPA recommended we amend Sec.  831.13(a) to include an 
``express exemption of voluntary safety reports submitted through 
codified and established voluntary safety programs including, but not 
limited to, ASAP and FOQA.''
    The Kettles Law Firm suggested we add the following regarding 
record release: ``Parties are allowed to release records and documents 
that existed before the NTSB commenced its investigation and such 
information is not subject to the restrictions on the release of 
information in 49 CFR 831.'' The commenter sent a copy of a letter from 
an NTSB General Counsel dated October 31, 2008, stating records that 
pre-existed the commencement of the NTSB investigation are not 
considered investigative information subject to the restrictions of 
Sec.  831.13. In referring to this letter, the commenter described 
investigative material subject to Sec.  831.13 as ``documents, e.g., 
analyses or data compilations . . . created after the accident at the 
request of NTSB staff--solely by virtue of the [entity's] status as a 
party the NTSB investigation.'' The firm suggested we clearly 
articulate this concept in the text of Sec.  831.13, to resolve the 
question of whether the regulation applies to records that existed 
``before the accident sequence'' or records that existed ``at the 
time'' the accident occurred. The firm contends these two phrases could 
be subject to varying interpretations; hence, the need for clarity.
    In defining investigate information, the NTSB is not limiting the 
scope of information the agency may obtain or consider under its 
statutory authority. The NTSB has broad authority to require the 
production of evidence it deems necessary for the investigation. 49 
U.S.C. 1113(a)(1). The regulatory definition of investigative 
information limits the scope of information that may be released 
outside the investigation. The scope of investigative information 
depends on the nature of the accident or incident. An accident may be 
the result of a series of events or actions, and is not defined 
exclusively by the time of impact. For example, if the NTSB is 
conducting a limited investigation, the investigative information may 
be limited to information created or originating immediately prior to 
impact. If the NTSB, however, is conducting a major investigation in 
which it is examining potential causes of the accident that include a 
number of complex safety issues, investigative information could 
include documents and data leading up to the accident. Crewmember 
training records and maintenance records may be critical to such an 
investigation, even though they pre-date the accident or incident. 
Determining the probable cause of an accident or incident, in lieu of 
simply describing what happened, expands what the NTSB considers 
investigative information. The NTSB has determined the definition of 
investigative information must therefore be flexible.
    In response to the concerns regarding release of ASAP or FOQA data, 
the NTSB recognizes that these data are VSI. Although the agency may 
rely on these and other types of data and VSI during the course of an 
investigation, as discussed in reference to Sec.  831.6, the NTSB is 
prohibited by statute from releasing such information.
    In this final rule, we have redrafted Sec.  831.13 to more clearly 
describe the applicability of the NTSB's regulations on the release of 
investigative information. Paragraph (a) describes the applicability of 
the section and more clearly limits it to information relevant to an 
investigation. The timeframe covered by the definition will necessarily 
be flexible based on the circumstances of each investigation. For this 
reason, coordination with the IIC is important. Revised Sec.  
831.9(a)(5) makes clear that an NTSB investigator is authorized to 
examine records regardless of the date they were created if necessary 
for the investigation.
2. IIC Approval
    Several commenters opposed our proposal regarding restriction on 
information release within a party organization, stating that we should 
permit release of information within an organization more freely when 
the goal is safety improvement.
    Comments supported the principle that maximizing the flow of useful 
information between the NTSB and parties is critical to ensure safety 
improvements can occur. Commenters stated that the changes we proposed 
create requirements that are cumbersome and may be contrary to the 
duties outlined in our Statement of Party Representatives. Commenters 
emphasized that dissemination of investigative information within party 
organizations is often necessary to advance the investigation. GE 
recommended that parties should not be required to notify the NTSB IIC 
when internally disseminating information for purposes of the 
investigation. GE suggested that we add language restricting the 
dissemination to ``those possessing technical expertise and/or product 
knowledge whose participation is beneficial to the investigation.'' ATA 
requested that we adopt language allowing disclosure of information to 
owner-operators, independent drivers, and outsourced drivers.
    DOT stated that our proposed rule could prohibit non-Federal 
entities from providing information to DOT's OAs. DOT acknowledged, 
however, the release of investigative information prior to the 
conclusion of an investigation ``could impact the investigation'' and 
stated ``not every corrective measure ordered by the Department must 
contain detailed information gathered during an investigation.'' DOT 
did not present

[[Page 29683]]

specific text, but noted it will continue its ``past practice of 
closely coordinating with the NTSB, to ensure that its investigation is 
not compromised.''
    Commenters raised concerns that parties may disseminate 
investigative information only to decision-makers within the party 
organization. Boeing and ATA suggested we permit dissemination to 
individuals with a ``need to know.''
    Commenters were concerned that the proposed language could have a 
chilling effect on the flow of safety information within a party. GAMA 
recommended we maintain the existing regulation and policies concerning 
dissemination of information, stating that manufacturers ``monitor, 
maintain, and upgrade their products on a daily basis,'' and ``some of 
these activities could be construed as overlapping an NTSB 
investigation, but in reality, have nothing to do with the findings or 
probable cause of an accident or incident.''
    The regulation has been revised to more clearly state our intent to 
balance the interest of improved safety through timely sharing of 
information with the need to ensure such sharing does not compromise 
the integrity of the investigation. The large number and widely varying 
size and character of parties to NTSB investigations has led us to 
conclude that decisions on dissemination of investigative information 
within an organization cannot be left completely to parties as was 
suggested by commenters.
    The reformatting of Sec.  831.13 includes a detailed paragraph (c) 
on the release of investigative information. Paragraphs (c)(1) and (2) 
describe release of information at the scene of an accident 
investigation by the NTSB. Paragraph (c)(3) describes the dissemination 
of information by the parties to persons in its organization that have 
a need to know for the purpose of addressing a safety issue or planned 
improvement. As stated in paragraph (c)(4) any other release of 
information must be coordinated with the IIC including within a party's 
organization for a reason other than specified in (c)(3).
    The NTSB and commenters agree that a release of information should 
not cause public confusion and speculation. The regulations promulgated 
here balance the need to know for certain persons inside a party 
organization with the general rule that investigative information is 
not to be released publicly. The NTSB does not seek to inhibit the flow 
of information where a safety purpose is served, but the IIC, as the 
primary director of an investigation, needs to remain cognizant of the 
information flow. Since investigations can differ dramatically in their 
scope and timing, we retain the right to direct the flow of information 
except in the limited case stated in the regulation. This final rule 
does not adopt the proposed term ``decision-makers;'' we agree with the 
commenters that it could inhibit the appropriate persons from taking 
remedial action.
    The regulation is adopted to include the revised format of this 
section and the comments as discussed.

N. Section 831.14 Proposed Findings

    The NTSB did not propose any substantive changes to Sec.  831.14, 
``Proposed findings.'' In the preamble to the NPRM, we summarized A4A's 
prior suggestion that we include a statement that the NTSB will provide 
a copy of the NTSB draft final report, including analytical conclusions 
(but not necessarily probable cause and recommendations), before the 
Board schedules a meeting on an investigation. A4A had recommended that 
the NTSB adopt the practice of ICAO Annex 13 regarding the release of 
draft reports to accredited representatives of the States participating 
in an aviation investigation who often seeks the input of their 
technical advisers.
    In the NPRM, we disagreed with A4A's comment regarding rule text in 
Sec.  831.14, but said that we would consider such a practice to be 
addressed outside a regulation and that any such sharing would involve 
timely notice to party representatives.
1. Sharing of Draft Reports
    Fourteen commenters to the NPRM addressed the sharing of draft 
reports.
    We maintain that the most appropriate means to undertake such a 
change would be through internal agency policies. While we appreciate 
consistency with the best practices of ICAO, Sec.  831.14 applies to 
investigations in all modes of transportation and the sharing of draft 
reports may be not be workable across all modes. Further, the NTSB 
needs to consider the specific circumstances of an investigation before 
we can determine whether such advance sharing would be a benefit. We 
will continue to examine our policies with regard to sharing draft 
reports and we will share them when we determine it would benefit an 
investigation. We will use the comments received on this issue when 
revising our internal policies and study whether such sharing might be 
most appropriate in a certain category of investigation.
2. Timing of Submissions
    While we did not propose any change to the language on timing of 
submissions from parties, we received comment on it. Textron noted that 
the proposed rule states that submissions ``must be received before the 
matter is announced in the Federal Register for consideration at a 
Board meeting. All written submissions shall be presented to staff in 
advance of the formal scheduling of the meeting. This procedure ensures 
orderly and thorough consideration of all views.'' Textron requested 
that we establish a predictable deadline for the timing of submissions, 
and suggests that we provide advance notice of the announcement of a 
Board meeting in the Federal Register, since preparing a submission can 
take considerable time and would be done before the meeting is formally 
announced.
    Both GAMA and Airbus agreed that we should provide a means of 
advance notice to provide sufficient time to develop their submissions.
    We have revised Sec.  831.14 based on the comments. Paragraph (a) 
now refers to submissions by a party rather than ``any person,'' since 
it is parties who have access to the information at issue and are in a 
position to be notified of the scheduled date of a Board meeting. 
Paragraph (b) has been revised to include the statement that the IIC 
will inform parties when submissions are due, and that such submissions 
must be received by the IIC before the matter is formally announced.
    We have removed paragraph (c) because the limitation provision was 
found to be confusing, since by its terms, safety enforcement cases are 
already handled under Part 821 of this chapter, which contains ex parte 
rules in subpart J. Repeating this information in paragraph (c) was not 
appropriate.

O. Comments on Mode-Specific Sections

    We received seven comments addressing proposed Subpart B on 
regulations specific to aviation investigations. We received one 
comment addressing Subpart E specific to marine investigations.
    We did not receive any comments on proposed Sec.  831.20 addressing 
the responsibility of the NTSB, or on Sec.  831.21 regarding the 
authority of NTSB representatives in aviation investigations.
    We have revised Sec.  831.20 to more clearly present the scope of 
the NTSB's authority based on the type of aircraft involved in an 
accident. We have also included the authority of NTSB representatives 
as paragraph (b) of this section, rather than as a separate section in 
the subpart. Therefore, we have renumbered sections 831.22 and 831.23 
to 831.21 and 831.22, respectively. The

[[Page 29684]]

changes were intended to be stylistic and not substantive.

P. Section 831.21 [NPRM Sec.  831.22] Aviation Investigations: Other 
Government Agencies

    A4A stated that it is important to air carriers to know which 
government agency is responsible for an investigation, and the 
responsible agency's supporting and reporting functions. A4A stated 
``[o]f particular importance to us is the need for the NTSB to 
underscore that it, and not any other agency, is responsible for the 
retrieval and custody of aircraft cockpit voice and data recorders.'' 
A4A requests that this concept be ``broadly communicated to other 
agencies.''
    A4A stated that describing the FAA as conducting fact-gathering 
``on behalf of'' the NTSB introduces confusion because both act as 
parties to an investigation, and each fulfills a role in COS. A4A 
stated that the NTSB does not delegate investigations to the FAA and 
that the text of Sec.  831.22 (now Sec.  831.21) should not suggest any 
delegation. Other commenters acknowledged similar concerns. United 
asked how an operator is to know whether an FAA employee at the scene 
of an accident or incident is working on behalf of the NTSB. United 
indicated it has encountered situations where FAA employees have been 
mistaken in this capacity and have impeded access to the site by the 
carrier. United suggested we add a statement to Sec.  831.22(c) (now 
Sec.  831.21(c)) to clarify how an FAA employee is granted authority to 
act on behalf of the NTSB, or whether parties should assume the FAA 
employee arriving at the site ``automatically possesses this 
authority.'' United said a similar concern exists for the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation and questioned whether its employees are 
considered representatives of the NTSB. United is concerned that each 
agency differs in the way it handles information it obtains.
    The comments concerning Sec.  831.22 (now Sec.  831.21) echo many 
of the concerns expressed in comments to Sec.  831.5 regarding the 
scope of authority of various agencies at an aviation accident site. We 
reiterate here that DOT employees, including those employed by the FAA, 
do not become NTSB employees during an investigation. Instead, DOT 
employees participate in our investigations and are able to collect 
evidence and question witnesses when participating in our 
investigations under the direction of the IIC.
    Similarly, there should be no confusion regarding which government 
agency is responsible for an investigation--the NTSB is responsible by 
statute for investigating all civil aviation accidents and certain 
aviation incidents. The FAA participates in--but does not oversee--each 
investigation. In some limited investigations in which the NTSB has not 
launched a full inquiry, the FAA may collect evidence and gather 
various types of information for its owns purposes, which the FAA then 
shares with the NTSB. For larger-scale investigations, the FAA only 
collects information and evidence at the request of the NTSB.
    The request for the assistance of the Secretary of the Department 
of Transportation and the FAA reaches back to an NTSB letter from 1977, 
which appears as an appendix to 49 CFR part 800. The NTSB remains 
mindful of the important role the FAA maintains in ensuring aviation 
safety. Given the varying nature of aviation accidents and incidents, 
maintaining flexibility allows for the most efficient use of 
investigative resources. The NTSB appreciates the FAA's and parties' 
respect for this model.
    In response to the comment we received from the DOT, and concerns 
recently expressed by the FAA to the NTSB, we have redrafted NPRM Sec.  
831.22 (now Sec.  831.21) to clarify that we provide for FAA 
participation in aviation accident investigations as a matter of 
statute; that the FAA has the same rights and privileges as other 
parties to an investigation; that the FAA may obtain information from 
others as part of its statutory responsibilities; that an FAA employee 
may have the same authority as an NTSB investigator when granted such 
by the IIC for purposes of the NTSB investigation; and that the FAA is 
expected to timely share information and coordinate its activities with 
the NTSB during an accident investigation. We remain cognizant that 
aviation accidents result in significant overlap of the NTSB's and 
FAA's need for information to satisfy statutory responsibilities. Our 
regulations seek to acknowledge this overlap, while affirming the 
investigative priority granted to the NTSB by statute. The NTSB and FAA 
share the goal of improving aviation safety.

Q. Section 831.22 [NPRM Sec.  831.23] International Aviation 
Investigations

    We received six comments on proposed Sec.  831.23 (now Sec.  
831.22), international aviation investigations.
    United observed occasions in which the NTSB representative appeared 
to have a ``reduced interest in supporting a foreign investigation'' 
and requested that our regulations specify that we will give sufficient 
support to affected airlines.
    Textron agreed with our proposed reorganization of the text, but 
stated that we are ``over reaching [our] authority by stating `[t]he 
NTSB considers the provisions of Sec.  831.13 to apply to U.S. advisers 
working under the supervision of the U.S. accredited representative.''' 
Textron stated that the NTSB is attempting to interject itself between 
an adviser and a foreign authority, and that Textron is unaware of 
``any statutes that allow the NTSB to limit and control the 
communication an entity has with a foreign authority.'' GAMA reacted to 
the same proposed language, stating that it ``seems to infer that the 
NTSB desires to apply its authority when an investigation is conducted 
by a foreign state under its authority.'' GAMA does not believe Sec.  
831.13 ``and its surrounding policy framework'' can be applied to 
foreign aviation investigations.
    In commenting on international investigations, GE referred to its 
comment on Sec.  831.6 which requested we make the protections afforded 
to trade secrets apply to both domestic and international 
investigations. In the alternative, GE suggested we include in Sec.  
831.23 a description of how we will handle information subject to 
protection as a trade secret or as confidential commercial information.
    Boeing asserts our proposed version of Sec.  831.23(c)(1) (now 
Sec.  831.22(c)(1)) is inconsistent with ICAO Annex 13 in that NTSB 
regulations require technical advisors to ``work at the direction and 
under the supervision of the NTSB accredited representative.'' Boeing 
stated that ``[w]hile these advisors certainly perform their function 
under the supervision of the accredited representative,'' the foreign 
state's IIC is the person who remains in control of the investigation 
and directs the investigative work. Accordingly, Boeing suggested the 
following language for paragraph (c)(1): ``Such technical advisors 
shall perform their role under the supervision of the NTSB accredited 
representative.'' [Italics in original].
    Boeing also commented on the proposed application of Sec.  831.13 
to foreign investigations, stating that Annex 13 recognizes the State 
responsible for conducting the investigation with the responsibility 
for determining the circumstances and content of information that will 
be released. As a result, the NTSB's regulation can apply only to 
accidents that occur in the United States and not to technical advisors 
in a foreign investigation.

[[Page 29685]]

    NADAF supported the proposed application of Sec.  831.13 to foreign 
investigations as providing ``a way of releasing information and 
documents to promote global aviation safety and is an important part of 
Investigation Procedures.''
    We have reformatted NPRM Sec.  831.23 (now Sec.  831.22) to clarify 
the application of ICAO Annex 13, the role and responsibility of the 
NTSB and the position of appointed technical advisers.
    We agree with Boeing that Sec.  831.22 should indicate that 
technical advisers work under the supervision of the NTSB accredited 
representative and we have revised the language of Sec.  831.22(c) 
accordingly. We use a common understanding of the term ``supervision,'' 
that of having oversight and direction of. Thus, an NTSB accredited 
representative receives direction from a foreign state's IIC, and in 
turn the NTSB oversees both the conduct of its technical advisers 
during the investigation and the responses the technical advisers 
provide to foreign states' IICs. We consider this practice consistent 
with the process described in Annex 13, and most effective in ensuring 
a fully coordinated investigation. U.S. technical advisers are 
generally already familiar with the NTSB's manner of conducting 
investigations and the NTSB's expectations.
    We agree that the application of Sec.  831.13 to foreign 
investigations needs clarification. We have revised Sec.  831.22(c)(2) 
to state that the proscription on release of information from Sec.  
831.13 applies to U.S. advisers invited by the NTSB to participate and 
work under the supervision of the NTSB as the U.S. accredited 
representative in an international investigation. For example, if a 
foreign state's IIC contacts a U.S. technical adviser directly and 
instructs the adviser to collect certain documents or engage in certain 
work, the adviser should respond to the request by informing the NTSB 
accredited representative and then directly providing the information 
to both the foreign state's IIC and the NTSB accredited representative. 
We do not interpret Sec.  831.13 as preventing the sharing of 
information between the foreign state's IIC and a U.S. technical 
adviser.
    We proposed that Sec.  831.13 apply to foreign investigations 
because technical advisers have disseminated information to 
organizations that were not participating in the investigation. In one 
instance, a technical adviser's organization disseminated information 
to the media without informing the NTSB accredited representative or 
the foreign state's IIC of its plan to share the information. To 
prevent any recurrence of this situation, we find that the provisions 
of Sec.  831.13 are appropriate for and can be effectively applied to 
U.S. technical advisers invited by the NTSB to participate in a foreign 
investigation without unduly delay to the investigation.
    We received no comments regarding proposed subparts C and D. We 
have reformatted the proposed language to be consistent with subpart B, 
but otherwise adopt the language as proposed.

VI. Regulatory Analysis

    This rule is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under section 
3(f) of Executive Order 12866, ``Regulatory Planning and Review,'' and 
does not require an assessment of the potential costs and benefits 
under section 6(a)(3) of that Order. As such, the Office of Management 
and Budget has not reviewed this rule under Executive Order 12866. 
Likewise, this rule does not require an analysis under the Unfunded 
Mandates Reform Act, 2 U.S.C. 1501-1571, or the National Environmental 
Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. 4321-4347.
    In addition, the NTSB has considered whether this rule would have a 
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities, 
under the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601-612). The NTSB 
certifies under 5 U.S.C. 605(b) that this rule would not have a 
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. 
Moreover, in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 605(b), the NTSB will submit this 
certification to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy at the Small Business 
Administration.
    Moreover, the NTSB does not anticipate this rule will have a 
substantial, direct effect on state or local governments or will 
preempt state law; as such, this rule does not have implications for 
Federalism under Executive Order 13132, Federalism. This rule also 
complies with all applicable standards in sections 3(a) and 3(b)(2) of 
Executive Order 12988, ``Civil Justice Reform,'' to minimize 
litigation, eliminate ambiguity, and reduce burden. In addition, the 
NTSB has evaluated this rule under: Executive Order 12630, 
``Governmental Actions and Interference with Constitutionally Protected 
Property Rights''; Executive Order 13045, ``Protection of Children from 
Environmental Health Risks and Safety Risks''; Executive Order 13175, 
``Consultation and Coordination with Indian Tribal Governments''; 
Executive Order 13211, ``Actions Concerning Regulations That 
Significantly Affect Energy Supply, Distribution, or Use''; and the 
National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act, 15 U.S.C. 272 note. 
The NTSB has concluded this rule does not contravene any of the 
requirements set forth in these Executive Orders and statutes, nor does 
this rule prompt further consideration with regard to such 
requirements.

List of Subjects in 49 CFR Part 831

    Aircraft accidents, Aircraft incidents, Aviation safety, Hazardous 
materials transportation, Highway safety, Investigations, Marine 
safety, Pipeline safety, Railroad safety.

    For the reasons discussed in the preamble, the NTSB amends Title 49 
of the CFR by revising part 831 to read as follows:

PART 831--INVESTIGATION PROCEDURES

Subpart A--General
Sec.
831.1 Applicability of this subpart.
831.2 Responsibility of the NTSB.
831.3 Authority of Directors.
831.4 Nature of investigation.
831.5 Priority of NTSB investigations.
831.6 Request to withhold information.
831.7 Representation during an interview.
831.8 Investigator-in-charge.
831.9 Authority during investigations.
831.10 Autopsies and postmortem testing.
831.11 Parties to the investigation.
831.12 Access to and release of wreckage, records, mail, and cargo.
831.13 Provision and dissemination of investigative information.
831.14 Proposed findings.
Subpart B--Aviation Investigations
831.20 Authority of NTSB in aviation investigations.
831.21 Other Government agencies and NTSB aviation investigations.
831.22 International aviation investigations.
Subpart C--Highway Investigations
831.30 Authority of NTSB in highway investigations.
Subpart D--Railroad, Pipeline, and Hazardous Materials Investigations
831.40 Authority of NTSB in railroad, pipeline, and hazardous 
materials investigations.

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 1113(f).

Subpart A--General


Sec.  831.1  Applicability of this subpart.

    (a) Except as provided in Subpart E of this part regarding marine 
casualties, and unless specified by the National Transportation Safety 
Board (NTSB), the provisions of this subpart apply to all NTSB 
investigations conducted under its statutory authority.

[[Page 29686]]

    (b) Consistent with its statutory authority, the NTSB conducts 
investigations of transportation accidents that include, but are not 
limited to: accidents, collisions, crashes, derailments, explosions, 
incidents, mishaps, ruptures, or other similar accidents. Use of the 
term ``accident'' throughout this part includes all such occurrences.
    (c) Throughout this part, the term ``IIC'' means the NTSB 
investigator-in-charge.


Sec.  831.2  Responsibility of the NTSB.

    The NTSB is required to investigate--
    (a) Aviation accidents as described in subpart B of this part;
    (b) Highway accidents as described in subpart C of this part;
    (c) Railroad, pipeline, and hazardous materials accidents as 
described in subpart D of this part; and
    (d) Any accident that occurs in connection with the transportation 
of people or property that, in the judgment of the NTSB, is 
catastrophic, involves problems of a recurring nature or would 
otherwise carry out the intent of its authorizing statutes. This 
authority includes selected events involving the transportation of 
hazardous materials, including their release.


Sec.  831.3  Authority of Directors.

    Subject to the provisions of Sec.  831.2 of this part and part 800 
of this chapter, the Directors of the Office of Aviation Safety, Office 
of Highway Safety, or Office of Railroad, Pipeline and Hazardous 
Materials Investigations, may order an investigation into any 
transportation accident.


Sec.  831.4  Nature of investigation.

    (a) General. The NTSB conducts investigations, or has them 
conducted, to determine the facts, conditions, and circumstances 
relating to an accident. The NTSB uses these results to determine one 
or more probable causes of an accident, and to issue safety 
recommendations to prevent or mitigate the effects of a similar 
accident. The NTSB is required to report on the facts and circumstances 
of accidents it investigates. The NTSB begins an investigation by 
monitoring the situation and assessing available facts to determine the 
appropriate investigative response. Following an initial assessment, 
the NTSB notifies persons and organizations it anticipates will be 
affected as to the extent of its expected investigative response.
    (b) NTSB products. An investigation may result in a report or brief 
of the NTSB's conclusions or other products designed to improve 
transportation safety. Other products may include factual records, 
safety recommendations, and other safety information.
    (c) NTSB investigations are fact-finding proceedings with no 
adverse parties. The investigative proceedings are not subject to the 
Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. 551 et seq.), and are not 
conducted for the purpose of determining the rights, liabilities, or 
blame of any person or entity, as they are not adjudicatory 
proceedings.


Sec.  831.5  Priority of NTSB investigations.

    (a) Relationships with other agencies. (1) Except as provided in 49 
U.S.C. 1131(a)(2)(B) and (C) regarding suspected criminal actions, an 
investigation conducted under the authority of the NTSB has priority 
over any investigation conducted by another Federal agency.
    (2) The NTSB will provide for appropriate participation by other 
Federal agencies in any NTSB investigation. Such agencies may not 
participate in the NTSB's probable cause determination.
    (3) The NTSB has first right to access wreckage, information, and 
resources, and to interview witnesses the NTSB deems pertinent to its 
investigation.
    (4) As indicated in Sec.  831.9(c) of this part, the NTSB has 
exclusive authority to decide when and how the testing and examination 
of evidence will occur.
    (5) The NTSB and other Federal agencies will exchange information 
obtained or developed about the accident in the course of their 
investigations in a timely manner. Nothing in this section prohibits 
the NTSB from sharing factual information with other agencies.
    (6) Incident command system. The NTSB recognizes the role of 
incident command systems to address emergencies. The NTSB does not 
assume the role of a first responder agency.
    (i) The NTSB IIC or his designee will participate in the incident 
command system to identify and coordinate investigative needs related 
to the preservation and collection of information and evidence.
    (ii) The NTSB may collect information and evidence from the 
incident command in a timely and reasonable manner so as not to 
interfere with its operations.
    (b) Investigations by other Federal agencies. (1) Nothing in this 
section limits the authority of any Federal agency to conduct an 
investigation of an accident or incident under applicable provisions of 
law or to obtain information directly from parties involved in, and 
witnesses to, a transportation accident. Other agencies are expected to 
coordinate with the NTSB IIC to avoid interference with, and 
duplication of, the NTSB's investigative efforts. These agencies will 
not participate in the NTSB's probable cause determination.
    (2) The NTSB recognizes that state and local agencies may conduct 
activities related to an accident under investigation by the NTSB. 
These agencies will not participate in the NTSB's probable cause 
determination.
    (3) Except as described in Sec.  831.30 of this part regarding 
highway investigations, the NTSB may request that a Federal agency 
provide to the NTSB the results of that agency's investigation of an 
accident when such investigation is intended to result in safety 
improvements or remedial action. The NTSB will not routinely request 
regulatory enforcement records or investigation results.


Sec.  831.6  Request to withhold information.

    (a) Applicability. This section applies to information the NTSB 
receives from any source that may be subject to the Trade Secrets Act 
(18 U.S.C. 1905) or the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA, 5 U.S.C. 
552).
    (b) Disclosure. The NTSB is authorized by 49 U.S.C. 1114(b) to 
disclose, under certain circumstances, confidential commercial 
information that would otherwise be subject to penalties for disclosure 
under the Trade Secrets Act, or excepted from disclosure under FOIA. 
The NTSB may exercise this authority when disclosure is necessary to 
support a key finding, a safety recommendation, or the NTSB's statement 
of probable cause of an accident.
    (c) Disclosure procedures. Information submitted to the NTSB that 
the submitter believes qualifies as a trade secret or as confidential 
commercial information subject either to the Trade Secrets Act or 
Exemption 4 of FOIA must be so identified by the submitter on each page 
that contains such information. In accordance with 49 U.S.C. 1114(b), 
the NTSB will provide the submitter of identified information (or 
information the NTSB has reason to believe qualifies as subject to the 
Trade Secrets Act or Exemption 4 of FOIA) the opportunity to comment on 
any disclosure contemplated by the NTSB. In all instances in which the 
NTSB decides to disclose such information pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 1114(b) 
or 5 U.S.C. 552, the NTSB will provide at least 10 days' advance notice 
to the submitter.

[[Page 29687]]

    (d) Voluntarily provided safety information. (1) The NTSB will not 
disclose safety-related information voluntarily submitted to the NTSB 
if the information is not related to the exercise of the NTSB's 
investigation authority, and if the NTSB finds disclosure of the 
information might inhibit the voluntary provision of that type of 
information.
    (2) The NTSB will review voluntarily provided safety information 
for confidential content, and will de-identify or anonymize any 
confidential content referenced in its products.
    (e) Other. Any person may make written objection to the public 
disclosure of any other information, such as interview summaries or 
transcripts, contained in any report or document filed, or otherwise 
obtained by the NTSB, stating the grounds for such objection. The NTSB 
on its own initiative or if such objection is made, may order such 
information withheld from public disclosure, when, in its judgment, the 
information may be withheld under the provisions of an exemption to the 
FOIA (see part 801 of this chapter), and its release is found not to be 
in the public interest.


Sec.  831.7  Representation during an interview.

    (a) Any person interviewed in any manner by the NTSB has the right 
to be accompanied during the interview by no more than one 
representative of the witness's choosing. The representative--
    (1) May be an attorney;
    (2) May provide support and counsel to the witness;
    (3) May not supplement the witness's testimony; and
    (4) May not advocate for the interests of a witness's other 
affiliations (e.g., the witnesses employer).
    (b) An investigator conducting the interview may take any necessary 
action (including removal of the representative from the interview) to 
ensure a witness's representative acts in accordance with the 
provisions of paragraph (a) of this section during the interview, and 
to prevent conduct that may be disruptive to the interview.


Sec.  831.8  Investigator-in-charge.

    In addition to the subpoena and deposition authority delegated to 
investigative officers under this chapter, a person designated as IIC 
for an investigation is authorized to--
    (a) Organize, conduct, control, and manage the field phase of an 
investigation, even when a Board Member is present;
    (b) Coordinate all resources and supervise all persons (including 
persons not employed by the NTSB) involved in an on-site investigation; 
and
    (c) Continue his or her organizational and management 
responsibilities through all phases of the investigation, including 
consideration and adoption of a report or brief determining one or more 
probable causes of an accident.


Sec.  831.9  Authority during investigations.

    (a) General authority of investigators. To carry out the statutory 
responsibilities of the agency, an NTSB investigator may--
    (1) Conduct hearings;
    (2) Administer oaths;
    (3) Require, by subpoena or otherwise, the production of evidence 
and witnesses;
    (4) Enter any property where an accident subject to the NTSB's 
jurisdiction has occurred, or wreckage from any such accident is 
located, and take all actions necessary to conduct a complete 
investigation of the accident;
    (5) Inspect, photograph, or copy any records or information 
(including medical records pursuant to paragraph (b)(2) of this 
section), and correspondence regardless of the date of their creation 
or modification, for the purpose of investigating an accident;
    (6) Take possession of wreckage, records or other information if it 
determines such possession is necessary for an investigation; and
    (7) Question any person having knowledge relevant to a 
transportation accident.
    (b) Subpoenas. The NTSB may issue a subpoena, enforceable in 
Federal District Court, to obtain testimony or evidence related to an 
accident, including but not limited to personal electronic devices.
    (1) The NTSB's authority to issue subpoenas includes access to 
medical records and specimens.
    (2) For purposes of the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), Public Law 104-191, and the 
regulations promulgated by the DHHS, 45 CFR 164.501 et seq., the NTSB 
is a ``public health authority'' to which protected health information 
may be disclosed by a HIPAA ``covered entity'' without the prior 
written authorization of the subject of the records. In addition, the 
NTSB may issue a subpoena to gain access to such information.
    (c) Examination of evidence. In accordance with 49 U.S.C. 1134(d), 
the NTSB has exclusive authority to decide timing, manner and method of 
testing and examination of evidence, and extraction of data.


Sec.  831.10  Autopsies and postmortem testing.

    When a person dies as a result of having been involved in a 
transportation accident within the jurisdiction of the NTSB--
    (a) The NTSB is authorized to obtain, with or without 
reimbursement, a copy of a report of autopsy performed by a State or 
local authority on such person.
    (b) The NTSB may order an autopsy or other postmortem tests of any 
person as may be related to its investigation of a transportation 
accident. The IIC may direct that an autopsy or other test be performed 
if necessary for an investigation. Provisions of local law protecting 
religious beliefs with respect to autopsies shall be observed to the 
extent they are consistent with the needs of the investigation.


Sec.  831.11  Parties to the investigation.

    (a) Participants. (1) The IIC may designate one or more entities to 
serve as parties in an investigation. Party status is limited to those 
persons, Federal, state, or local government agencies and organizations 
whose employees, functions, activities, or products were involved in 
the accident and that can provide suitable qualified technical 
personnel to actively assist in an investigation. To the extent 
practicable, a representative proposed by party organizations to 
participate in the investigation may not be a person who had direct 
involvement in the accident under investigation.
    (2) Except for the FAA, no entity has a right to participate in an 
NTSB investigation as a party.
    (3) The participation of the Administrator of the FAA and other 
Federal entities in aviation accident investigations is addressed in 
Sec.  831.21 of this part.
    (4) Participants in an investigation (e.g., party representatives, 
party coordinators, and/or the larger party organization) must follow 
all directions and instructions from NTSB representatives. Party status 
may be revoked or suspended if a party fails to comply with assigned 
duties and instructions, withholds information, or otherwise acts in a 
manner prejudicial or disruptive to an investigation.
    (b) Prohibitions on serving as party representatives. (1) In 
accordance with Sec.  845.6 of this chapter, no party representative 
may occupy a legal position or be a person who also represents 
claimants or insurers.
    (2) Failure to comply with these provisions may result in 
sanctions, including loss of party status.
    (c) Disclosures. (1) The name of a party and its representative may 
be

[[Page 29688]]

disclosed in documents the NTSB places in the public docket for the 
investigation.
    (2) The NTSB may share information considered proprietary or 
confidential by one party with other parties during the course of an 
investigation, but will preserve the confidentiality of the information 
to the greatest extent possible.
    (3) Section 831.6(d) of this part describes how the NTSB will 
handle voluntarily submitted safety information, and the NTSB's 
determination whether to share any such information. The NTSB will de-
identify the source of such information when deciding to share it.
    (d) Party agreement. Except for representatives of other Federal 
agencies, all party representatives must sign the ``Statement of Party 
Representatives to NTSB Investigation'' (Statement) upon acceptance of 
party status. Failure to timely sign the statement may result in 
sanctions, including loss of party status. Representatives of other 
Federal agencies, while not required to sign the Statement, will be 
provided notice of and must comply with the responsibilities and 
limitations set forth in the agreement.
    (e) Internal review by a party. (1) To assure coordination of 
concurrent efforts, a party to an investigation that conducts or 
authorizes a review of its own processes and procedures as a result of 
an accident the NTSB is investigating, by signing the party agreement, 
agrees to, in a timely manner--
    (i) Inform the IIC of the nature of the review; and
    (ii) Provide the IIC with the findings from the review.
    (2) If the findings from a review contain privileged information--,
    (i) The submitting party must inform the IIC that the review 
contains privileged information;
    (ii) The submitting party must identify the privileged content at 
the time of submission to the IIC; and
    (iii) The NTSB must, if informed that such information is being 
submitted, review the information for relevancy to the investigation, 
and determine whether public disclosure of the information is necessary 
for the investigation.
    (3) The NTSB may use the protections described in Sec.  831.6 of 
this part, as applicable, to protect certain findings from public 
disclosure.
    (4) Investigations performed by other Federal agencies during an 
NTSB investigation are addressed in Sec.  831.5 of this part.


Sec.  831.12  Access to and release of wreckage, records, mail, and 
cargo.

    (a) Only persons authorized by the NTSB IIC may be permitted access 
to wreckage, records, mail, or cargo.
    (b) Wreckage, records, mail, and cargo in the NTSB's custody will 
be released when the NTSB determines it has no further need for such 
items. Recipients of released wreckage must sign an acknowledgement of 
release provided by the NTSB.


Sec.  831.13  Provision and dissemination of investigative information.

    (a) Applicability. This section applies to:
    (1) Information related to the accident or incident;
    (2) Any information collected or compiled by the NTSB as part of 
its investigation, such as photographs, visual representations of 
factual data, physical evidence from the scene of the accident, 
interview statements, wreckage documentation, flight data and cockpit 
voice recorder information, and surveillance video; and
    (3) Any information regarding the status of an investigation, or 
activities conducted as part of the investigation.
    (b) Provision of information. All information described in 
paragraph (a) of this section and obtained by any person or 
organization participating in the investigation must be promptly 
provided to the NTSB, except where the NTSB authorizes the party to 
retain the information.
    (c) Release of information. Parties are prohibited from releasing 
information obtained during an investigation at any time prior to the 
NTSB's public release of information unless the release is consistent 
with the following criteria:
    (1) Information released at the scene of an accident--
    (i) Is limited to factual information concerning the accident and 
the investigation released in coordination with the IIC; and
    (ii) Will be made by the Board Member present at the scene as the 
official spokesperson for the NTSB. Additionally, the IIC or 
representatives from the NTSB's Office of Safety Recommendations and 
Communications may release information to media representatives, family 
members, and elected officials as deemed appropriate.
    (2) The release of information described in paragraph (a)(1) of 
this section by the NTSB at the scene of an accident does not authorize 
any party to the investigation to comment publicly on the information 
during the course of the investigation. Any dissemination of factual 
information by a party may be made only as provided in this section.
    (3) A party may disseminate information related to an investigation 
to those individuals within its organization who have a need to know 
for the purpose of addressing a safety issue including preventive or 
remedial actions. If such internal release of information results in a 
planned safety improvement, the party must inform the IIC of such 
planned improvement in a timely manner before it is implemented.
    (4) Any other release of factual information related to the 
investigation must be approved by the IIC prior to release, including:
    (i) Dissemination within a party organization, for a purpose not 
described in paragraph (b)(3) of this section;
    (ii) Documents that provide information concerning the 
investigation, such as written directives or informational updates for 
release to employees or customers of a party;
    (iii) Information related to the investigation released to an 
organization or person that is not a party to the investigation;
    (d) The release of recordings or transcripts from certain recorders 
may be made only in accordance with the statutory limitations of 49 
U.S.C. 1114(c) and (d).


Sec.  831.14  Proposed findings.

    (a) General. Any party to the investigation designated under Sec.  
831.11 may submit to the NTSB written proposed findings to be drawn 
from the evidence produced during the course of the investigation, a 
proposed probable cause, and/or proposed safety recommendation(s) 
designed to prevent future accidents.
    (b) Timing of submissions. The IIC will inform parties when 
submissions are due. All written submissions must be received by the 
IIC by the due date. If there is a Board meeting, the due date will be 
set prior to the date the matter is published in the Federal Register.

Subpart B--Aviation Investigations


Sec.  831.20  Authority of NTSB in aviation accident investigations.

    (a) Scope. The NTSB is authorized to investigate--
    (1) Each accident involving a civil aircraft in the United States, 
and any civil aircraft registered in the United States when an accident 
occurs in international waters;
    (2) Each accident involving a public aircraft as defined in 49 
U.S.C. 40102(a)(41), except for aircraft operated by the U.S. Armed 
Forces or by an intelligence agency of the United States;
    (3) With the participation of appropriate military authorities, 
each

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accident involving a military aircraft and--
    (i) a civil aircraft; or
    (ii) certain public aircraft as described in paragraph (a)(2) of 
this section.
    (b) Authority to examine or test. Pursuant to Sec.  831.9 of this 
part, a credentialed employee of the NTSB is authorized to examine or 
test any civil or certain public aircraft, aircraft engine, propeller, 
appliance, or property aboard such aircraft involved in an accident or 
incident subject to the NTSB's authority.


Sec.  831.21  Other Government agencies and NTSB aviation 
investigations.

    (a) Pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 1132(c) and 106(g)(1)(A), the NTSB will 
provide for the participation of the Administrator of the FAA in the 
investigation of an aircraft accident when participation is necessary 
to carry out the duties and powers of the FAA Administrator.
    (b) Title 49 U.S.C. 1131(a)(2) provides for the appropriate 
participation by other departments, agencies, or instrumentalities of 
the United States Government in the investigation of an aircraft 
accident by the NTSB.
    (c) Rights and duties of other Federal agencies. (1) The FAA and 
other Federal agencies named as parties to an aircraft accident 
investigation will be accorded the same rights and privileges, and are 
subject to the same limitations, as other parties. Participation in an 
investigation includes the duty to timely share with the NTSB any 
information that has been developed by the FAA or other Federal agency 
in the exercise of that agency's investigative authority.
    (2) In exercising its authority, the FAA or other Federal agency 
may obtain information directly from a party to an accident or incident 
under investigation by the NTSB.
    (3) Information obtained by another Federal agency must be timely 
shared with the NTSB.
    (4) Investigative activities by another Federal agency must be 
coordinated to ensure that they do not interfere with the NTSB's 
investigation.
    (5) Under no circumstances may an NTSB aviation accident 
investigation for which the FAA or any other Federal agency has 
conducted fact-finding be considered a joint investigation with shared 
responsibility. Decisions about what information to include in the 
public docket will be made by the NTSB.
    (6) Notwithstanding the rights and duties described in paragraphs 
(c)(1) through (5) of this section, determining the probable cause of 
an accident is exclusively the right and duty of the NTSB.
    (d) An FAA employee designated to act by the NTSB IIC has the same 
authority as an NTSB investigator when conducting activities under this 
part. The investigation remains that of the NTSB.
    (e) Nothing in this section may be construed as inhibiting the FAA 
from proceeding with activities intended to fulfill a statutory 
requirement or objective, including the collection of data for safety 
management or enforcement purposes. Section 831.5 of this part also 
applies to the investigation of aviation accidents.


Sec.  831.22  International aviation investigations.

    (a) General. (1) Annex 13 to the Convention on International Civil 
Aviation, Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation (Annex 13) 
contains standards and recommended practices for the notification, 
investigation, and reporting of certain accidents involving 
international civil aviation.
    (2) Annex 13 provides that the state of occurrence of an accident 
or incident is responsible for the investigation when the state is a 
signatory to the Convention.
    (b) The NTSB--
    (1) Is the U.S. agency that fulfills the obligations of the United 
States under Annex 13, in coordination with and consistent with the 
requirements of the United States Department of State.
    (2) Participates in the investigation as the accredited 
representative to an international investigation when the accident 
involves a civil aircraft--
    (i) of a U.S. operator;
    (ii) of U.S. registry;
    (iii) of U.S. manufacture; or
    (iv) when the U.S. is the state of design or manufacture of the 
aircraft or parts thereof.
    (c) Technical advisers. Once designated the accredited 
representative in an international investigation, the NTSB may elect to 
receive assistance by appointing one or more advisers to serve under 
the NTSB's direction. Such technical advisers--
    (1) Work at the direction and under the supervision of the NTSB 
accredited representative.
    (2) Are subject to the provisions of Sec.  831.13 of this part 
while working under the supervision of the NTSB accredited 
representative.
    (d) If an accident occurs in a foreign state that is not a 
signatory to the Convention, or if an accident or incident involves an 
aircraft that is not a civil aircraft, the NTSB will participate in the 
investigation in accordance with any agreement between the United 
States and the foreign state that addresses such occurrences.
    (e) The NTSB's disclosure of records of a foreign investigation is 
limited by statute (49 U.S.C 1114(f)) and by Sec.  831.6 of this part.

Subpart C--Highway Investigations


Sec.  831.30  Authority of NTSB in highway investigations.

    (a) Scope. The NTSB is responsible for the investigation of 
selected highway accidents (e.g., collisions, crashes and explosions), 
including at railroad grade-crossing accidents. Such investigations 
will be conducted in cooperation with the designated authorities of the 
state or local jurisdiction in which the accident occurred.
    (b) Authority to examine or test. Pursuant to Sec.  831.9 of this 
part, a credentialed employee of the NTSB is authorized to examine or 
test any item, including any vehicle, part of a vehicle, equipment, or 
contents of any vehicle or equipment involved in an accident subject to 
the NTSB's authority. Examination or testing will be conducted--
    (1) To the extent practicable, so as to not interfere with or 
obstruct the transportation services provided by the owner or operator 
of a vehicle or equipment; and
    (2) In a manner that preserves evidence relating to the 
transportation accident, in cooperation with the owner or operator of 
the vehicle or equipment, and consistent with the needs of the 
investigation.
    (c) Any Federal, state, or local agency that conducts an 
investigation of the same highway accident the NTSB is investigating 
shall provide the results of its investigation to the NTSB.

Subpart D--Railroad, Pipeline, and Hazardous Materials 
Investigations


Sec.  831.40  Authority of NTSB in railroad, pipeline, and hazardous 
materials investigations.

    (a) Scope. (1) Railroads. Consistent with its statutory authority, 
the NTSB is responsible for the investigation of railroad accidents, 
collisions, crashes, derailments, explosions, incidents, and releases 
in which there is a fatality, substantial property damage, or which 
involve a passenger train, as described in part 840 of this chapter.
    (2) Pipelines. The NTSB is responsible for the investigation of 
pipeline accidents, explosions, incidents, and ruptures in which there 
is a fatality, significant injury to the environment, or substantial 
property damage. This excludes accidents involving pipelines only 
carrying water or sewage.
    (3) Hazardous Materials. The NTSB is responsible for evaluating the 
adequacy

[[Page 29690]]

of safeguards and procedures for the transportation of hazardous 
materials, and the performance of other entities of the Federal 
government responsible for the safe transportation of hazardous 
materials. Such evaluations may take place as part of the investigation 
of a transportation accident subject to the NTSB's authority and 
include applicable regulations in other subparts of this part.
    (b) Authority to examine or test. Pursuant to Sec.  831.9 of this 
part, during an investigation, a credentialed employee of the NTSB is 
authorized to examine or test any rolling stock, track, or pipeline 
component, or any part of any such item (or contents therein) when such 
examination or testing is determined to be required for purposes of 
such investigation. Examination or testing will be conducted--
    (1) To the extent practicable, so as to not interfere with or 
obstruct the transportation services provided by the owner or operator 
of such rolling stock, track, signal, rail shop, property, or pipeline 
component; and
    (2) In a manner that preserves evidence relating to the 
transportation accident consistent with the needs of the investigation.

Robert L. Sumwalt, III,
Acting Chairman.
[FR Doc. 2017-12988 Filed 6-28-17; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7533-01-P