[Federal Register Volume 82, Number 95 (Thursday, May 18, 2017)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 22780-22797]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2017-09886]


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FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

47 CFR Part 20

[GN Docket No. 13-111; FCC 17-25]


Promoting Technological Solutions To Combat Contraband Wireless 
Device Use in Correctional Facilities

AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission.

ACTION: Proposed rule.

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SUMMARY: In this document, the Federal Communications Commission seeks 
additional comment on a broad range of steps the Commission can take to 
help eliminate the problem of contraband wireless devices in 
correctional facilities. In particular, the Commission proposes a 
process for wireless providers to disable contraband wireless devices 
once they have been identified. The Commission seeks comment on 
additional methods and technologies that might prove successful in 
combating contraband device use in correctional facilities, and on 
various other proposals related to the authorization process for 
contraband interdiction systems and the deployment of these systems.

DATES: Interested parties may file comments on or before June 19, 2017, 
and reply comments on or before July 17, 2017.

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments, identified by GN Docket No. 13-111, 
by any of the following methods:
    [ssquf] Electronic Filers: Comments may be filed electronically 
using the Internet by accessing the Commission's Electronic Comment 
Filing System (ECFS): http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs2/. See Electronic 
Filing of Documents in Rulemaking Proceedings, 63 FR 24121 (1998).
    [ssquf] Paper Filers: Parties who choose to file by paper must file 
an original and one copy of each filing. Generally if more than one 
docket or rulemaking number appears in the caption of this proceeding, 
filers must submit two additional copies for each additional docket or 
rulemaking number. Commenters are only required to file copies in GN 
Docket No. 13-111.
    [ssquf] Filings can be sent by hand or messenger delivery, by 
commercial overnight courier, or by first-class or overnight U.S. 
Postal Service mail. All filings must be addressed to the Commission's 
Secretary, Office of the Secretary, Federal Communications Commission.
    [ssquf] All hand-delivered or messenger-delivered paper filings for 
the Commission's Secretary must be delivered to FCC Headquarters at 445 
12th St. SW., Room TW-A325, Washington, DC 20554. The filing hours are 
8:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. All hand deliveries must be held together with 
rubber bands or fasteners. Any envelopes and boxes must be disposed of 
before entering the building.
    [ssquf] Commercial overnight mail (other than U.S. Postal Service 
Express Mail and Priority Mail) must be sent to 9300 East Hampton 
Drive, Capitol Heights, MD 20743.
    [ssquf] U.S. Postal Service first-class, Express, and Priority mail 
must be addressed to 445 12th Street SW., Washington, DC 20554.
    People with Disabilities: To request materials in accessible 
formats for people with disabilities (Braille, large print, electronic 
files, audio format), send an email to [email protected] or call the 
Consumer & Governmental Affairs Bureau at 202-418-0530 (voice), 202-
418-0432 (TTY).

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Melissa Conway, 
[email protected], of the Wireless Telecommunications Bureau, 
Mobility Division, (202) 418-2887. For additional information 
concerning the PRA information collection requirements contained in 
this document, contact Cathy Williams at (202) 418-2918 or send an 
email to [email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a summary of the Commission's 
Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (FNPRM) in GN Docket No. 13-111, 
FCC 17-25, released on March 24, 2017. The complete text of the FNPRM 
is available for viewing via the Commission's ECFS Web site by entering 
the docket number, GN Docket No. 13-111. The complete text of the FNPRM 
is also available for public inspection and copying from 8:00 a.m. to 
4:30 p.m. Eastern Time (ET) Monday through Thursday or from 8:00 a.m. 
to 11:30 a.m. ET on Fridays in the FCC Reference Information Center, 
445 12th Street SW., Room CY-B402, Washington, DC 20554, telephone 202-
488-5300, fax 202-488-5563.
    This proceeding shall continue to be treated as a ``permit-but-
disclose'' proceeding in accordance with the Commission's ex parte 
rules (47 CFR 1.1200 et seq.). Persons making ex parte presentations 
must file a copy of any written presentation or a memorandum 
summarizing any oral presentation within two business days after the 
presentation (unless a different deadline applicable to the Sunshine 
period applies). Persons making oral ex parte presentations are 
reminded that memoranda summarizing the presentation must (1) list all 
persons

[[Page 22781]]

attending or otherwise participating in the meeting at which the ex 
parte presentation was made, and (2) summarize all data presented and 
arguments made during the presentation. If the presentation consisted 
in whole or in part of the presentation of data or arguments already 
reflected in the presenter's written comments, memoranda or other 
filings in the proceeding, the presenter may provide citations to such 
data or arguments in his or her prior comments, memoranda, or other 
filings (specifying the relevant page and/or paragraph numbers where 
such data or arguments can be found) in lieu of summarizing them in the 
memorandum. Documents shown or given to Commission staff during ex 
parte meetings are deemed to be written ex parte presentations and must 
be filed consistent with rule 1.1206(b). In proceedings governed by 
rule 1.49(f) or for which the Commission has made available a method of 
electronic filing, written ex parte presentations and memoranda 
summarizing oral ex parte presentations, and all attachments thereto, 
must be filed through the electronic comment filing system available 
for that proceeding, and must be filed in their native format (e.g., 
.doc, .xml, .ppt, searchable .pdf). Participants in this proceeding 
should familiarize themselves with the Commission's ex parte rules.
    The Commission will send a copy of the FNPRM in a report to be sent 
to Congress and the Government Accountability Office pursuant to the 
Congressional Review Act, see 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A).

I. FNPRM

    1. The use of contraband wireless devices in correctional 
facilities to engage in criminal activity poses a significant and 
growing security challenge to correctional facility administrators, law 
enforcement authorities, and the general public.
    2. As a general matter, there are primarily two categories of 
technological solutions currently deployed today in the U.S. to address 
the issue of contraband wireless device use in correctional facilities: 
Managed access and detection. A managed access system (MAS) is a micro-
cellular, private network that typically operates on spectrum already 
licensed to wireless providers offering commercial subscriber services 
in geographic areas that include a correctional facility. These systems 
analyze transmissions to and from wireless devices to determine whether 
the device is authorized or unauthorized by the correctional facility 
for purposes of accessing wireless carrier networks. A MAS utilizes 
base stations that are optimized to capture all voice, text, and data 
communications within the system coverage area. When a wireless device 
attempts to connect to the network from within the coverage area of the 
MAS, the system cross-checks the identifying information of the device 
against a database that lists wireless devices authorized to operate in 
the coverage area. Authorized devices are allowed to communicate 
normally (i.e., transmit and receive voice, text, and data) with the 
commercial wireless network, while transmissions to or from 
unauthorized devices are terminated. A MAS is capable of being 
programmed not to interfere with 911 calls. The systems may also 
provide an alert to the user notifying the user that the device is 
unauthorized. A correctional facility or third party at a correctional 
facility may operate a MAS if authorized by the Commission, and this 
authorization has, to date, involved agreements with the wireless 
providers serving the geographic area within which the correctional 
facility is located, as well as spectrum leasing applications approved 
by the Commission.
    3. Detection systems are used to detect devices within a 
correctional facility by locating, tracking, and identifying radio 
signals originating from a device. Traditionally, detection systems use 
passive, receive-only technologies that do not transmit radio signals 
and do not require separate Commission authorization. However, 
detection systems have evolved with the capability of transmitting 
radio signals to not only locate a wireless devices, but also to obtain 
device identifying information. These types of advanced transmitting 
detection systems also operate on frequencies licensed to wireless 
providers and require separate Commission authorization, also typically 
through the filing of spectrum leasing applications reflecting wireless 
provider agreement.
    4. The Commission has taken a variety of steps to facilitate the 
deployment of technologies by those seeking to combat the use of 
contraband wireless devices in correctional facilities, including 
authorizing spectrum leases between CMRS providers \1\ and MAS 
providers and granting Experimental Special Temporary Authority (STA) 
for testing managed access technologies, and also through outreach and 
joint efforts with federal and state partners and industry to 
facilitate development of viable solutions. In addition, Commission 
staff has worked with stakeholder groups, including our federal agency 
partners, wireless providers, technology providers, and corrections 
agencies, to encourage the development of technological solutions to 
combat contraband wireless device use while avoiding interference with 
legitimate communications.
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    \1\ Unless otherwise specifically clarified herein, for purposes 
of the FNPRM, we use the terms CMRS provider, wireless provider, and 
wireless carrier interchangeably. These terms typically refer to 
entities that offer and provide subscriber-based services to 
customers through Commission licenses held on commercial spectrum in 
geographic areas that might include correctional facilities.
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    5. On May 1, 2013, the Commission issued the Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking (NPRM) (78 FR 36469, June 18, 2013) in this proceeding in 
order to examine various technological solutions to the contraband 
problem and proposals to facilitate the deployment of these 
technologies. In the NPRM, the Commission proposed to require CMRS 
licensees to terminate service to detected contraband wireless devices 
within correctional facilities pursuant to a qualifying request from an 
authorized party and sought comment on any other proposals that would 
facilitate the deployment of traditional detection systems. Technology 
has evolved such that many advanced detection systems are designed to 
transmit radio signals typically already licensed to wireless providers 
in areas that include correctional facilities. Consequently, operators 
of these types of advanced detection systems require Commission 
authorization. Accordingly, we will refer to any system that transmits 
radio communication signals comprised of one or more stations used only 
in a correctional facility exclusively to prevent transmissions to or 
from contraband wireless devices within the boundaries of the facility 
and/or to obtain identifying information from such contraband wireless 
devices as a Contraband Interdiction System (CIS).\2\ By definition, 
therefore, the processes proposed in the FNPRM are limited to 
correctional facilities' use.
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    \2\ For purposes of the FNPRM, ``contraband wireless device'' 
refers to any wireless device, including the physical hardware or 
part of a device--such as a subscriber identification module (SIM)--
that is used within a correctional facility in violation of federal, 
state, or local law, or a correctional facility rule, regulation, or 
policy. We use the phrase ``correctional facility'' to refer to any 
facility operated or overseen by federal, state, or local 
authorities that houses or holds criminally charged or convicted 
inmates for any period of time, including privately owned and 
operated correctional facilities that operate through contracts with 
federal, state, or local jurisdictions.

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[[Page 22782]]

Disabling Contraband Wireless Devices in Correctional Facilities

    6. In the NPRM, the Commission sought comment on each of the steps 
involved in the process of terminating service to contraband wireless 
devices, including the information that the correctional facility must 
transmit to the provider to effectuate termination, the timing for 
carrier termination, the method of authenticating a termination 
request, and other issues. CellAntenna has proposed a termination 
process that includes minimum standards for detection equipment, the 
form of notice to the carrier, and a carrier response process that 
consists of a set of deadlines for responding, based on the volume of 
reports or inquiries the carrier receives concerning contraband 
wireless devices. Under this staged response obligation, the carriers 
would have a longer time to respond if they receive a large number of 
requests, ranging from one hour to 24 hours after receipt of notice. 
CellAntenna encourages the Commission to determine a ``reasonable'' 
time frame for service suspension.
    7. Commenting parties focused substantially on the issue of 
liability associated with termination, and their alternative proposal 
that termination should be required only pursuant to a court order. 
Wireless carriers expressed concern that the proposed termination 
process would require carriers to investigate requests and risk 
erroneous termination, which could endanger safety and create potential 
liability. Instead, the carriers argue, the Commission should amend its 
proposed termination rules to require that requests to terminate be 
executed pursuant to an order from a court of relevant jurisdiction. 
Other commenters, however, reject the notion that court-ordered 
termination is necessary in order to protect carriers from liability in 
the event of erroneous termination, and argue that the Commission's 
role in managing the public's use of spectrum empowers it to require 
carriers to terminate service to unlawful devices, irrespective of 
whether the request is made by the FCC, a court order, or upon the 
request of an authorized prison official.
    8. We seek further comment on a Commission rule-based process 
regarding the disabling of contraband wireless devices where certain 
criteria are met, including a determination of system eligibility and a 
validation process for qualifying requests designed to address many 
wireless provider concerns. We clarify that a disabling process would 
involve participation by stakeholders to effectively implement a 
Commission directive to disable such devices, and would in no way 
represent a delegation of authority to others to compel such disabling. 
We recognize that wireless providers favor a court-ordered termination 
process as an alternative, but requiring court orders might be 
unnecessarily burdensome. Based on the comments filed in the record, 
moreover, it is far from clear that a CMRS provider that terminates 
service to a particular device based on a qualifying request would be 
exposed to any form of liability. Indeed, we welcome comment from CMRS 
providers on the scope of their existing authority under their 
contracts and terms of service with consumers to terminate service. 
Commenters who agree with the view that a court-ordered approach is 
preferable should specifically address why termination pursuant to a 
federal requirement, i.e., Commission directive, does not address 
liability concerns as well as termination pursuant to court order. We 
note that the current record does not sufficiently demonstrate that 
reliance on the wireless providers' alternative court-ordered approach 
in lieu of the proposed rule-based approach discussed below would 
achieve one of the Commission's overall goals in this proceeding of 
facilitating a comprehensive, nationwide solution. We also note that 
the record does not reflect persuasive evidence of successful voluntary 
termination of service to contraband wireless devices in correctional 
facilities by the CMRS licensees, even where there is evidence of a 
growing problem.
    9. To the extent commenters continue to support a court-ordered 
approach, we seek specific comment on the particulars of the requested 
court-ordered process to evaluate and compare it to a Commission 
disabling process: Who is qualified to seek a court order and with what 
specific information or evidence? To whom is the request submitted and 
how is the court order implemented? How can existing processes carriers 
use for addressing law enforcement requests/subpoenas apply in the 
contraband wireless device context? Does the success of a court-ordered 
process depend on the extent to which a particular state has 
criminalized wireless device use in correctional facilities? 
Additionally, given the acknowledged nationwide scope and growth of the 
contraband wireless device problem, how would CIS and wireless 
providers navigate the myriad fora through which requests for 
termination might flow, potentially requiring engagement with a wide 
variety of state or federal district attorneys' offices; federal, state 
or county courts; or local magistrates? In this regard, we seek 
examples of successfully issued and implemented court orders 
terminating service to contraband wireless devices, as well as 
demonstrations that court orders can be effective at scale and not 
overly burdensome or time-consuming to obtain and effectuate in this 
context.
    10. Commission Authority. In the NPRM, the Commission stated its 
belief that the Commission has authority under section 303 to require 
CMRS licensees to terminate service to contraband wireless devices. 
AT&T recognizes the Commission's authority pursuant to section 303 to 
require termination, but argues that deactivation must be ordered by a 
court or the FCC because the Commission cannot lawfully delegate its 
statutory authority to a third party, such as a state corrections 
officer. In response, Boeing and Triple Dragon reject AT&T's position, 
arguing that the proposed termination process does not raise any issues 
of delegation, as the Commission has clear authority to require 
carriers to terminate service to unauthorized devices upon receiving a 
Commission-mandated qualifying request. Section 303 provides the 
Commission authority to adopt rules requiring CMRS carriers to disable 
contraband wireless devices (see 47 U.S.C. 303; see also 154(i)). 
Pursuant to section 303(b), the Commission is required to prescribe the 
nature of the service to be rendered by each class of licensed stations 
and each station within any class. Additionally, section 303(d) 
requires the Commission to determine the location of classes of 
stations or individual stations, and section 303(h) grants the 
Commission the authority to establish areas or zones to be served by 
any station. When tied together with section 303(r), which requires the 
Commission to make such rules and regulations and prescribe such 
restrictions and conditions, not inconsistent with law, as may be 
necessary to carry out the provisions of this chapter, these provisions 
empower the Commission to address these issues.
    11. Further, with respect to wireless carrier arguments that any 
proposal for requests by departments of corrections based on CIS-
collected data seeking disabling of contraband wireless devices is an 
unlawful delegation of authority, we clarify that any such request 
would be pursuant to an adopted Commission rule mandating disabling 
where certain criteria are met. Such criteria, as discussed in detail 
below, include

[[Page 22783]]

various factors involving the deployment of CIS technologies. The 
Commission's authority under section 303 to regulate the use of 
spectrum in the public interest necessarily includes the authority to 
promulgate rules requiring regulated entities to terminate unlawful use 
of spectrum where certain indicia are met. We seek comment on a process 
by which carriers would be required to disable contraband devices 
identified through CIS systems deemed eligible by the Commission. The 
Commission would not be delegating decision-making authority regarding 
the disabling of contraband wireless devices.
    12. Disabling of Contraband Wireless Devices in Correctional 
Facilities. We seek comment on a process whereby CMRS licensees would 
disable contraband wireless devices in correctional facilities detected 
by an eligible CIS when they receive a qualifying request from an 
authorized party. We seek comment on a range of issues, including CIS 
eligibility, what constitutes a qualifying request, and specifics 
regarding the carrier disabling process. We clarify that CIS systems 
operating solely to prevent calls and other communications from 
contraband wireless devices, described in the Notice as MASs, would not 
be subject to these eligibility criteria, unless the department of 
corrections/CIS provider seeks to use the information received from 
such a system to request, through Commission rules, contraband wireless 
device disabling.
    13. Numerous individual state departments of corrections support 
the Commission's proposal to mandate termination of service to 
contraband wireless devices. For example, the Chief Information Officer 
of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice encourages implementation 
of a termination of service process, including criteria establishing a 
maximum allowable time limit for termination of service upon proper 
notification by an authorized correctional official. The Minnesota 
Department of Corrections supports a nationally standardized protocol 
for identifying contraband wireless devices and notification to the 
carrier. The Florida Department of Corrections also supports the 
standardization of information required to be provided by correctional 
facilities to service providers for termination of service and of the 
method of submission of information. The Mississippi Department of 
Corrections supports a Commission mandate to terminate service to 
contraband wireless devices, noting that it has made efforts to 
terminate service by seeking court orders with the cooperation of some 
wireless providers, that not all providers have been cooperative, and 
that a Commission rule would save time and resources used in obtaining 
a court order.
    14. Several commenters express concern regarding the validation 
process and accuracy of termination information relayed to the carriers 
to implement termination of service to contraband wireless devices in 
correctional facilities. The carriers assert that the record simply 
does not contain sufficient information to define a process for 
termination at this time. AT&T suggests that there must be a validation 
process whereby carriers have the opportunity to confirm the accuracy 
of the termination information. AT&T is concerned that if there is not 
an FCC or court order compelling termination, the carrier bears the 
responsibility for deciding whether to terminate service to a 
particular device. Verizon also expresses significant concern regarding 
the dearth of carrier experience with handling termination requests. 
Verizon contends that carriers have material concerns regarding the 
ability of detection systems to accurately identify contraband devices, 
the security and authenticity of the termination requests being 
transmitted to carriers, and the potential liability of carriers for 
erroneous termination. Verizon believes that carriers require accurate 
information about the MIN and the device MDN,\3\ and therefore the 
Commission should review and certify managed access and detection 
systems. Verizon also recommends that termination requests be 
transmitted via secure transmission paths such as secure web portals 
that already exist to receive court-ordered termination requests.
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    \3\ MIN is the mobile identification number and MDN is the 
mobile directory number. The MIN and the MDN are used by CDMA 
devices.
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    15. Furthermore, Verizon claims that, due to the lack of 
information in the record, it is impossible at this time to determine 
important details about termination requests, such as how many entities 
will be making such requests, how frequently those requests will be 
made, and how many devices carriers will be asked to terminate in each 
request. As a result, Verizon states, carriers have no way of assessing 
the costs of processing termination requests or the systems that will 
have to be in place. CTIA concurs that, in light of the complexities in 
the termination proposal, the Commission should certify detection 
systems and validate that a detection system is working properly and 
capturing accurate, necessary information regarding the unauthorized 
devices. One managed access provider, CellBlox, opposes proposals to 
require termination of service to contraband wireless devices not only 
as unworkable and burdensome to correctional facilities, but also as 
raising too many unanswered questions regarding the specifics of the 
termination process.
    16. Tecore is a proponent of MASs as the preferred solution to the 
contraband problem, but is not opposed to detection and termination 
solutions used in conjunction with MAS, if the Commission establishes 
the specifics for a termination process. To the extent that the 
Commission decides to mandate termination procedures, Tecore implores 
the Commission to define specific information that the correctional 
facility must transmit to the carrier in order to effectuate a 
termination, including device information, criteria for concluding that 
a device is contraband, a defined interface for accepting or rejecting 
a request, a defined timeframe, and procedures for protesting or 
reinstating an invalid termination.
    17. Triple Dragon supports Commission regulations governing the 
detection and termination of service to contraband wireless devices and 
urges the Commission to revise its rules to accommodate an equipment 
certification process for detection systems. With regard to the 
timeframe for carriers to terminate service subsequent to a request, 
Triple Dragon suggests that immediate termination is necessary for 
public safety and that termination should be based on clear data 
indicating that the device is operating in violation of federal or 
state law or prison policy. Boeing contends that performance standards 
or additional technical requirements for passive detection systems are 
unnecessary and impractical. Boeing highlights that, despite numerous 
and lengthy trials of detection technology at various facilities around 
the country, there have been no reports of misidentification. Indeed, 
Boeing believes that there is a lack of evidence to warrant the 
imposition of technical requirements for detection systems, noting that 
the record does not show an appreciable risk of misidentification, nor 
does it support the imposition of burdensome technical standards to 
address this hypothetical risk.
    18. Other stakeholders encourage the Commission to foster the 
development of all solutions to combat contraband wireless devices in 
correctional facilities, including detection and

[[Page 22784]]

termination. The supporters of termination include providers of inmate 
calling services. Securus recommends that the Commission should not 
preclude any of these alternatives and should support the testing and 
implementation of all these options. Further, Securus suggests that the 
FCC should take a firm stance that CMRS providers must cooperate with 
correctional facilities to quickly terminate service to detected 
contraband devices. GTL supports the Commission's proposal to require 
wireless carriers to terminate service to contraband wireless devices, 
without the need for a court order. GEO, a private manager and operator 
of correctional facilities, agrees with the Commission's proposal to 
require carriers to terminate service to contraband wireless devices 
within one hour of receipt of notice from a qualifying authority. GEO 
recommends a broad definition of qualifying authority that would 
include wardens of both private and public correctional facilities. ACA 
urges the Commission to permit the corrections community to employ 
every possible tool in the toolbox to combat contraband wireless 
devices in correctional facilities, including immediate termination of 
service by carriers upon notification by any public safety agency 
pursuant to a standardized process. Acknowledging the carriers' concern 
about potential liability for erroneous termination, ACA suggests that 
the Commission adopt rules granting carriers protection while acting in 
good faith and for public safety to further protect the carriers above 
and beyond the language in the customer contracts.
    19. After careful consideration of the record, we seek further 
comment on a process whereby CMRS licensees would disable contraband 
wireless devices in correctional facilities detected by an eligible CIS 
pursuant to a qualifying request that includes, inter alia, specific 
identifying information regarding the device and the correctional 
facility. We seek to ensure that any disabling process will completely 
disable the contraband device itself and render it unusable, not simply 
terminate service to the device as the Commission had originally 
proposed in the NPRM. We seek comment on whether a process should 
include a required FCC determination of eligibility of CISs to ensure 
the systems satisfy minimum performance standards, appropriate means of 
requesting the disabling, and specifics regarding the required carrier 
response. We seek specific comment on all aspects of the process as 
well as the costs and benefits of their implementation.
    20. Eligibility of CISs. We seek to ensure that the systems 
detecting contraband wireless devices first meet certain minimum 
performance standards in order to minimize the risk of disabling a non-
contraband wireless device. We therefore seek comment on whether it is 
necessary to determine in advance whether a CIS meets the threshold for 
eligibility to be the basis for a subsequent qualifying request for 
device disabling, which might facilitate contracts between 
stakeholders, for example departments of corrections and CIS providers, 
and appropriate spectrum leasing arrangements, typically between CIS 
providers and wireless providers. We envision that any eligibility 
determination would not at this stage assess the CIS's characteristics 
related to a specific deployment at a certain correctional facility, 
but rather a CIS's overall methodology for system design and data 
analysis that could be included in a qualifying request, where more 
specific requirements must be met for device disabling. We seek comment 
on whether a CIS operator seeking wireless provider disabling of 
contraband wireless devices in a correctional facility should first be 
deemed an eligible CIS by the Commission, and whether the Commission 
should periodically issue public notices listing all eligible CISs. We 
seek comment on the following potential criteria for determining 
eligibility: (1) All radio transmitters used as part of the CIS have 
appropriate equipment authorization pursuant to Commission rules; (2) 
the CIS is designed and will be configured to locate devices solely 
within a correctional facility,\4\ can secure and protect the collected 
information, and is capable of being programmed not to interfere with 
emergency 911 calls; and (3) the methodology to be used in analyzing 
data collected by the CIS is sufficiently robust to provide a high 
degree of certainty that the particular wireless device subject to a 
later disabling request is in fact located within a correctional 
facility. We also seek comment on the appropriate format for requesting 
eligibility, taking into consideration our goal of reducing burdens and 
increasing administrative efficiency.
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    \4\ To comply with this criteria, a CIS operator may need to 
employ a range of mitigation techniques that might vary depending on 
the location of the correctional facility, as rural v. urban 
facilities differ substantially regarding their proximity to the 
general public.
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    21. We seek further comment on the costs, benefits, and burdens to 
potential stakeholders of requiring CIS eligibility before qualifying 
disabling requests can be made to wireless providers and whether the 
stated eligibility criteria adequately address concerns expressed in 
the record regarding improper functioning of CIS systems and 
inaccurately identifying contraband devices. If commenters disagree, we 
seek comment on what additional eligibility criteria would ensure the 
accuracy and authenticity of CISs. For example, should we require 
testing or demonstrations at a specific correctional facility prior to 
making a CIS eligibility determination? If so, what type of tests would 
be appropriate? How should signals be measured and what criteria should 
be used to evaluate such tests? Importantly, should such a testing 
requirement be part of the initial eligibility assessment or should it 
part of what constitutes a qualifying request? If testing were part of 
a general eligibility assessment, would such additional testing at a 
specific site be unduly burdensome or unnecessarily delay or undermine 
either state RFP processes or spectrum lease negotiations? Would 
parties enter into agreements and lease arrangements where a CIS had 
not yet been deemed eligible? Should we require that a CIS be able to 
identify the location of a wireless device to within a certain 
distance? Is such an accuracy requirement unnecessary or would it be 
beneficial in assessing the merits of a CIS design and reducing the 
risk of capturing non-contraband devices? Should any eligibility 
determination be subject to a temporal component, for example, 
requiring a representation on an annual basis that the basic system 
design and data analysis methodology have not materially changed, and 
should the CIS operator be required to provide the Commission with 
periodic updates on substantial system changes, upgrades, or redesign 
of location technology? Should eligibility be contingent on the 
submission of periodic reports detailing any incidents during the 
applicable period where devices were erroneously disabled? Should the 
eligibility criteria be different depending on whether the facility is 
in a rural or urban area, or whether the CIS provider, the correctional 
facility, or the CMRS licensee is large or small? Commenters should be 
specific in justifying any proposed additional minimum standards for 
CIS eligibility, including the costs and benefits to stakeholders.
    22. Qualifying Request. In addition to ensuring that CISs meet 
certain performance standards in order to minimize the risk of error, 
we also seek

[[Page 22785]]

to ensure that an authorized party provides the information necessary 
for a wireless provider to disable contraband wireless devices. We seek 
comment on potentially requiring CMRS licensees to comply with a 
disabling process upon receipt of a qualifying request made in writing 
and transmitted via a verifiable transmission mechanism.\5\ We seek 
comment on whether the qualifying request must be transmitted (1) by 
the Commission (including, potentially, by the contraband wireless 
device ombudsperson referenced above), upon the request of a Designated 
Correctional Facility Official (DCFO); or (2) by the DCFO. We seek 
comment on whether we should define the DCFO as a state or local 
official responsible for the facility where the contraband device is 
located. We seek specific comment on the costs and benefits of these 
two approaches to the transmission of the qualifying request, both in 
terms of timeliness and any perceived liability concerns.
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    \5\ A verifiable transmission mechanism is a reliable electronic 
means of communicating a disabling requesting that will provide 
certainty regarding the identity of both the sending and receiving 
parties.
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    23. We seek comment on whether carrier concerns about the 
authenticity of termination requests are best addressed by requiring 
that a request to disable be initiated by a state or local official 
responsible for the correctional facility, who arguably has more 
responsibility and oversight in the procurement of a CIS for 
correctional facilities than a warden or other prison official or 
employee, as suggested in the record. A review of our ULS and OET 
databases reflects that, to date, requests for Commission authorization 
of CISs have only been in state correctional facilities, but we seek to 
facilitate a wide range of deployments where possible to achieve a more 
nationwide solution, including within federal and/or local correctional 
facilities that may seek to deploy CIS. We also seek specific comment 
on the extent to which, as Verizon claims, carriers have existing 
secure electronic means used to receive court-ordered termination 
requests, which could be leveraged to transmit and receive disabling 
requests from correctional facilities that employ CISs.
    24. We seek comment on whether a qualifying disabling request 
should include a number of certifications by the DCFO, as well as 
device and correctional facility information. Should the DCFO certify 
in the qualifying request that (1) an eligible CIS was used in the 
correctional facility, and include evidence of such eligibility; (2) 
the CIS is authorized for operation through a license or Commission 
approved lease agreement, referencing the applicable ULS identifying 
information; (3) the DCFO has contacted all CMRS licensees providing 
service in the area of the correctional facility for which it will seek 
device disabling in order to establish a verifiable transmission 
mechanism for making qualifying requests and for receiving 
notifications from the licensee; and (4) it has substantial evidence 
that the contraband wireless device was used in the correctional 
facility, and that such use was observed within the 30 day period 
immediately prior to the date of submitting the request? We seek 
comment on this process and any methods in which the Commission can 
facilitate interaction between the authorized party and the CMRS 
licensees during the design, deployment, and testing of CISs. For 
example, would it be useful for the Commission to maintain a list of 
DCFOs? What role could the contraband ombudsperson play in facilitating 
the interaction between DCFOs and CMRS licensees?
    25. Finally, we seek comment on whether a qualifying request should 
include specific identifying information regarding the device and the 
correctional facility. Should the request include device identifiers 
sufficient to uniquely describe the device in question and the licensee 
providing CMRS service to the device? We seek comment on whether 
including the CMRS licensee is warranted if the request is made 
directly to the Commission, but unnecessary if the request is made 
directly from a DCFO to the CMRS licensee able to confirm that the 
device is a subscriber on its network. With regard to device 
identifiers, we seek specific comment on whether other details are 
necessary in addition to identifiers that uniquely describe the 
specific devices, such as make and model of the device or the mode of 
device utilization at the time of detection. Is it relevant whether the 
device--at the time of detection--was making an incoming or outgoing 
voice call, incoming or outgoing SMS text or MMS (multimedia) message, 
or downloading or uploading data?
    26. We seek additional comment on whether other details are 
necessary in terms of location and time identifiers, such as latitude 
and longitude to the nearest tenth of a second, or frequency band(s) of 
usage during the detection period, in order to accurately identify and 
disable the device. Is it necessary to require that a request include 
specific identifiers to accurately identify and disable the device, or 
would providing the flexibility to include alternative information to 
accommodate changes in technology be appropriate, and what types of 
alternative information would further our goal of an efficient 
disabling process? Specifically, what is necessary to accurately 
identify and disable the device? For example, common mobile identifiers 
include international mobile equipment identifier (IMEI) and the 
international mobile subscriber identity (IMSI), used by GSM, UMTS, and 
LTE devices; and electronic serial number (ESN), mobile identification 
number (MIN), and mobile directory number (MDN), used by CDMA devices. 
Should additional information be required to accurately identify a 
specific wireless device for requested disabling? Are there significant 
differences in the identifying information of current wireless devices 
(e.g., android, iOS, windows) that must be accounted for? We seek to 
minimize burdens for those providing information, by only requiring 
what is essential to properly disable.
    27. We seek comment on whether there are commonalities that would 
permit standardized information sharing, while still taking into 
account the full range of devices, operating systems, and carriers. We 
also seek comment on the appropriate format of a qualifying request to 
streamline the process and reduce administrative burdens. Would it be 
more efficient for carriers to develop a common data format so that 
corrections facilities, through a DCFO, are not required to develop a 
different format for each wireless provider? Should any of these 
possible requirements vary depending on whether the wireless provider 
is small or large?
    28. In comments, Tecore raises the concern that SIM cards can be 
easily replaced so that devices are only temporarily deactivated. The 
record indicates that termination of service alone may be an incomplete 
solution capable of inmate exploitation. We therefore seek comment on a 
potentially more effective approach to ensure that not only is service 
terminated to the detected contraband device, but also that the device 
is rendered unusable on that carrier's network. We seek comment on the 
technical feasibility of a disabling process, including the costs and 
benefits of implementation, as well as any impact on 911 calls. We note 
that a disabled device will not have 911 calling capability, whereas a 
service terminated device would maintain 911 calling capability 
pursuant to the Commission's current rules regarding

[[Page 22786]]

non-service initialized (NSI) phones.\6\ Should we maintain the 
requirement that CMRS carriers keep 911 capability for disabled 
contraband phones, subject to the outcome of the NSI proceeding? What 
are the costs and benefits to stakeholders of such a requirement?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \6\ The Commission has proposed revising its rules to sunset, 
after a six month period, the requirement that NSI phones be 911 
capable.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    29. We seek comment on whether a qualifying request should also 
include correctional facility identifiers, including the name of the 
correctional facility, the street address of the correctional facility, 
the latitude and longitude coordinates sufficient to describe the 
boundaries of the correctional facility, and the call signs of the 
Commission licenses and/or leases authorizing the CIS. Would this 
information provide sufficiently accurate information about the 
correctional facility to ensure that the carrier can restrict the 
disabling of wireless devices to those that are located within that 
facility?
    30. Disabling Process. As a preliminary matter, we seek to ensure 
that such requests can be transmitted in an expeditious manner and to 
have confidence that the request will be received and acted upon. 
Should the CMRS licensee be required to provide a point of contact 
suitable for receiving qualifying requests to disable contraband 
wireless devices in correctional facilities? We also recognize the need 
to safeguard legitimate devices from being disabled. Accordingly, we 
seek comment on what steps, if any, the CMRS licensee should take to 
verify the information received, whether customer outreach should be 
part of the process, and the time frame within which the steps must be 
taken. We seek information to assist us in determining what level of 
carrier investigation, if any, is warranted to determine whether there 
is clear evidence that the device sought to be disabled is not 
contraband. We also seek comment on what level of customer outreach, if 
any, would ensure that the disabling request is not erroneous.
    31. With regard to customer outreach, we again seek comment on a 
range of approaches, including the carrier immediately disabling 
without any customer outreach, the carrier contacting the subscriber of 
record through any available means (e.g., text, phone, email) and 
providing a reasonable amount of time prior to disabling for the 
customer to demonstrate that the disabling request is in error. We seek 
comment on whether a particular alternative enables inmates to evade 
device disabling. Each of these approaches impacts carrier response 
time and the ability to address, however unlikely, disabling errors. If 
some level of carrier investigation or customer outreach is warranted, 
should we provide CMRS licensees a method to reject a qualifying 
request if it is determined the wireless device in question is not 
contraband?
    32. We seek comment on whether the CMRS licensee should provide 
notification to the DCFO within a reasonable time period that it has 
either disabled the device or rejected the request. We seek comment on 
what the reasonable time period should be for this notification, 
whether the licensee must provide an explanation for the rejection, and 
whether the DCFO can contest the rejection. We seek comment on all 
aspects of a disabling process regarding verification of disabling 
requests, particularly the costs and benefits to the wireless 
providers, CIS operators, and the correctional facilities.
    33. Timeframe for Disabling. We seek comment on various options for 
the appropriate timeframe for disabling a contraband wireless device, 
or rejecting the request if appropriate, each of which might be 
impacted by the range of potential levels of carrier investigation in 
independently verifying a disabling request and engaging in customer 
outreach. CellAntenna recommends a staged obligation between one hour 
and 24 hours depending on the volume of requests, and other commenters 
suggest immediate action or action within one hour. These positions 
would be consistent with CMRS licensees disabling devices without any 
independent investigation or, at best, after a brief period of research 
using readily available resources, but achieve the goal of promptly 
disabling contraband wireless devices. In contrast, if carriers disable 
devices following exhaustive research or customer outreach, a period of 
seven days or more would likely be more appropriate. While providing 
greater assurance that the disabling is not an error, a longer period 
allows further use of an identified contraband phone.
    34. If the carrier attempts to contact the device's subscriber of 
record to permit a legitimate user the opportunity to demonstrate that 
the device is not contraband, how long should the user have to respond 
and does this notification requirement unnecessarily prolong device 
disabling? To what extent could a longer notification period increase 
the risk of inadvertently tipping off the user of a contraband device 
and thereby create opportunities for malefactors to cause harm or 
circumvent the correctional facility's efforts to address the illegal 
use? We seek specific comment regarding what periods of time are 
required in order to adequately balance the public safety needs with 
wireless provider concerns. We also seek comment on whether small 
entities face any special or unique issues with respect to disabling 
devices such that they would require additional time to comply.
    35. Finally, we seek comment on the methods available to ensure 
that any process for determining CIS eligibility minimizes the risk of 
disabling customers' devices that are not located within correctional 
facilities, and any related costs and benefits. Are there contractual 
provisions in existing contracts between CMRS providers and their 
customers that address this or similar issues? We seek comment on what 
period of time would be reasonable to expect a CMRS licensee to 
reactivate a disabled device. For example, what methods of discovery 
will sufficiently confirm that a wireless device is not contraband? Is 
24 hours a reasonable period to resolve potential errors and how 
extensive is the burden on subscribers to remain disabled for that 
period? What is the most efficient method of notifying the carriers of 
errors, if originating from parties outside a correctional facility, 
and of notifying subscribers of reactivation?
    36. In the NPRM, the Commission also sought comment on 
CellAntenna's proposal that we adopt a rule to insulate carriers from 
any legal liability for wrongful termination, while noting that 
wireless carriers' current end user licensing agreements may already 
protect the carriers. We seek further comment on this proposal. 
Specifically, we seek comment on whether the Commission should create a 
safe harbor by rule for wireless providers that comply with the federal 
process for disabling phones in correctional facilities. How broadly 
should that safe harbor be written, and should it apply only to 
wireless providers that comply with every aspect of the rules we adopt 
or also those that act in good-faith to carry out the disablement 
process? Does the Commission have authority to adopt a safe harbor? Is 
our authority to adopt the rules at issue sufficient to create a safe 
harbor? Are there other provisions of the Communications Act not 
previously discussed that would authorize a safe harbor? And what, if 
any, downsides are there to creating a safe harbor for wireless 
providers that comply with federal law?
    37. In the NPRM, the Commission also sought comment on the extent 
to which providers or operators of managed

[[Page 22787]]

access or detection systems comply with section 705 if they divulge or 
publish the existence of a communication for the purpose of operating 
the system, and whether such providers or operators are entitled to 
receive communications under section 705. Section 705 of the Act 
generally prohibits, except as authorized under Chapter 119, Title 18 
of the U.S. Code, any person ``receiving, assisting in receiving, 
transmitting, or assisting in transmitting, any interstate or foreign 
communication by wire or radio'' from divulging or publishing the 
``existence, contents, substance, purport, effect or meaning thereof'' 
to another person other than through authorized channels (47 U.S.C. 
605(a)). Additionally, Chapter 206, Title 18 of the U.S. Code, 
generally prohibits the use of pen register and trap and trace devices 
without a court order, subject to several exceptions including where a 
provider of a communications service obtains the consent of the user 
(18 U.S.C. 3121-3127). The Commission sought comment on whether any of 
the proposals regarding detection and MASs would implicate the pen 
register and trap and trace devices chapter of Title 18 of the U.S. 
Code.
    38. ShawnTech believes that the operation of its MASs is in 
compliance with federal and state law concerning the use of pen 
register and trap and trace devices, but expresses concern that 
detection systems that function to terminate service to contraband 
devices may not be in compliance. In addition to the questions the 
Commission asked in the NPRM, we seek comment on whether and to what 
extent a system used to request wireless provider disabling of a 
contraband wireless device pursuant to a Commission rule raises issues 
under Title 18 or section 705 that may be different from those raised 
by MAS implementation.
    39. Some commenters in response to the NPRM also have raised 
concerns about the applicability of the privacy obligations under 
section 222 of the Communications Act (47 U.S.C. 222). After review of 
the record, we do not find that comments submitted in response to the 
NPRM demonstrate that section 222 would prohibit a carrier from 
complying with a Commission rule mandating a disabling process. To the 
extent commenters maintain a contrary view, we seek comment on this 
issue clearly providing support for such a position and on any other 
relationship of section 222 to the FNPRM.

Notification to CIS Operators of Carrier Technical Changes

    40. In the NPRM, the Commission sought comment generally on 
proposals submitted by interested parties regarding rule changes 
intended to expedite the deployment of MASs, including GTL's proposal 
to impose network upgrade notification obligations on carriers. In its 
original petition, GTL requested that the Commission adopt rules that 
require CMRS providers to notify MAS operators or prison administrators 
in advance of any network changes likely to impact the MAS and 
negotiate in good faith on the implementation timing of the change. The 
reason for the requirement, GTL explained, is that rapid technological 
evolution impacts the effectiveness of a MAS and could render them 
ineffective; for example, network changes such as changing power levels 
or antenna patterns could impact proper operation of the system. In its 
comments, ACA supports this notification requirement.
    41. In its comments, MSS suggests that effective implementation of 
MAS requires mandatory coordination of network changes with the MAS 
operator. As an example, MSS cites the impact of a technical change 
such as a switch from 3G to 4G at a given base station for a given 
band. At the same time, MSS notes the possibility that carriers may 
find the coordination of network changes with MAS operators burdensome. 
Tecore has highlighted the importance of communicating with the 
carriers regarding changes in technologies and the need to modify MAS 
deployments to respond to those changes, which occur frequently. GTL 
has also reiterated the challenges it faces in keeping pace with the 
software changes required to respond to rapidly changing wireless 
technology. GTL suggests that policies must ensure that wireless 
carriers are active participants in the effort to eliminate contraband 
cellphone use.
    42. We acknowledge that the effectiveness of CIS systems depends on 
coordination between CMRS licensees, CIS operators, and correctional 
facilities, yet we recognize that any carrier notification requirement 
must not be overly burdensome or costly or have a negative impact on 
consumers. T-Mobile claims that the record on this issue is in need of 
further development, and that a notification requirement could impede 
carrier network management flexibility and could delay the rollout of 
new technologies which would negatively impact consumers and carriers.
    43. We recognize that a notification requirement that is too broad 
in scope, resulting in the need to send notifications possibly on a 
daily basis for minor technical changes, could be unduly burdensome on 
CMRS licensees. We also recognize that lack of notice to CIS operators 
of certain types of carrier system changes could potentially result in 
the CIS not providing the strongest signal in the correctional 
facility, compromising the system's effectiveness if contraband 
communications pass directly to the carrier network. Accordingly, in 
the FNPRM, we seek comment on the appropriate scope of a notification 
requirement. Would it be appropriate to require CMRS licensees that are 
parties to lease arrangements for CISs in correctional facilities to 
provide written notification to the CIS operator in advance of adding 
new frequency band(s) to their service offerings or deploying a new air 
interface technology (e.g., a carrier that previously offered CDMA 
technology deploying LTE) so that CISs can be timely upgraded to 
prevent spectrum gaps in the system that could be exploited by users of 
contraband wireless devices? To what extent should we require 
notification for additional types of carrier network changes, as GTL 
proposed, and if so, what specific network changes (e.g., transmitter 
power or antenna modifications) should be included? We seek specific 
comment on what other carrier network changes implemented without 
notice to CIS providers could render the systems in the correctional 
facilities ineffective, while also seeking comment on whether it is 
unduly burdensome to require notification for every routine carrier 
network modification. Would it be feasible to adopt a rule requiring a 
CMRS licensee providing service at a correctional facility to notify a 
CIS provider in advance of any network change likely to impact the CIS? 
We seek comment on AT&T's position that CIS providers should be 
required to respond within 24 hours to any notification from a CMRS 
licensee that the CIS is causing adverse effects to the carrier's 
network.
    44. We also seek comment on how far in advance the notification 
should be sent from the CMRS licensee to the CIS operator in order to 
allow for sufficient time to upgrade the CIS and enable continuous 
successful CIS operation with no spectrum gaps. Is a 90 day advance 
notification requirement reasonable? Would a 30 day advance 
notification requirement allow sufficient time for upgrades? Finally, 
we seek comment on whether and to what extent CMRS licensees are 
currently coordinating with CIS operators in this regard. For example, 
T-Mobile states that a notification requirement will not provide any 
benefit and is unnecessary

[[Page 22788]]

because CIS providers conduct spectrum scans as part of daily 
operations to detect new bands and technologies and air interfaces in 
use and already coordinate this scanning with CMRS licensees. We seek 
comment on the costs and benefits of any suggested notification 
requirements.

Other Technological Solutions

    45. In the NPRM, the Commission invited comment on other 
technological solutions to address the problem of contraband wireless 
devices in correctional facilities, including those solutions discussed 
in previously filed documents referred to in the NPRM.
    46. ``Quiet Zones.'' In response to the NPRM seeking comment 
regarding alternative technological solutions to the contraband 
problem, some commenters suggest that the Commission mandate ``dead 
zones'' or ``quiet zones'' in and around correctional facilities. 
Although the proposals vary somewhat from a technical perspective and 
are referred to by different names, the common goal seems to be the 
creation of areas in which communications are not authorized such that 
contraband wireless devices in correctional facilities would not 
receive service from a wireless provider.
    47. CellAntenna's position is that the Commission has authority to 
modify spectrum licenses to create areas, such as in correctional 
facilities, in which wireless services are not authorized. CellAntenna 
refers to NTCH's recommendation for ``quiet zones'' where no licensee 
would be authorized to provide services. CellAntenna suggests that, 
given the variability in geography, each local correctional facility 
should be allowed to determine its need for a ``no service'' zone and 
petition the Commission to establish the ``no service'' zone and 
procedures for the registration of complaints of interference outside 
of the zones. Despite the fact that CellAntenna references NTCH's 
comments, NTCH's plan for the designation of ``quiet zones'' similar to 
radio astronomy or other research facilities to cover correctional 
facilities appears to differ from CellAntenna's ``no service'' zones 
because, according to NTCH's plan, there would be an official entity 
responsible for preventing unauthorized communications and for offering 
service over authorized frequencies in the prison area, called the 
``Prison Service Provider.'' NCIC suggests that the Commission create 
``dead zones'' around correctional facilities in which carriers would 
be required to prevent the signal from reaching the correctional 
facility. GTL agrees that the Commission should explore the creation of 
``dead zones'' or ``quiet zones.''
    48. Similar to a ``no service'' zone, MSS proposes an alternative 
approach called geolocation-based denial (GBD) which permits a 
correctional facility to request that the Commission declare the 
facility outside the service area of all CMRS carriers if the facility 
has at least 300 meters of space in all directions between secure areas 
accessible by inmates and areas with unrestricted public access. MSS 
describes GBD as a low-risk solution that will address highly 
problematic rural maximum security prisons. ACA supports the creation 
of ``quiet zones'' and GBD.
    49. The carriers oppose the ``quiet zone''-like proposals. AT&T 
opposes NCIC's proposal to create ``quiet zones'' around correctional 
facilities in which carriers are unauthorized to provide wireless 
service, claiming that a quiet zone would prevent the completion of 
legitimate emergency calls from the correctional facility and vicinity 
within the quiet zone. Even in rural areas, Verizon suggests, 
legitimate communications in the areas around prisons could be 
impacted. In opposing the idea of a quiet or exclusion zone, Verizon 
argues that these proposals would indiscriminately prevent legitimate 
communications, including public safety communications from being 
completed both inside and outside the prison grounds. CTIA opposes the 
establishment of quiet zones because they would unnecessarily 
complicate wireless network design and be an intrusion on licensees' 
exclusive spectrum rights.
    50. In the FNPRM, we seek additional comment on the proposals in 
the record for the mandatory creation of ``quiet zones'' or ``no 
service'' zones in order to help us better understand the similarities 
and differences among the proposals and receive more detailed 
information in the record regarding how the zones would be created from 
a legal and technical perspective. What are the methods wireless 
providers would use to create the quiet zone, including technical 
criteria used to define the zone? Should there be a field strength 
limit on the perimeter of the zone and, if so, what is the appropriate 
limit? Would the limits set forth in Commission rule 15.109 (47 CFR 
15.109) applicable to unintentional radiators be appropriate and how 
would this be measured? Or would a different criterion, such as 15 dBu, 
be appropriate to ensure calls outside the perimeter could be completed 
while not providing the ability for connection to the network inside 
the perimeter? How would such a limit impact carrier network design? 
Again, we request that commenters elaborate on the role of the 
Commission in the creation of these zones and the legal basis for their 
establishment. We query whether ``quiet zones'' could be created 
voluntarily or whether there is a legal bar to their creation in the 
absence of Commission action. We also seek comment on the application 
of ``geo-fencing'' in the contraband wireless device context and how it 
differs from a ``quiet zone.'' Just as geo-fencing software can prevent 
drones from flying over a specific location, could geo-fencing be used 
to create a virtual perimeter around a correctional facility such that 
wireless devices would be disabled within the geo-fence? We seek 
comment on whether geo-fencing could be used to create zones within 
which contraband wireless devices would be inoperable and whether this 
technology would permit the delivery of emergency calls within the zone 
or interfere with other legitimate communications outside the geo-
fence.
    51. Network-Based Solution. Relatedly, we seek comment on the 
concept of requiring CMRS licensees to identify and disable contraband 
wireless devices in correctional facilities using their own network 
elements, including base stations and handsets/devices. As technology 
evolves, CMRS licensees are acquiring new and better ways of more 
accurately determining the precise location of a wireless device. 
Indeed, the Commission addressed the technological advances and need to 
improve location accuracy in the context of emergency 911 calling when 
it adopted E911 location accuracy deadlines aimed at enhancing PSAPs' 
ability to accurately identify the location of wireless 911 callers 
when indoors. In order to meet the Commission's requirements over the 
next several years, carriers will be required to deploy technology 
capable of locating wireless devices to within certain distances or 
coordinates. We also know that carriers currently have ways of 
determining the location of a wireless device using an analysis of call 
records or Global Positioning System (GPS) technology. In fact, more 
than 20 states have enacted legislation based on the Kelsey Smith Act 
(H.R. 4889, 114th Cong., 2d Sess. (2016)) that requires carriers to 
give law enforcement call location information in an emergency 
involving the risk of death or serious injury. Further, there are 
device applications (e.g., Uber or Google Maps) that enable the 
identification of the location of the device through GPS

[[Page 22789]]

technology located in the device. Given the improved and evolving 
capability of carriers to identify the location of wireless devices, we 
seek comment on whether existing methodologies could also be effective 
in the context of contraband wireless devices in correctional 
facilities. We acknowledge that an approach relying solely on GPS 
technology may not be effective inside correctional facilities if the 
GPS capability can be disabled or if GPS signals are insufficient 
within the correctional facility. Further, we note that a carrier's 
ability to identify the location based on network (not device GPS) data 
is affected by the number, location, and orientation of carrier base 
stations in the area. That said, we seek comment on whether it is 
possible for CMRS licensees to use their own network elements to 
determine that a wireless device is in a correctional facility, and 
what are the costs and benefits of such a process.
    52. If we require CMRS licensees to identify wireless devices in 
correctional facilities using their own network elements, should we 
require carriers to recognize whether contraband wireless devices are 
persistently used in a correctional facility located in the carrier's 
geographic service area and to disable them using their own resources? 
How should we define ``persistently''? How would the carriers determine 
that a wireless device in a correctional facility is, in fact, 
contraband? Should the carriers be required to have an internal process 
in place whereby they could reactivate a device disabled in error? If a 
network-based solution is feasible, should we require it only if a 
particular correctional facility requests this approach as opposed to 
the solution of requiring CMRS licensees to disable devices pursuant to 
qualifying requests as described above? Do particular types of wireless 
devices or carrier air interfaces present unique challenges? We seek 
comment on the implementation, technical, and other issues associated 
with this carrier network-based solution as well as the costs and 
benefits associated with this potential solution. In particular, what 
would the costs be to carriers of complying with a mandate of having to 
locate contraband wireless devices in all correctional facilities 
nationwide? Finally, we seek comment on whether the network-based 
solution described herein raises any privacy concerns, including the 
privacy obligations under section 222 of the Communications Act.
    53. Beacon Technology. We also seek comment on technologies that 
are intended to disable contraband wireless devices in correctional 
facilities using the interaction of a beacon system set up in the 
correctional facility with software embedded in the wireless devices. 
Essentially, these types of technologies rely on a system of beacons 
creating a restricted zone in a correctional facility, such that any 
wireless device in the zone will not operate. One of the benefits of 
this approach is that this technology would appear to render the phone 
unusable by an inmate for any purpose. In other words, some of the 
technologies discussed above could prevent an inmate from placing a 
call, but they may not prevent the inmate from using the phone for 
taking videos or otherwise sharing or disseminating information that 
itself could pose a threat to public safety. We thus also seek comment 
on whether this type of technology--or elements thereof--can and should 
be incorporated into any other approach the Commission may take. For 
example, should we consider requiring that phones be rendered 
completely unusable as part of our implementation of another solution, 
including the network-based solution discussed above.
    54. At the same time, it appears that beacon-based technologies 
would function effectively only if all wireless carriers perform a 
system update to include the software for all existing and future 
wireless devices, and all mobile device manufacturers include the 
software in all devices. We seek comment on this technological 
solution, including costs and benefits of its implementation. Would 
this solution require legislation to ensure that all wireless carriers 
and wireless device manufacturers include the software in the wireless 
devices? In the absence of legislation, how would the Commission ensure 
wireless carrier and device manufacturer cooperation and pursuant to 
what authority would the Commission be acting? How would compliance be 
enforced? Should it be incorporated as part of the Commission's 
equipment certification requirements or be made part of an industry 
certification process? Would a ``system update'' actually accomplish 
the goal of ensuring that all wireless devices currently in existence 
get updated with the software? Would the beacon system in the 
correctional facility permit 911 or E911 calls from the restricted zone 
to be connected? Is a voluntary solution possible between the carriers 
and the providers of beacon technology?
    55. We welcome comment on any other new technologies designed to 
combat the problem of contraband wireless devices in correctional 
facilities and what regulatory steps the Commission could take to 
assist in the development and deployment of these new technologies. We 
seek comment on what additional steps the Commission could take to 
address the contraband cellphone problem, for example, educational 
efforts designed to highlight available solutions, other expertise, or 
additional ways in which we can coordinate stakeholder efforts.

II. Procedural Matters

Initial Paperwork Reduction Act Analysis

    56. The FNPRM contains proposed new information collection 
requirements. The Commission, as part of its continuing effort to 
reduce paperwork burdens, invites the general public and OMB to comment 
on the information collection requirements contained in this document, 
as required by PRA. In addition, pursuant to the Small Business 
Paperwork Relief Act of 2002, Public Law 107-198, see 44 U.S.C. 
3506(c)(4), the Commission seeks specific comment on how it might 
``further reduce the information collection burden for small business 
concerns with fewer than 25 employees.''

Initial Regulatory Flexibility Act Analysis

    57. As required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (5 U.S.C. 
603), the Commission has prepared an Initial Regulatory Flexibility 
Analysis (IRFA) of the possible significant economic impact on small 
entities of the policies and rules proposed in this document. We 
request written public comment on the IRFA. Comments must be filed in 
accordance with the same deadlines as comments filed in response to the 
FNPRM as set forth on the first page of this document, and have a 
separate and distinct heading designating them as responses to the 
IRFA. The Commission's Consumer and Governmental Affairs Bureau, 
Reference Information Center, will send a copy of the FNPRM, including 
the IRFA, to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business 
Administration.
    58. Need for, and Objectives of, the Proposed Rules. The FNPRM 
seeks comment on methods to provide additional tools to combat 
contraband wireless devices in correctional facilities. It is clear 
that inmate possession of wireless devices is a serious threat to the 
safety and welfare of correctional facility employees and the general 
public. First, as a safeguard to ensure coordination between CMRS 
licensees and CIS operators, the Commission seeks comment on a

[[Page 22790]]

requirement that CMRS licensees that are parties to lease arrangements 
for CIS in correctional facilities provide written notification to the 
CIS operator no later than 90 days in advance of adding new frequency 
band(s) to its service offerings or deploying a new air interface 
technology (e.g., a carrier that previously offered CDMA deploying 
LTE), unless a different timeframe is agreed to by both parties. The 
Commission seeks comment on the appropriate timing, costs, and 
alternatives to such a notice requirement. The FNPRM seeks comments on 
the types of notice protocol CMRS licensees might already have in 
place, and whether and how those procedures could be used to satisfy 
any notice requirement.
    59. The FNPRM seeks comment on a requirement that CMRS providers 
disable a contraband wireless devices found by a CIS to be in 
correctional facilities pursuant to a qualifying request from an 
authorized party. The FNPRM seeks comment on a process that would 
include a CIS eligibility determination to ensure the systems satisfy 
minimum performance standards, appropriate means of requesting the 
disabling, and specifics regarding the required carrier response. The 
Commission seeks comment on maintaining a public list of all eligible 
CISs to facilitate expeditious lease transactions for those seeking to 
deploy systems resulting in requests for contraband wireless device 
disabling. We seek comment on the following criteria for determining 
eligibility: (1) The CIS has appropriate equipment authorization 
pursuant to Commission rules; (2) the CIS is designed and will be 
configured to locate devices solely within a correctional facility, 
secure and protect the collected information, and avoid interfering 
with emergency 911 calls; and (3) the methodology to be used in 
analyzing data collected by the CIS is sufficiently robust to provide a 
high degree of certainty that the particular wireless device is in fact 
located within a correctional facility. The Commission also seeks 
comment on these standards, and whether additional standards may be 
required for accuracy
    60. To ensure that an authorized party provides the information 
necessary for a wireless provider to disable the contraband wireless 
devices, the Commission seeks comment on a requirement that CMRS 
licensees comply with a disabling process upon receipt of a qualifying 
request made in writing and transmitted via a verifiable transmission 
mechanism. The Commission seeks comment on whether the qualifying 
request must be transmitted (1) by the Commission upon the request of a 
Designated Correctional Facility Official (DCFO); or (2) by the DCFO. 
We seek comment on whether we should define the DCFO as a state or 
local official responsible for the facility where the contraband device 
is located. In order for the request to disable a contraband device to 
be a qualifying request, the Commission also seeks comment on a 
requirement that the DCFO certify in the qualifying request that: (1) 
An eligible CIS was used in the correctional facility, and include 
evidence of such eligibility; (2) the CIS is authorized for operation 
through a license or Commission approved lease agreement, referencing 
the applicable ULS identifying information; (3) the DCFO has contacted 
all CMRS licensees providing service in the area of the correctional 
facility for which it will seek device disabling in order to establish 
a verifiable transmission mechanism for making qualifying requests and 
for receiving notifications from the licensee; and (4) it has 
substantial evidence that the contraband wireless device was used in 
the correctional facility, and that such use was observed within the 30 
day period immediately prior to the date of submitting the request. The 
Commission seeks comment on these requirements and any methods to 
facilitate interaction between the authorized party and the CMRS 
licensees during design, deployment, and testing of CISs.
    61. In the FNPRM, the Commission seeks comment on whether a 
qualifying request should include specific identifying information 
regarding the device and the correctional facility. Importantly, the 
Commission asks whether the request should include device identifiers 
sufficient to uniquely describe the device in question and the licensee 
providing CMRS service to the device. With regard to device 
identifiers, the Commission seeks specific comment on whether other 
details are necessary in addition to identifiers that uniquely describe 
the specific devices, such as make and model of the device or the mode 
of device utilization at the time of detection. The FNPRM also seeks 
comment on whether a qualifying request should also include 
correctional facility identifiers, including the name of the 
correctional facility, the street address of the correctional facility, 
the latitude and longitude coordinates sufficient to describe the 
boundaries of the correctional facility, and the call signs of the 
Commission licenses and/or leases authorizing the CIS.
    62. In considering a process whereby CMRS licensees disable 
contraband wireless devices upon receiving a qualifying request, the 
Commission recognizes the need to safeguard legitimate devices from 
being disabled to the greatest extent possible. Accordingly, the FNPRM 
seeks comment on the appropriate steps, if any, the CMRS licensee 
should take to verify the information received, whether customer 
outreach should be part of the process, and the time frame within which 
the steps must be taken. The Commission seeks comment on a requirement 
that, if the DCFO is the authorized party transmitting the qualifying 
request to the CMRS licensees, then the CMRS licensee must provide a 
point of contact suitable for receiving qualifying requests to disable 
contraband wireless devices in correctional facilities. With regard to 
carrier investigations, the Commission seeks comment on a range of 
possible options, including requiring the carrier to immediately 
disable the wireless devices upon receipt of a qualifying request from 
an authorized party without conducing any investigation; requiring the 
carrier to conduct brief research of readily accessible data prior to 
disabling or to respond to a series of Commission questions regarding 
the status of the wireless device to determine its status; or requiring 
the carrier to use all data at its disposal prior to disabling. The 
FNPRM seeks comment on all aspects of the disabling process regarding 
verification of disabling requests, particularly the costs and benefits 
to the wireless providers, CIS operators, and the correctional 
facilities.
    63. With respect to the appropriate timeframe for disabling a 
contraband wireless device, or rejecting the request if appropriate, 
the Commission seeks comment on various options, each of which might be 
impacted by the range of potential levels of carrier investigation in 
independently verifying a disabling request and customer outreach. The 
Commission believes that appropriate timeframes should strike a 
reasonable balance between the need for prompt action to disable a 
contraband device potentially used for criminal purposes, and licensee 
resources required to either verify and implement, or reasonably reject 
a qualifying request.
    64. While the Commission seeks comment on a CIS eligibility process 
that will substantially ensure that only contraband wireless devices 
located within correctional facilities are identified for carrier 
disabling, we also recognize that in limited instances a non-contraband 
device in close proximity to a correctional facility might be 
mistakenly identified as

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contraband and disabled in error. In the event of such an error, the 
Commission seeks comment on what timely and efficient methods wireless 
providers can implement to minimize customer inconvenience to resume 
service to the device.
    65. The Commission has considered various alternatives, including a 
court order process or a voluntary carrier termination process, on 
which it seeks comment. The Commission sought comment on a proposal 
seeking adoption of a rule to insulate carriers from any legal 
liability for wrongful termination. The Commission noted that wireless 
carriers' current end user licensing agreements may already protect the 
carriers, but seeks further comment on this proposal, and on whether 
the Commission should create a safe harbor by rule for wireless 
providers that comply with the federal process for disabling phones in 
correctional facilities. The Commission also seeks comment on whether 
and to what extent a system used to request wireless provider disabling 
of a contraband wireless device pursuant to a Commission rule raises 
issues under Title 18 of the U.S. Code or section 705 of the 
Communications Act, as amended (Act), that may be different from those 
raised by MAS implementation. The Commission does not find that the 
record supports the position that section 222 of the Act would prohibit 
a carrier from complying with a disabling process, but seeks comment on 
the issue to the extent commenters maintain a contrary view.
    66. In the alternative, the Commission seeks comment on additional 
technological means of combating contraband devices, including 
imposition of quiet zones around correctional facilities, network-based 
solutions, and incorporation of beacon technology into wireless 
handsets that would provide a software method of disabling 
functionality within correctional facilities
    67. Legal Basis. The legal basis for any action that may be taken 
pursuant to the FNPRM is contained in sections 2, 4(i), 4(j), 301, 302, 
303, 307, 308, 309, 310, and 332 of the Communications Act of 1934, as 
amended, 47 U.S.C. 151, 152, 154(i), 154(j), 301, 302a, 303, 307, 308, 
309, 310, and 332.
    68. Description and Estimate of the Number of Small Entities to 
Which the Proposed Rules Will Apply. The RFA directs agencies to 
provide a description of, and where feasible, an estimate of the number 
of small entities that may be affected by the proposed rules, if 
adopted (15 U.S.C. 603(b)(3)). The RFA generally defines the term 
``small entity'' as having the same meaning as the terms ``small 
business,'' ``small organization,'' and ``small governmental 
jurisdiction'' (5 U.S.C. 601(6)). In addition, the term ``small 
business'' has the same meaning as the term ``small-business concern'' 
under the Small Business Act (5 U.S.C. 601(3)). A ``small-business 
concern'' is one which: (1) Is independently owned and operated; (2) is 
not dominant in its field of operation; and (3) satisfies any 
additional criteria established by the SBA (5 U.S.C. 601(3)).
    69. Small Businesses, Small Organizations, Small Governmental 
Jurisdictions. Our actions, over time, may affect small entities that 
are not easily categorized at present. We therefore describe here, at 
the outset, three comprehensive small entity size standards that could 
be directly affected herein. First, while there are industry specific 
size standards for small businesses that are used in the regulatory 
flexibility analysis, according to data from the SBA's Office of 
Advocacy, in general a small business is an independent business having 
fewer than 500 employees. These types of small businesses represent 
99.9% of all businesses in the United States which translates to 28.8 
million businesses. Next, the type of small entity described as a 
``small organization'' is generally ``any not-for-profit enterprise 
which is independently owned and operated and is not dominant in its 
field.'' Nationwide, as of 2007, there were approximately 1,621,215 
small organizations. Finally, the small entity described as a ``small 
governmental jurisdiction'' is defined generally as ``governments of 
cities, towns, townships, villages, school districts, or special 
districts, with a population of less than fifty thousand.'' U.S. Census 
Bureau data published in 2012 indicate that there were 89,476 local 
governmental jurisdictions in the United States. We estimate that, of 
this total, as many as 88,761 entities may qualify as ``small 
governmental jurisdictions.'' Thus, we estimate that most governmental 
jurisdictions are small.
    70. Wired Telecommunications Carriers. The U.S. Census Bureau 
defines this industry as establishments primarily engaged in operating 
and/or providing access to transmission facilities and infrastructure 
that they own and/or lease for the transmission of voice, data, text, 
sound, and video using wired communications networks. Transmission 
facilities may be based on a single technology or a combination of 
technologies. Establishments in this industry use the wired 
telecommunications network facilities that they operate to provide a 
variety of services, such as wired telephony services, including VoIP 
services, wired (cable) audio and video programming distribution, and 
wired broadband internet services. By exception, establishments 
providing satellite television distribution services using facilities 
and infrastructure that they operate are included in this industry. The 
SBA has developed a small business size standard for Wired 
Telecommunications Carriers, which consists of all such companies 
having 1,500 or fewer employees. U.S. Census data for 2012 shows that 
there were 3,117 firms that operated that year. Of this total, 3,083 
operated with fewer than 1,000 employees. Thus, under this size 
standard, the majority of firms in this industry can be considered 
small.
    71. Neither the Commission nor the SBA has developed a definition 
for Interexchange Carriers. The closest NAICS Code category is Wired 
Telecommunications Carriers and the applicable small business size 
standard under SBA rules consists of all such companies having 1,500 or 
fewer employees. U.S. Census data for 2012 indicates that 3,117 firms 
operated during that year. Of that number, 3,083 operated with fewer 
than 1,000 employees. According to internally developed Commission 
data, 359 companies reported that their primary telecommunications 
service activity was the provision of interexchange services. Of this 
total, an estimated 317 have 1,500 or fewer employees. Consequently, 
the Commission estimates that the majority of interexchange service 
providers are small entities that may be affected by the rules adopted.
    72. The SBA has not developed a small business size standard 
specifically for Local Resellers. The SBA category of 
Telecommunications Resellers is the closest NAICs code category for 
local resellers. The Telecommunications Resellers industry comprises 
establishments engaged in purchasing access and network capacity from 
owners and operators of telecommunications networks and reselling wired 
and wireless telecommunications services (except satellite) to 
businesses and households. Establishments in this industry resell 
telecommunications; they do not operate transmission facilities and 
infrastructure. Mobile virtual network operators (MVNOs) are included 
in this industry. Under the SBA size standard, such a business is small 
if it has 1,500 or fewer employees. U.S. Census data for 2012 show that 
1,341 firms provided

[[Page 22792]]

resale services during that year. Of that number, 1,341 operated with 
fewer than 1,000 employees. Thus, under this category and the 
associated small business size standard, the majority of these 
resellers can be considered small entities. According to Commission 
data, 213 carriers have reported that they are engaged in the provision 
of local resale services. Of these, an estimated 211 have 1,500 or 
fewer employees and two have more than 1,500 employees. Consequently, 
the Commission estimates that the majority of local resellers are small 
entities that may be affected by the rules adopted.
    73. Toll Resellers. The SBA has not developed a small business size 
standard specifically for the category of Toll Resellers. The SBA 
category of Telecommunications Resellers is the closest NAICs code 
category for toll resellers. The Telecommunications Resellers industry 
comprises establishments engaged in purchasing access and network 
capacity from owners and operators of telecommunications networks and 
reselling wired and wireless telecommunications services (except 
satellite) to businesses and households. Establishments in this 
industry resell telecommunications; they do not operate transmission 
facilities and infrastructure. Mobile virtual network operators (MVNOs) 
are included in this industry. Under the SBA size standard, such a 
business is small if it has 1,500 or fewer employees. U.S. Census data 
for 2012 show that 1,341 firms provided resale services during that 
year. Of that number, 1,341 operated with fewer than 1,000 employees. 
Thus, under this category and the associated small business size 
standard, the majority of these resellers can be considered small 
entities. According to Commission data, 881 carriers have reported that 
they are engaged in the provision of toll resale services. Of these, an 
estimated 857 have 1,500 or fewer employees and 24 have more than 1,500 
employees. Consequently, the Commission estimates that the majority of 
toll resellers are small entities that may be affected by the rules 
adopted.
    74. Other Toll Carriers. Neither the Commission nor the SBA has 
developed a size standard for small businesses specifically applicable 
to Other Toll Carriers. This category includes toll carriers that do 
not fall within the categories of interexchange carriers, operator 
service providers, prepaid calling card providers, satellite service 
carriers, or toll resellers. The closest applicable size standard under 
SBA rules is for Wired Telecommunications Carriers and the applicable 
small business size standard under SBA rules consists of all such 
companies having 1,500 or fewer employees. U.S. Census data for 2012 
indicates that 3,117 firms operated during that year. Of that number, 
3,083 operated with fewer than 1,000 employees. According to Commission 
data, 284 companies reported that their primary telecommunications 
service activity was the provision of other toll carriage. Of these, an 
estimated 279 have 1,500 or fewer employees and five have more than 
1,500 employees. Consequently, the Commission estimates that most Other 
Toll Carriers are small entities that may be affected by the rules and 
policies adopted.
    75. 800 and 800-Like Service Subscribers. Neither the Commission 
nor the SBA has developed a small business size standard specifically 
for 800 and 800-like service (toll free) subscribers. The appropriate 
size standard under SBA rules is for the category Telecommunications 
Resellers. Under that size standard, such a business is small if it has 
1,500 or fewer employees. The most reliable source of information 
regarding the number of these service subscribers appears to be data 
the Commission collects on the 800, 888, 877, and 866 numbers in use. 
According to our data, as of September 2009, the number of 800 numbers 
assigned was 7,860,000; the number of 888 numbers assigned was 
5,588,687; the number of 877 numbers assigned was 4,721,866; and the 
number of 866 numbers assigned was 7,867,736. We do not have data 
specifying the number of these subscribers that are not independently 
owned and operated or have more than 1,500 employees, and thus are 
unable at this time to estimate with greater precision the number of 
toll free subscribers that would qualify as small businesses under the 
SBA size standard. Consequently, we estimate that there are 7,860,000 
or fewer small entity 800 subscribers; 5,588,687 or fewer small entity 
888 subscribers; 4,721,866 or fewer small entity 877 subscribers; and 
7,867,736 or fewer small entity 866 subscribers.
    76. Wireless Telecommunications Carriers (except Satellite). This 
industry comprises establishments engaged in operating and maintaining 
switching and transmission facilities to provide communications via the 
airwaves. Establishments in this industry have spectrum licenses and 
provide services using that spectrum, such as cellular services, paging 
services, wireless internet access, and wireless video services. The 
appropriate size standard under SBA rules is that such a business is 
small if it has 1,500 or fewer employees. For this industry, U.S. 
Census data for 2012 show that there were 967 firms that operated for 
the entire year. Of this total, 955 firms had employment of 999 or 
fewer employees and 12 had employment of 1000 employees or more. Thus 
under this category and the associated size standard, the Commission 
estimates that the majority of wireless telecommunications carriers 
(except satellite) are small entities.
    77. Broadband Personal Communications Service. The broadband 
personal communications service (PCS) spectrum is divided into six 
frequency blocks designated A through F, and the Commission has held 
auctions for each block. The Commission defined ``small entity'' for 
Blocks C and F as an entity that has average gross revenues of $40 
million or less in the three previous calendar years. For Block F, an 
additional classification for ``very small business'' was added and is 
defined as an entity that, together with its affiliates, has average 
gross revenues of not more than $15 million for the preceding three 
calendar years. These standards defining ``small entity'' in the 
context of broadband PCS auctions have been approved by the SBA. No 
small businesses, within the SBA-approved small business size standards 
bid successfully for licenses in Blocks A and B. There were 90 winning 
bidders that qualified as small entities in the Block C auctions. A 
total of 93 small and very small business bidders won approximately 40 
percent of the 1,479 licenses for Blocks D, E, and F. In 1999, the 
Commission re-auctioned 347 C, E, and F Block licenses. There were 48 
small business winning bidders. In 2001, the Commission completed the 
auction of 422 C and F Broadband PCS licenses in Auction 35. Of the 35 
winning bidders in this auction, 29 qualified as ``small'' or ``very 
small'' businesses. Subsequent events, concerning Auction 35, including 
judicial and agency determinations, resulted in a total of 163 C and F 
Block licenses being available for grant. In 2005, the Commission 
completed an auction of 188 C block licenses and 21 F block licenses in 
Auction 58. There were 24 winning bidders for 217 licenses. Of the 24 
winning bidders, 16 claimed small business status and won 156 licenses. 
In 2007, the Commission completed an auction of 33 licenses in the A, 
C, and F Blocks in Auction 71. Of the 14 winning bidders, six were 
designated entities. In 2008, the Commission completed an auction of 20

[[Page 22793]]

Broadband PCS licenses in the C, D, E and F block licenses in Auction 
78.
    78. Advanced Wireless Services. AWS Services (1710-1755 MHz and 
2110-2155 MHz bands (AWS-1); 1915-1920 MHz, 1995-2000 MHz, 2020-2025 
MHz and 2175-2180 MHz bands (AWS-2); 2155-2175 MHz band (AWS-3)). For 
the AWS-1 bands, the Commission has defined a ``small business'' as an 
entity with average annual gross revenues for the preceding three years 
not exceeding $40 million, and a ``very small business'' as an entity 
with average annual gross revenues for the preceding three years not 
exceeding $15 million. For AWS-2 and AWS-3, although we do not know for 
certain which entities are likely to apply for these frequencies, we 
note that the AWS-1 bands are comparable to those used for cellular 
service and personal communications service. The Commission has not yet 
adopted size standards for the AWS-2 or AWS-3 bands but proposes to 
treat both AWS-2 and AWS-3 similarly to broadband PCS service and AWS-1 
service due to the comparable capital requirements and other factors, 
such as issues involved in relocating incumbents and developing 
markets, technologies, and services.
    79. Specialized Mobile Radio. The Commission awards small business 
bidding credits in auctions for Specialized Mobile Radio (``SMR'') 
geographic area licenses in the 800 MHz and 900 MHz bands to entities 
that had revenues of no more than $15 million in each of the three 
previous calendar years. The Commission awards very small business 
bidding credits to entities that had revenues of no more than $3 
million in each of the three previous calendar years. The SBA has 
approved these small business size standards for the 800 MHz and 900 
MHz SMR Services. The Commission has held auctions for geographic area 
licenses in the 800 MHz and 900 MHz bands. The 900 MHz SMR auction was 
completed in 1996. Sixty bidders claiming that they qualified as small 
businesses under the $15 million size standard won 263 geographic area 
licenses in the 900 MHz SMR band. The 800 MHz SMR auction for the upper 
200 channels was conducted in 1997. Ten bidders claiming that they 
qualified as small businesses under the $15 million size standard won 
38 geographic area licenses for the upper 200 channels in the 800 MHz 
SMR band. A second auction for the 800 MHz band was conducted in 2002 
and included 23 BEA licenses. One bidder claiming small business status 
won five licenses.
    80. The auction of the 1,053 800 MHz SMR geographic area licenses 
for the General Category channels was conducted in 2000. Eleven bidders 
won 108 geographic area licenses for the General Category channels in 
the 800 MHz SMR band qualified as small businesses under the $15 
million size standard. In an auction completed in 2000, a total of 
2,800 Economic Area licenses in the lower 80 channels of the 800 MHz 
SMR service were awarded. Of the 22 winning bidders, 19 claimed small 
business status and won 129 licenses. Thus, combining all three 
auctions, 40 winning bidders for geographic licenses in the 800 MHz SMR 
band claimed status as small business.
    81. In addition, there are numerous incumbent site-by-site SMR 
licensees and licensees with extended implementation authorizations in 
the 800 and 900 MHz bands. We do not know how many firms provide 800 
MHz or 900 MHz geographic area SMR pursuant to extended implementation 
authorizations, nor how many of these providers have annual revenues of 
no more than $15 million. One firm has over $15 million in revenues. In 
addition, we do not know how many of these firms have 1500 or fewer 
employees. We assume, for purposes of this analysis, that all of the 
remaining existing extended implementation authorizations are held by 
small entities, as that small business size standard is approved by the 
SBA.
    82. Lower 700 MHz Band Licenses. The Commission previously adopted 
criteria for defining three groups of small businesses for purposes of 
determining their eligibility for special provisions such as bidding 
credits. The Commission defined a ``small business'' as an entity that, 
together with its affiliates and controlling principals, has average 
gross revenues not exceeding $40 million for the preceding three years. 
A ``very small business'' is defined as an entity that, together with 
its affiliates and controlling principals, has average gross revenues 
that are not more than $15 million for the preceding three years. 
Additionally, the lower 700 MHz Service had a third category of small 
business status for Metropolitan/Rural Service Area (MSA/RSA) 
licenses--``entrepreneur''--which is defined as an entity that, 
together with its affiliates and controlling principals, has average 
gross revenues that are not more than $3 million for the preceding 
three years. The SBA approved these small size standards. An auction of 
740 licenses (one license in each of the 734 MSAs/RSAs and one license 
in each of the six Economic Area Groupings (EAGs)) commenced on August 
27, 2002, and closed on September 18, 2002. Of the 740 licenses 
available for auction, 484 licenses were won by 102 winning bidders. 
Seventy-two of the winning bidders claimed small business, very small 
business or entrepreneur status and won a total of 329 licenses. A 
second auction commenced on May 28, 2003, closed on June 13, 2003, and 
included 256 licenses: 5 EAG licenses and 476 Cellular Market Area 
licenses. Seventeen winning bidders claimed small or very small 
business status and won 60 licenses, and nine winning bidders claimed 
entrepreneur status and won 154 licenses. On July 26, 2005, the 
Commission completed an auction of 5 licenses in the Lower 700 MHz band 
(Auction No. 60). There were three winning bidders for five licenses. 
All three winning bidders claimed small business status.
    83. In 2007, the Commission reexamined its rules governing the 700 
MHz band. An auction of 700 MHz licenses commenced January 24, 2008 and 
closed on March 18, 2008, which included, 176 Economic Area licenses in 
the A Block, 734 Cellular Market Area licenses in the B Block, and 176 
EA licenses in the E Block. Twenty winning bidders, claiming small 
business status (those with attributable average annual gross revenues 
that exceed $15 million and do not exceed $40 million for the preceding 
three years) won 49 licenses. Thirty-three winning bidders claiming 
very small business status (those with attributable average annual 
gross revenues that do not exceed $15 million for the preceding three 
years) won 325 licenses.
    84. Upper 700 MHz Band Licenses. On January 24, 2008, the 
Commission commenced Auction 73 in which several licenses in the Upper 
700 MHz band were available for licensing: 12 Regional Economic Area 
Grouping licenses in the C Block, and one nationwide license in the D 
Block. The auction concluded on March 18, 2008, with 3 winning bidders 
claiming very small business status (those with attributable average 
annual gross revenues that do not exceed $15 million for the preceding 
three years) and winning five licenses.
    85. Satellite Telecommunications. This category comprises firms 
``primarily engaged in providing telecommunications services to other 
establishments in the telecommunications and broadcasting industries by 
forwarding and receiving communications signals via a system of 
satellites or reselling satellite telecommunications.'' The category 
has a small business size standard of $32.5 million or less in average 
annual

[[Page 22794]]

receipts, under SBA rules. For this category, U.S. Census Bureau data 
for 2012 show that there were a total of 333 firms that operated for 
the entire year. Of this total, 299 firms had annual receipts of less 
than $25 million. Consequently, we estimate that the majority of 
satellite telecommunications providers are small entities.
    86. All Other Telecommunications. The ``All Other 
Telecommunications'' category is comprised of establishments that are 
primarily engaged in providing specialized telecommunications services, 
such as satellite tracking, communications telemetry, and radar station 
operation. This industry also includes establishments primarily engaged 
in providing satellite terminal stations and associated facilities 
connected with one or more terrestrial systems and capable of 
transmitting telecommunications to, and receiving telecommunications 
from, satellite systems. Establishments providing Internet services or 
voice over Internet protocol (VoIP) services via client-supplied 
telecommunications connections are also included in this industry. The 
SBA has developed a small business size standard for ``All Other 
Telecommunications,'' which consists of all such firms with gross 
annual receipts of $32.5 million or less. For this category, U.S. 
Census data for 2012 show that there were 1,442 firms that operated for 
the entire year. Of these firms, a total of 1,400 had gross annual 
receipts of less than $25 million. Thus, a majority of ``All Other 
Telecommunications'' firms potentially affected by the rules adopted 
can be considered small.
    87. Other Communications Equipment Manufacturing. This industry 
comprises establishments primarily engaged in manufacturing 
communications equipment (except telephone apparatus, and radio and 
television broadcast, and wireless communications equipment). Examples 
of such manufacturing include fire detection and alarm systems 
manufacturing, Intercom systems and equipment manufacturing, and 
signals (e.g., highway, pedestrian, railway, traffic) manufacturing. 
The SBA has established a size standard for this industry as 750 
employees or less. Census data for 2012 show that 383 establishments 
operated in that year. Of that number, 379 operated with less than 500 
employees. Based on that data, we conclude that the majority of Other 
Communications Equipment Manufacturers are small.
    88. Radio and Television Broadcasting and Wireless Communications 
Equipment Manufacturing. This industry comprises establishments 
primarily engaged in manufacturing radio and television broadcast and 
wireless communications equipment. Examples of products made by these 
establishments are: Transmitting and receiving antennas, cable 
television equipment, GPS equipment, pagers, cellular phones, mobile 
communications equipment, and radio and television studio and 
broadcasting equipment. The SBA has established a size standard for 
this industry of 750 employees or less. U.S. Census data for 2012 show 
that 841 establishments operated in this industry in that year. Of that 
number, 819 establishments operated with less than 500 employees. Based 
on this data, we conclude that a majority of manufacturers in this 
industry is small.
    89. Engineering Services. This industry comprises establishments 
primarily engaged in applying physical laws and principles of 
engineering in the design, development, and utilization of machines, 
materials, instruments, structures, process, and systems. The 
assignments undertaken by these establishments may involve any of the 
following activities: Provision of advice, preparation of feasibility 
studies, preparation of preliminary and final plans and designs, 
provision of technical services during the construction or installation 
phase, inspection and evaluation of engineering projects, and related 
services. The SBA deems engineering services firms to be small if they 
have $15 million or less in annual receipts, except military and 
aerospace equipment and military weapons engineering establishments are 
deemed small if they have $38 million or less in annual receipts. 
According to U.S. Census Bureau data for 2012, there were 49,092 
establishments in this category that operated the full year. Of the 
49,092 establishments, 45,848 had less than $10 million in receipts and 
3,244 had $10 million or more in annual receipts. Accordingly, the 
Commission estimates that a majority of engineering service firms are 
small.
    90. Search, Detection, Navigation, Guidance, Aeronautical, and 
Nautical System Instrument Manufacturing. This U.S. industry comprises 
establishments primarily engaged in manufacturing search, detection, 
navigation, guidance, aeronautical, and nautical systems and 
instruments. Examples of products made by these establishments are 
aircraft instruments (except engine), flight recorders, navigational 
instruments and systems, radar systems and equipment, and sonar systems 
and equipment. The SBA has established a size standard for this 
industry of 1,250 employees or less. Data from the 2012 Economic Census 
show 588 establishments operated during that year. Of that number, 533 
establishments operated with less than 500 employees. Based on this 
data, we conclude that the majority of manufacturers in this industry 
are small.
    91. Security Guards and Patrol Services. The U.S. Census Bureau 
defines this category to include ``establishments primarily engaged in 
providing guard and patrol services.'' The SBA deems security guards 
and patrol services firms to be small if they have $18.5 million or 
less in annual receipts. According to U.S. Census Bureau data for 2012, 
there were 8,742 establishments in operation the full year. Of the 
8,842 establishments, 8,276 had less than $10 million while 466 had 
more than $10 million in annual receipts. Accordingly, the Commission 
estimates that a majority of firms in this category are small.
    92. All Other Support Services. This U.S. industry comprises 
establishments primarily engaged in providing day-to-day business and 
other organizational support services (except office administrative 
services, facilities support services, employment services, business 
support services, travel arrangement and reservation services, security 
and investigation services, services to buildings and other structures, 
packaging and labeling services, and convention and trade show 
organizing services). The SBA deems all other support services firms to 
be small if they have $11 million or less in annual receipts. According 
to U.S. Census Bureau data for 2012, there were 11,178 establishments 
in operation the full year. Of the 11,178 establishments, 10,886 had 
less than $10 million while 292 had greater than $10 million in annual 
receipts. Accordingly, the Commission estimates that a majority of 
firms in this category are small.
    93. Correctional Institutions (State and Federal Facilities). This 
industry comprises government establishments primarily engaged in 
managing and operating correctional institutions. The Department of 
Justice's Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) collects and publishes 
census information on adult correctional facilities operating under 
state or federal authority as well as private and local facilities 
operating under contract to house inmates for federal or state 
correctional authorities. The types of facilities included in the 
census data from BJS are prisons and prison farms; prison hospitals; 
centers for medical treatment and psychiatric

[[Page 22795]]

confinement; boot camps; centers for reception; diagnosis; 
classification; alcohol and drug treatment; community correctional 
facilities; facilities for parole violators and other persons returned 
to custody; institutions for youthful offenders; and institutions for 
geriatric inmates.
    94. While neither the SBA nor the Commission have developed a size 
standard for this category, the size standard for a small facility in 
the BJS census data is one that has an average daily population (ADP) 
of less than 500 inmates. The latest BJS census data available shows 
that as of December 30, 2005 there were a total of 1821 correctional 
facilities operating under state or local federal authority. Of that 
number more than half of the facilities or a total 946 facilities had 
an average daily population of less than 500 inmates. Based on this 
data a majority of ``Governmental Correctional Institutions'' 
potentially affected by the rules adopted can be considered small.
    95. Facilities Support Services. This industry comprises 
establishments primarily engaged in providing operating staff to 
perform a combination of support services within a client's facilities. 
Establishments providing facilities (except computer and/or data 
processing) operation support services and establishments providing 
private jail services or operating correctional facilities (i.e., 
jails) on a contract or fee basis are included in this industry. 
Establishments in this industry typically provide a combination of 
services, such as janitorial, maintenance, trash disposal, guard and 
security, mail routing, reception, laundry, and related services to 
support operations within facilities. These establishments provide 
operating staff to carry out these support activities, but are not 
involved with or responsible for the core business or activities of the 
client. The SBA has developed a small business size standard for 
``Facilities Support Services,'' which consists of all such firms with 
gross annual receipts of $38.5 million or less. For this category, U.S. 
Census data for 2012 shows that there were 5,344 firms that operated 
for the entire year. Of these firms, 4,882 had gross annual receipts of 
less than $10 million and 462 had gross annual receipts of $10 million 
or more. Based on this data a majority of ``Facilities Support 
Services'' firms potentially affected by the rules adopted can be 
considered small.
    96. Description of Projected Reporting, Recordkeeping, and Other 
Compliance Requirements for Small Entities. In the FNPRM, the 
Commission seeks public comment on methods to improve the viability of 
technologies used to combat contraband wireless devices in correctional 
facilities. The potential process is prospective in that it would only 
apply if an entity avails itself of managed access or detection 
technologies. There are three classes of small entities that might be 
impacted: Providers of wireless services, providers or operators of 
managed access or detection systems, and correctional facilities.
    97. For small entities that are providers of wireless services and 
enter into lease arrangements with CIS operators, the Commission seeks 
notice on a requirement that those entities provide advance notice 
prior to certain changes in the CMRS licensee's network. We seek 
comment on limiting the notice requirement to particular changes in the 
carrier's network--e.g., additions of new frequency bands--in order to 
ensure the notice requirement does not result in an unnecessary burden 
on CMRS licensees, but seek comment on what other notice requirements 
might be necessary to ensure effective CIS operation. The FNPRM also 
seeks comment on a process whereby CMRS providers would disable 
contraband wireless devices detected within a correctional facility 
upon receipt of a qualifying request. In order to receive qualifying 
requests, the FNPRM seeks comment on a requirement that CMRS licensees 
who enter into lease arrangements with CIS operators to have a 
verifiable transmittal mechanism in place and, upon request, provide a 
DCFO with a point of contact suitable for receiving qualifying 
requests. We note that some carriers may already have such secure 
portals in place for receipt of similar requests. The costs of 
complying with a disabling process would vary depending on the level of 
investigation required of carriers upon receiving a qualifying request. 
The Commission seeks comment on this issue, but notes that several 
carriers already have internal procedures for disabling contraband 
wireless devices pursuant to court orders, which could be modified to 
accommodate a disabling process. Nevertheless, these requirements would 
likely require the allocation of resources to tailor internal 
processes, including some level of additional staffing.
    98. The FNPRM also contemplates the option of requiring CMRS 
licensees to perform varying levels of customer outreach upon receiving 
a qualifying request, or after disabling a contraband wireless device. 
The Commission seeks comment on the costs and benefits of this 
proposal, but notes carriers may already have mechanisms in place for 
customer outreach.
    99. The Commission seeks to streamline the process for 
identification, notification, and disabling of contraband devices to 
the greatest extent possible, while also ensuring the accuracy, 
security, and efficiency of such a process. Therefore, the FNPRM seeks 
comment on a process that would require small entity CIS operators, as 
well as all other CIS operators, to be deemed eligible and provide 
various pieces of required information along with a qualifying request 
for disabling a contraband device to the wireless carriers. 
Specifically, in order to be eligible, the Commission asks whether a 
CIS operator should demonstrate the following: (1) The CIS has 
appropriate equipment authorization pursuant to Commission rules; (2) 
the CIS is designed and will be configured to locate devices solely 
within a correctional facility, secure and protect the collected 
information, and avoid interfering with emergency 911 calls; and (3) 
the methodology to be used in analyzing data collected by the CIS is 
sufficiently robust to provide a high degree of certainty that the 
particular wireless device is in fact located within a correctional 
facility.
    100. The Commission seeks comment on an eligibility process that 
would apply equally to all CIS operators, irrespective of size. We note 
that a mandatory process for disabling contraband wireless devices 
identified using detection systems does not currently exist, and, 
without adoption of a process like that considered in the FNPRM, is 
subject to the discretion of wireless carriers to voluntarily disable 
devices. It is possible that an outgrowth of the questions asked and 
responses received could result in additional requirements for being 
deemed an eligible CIS, submitting qualifying requests, and disabling 
contraband devices. This may also require some level of recordkeeping 
to ensure that contraband wireless devices, and not legitimate devices, 
are disabled. To the extent the process would impose these 
requirements, they would be necessary to ensure that legitimate 
wireless users are not impacted by the operation of CISs, which should 
be the minimum performance objective for any detection system. 
Therefore, while these requirements might impose some compliance or 
recordkeeping obligations, they would be a necessary predicate for the 
operation of a detection system.
    101. In the FNPRM, we also seek comment on requiring correctional 
facilities wishing to use CIS as a means

[[Page 22796]]

of combatting contraband cellphones use inside the prison to designate 
a DCFO. The Commission seeks comment on whether qualifying requests 
should be transmitted either by the Commission upon the request of the 
DCFO, or by the DCFO. If the DCFO is to transmit the requests, the 
Commission also seeks comment on a requirement that the DCFO certify in 
the qualifying request that: (1) An eligible CIS was used in the 
correctional facility, and include evidence of such eligibility; (2) 
the CIS is authorized for operation through a license or Commission 
approved lease agreement, referencing the applicable ULS identifying 
information; (3) the DCFO has contacted all CMRS licensees providing 
service in the area of the correctional facility for which it will seek 
device disabling in order to establish a verifiable transmission 
mechanism for making qualifying requests and for receiving 
notifications from the licensee; and (4) it has substantial evidence 
that the contraband wireless device was used in the correctional 
facility, and that such use was observed within the 30 day period 
immediately prior to the date of submitting the request. It is possible 
that an outgrowth of the questions asked and responses received could 
result in additional reporting and recordkeeping requirements on the 
DCFO and its respective correctional facility. The goal of imposing 
such requirements on the DCFO, however, would be to provide an 
efficient means of communication among CIS operators, correctional 
facilities, and CMRS providers, and to ensure the accuracy and 
legitimacy of any termination process.
    102. Steps Taken To Minimize the Significant Economic Impact on 
Small Entities, and Significant Alternatives Considered. The RFA 
requires an agency to describe any significant, specifically small 
business, alternatives that it has considered in reaching its proposed 
approach, which may include the following four alternatives (among 
others): ``(1) The establishment of differing compliance or reporting 
requirements or timetables that take into account the resources 
available to small entities; (2) the clarification, consolidation, or 
simplification of compliance and reporting requirements under the rule 
for small entities; (3) the use of performance rather than design 
standards; and (4) an exemption from coverage of the rule, or any part 
thereof for small entities.''
    103. First, in the FNPRM, the Commission contemplates the 
possibility that the obligations considered might create additional 
compliance costs on CMRS licensees and CIS operators, both large and 
small. However, the Commission seeks comment on the specific criteria 
and timetables that should be required, and the associated costs and 
benefits in order to facilitate informed decisions in the final rules. 
Specifically, the Commission considers a range of timeframes in which 
CMRS licensees would be required to respond to qualifying requests and 
seeks comment on the resource and staff demands associated with those 
timeframes. With respect to the demands on CIS operators, the FNPRM 
considers a range of certifications and necessary information to be 
included with qualifying requests, and seeks comment on which pieces of 
information are important to accurately identify contraband wireless 
devices. Commenters are asked whether small entities face any special 
or unique issues with respect to terminating service to devices, and 
whether they would require additional time to take such action. In 
doing so, the Commission seeks to ensure the accuracy, security, and 
efficiency of the identification and disabling process, while also 
minimizing compliance burdens to the greatest extent possible.
    104. Second, to limit the economic impact of a notice requirement, 
we seek comment on the types of network changes that should require 
advanced notification to CIS providers. While the Commission emphasizes 
the importance of cooperation between CIS operators and CMRS providers 
at every stage of CIS deployment, we also recognize the potential for 
overly burdensome notice requirements that would require notice upon 
making any network changes, even those that are unlikely to negatively 
impact the CIS.
    105. Third, in order to clarify and simplify compliance and 
reporting requirements for small entities, as well as all other 
impacted entities, the Commission intends to designate a single point 
of contact at the Commission to serve as the ombudsperson on contraband 
wireless device issues. The ombudsperson's duties may include, as 
necessary, providing assistance to CIS operators in connecting with 
CMRS licensees, playing a role in identifying required CIS filings for 
a given correctional facility, facilitating the required Commission 
filings, thereby reducing regulatory burdens, and resolving issues that 
may arise during the leasing process. The ombudsperson will also 
conduct outreach and maintain a dialogue with all stakeholders on the 
issues important to furthering a solution to the problem of contraband 
wireless device use in correctional facilities. Finally, the 
ombudsperson, in conjunction with WTB, will maintain Web page with a 
list of active CIS operators and locations where CIS has been deployed. 
The appointment of an ombudsperson provides an important resource for 
small entities to understand and comply with any CIS-related 
requirements.
    106. While the FNPRM considers a requirement that CISs be deemed 
eligible prior to making a qualifying request, the Commission does not 
seek comment on any specific design standard. Instead, the Commission 
seeks comment on the elements of detection systems and identification 
methods that contribute to the accuracy and reliability of a particular 
CIS. The FNPRM asks whether the standard should differ between rural 
and urban areas, or between large and small detection system providers 
or operators.
    107. Finally, the FNPRM does not propose any exemption for small 
entities. The Commission finds an overriding public interest in 
preventing the illicit use of contraband wireless devices by prisoners 
to perpetuate criminal enterprises. The CIS eligibility requirement 
discussed in the FNPRM would be vital to the accuracy and reliability 
of the information ultimately used to disable contraband wireless 
devices, regardless of the size of the entity obtaining that 
information. Further, to the extent that a small entity could be exempt 
from a disabling requirement, it would reduce the overall effectiveness 
of a CIS. If inmates discover that a wireless provider whose service 
area includes the correctional facility does not disable contraband 
wireless devices within the facility, inmates will accordingly use only 
that service. Therefore, while the Further Notice seeks comment on 
alternative considerations for the overall identification and disabling 
process to accommodate the needs and resources of small entities, an 
exemption would be contrary to the Commission's overarching goal of 
combatting contraband wireless devices in wireless facilities.
    108. Federal Rules That May Duplicate, Overlap, or Conflict With 
the Proposed Rules. The FNPRM seeks comment on the application and 
relevance of sections 705 and 222 of the Act and Title 18 of the U.S. 
Code.

Congressional Review Act

    109. The Commission will send a copy of the FNPRM to Congress and 
the Government Accountability Office pursuant to the Congressional 
Review Act, see 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A).

[[Page 22797]]

III. Ordering Clauses

    110. It is ordered that, pursuant to the authority contained in 
sections 1, 2, 4(i), 4(j), 301, 302, 303, 307, 308, 309, 310, and 332 
of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. 151, 152, 
154(i), 154(j), 301, 302a, 303, 307, 308, 309, 310, and 332, the FNPRM 
in GN Docket No. 13-111 is adopted.
    111. It is further ordered that, pursuant to applicable procedures 
set forth in sections 1.415 and 1.419 of the Commission's rules, 47 CFR 
1.415, 1.419, interested parties may file comments on the FNPRM on or 
before 30 days after publication in the Federal Register and reply 
comments on or before 60 days after publication in the Federal 
Register.
    112. It is further ordered that, pursuant to section 801(a)(1)(A) 
of the Congressional Review Act, 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A), the Commission 
shall send a copy of the FNPRM to Congress and to the Government 
Accountability Office.
    113. It is further ordered that the Commission's Consumer & 
Governmental Affairs Bureau, Reference Information Center, shall send a 
copy of the FNPRM, including the Initial Regulatory Flexibility 
Analysis, to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business 
Administration.

List of Subjects in 47 CFR Part 20

    Communications common carriers, Radio.

Federal Communications Commission.
Marlene H. Dortch,
Secretary.

Proposed Rules

    For the reasons discussed in the preamble, the Federal 
Communications Commission proposes to further amend 47 CFR part 20, as 
amended in a final rule published elsewhere in this issue of the 
Federal Register, as set forth below:

PART 20--COMMERCIAL MOBILE RADIO SERVICES

0
1. The authority citation for part 20 continues to read as follows:

    Authority:  47 U.S.C. 151, 152(a), 154(i), 157, 160, 201, 214, 
222, 251(e), 301, 302, 303, 303(b), 303(r), 307, 307(a), 309, 
309(j)(3), 316, 316(a), 332, 610, 615, 615a, 615b, 615c, unless 
otherwise noted.

0
2. Amend Sec.  20.23 by adding paragraph (b) to read as follows:


Sec.  20.23   Contraband wireless devices in correctional facilities.

* * * * *
    (b) Disabling contraband wireless devices. A Designated 
Correctional Facility Official may request that a CMRS licensee disable 
a contraband wireless device in a correctional facility detected by a 
Contraband Interdiction System as described below.
    (1) Licensee obligation. A licensee providing CMRS service must:
    (i) Upon request of a Designated Correctional Facility Official, 
provide a point of contact suitable for receiving qualifying requests 
to disable devices; and
    (ii) Upon request of a Designated Correctional Facility Office to 
disable a contraband wireless devices, verify that the request is a 
qualifying request and, if so, permanently disable the device.
    (2) Qualifying request. A qualifying request must be made in 
writing via a verifiable transmission mechanism, contain the 
certifications in paragraph (3) of this section and the device and 
correctional facility identifying information in paragraph (4) of this 
section, and be signed by a Designated Correctional Facility Official. 
For purposes of this section, a Designated Correctional Facility 
Official means a state or local official responsible for the 
correctional facility where the contraband device is located.
    (3) Certifications. A qualifying request must include the following 
certifications by the Designated Correctional Facility Official:
    (i) The CIS used to identify the device is authorized for operation 
through a Commission license or approved lease agreement, referencing 
the applicable ULS identifying information;
    (ii) The Designated Correctional Facility Official has contacted 
all CMRS licensees providing service in the area of the correctional 
facility in order to establish a verifiable transmission mechanism for 
making qualifying requests and for receiving notifications from the 
CMRS licensee;
    (iii) The Designated Correctional Facility Official has substantial 
evidence that the contraband wireless device was used in the 
correctional facility, and that such use was observed within the 30 day 
period immediately prior to the date of submitting the request; and
    (iv) The CIS used to identify the device is an Eligible CIS as 
defined in paragraph (5) of this section. The Designated Correctional 
Facility Official must include a copy of a FCC Public Notice listing 
the eligible CIS.
    (4) Device and correctional facility identifying information. The 
request must identify the device to be disabled and correctional 
facility by providing the following information:
    (i) Identifiers sufficient to uniquely describe the device in 
question;
    (ii) Licensee providing CMRS service to the device;
    (iii) Name of correctional facility;
    (iv) Street address of correctional facility;
    (v) Latitude and longitude coordinates sufficient to describe the 
boundaries of the correctional facility; and
    (vi) Call signs of FCC Licenses and/or Leases authorizing the CIS.
    (5) Eligible CIS. (i) In order to be listed on a FCC Public Notice 
as an Eligible CIS, a CIS operator must demonstrate to the Commission 
that:
    (A) All radio transmitters used as part of the CIS have appropriate 
equipment authorization pursuant to Commission rules;
    (B) The CIS is designed and will be configured to locate devices 
solely within a correctional facility, secure and protect the collected 
information, and is capable of being programmed not to interfere with 
emergency 911 calls; and
    (C) The methodology to be used in analyzing data collected by the 
CIS is sufficiently robust to provide a high degree of certainty that 
the particular wireless device is in fact located within a correctional 
facility.
    (ii) Periodically, the Commission will issue Public Notices listing 
all Eligible CISs.

[FR Doc. 2017-09886 Filed 5-17-17; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 6712-01-P