[Federal Register Volume 82, Number 33 (Tuesday, February 21, 2017)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 11159-11162]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2017-03284]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

10 CFR Part 50

[Docket No. PRM-50-113; NRC-2015-0230]


Uninterruptible Monitoring of Coolant and Fuel in Reactors and 
Spent Fuel Pools

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Petition for rulemaking; denial.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is denying a 
petition for rulemaking (PRM), dated September 10, 2015, submitted by 
Dr. Alexander DeVolpi (the petitioner). The petition was docketed by 
the NRC on September 21, 2015, and was assigned Docket No. PRM-50-113. 
The petitioner requested that the NRC amend its regulations to require 
``installation of ex-vessel instrumentation for uninterruptible 
monitoring of coolant and fuel in reactors and spent-fuel pools.'' The 
NRC is denying the petition because the Commission finds that the 
issues raised by the petitioner have been addressed by actions taken by 
the NRC in response to the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear accident.

DATES: The docket for the petition for rulemaking, PRM-50-113, is 
closed on February 21, 2017.

ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID NRC-2015-0230, when contacting the 
NRC about the availability of information regarding this petition. You 
may obtain publicly-available information related to this petition by 
any of the following methods:
     Federal Rulemaking Web site: Go to http://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2015-0230. Address 
questions about NRC dockets to Carol Gallagher; telephone: 301-415-
3463; email: [email protected]. For technical questions, contact 
the individual listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section of 
this document.
     NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System 
(ADAMS): You may obtain publicly-available documents online in the 
ADAMS Public Documents collection at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To begin the search, select ``ADAMS Public Documents'' and 
then select ``Begin Web-based ADAMS

[[Page 11160]]

Search.'' For problems with ADAMS, please contact the NRC's Public 
Document Room (PDR) reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737, or 
by email to [email protected]. For the convenience of the reader, 
instructions about obtaining materials referenced in this document are 
provided in Section IV, ``Availability of Documents,'' of this 
document.
     NRC's PDR: You may examine and purchase copies of public 
documents at the NRC's PDR, Room O1-F21, One White Flint North, 11555 
Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Jennifer C. Tobin, Office of Nuclear 
Reactor Regulation, telephone: 301-415-2328; email: 
[email protected]; U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, 
DC 20555-0001.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Table of Contents

I. The Petition
II. Reasons for Denial
III. Conclusion
IV. Availability of Documents

I. The Petition

    Section 2.802 of title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 
CFR), ``Petition for rulemaking,'' provides an opportunity for any 
interested person to petition the Commission to issue, amend, or 
rescind any regulation. The NRC received a petition dated September 10, 
2015, from Dr. Alexander DeVolpi and assigned it Docket No. PRM-50-113. 
The NRC published a notice of docketing in the Federal Register (FR) on 
December 1, 2015 (80 FR 75009). The NRC did not request public comment 
on PRM-50-113 because it had sufficient information to review the 
issues raised by the petitioner.
    The petitioner requested that the NRC amend 10 CFR part 50, 
``Domestic licensing of production and utilization facilities,'' to 
require ``installation of ex-vessel instrumentation for uninterruptible 
monitoring of coolant and fuel in reactors and spent-fuel pools.''

II. Reasons for Denial

    The NRC is denying the petition because the issues raised by the 
petitioner have been addressed through actions taken in response to the 
Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear accident. The NRC determined that there is 
no sufficient technical or regulatory basis to amend the NRC's 
regulations as requested by the petitioner.
    The petitioner proposed that Recommendation 5.1A in the 2014 
National Academy of Sciences (NAS) report entitled ``Lessons Learned 
from the Fukushima Nuclear Accident for Improving Safety of U.S. 
Nuclear Plants'' should be mandated (as an NRC regulation) to require 
installation of ex-vessel instrumentation for uninterruptible 
monitoring of coolant and fuel in reactors and spent fuel pools. The 
petitioner stated that NAS gave a high priority to this recommendation 
and the petitioner indicated that he has developed instrumentation that 
is capable of uninterruptible monitoring of critical thermodynamic 
parameters. The petitioner included diagrams and explanations of his 
patented instrumentation and supportive technical papers and requested 
that the NRC require use of such instrumentation to prevent or mitigate 
accidents. In particular, the petitioner contends that the accident at 
Three Mile Island, Unit 2 might have been prevented if real-time 
uninterruptible ex-vessel reactor water-level monitoring had been in 
place. Further, the petitioner states that one or two of the Fukushima 
Dai-ichi meltdowns might have been delayed or averted if 
uninterruptible ex-vessel real-time reactor water-level monitoring had 
been in place and operating on self-contained low-current battery 
supplies.
    The NRC staff responded to the NAS report and its recommendations 
in SECY-15-0059, ``Seventh 6-Month Status Update on Response to Lessons 
Learned from Japan's March 11, 2011, Great T[omacr]hoku Earthquake and 
Subsequent Tsunami,'' dated April 9, 2015. The NRC staff's discussion 
of Recommendation 5.1A in enclosure 6 of SECY-15-0059 addresses the 
installation of ex-vessel instrumentation for uninterruptible 
monitoring of coolant and fuel in reactors and spent fuel pools. The 
NRC staff found that this recommendation was addressed by existing 
requirements and other ongoing activities. The issues that the 
petitioner's proposal would address are being or have already been 
addressed by NRC actions taken in response to the Fukushima Dai-ichi 
nuclear accident, as summarized in this document.
    Instrumentation used to support strategies in the mitigation of 
beyond-design-basis events is addressed in Order EA-12-049, ``Issuance 
of Order to Modify Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation 
Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events.'' This Order 
ensures that plant operators have the information concerning key 
parameters needed to support implementation of mitigation strategies to 
maintain or restore core cooling, spent fuel pool cooling, and 
containment prior to the onset of core or spent fuel damage. Either 
installed instrumentation remains powered during an extended loss of 
alternating current power via safety-related batteries and other power 
supplies that provide coping capabilities for an indefinite period of 
time, or portable instruments are used that are independent from 
installed plant power systems. If mitigation strategies are not 
successful and severe accident conditions develop, the enhancements 
made in response to Order EA-12-049 will provide for monitoring of key 
parameters on the condition of the reactor, containment, and spent fuel 
pool throughout the accident's progression until instrumentation 
becomes unavailable or unreliable. These enhancements should also 
enable licensees to more easily transition to the use of computational 
aids when direct diagnosis of key plant conditions cannot be determined 
reliably from instrumentation. Further, spent fuel pool instrumentation 
is also required by Order EA-12-051, ``Order Modifying Licenses with 
Regard to Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation,'' to remotely 
report three distinct water levels: Normal level; low level but still 
enough to shield workers above the pools from radiation; and a level 
near the top of the spent fuel rods, at which more water should be 
added without delay.
    Following the issuance of the Orders, the NRC staff presented its 
evaluation of enhanced instrumentation for beyond-design-basis 
conditions in enclosure 5 to SECY-15-0137, ``Proposed Plans for 
Resolving Open Fukushima Tier 2 and 3 Recommendations.'' The staff 
recommended that the Commission not pursue additional regulatory 
requirements for enhanced reactor and containment instrumentation. The 
NRC staff concluded that additional studies are unlikely to support 
additional regulatory requirements related to enhanced reactor and 
containment instrumentation for beyond-design-basis conditions, when 
evaluated against the criteria for operating reactors in Sec.  50.109, 
``Backfitting,'' or the issue finality provisions of 10 CFR part 52, 
``Licenses, Certifications, and Approvals for Nuclear Power Plants.''
    In the staff requirements memorandum associated with SECY-15-0137, 
the Commission directed the NRC staff to provide the final results of 
its evaluation following interactions with external stakeholders and 
the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS). Accordingly, the 
NRC staff provided updated information regarding enhanced reactor and

[[Page 11161]]

containment instrumentation for beyond-design-basis conditions in 
enclosure 2 to SECY-16-0041, ``Closure of Fukushima Tier 3 
Recommendations Related to Containment Vents, Hydrogen Control, and 
Instrumentation.'' The updated information addressed the observations 
provided by the ACRS in letters dated November 16, 2015, and March 15, 
2016, and insights provided by external stakeholders. For example, 
information was added to the final assessment that describes the 
technical support guidance (TSG) for the severe accident management 
guidelines (SAMGs) and related assessments of plant parameters as well 
as the status of safety functions that would be performed by plant 
personnel during a severe accident. The SAMGs are entered when plant 
conditions indicate that cooling of the spent fuel pool or core cannot 
be maintained and the fuel in the spent fuel pool or reactor is on a 
trajectory towards damage. The SAMGs then invoke the TSGs that are 
based on an engineering evaluation of the scenario. This would include 
an assessment of the available parameter indications, their functional 
consistency, and their trends as the plant transitions to severe 
accident conditions, which may be more severe than the conditions 
assumed in instrument design and environmental qualifications. The 
severe accident response strategies are then based on fundamental 
principles that do not rely on precise indications of parameter values, 
but rather on an integrated technical assessment of the evolving event 
scenario and the conditions that preceded the onset of fuel damage in 
the spent fuel pool or core.
    The additional NRC staff evaluations further support the conclusion 
that regulatory actions to require enhancements to reactor and 
containment instrumentation to support the response to severe accidents 
would not provide a substantial safety enhancement, and therefore, 
additional regulatory actions would not be warranted when evaluated 
against the Sec.  50.109 criteria. The ACRS agreed in its March 15, 
2016, letter that no further regulatory action is warranted in support 
of the closure of the recommendation on enhanced instrumentation.
    In addition to the discussions in SECY-15-0137 and SECY-16-0041, 
the NRC staff notes that, depending on an accident's progression, 
licensees will use available indicators and technical assessments of 
the evolving scenario to implement adequate measures to protect public 
health and safety in accordance with the NRC's emergency preparedness 
requirements. If an accident progresses to fuel damage, specific 
additional actions may be required, including initiating predetermined 
protective actions for the public.
    Moreover, the NRC is proposing to amend its regulations to 
establish regulatory requirements for nuclear power reactor applicants 
and licensees to mitigate beyond-design-basis events to reflect 
requirements imposed on current licensees by Order and the lessons 
learned from the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident. This proposed rule, 
``Mitigation of Beyond-Design-Basis Events,'' which was published in 
the Federal Register on November 13, 2015 (80 FR 70610; corrected 
November 30, 2015 at 80 FR 74717), would, among other things, add a new 
regulation (proposed 10 CFR 50.155) to make Orders EA-12-049 and EA-12-
051 generically applicable, establish regulatory requirements for an 
integrated response capability, and include requirements for enhanced 
onsite emergency response capabilities.
    Therefore, in accordance with the NRC staff's evaluation in SECY-
15-0137, the Commission's direction on SECY-15-0137, updated 
information provided in SECY-16-0041, and existing emergency 
preparedness requirements, and the proposed Mitigation of Beyond-
Design-Basis Events rulemaking, the NRC has determined that additional 
instrumentation requirements to address severe accident conditions 
proposed in PRM-50-113 are not necessary.

III. Conclusion

    For the reasons cited in Section II of this document, the NRC has 
concluded that the issues raised by the petitioner have been addressed 
by NRC actions taken in response to the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear 
accident and there is no sufficient technical or regulatory basis to 
amend the NRC's regulations as requested by the petitioner. Therefore, 
the NRC is denying PRM-50-113.

IV. Availability of Documents

    The documents identified in the following table are available to 
interested persons through one or more of the methods listed in the 
ADDRESSES section of this document.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                     Document                          ADAMS accession No./Web link/ Federal Register citation
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ACRS Letter, ``Plans for Resolving the NRC Near-    ML15320A074.
 Term Task Force Open Fukushima Tier 2 and 3
 Recommendations,'' November 16, 2015.
ACRS Letter, ``Closure of Fukushima Tier 3          ML16075A330.
 Recommendations Related to Vents, Hydrogen
 Control, and Enhanced Instrumentation,'' March
 15, 2016.
Federal Register notice, ``Uninterruptible          80 FR 75009.
 Monitoring of Coolant and Fuel in Reactors and
 Spent Fuel Pools,'' December 1, 2015.
Federal Register notice, ``Mitigation of Beyond-    80 FR 70610 (corrected by 80 FR 74717; November 30, 2015).
 Design-Basis Events,'' November 13, 2015.
Letter from Nuclear Energy Institute to NRC,        ML15335A442.
 ``Submittal of Industry Initiative to Maintain
 Severe Accident Management Guidelines,'' October
 26, 2015.
National Academy of Sciences, ``Lessons Learned     http://www.nap.edu/read/18294/chapter/1.
 from the Fukushima Nuclear Accident for Improving
 Safety of U.S. Nuclear Plants,'' 2014.
NRC Generic Letter 1982-033, ``Supplement 1 to      ML031080548.
 NUREG-0737--Requirements for Emergency Response
 Capability,'' December 17, 1982.
NUREG-0933, ``Resolution of Generic Safety          http://nureg.nrc.gov/sr0933.
 Issues,'' December 2011.
Order EA-12-049, ``Issuance of Order to Modify      ML12054A735.
 Licenses With Regard to Requirements for
 Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis
 External Events,'' March 12, 2012.
Order EA-12-051, ``Order Modifying Licenses with    ML12056A044.
 Regard to Reliable Spent Fuel Pool
 Instrumentation,'' March 12, 2012.
PRM-50-113, ``Uninterruptible Monitoring of         ML15264A857.
 Critical Thermodynamic Parameters (Coolant and
 Fuel in Reactors and Spent-Fuel Pools),''
 September 10, 2015.
SECY-15-0059, ``Seventh 6-Month Status Update on    ML15069A444, ML15069A568 (enc. 3), ML15069A600 (enc. 6).
 Response to Lessons Learned from Japan's March
 11, 2011, Great Tohoku Earthquake and Subsequent
 Tsunami,'' April 9, 2015.

[[Page 11162]]

 
SECY-15-0065, ``Proposed Rulemaking: Mitigation of  ML15049A201.
 Beyond-Design-Basis Events (RIN 3150-AJ49),''
 April 30, 2015.
SECY-15-0137, ``Proposed Plans for Resolving Open   ML15254A006, ML15254A034 (enc. 5).
 Fukushima Tier 2 and 3 Recommendations,'' October
 29, 2015.
SECY-16-0041, ``Closure of Fukushima Tier 3         ML16049A079.
 Recommendations Related to Containment Vents,
 Hydrogen Control, and Enhanced Instrumentation,''
 March 31, 2016.
SRM-SECY-15-0065, ``Proposed Rulemaking:            ML15239A767.
 Mitigation of Beyond-Design-Basis Events (RIN
 3150-AJ49),'' August 27, 2015.
SRM-SECY-15-0137, ``Proposed Plans for Resolving    ML16039A175.
 Open Fukushima Tier 2 and 3 Recommendations,''
 February 8, 2016.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 14th day of February 2017.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Annette L. Vietti-Cook,
Secretary of the Commission.
[FR Doc. 2017-03284 Filed 2-17-17; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P