[Federal Register Volume 82, Number 33 (Tuesday, February 21, 2017)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 11159-11162]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2017-03284]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
10 CFR Part 50
[Docket No. PRM-50-113; NRC-2015-0230]
Uninterruptible Monitoring of Coolant and Fuel in Reactors and
Spent Fuel Pools
AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
ACTION: Petition for rulemaking; denial.
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SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is denying a
petition for rulemaking (PRM), dated September 10, 2015, submitted by
Dr. Alexander DeVolpi (the petitioner). The petition was docketed by
the NRC on September 21, 2015, and was assigned Docket No. PRM-50-113.
The petitioner requested that the NRC amend its regulations to require
``installation of ex-vessel instrumentation for uninterruptible
monitoring of coolant and fuel in reactors and spent-fuel pools.'' The
NRC is denying the petition because the Commission finds that the
issues raised by the petitioner have been addressed by actions taken by
the NRC in response to the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear accident.
DATES: The docket for the petition for rulemaking, PRM-50-113, is
closed on February 21, 2017.
ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID NRC-2015-0230, when contacting the
NRC about the availability of information regarding this petition. You
may obtain publicly-available information related to this petition by
any of the following methods:
Federal Rulemaking Web site: Go to http://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2015-0230. Address
questions about NRC dockets to Carol Gallagher; telephone: 301-415-
3463; email: [email protected]. For technical questions, contact
the individual listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section of
this document.
NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System
(ADAMS): You may obtain publicly-available documents online in the
ADAMS Public Documents collection at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To begin the search, select ``ADAMS Public Documents'' and
then select ``Begin Web-based ADAMS
[[Page 11160]]
Search.'' For problems with ADAMS, please contact the NRC's Public
Document Room (PDR) reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737, or
by email to [email protected]. For the convenience of the reader,
instructions about obtaining materials referenced in this document are
provided in Section IV, ``Availability of Documents,'' of this
document.
NRC's PDR: You may examine and purchase copies of public
documents at the NRC's PDR, Room O1-F21, One White Flint North, 11555
Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Jennifer C. Tobin, Office of Nuclear
Reactor Regulation, telephone: 301-415-2328; email:
[email protected]; U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington,
DC 20555-0001.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Table of Contents
I. The Petition
II. Reasons for Denial
III. Conclusion
IV. Availability of Documents
I. The Petition
Section 2.802 of title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10
CFR), ``Petition for rulemaking,'' provides an opportunity for any
interested person to petition the Commission to issue, amend, or
rescind any regulation. The NRC received a petition dated September 10,
2015, from Dr. Alexander DeVolpi and assigned it Docket No. PRM-50-113.
The NRC published a notice of docketing in the Federal Register (FR) on
December 1, 2015 (80 FR 75009). The NRC did not request public comment
on PRM-50-113 because it had sufficient information to review the
issues raised by the petitioner.
The petitioner requested that the NRC amend 10 CFR part 50,
``Domestic licensing of production and utilization facilities,'' to
require ``installation of ex-vessel instrumentation for uninterruptible
monitoring of coolant and fuel in reactors and spent-fuel pools.''
II. Reasons for Denial
The NRC is denying the petition because the issues raised by the
petitioner have been addressed through actions taken in response to the
Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear accident. The NRC determined that there is
no sufficient technical or regulatory basis to amend the NRC's
regulations as requested by the petitioner.
The petitioner proposed that Recommendation 5.1A in the 2014
National Academy of Sciences (NAS) report entitled ``Lessons Learned
from the Fukushima Nuclear Accident for Improving Safety of U.S.
Nuclear Plants'' should be mandated (as an NRC regulation) to require
installation of ex-vessel instrumentation for uninterruptible
monitoring of coolant and fuel in reactors and spent fuel pools. The
petitioner stated that NAS gave a high priority to this recommendation
and the petitioner indicated that he has developed instrumentation that
is capable of uninterruptible monitoring of critical thermodynamic
parameters. The petitioner included diagrams and explanations of his
patented instrumentation and supportive technical papers and requested
that the NRC require use of such instrumentation to prevent or mitigate
accidents. In particular, the petitioner contends that the accident at
Three Mile Island, Unit 2 might have been prevented if real-time
uninterruptible ex-vessel reactor water-level monitoring had been in
place. Further, the petitioner states that one or two of the Fukushima
Dai-ichi meltdowns might have been delayed or averted if
uninterruptible ex-vessel real-time reactor water-level monitoring had
been in place and operating on self-contained low-current battery
supplies.
The NRC staff responded to the NAS report and its recommendations
in SECY-15-0059, ``Seventh 6-Month Status Update on Response to Lessons
Learned from Japan's March 11, 2011, Great T[omacr]hoku Earthquake and
Subsequent Tsunami,'' dated April 9, 2015. The NRC staff's discussion
of Recommendation 5.1A in enclosure 6 of SECY-15-0059 addresses the
installation of ex-vessel instrumentation for uninterruptible
monitoring of coolant and fuel in reactors and spent fuel pools. The
NRC staff found that this recommendation was addressed by existing
requirements and other ongoing activities. The issues that the
petitioner's proposal would address are being or have already been
addressed by NRC actions taken in response to the Fukushima Dai-ichi
nuclear accident, as summarized in this document.
Instrumentation used to support strategies in the mitigation of
beyond-design-basis events is addressed in Order EA-12-049, ``Issuance
of Order to Modify Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation
Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events.'' This Order
ensures that plant operators have the information concerning key
parameters needed to support implementation of mitigation strategies to
maintain or restore core cooling, spent fuel pool cooling, and
containment prior to the onset of core or spent fuel damage. Either
installed instrumentation remains powered during an extended loss of
alternating current power via safety-related batteries and other power
supplies that provide coping capabilities for an indefinite period of
time, or portable instruments are used that are independent from
installed plant power systems. If mitigation strategies are not
successful and severe accident conditions develop, the enhancements
made in response to Order EA-12-049 will provide for monitoring of key
parameters on the condition of the reactor, containment, and spent fuel
pool throughout the accident's progression until instrumentation
becomes unavailable or unreliable. These enhancements should also
enable licensees to more easily transition to the use of computational
aids when direct diagnosis of key plant conditions cannot be determined
reliably from instrumentation. Further, spent fuel pool instrumentation
is also required by Order EA-12-051, ``Order Modifying Licenses with
Regard to Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation,'' to remotely
report three distinct water levels: Normal level; low level but still
enough to shield workers above the pools from radiation; and a level
near the top of the spent fuel rods, at which more water should be
added without delay.
Following the issuance of the Orders, the NRC staff presented its
evaluation of enhanced instrumentation for beyond-design-basis
conditions in enclosure 5 to SECY-15-0137, ``Proposed Plans for
Resolving Open Fukushima Tier 2 and 3 Recommendations.'' The staff
recommended that the Commission not pursue additional regulatory
requirements for enhanced reactor and containment instrumentation. The
NRC staff concluded that additional studies are unlikely to support
additional regulatory requirements related to enhanced reactor and
containment instrumentation for beyond-design-basis conditions, when
evaluated against the criteria for operating reactors in Sec. 50.109,
``Backfitting,'' or the issue finality provisions of 10 CFR part 52,
``Licenses, Certifications, and Approvals for Nuclear Power Plants.''
In the staff requirements memorandum associated with SECY-15-0137,
the Commission directed the NRC staff to provide the final results of
its evaluation following interactions with external stakeholders and
the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS). Accordingly, the
NRC staff provided updated information regarding enhanced reactor and
[[Page 11161]]
containment instrumentation for beyond-design-basis conditions in
enclosure 2 to SECY-16-0041, ``Closure of Fukushima Tier 3
Recommendations Related to Containment Vents, Hydrogen Control, and
Instrumentation.'' The updated information addressed the observations
provided by the ACRS in letters dated November 16, 2015, and March 15,
2016, and insights provided by external stakeholders. For example,
information was added to the final assessment that describes the
technical support guidance (TSG) for the severe accident management
guidelines (SAMGs) and related assessments of plant parameters as well
as the status of safety functions that would be performed by plant
personnel during a severe accident. The SAMGs are entered when plant
conditions indicate that cooling of the spent fuel pool or core cannot
be maintained and the fuel in the spent fuel pool or reactor is on a
trajectory towards damage. The SAMGs then invoke the TSGs that are
based on an engineering evaluation of the scenario. This would include
an assessment of the available parameter indications, their functional
consistency, and their trends as the plant transitions to severe
accident conditions, which may be more severe than the conditions
assumed in instrument design and environmental qualifications. The
severe accident response strategies are then based on fundamental
principles that do not rely on precise indications of parameter values,
but rather on an integrated technical assessment of the evolving event
scenario and the conditions that preceded the onset of fuel damage in
the spent fuel pool or core.
The additional NRC staff evaluations further support the conclusion
that regulatory actions to require enhancements to reactor and
containment instrumentation to support the response to severe accidents
would not provide a substantial safety enhancement, and therefore,
additional regulatory actions would not be warranted when evaluated
against the Sec. 50.109 criteria. The ACRS agreed in its March 15,
2016, letter that no further regulatory action is warranted in support
of the closure of the recommendation on enhanced instrumentation.
In addition to the discussions in SECY-15-0137 and SECY-16-0041,
the NRC staff notes that, depending on an accident's progression,
licensees will use available indicators and technical assessments of
the evolving scenario to implement adequate measures to protect public
health and safety in accordance with the NRC's emergency preparedness
requirements. If an accident progresses to fuel damage, specific
additional actions may be required, including initiating predetermined
protective actions for the public.
Moreover, the NRC is proposing to amend its regulations to
establish regulatory requirements for nuclear power reactor applicants
and licensees to mitigate beyond-design-basis events to reflect
requirements imposed on current licensees by Order and the lessons
learned from the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident. This proposed rule,
``Mitigation of Beyond-Design-Basis Events,'' which was published in
the Federal Register on November 13, 2015 (80 FR 70610; corrected
November 30, 2015 at 80 FR 74717), would, among other things, add a new
regulation (proposed 10 CFR 50.155) to make Orders EA-12-049 and EA-12-
051 generically applicable, establish regulatory requirements for an
integrated response capability, and include requirements for enhanced
onsite emergency response capabilities.
Therefore, in accordance with the NRC staff's evaluation in SECY-
15-0137, the Commission's direction on SECY-15-0137, updated
information provided in SECY-16-0041, and existing emergency
preparedness requirements, and the proposed Mitigation of Beyond-
Design-Basis Events rulemaking, the NRC has determined that additional
instrumentation requirements to address severe accident conditions
proposed in PRM-50-113 are not necessary.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons cited in Section II of this document, the NRC has
concluded that the issues raised by the petitioner have been addressed
by NRC actions taken in response to the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear
accident and there is no sufficient technical or regulatory basis to
amend the NRC's regulations as requested by the petitioner. Therefore,
the NRC is denying PRM-50-113.
IV. Availability of Documents
The documents identified in the following table are available to
interested persons through one or more of the methods listed in the
ADDRESSES section of this document.
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Document ADAMS accession No./Web link/ Federal Register citation
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ACRS Letter, ``Plans for Resolving the NRC Near- ML15320A074.
Term Task Force Open Fukushima Tier 2 and 3
Recommendations,'' November 16, 2015.
ACRS Letter, ``Closure of Fukushima Tier 3 ML16075A330.
Recommendations Related to Vents, Hydrogen
Control, and Enhanced Instrumentation,'' March
15, 2016.
Federal Register notice, ``Uninterruptible 80 FR 75009.
Monitoring of Coolant and Fuel in Reactors and
Spent Fuel Pools,'' December 1, 2015.
Federal Register notice, ``Mitigation of Beyond- 80 FR 70610 (corrected by 80 FR 74717; November 30, 2015).
Design-Basis Events,'' November 13, 2015.
Letter from Nuclear Energy Institute to NRC, ML15335A442.
``Submittal of Industry Initiative to Maintain
Severe Accident Management Guidelines,'' October
26, 2015.
National Academy of Sciences, ``Lessons Learned http://www.nap.edu/read/18294/chapter/1.
from the Fukushima Nuclear Accident for Improving
Safety of U.S. Nuclear Plants,'' 2014.
NRC Generic Letter 1982-033, ``Supplement 1 to ML031080548.
NUREG-0737--Requirements for Emergency Response
Capability,'' December 17, 1982.
NUREG-0933, ``Resolution of Generic Safety http://nureg.nrc.gov/sr0933.
Issues,'' December 2011.
Order EA-12-049, ``Issuance of Order to Modify ML12054A735.
Licenses With Regard to Requirements for
Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis
External Events,'' March 12, 2012.
Order EA-12-051, ``Order Modifying Licenses with ML12056A044.
Regard to Reliable Spent Fuel Pool
Instrumentation,'' March 12, 2012.
PRM-50-113, ``Uninterruptible Monitoring of ML15264A857.
Critical Thermodynamic Parameters (Coolant and
Fuel in Reactors and Spent-Fuel Pools),''
September 10, 2015.
SECY-15-0059, ``Seventh 6-Month Status Update on ML15069A444, ML15069A568 (enc. 3), ML15069A600 (enc. 6).
Response to Lessons Learned from Japan's March
11, 2011, Great Tohoku Earthquake and Subsequent
Tsunami,'' April 9, 2015.
[[Page 11162]]
SECY-15-0065, ``Proposed Rulemaking: Mitigation of ML15049A201.
Beyond-Design-Basis Events (RIN 3150-AJ49),''
April 30, 2015.
SECY-15-0137, ``Proposed Plans for Resolving Open ML15254A006, ML15254A034 (enc. 5).
Fukushima Tier 2 and 3 Recommendations,'' October
29, 2015.
SECY-16-0041, ``Closure of Fukushima Tier 3 ML16049A079.
Recommendations Related to Containment Vents,
Hydrogen Control, and Enhanced Instrumentation,''
March 31, 2016.
SRM-SECY-15-0065, ``Proposed Rulemaking: ML15239A767.
Mitigation of Beyond-Design-Basis Events (RIN
3150-AJ49),'' August 27, 2015.
SRM-SECY-15-0137, ``Proposed Plans for Resolving ML16039A175.
Open Fukushima Tier 2 and 3 Recommendations,''
February 8, 2016.
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Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 14th day of February 2017.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Annette L. Vietti-Cook,
Secretary of the Commission.
[FR Doc. 2017-03284 Filed 2-17-17; 8:45 am]
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