[Federal Register Volume 81, Number 251 (Friday, December 30, 2016)]
[Notices]
[Pages 96507-96518]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2016-31653]


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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Antitrust Division


United States v. Clear Channel Outdoor Holdings, Inc., et al.; 
Proposed Final Judgment and Competitive Impact Statement

    Notice is hereby given pursuant to the Antitrust Procedures and 
Penalties Act, 15 U.S.C. 16(b)-(h), that a proposed Final Judgment, 
Asset Preservation Stipulation and Order, and Competitive Impact 
Statement have been filed with the United States District Court for the 
District of Columbia in United States of America v. Clear Channel 
Outdoor Holdings, Inc., Civil Action No. 1:16-cv-02497. On December 22, 
2016, the United States filed a Complaint alleging that a proposed 
transaction between Clear Channel Outdoor Holdings, Inc. and Fairway 
Media Group, LLC would violate Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 
18. The proposed Final Judgment, filed at the same time as the 
Complaint, resolves the case by requiring Clear Channel and Fairway to 
divest certain billboards in Atlanta, Georgia, and Indianapolis, 
Indiana.
    Copies of the Complaint, proposed Final Judgment, and Competitive 
Impact Statement are available for inspection on the Antitrust 
Division's Web site at http://www.justice.gov/atr and at the Office of 
the Clerk of the United States District Court for the District of 
Columbia. Copies of these materials may be obtained from the Antitrust 
Division upon request and payment of the copying fee set by Department 
of Justice regulations.
    Public comment is invited within 60 days of the date of this 
notice. Such comments, including the name of the submitter, and 
responses thereto, will be posted on the Antitrust Division's Web site, 
filed with the Court, and, under certain circumstances, published in 
the Federal Register. Comments should be directed to Owen M. Kendler, 
Acting Chief, Litigation III Section, Antitrust Division, Department of 
Justice, 450 Fifth Street NW., Suite 4000, Washington, DC 20530 
(telephone: 202-305-8376).

Patricia A. Brink,
Director of Civil Enforcement.

United States District Court for the District of Columbia

    United States of America, Department of Justice, Antitrust 
Division, 450 Fifth Street NW., Suite 7000, Washington, DC 20530, 
Plaintiff, v. Clear Channel Outdoor Holdings, Inc., 200 East Basse 
Road, Suite 100, San Antonio, TX 78209, and Fairway Media Group, 
LLC, 3801 Capital City Blvd., Lansing, MI 48906, Defendants.

Case No.: 1:16-cv-02497
Judge: Randolph D. Moss
Filed: 12/22/2016

COMPLAINT

    The United States of America (``Plaintiff''), acting under the 
direction of the Attorney General of the United States, brings this 
civil action to enjoin the transaction between Defendants Clear Channel 
Outdoor Holdings, Inc. (``Clear Channel'') and Fairway Media Group, LLC 
(``Fairway'') and to obtain other equitable relief.

I. NATURE OF THE ACTION

    1. Clear Channel and Fairway sell outdoor advertising on billboards 
to local and national customers in numerous metropolitan areas 
throughout the United States. Among other metropolitan areas, they 
compete head-to-head to sell advertising on billboards that are located 
in Indianapolis, Indiana and Atlanta, Georgia (collectively, the 
``Metropolitan Markets''). Within each of the Metropolitan Markets, 
Clear Channel and Fairway own and operate billboards that are located 
in close proximity to each other and therefore constitute attractive 
competitive alternatives for advertisers that seek to advertise on 
billboards in those specific areas.
    2. On March 3, 2016, Clear Channel and Fairway entered into an 
asset exchange pursuant to which Clear Channel would acquire certain 
Fairway billboards located in Atlanta and Fairway would acquire certain 
Clear Channel billboards located in Indianapolis, along with billboards 
in other metropolitan areas.
    3. If consummated, the proposed transaction would eliminate the 
substantial head-to-head competition between Clear Channel and Fairway 
within each of the Metropolitan Markets. Head-to-head competition 
between Clear Channel and Fairway billboards that are located in close 
proximity to each other in each of the Metropolitan Markets has 
benefitted advertisers through lower prices and better services. The 
proposed transaction threatens to end that competition in these areas 
in violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 18, and should 
be enjoined.

II. JURISDICTION, VENUE, AND COMMERCE

    4. The United States brings this action pursuant to Section 15 of 
the Clayton Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 25, to prevent and restrain 
Defendants from violating Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 18.
    5. The Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action 
pursuant to Section 15 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 25, and 28 U.S.C. 
1331, 1337(a), and 1345.
    6. Defendants are engaged in interstate commerce and in activities 
substantially affecting interstate commerce. They each own and operate 
billboards in various locations throughout the United States and sell 
outdoor advertising in the geographic areas where their billboards are 
located. Their sale of advertising on billboards has had a substantial 
effect upon interstate commerce.
    7. Defendants have consented to venue and personal jurisdiction in 
this district. Venue is also proper in this district under Section 12 
of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 22, and 28 U.S.C. 1391(c).

III. THE DEFENDANTS AND THE TRANSACTION

    8. Clear Channel is a Delaware corporation, with its corporate 
headquarters in San Antonio, Texas. Clear Channel is one of the largest 
outdoor advertising companies in the United States. Clear Channel 
reported consolidated revenues of over $2.8 billion in 2015. As of 
December 31, 2015, Clear Channel owned or operated more than 650,000 
outdoor advertising displays worldwide. It owns and operates billboards 
in each of the Metropolitan Markets.

[[Page 96508]]

    9. Fairway is a Delaware limited liability company with its 
headquarters in Duncan, South Carolina. Fairway owns or operates 
outdoor advertising displays in fifteen states. Fairway had revenues of 
approximately $110 million in 2015. Fairway also owns and operates 
billboards in each of the Metropolitan Markets.
    10. Pursuant to an Asset Purchase and Exchange Agreement dated 
March 3, 2016, Clear Channel and Fairway agreed to exchange billboards 
in a transaction valued at $150 million. Specifically, the parties 
agreed that Clear Channel would acquire certain Fairway billboards 
located in Atlanta and Fairway would acquire certain Clear Channel 
billboards located in Indianapolis and Sherman/Denison, Texas. Although 
the Asset Purchase and Exchange Agreement originally provided that 
Fairway would acquire certain Clear Channel billboards in Rochester, 
Minnesota, and that Clear Channel would acquire additional Fairway 
billboards in Atlanta, the parties subsequently amended their agreement 
to remove the Rochester assets and the additional Atlanta assets from 
the transaction.

IV. THE RELEVANT MARKETS

    11. The relevant markets for purposes of Section 7 of the Clayton 
Act are the sale of outdoor advertising on billboards to advertisers 
targeting consumers located in areas no larger than the Metropolitan 
Markets, and likely smaller areas within each of the Metropolitan 
Markets where the parties own and operate billboards in close proximity 
to each other.
    12. Clear Channel and Fairway generate revenue from the sale of 
outdoor advertising to local and national businesses that want to 
promote their products and services. Outdoor advertising is available 
in a variety of sizes and forms for advertising campaigns of differing 
styles and duration. Outdoor advertising sales include selling space on 
billboards and posters, public transportation, such as subways and 
buses, and other public spaces, such as bus stops, kiosks, and benches.
    13. Outdoor advertising has prices and characteristics that are 
distinct from other advertising media platforms like radio, television, 
the Internet, newspapers, and magazines. Outdoor advertising is 
suitable for highly visual, limited-information advertising, because 
consumers are exposed to an outdoor advertisement for only a brief 
period of time as they travel through specific geographic areas. 
Outdoor advertisements typically are less expensive and more cost-
efficient when compared to other media at reaching an advertiser's 
target audience. Many advertisers use outdoor advertisements when they 
want a large number of exposures to consumers at a low cost per 
exposure. Such advertisers do not view other advertising mediums or 
platforms as close substitutes.
    14. Advertisers often choose a particular form of outdoor 
advertising over other outdoor advertising forms based upon the purpose 
of an advertising campaign, the target demographic group, and the 
geographic area where that campaign is to occur. For this reason, some 
outdoor advertising forms compete more closely with each other when 
compared to other outdoor advertising forms. And certain outdoor 
advertising forms compete more closely with each other depending upon 
their specific geographic locations.
    15. With respect to outdoor advertising forms, billboards compete 
most closely with other billboards located in the same geographic area. 
Advertisers select billboards over other outdoor advertising forms 
based upon a number of factors. These include the size and demographic 
of the target audience (individuals most likely to purchase the 
advertiser's products or services), the traffic and commuting patterns 
of the audience, and other audience characteristics. Additionally, in 
certain geographic areas, other forms of outdoor advertising are not 
present.
    16. The precise geographic location of a particular billboard is 
also important to advertisers. Many advertisers need to reach consumers 
in a particular city, part of a city, metropolitan area, or part of a 
metropolitan area. They also seek to reach certain demographic 
categories of consumers within a city or metropolitan area. 
Consequently, many advertisers select billboards that are located on 
highways, roads and streets where the vehicle and pedestrian traffic of 
that target audience is high, or where that traffic is close to the 
advertiser's commercial locations. By selecting billboards in these 
locations, advertisers can ensure that their target audience will 
frequently view billboards that contain their advertisements. If 
different firms own billboards that are located in close proximity to 
each other that would efficiently reach an advertiser's target 
audience, the advertiser would benefit from the competition among those 
billboard firms to offer better prices and services.
    17. At a minimum, billboard companies could profitably impose a 
small but significant and non-transitory increase in price (``SSNIP'') 
to those advertisers who view billboards in certain geographic 
locations either as their sole method of advertising or as a necessary 
advertising complement to other media, including other outdoor 
advertising forms. Consequently, for many advertisers who want to 
advertise on billboards in each of the Metropolitan Markets or in 
certain smaller areas within each of the Metropolitan Markets, the 
imposition of a SSNIP would not cause these advertisers to switch some 
of their advertising to other media, other outdoor advertising forms, 
or to billboards located outside each area.
    18. For all of the above reasons, for purposes of analyzing the 
competitive effects of the proposed transaction, the relevant product 
market is outdoor advertising on billboards and the relevant geographic 
markets are no larger than each of the Metropolitan Markets, and may 
consist of considerably smaller areas within each of those Metropolitan 
Markets where the parties own and operate billboards in close proximity 
to each other.

V. LIKELY ANTICOMPETITIVE EFFECTS

    19. Market concentration is often one useful indicator of the 
likely competitive effects of a transaction. Concentration in each of 
the Metropolitan Markets and in certain smaller areas within each of 
the Metropolitan Markets would increase significantly as a result of 
the proposed transaction.
    20. As articulated in the Horizontal Merger Guidelines issued by 
the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (``HHI'') is a standard measure of market 
concentration (defined and explained in Appendix A). The more 
concentrated a market, and the more a transaction would increase 
concentration in a market, the more likely it is that a transaction 
would result in a meaningful reduction in competition harming 
consumers. Mergers resulting in highly concentrated markets (with an 
HHI in excess of 2,500) that involve an increase in the HHI of more 
than 200 points are presumed to be likely to enhance market power under 
the Horizontal Merger Guidelines.
    21. In each of the Metropolitan Markets, and in certain smaller 
areas within each of the Metropolitan Markets, the market for outdoor 
advertising on billboards is highly concentrated. The proposed 
transaction between Clear Channel and Fairway would result in HHIs in 
excess of 2,500 in each of the Metropolitan Markets and in certain 
areas within each Metropolitan Market. These post-transaction HHIs, 
which reflect

[[Page 96509]]

increases of more than 200 points in each Metropolitan Market and in 
certain areas within each Metropolitan Market, are well above the 2,500 
threshold at which a transaction is presumed likely to enhance market 
power.
    22. In addition to increasing concentration, the proposed 
transaction will eliminate head-to-head competition between Clear 
Channel and Fairway by bringing under the control of one firm 
billboards that are close substitutes, based on their geographic 
locations, in areas with limited alternatives. In some of the areas 
within each of the Metropolitan Markets, there are no other competing 
billboards that would be attractive competitive alternatives to Clear 
Channel's and Fairway's billboards. In other areas within each of the 
Metropolitan Markets, there are other competitors present, but the 
number of billboards or their quality is insufficient to preclude the 
exercise of market power by Clear Channel or Fairway post-transaction.
    23. In each of the Metropolitan Markets, there are significant 
barriers to entry, including governmental regulations that limit new 
billboard construction. Therefore, it is unlikely that any new entry or 
repositioning from existing firms would be sufficient or timely to 
defeat Clear Channel or Fairway from profitably imposing a SSNIP on 
their billboards in the Metropolitan Markets and in certain smaller 
areas within the Metropolitan Markets.

VI. VIOLATION ALLEGED

    24. The United States hereby repeats and realleges the allegations 
of paragraphs 1 through 23 as if fully set forth herein.
    25. Clear Channel's proposed transaction with Fairway likely would 
substantially lessen competition in interstate trade and commerce in 
the relevant markets, in violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 
U.S.C. 18. Unless enjoined, the proposed transaction likely would have 
the following anticompetitive effects, among others:
    a) competition in the sale of outdoor advertising on billboards in 
each of the Metropolitan Markets and in certain areas within each of 
the Metropolitan Markets would be substantially lessened;
    b) actual and potential competition between Clear Channel and 
Fairway in the sale of outdoor advertising on billboards in each of the 
Metropolitan Markets and in certain areas within each of the 
Metropolitan Markets would be eliminated; and
    c) prices for outdoor advertising on billboards in each of the 
Metropolitan Market and in certain areas within each of the 
Metropolitan Markets would likely increase, and the quality of services 
would likely decline.

VII. REQUEST FOR RELIEF

    26. The United States requests:
    a) that the Court adjudge the proposed transaction to violate 
Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 18;
    b) that the Court permanently enjoin and restrain Defendants from 
carrying out the proposed transaction, or entering into any other 
agreement, understanding, or plan by which Clear Channel and Fairway 
would exchange billboards in each of the Metropolitan Markets;
    c) that the Court award the United States the costs of this action; 
and
    d) that the Court award such other relief to the United States as 
the Court may deem just and proper.

Dated: December 22, 2016

Respectfully submitted,

FOR PLAINTIFF UNITED STATES:

/s/--------------------------------------------------------------------
Renata B. Hesse (D.C. Bar #466107),

Acting Assistant Attorney General.

/s/--------------------------------------------------------------------
Jonathan B. Sallet,

Deputy Assistant Attorney General.

/s/--------------------------------------------------------------------
Patricia A. Brink,

Director of Civil Enforcement.

/s/--------------------------------------------------------------------
Owen M. Kendler,

Acting Chief, Litigation III Section.

/s/--------------------------------------------------------------------
Mark A. Merva * (D.C. Bar #451743),

Trial Attorney, United States Department of Justice, Antitrust 
Division, Litigation III Section, 450 Fifth Street NW., Suite 4000, 
Washington, DC 20530, Phone: 202-616-1398, Facsimile: 202-514-7308, 
Email: [email protected].
* Attorney of Record

APPENDIX A

    The term ``HHI'' means the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, a commonly 
accepted measure of market concentration. The HHI is calculated by 
squaring the market share of each firm competing in the market and then 
summing the resulting numbers. For example, for a market consisting of 
four firms with shares of 30, 30, 20, and 20 percent, the HHI is 2,600 
(30\2\ + 30\2\ + 20\2\ + 20\2\ = 2,600). The HHI takes into account the 
relative size distribution of the firms in a market. It approaches zero 
when a market is occupied by a large number of firms of relatively 
equal size and reaches its maximum of 10,000 points when a market is 
controlled by a single firm. The HHI increases both as the number of 
firms in the market decreases and as the disparity in size between 
those firms increases.
    Markets in which the HHI is between 1,500 and 2,500 points are 
considered to be moderately concentrated, and markets in which the HHI 
is in excess of 2,500 points are considered to be highly concentrated. 
See U.S. Department of Justice & FTC, Horizontal Merger Guidelines 
Sec.  5.3 (2010). Transactions that increase the HHI by more than 200 
points in highly concentrated markets presumptively raise antitrust 
concerns under the Horizontal Merger Guidelines issued by the 
Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission. See id.

United States District Court for the District of Columbia

    United States of America, Plaintiff, v. Clear Channel Outdoor 
Holdings, Inc., and Fairway Media Group, LLC, Defendants.

Case No.: 1:16-cv-02497
Judge: Randolph D. Moss
Filed: 12/22/2016

COMPETITIVE IMPACT STATEMENT

    Pursuant to Section 2(b) of the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties 
Act (``APPA'' or ``Tunney Act''), 15 U.S.C. 16(b)-(h), Plaintiff United 
States of America (``United States'') files this Competitive Impact 
Statement relating to the proposed Final Judgment submitted for entry 
in this civil antitrust proceeding.

I. NATURE AND PURPOSE OF THE PROCEEDING

    On March 3, 2016, Defendants Clear Channel Outdoor Holdings, Inc. 
(``Clear Channel'') and Fairway Media Group, LLC (``Fairway'') entered 
into an asset exchange pursuant to which Clear Channel would acquire 
certain Fairway billboards located in Atlanta, Georgia, and Fairway 
would acquire certain Clear Channel billboards located in Indianapolis, 
Indiana (collectively Atlanta and Indianapolis are the ``Metropolitan 
Markets''), along with billboards in other metropolitan areas.
    The United States filed a civil antitrust Complaint on December 22, 
2016, seeking to enjoin the proposed transaction. The Complaint alleges 
that the proposed transaction likely would eliminate the substantial 
head-to-head competition between Clear Channel and Fairway within each 
of the Metropolitan Markets. Head-to-head competition between Clear 
Channel and Fairway billboards that are located in close proximity to 
each other in each of the Metropolitan Markets has benefitted 
advertisers through lower prices and

[[Page 96510]]

better services. These likely competitive effects would substantially 
lessen competition in violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 
U.S.C. 18.
    At the same time the Complaint was filed, the United States also 
filed an Asset Preservation Stipulation and Order (``Asset Preservation 
Order'') and proposed Final Judgment, which are designed to eliminate 
the likely anticompetitive effects of the transaction. The proposed 
Final Judgment, which is explained more fully below, requires 
Defendants to divest their interests in 57 identified outdoor billboard 
assets in the Metropolitan Markets to acquirers approved by the United 
States in a manner that preserves competition in each of those markets.
    The Asset Preservation Order requires Defendants to take certain 
steps to ensure that each of the divested assets continues to be 
operated as a competitive, economically viable, and ongoing outdoor 
advertising asset, uninfluenced by the consummation of the transaction 
so that competition is maintained until the required divestitures 
occur.
    The United States and Defendants have stipulated that the proposed 
Final Judgment may be entered after compliance with the APPA. Entry of 
the proposed Final Judgment would terminate this action, except that 
the Court would retain jurisdiction to construe, modify, or enforce the 
provisions of the proposed Final Judgment and to punish violations 
thereof.

II. DESCRIPTION OF THE EVENTS GIVING RISE TO THE ALLEGED VIOLATION

A. The Defendants and the Transaction

    Clear Channel is a Delaware corporation with its headquarters in 
San Antonio, Texas. Clear Channel is one of the largest outdoor 
advertising companies in the United States.
    Fairway is a Delaware limited liability company with its 
headquarters in Duncan, South Carolina. Fairway owns and operates 
outdoor advertising displays in fifteen states.
    Pursuant to an Asset Purchase and Exchange Agreement dated March 3, 
2016, Clear Channel and Fairway agreed to exchange billboards in a 
transaction valued at $150 million. Specifically, the parties agreed 
that Clear Channel would acquire certain Fairway billboards located in 
Atlanta and Fairway would acquire certain Clear Channel billboards 
located in Indianapolis and Sherman/Denison, Texas. Although the Asset 
Purchase and Exchange Agreement originally provided that Fairway would 
acquire certain Clear Channel billboards in Rochester, Minnesota, and 
that Clear Channel would acquire additional Fairway billboards in 
Atlanta, the parties subsequently amended their agreement to remove the 
Rochester assets and additional Atlanta assets from the transaction.
    The proposed transaction, as agreed to by Defendants, likely would 
lessen competition substantially within each of the Metropolitan 
Markets. This transaction is the subject of the Complaint and proposed 
Final Judgment filed today by the United States.

B. The Transaction's Likely Anticompetitive Effects

1. The Relevant Markets

    The Complaint alleges that the sale of outdoor advertising on 
billboards to advertisers that seek to target consumers located in 
geographic areas no larger than each of the Metropolitan Markets, and 
likely smaller areas within each of those market where the parties own 
and operate billboards in close proximity to each other, constitute 
relevant markets under Section 7 of the Clayton Act.
    Clear Channel and Fairway sell outdoor advertising to local and 
national businesses that seek to promote their products and services to 
consumers in each of the Metropolitan Markets and in certain smaller 
areas within each of the Metropolitan Markets.
    Outdoor advertising possesses a unique combination of attributes 
that sets it apart from advertising using other types of media, like 
radio, television, the Internet, newspapers and magazines. Outdoor 
advertising is suitable for highly visual, limited-information 
advertising, because consumers are exposed to an outdoor advertisement 
for only a brief period of time as they travel through specific 
geographic areas. Outdoor advertisements typically are less expensive 
and more cost-efficient when compared to other media at reaching an 
advertiser's target audience. Many advertisers use outdoor 
advertisements when they want a large number of exposures to consumers 
at a low cost per exposure. Such advertisers do not view other 
advertising mediums or platforms as close substitutes.
    Outdoor advertising is available in a variety of sizes and forms 
for advertising campaigns of differing styles and duration. Outdoor 
advertising sales include selling space on billboards and posters, 
public transportation, such as subways and buses, and other public 
spaces, such as bus stops, kiosks, and benches. Advertisers often 
choose a particular form of outdoor advertising over other outdoor 
advertising forms based upon the purpose of an advertising campaign, 
the target demographic group, and the geographic area where that 
campaign is to occur. For this reason, some outdoor advertising forms 
compete more closely with each other when compared to other outdoor 
advertising forms. And certain outdoor advertising forms compete more 
closely with each other depending upon their specific geographic 
locations.
    With respect to outdoor advertising forms, billboards compete most 
closely with other billboards located in the same geographic area. 
Advertisers select billboards over other outdoor advertising forms 
based upon a number of factors. These include the size and demographic 
of the target audience (individuals most likely to purchase the 
advertiser's products or services), the traffic and commuting patterns 
of the audience, and other audience characteristics. Additionally, in 
certain geographic areas, other forms of outdoor advertising are not 
present.
    The precise geographic location of a particular billboard is also 
important to advertisers. Many advertisers need to reach consumers in a 
particular city, part of a city, metropolitan area, or part of a 
metropolitan area. They also seek to reach certain demographic 
categories of consumers within a city or metropolitan area. 
Consequently, many advertisers select billboards that are located on 
highways, roads and streets where the vehicle and pedestrian traffic of 
that target audience is high, or where that traffic is close to the 
advertiser's commercial locations. By selecting billboards in these 
locations, advertisers can ensure that their target audience will 
frequently view billboards that contain their advertisements. If 
different firms own billboards that are located in close proximity to 
each other that would efficiently reach an advertiser's target 
audience, the advertiser would benefit from the competition among those 
billboard firms to offer better prices and services.
    At a minimum, billboard companies could profitably impose a small 
but significant and non-transitory increase in price (``SSNIP'') to 
those advertisers who view billboards in certain geographic locations 
either as their sole method of advertising or as a necessary 
advertising complement to other media, including other outdoor 
advertising forms. Consequently, for many advertisers who want to 
advertise on billboards in each of the Metropolitan Markets or in 
certain smaller areas within each of the Metropolitan

[[Page 96511]]

Markets, the imposition of a SSNIP would not cause these advertisers to 
switch some of their advertising to other media, other outdoor 
advertising forms, or to billboards located outside each area.
    For all of the above reasons, for purposes of analyzing the 
competitive effects of the proposed transaction, the relevant product 
market is outdoor advertising on billboards and the relevant geographic 
markets are no larger than each of the Metropolitan Markets, and may 
consist of considerably smaller areas within each of those Metropolitan 
Markets where the parties own and operate billboards in close proximity 
to each other.
2. Harm to Competition within Each of the Metropolitan Markets
    The Complaint alleges that the proposed acquisition likely would 
substantially lessen competition in interstate trade and commerce, in 
violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 18, and likely 
would have the following effects, among others:
    a) competition in the sale of outdoor advertising on billboards in 
each of the Metropolitan Markets and in certain smaller areas within 
each of the Metropolitan Markets would be substantially lessened;
    b) actual and potential competition between Clear Channel and 
Fairway in the sale of outdoor advertising on billboards in each of the 
Metropolitan Markets and in certain areas within each of the 
Metropolitan Markets would be substantially lessened; and
    c) prices for outdoor advertising on billboards in each of the 
Metropolitan Markets and in certain areas within each of the 
Metropolitan Markets would likely increase, and the quality of services 
would likely decline.
    As alleged in the Complaint, in each of the Metropolitan Markets 
and in certain areas within each of the Metropolitan Markets, the 
market for outdoor advertising on billboards is highly concentrated and 
the proposed transaction would substantially increase that 
concentration.
    Using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (``HHI''), a standard measure 
of market concentration, the proposed transaction between Clear Channel 
and Fairway would result in HHIs in excess of 2,500 in each of the 
Metropolitan Markets and in certain areas within each Metropolitan 
Market. These post-transaction HHIs reflect increases of more than 200 
points in each Metropolitan Market and in certain areas within each 
Metropolitan Market. As a result, the proposed transaction in those 
Metropolitan Markets is presumed likely to enhance market power under 
the Horizontal Merger Guidelines issued by the Department of Justice 
and Federal Trade Commission.
    Moreover, in addition to increasing concentration, the proposed 
transaction will eliminate head-to-head competition between Clear 
Channel and Fairway by bringing under the control of one firm 
billboards that are close substitutes, based on their geographic 
locations, in areas with limited alternatives. In some of the areas 
within each of the Metropolitan Markets, there are no other competing 
billboards that would be attractive competitive alternatives to Clear 
Channel's and Fairway's billboards. In other areas within each of the 
Metropolitan Markets, there are other competitors present, but the 
number of billboards or their quality is insufficient to preclude the 
exercise of market power by Clear Channel or Fairway post-transaction. 
Because a significant number of advertisers would likely be unable to 
reach their desired audiences as effectively unless they advertise on 
billboards that Clear Channel or Fairway would control after the 
proposed transaction, those advertisers' bargaining positions would be 
weaker, and the advertising rates they pay would likely increase.
3. Entry
    The Complaint alleges that entry or expansion in outdoor 
advertising on billboards in each of the Metropolitan Markets would not 
be timely, likely, or sufficient to prevent any anticompetitive 
effects. In each of the Metropolitan Markets, there are significant 
barriers to entry including those due to governmental regulations that 
limit new billboard construction. Therefore, it is unlikely that any 
new entry or repositioning from existing firms would be sufficient or 
timely to defeat Clear Channel or Fairway from profitably imposing a 
SSNIP on their billboards in the Metropolitan Markets and certain areas 
within the Metropolitan Markets.

III. EXPLANATION OF THE PROPOSED FINAL JUDGMENT

    The divestiture requirement of the proposed Final Judgment will 
eliminate the likely anticompetitive effects of the transaction in each 
of the Metropolitan Markets by maintaining the Divestiture Assets as 
independent, economically viable and competitive. The proposed Final 
Judgment requires Clear Channel and Fairway to divest the Divestiture 
Assets to the following Acquirers:
     Divestiture Assets located in the Indianapolis 
Metropolitan Market to Circle City Outdoor, LLC; and
     Divestiture Assets located in the Atlanta Metropolitan 
Market to Link Media Georgia, LLC.
    The United States has approved each of these Acquirers as suitable 
divestiture buyers. The United States required Clear Channel and 
Fairway to identify each Acquirer of a Divestiture Asset in order to 
provide greater certainty and efficiency in the divestiture process. 
If, for any reason, Defendants are unable to complete the divestitures 
to either of these Acquirers, Defendants must divest the remaining 
Divestiture Assets to one or more alternative Acquirers approved by the 
United States in its sole discretion.
    The Divestiture Assets are defined in Paragraph II.F of the 
proposed Final Judgment to include all assets set forth in Schedules A 
and B to the proposed Final Judgment, tangible or intangible, relating 
to each outdoor advertising display face, including all real property 
(owned or leased), all licenses, permits and authorizations issued by 
any governmental organization relating to the operation of the asset, 
and all contracts, agreements, leases, licenses, commitments and 
understandings pertaining to the sale of outdoor advertising on each 
asset.
    To ensure that the Divestiture Assets are operated independently 
from Clear Channel and Fairway after the divestitures, Section XII of 
the proposed Final Judgment prohibits Defendants from reacquiring any 
part of the Divestiture Assets during the term of the Final Judgment 
and Section VII prohibits Defendants from financing all or any part of 
the Acquirers' purchase of the Divestiture Assets.
    Defendants are required to take all steps reasonably necessary to 
accomplish the divestitures quickly and to cooperate with prospective 
purchasers. Pursuant to Paragraph IV.A of the proposed Final Judgment, 
divestiture of each of the Divestiture Assets must occur within ten 
calendar days after the Court's signing of the Asset Preservation Order 
or consummation of the Transaction, whichever is later. The United 
States, in its sole discretion, may agree to one or more extensions of 
this time period not to exceed 60 calendar days in total, and shall 
notify the Court in such circumstances.
    In the event that Defendants do not accomplish all of the 
divestitures within the periods prescribed in the proposed Final 
Judgment, Section V of the proposed Final Judgment provides that the 
Court, upon application of the United States, will appoint a trustee 
selected by the United States to effect any remaining divestitures. If 
a trustee

[[Page 96512]]

is appointed, the proposed Final Judgment provides that Clear Channel 
and Fairway will pay all costs and expenses of the trustee. The 
trustee's commission will be structured to provide an incentive for the 
trustee based on the price obtained and the speed with which the 
divestitures are accomplished. After his or her appointment becomes 
effective, the trustee will file monthly reports with the Court and the 
United States describing his or her efforts to accomplish the 
divestiture of any remaining stations. If the divestiture has not been 
accomplished after 6 months, the trustee and the United States will 
make recommendations to the Court, which shall enter such orders as 
appropriate, to carry out the purpose of the trust, including extending 
the trust or the term of the trustee's appointment.
    Section XI of the proposed Final Judgment requires Defendants to 
provide advance notification of certain future proposed acquisitions 
not otherwise subject to the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements 
Act of 1976, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 18a. Specifically, Fairway must 
provide at least thirty days advance written notice to the United 
States before it acquires, directly or indirectly, any interest in any 
outdoor advertising asset in the form of a billboard or any outdoor 
advertising business that owns billboards in the metropolitan 
statistical areas associated with Rochester, Minnesota and 
Indianapolis; and Clear Channel must provide at least thirty days 
advance written notice to the United States before it (a) acquires any 
assets located in the Atlanta metropolitan statistical area that were 
included in, but later removed from, the original transaction agreement 
between Clear Channel and Fairway; and (b) directly or indirectly 
acquires any outdoor advertising assets in the form of billboards or 
any interest, including any financial, security, loan, equity or 
management interest, in any outdoor advertising business that owns 
billboards in the Atlanta metropolitan statistical area where the 
assets or interests acquired have annual revenues for the last twelve 
months in excess of $5 million. Section XI then provides for waiting 
periods and opportunities for the United States to obtain additional 
information similar to the provisions of the HSR Act before 
acquisitions in these geographic areas may be consummated.
    The geographic areas that Section XI applies to include one 
metropolitan area not subject to divestitures: Rochester, Minnesota. 
Although, as discussed above, Rochester billboard assets were 
ultimately excluded from the Defendants' asset swap transaction, given 
the highly concentrated market for outdoor advertising on billboards in 
Rochester and the fact that the Rochester billboard assets originally 
were part of the transaction, the United States sought to ensure that 
it would have the opportunity to review future acquisitions in that 
area so that it can seek effective relief, if necessary.

IV. REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO POTENTIAL PRIVATE LITIGANTS

    Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 15, provides that any 
person who has been injured as a result of conduct prohibited by the 
antitrust laws may bring suit in federal court to recover three times 
the damages the person has suffered, as well as costs and reasonable 
attorneys' fees. Entry of the proposed Final Judgment will neither 
impair nor assist the bringing of any private antitrust damage action. 
Under the provisions of Section 5(a) of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 
16(a), the proposed Final Judgment has no prima facie effect in any 
subsequent private lawsuit that may be brought against Defendants.

V. PROCEDURES AVAILABLE FOR MODIFICATION OF THE PROPOSED FINAL JUDGMENT

    The United States and Defendants have stipulated that the proposed 
Final Judgment may be entered by the Court after compliance with the 
provisions of the APPA, provided that the United States has not 
withdrawn its consent. The APPA conditions entry upon the Court's 
determination that the proposed Final Judgment is in the public 
interest.
    The APPA provides a period of at least sixty (60) days preceding 
the effective date of the proposed Final Judgment within which any 
person may submit to the United States written comments regarding the 
proposed Final Judgment. Any person who wishes to comment should do so 
within sixty (60) days of the date of publication of this Competitive 
Impact Statement in the Federal Register, or the last date of 
publication in a newspaper of the summary of this Competitive Impact 
Statement, whichever is later. All comments received during this period 
will be considered by the United States, which remains free to withdraw 
its consent to the proposed Final Judgment at any time prior to the 
Court's entry of judgment. The comments and the response of the United 
States, if any, will be filed with the Court. In addition, comments 
will be posted on the Antitrust Division's Web site and, under certain 
circumstances, published in the Federal Register.
    Written comments should be submitted to:

Owen M. Kendler
Acting Chief, Litigation III Section
Antitrust Division
United States Department of Justice
450 5th Street NW., Suite 4000
Washington, DC 20530

The proposed Final Judgment provides that the Court retains 
jurisdiction over this action, and Defendants may apply to the Court 
for any order necessary or appropriate for the modification, 
interpretation, or enforcement of the Final Judgment.

VI. ALTERNATIVES TO THE PROPOSED FINAL JUDGMENT

    The United States considered, as an alternative to the proposed 
Final Judgment, a full trial on the merits against Defendants. The 
United States could have continued the litigation and sought 
preliminary and permanent injunctions against the transaction between 
Clear Channel and Fairway. The United States is satisfied, however, 
that the divestiture of assets described in the proposed Final Judgment 
will preserve competition for the sale of outdoor advertising on 
billboards in each of the Metropolitan Markets and the affected smaller 
areas within each Metropolitan Market. Thus, the proposed Final 
Judgment would achieve all or substantially all of the relief the 
United States would have obtained through litigation, but avoids the 
time, expense, and uncertainty of a full trial on the merits of the 
Complaint.

VII. STANDARD OF REVIEW UNDER THE APPA FOR THE PROPOSED FINAL JUDGMENT

    The Clayton Act, as amended by the APPA, requires that proposed 
consent judgments in antitrust cases brought by the United States be 
subject to a sixty-day comment period, after which the Court shall 
determine whether entry of the proposed Final Judgment ``is in the 
public interest.'' 15 U.S.C. 16(e)(1). In making that determination, 
the Court, in accordance with the statute as amended in 2004, is 
required to consider:

    (A) the competitive impact of such judgment, including 
termination of alleged violations, provisions for enforcement and 
modification, duration of relief sought, anticipated effects of 
alternative remedies actually considered, whether its terms are 
ambiguous, and any other competitive considerations bearing upon the 
adequacy of such judgment that the court deems necessary to a 
determination of whether the consent judgment is in the public 
interest; and
    (B) the impact of entry of such judgment upon competition in the 
relevant market or markets, upon the public generally and 
individuals alleging specific injury from the violations set forth 
in the complaint

[[Page 96513]]

including consideration of the public benefit, if any, to be derived 
from a determination of the issues at trial.

15 U.S.C. 16(e)(1)(A) & (B). In considering these statutory factors, 
the Court's inquiry is necessarily a limited one as the government is 
entitled to ``broad discretion to settle with the defendant within the 
reaches of the public interest.'' United States v. Microsoft Corp., 56 
F.3d 1448, 1461 (D.C. Cir. 1995); see generally United States v. SBC 
Commc'ns, Inc., 489 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2007) (assessing public 
interest standard under the Tunney Act); United States v. US Airways 
Group, Inc., 38 F. Supp. 3d 69, 75 (D.D.C. 2014) (explaining that the 
``court's inquiry is limited'' in Tunney Act settlements); United 
States v. InBev N.V./S.A., No. 08-1965 (JR), 2009-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) ] 
76,736, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84787, at *3, (D.D.C. Aug. 11, 2009) 
(noting that the court's review of a consent judgment is limited and 
only inquires ``into whether the government's determination that the 
proposed remedies will cure the antitrust violations alleged in the 
complaint was reasonable, and whether the mechanism to enforce the 
final judgment are clear and manageable.'').\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ The 2004 amendments substituted ``shall'' for ``may'' in 
directing relevant factors for court to consider and amended the 
list of factors to focus on competitive considerations and to 
address potentially ambiguous judgment terms. Compare 15 U.S.C. 
16(e) (2004) with 15 U.S.C. 16(e)(1) (2006); see also SBC Commc'ns, 
489 F. Supp. 2d at 11 (concluding that the 2004 amendments 
``effected minimal changes'' to Tunney Act review).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit has held, under the APPA a court considers, among other things, 
the relationship between the remedy secured and the specific 
allegations set forth in the government's complaint, whether the decree 
is sufficiently clear, whether enforcement mechanisms are sufficient, 
and whether the decree may positively harm third parties. See 
Microsoft, 56 F.3d at 1458-62. With respect to the adequacy of the 
relief secured by the decree, a court may not ``engage in an 
unrestricted evaluation of what relief would best serve the public.'' 
United States v. BNS, Inc., 858 F.2d 456, 462 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting 
United States v. Bechtel Corp., 648 F.2d 660, 666 (9th Cir. 1981)); see 
also Microsoft, 56 F.3d at 1460-62; United States v. Alcoa, Inc., 152 
F. Supp. 2d 37, 40 (D.D.C. 2001); InBev, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84787, 
at *3. Courts have held that:

[t]he balancing of competing social and political interests affected 
by a proposed antitrust consent decree must be left, in the first 
instance, to the discretion of the Attorney General. The court's 
role in protecting the public interest is one of insuring that the 
government has not breached its duty to the public in consenting to 
the decree. The court is required to determine not whether a 
particular decree is the one that will best serve society, but 
whether the settlement is ``within the reaches of the public 
interest.'' More elaborate requirements might undermine the 
effectiveness of antitrust enforcement by consent decree.

Bechtel, 648 F.2d at 666 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).\2\ In 
determining whether a proposed settlement is in the public interest, a 
district court ``must accord deference to the government's predictions 
about the efficacy of its remedies, and may not require that the 
remedies perfectly match the alleged violations.'' SBC Commc'ns, 489 F. 
Supp. 2d at 17; see also US Airways, 38 F. Supp. 3d at 75 (noting that 
a court should not reject the proposed remedies because it believes 
others are preferable); Microsoft, 56 F.3d at 1461 (noting the need for 
courts to be ``deferential to the government's predictions as to the 
effect of the proposed remedies''); United States v. Archer-Daniels-
Midland Co., 272 F. Supp. 2d 1, 6 (D.D.C. 2003) (noting that the court 
should grant due respect to the United States' prediction as to the 
effect of proposed remedies, its perception of the market structure, 
and its views of the nature of the case).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \2\ Cf. BNS, 858 F.2d at 464 (holding that the court's 
``ultimate authority under the [APPA] is limited to approving or 
disapproving the consent decree''); United States v. Gillette Co., 
406 F. Supp. 713, 716 (D. Mass. 1975) (noting that, in this way, the 
court is constrained to ``look at the overall picture not 
hypercritically, nor with a microscope, but with an artist's 
reducing glass''). See generally Microsoft, 56 F.3d at 1461 
(discussing whether ``the remedies [obtained in the decree are] so 
inconsonant with the allegations charged as to fall outside of the 
`reaches of the public interest' '').

    Courts have greater flexibility in approving proposed consent 
decrees than in crafting their own decrees following a finding of 
liability in a litigated matter. ``[A] proposed decree must be approved 
even if it falls short of the remedy the court would impose on its own, 
as long as it falls within the range of acceptability or is `within the 
reaches of public interest.' '' United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 
552 F. Supp. 131, 151 (D.D.C. 1982) (citations omitted) (quoting United 
States v. Gillette Co., 406 F. Supp. 713, 716 (D. Mass. 1975)), aff'd 
sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983); see also US 
Airways, 38 F. Supp. 3d at 76 (noting that room must be made for the 
government to grant concessions in the negotiation process for 
settlements) (citing Microsoft, 56 F.3d at 1461); United States v. 
Alcan Aluminum Ltd., 605 F. Supp. 619, 622 (W.D. Ky. 1985) (approving 
the consent decree even though the court would have imposed a greater 
remedy). To meet this standard, the United States ``need only provide a 
factual basis for concluding that the settlements are reasonably 
adequate remedies for the alleged harms.'' SBC Commc'ns, 489 F. Supp. 
2d at 17.
    Moreover, the Court's role under the APPA is limited to reviewing 
the remedy in relationship to the violations that the United States has 
alleged in its Complaint, and does not authorize the Court to 
``construct [its] own hypothetical case and then evaluate the decree 
against that case.'' Microsoft, 56 F.3d at 1459; see also US Airways, 
38 F. Supp. 3d at 75 (noting that the court must simply determine 
whether there is a factual foundation for the government's decisions 
such that its conclusions regarding the proposed settlements are 
reasonable); InBev, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84787, at *20 (``the `public 
interest' is not to be measured by comparing the violations alleged in 
the complaint against those the court believes could have, or even 
should have, been alleged''). Because the ``court's authority to review 
the decree depends entirely on the government's exercising its 
prosecutorial discretion by bringing a case in the first place,'' it 
follows that ``the court is only authorized to review the decree 
itself,'' and not to ``effectively redraft the complaint'' to inquire 
into other matters that the United States did not pursue. Microsoft, 56 
F.3d at 1459-60. As this Court confirmed in SBC Communications, courts 
``cannot look beyond the complaint in making the public interest 
determination unless the complaint is drafted so narrowly as to make a 
mockery of judicial power.'' SBC Commc'ns, 489 F. Supp. 2d at 15.
    In its 2004 amendments, Congress made clear its intent to preserve 
the practical benefits of utilizing consent decrees in antitrust 
enforcement, adding the unambiguous instruction that ``[n]othing in 
this section shall be construed to require the court to conduct an 
evidentiary hearing or to require the court to permit anyone to 
intervene.'' 15 U.S.C. 16(e)(2); see also US Airways, 38 F. Supp. 3d at 
76 (indicating that a court is not required to hold an evidentiary 
hearing or to permit intervenors as part of its review under the Tunney 
Act). The language wrote into the statute what Congress intended when 
it enacted the Tunney Act in 1974, as Senator Tunney explained: ``[t]he 
court is nowhere compelled to go to trial or to engage in extended 
proceedings which might have the effect of vitiating the benefits of

[[Page 96514]]

prompt and less costly settlement through the consent decree process.'' 
119 Cong. Rec. 24,598 (1973) (statement of Sen. Tunney). Rather, the 
procedure for the public interest determination is left to the 
discretion of the Court, with the recognition that the Court's ``scope 
of review remains sharply proscribed by precedent and the nature of 
Tunney Act proceedings.'' SBC Commc'ns, 489 F. Supp. 2d at 11.\3\ A 
court can make its public interest determination based on the 
competitive impact statement and response to public comments alone. US 
Airways, 38 F. Supp. 3d at 76.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \3\ See United States v. Enova Corp., 107 F. Supp. 2d 10, 17 
(D.D.C. 2000) (noting that the ``Tunney Act expressly allows the 
court to make its public interest determination on the basis of the 
competitive impact statement and response to comments alone''); 
United States v. Mid-Am. Dairymen, Inc., No. 73-CV-681-W-1, 1977-1 
Trade Cas. (CCH) ] 61,508, at 71,980, *22 (W.D.Mo. 1977) (``Absent a 
showing of corrupt failure of the government to discharge its duty, 
the Court, in making its public interest finding, should . . . 
carefully consider the explanations of the government in the 
competitive impact statement and its responses to comments in order 
to determine whether those explanations are reasonable under the 
circumstances.''); S. Rep. No. 93-298, at 6 (1973) (``Where the 
public interest can be meaningfully evaluated simply on the basis of 
briefs and oral arguments, that is the approach that should be 
utilized.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

VIII. DETERMINATIVE DOCUMENTS

    There are no determinative materials or documents within the 
meaning of the APPA that were considered by the United States in 
formulating the proposed Final Judgment.

Dated: December 22, 2016

Respectfully submitted,

Mark A. Merva* (D.C. Bar #451743),

Trial Attorney, United States Department of Justice, Antitrust 
Division, Litigation III Section, 450 Fifth Street NW., Suite 4000, 
Washington, D.C. 20530, Phone: 202-616-1398, Facsimile: 202-514-
7308, E-mail: [email protected].
* Attorney of Record

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

    I, Mark A. Merva, of the Antitrust Division of the United States 
Department of Justice, do hereby certify that true copies of the 
Complaint, Competitive Impact Statement, Asset Preservation Stipulation 
and Order, Proposed Final Judgment, and Plaintiff's Explanation of 
Consent Decree Procedures were served this 22 day of December, 2016, by 
email, to the following:

Counsel for Defendant Clear Channel Outdoor Holdings, Inc.

Michael DeRita (D.C. Bar No. 1032126),
Marin Boney (D.C. Bar No. 990336),

Kirkland & Ellis LLP, 655 Fifteenth Street NW., Washington, D.C. 
20005, Phone: 202-879-5122, [email protected].

Ian G. John,

Kirkland & Ellis LLP, 601 Lexington Avenue, New York, NY 10022-4611, 
Phone: 212-446-4665, [email protected].

Counsel for Defendant Fairway Media Group, LLC

Jason D. Cruise (D.C. Bar No. 497565),
Farrell J. Malone (D.C. Bar No. 983746),

Latham & Watkins LLP, 555 Eleventh Street NW., Suite 1000, 
Washington, DC 20004, Phone: 202-637-2200, [email protected], 
[email protected].

Joshua N. Holian,
Latham & Watkins LLP, 505 Montgomery Street, Suite 2000, San 
Francisco, CA 94111, Phone: 415-646-8343, [email protected].

/s/_Mark A. Merva------------------------------------------------------
Mark A. Merva

United States District Court for the District of Columbia

    United States of America, Plaintiff, v. Clear Channel Outdoor 
Holdings, Inc., and Fairway Media Group, LLC, Defendants.

Case No.: 1:16-cv-02497
Judge: Randolph D. Moss
Filed: 12/22/2016

PROPOSED FINAL JUDGMENT

    WHEREAS, Plaintiff, the United States of America, filed its 
Complaint on December 22, 2016, and Defendant Clear Channel Outdoor 
Holdings, Inc. (``Clear Channel'') and Defendant Fairway Media Group, 
LLC (``Fairway''), by their respective attorneys, have consented to the 
entry of this Final Judgment without trial or adjudication of any issue 
of fact or law, and without this Final Judgment constituting any 
evidence against or admission by any party regarding any issue of fact 
or law;
    AND WHEREAS, Defendants agree to be bound by the provisions of this 
Final Judgment pending its approval by the Court;
    AND WHEREAS, the essence of this Final Judgment is the prompt and 
certain divestiture of certain rights or assets by the Defendants to 
assure that competition is not substantially lessened;
    AND WHEREAS, the United States requires Defendants to make certain 
divestitures for the purpose of remedying the loss of competition 
alleged in the Complaint;
    AND WHEREAS, Defendants have represented to the United States that 
the divestitures required below can and will be made and that 
Defendants will later raise no claim of hardship or difficulty as 
grounds for asking the Court to modify any of the divestiture 
provisions contained below;
    NOW THEREFORE, before any testimony is taken, without trial or 
adjudication of any issue of fact or law, and upon consent of the 
parties, it is ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED:

I. JURISDICTION

    This Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and each of the 
parties to this action. The Complaint states a claim upon which relief 
may be granted against Defendants under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 
as amended, 15 U.S.C. 18.

II. DEFINITIONS

    As used in this Final Judgment:
    A. ``Clear Channel'' means Defendant Clear Channel Outdoor 
Holdings, Inc., a Delaware corporation headquartered in San Antonio, 
Texas, its successors and assigns, and its subsidiaries, divisions, 
groups, affiliates, partnerships, and joint ventures, and their 
directors, officers, managers, agents, and employees.
    B. ``Fairway'' means Defendant Fairway Media Group, LLC, a Delaware 
limited liability company headquartered in Duncan, South Carolina, its 
successors and assigns, and its subsidiaries, divisions, groups, 
affiliates, partnerships, and joint ventures, and their directors, 
officers, managers, agents, and employees.
    C. ``Circle City'' means Circle City Outdoor, LLC, a Washington 
limited liability company headquartered in Spokane, Washington, its 
successor and assigns, and its subsidiaries, divisions, groups, 
affiliates, partnerships, and joint ventures, and their directors, 
officers, managers, agents, and employees.
    D. ``Link Media'' means Link Media Georgia, LLC, a Georgia limited 
liability company headquartered in Wichita, Kansas, its successor and 
assigns, parents, subsidiaries, divisions, groups, affiliates, 
partnerships, and joint ventures, including Link Media Holdings, LLC 
and Boston Omaha Corporation, and their directors, officers, managers, 
agents, and employees.
    E. ``Acquirer'' means Circle City, Link Media, or another entity or 
entities to which Defendants divest the Divestiture Assets.
    F. ``Atlanta Divestiture Assets'' means all of Defendants' 
interests in the assets set forth in Schedule A, including all assets, 
tangible or intangible, relating to each outdoor advertising display 
face, including all real property (owned or leased), all licenses, 
permits and authorizations issued by any governmental organization 
relating to the operation of the assets, and all contracts, agreements, 
leases, licenses, commitments and understandings pertaining to the sale 
of outdoor advertising on the assets.

[[Page 96515]]

    G. ``Indianapolis Divestiture Assets'' means all of Defendants' 
interests in the assets set forth in Schedule B, including all assets, 
tangible or intangible, relating to each outdoor advertising display 
face, including all real property (owned or leased), all licenses, 
permits and authorizations issued by any governmental organization 
relating to the operation of the assets, and all contracts, agreements, 
leases, licenses, commitments and understandings pertaining to the sale 
of outdoor advertising on the assets.
    H. ``Divestiture Assets'' means the Indianapolis Divestiture Assets 
and the Atlanta Divestiture Assets.
    I. ``Transaction'' means the Asset Purchase and Exchange Agreement, 
dated March 3, 2016, between Clear Channel and Fairway.

III. APPLICABILITY

    A. This Final Judgment applies to Clear Channel and Fairway, as 
defined above, and all other persons in active concert or participation 
with any of them who receive actual notice of this Final Judgment by 
personal service or otherwise.
    B. If, prior to complying with Sections IV and V of this Final 
Judgment, Defendants sell or otherwise dispose of all or substantially 
all of their assets or of lesser business units that include the 
Divestiture Assets, they shall require the purchaser to be bound by the 
provisions of this Final Judgment. Defendants need not obtain such an 
agreement from the Acquirer(s) of the assets divested pursuant to this 
Final Judgment.

IV. DIVESTITURES

    A. Defendants are ordered and directed, within ten (10) calendar 
days after (i) the Court's signing of the Asset Preservation 
Stipulation and Order in this matter or (ii) consummation of the 
Transaction, whichever is later, to divest in a manner consistent with 
this Final Judgment the Indianapolis Divestiture Assets to Circle City 
and the Atlanta Divestiture Assets to Link Media or another Acquirer(s) 
acceptable to the United States, in its sole discretion. The United 
States, in its sole discretion, may agree to one or more extensions of 
this time period not to exceed sixty (60) calendar days in total, and 
shall notify the Court in such circumstances. Defendants agree to use 
their best efforts to divest the Indianapolis Divestiture Assets and 
the Atlanta Divestiture Assets as expeditiously as possible.
    B. In the event that Defendants are attempting to divest the 
Indianapolis Divestiture Assets to an Acquirer other than Circle City, 
or the Atlanta Divestiture Assets to an Acquirer other than Link Media:
    (1) Defendants promptly shall make known, by usual and customary 
means, the availability of the Divestiture Assets to be divested; and
    (2) Defendants shall inform any person making an inquiry regarding 
a possible purchase of the relevant Divestiture Assets that they are 
being divested pursuant to this Final Judgment and provide that person 
with a copy of this Final Judgment.
    C. Defendants shall offer to furnish to all prospective Acquirers, 
subject to customary confidentiality assurances, all information and 
documents relating to the relevant Divestiture Assets customarily 
provided in a due diligence process except such information or 
documents subject to the attorney-client privilege or work-product 
doctrine; and Defendants shall make available such information to the 
United States at the same time that such information is made available 
to any other person.
    D. Defendants shall permit prospective Acquirers of the Divestiture 
Assets to have reasonable access to make inspections of the Divestiture 
Assets; access to any and all environmental, zoning, and other permit 
documents and information; and access to any and all financial, 
operational, or other documents and information customarily provided as 
part of a due diligence process.
    E. Defendants shall warrant to the Acquirers that each Divestiture 
Asset will be operational on the date of sale.
    F. Defendants shall not take any action that will impede in any way 
the permitting, operation, or divestiture of the Divestiture Assets.
    G. Defendants shall warrant to the Acquirer(s) that there are no 
material defects in the environmental, zoning, or other permits 
pertaining to the operation of each Divestiture Asset, and that, 
following the sale of the Divestiture Assets, Defendants will not 
undertake, directly or indirectly, any challenges to the environmental, 
zoning, or other permits relating to the operation of the Divestiture 
Assets.
    H. Unless the United States otherwise consents in writing, the 
divestitures pursuant to Section IV, or by a Divestiture Trustee 
appointed pursuant to Section V of this Final Judgment, shall include 
the entire Divestiture Assets and be accomplished in such a way as to 
satisfy the United States, in its sole discretion, that the Divestiture 
Assets can and will be used by the Acquirers as part of a viable, 
ongoing outdoor advertising business. Divestiture of the Divestiture 
Assets may be made to one or more Acquirers, provided that in each 
instance it is demonstrated to the sole satisfaction of the United 
States that the Divestiture Assets will remain viable, and the 
divestiture of such assets will remedy the competitive harm alleged in 
the Complaint. The divestitures, whether pursuant to Section IV or 
Section V of this Final Judgment:
    (1) shall be made to Acquirers that, in the United States' sole 
judgment, have the intent and capability (including the necessary 
managerial, operational, technical, and financial capability) of 
competing effectively in the outdoor advertising business; and
    (2) shall be accomplished so as to satisfy the United States, in 
its sole discretion, that none of the terms of any agreement between 
the Acquirers and Defendants gives Defendants the ability unreasonably 
to raise the costs of the Acquirers, to lower the efficiency of the 
Acquirers, or otherwise to interfere in the ability of the Acquirers to 
compete effectively.

V. APPOINTMENT OF DIVESTITURE TRUSTEE

    A. If Defendants have not divested the Divestiture Assets within 
the time period specified in Section IV(A), Defendants shall notify the 
United States of that fact in writing, specifically identifying the 
Divestiture Assets that have not been divested. Upon application of the 
United States, the Court shall appoint a Divestiture Trustee selected 
by the United States and approved by the Court to effect the 
divestiture of the Divestiture Assets that have not yet been divested.
    B. After the appointment of a Divestiture Trustee becomes 
effective, only the Divestiture Trustee shall have the right to sell 
the relevant Divestiture Assets. The Divestiture Trustee shall have the 
power and authority to accomplish the divestiture to an Acquirer 
acceptable to the United States at such price and on such terms as are 
then obtainable upon reasonable effort by the Divestiture Trustee, 
subject to the provisions of Sections IV, V, and VI of this Final 
Judgment, and shall have such other powers as this Court deems 
appropriate. Subject to Section V(D) of this Final Judgment, the 
Divestiture Trustee may hire at the cost and expense of Defendants any 
investment bankers, attorneys, or other agents, who shall be solely 
accountable to the Divestiture Trustee, reasonably necessary in the 
Divestiture Trustee's judgment to assist in the divestiture. Any such 
investment bankers, attorneys, or other agents shall serve on such 
terms and conditions as the United States approves, including 
confidentiality

[[Page 96516]]

requirements and conflict of interest certifications.
    C. Defendants shall not object to a sale by the Divestiture Trustee 
on any ground other than the Divestiture Trustee's malfeasance. Any 
such objections by Defendants must be conveyed in writing to the United 
States and the Divestiture Trustee within ten (10) calendar days after 
the Divestiture Trustee has provided the notice required under Section 
VI.
    D. The Divestiture Trustee shall serve at the cost and expense of 
Defendants pursuant to a written agreement, on such terms and 
conditions as the United States approves, including confidentiality 
requirements and conflict of interest certifications. The Divestiture 
Trustee shall account for all monies derived from the sale of the 
relevant Divestiture Assets and all costs and expenses so incurred. 
After approval by the Court of the Divestiture Trustee's accounting, 
including fees for its services yet unpaid and those of any 
professionals and agents retained by the Divestiture Trustee, all 
remaining money shall be paid to Defendants and the trust shall then be 
terminated. The compensation of the Divestiture Trustee and any 
professionals and agents retained by the Divestiture Trustee shall be 
reasonable in light of the value of the Divestiture Assets subject to 
sale by the Divestiture Trustee and based on a fee arrangement 
providing the Divestiture Trustee with an incentive based on the price 
and terms of the divestiture and the speed with which it is 
accomplished, but timeliness is paramount. If the Divestiture Trustee 
and Defendants are unable to reach agreement on the Divestiture 
Trustee's or any agents' or consultants' compensation or other terms 
and conditions of engagement within 14 calendar days of appointment of 
the Divestiture Trustee, the United States may, in its sole discretion, 
take appropriate action, including making a recommendation to the 
Court. The Divestiture Trustee shall, within three (3) business days of 
hiring any other professionals or agents, provide written notice of 
such hiring and the rate of compensation to Defendants and the United 
States.
    E. Defendants shall use their best efforts to assist the 
Divestiture Trustee in accomplishing the required divestiture. The 
Divestiture Trustee and any consultants, accountants, attorneys, and 
other agents retained by the Divestiture Trustee shall have full and 
complete access to the personnel, books, records, and facilities of the 
business to be divested, and Defendants shall develop financial and 
other information relevant to such business as the Divestiture Trustee 
may reasonably request, subject to reasonable protection for trade 
secret or other confidential research, development, or commercial 
information or any applicable privileges. Defendants shall take no 
action to interfere with or to impede the Divestiture Trustee's 
accomplishment of the divestiture.
    F. After its appointment, the Divestiture Trustee shall file 
monthly reports with the United States and, as appropriate, the Court 
setting forth the Divestiture Trustee's efforts to accomplish the 
relevant divestitures ordered under this Final Judgment. To the extent 
such reports contain information that the Divestiture Trustee deems 
confidential, such report shall not be filed in the public docket of 
the Court. Such report shall include the name, address, and telephone 
number of each person who, during the preceding month, made an offer to 
acquire, expressed an interest in acquiring, entered into negotiations 
to acquire, or was contacted or made an inquiry about acquiring, any 
interest in the Divestiture Assets, and shall describe in detail each 
contact with any such person. The Divestiture Trustee shall maintain 
full records of all efforts made to divest the relevant Divestiture 
Assets.
    G. If the Divestiture Trustee has not accomplished the divestitures 
ordered under this Final Judgment within six (6) months after its 
appointment, the Divestiture Trustee shall promptly file with the Court 
a report setting forth (1) the Divestiture Trustee's efforts to 
accomplish the required divestiture, (2) the reasons, in the 
Divestiture Trustee's judgment, why the required divestiture has not 
been accomplished, and (3) the Divestiture Trustee's recommendations. 
To the extent such report contains information that the Divestiture 
Trustee deems confidential, such report shall not be filed in the 
public docket of the Court. The Divestiture Trustee shall at the same 
time furnish such report to the United States which shall have the 
right to make additional recommendations consistent with the purpose of 
the trust. The Court thereafter shall enter such orders as it shall 
deem appropriate to carry out the purpose of the Final Judgment, which 
may, if necessary, include extending the trust and the term of the 
Divestiture Trustee's appointment by a period requested by the United 
States.
    H. If the United States determines that the Divestiture Trustee has 
ceased to act or failed to act diligently or in a reasonably cost-
effective manner, it may recommend the Court appoint a substitute 
Divestiture Trustee.

VI. NOTICE OF PROPOSED DIVESTITURE

    A. Within two (2) business days following execution of a definitive 
divestiture agreement, Defendants or the Divestiture Trustee, whichever 
is then responsible for effecting the divestitures required herein, 
shall notify the United States of any proposed divestiture required by 
Section IV or V of this Final Judgment. If the Divestiture Trustee is 
responsible, it shall similarly notify Defendants. The notice shall set 
forth the details of the proposed divestiture and list the name, 
address, and telephone number of each person not previously identified 
who offered or expressed an interest in or desire to acquire any 
ownership interest in the Divestiture Assets, together with full 
details of the same.
    B. Within fifteen (15) calendar days of receipt by the United 
States of such notice, the United States may request from Defendants, 
the proposed Acquirer, any other third party, or the Divestiture 
Trustee, if applicable, additional information concerning the proposed 
divestiture, the proposed Acquirer, and any other potential Acquirers. 
Defendants and the Divestiture Trustee shall furnish any additional 
information requested within fifteen (15) calendar days of the receipt 
of the request, unless the parties shall otherwise agree.
    C. Within thirty (30) calendar days after receipt of the notice or 
within twenty (20) calendar days after the United States has been 
provided the additional information requested from Defendants, the 
proposed Acquirer, any third party, and the Divestiture Trustee, 
whichever is later, the United States shall provide written notice to 
Defendants and the Divestiture Trustee, if there is one, stating 
whether or not it objects to the proposed divestiture. If the United 
States provides written notice that it does not object, the divestiture 
may be consummated, subject only to Defendants' limited right to object 
to the sale under Section V(C) of this Final Judgment. Absent written 
notice that the United States does not object to the proposed Acquirer 
or upon objection by the United States, a divestiture proposed under 
Section IV or Section V shall not be consummated. Upon objection by 
Defendants under Section V(C), a divestiture proposed under Section V 
shall not be consummated unless approved by the Court.

VII. FINANCING

    Defendants shall not finance all or any part of any purchase made 
pursuant

[[Page 96517]]

to Section IV or V of this Final Judgment.

VIII. ASSET PRESERVATION

    Until the divestitures required by this Final Judgment have been 
accomplished, Defendants shall take all steps necessary to comply with 
the Asset Preservation Stipulation and Order entered by this Court. 
Defendants shall take no action that would jeopardize the divestitures 
ordered by this Court.

IX. AFFIDAVITS

    A. Within twenty (20) calendar days of the filing of the Complaint 
in this matter, and every thirty (30) calendar days thereafter until 
the divestiture has been completed under Section IV or V of this Final 
Judgment, Defendants shall deliver to the United States an affidavit as 
to the fact and manner of their compliance with Section IV or V of this 
Final Judgment. Each such affidavit shall include the name, address, 
and telephone number of each person who, during the preceding thirty 
(30) calendar days, made an offer to acquire, expressed an interest in 
acquiring, entered into negotiations to acquire, or was contacted or 
made an inquiry about acquiring, any interest in the Divestiture 
Assets, and shall describe in detail each contact with any such person 
during that period. Each such affidavit shall also include a 
description of the efforts Defendants have taken to solicit buyers for 
the Divestiture Assets and to provide required information to 
prospective Acquirers, including the limitations, if any, on such 
information. Assuming the information set forth in the affidavit is 
true and complete, any objection by the United States to information 
provided by Defendants, including limitations on information, shall be 
made within fourteen (14) calendar days of receipt of such affidavit.
    B. Within twenty (20) calendar days of the filing of the Complaint 
in this matter, Defendants shall deliver to the United States an 
affidavit that describes in reasonable detail all actions Defendants 
have taken and all steps Defendants have implemented on an ongoing 
basis to comply with Section VIII of this Final Judgment. Defendants 
shall deliver to the United States an affidavit describing any changes 
to the efforts and actions outlined in Defendants' earlier affidavits 
filed pursuant to this section within fifteen (15) calendar days after 
the change is implemented.
    C. Defendants shall keep all records of all efforts made to 
preserve and divest the Divestiture Assets until one year after such 
divestiture has been completed.

X. COMPLIANCE INSPECTION

    A. For the purposes of determining or securing compliance with this 
Final Judgment, or of any related orders such as any Asset Preservation 
Stipulation and Order, or of determining whether the Final Judgment 
should be modified or vacated, and subject to any legally recognized 
privilege, from time to time authorized representatives of the United 
States Department of Justice, including consultants and other persons 
retained by the United States, shall, upon written request of an 
authorized representative of the Assistant Attorney General in charge 
of the Antitrust Division, and on reasonable notice to Defendants, be 
permitted:
    (1) access during Defendants' office hours to inspect and copy, or 
at the option of the United States, to require Defendants to provide 
hard copies or electronic copies of, all books, ledgers, accounts, 
records, data, and documents in the possession, custody, or control of 
Defendants, relating to any matters contained in this Final Judgment; 
and
    (2) to interview, either informally or on the record, Defendants' 
officers, employees, or agents, who may have their individual counsel 
present, regarding such matters. The interviews shall be subject to the 
reasonable convenience of the interviewee and without restraint or 
interference by Defendants.
    B. Upon the written request of an authorized representative of the 
Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division, 
Defendants shall submit written reports or responses to written 
interrogatories, under oath if requested, relating to any of the 
matters contained in this Final Judgment as may be requested.
    C. No information or documents obtained by the means provided in 
this section shall be divulged by the United States to any person other 
than an authorized representative of the executive branch of the United 
States, except in the course of legal proceedings to which the United 
States is a party (including grand jury proceedings), or for the 
purpose of securing compliance with this Final Judgment, or as 
otherwise required by law.
    D. If at the time information or documents are furnished by 
Defendants to the United States, Defendants represent and identify in 
writing the material in any such information or documents to which a 
claim of protection may be asserted under Rule 26(c)(1)(G) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and Defendants mark each pertinent 
page of such material, ``Subject to claim of protection under Rule 
26(c)(1)(G) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,'' then the United 
States shall give Defendants ten (10) calendar days notice prior to 
divulging such material in any legal proceeding (other than a grand 
jury proceeding).

XI. NOTIFICATION

    A. Unless such transaction is otherwise subject to the reporting 
and waiting period requirements of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust 
Improvements Act of 1976, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 18a (the ``HSR Act''): 
(1) Fairway, without providing advance notification to DOJ, shall not 
directly or indirectly acquire any outdoor advertising assets in the 
form of billboards or any interest, including any financial, security, 
loan, equity or management interest, in any outdoor advertising 
business that owns billboards in the metropolitan statistical areas 
associated with Rochester, Minnesota and Indianapolis, Indiana; and (2) 
Clear Channel, without providing advance notification to DOJ, shall not 
(a) acquire any outdoor advertising assets located in the Atlanta 
metropolitan statistical area that were originally included in, but 
later removed from, the Transaction; and (b) directly or indirectly 
acquire any outdoor advertising assets in the form of billboards or any 
interest, including any financial, security, loan, equity or management 
interest, in any outdoor advertising business that owns billboards in 
the metropolitan statistical area associated with Atlanta, Georgia 
where the assets or interests to be acquired have annual revenues for 
the last twelve months in excess of $5 million.
    B. Such notification shall be provided to the DOJ in the same 
format as, and per the instructions relating to the Notification and 
Report Form set forth in the Appendix to Part 803 of Title 16 of the 
Code of Federal Regulations as amended, except that the information 
requested in Items 5 through 8 of the instructions must be provided 
only about outdoor advertising. Notification shall be provided at least 
thirty (30) calendar days prior to acquiring any such interest, and 
shall include, beyond what may be required by the applicable 
instructions, the names of the principal representatives of the parties 
to the agreement who negotiated the agreement, and any management or 
strategic plans discussing the proposed transaction. If within the 30-
day period after notification, representatives of the Antitrust 
Division make a written request for additional information, Defendants 
shall not consummate the

[[Page 96518]]

proposed transaction or agreement until thirty (30) calendar days after 
submitting all such additional information. Early termination of the 
waiting periods in this paragraph may be requested and, where 
appropriate, granted in the same manner as is applicable under the 
requirements and provisions of the HSR Act and rules promulgated 
thereunder. This Section shall be broadly construed and any ambiguity 
or uncertainty regarding the filing of notice under this Section shall 
be resolved in favor of filing notice.

XII. NO REACQUISITION

    Defendants may not reacquire any part of the Divestiture Assets 
during the term of this Final Judgment.

XIII. RETENTION OF JURISDICTION

    This Court retains jurisdiction to enable any party to this Final 
Judgment to apply to this Court at any time for further orders and 
directions as may be necessary or appropriate to carry out or construe 
this Final Judgment, to modify any of its provisions, to enforce 
compliance, and to punish violations of its provisions.

XIV. EXPIRATION OF FINAL JUDGMENT

    Unless this Court grants an extension, this Final Judgment shall 
expire ten years from the date of its entry.

XV. PUBLIC INTEREST DETERMINATION

    Entry of this Final Judgment is in the public interest. The parties 
have complied with the requirements of the Antitrust Procedures and 
Penalties Act, 15 U.S.C Sec.  16, including making copies available to 
the public of this Final Judgment, the Competitive Impact Statement, 
and any comments thereon, and the United States' responses to comments. 
Based upon the record before the Court, which includes the Competitive 
Impact Statement and any comments and response to comments filed with 
the Court, entry of this Final Judgment is in the public interest.

Date:------------------------------------------------------------------

Court approval subject to procedures of Antitrust Procedures and 
Penalties Act, 15 U.S.C. 16

-----------------------------------------------------------------------
United States District Judge

                               SCHEDULE A
------------------------------------------------------------------------
            Metropolitan area                       Structure ID
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Atlanta..................................  FWY184
Atlanta..................................  CCO000059
Atlanta..................................  FWY140
Atlanta..................................  CCO000075
Atlanta..................................  CCO000179
Atlanta..................................  CCO000935
Atlanta..................................  FWY5115
Atlanta..................................  CCO000335
Atlanta..................................  CCO000612
Atlanta..................................  CCO000266
Atlanta..................................  CCO000395
Atlanta..................................  FWY174
Atlanta..................................  CCO000049
Atlanta..................................  CCO000277
Atlanta..................................  CCO000091
Atlanta..................................  CCO000278
Atlanta..................................  CCO001993
Atlanta..................................  CCO000150
Atlanta..................................  CCO001276
Atlanta..................................  CCO001274
Atlanta..................................  CCO000860
Atlanta..................................  CCO000861
Atlanta..................................  CCO000173
Atlanta..................................  CCO000175
Atlanta..................................  FWY244
Atlanta..................................  FWY245
Atlanta..................................  CCO001763
Atlanta..................................  FWY210
Atlanta..................................  CCO001417
Atlanta..................................  CCO001501
Atlanta..................................  CCO000009
Atlanta..................................  FWY220
Atlanta..................................  FWY221
Atlanta..................................  FWY216
Atlanta..................................  CCO000904
Atlanta..................................  CCO000905
Atlanta..................................  FWY148
Atlanta..................................  FWY190
Atlanta..................................  FWY191
Atlanta..................................  FWY194
Atlanta..................................  FWY266
Atlanta..................................  FWY271
Atlanta..................................  CCO000367
Atlanta..................................  CCO001132
------------------------------------------------------------------------


                               SCHEDULE B
------------------------------------------------------------------------
            Metropolitan area                       Structure ID
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Indianapolis.............................  IN2008
Indianapolis.............................  IN2009
Indianapolis.............................  IN2036
Indianapolis.............................  IN2087
Indianapolis.............................  IN2088
Indianapolis.............................  IN2089
Indianapolis.............................  IN2165
Indianapolis.............................  CCO000915
Indianapolis.............................  CCO000665
Indianapolis.............................  CCO000668
Indianapolis.............................  CCO000687
Indianapolis.............................  CCO000318
Indianapolis.............................  CCO000322
------------------------------------------------------------------------

[FR Doc. 2016-31653 Filed 12-29-16; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 4410-11-P