[Federal Register Volume 81, Number 242 (Friday, December 16, 2016)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 91454-91492]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2016-29582]



[[Page 91453]]

Vol. 81

Friday,

No. 242

December 16, 2016

Part V





Commodity Futures Trading Commission





-----------------------------------------------------------------------





 17 CFR Part 150





 Aggregation of Positions; Final Rule

  Federal Register / Vol. 81 , No. 242 / Friday, December 16, 2016 / 
Rules and Regulations  

[[Page 91454]]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION

17 CFR Part 150

RIN 3038-AD82


Aggregation of Positions

AGENCY: Commodity Futures Trading Commission.

ACTION: Final rule.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (``Commission'' or 
``CFTC'') is issuing a final rule to amend part 150 of the Commission's 
regulations with respect to the policy for aggregation under the 
Commission's position limits regime for futures and option contracts on 
nine agricultural commodities. The Commission notes that if its 
proposed position limits regime for other exempt and agricultural 
commodity futures and options contracts and the physical commodity 
swaps that are economically equivalent to such contracts are finalized, 
these amended regulations would also apply to the position limits 
regime for those contracts and swaps.

DATES: The effective date for this final rule is February 14, 2017.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Stephen Sherrod, Senior Economist, 
Division of Market Oversight, (202) 418-5452, [email protected]; Riva 
Spear Adriance, Senior Special Counsel, Division of Market Oversight, 
(202) 418-5494, [email protected]; or Mark Fajfar, Assistant General 
Counsel, Office of General Counsel, (202) 418-6636, [email protected]; 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Three Lafayette Centre, 1155 21st 
Street NW., Washington, DC 20581.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Table of Contents

I. Background
II. Final Rules
    A. Aggregation on the Basis of Ownership or Control of Positions 
in Rule 150.4(a)(1) and Related Exemption From Aggregation in Rule 
150.4(b)(2)
    B. Criteria for Aggregation Relief in Rule 150.4(b)(2)(i)
    C. Notice Filing Requirement in Rule 150.4(c)
    D. Other Issues Related to Aggregation on the Basis of Ownership
    E. Exemption for Certain Accounts Held by FCMs in Rule 
150.4(b)(3)
    F. Exemptions From Aggregation for Underwriting and Broker-
Dealer Activities in Rules 150.4(b)(5) and (b)(6)
    G. Exemption From Aggregation Where Information Sharing Would 
Violate Law in Rule 150.4(b)(7)
    H. Aggregation Requirement for Substantially Identical Trading 
in Rule 150.4(a)(2)
    I. Exemption for Ownership by Limited Partners, Shareholders or 
Other Pool Participants in Rule 150.4(b)(1)
    J. Exemption for Accounts Carried by an Independent Account 
Controller in Rule 150.4(b)(4) and Conforming Change in Rule 150.1
    K. Revisions To Clarify Regulations
III. Related Matters
    A. Considerations of Costs and Benefits
    B. Regulatory Flexibility Act
    C. Paperwork Reduction Act

I. Background

    The Commission has long established and enforced speculative 
position limits for futures and options contracts on various 
agricultural commodities as authorized by the Commodity Exchange Act 
(``CEA'').\1\ The part 150 position limits regime \2\ generally 
includes three components: (1) The level of the limits, which set a 
threshold that restricts the number of speculative positions that a 
person may hold in the spot-month, individual month, and all months 
combined,\3\ (2) exemptions for positions that constitute bona fide 
hedging transactions and certain other types of transactions,\4\ and 
(3) rules to determine which accounts and positions a person must 
aggregate for the purpose of determining compliance with the position 
limit levels.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ 7 U.S.C. 1 et seq.
    \2\ See 17 CFR part 150. Part 150 of the Commission's 
regulations establishes federal position limits on certain 
enumerated agricultural contracts; the listed commodities are 
referred to as enumerated agricultural commodities. The Commission 
has proposed to amend its position limits to also encompass other 
exempt and agricultural commodity futures and options contracts and 
the physical commodity swaps that are economically equivalent to 
such contracts. See Position Limits for Derivatives, 78 FR 75680 
(Dec. 12, 2013).
    \3\ See 17 CFR 150.2.
    \4\ See 17 CFR 150.3.
    \5\ See 17 CFR 150.4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission's existing aggregation policy under regulation 150.4 
generally requires that unless a particular exemption applies, a person 
must aggregate all positions and accounts for which that person 
controls the trading decisions with all positions and accounts in which 
that person has a 10 percent or greater ownership interest, and with 
the positions of any other persons with which the person is acting 
pursuant to an express or implied agreement or understanding.\6\ The 
scope of exemptions from aggregation include the ownership interests of 
limited partners in pooled accounts,\7\ discretionary accounts and 
customer trading programs of futures commission merchants (``FCM''),\8\ 
and eligible entities with independent account controllers (``IAC'') 
that manage customer positions.\9\ Market participants claiming one of 
the exemptions from aggregation are subject to a call by the Commission 
for information demonstrating compliance with the conditions applicable 
to the claimed exemption.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \6\ See 17 CFR 150.4(a) and (b).
    \7\ See 17 CFR 150.4(c).
    \8\ See 17 CFR 150.4(d).
    \9\ See 17 CFR 150.3(a)(4).
    \10\ See 17 CFR 150.3(b) and 150.4(e).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission adopted aggregation rules in 2011, as part of its 
adoption of part 151 of its regulations, that were largely similar to 
the existing aggregation policy under regulation 150.4.\11\ In 2012, 
the Commission proposed to amend the aggregation rules in part 151.\12\ 
Prior to finalization of the 2012 amendments, however, part 151 of the 
Commission's regulations was vacated by court order.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \11\ See Position Limits for Futures and Swaps, 76 FR 71626 
(Nov. 18, 2011). With regard to determining which accounts and 
positions a person must aggregate, regulation 151.7 (now vacated, 
see footnote 13, below) implemented the Commission's existing 
aggregation policy under regulation 150.4 and also provided 
additional exemptions for underwriters of securities, and for where 
the sharing of information between persons would cause either person 
to violate federal law or regulations adopted thereunder. With the 
exception of the exemption for underwriters, vacated regulation 
151.7 required market participants to file a notice with the 
Commission demonstrating compliance with the conditions applicable 
to each exemption.
    \12\ See Aggregation, Position Limits for Futures and Swaps, 77 
FR 31767 (May 30, 2012).
    \13\ See International Swaps and Derivatives Association v. 
United States Commodity Futures Trading Commission, 887 F. Supp. 2d 
259 (D.D.C. 2012). The revised position limit levels in amended 
section 150.2 were not vacated.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In November 2013, the Commission proposed to amend the existing 
aggregation rules in regulation 150.4, and certain related regulations, 
to modify rules to determine which accounts and positions a person must 
aggregate.\14\ This proposal and the related notice of proposed 
rulemaking are referred to herein as the ``Proposed Rule.'' The 
Proposed Rule was substantially similar to the aggregation rules that 
had been adopted in part 151 of the Commission's regulations in 2011, 
as they were proposed to be amended in May 2012.\15\ After reviewing 
public comments on the Proposed Rule, the Commission supplemented it 
with a limited revision in September 2015 that would permit the 
disaggregation of positions of owned entities in expanded 
circumstances.\16\ This supplement to the proposal and the

[[Page 91455]]

related supplemental notice of proposed rulemaking are referred to 
herein as the ``Supplemental Notice.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \14\ See Aggregation of Positions; Proposed Rule, 78 FR 68946 
(Nov. 15, 2013).
    \15\ See Proposed Rule, 78 FR at 68947-48.
    \16\ See Aggregation of Positions: Supplemental notice of 
proposed rulemaking, 80 FR 58365 (Sept. 29, 2015).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

II. Final Rules

    The Commission is adopting the amendments to its aggregation rules 
in regulation 150.4, and certain related regulations, as set forth in 
the Proposed Rule and modified in the Supplemental Notice, with certain 
further changes made in response to public comments. The amendments and 
the public comments relevant to each amendment are discussed below.\17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \17\ The public comments on the Proposed Rule and the 
Supplemental Notice are available at http://comments.cftc.gov/PublicComments/CommentList.aspx?id=1620.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

A. Aggregation on the Basis of Ownership or Control of Positions in 
Rule 150.4(a)(1) and Related Exemption From Aggregation in Rule 
150.4(b)(2)

1. Proposed Approach
    The Proposed Rule reflected the Commission's long-standing 
incremental approach to exemptions from the aggregation requirement for 
persons owning a financial interest in an entity. The Proposed Rule 
highlighted the relevant statutory language of section 4a(a)(1) of the 
CEA, which requires aggregation of an entity's positions on the basis 
of either ownership or control of the entity, and the related 
legislative history and regulatory developments which support the 
Commission's approach.\18\ In addition, the Proposed Rule explained 
that the Commission's historical practice has been to craft narrowly-
tailored exemptions, when and if appropriate, to the basic requirement 
of aggregation when there is either ownership or control of an entity. 
On this basis, proposed rule 150.4(a)(1) would maintain the requirement 
in existing regulation 150.4(b) that all positions in accounts for 
which any person, by power of attorney or otherwise, directly or 
indirectly, controls trading or holds a 10 percent or greater ownership 
or equity interest be aggregated with the positions held and trading 
done by such person.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \18\ See Proposed Rule, 78 FR at 68956, citing 7 U.S.C. 6a(a)(1) 
(``In determining whether any person has exceeded such limits, the 
positions held and trading done by any persons directly or 
indirectly controlled by such person shall be included with the 
positions held and trading done by such person'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    To explain the basis for maintaining the existing 10 percent 
threshold level, the Commission noted that it has generally found that 
an ownership or equity interest of less than 10 percent in an account 
or position that is controlled by another person who makes 
discretionary trading decisions does not present a concern that such 
ownership interest results in control over trading or can be used 
indirectly to create a large speculative position through ownership 
interests in multiple accounts.\19\ As such, the Commission has 
exempted an ownership interest below 10 percent from the aggregation 
requirement, while requiring aggregation when there is an ownership 
interest above 10 percent.\20\ Prior comments, discussed in the 
Proposed Rule, had advocated that an ownership interest of 10 percent 
or more should also be exempt from the aggregation requirement, so long 
as such ownership represents a passive investment that does not involve 
control of the trading decisions of the owned entity.\21\ The prior 
commenters had asserted that such passive investments would be unlikely 
to allow the owner to directly or indirectly control the trading of the 
owned entity, and therefore would be unlikely to present a risk that 
persons would be able to hold an unduly large overall position through 
positions in multiple accounts.\22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \19\ See Proposed Rule, 78 FR at 68958.
    \20\ The Commission codified this aggregation threshold in its 
1979 statement of policy on aggregation, which was derived from the 
administrative experience of the Commission's predecessor. See 
Statement of Policy on Aggregation of Accounts and Adoption of 
Related Reporting Rules, 44 FR 33839, 33843 (June 13, 1979) (``1979 
Aggregation Policy''). Note, however, that proposed rule 150.4(a)(2) 
would also separately require aggregation of investments in accounts 
with substantially identical trading strategies.
    \21\ See Proposed Rule, 78 FR at 68951.
    \22\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Responding to these prior comments, the Commission explained in the 
Proposed Rule that it had previously considered, but not adopted, a 
broad passive investment exemption from the aggregation requirement, 
and had instead generally restricted exemptions based on ownership to 
those for FCMs, limited partner investors in commodity pools, and IACs 
managing customer funds for an eligible entity.\23\ Further, the 
Proposed Rule reiterated the Commission's belief in incremental 
development of aggregation exemptions over time.\24\ Consistent with 
that incremental approach, the Proposed Rule maintained the 10 percent 
threshold in the existing regulation but proposed to adopt specific, 
tailored relief from the ownership criteria of aggregation for certain 
situations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \23\ See id, citing Exemptions from Speculative Position Limits 
for Positions which have a Common Owner but which are Independently 
Controlled and for Certain Spread Positions; Proposed Rule, 53 FR 
13290, 13292 (Apr. 22, 1988). The 1988 proposal for the independent 
account controller rule requested comment on the possibility of a 
broader passive investment exemption, and specifically noted:
    [Q]uestions also have been raised regarding the continued 
appropriateness of the Commission's aggregation standard which 
provides that a beneficial interest in an account or positions of 
ten percent or more constitutes a financial interest tantamount to 
ownership. This threshold financial interest serves to establish 
ownership under both the ownership criterion of the aggregation 
standard and as one of the indicia of control under the 1979 
Aggregation Policy.
    In particular, certain instances have come to the Commission's 
attention where beneficial ownership in several otherwise unrelated 
accounts may be greater than ten percent, but the circumstances 
surrounding the financial interest clearly exclude the owner from 
control over the positions. The Commission is requesting comment on 
whether further revisions to the current Commission rules and 
policies regarding ownership are advisable in light of the exemption 
hereby being proposed. If such financial interests raise issues not 
addressed by the proposed exemption for independent account 
controllers, what approach best resolves those issues while 
maintaining a bright-line aggregation test?
    \24\ See Proposed Rule, 78 FR at 68951, citing Aggregation, 
Position Limits for Futures and Swaps, 77 FR 31767, 31773 (May 30, 
2012). This incremental approach to account aggregation standards 
reflects the Commission's historical practice. See, e.g., Exemptions 
from Speculative Position Limits for Positions Which Have a Common 
Owner But Which are Independently Controlled and for Certain Spread 
Positions; Final Rule, 53 FR 41563, 41567 (Oct. 24, 1988) (the 
definition of eligible entity for purposes of the IAC exemption 
originally only included commodity pool operators (``CPOs''), or 
exempt CPOs or pools, but the Commission indicated a willingness to 
expand the exemption after a ``reasonable opportunity'' to review 
the exemption.); Exemption From Speculative Position Limits for 
Positions Which Have a Common Owner, But Which Are Independently 
Controlled, 56 FR 14308, 14312 (Apr. 9, 1991) (the Commission 
expanded eligible entities to include commodity trading advisors, 
but did not include additional entities requested by commenters 
until the Commission had the opportunity to assess the current 
expansion and further evaluate the additional entities); and 
Revision of Federal Speculative Position Limits and Associated 
Rules, 64 FR 24038 (May 5, 1999) (``1999 Amendments'') (the 
Commission expanded the list of eligible entities to include many of 
the entities commenters requested in the 1991 rulemaking).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

a. Initial Ownership Threshold for Disaggregation Relief in the 
Proposed Rule
    The Proposed Rule included two tiers of relief from the ownership 
criteria of aggregation--relief on the basis of a notice filing, 
effective upon submission, by persons holding an interest of between 10 
percent and 50 percent in an owned entity, and relief on the basis of 
an application by persons holding an interest of more than 50 percent 
in an owned entity.\25\ Each of these procedures for relief in the 
Proposed Rule is described briefly below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \25\ See Proposed Rule, 78 FR at 68958-61.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Proposed Rule set out a notice filing procedure, effective upon 
submission, to permit a person with either an ownership or an equity 
interest in an owned entity of 50 percent

[[Page 91456]]

or less to disaggregate the positions of an owned entity in specified 
circumstances, even if such person has a 10 percent or greater interest 
in the owned entity.\26\ The notice filing would have to demonstrate 
compliance with certain conditions set forth in proposed rule 
150.4(b)(2)(i). Similar to other exemptions from aggregation, the 
notice filing would be effective upon submission to the Commission, but 
under proposed rule 150.4(c) the Commission would be able to 
subsequently call for additional information, and to amend, terminate 
or otherwise modify the person's aggregation exemption for failure to 
comply with the provisions of proposed rule 150.4(b)(2). Further, the 
person would be obligated by proposed rule 150.4(c) to amend the notice 
filing in the event of a material change to the circumstances described 
in the filing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \26\ Under the Proposed Rule, and in a manner similar to current 
regulation, if a person qualifies for disaggregation relief, the 
person would nonetheless have to aggregate those same accounts or 
positions covered by the relief if they are held in accounts with 
substantially identical trading strategies. See proposed rule 
150.4(a)(2). The exemptions in proposed rule 150.4 were set forth as 
alternatives, so that, for example, the applicability of the 
exemption in paragraph (b)(2) would not affect the applicability of 
a separate exemption from aggregation (e.g., the independent account 
controller exemption).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In the Proposed Rule, the Commission stated its preliminary belief 
that a 50 percent limit on the ownership interest in another entity is 
a reasonable, ``bright line'' standard for determining when aggregation 
of positions is required, even where the ownership interest is 
passive.\27\ In the Proposed Rule, the Commission explained that 
majority ownership (i.e., over 50 percent) is indicative of control, 
and this standard addresses the Commission's concerns about 
circumvention of position limits by coordinated trading or direct or 
indirect influence between entities. For these reasons, the Commission 
preliminarily believed that the 50 percent limit would be appropriate 
to address the heightened risk of direct or indirect influence over the 
owned entity and therefore a threshold at this level would be a 
reasonable approach to the aggregation of owned accounts pursuant to 
Section 4a(a)(1) of the CEA.\28\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \27\ See Proposed Rule, 78 FR at 68959.
    \28\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    With respect to a person who has a greater than 50 percent 
ownership or equity interest in the owned entity, proposed rule 
150.4(b)(3) included disaggregation relief in limited situations where 
the owned entity is not required to be, and is not, consolidated on the 
financial statement of the person, if the person can demonstrate that 
the person does not control the trading of the owned entity, based on 
the criteria in proposed rule 150.4(b)(2)(i), and if both the person 
and the owned entity have procedures in place that are reasonably 
effective to prevent coordinated trading.
    Under proposed rule 150.4(b)(3), a person with a greater than 50 
percent ownership of an owned entity would have to apply on a case-by-
case basis to the Commission for permission to disaggregate, and await 
the Commission's decision as to whether certain conditions specified in 
the proposed rule had been satisfied and therefore disaggregation would 
be permitted.\29\ The person would be required to demonstrate to the 
Commission that:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \29\ See Proposed Rule, 78 FR at 68959-61. This approach was 
consistent with the Commission's preliminary view that relief from 
the aggregation requirement should not be available merely upon a 
notice filing by a person who has a greater than 50 percent 
ownership or equity interest in the owned entity. The Commission 
explained that, in its view, a person with a greater than 50 percent 
ownership interest in multiple accounts would have the ability to 
hold and control a significant and potentially unduly large overall 
position in a particular commodity, which position limits are 
intended to prevent. See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    i. The owned entity is not required to be, and is not, consolidated 
on the financial statement of the person,
    ii. the person does not control the trading of the owned entity 
(based on criteria in proposed rule 150.4(b)(2)(i)), with the person 
showing that it and the owned entity have procedures in place that are 
reasonably effective to prevent coordinated trading in spite of 
majority ownership,
    iii. each representative of the person (if any) on the owned 
entity's board of directors attests that he or she does not control 
trading of the owned entity, and
    iv. the person certifies that either (a) all of the owned entity's 
positions qualify as bona fide hedging transactions or (b) the owned 
entity's positions that do not so qualify do not exceed 20 percent of 
any position limit currently in effect, and the person agrees in either 
case that:
     If this certification becomes untrue for the owned entity, 
the person will aggregate the owned entity for three complete calendar 
months and if all of the owned entity's positions qualify as bona fide 
hedging transactions during that time the person would have the 
opportunity to make the certification again and stop aggregating,
     upon any call by the Commission, the owned entity(ies) 
will make a filing responsive to the call, reflecting the owned 
entity's positions and transactions only, at any time (such as when the 
Commission believes the owned entities in the aggregate may exceed a 
visibility level), and
     the person will provide additional information to the 
Commission if any owned entity engages in coordinated activity, short 
of common control (understanding that if there were common control, the 
positions of the owned entity(ies) would be aggregated).
    The relief under proposed rule 150.4(b)(3) would not be automatic, 
but rather would be available only if the Commission finds, in its 
discretion, that the four conditions above are met. There would be no 
time limits on the Commission's process for making the determination of 
whether relief under proposed rule 150.4(b)(3) is appropriately 
granted, and relief would be available only if and when the Commission 
acts on a particular request for relief.\30\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \30\ See Proposed Rule, 78 FR at 68960.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

b. Ownership Threshold for Disaggregation Relief in the Supplemental 
Notice
    The Supplemental Notice discussed the public comments received on 
this aspect of the Proposed Rule. In brief, it noted that commenters 
generally praised the proposed relief for owners of between 10 percent 
and 50 percent of an owned entity, but commenters asserted that the 
proposed application procedures under proposed rule 150.4(b)(3) for 
owners of a more than 50 percent equity or ownership interest were 
unnecessary and inappropriate.\31\ Several commenters said that the 
Commission should provide the same disaggregation relief for owners of 
more than 50 percent of an owned entity as was proposed to be provided 
for owners of 50 percent or less.\32\ On the other hand, the 
Supplemental Notice noted that a few commenters opposed providing 
aggregation relief for owners of more than 10 percent of an owned 
entity.\33\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \31\ See Supplemental Notice, 80 FR at58369.
    \32\ See id.
    \33\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In view of the points raised by commenters on the Proposed Rule, 
the Commission proposed in the Supplemental Notice to delete proposed 
rules 150.4(b)(3) and 150.4(c)(2), and to change proposed rule 
150.4(b)(2) so that it would apply to all persons with an ownership or 
equity interest in an owned entity of 10 percent or greater (i.e., an 
interest of up to and including 100 percent) in the same manner as 
proposed rule 150.4(b)(2) would have applied, before this revision, to 
owners

[[Page 91457]]

of an interest of between 10 percent and 50 percent.\34\ The Commission 
stated in the Supplemental Notice that, while the language in section 
4a of the CEA, its legislative history, subsequent regulatory 
developments, and the Commission's historical practices in this regard 
all support aggregation on the basis of either ownership or control of 
an entity as a necessary part of the Commission's position limit 
regime,\35\ the Commission is also mindful that, as discussed by 
commenters on the Proposed Rule, aggregation of positions held by owned 
entities may in some cases be impractical, burdensome, or not in 
keeping with modern corporate structures.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \34\ See Supplemental Notice, 80 FR at 58371. The Supplemental 
Notice also laid out conforming changes in proposed rule 
150.4(b)(7), to delete a cap of 50 percent on the ownership or 
equity interest for broker-dealers to disaggregate, in proposed rule 
150.4(e)(1)(i), to delete a delegation of authority referencing 
proposed rule 150.4(b)(3), and in proposed rule 150.4(c)(1), to 
delete a cross-reference. See id.
    \35\ See Supplemental Notice, 80 FR at 58372, citing 1999 
Amendments, 64 FR at 24044 (``[T]he Commission . . . interprets the 
`held or controlled' criteria as applying separately to ownership of 
positions or to control of trading decisions.''). See also, 
Exemptions from Speculative Position Limits for Positions which have 
a Common Owner but which are Independently Controlled and for 
Certain Spread Positions; Proposed Rule, 53 FR 13290, 13292, (Apr. 
22, 1988) (responding to petitions, the Commission proposed the IAC 
exemption from speculative position limits, but declined to remove 
the ownership standard from its aggregation policy).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission explained that the modifications in the Supplemental 
Notice would address comments that ownership of a greater than 50 
percent interest in an entity (and the related consolidation of 
financial statements) may not mean that the owner actually controls 
day-to-day trading decisions of the owned entity.\36\ The Commission 
stated in the Supplemental Notice that, on balance, the overall purpose 
of the position limits regime (to diminish the burden of excessive 
speculation which may cause unwarranted changes in commodity prices) 
would be better served by focusing the aggregation requirement on 
situations where the owner is, in view of the circumstances, actually 
able to control the trading of the owned entity.\37\ The Commission 
reasoned that the ability to cause unwarranted changes in the price of 
a commodity derivatives contract would result from the owner's control 
of the owned entity's trading activity, while due to variances in 
corporate structures there may be instances where one entity has a 100 
percent ownership interest in another entity yet does not control day-
to-day business activities of the owned entity. In this situation the 
owned entity would not have knowledge of the activities of other 
entities owned by the same owner, nor would it raise the heightened 
concerns, triggered when one entity both owns and controls trading of 
another entity, that the owner would necessarily act in a coordinated 
manner with other owned entities.\38\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \36\ See Supplemental Notice, 80 FR at 58371.
    \37\ See id. The Commission notes in this regard that there may 
be significant burdens in meeting the requirements of proposed rule 
150.4(b)(3) even where there is no control of the trading of the 
owned entity, as was suggested by the Center for Capital Markets 
Competitiveness of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the Asset 
Management Group of the Securities Industry and Financial Markets 
Association and the other commenters. See Supplemental Notice, 80 FR 
at 58372.
    \38\ Supplemental Notice, 80 FR at 58371. In the Supplemental 
Notice, the Commission also considered that aggregation of the 
positions of majority-owned subsidiaries could require corporate 
groups to establish procedures to monitor and coordinate trading 
activities across disparate owned entities, which could have 
unpredictable consequences including not only the cost of 
establishing these procedures, but also the impairment of corporate 
structures which were established to ensure that the various owned 
entities engage in business independently. On the other hand, the 
Commission believed that the disaggregation criteria in proposed 
rule 150.4(b)(2)(i) are in line with prudent corporate practices 
that are maintained for longstanding, well-accepted reasons with 
which the Commission did not intend to interfere. See Supplemental 
Notice, 80 FR at 58372.
    In the Proposed Rule, the Commission noted that if the 
aggregation rules adopted by the Commission would be a precedent for 
aggregation rules enforced by designated contract markets (``DCMs'') 
and swap execution facilities (``SEFs''), it would be even more 
important that the aggregation rules set out, to the extent 
feasible, ``bright line'' rules that are capable of easy application 
by a wide variety of market participants while not being susceptible 
to circumvention. See Proposed Rule, 78 FR at 68596, n. 103. In the 
Supplemental Notice, the Commission stated that implementing an 
approach to aggregation that is in keeping with longstanding 
corporate practices would promote the goal of setting out ``bright 
line'' rules that are relatively easy to apply while not being 
susceptible to circumvention. See Supplemental Notice, 80 FR at 
58372.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Prior to issuing the Supplemental Notice, the Commission considered 
the views of commenters who warned that inappropriate relief from the 
aggregation requirements could allow circumvention of position limits 
through the use of multiple subsidiaries. However, the Commission 
believed that the criteria in proposed rule 150.4(b)(2)(i), which must 
be satisfied in order to disaggregate, will appropriately indicate 
whether an owner has control of or knowledge of the trading activity of 
the owned entity, such that if the disaggregation criteria are 
satisfied, the ability of an owner and the owned entity to act together 
to engage in excessive speculation should not differ significantly from 
that of two separate individuals.\39\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \39\ See Supplemental Notice, 80 FR at 58371. See also Proposed 
Rule, 78 FR at 68961, referring to regulation 150.3(a)(4) (proposed 
to be replaced by proposed rule 150.4(b)(5)). Such conditions have 
been useful in ensuring that trading is not coordinated through the 
development of similar trading systems, and that procedures are in 
place to prevent the sharing of trading decisions between entities. 
The disaggregation criteria require that the two entities not have 
knowledge of each other's trading and, moreover, have and enforce 
written procedures to preclude such knowledge.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A commenter on the Proposed Rule had said the Commission should 
eliminate the proposed aggregation exemptions for ownership interests 
up to 50 percent, because such notices would make it virtually 
impossible for the Commission to make timely, informed decisions about 
whether one person in fact controls the trading decisions of another 
and whether all proffered certifications are accurate.\40\ This 
commenter said that, alternatively, the Commission should only provide 
aggregation exemptions where the ownership interest is no greater than 
25 percent, in order to prevent abusive practices, which should not 
become effective prior to Commission review of the facts.\41\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \40\ See Honorable Carl Levin, United States Senate on February 
10, 2014 (``CL-Sen. Levin Feb 10''), see also Americans for 
Financial Reform on February 10, 2014 (Commission should trigger 
automatic aggregation for an ownership interest well under 50 
percent, because potential aggregation exemptions for ownership 
interests over 10 percent may undermine the proposed limits).
    \41\ See CL-Sen. Levin Feb 10.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission pointed out in the Supplemental Notice that 
finalization of proposed rule 150.4(b)(2), which would allow persons 
with ownership or equity interests in an owned entity of up to and 
including 100 percent to disaggregate the positions of the owned entity 
if certain conditions were satisfied, would not mean that there would 
be no aggregation on the basis of ownership. Rather, aggregation would 
still be the ``default requirement'' for the owner of a 10 percent or 
greater interest in an owned entity, unless the conditions of proposed 
rule 150.4(b)(2) are satisfied.\42\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \42\ See Supplemental Notice, 80 FR at 58371. The Commission 
noted in the Proposed Rule that if there were no aggregation on the 
basis of ownership, it would have to apply a control test in all 
cases, which would pose significant administrative challenges to 
individually assess control across all market participants. See 
Proposed Rule, 78 FR at 68956. Further, the Commission considered 
that if the statute required aggregation only if the existence of 
control were proven, market participants may be able to use an 
ownership interest to directly or indirectly influence the account 
or position and thereby circumvent the aggregation requirement. See 
id. On further review and after considering the comments on the 
Proposed Rule, the Commission stated in the Supplemental Notice that 
the disaggregation criteria in proposed rule 150.4(b)(2)(i) provide 
an effective, easily implemented means of applying a ``control 
test'' to determine if disaggregation should be allowed, without 
creating a loophole through which market participants could 
circumvent the aggregation requirement. See Supplemental Notice, 80 
FR at 58371.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 91458]]

2. Commenters' Views
a. Comments on the Ownership Threshold
    The large majority of comments received after the Supplemental 
Notice was issued supported proposed rule 150.4(b)(2) as it was 
modified in the Supplemental Notice, and said the Commission should not 
adopt proposed rule 150.4(b)(3). The commenters said that the 
modifications described in the Supplemental Notice would provide for a 
more workable aggregation standard, enhance the Commission's regulatory 
goals, and focus the Commission's limited resources on only those 
disaggregation filings which might reasonably warrant additional 
discretionary review.\43\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \43\ See Electric Power Supply Association on November 13, 2015 
(``CL-EPSA Nov 13''); International Swaps and Derivatives 
Association on November 12, 2015 (``CL-ISDA Nov 12''); Alternative 
Investment Management Association on November 12, 2015 (``CL-AIMA 
Nov 12''); Asset Management Group of the Securities Industry and 
Financial Markets Association (``SIFMA AMG'') on November 13, 2015 
(``CL-SIFMA AMG Nov 13''); International Energy Credit Association 
on November 13, 2015 (``CL-IECA Nov 13''); Energy Transfer Partners, 
L.P., on behalf of itself and Energy Transfer Equity, L.P. on 
November 13, 2015 (``CL-Energy Transfer Nov 13''); CME Group, Inc. 
on November 13, 2015 (``CL-CME Nov 13''); Coalition of Physical 
Energy Companies on November 13, 2015 (``CL-COPE Nov 13''); 
Commercial Energy Working Group on November 13, 2015 (``C-Working 
Group Nov 13''); Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP on November 13, 2015 
(``CL-Morgan Lewis Nov 13''); Sempra Energy on November 13, 2015 
(``CL-Sempra Nov 13''); Commodity Markets Council, November 13, 2015 
(``CL-CMC Nov 13''); ECOM Agroindustrial Corp., Ltd. on November 13, 
2015 (``CL-ECOM Nov 13''); Edison Electric Institute on November 13, 
2015 (``CL-EEI Nov 13''); Futures Industry Association (``FIA'') on 
November 13, 2015 (``CL-FIA Nov 13''); Ontario Teachers' Pension 
Plan on November 13, 2015 (``CL-OTPP Nov 13''); ICE Futures US, Inc. 
on November 13, 2015 (``CL-ICE Nov 13''); Natural Gas Supply 
Association on November 13, 2015 (``CL-NGSA Nov 13''); Managed Funds 
Association on November 12, 2015 (``CL-MFA Nov 12''); Private Equity 
Growth Capital Council on November 12, 2015 (``CL-PEGCC Nov 12'') ; 
Minneapolis Grain Exchange, Inc. on November 13, 2015.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Many of the commenters who supported the revisions in the 
Supplemental Notice had also provided comments on the Proposed Rule to 
the effect that the Commission should provide the same disaggregation 
relief for owners of more than 50 percent of an owned entity as was 
proposed to be provided for owners of 50 percent or less. For example, 
one commented that the Commission should permit majority-owned 
affiliates to be disaggregated regardless of whether the entities are 
required to consolidate financial statements, another commented that 
the requirement to submit an application to the Commission and await 
its approval would be unworkable in practice and not provide any 
apparent regulatory benefit, and a third commented that aggregation 
relief for majority-owned affiliates was necessary to avoid ``serious 
regulatory costs and consequences.'' \44\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \44\ See Supplemental Notice, 80 FR at 58369-70 (describing 
comments of FIA, the Center for Capital Markets Competitiveness of 
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and MidAmerican Energy Holdings 
Company).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Three commenters, each a public policy organization, opposed the 
modifications described in the Supplemental Notice, saying the 
modifications would impermissibly weaken the aggregation regime by 
allowing entities with majority ownership not only to qualify for 
disaggregation, but also to do so through a simple, immediately 
effective filing. One commenter said that to allow this would be 
fundamentally at odds with the statutory mandate of limiting 
speculation and the requirement of aggregation based on indirect 
control of an owned entity, because the proposal in the Supplemental 
Notice would effectively remove the distinction between minority and 
majority ownership by implementing a presumption that ownership does 
not entail control over the owned entity's trading activity.\45\ This 
commenter believes the Commission should reinstate a requirement of 
aggregation of positions whenever an ownership interest in an owned 
entity exceeds 10 percent.\46\ Another commenter asserted that the 
procedure in the Supplemental Notice may be contrary to the CEA, 
because it allows an entity other than the Commission (i.e., the entity 
which files an automatically-effective compliance notice) to make the 
determination of whether aggregation is required.\47\ The third 
commenter in this group also maintained that relief from the 
aggregation requirement should not be available to an owner of more 
than 10 percent of a subsidiary, because ``allowing [position] 
disaggregation of majority-owned subsidiaries would violate the clear 
language'' of CEA section 4a(a)(1) and would allow the owner of such 
subsidiaries to circumvent position limits through the creation of 
multiple subsidiaries.\48\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \45\ See Better Markets, Inc. (``Better Markets'') on November 
13, 2015 (``CL-Better Markets Nov 13''). The commenter had also 
commented on the Proposed Rule, saying that allowing disaggregation 
of majority-owned subsidiaries would ignore the clear language of 
CEA section 4a(a)(1). See Supplemental Notice, 80 FR at 58369 
(describing comment of Better Markets).
    \46\ See CL-Better Markets Nov 13.
    \47\ See Occupy the SEC on November 13, 2015 (``CL-Occupy the 
SEC Nov 13''). This commenter warned that challenges to the 
Commission's handling of large amounts of data could likely allow 
many companies that should have their positions aggregated to evade 
that restriction. See id. The commenter had also commented on the 
Proposed Rule, saying that no relief from aggregation should be 
allowed for owners of more than 50 percent of an owned entity 
because in this case the two firms are ``largely interconnected.'' 
See Supplemental Notice, 80 FR at 58369 (describing comment of 
Occupy the SEC).
    \48\ See Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy (``IATP'') 
on November 13, 2015 (``CL-IATP Nov 13'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    One commenter opposed to the approach in the Supplemental Notice 
argued that it would lead to inconsistent results because it calls for 
a case-by-case, discretionary assessment of compliance with standards 
that test separation of trading activity, instead of an easy to 
understand, bright-line test premised on ownership percentage. This 
commenter feared that entities subject to this discretionary standard 
would be able to attack the Commission's efforts to enforce the 
aggregation requirement as arbitrary and capricious.\49\ Therefore, the 
Commission would have to be vigilant in enforcing regulations requiring 
aggregation by unaffiliated individuals acting pursuant to an implied 
agreement.\50\ For example, this commenter asserted that unaffiliated 
investment vehicles could serve as a conduit for the trading strategies 
of a sponsor that holds no equity interest in the investment vehicle, 
the trading decisions of which are nominally outsourced to an 
unaffiliated investment advisor.\51\ The commenter believes that 
aggregation must be applied in such a case, despite the apparent 
absence of an ownership relationship between the sponsor and the 
investment vehicle.\52\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \49\ See CL-Occupy the SEC Nov 13.
    \50\ See id. Along similar lines, another commenter said that 
the increasing ease of electronic interoffice communication could 
allow for circumvention of the aggregation requirements. See CL-IATP 
Nov 13.
    \51\ See CL-Occupy the SEC Nov 13.
    \52\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

b. Comments Suggesting Additional Relief From the Aggregation 
Requirement, or a Different Ownership Threshold
    Several commenters believed that the proposal should be modified to 
provide relief from the aggregation requirement in additional 
situations. For instance, one commenter said that the Commission should 
provide an exemption from aggregation for transitory ownership or 
equity interests in an owned-entity, such as those acquired through 
foreclosure or a similar credit event.\53\ Other commenters said the 
Commission

[[Page 91459]]

should establish a process for entities that do not squarely meet the 
criteria for disaggregation relief in proposed rule 150.4(b)(2), 
allowing them to seek disaggregation relief based upon particular facts 
and circumstances demonstrating that the owner does not control or have 
shared knowledge of the owned entity's trading activities.\54\ Other 
commenters asked for clarification of whether relief from aggregation 
on the basis of ownership is available to general partners or other 
persons holding interests in various forms of partnerships.\55\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \53\ See FIA on February 6, 2014 (``CL-FIA Feb 6'') and CL-FIA 
Nov 13.
    \54\ See CL-COPE Nov 13. See also CL-Morgan Lewis Nov 13 
(exemption from aggregation requirement should be a non-exclusive 
safe harbor, not excluding the possibility of relief for owners and 
owned entities that do not satisfy every criteria; delegate 
authority under 4a(a)(7) to staffs of the Commission, DCMs and SEFs 
to provide disaggregation relief to such firms on a case-by-case 
basis); CL-EPSA Nov 13 (10 percent ownership should invoke a 
rebuttable presumption that can be overcome by making the required 
notice filing in good faith).
    \55\ See Managed Funds Association on February 7, 2014 (``CL-MFA 
Feb 7''); CL-Energy Transfer Nov 13.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Although commenters generally supported the modifications made in 
the Supplemental Notice, and in particular the removal of the 
distinction between ownership interests of less than 50 percent and 
more than 50 percent, several commenters maintained that the Commission 
should not apply a threshold of 10 percent for the requirement of a 
notice filing in order to claim disaggregation relief.
    Some commenters said that the Commission should apply a higher 
threshold below which a claim for disaggregation relief would not be 
required. Three commenters advocated for the threshold to be moved to 
25 percent.\56\ Other commenters said the threshold should be 50 
percent, claiming that minority ownership generally does not permit 
control over operational aspects of the owned entity's activities, 
including trading strategy and decisions.\57\ One commenter supporting 
a higher threshold remarked that maintaining the 10 percent threshold 
will trigger ``false positives'' requiring owners with no actual 
control over an owned-entity's trading activity to file a notice with 
the Commission, which will impose significant costs on market 
participants to prepare and file a notice, and on the Commission which 
will have to review and administer all of the filed notices.\58\ In 
contrast, this commenter said, a higher threshold would allow the 
Commission to focus its surveillance resources on entities where there 
is a greater likelihood of commonly controlled trading activity.\59\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \56\ See CL-ISDA Nov 12; CL-MFA Feb 7; CL-AIMA Feb 10.
    \57\ See CSC Sugar, LLC on February 10, 2014; CL-IECA Nov 13; 
CL-PEGCC Nov 12; CL-OTPP Nov 13; CL-FIA Nov 13; CL-NGSA Nov 13.
    \58\ See CL-FIA Nov 13.
    \59\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

c. Comments Asserting That Aggregation Should Not Be Based on Ownership 
Alone
    Other commenters said that there should be no ownership percentage 
threshold for disaggregation relief, but rather aggregation should be 
required solely on the basis of actual control of trading.\60\ Certain 
of these commenters asserted that the CEA requires that a person 
control the owned entity's accounts in order to require 
aggregation.\61\ Other commenters focused on the operational challenges 
of aggregation based on ownership, and asserted that limiting the 
aggregation requirement to cases where there is control would more 
closely match how affiliated companies operate.\62\ One DCM argued that 
aggregation should be required only when there is both ownership and 
control of the owned entity, and said that it (i.e., the DCM) does not 
automatically aggregate positions of companies with 100 percent common 
ownership, so long as the commonly-owned companies operate 
independently from one another in terms of decision-making and control 
of trading decisions.\63\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \60\ See Wilmar International Limited on November 13, 2015 
(``CL-Wilmar Nov 13''); U.S. Chamber of Commerce's Center for 
Capital Markets Competitiveness on February 10, 2014 (``CL-Chamber 
Feb 10''); National Council of Farmers Cooperatives on August 4, 
2014 (``CL-NCFC Aug 4''); Commodity Markets Council on January 22, 
2015 (``CL-CMC Jan 22''); Natural Gas Supply Association on February 
10, 2014 (``CL-NGSA Feb 10''); Archer Daniels Midland Company on 
January 20, 2015; The Andersons, Inc. on January 15, 2014. See also 
CL-ECOM Nov 13 (Commission should apply a facts and circumstances 
approach that permits disaggregation conditioned on independence of 
control of trading decisions).
    \61\ See CL-Wilmar Nov 13 and CL-Chamber Feb 10.
    \62\ See CL-NCFC Aug 4; CL-CMC Jan 22; CL-NGSA Feb 10.
    \63\ See ICE Futures US, Inc. on February 10, 2014 (``CL-ICE Feb 
10''). See also CL-NGSA Feb 10 (arguing that aggregation should 
require findings of both ownership and control).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A commenter representing investment managers maintained that the 
Commission should not require passive investors in owned entities to 
aggregate the owned entities' positions when the passive investors do 
not have actual control over the owned entities' trading.\64\ This 
commenter focused on the requirement to file a notice to claim relief 
from aggregation (which it said would be burdensome for entities that 
manage a large number of investment funds), and suggested instead that 
the criteria in proposed rule 105.4(b)(2)(i) be treated as a non-
exclusive safe harbor, with other relief from aggregation being 
available in various circumstances.\65\ The commenter asserted that the 
CEA requires aggregation only when there is actual control of the owned 
entity's derivatives trading, which the Commission has traditionally 
interpreted not to follow necessarily from mere corporate control of 
the owned entity.\66\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \64\ See CL-SIFMA AMG Nov 13.
    \65\ See SIFMA AMG on August 1, 2014 (discussing practical 
difficulties such as monitoring the equity ownership held by managed 
funds/accounts, and monitoring the commodity derivatives positions 
held by the operating companies in which managed funds/accounts hold 
equity ownership). See also CL-SIFMA AMG Nov 13; CL-Wilmar Nov 13.
    \66\ See SIFMA AMG on February 10, 2014 (``CL-SIFMA AMG Feb 
10'') (referring to requirement to file reports on Form 40 and 
asserting that the Commission's pre-2011 rulemakings required 
aggregation on the basis of direct ownership in accounts, not on the 
basis of ownership interests in third parties who, in turn, owned 
positions in derivatives trading accounts).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A holding company for a number of DCMs commented that the 
Commission did not identify any basis or justification for the various 
features of the Proposed Rule.\67\ This commenter contended that 
features of the Proposed Rule (regarding the owned entity aggregation 
rules, the IAC exemption, and the ``substantially identical trading 
strategies'' rule) are not in accordance with law, are arbitrary and 
capricious, are an unexplained departure from the Commission's 
administrative precedent, and are not more permissive than existing 
aggregation standards.\68\ Two other commenters were also of the 
opinion that the Proposed Rule was not supported by the Commission's 
administrative precedent.\69\

[[Page 91460]]

Commenters asserted that section 4a(a)(1) of the CEA provides no basis 
for requiring aggregation of positions held by another person in the 
absence of control of such other person.\70\ One of these commenters 
also stated that existing regulation 150.4(b) generally exempts a 
commodity pool's participants with an ownership interest of 10 percent 
or greater from aggregating the positions held by the pool.\71\ 
Finally, commenters contended that two of the Commission's enforcement 
cases indicate that the Commission has viewed aggregation as being 
required only where there is common trading control.\72\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \67\ See CME Group, Inc. on February 10, 2014 (``CL-CME Feb 
10'').
    \68\ CL-CME Feb 10 (opining that under Commission precedent, a 
10 percent or more ownership or equity interest in an account is an 
indicia of trading control, but precedent does not support a 
requirement for aggregation based on a 10 percent or more ownership 
or equity interest in an entity). This commenter reasoned that the 
Commission's use of the term ``account'' has never referred to an 
owned entity that itself has accounts, that the 1979 Aggregation 
Policy suggests the Commission contemplated a definition of 
``account'' that means no more than a personally owned futures 
trading account, and that the 1999 Amendments to the aggregation 
rules were focused on directly owned accounts. Id.
    \69\ One of these commenters contended that under the 
Commission's precedents ``[l]egal affiliation [between companies] 
has been an indicium but not necessarily sufficient for position 
aggregation.'' See Commodity Markets Council on Feb 10, 2014 (``CL-
CMC Feb 10'').
    The other commenter asserted that the Commission has never 
specifically required aggregation solely on the basis of ownership 
of another legal person. CL-NGSA Feb 10. To support its view, this 
commenter said that the 1979 Aggregation Policy and the 1999 
Amendments apply to only trading accounts that are directly or 
personally held or controlled by an individual or legal entity, the 
Commission's large trader rules require aggregation of multiple 
accounts held by a particular person, not the accounts of a person 
and its owned entities, and existing regulation 18.04(b) 
distinguishes between owners of the ``reporting trader'' and the 
owners of the ``accounts of the reporting trader.'' Id.
    \70\ See CL-CME Feb 10; CL-NGSA Feb 10. One commenter asserted 
that the Commission's citation of prior rules requiring aggregation 
of owned entity positions at a 10 percent ownership level was not a 
sufficient consideration of the statutorily required factors. CL-CME 
Feb 10.
    Another commenter contended that ``CEA section 4a(a)(1) only 
allows the Commission to require the aggregation of positions on 
ownership alone when those positions are directly owned by a person. 
The positions of another person are only to be aggregated when the 
person has direct or indirect control over the trading of another 
person.'' CL-NGSA Feb 10.
    \71\ See CL-CME Feb 10 (noting that the Commission's proposal to 
amend regulation 150.3 to include the separately incorporated 
affiliates of CPOs, CTAs or FCMs as eligible entities for the 
exemption relief of regulation 150.3 (63 FR 38525 at 38532 n. 27 
(July 17, 1998)) states: ``Affiliated companies are generally 
understood to include one company that owns, or is owned by, another 
or companies that share a common owner''). This commenter also 
asserted that the term ``principals'' under existing regulation 
3.1(a)(2)(ii) include entities that have a direct ownership interest 
that is 10 percent or greater in a lower tier entity, such as the 
parent of a wholly-owned subsidiary. Id. From these two provisions, 
the commenter concluded that the corporate parent of a wholly-owned 
CPO would be affiliated with, and a principal of, its wholly-owned 
subsidiary.
    \72\ See CL-CME Feb 10, citing In the Matter of Vitol Inc. et 
al., Docket No. 10-17 (Sept. 14, 2010), available at http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/legalpleading/enfvitolorder09142010.pdf and In the Matter of 
Citigroup Inc. et al., Docket No. 12-34 (Sept. 21, 2012), available 
at http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/legalpleading/enfcitigroupcgmlorder092112.pdf. Another 
commenter contended that In the Matter of Vitol was based on facts 
that would be relevant only if common trading control was necessary 
for aggregating the positions of affiliated companies. See CL-NGSA 
Feb 10.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

d. Other Comments Related to Aggregation
    The Commission received conflicting comments about passive index-
tracking commodity pools. One commenter asserted that the operators of 
such pools do not have discretion to react to market movements and, 
thus, do not ``control'' trading in the usual meaning of that word, so 
the positions of such pools should not be aggregated with other pools 
operated by the same operator.\73\ Another commenter said the 
Commission should mandate aggregation of all positions of a group or 
class of traders such as operators of passive index-tracking commodity 
pools, because the Commission should focus on excessive concentration 
of positions and potential market manipulation.\74\ This commenter 
noted that the CEA includes language extending the CFTC's aggregation 
powers to cover ``any group or class of traders.'' \75\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \73\ See DB Commodity Services LLC (a wholly-owned, indirect 
subsidiary of Deutsche Bank AG) on February 10, 2014 (``CL-DBCS Feb 
10'').
    \74\ See CL-Better Markets Nov 13.
    \75\ See id. (citing CEA section 4a(a)(1)).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Two commenters suggested that the rule provide an explicit 
exemption from aggregation for pension plans, because the proposed rule 
creates a complicated and potentially unavailable route to relief to 
entities that are required to operate only in the best interests of 
plan beneficiaries and thus cannot be used to further the interests of 
the pension plan's sponsor.\76\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \76\ See Commercial Energy Working Group on February 10, 2014 
(``CL-Working Group Feb 10''); CL-Working Group Nov 13; CL-CMC Nov 
13; CL-CMC Feb 10. One of these commenters asserted that a common 
structure for U.S. pension plans is to have employees of the sponsor 
serve as members of the investment committee of the plan, which is a 
separate legal entity from and unaffiliated with the sponsor. The 
commenter claimed that these employees typically have an investment 
background and may serve in trading-related roles for the plan 
sponsor, and may have knowledge of both the plan and the sponsor's 
trading activity, which may prevent the plan and the sponsor from 
utilizing the proposed exemption from aggregation for pension plans. 
Aggregation would, the commenter said, put the fiduciaries of these 
plans in the position of having to account for the trading 
strategies of the sponsor, which may not be in the best interests of 
plan participants. See CL-Working Group Nov 13; CL-Working Group Feb 
10.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Final Rule
    The Commission is adopting rule 150.4(a)(1) as it was stated in the 
Proposed Rule and reiterated in the Supplemental Notice. This rule sets 
forth the requirements to aggregate positions on the basis of ownership 
or control, or when two or more persons act together under an express 
or implied agreement. The Commission is also adopting rule 150.4(b)(2) 
substantially as it was proposed in the Supplemental Notice (with 
certain modifications discussed below) but, as stated in the 
Supplemental Notice, it is not adopting proposed rule 150.4(b)(3).\77\ 
The Commission is also adopting the conforming change in rule 
150.4(b)(6) from the Supplemental Notice, to delete a cap of 50 percent 
on the ownership or equity interest for broker-dealers to 
disaggregate.\78\ The Commission is persuaded by the commenters that 
rule 150.4(b)(2) should apply to all persons with an ownership or 
equity interest in an owned entity of 10 percent or greater (i.e., an 
interest of up to and including 100 percent) in the same manner.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \77\ Because the Commission is not adopting proposed rule 
150.4(b)(3), paragraphs (b)(4) to (b)(9) of proposed rule 150.4 are 
renumbered in the final rule as paragraphs (b)(3) to (b)(8), 
respectively. Also, as proposed in the Supplemental Notice, the 
Commission is not adopting proposed rule 150.4(e)(1)(i) which 
contained a delegation of authority referencing proposed rule 
150.4(b)(3), and the final rule also reflects the deletion of a 
cross-reference to proposed rule 150.4(b)(3)(vii) in rule 
150.4(c)(1). See Supplemental Notice, 80 FR at 58371.
    \78\ See id. Final rule 150.4(b)(6) (proposed as rule (b)(7)) is 
discussed more fully in section II.F, below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

a. Ownership Threshold for Aggregation
    The Commission continues to believe that, as stated in the 
Supplemental Notice, the overall purpose of the position limits regime 
(to diminish the burden of excessive speculation which may cause 
unwarranted changes in commodity prices) would be better served by 
focusing the aggregation requirement on situations where the owner is, 
in view of the circumstances, actually able to control the trading of 
the owned entity.\79\ The Commission reasons that the ability to cause 
unwarranted changes in the price of a commodity derivatives contract 
would result from the owner's control of the owned entity's trading 
activity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \79\ The Commission notes in this regard that there may have 
been significant burdens in meeting the requirements of proposed 
rule 150.4(b)(3) even where there is no control of the trading of 
the owned entity, as was suggested by the Center for Capital Markets 
Competitiveness of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, SIFMA AMG and other 
commenters on the Proposed Rule. See Supplemental Notice, 80 FR at 
58371.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Rule 150.4(b)(2) will continue the Commission's longstanding rule 
that persons with either an ownership or an equity interest in an 
account or position of less than 10 percent need not aggregate such 
positions solely on the basis of the ownership criteria, and persons 
with a 10 percent or greater ownership interest will generally be 
required to aggregate the account or position.\80\ The Commission has 
found,

[[Page 91461]]

over the decades that the 10 percent threshold has been in effect, that 
this is an appropriate level at which aggregation should be required, 
and no change to this threshold was proposed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \80\ For purposes of aggregation, the Commission continues to 
believe, as stated in the Proposed Rule, that contingent ownership 
rights, such as an equity call option, would not constitute an 
ownership or equity interest. See Proposed Rule at 68958.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission considered the comments that suggested different 
ownership thresholds (e.g., 25 percent or 50 percent) for the 
aggregation requirement. In contrast to the satisfactory experience 
with the 10 percent threshold, the Commission believes that none of the 
commenters presented a compelling analysis to justify a different 
threshold. That is, while it is undoubtedly true that application of 
different ownership thresholds would result in differences in which 
persons would be required to aggregate or seek exemptions from 
aggregation, the commenters did not provide a persuasive explanation of 
how application of a 25 percent or 50 percent ownership threshold would 
more appropriately further the purposes of the position limit regime 
than the 10 percent threshold which has been applied to date.
    For example, one commenter posited that maintaining the 10 percent 
threshold would require owners to file unnecessary notices seeking 
exemptions from aggregation, imposing a burden on both market 
participants and the Commission.\81\ However, the Commission believes 
that preparation of the required notices (and the Commission's review 
of them) will not impose undue burdens, and the notices will be helpful 
to the Commission in monitoring the use of exemptions from 
aggregation.\82\ So while raising the threshold would presumably 
decrease the number of notices that are filed, it is not clear that the 
benefit would be significant since the filing burden is minimal; at the 
same time, however, the amount of information available to the 
Commission for use in monitoring and enforcement would be reduced, a 
potential harm. Because of this uncertainty, the Commission cannot 
conclude that a 25 percent, 50 percent or other threshold would be 
significantly better than the 10 percent threshold which has been 
satisfactorily applied to date, and the Commission has determined to 
leave the 10 percent threshold in place.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \81\ See CL-FIA Nov 13.
    \82\ As discussed below, the Commission has instructed its staff 
to conduct ongoing surveillance and monitoring of disaggregation 
filings and related information for red flags.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    After considering the comments on the proposed procedure in rule 
150.4(b)(2) for a notice filing to permit a person with an ownership or 
an equity interest in an owned entity of 10 percent or greater to 
disaggregate the positions of the owned entity in specified 
circumstances, the Commission has determined to adopt this 
proposal.\83\ The notice filing must demonstrate compliance with the 
conditions set forth in rule 150.4(b)(2), which are discussed below. 
Similar to other exemptions from aggregation, the notice filing will be 
effective upon submission to the Commission, but the Commission is able 
to subsequently call for additional information, and to amend, 
terminate or otherwise modify the person's aggregation exemption for 
failure to comply with the provisions of rule 150.4(b)(2). Further, the 
person is obligated to amend the notice filing in the event of a 
material change to the circumstances described in the filing.\84\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \83\ Under the rule adopted here, and in a manner similar to 
current regulation, if a person qualifies for disaggregation relief, 
the person would nonetheless have to aggregate those same accounts 
or positions covered by the relief if they are held in accounts with 
substantially identical trading strategies. See rule 150.4(a)(2). 
The exemptions in rule 150.4 are set forth as alternatives, so that, 
for example, the applicability of the exemption in paragraph (b)(2) 
would not affect the applicability of a separate exemption from 
aggregation (e.g., the independent account controller exemption in 
paragraph (b)(4)).
    \84\ See rule 150.4(c), discussed in section II.C., below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission notes that commenters raised valid concerns about 
permitting disaggregation following a notice filing that is effective 
upon submission.\85\ The Commission has instructed its staff to conduct 
ongoing surveillance and monitoring of disaggregation filings and 
related information for red flags which could include, but would not be 
limited to, the creation of multiple subsidiaries, filings that are 
only superficially complete, and patterns of trading that suggest 
coordination after a filing has been made. The Commission is sensitive 
to the potential for circumvention of position limits through the use 
of multiple subsidiaries, but it continues to believe, as stated in the 
Supplemental Notice, that the criteria in rule 150.4(b)(2)(i), which 
must be satisfied in order to disaggregate, will appropriately indicate 
whether an owner has control of or knowledge of the trading activity of 
the owned entity.\86\ The disaggregation criteria require that the two 
entities not have knowledge of each other's trading and, moreover, have 
and enforce written procedures to preclude such knowledge.\87\ And, in 
fact, as noted in the Proposed Rule, the Commission has applied, and 
expects to continue to apply, certain of the same conditions in 
connection with the IAC exemption to ensure independence of trading 
between an eligible entity and an affiliated independent account 
controller.\88\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \85\ See CL-Better Markets Nov 13; CL-Occupy the SEC Nov 13; CL-
IATP Nov 13.
    \86\ See Supplemental Notice, 80 FR at 58371.
    \87\ See rule 150.4(b)(2)(i), discussed in section II.B., below.
    \88\ See Proposed Rule, 78 FR at 68961, referring to existing 
regulation 150.3(a)(4) (to be replaced by rule 150.4(b)(4)). Such 
conditions have been useful in ensuring that trading is not 
coordinated through the development of similar trading systems, and 
that procedures are in place to prevent the sharing of trading 
decisions between entities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    If the disaggregation criteria are satisfied, the Commission 
believes that disaggregation may be permitted without weakening the 
aggregation regime, even if the owner has a greater than 50 percent 
ownership or equity interest in the owned entity. Even in the case of 
majority ownership, if the disaggregation criteria are satisfied, the 
ability of an owner and the owned entity to act together to engage in 
excessive speculation or to cause unwarranted price changes should not 
differ significantly from that of two separate individuals. The 
Commission reaches this conclusion based in part on commenters' 
descriptions of relevant corporate structures. For example, one 
commenter described instances where an entity has a 100 percent 
ownership interest in another entity, yet does not control day-to-day 
business activities of the owned entity.\89\ In this situation the 
owned entity would not have knowledge of the activities of other 
entities owned by the same owner, nor would it raise the heightened 
concerns, triggered when one entity both owns and controls trading of 
another entity, that the owner would necessarily act in a coordinated 
manner with other owned entities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \89\ See MidAmerican Energy Holdings Company on February 7, 2014 
(``CL-MidAmerican Feb 7'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As explained in the Supplemental Notice, the Commission believes it 
would be inappropriate to disallow the possibility of a notice filing 
to disaggregate the positions of majority-owned subsidiaries, because 
without this possibility of relief, corporate groups may be required to 
establish procedures to monitor and coordinate trading activities 
across disparate owned entities, which could have unpredictable 
consequences.\90\ The Commission recognizes that these consequences 
could include not only the cost of establishing these procedures, but 
also the impairment of corporate structures which were established to 
ensure that the various

[[Page 91462]]

owned entities engage in business independently. This independence may 
serve important purposes which could be lost if the aggregation 
requirement were imposed too widely. The Commission does not intend 
that the aggregation requirement interfere with existing corporate 
structures and procedures adopted to ensure the independence of owned 
entities.\91\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \90\ See Supplemental Notice, 80 FR at 58369-70.
    \91\ The Commission noted in the Supplemental Notice that the 
disaggregation criteria in rule 150.4(b)(2)(i) should be relatively 
familiar to corporate groups, because they are in line with prudent 
corporate practices that are maintained for longstanding, well-
accepted reasons. See id. The Commission also notes that since the 
aggregation rules may be a precedent for aggregation rules enforced 
by DCMs and SEFs, it is even more important that the aggregation 
rules set out, to the extent feasible, ``bright line'' rules that 
are capable of easy application by a wide variety of market 
participants while not being susceptible to circumvention. See 
Proposed Rule, 78 FR at 68596, n. 103. The Commission believes that 
by implementing an approach to aggregation that is in keeping with 
longstanding corporate practices, rule 150.4(b)(2) promotes the goal 
of setting out ``bright line'' rules that are relatively easy to 
apply while not being susceptible to circumvention.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Adoption of rule 150.4(b)(2) is in accordance with the Commission's 
authority under CEA section 4a(a)(7) to provide relief from the 
position limits regime. The notice filing requirement in the rule will 
appropriately implement the CEA. The 10 percent threshold historically 
applied by the Commission continues to have importance, because it 
demarcates the level at which the notice filing and the procedures 
underlying the notice are required. Relief under rule 150.4(b)(2) will 
not be automatic, but rather will require a certification (provided in 
the notice under rule 150.4(c)) that procedures to ensure independence 
are in place.
    Furthermore, as the Commission noted in the Supplemental Notice, 
satisfaction of the criteria in rule 150.4(b)(2) would not foreclose 
the possibility that positions of owners and owned entities would have 
to be aggregated.\92\ For example, aggregation is and would continue to 
be required under rule 150.4(a)(1) if two or more persons act pursuant 
to an express or implied agreement; and this aggregation requirement 
would apply whether the two or more persons are an owner and owned 
entity(ies) that meet the conditions in proposed rule 150.4(b)(2), or 
are unaffiliated individuals.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \92\ See Supplemental Notice, 80 FR at 58371.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

b. Ownership Is a Valid Basis for Aggregation
    Regarding those commenters who said that ownership of an entity 
should not be a basis for aggregation of that entity's positions, the 
Commission continues to interpret section 4a(a)(1) of the CEA, as 
stated in the Proposed Rule and reiterated in the Supplemental Notice, 
to provide for the general aggregation standard with regard to position 
limits, and specifically supports aggregation on the basis of 
ownership, because it provides that in determining whether any person 
has exceeded such limits, the positions held and trading done by any 
persons directly or indirectly controlled by such person shall be 
included with the positions held and trading done by such person; and 
further, such limits upon positions and trading shall apply to 
positions held by, and trading done by, two or more persons acting 
pursuant to an expressed or implied agreement or understanding, the 
same as if the positions were held by, or the trading were done by, a 
single person.\93\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \93\ 7 U.S.C. 6a(a)(1), cited in Proposed Rule, 78 FR at 68956, 
and Supplemental Notice, 80 FR 58366.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission explained in the Proposed Rule that this 
interpretation is supported by Congressional direction and Commission 
precedent from as early as 1957 and continued through 1999.\94\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \94\ See Proposed Rule, 78 FR at 68956.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    For example, in 1968, Congress amended the aggregation standard in 
CEA section 4a to include positions ``held by'' one trader for 
another,\95\ supporting the view that an owner should aggregate the 
positions held by an owned entity (because the owned entity is holding 
the positions for the owner). During the Commission's 1986 
reauthorization, witnesses at Congressional hearings suggested that 
``aggregation of positions based on ownership without actual control 
unnecessarily restricts a trader's use of the futures and options 
markets,'' but the Congressional committee did not recommend any 
changes to the statute based on these suggestions.\96\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \95\ See S. Rep No. 947, 90th Cong., 2 Sess. 5 (1968) regarding 
the CEA Amendments of 1968, Public Law 90-258, 82 Stat. 26 (1968). 
This Senate Report provides:
    Certain longstanding administrative interpretations would be 
incorporated in the act. As an example, the present act authorizes 
the Commodity Exchange Commission to fix limits on the amount of 
speculative ``trading'' that may be done. The Commission has 
construed this to mean that it has the authority to set limits on 
the amount of buying or selling that may be done and on the size of 
positions that may be held. All of the Commission's speculative 
limit orders, dating back to 1938, have been based upon this 
interpretation. The bill would clarify the act in this regard. . . .
    Section 2 of the bill amends section 4a(1) of the act to show 
clearly the authority to impose limits on ``positions which may be 
held.'' It further provides that trading done and positions held by 
a person controlled by another shall be considered as done or held 
by such other; and that trading done or positions held by two or 
more persons acting pursuant to an express or implied understanding 
shall be treated as if done or held by a single person.
    \96\ See H.R. Rep. No. 624, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986) at page 
43. The Report noted that:
    During the subcommittee hearings on reauthorization, several 
witnesses expressed dissatisfaction with the manner in which certain 
market positions are aggregated for purposes of determining 
compliance with speculative limits fixed under Section 4a of the 
Act. The witnesses suggested that, in some instances, aggregation of 
positions based on ownership without actual control unnecessarily 
restricts a trader's use of the futures and options markets. In this 
connection, concern was expressed about the application of 
speculative limits to the market positions of certain commodity 
pools and pension funds using multiple trading managers who trade 
independently of each other. The Committee does not take a position 
on the merits of the claims of the witnesses. Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In 1988, the Commission reviewed petitions by the Managed Futures 
Trade Association and the Chicago Board of Trade which argued against 
aggregation based only on ownership.\97\ In response to the petition, 
however, the Commission stated that:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \97\ The Managed Futures Trade Association petition requested 
that the Commission amend the aggregation standard for exchange-set 
speculative position limits in regulation 1.61(g) (now regulation 
150.5(g)), by adding a proviso to exclude the separate accounts of a 
commodity pool where trading in those accounts is directed by 
unaffiliated CTAs acting independently. See Exemption From 
Speculative Position Limits for Positions Which Have a Common Owner 
but Which Are Independently Controlled; Proposed Rule, 53 FR 13290, 
13291-92 (Apr. 22, 1988). The petition argued the ownership 
standard, as applied to ``multiple-advisor commodity pools, is 
unfair and unrealistic'' because while the commodity pool may own 
the positions in the separate accounts, the CPO does not control 
trading of those positions (the unaffiliated commodity trading 
advisor (``CTA'') does) and therefore the pool's ownership of the 
positions will not result in unwarranted price fluctuations. See id. 
at 13292.
    The petition from the Chicago Board of Trade (which is now a 
part of CME Group, Inc.) sought to revise the aggregation standard 
so as not to require aggregation based solely on ownership without 
control. See id.

    Both ownership and control have long been included as the 
appropriate aggregation criteria in the Act and Commission 
regulations. Generally, inclusion of both criteria has resulted in a 
bright-line test for aggregating positions. And as noted above, 
although the factual circumstances surrounding the control of 
accounts and positions may vary, ownership generally is clear.
    . . . In the absence of an ownership criterion in the 
aggregation standard, each potential speculative position limit 
violation would have to be analyzed with regard to the individual 
circumstances surrounding the degree of trading control of the 
positions in question. This would greatly increase uncertainty.\98\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \98\ See id. In response to the petitions, however, the 
Commission proposed the IAC exemption, which provides ``an 
additional exemption from speculative position limits for positions 
of commodity pools which are traded in separate accounts by 
unaffiliated account controllers acting independently.'' Id.


[[Page 91463]]


---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Even earlier administrative determinations, as well as regulations 
of the Commodity Exchange Authority, announced standards that included 
control of trading and financial interests in positions. As early as 
1957, the Commission's predecessor issued determinations requiring that 
accounts in which a person has a financial interest be included in 
aggregation.\99\ In addition, the definition of ``proprietary account'' 
in regulation 1.3(y), which has been in effect for decades, includes 
any account in which there is 10 percent ownership.\100\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \99\ See Administrative Determination 163 (Aug. 7, 1957) (``[I]n 
the application of speculative limits, accounts in which the firm 
has a financial interest must be combined with any trading of the 
firm itself or any other accounts in which it in fact exercises 
control.''). In addition, the Commission's predecessor, and later 
the Commission, provided the aggregation standards for purposes of 
position limits in the large trader reporting rules. See Supersedure 
of Certain Regulations, 26 FR 2968 (Apr. 7, 1961). In 1961, then 
regulation 18.01(a) (``Multiple Accounts'') stated that if any 
trader holds or has a financial interest in or controls more than 
one account, whether carried with the same or with different futures 
commission merchants or foreign brokers, all such accounts shall be 
considered as a single account for the purpose of determining 
whether such trader has a reportable position and for the purpose of 
reporting. 17 CFR 18.01 (1961).
    In the 1979 Aggregation Policy, the Commission discussed 
regulation 18.01, stating:
    Financial Interest in Accounts. Consistent with the underlying 
rationale of aggregation, existing reporting Rule 18.10(a) a (sic) 
basically provides that if a trader holds or has a financial 
interest in more than one account, all accounts are considered as a 
single account for reporting purposes. Several inquiries have been 
received regarding whether a nomial (sic) financial interest in an 
account requires the trader to aggregate. Traditionally, the 
Commission's predecessor and its staff have expressed the view that 
except for the financial interest of a limited partner or 
shareholder (other than the commodity pool operator) in a commodity 
pool, a financial interest of 10 percent or more requires 
aggregation. The Commission has determined to codify this 
interpretation at this time and has amended Rule 18.01 to provide in 
part that, ``For purposes of this Part, except for the interest of a 
limited partner or shareholder (other than the commodity pool 
operator) in a commodity pool, the term `financial interest' shall 
mean an interest of 10 percent or more in ownership or equity of an 
account.''
    Thus, a financial interest at or above this level will 
constitute the trader as an account owner for aggregation purposes.
    1979 Aggregation Policy, 44 FR at 33843.
    The provisions concerning aggregation for position limits 
generally remained part of the Commission's large trader reporting 
regime until 1999 when the Commission incorporated the aggregation 
provisions into existing regulation 150.4 with the existing position 
limit provisions in part 150. See 1999 Amendments. The Commission's 
part 151 rulemaking also incorporated the aggregation provisions in 
vacated regulation 151.7 along with the remaining position limit 
provisions in part 151. See 76 FR 71626, Nov. 18, 2011.
    \100\ 17 CFR 1.3(y). This provision has been in existing 
regulation 1.3(y)(1)(iv) since at least 1976, which the Commission 
adopted from regulations of its predecessor, with ``for the most 
part, procedural, housekeeping-type modifications, conforming the 
regulations to the recently enacted CFTCA.'' See 41 FR 3192, 3195 
(January 21, 1976).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In light of the language in section 4a, its legislative history, 
subsequent regulatory developments, and the Commission's historical 
practices in this regard, the Commission continues to interpret section 
4a to require aggregation on the basis of either ownership or control 
of an entity. The Commission also believes that aggregation of 
positions across accounts based upon ownership is a necessary part of 
the Commission's position limit regime.\101\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \101\ See 1999 Amendments, 64 FR at 24044 (``[T]he Commission . 
. . interprets the `held or controlled' criteria as applying 
separately to ownership of positions or to control of trading 
decisions.''). See also, Exemptions from Speculative Position Limits 
for Positions which have a Common Owner but which are Independently 
Controlled and for Certain Spread Positions, 53 FR 13290, 13292 
(Apr. 22, 1988). In response to two separate petitions, the 
Commission proposed the independent account controller exemption 
from speculative position limits, but declined to remove the 
ownership standard from its aggregation policy. The 1999 Amendments' 
reference to the Commission's large-trader reporting system, 64 FR 
at 24043, is not related to the aggregation rules for the position 
limits regime. Rather, the 1999 Amendments included an explanation 
of situations in which reporting could be required based on both 
control and ownership. 1999 Amendments, 64 FR at 24043 and n. 26. 
(the ``routine large trader reporting system is set up so that it 
does not double count positions which may be controlled by one and 
traded for the beneficial ownership of another. In such 
circumstances, although the routine reporting system will aggregate 
the positions reported by FCMs using only the control criterion, the 
staff may determine that certain accounts or positions should also 
be aggregated using the ownership criterion or may by special call 
receive reports directly from a trader.'')
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Moreover, an ownership standard establishes a bright-line test that 
provides certainty to market participants and the Commission.\102\ 
Without aggregation on the basis of ownership, the Commission would 
have to apply a control test in all cases, which would pose significant 
administrative challenges to individually assess control across all 
market participants. Further, the Commission considers that if the 
statute were read to require aggregation based only on control, market 
participants may be able to use an ownership interest to directly or 
indirectly influence the account or position and thereby circumvent the 
aggregation requirement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \102\ See footnote 91, above.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In the Supplemental Notice, the Commission responded to commenters' 
assertions that the Proposed Rule was not in accordance with the 
Commission's statutory authority or precedents.\103\ In brief, the 
Commission explained that the aggregation requirement in CEA section 4a 
is not phrased in terms of whether the owner holds an interest in a 
trading account.\104\ The Commission also explained why its enforcement 
history does not contradict the Commission's traditional view of 
aggregation of owned entity positions as being required on the basis of 
either control or ownership.\105\ The relevant commenters did not 
discuss these points in the comments they submitted on the Supplemental 
Notice,\106\ and the Commission considers that the discussion of these 
matters in the Supplemental Notice explains how the final rule is in 
accordance with law and the Commission's precedents.\107\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \103\ See Supplemental Notice, 80 FR at 58373.
    \104\ In fact, the word ``account'' does not even appear in the 
statute. As noted above, section 4a(a)(1) of the CEA provides that 
in determining whether any person has exceeded such limits, the 
positions held and trading done by any persons directly or 
indirectly controlled by such person shall be included with the 
positions held and trading done by such person. 7 U.S.C. 6a(a)(1).
    \105\ See Supplemental Notice, 80 FR at 58373.
    \106\ See CL-CME Nov 13 and CL-NGSA Nov 13.
    \107\ See Supplemental Notice, 80 FR at 58373.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

c. Other Considerations Relevant to the Proposed Rule
    The Commission does not believe, as suggested by some commenters, 
that the aggregation requirement in rule 150.4(a)(1) would lead to 
significantly more information sharing or significantly increased 
levels of coordinated speculative trading by the entities subject to 
aggregation. Among other things, the position limits would affect the 
trading of only entities that hold positions in excess of the limits, 
which the Commission expects to be relatively small in comparison to 
all entities that are active in the relevant markets.\108\ Thus, the 
Commission continues to believe that the final rule will not result in 
a significantly increased level of information sharing that would 
increase coordinated speculative trading. The Commission notes that 
rule 150.4(b) sets out various aggregation exemptions, lessening the 
need to share information regarding speculative trading to ensure 
compliance with position limits.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \108\ See, e.g., Position Limits for Futures and Swaps, 76 FR 
71626, 71668 (Nov. 18, 2011) (describing the number of traders 
estimated to be subject to position limits).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission has also considered that relief from any rule 
requiring the aggregation of positions held by separate entities is 
only necessary where the entities would be below the relevant limits on 
an individual basis, but above a limit when aggregated. Thus, as the 
Commission suggested in the Proposed Rule, if a group of affiliated 
entities can take steps to maintain an aggregate

[[Page 91464]]

position that does not exceed any limit, then the group will not have 
to seek disaggregation relief.\109\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \109\ See Proposed Rule, 78 FR at 68958.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In other words, the Commission continues to believe that seeking 
disaggregation relief is one option for those groups of affiliated 
entities that may exceed a limit on an aggregate basis but will remain 
below the relevant limits on an individual basis. Other avenues are 
also available to corporate groups that seek to remain in compliance 
with the position limit regime. For example, the affiliated entities 
may put into place procedures to avoid exceeding the limits on an 
aggregate basis.\110\ One potential approach that could be available to 
a holding company with multiple subsidiaries would be to assign each 
subsidiary an internal limit based on a percentage of the level of the 
position limit. The holding company would allocate no more in aggregate 
internal limits than the level of the position limit.\111\ Further, a 
breach of an internal limit would provide the holding company with 
notice that it should consider filing for bona fide hedging exemptions 
or taking other compliance steps, as applicable.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \110\ The procedures adopted by the affiliates may obviate more 
complex steps such as the implementation of real-time monitoring 
software to consolidate all derivative activities of the affiliates, 
especially if the group currently does not have an aggregate 
position approaching the size of a position limit and has 
historically not changed position sizes day-over-day by a 
significant percentage of the position limit.
    \111\ An even more cautious approach would be for the holding 
company to limit the overall allocation to the subsidiaries to less 
than 100 percent of the position limit. For example, a holding 
company with three subsidiaries may assign each subsidiary an 
internal limit equal to 30 percent of the level of the federal 
limit. Thus, the holding company has allocated permission to 
subsidiaries to hold, in the aggregate, positions equal to up to 90 
percent of the level of the relevant position limit. Each subsidiary 
would simply report at close of business its derivative position to 
the holding company. The 10 percent cushion provides the holding 
company with the ability to remain in compliance with the limit, 
even if all subsidiaries slightly exceed the internal limits on the 
same side of the market at the same time.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission also considered whether aggregation of positions is 
unnecessary because information about ownership and control is 
available to the Commission through reports on Commission Form 40.\112\ 
However, the Commission is not persuaded that these reports are a 
sufficient substitute for the position limits regime. While these 
reports provide some information necessary for surveillance of 
positions, some owned entities may not file these reports. On a more 
fundamental level, the Commission believes that compliance with the 
position limit rules, including aggregation of the positions of owned 
entities, is primarily the responsibility of the owned entities and 
their owners. Even if the information on Form 40 were sufficient, it 
would be impractical and inefficient for the Commission to use that 
information to monitor compliance with the position limit rules, as 
compared to the ability of the entities themselves to maintain 
compliance with the position limits.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \112\ See 17 CFR part 18, Appendix A.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

d. Consideration of Alternatives Suggested by Commenters
    Regarding the requests for specific exemptions or other special 
treatment for various types of entities or situations, such as 
investment companies, pension plans, passive index-tracking commodity 
pools, and cases of transitory ownership, the Commission is not 
persuaded that any further relief for such entities (i.e., beyond the 
relief already provided in the final rule) would justify the complexity 
of applying the new rules that would be necessary for such specific 
treatment, which would likely include definitional rules to set out the 
scope of entities that qualify for the special treatment. For example, 
the Commission believes that distinguishing ``transitory'' ownership 
from other forms of ownership would be more complicated than completing 
the notice required to obtain relief, and in such situations it is 
reasonable to expect that the notice filing would be made on a summary 
basis appropriate to the transitory situation.
    The Commission reached a similar conclusion regarding the 
suggestions for different types of filings in various situations. 
Again, the Commission believes that the filing required by rule 
150.4(c) is relatively simple because it requires only a description of 
the relevant circumstances that warrant disaggregation, and a statement 
certifying that the conditions set forth in the applicable aggregation 
exemption provision have been met. Therefore, the complexity of 
determining which filing to provide in various situations would be 
greater than that involved in completing the required filing.
    As for the commenters that suggested certain categories of persons 
(such as passive investors) should be exempt from the aggregation 
requirement without making any filing at all, the Commission concluded 
that this approach would put at risk the satisfactory experience under 
the existing regulation, under which aggregation is required without 
exemption. For this reason, the Commission did not propose to provide 
categorical exemptions from the aggregation requirement. As explained 
above, the Commission believes it is important that its staff be able 
to conduct ongoing surveillance and monitoring of disaggregation 
filings and related information for red flags. If greater than 10 
percent owners were permitted to avoid the aggregation requirement 
without making any filing, there could be a greater potential for 
circumvention of position limits.
    Last, the Commission emphasizes that the categories of relief from 
the aggregation requirement set forth in the final rule do not limit 
the Commission's existing authority under section 4a(a)(7) of the CEA 
to grant exemptions from the aggregation requirement on a case-by-case 
basis.

B. Criteria for Aggregation Relief in Rule 150.4(b)(2)(i)

1. Proposed Approach
    The proposed criteria to claim relief addressed the Commission's 
concerns that an ownership or equity interest of 10 percent and above 
may facilitate or enable control over trading of the owned entity, or 
allow a person to accumulate a large position through multiple accounts 
that could overall amount to an unduly large position.\113\ The 
Proposed Rule grouped these criteria into five paragraphs in proposed 
rule 150.4(b)(2)(i). The Commission stated its intent that these 
criteria would be interpreted and applied in accordance with the 
Commission's past practices in this regard.\114\ In accordance with 
these precedents, the Commission would not expect that the criteria 
would impose requirements beyond a reasonable, plain-language 
interpretation of the

[[Page 91465]]

criteria. For example, routine pre- or post-trade systems to effect 
trading on an operational level (such as trade capture, trade risk or 
order-entry systems) would not, broadly speaking, have to be 
independently developed in order to comply with the criteria. Also, 
employees that do not direct or participate in an entity's trading 
decisions would generally not be subject to these requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \113\ The Proposed Rule noted that the criteria would apply to 
the person filing the notice as well as the owned entity. See 
Proposed Rule, 78 FR at 68961. In addition, the Proposed Rule noted 
that for purposes of meeting the criteria, such ``person'' would 
include any entity that such person must aggregate pursuant to 
proposed rule 150.4. For example, if company A files a notice under 
proposed rule 150.4(c) for company A's equity interest of 30 percent 
in company B, then company A must comply with the conditions for the 
exemption, including any entity with which company A aggregates 
positions under proposed rule 150.4. In this connection, if company 
A controlled the trading of company C, then company A's 150.4(c) 
notice filing must demonstrate that there is independence between 
company B and company C. See id.
    \114\ See id., citing 1979 Aggregation Policy, 44 FR 33839 
(providing indicia of independence); CFTC Interpretive Letter No. 
92-15 (CCH ] 25,381) (ministerial capacity overseeing execution of 
trades not necessarily inconsistent with indicia of independence); 
1999 Amendments, 64 FR at 24044 (intent in issuing final aggregation 
rule ``merely to codify the 1979 Aggregation Policy, including the 
continued efficacy of the [1992] interpretative letter'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Proposed rule 150.4(b)(2)(i)(A) would condition aggregation relief 
on a demonstration that the person filing for disaggregation relief and 
the owned entity do not have knowledge of the trading decisions of the 
other. The Commission noted its preliminary belief that where an entity 
has an ownership interest in another entity and neither entity shares 
trading information, such entities demonstrate independence.\115\ In 
contrast, persons with knowledge of trading decisions of another in 
which they have an ownership interest are likely to take such decisions 
into account in making their own trading decisions, which implicates 
the Commission's concern about independence and enhances the risk for 
coordinated trading.\116\ This proposed criterion would address 
concerns regarding knowledge of employees who control, direct or 
participate in an entity's trading decisions, and would not prohibit 
information sharing solely for risk management, accounting, compliance, 
or similar purposes and information sharing among mid- and back-office 
personnel that do not control, direct or participate in trading 
decisions. In the Proposed Rule, the Commission clarified that this 
criterion would generally not require aggregation solely based on 
knowledge that a party gains during execution of a transaction 
regarding the trading of the counterparty to that transaction, nor 
would it encompass knowledge that an entity would gain when carrying 
out due diligence under a fiduciary duty, so long as such knowledge is 
not directly used to affect the entity's trading.\117\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \115\ See Proposed Rule, 78 FR at 68961.
    \116\ As noted in the Proposed Rule, the Commission does not 
consider knowledge of overall end-of-day position information to 
necessarily constitute knowledge of trading decisions, so long as 
the position information cannot be used to dictate or infer trading 
strategies. As such, the knowledge of end-of-day positions for the 
purpose of monitoring credit limits for corporate guarantees does 
not necessarily constitute knowledge of trading information. 
However, the ability to monitor the development of positions on a 
real time basis could constitute knowledge of trading decisions 
because of the substantial likelihood that such knowledge might 
affect trading strategies or influence trading decisions of the 
other. See id.
    \117\ As explained in the Proposed Rule, proposed paragraph (A) 
was along the lines suggested by commenters on the proposed 
amendments to part 151. These commenters had said that the limits on 
sharing information between the person and the owned entity should 
not apply to employees that do not direct or influence trading (such 
as attorneys or risk management and compliance personnel), although 
the employees may have knowledge of the trading of both the person 
and the owned entity. Also, a commenter representing employee 
benefit plan managers said that restrictions on information sharing 
are, in general, a problem for plan managers, which have a fiduciary 
duty to inquire as to an owned entities' activities, so the 
Commission should recognize that acting as required by fiduciary 
duties does not constitute a violation of the information sharing 
restriction. And a commenter had said that information sharing 
resulting when the person and the owned entity (or two owned 
entities) are counterparties in an arm's length transaction should 
not be a violation of the rule. See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Proposed rule 150.4(b)(2)(i)(B) would condition aggregation relief 
on a demonstration that the person seeking disaggregation relief and 
the owned entity trade pursuant to separately developed and independent 
trading systems. Further, proposed rule 150.4(b)(2)(i)(C) would 
condition relief on a demonstration that such person and the owned 
entity have, and enforce, written procedures to preclude the one entity 
from having knowledge of, gaining access to, or receiving data about, 
trades of the other. Such procedures would have to include document 
routing and other procedures or security arrangements, including 
separate physical locations, which would maintain the independence of 
their activities. As noted in the Proposed Rule, the Commission has 
applied these same conditions in connection with the IAC exemption to 
ensure independence of trading between an eligible entity and an 
affiliated IAC.\118\ Similar to the IAC exemption, proposed rule 
150.4(b)(2) would permit disaggregation in certain circumstances where 
there is independence of trading between two entities. Thus, the 
Commission proposed these conditions, which were already applicable and 
working well in the IAC context, and which were expected to strengthen 
the independence between the two entities for the owned entity 
exemption.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \118\ See id. See also existing regulation150.3(a)(4). Such 
conditions have been useful in ensuring that trading is not 
coordinated through the development of similar trading systems, and 
that procedures are in place to prevent the sharing of trading 
decisions between entities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission proposed that the phrase ``separately developed and 
independent trading systems'' be interpreted in accordance with the 
Commission's prior practices in this regard.\119\ The Commission stated 
that it generally would not expect that this criterion would prevent an 
owner and an owned entity from both using the same ``off-the-shelf'' 
system that is developed by a third party.\120\ Rather, the concern 
driving the Commission's proposal was that trading systems (in 
particular, the parameters for trading that are applied by the systems) 
could be used by multiple parties who each know that the other parties 
are using the same trading system as well as the specific parameters 
used for trading and, therefore, are indirectly coordinating their 
trading.\121\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \119\ See, e.g., 1979 Aggregation Policy, 44 FR at 33840-1 
(futures commission merchant (FCM) ``deemed to control'' trading of 
customer accounts in trading program where FCM gives specific advice 
or recommendations not made available to other customers, unless 
such accounts and programs are traded independently and for 
different purposes than proprietary accounts).
    \120\ Commenters on the proposed amendments to part 151 had said 
that this requirement should not prevent the use of third party 
``off-the-shelf'' execution algorithms, should permit the sharing of 
virtual documentation, so long as such document can be accessed only 
by persons that do not manage or control trading, and should apply 
only to systems that direct trading decisions, but not trade 
capture, trade risk or trade facilitation systems. See Proposed 
Rule, 78 FR at 68962.
    \121\ Compare 1979 Aggregation Policy, 44 FR at 33841. 
``However, the Commission also recognizes that purportedly different 
programs which in fact are similar in design and purpose and are 
under common control may be initiated in an attempt to circumvent 
speculative limit and reporting requirements.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The requirement of ``separate physical locations'' in proposed rule 
150.4(b)(2)(i)(C) would not necessarily require that the relevant 
personnel be located in separate buildings. In the Proposed Rule, the 
Commission stated that the important factor is that there be a physical 
barrier between the personnel that prevents access between the 
personnel that would impinge on their independence.\122\ For example, 
locked doors with restricted access would generally be sufficient, 
while merely providing the purportedly ``independent'' personnel with 
desks of their own would not. Similar principles would apply to sharing 
documents or other resources.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \122\ See Proposed Rule, 78 FR at 68962.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Proposed rule 150.4(b)(2)(i)(D) would condition aggregation relief 
on a demonstration that the person does not share employees that 
control the owned entity's trading decisions, and the employees of the 
owned entity do not share trading control with such persons. The 
Proposed Rule noted the Commission's concern that shared employees with 
control of trading decisions may undermine the independence of trading 
between entities.\123\ Regarding the sharing of

[[Page 91466]]

attorneys, accountants, risk managers, compliance and other mid- and 
back-office personnel, the Commission proposed that sharing of such 
personnel between entities would generally not compromise independence 
so long as the employees do not control, direct or participate in the 
entities' trading decisions.\124\ Similarly, sharing of board or 
advisory committee members, research personnel or sharing of employees 
for training, operational or compliance purposes would not result in a 
violation of the criteria if the personnel do not influence (e.g., 
``have a say in'') or direct the entities' trading decisions.\125\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \123\ Commenters on the proposed amendments to part 151 said 
this criteria should not prohibit sharing of board or advisory 
committee members who do not influence trading decisions, sharing of 
research personnel, or sharing for training, operational or 
compliance purposes, so long as trading of the person and the owned 
entity remains independent. See id.
    \124\ As noted in the Proposed Rule, the condition barring the 
sharing of employees that control the owned entity's trading 
decisions would include a prohibition on sharing of attorneys, 
accountants, risk managers, compliance and other mid-and back-office 
personnel, to the extent such employees participate in control of 
the trading decisions of the person or the owned entity. See id.
    \125\ In this respect, proposed rule 150.4(b)(2)(i)(D) was 
consistent with the Commission's Interpretive Letter No. 92-15 (CCH 
] 25,381), where an employee both oversaw the execution of orders 
for a commodity pool, as well as maintained delta neutral option 
positions in non-agricultural commodities for the proprietary 
account of an affiliate of the sponsor of the commodity pool. The 
Commission concluded that the use of clerical personnel who are dual 
employees of both affiliates would not require aggregation when the 
clerical personnel engage in ministerial activities and steps are 
taken to maintain independence, such as: (i) Limiting trading 
authority so that the personnel do not have responsibility for the 
two entities' activities in the same commodity; and (ii) separating 
the times at which the personnel conduct activities for the two 
entities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Proposed rule 150.4(b)(2)(i)(E) would condition aggregation relief 
on a demonstration that the person and the owned entity do not have 
risk management systems that permit the sharing of trades or trading 
strategies with the other. This condition was intended to address 
concerns that risk management systems that permit the sharing of trades 
or trading strategies with each other present a significant risk of 
coordinated trading through the sharing of information.\126\ The 
Commission proposed that this criterion generally would not prohibit 
sharing of information to be used only for risk management and 
surveillance purposes, when such information is not used for trading 
purposes and not shared with employees that, as noted above, control, 
direct or participate in the entities' trading decisions.\127\ Thus, 
sharing with employees who use the information solely for risk 
management or compliance purposes would generally be permitted, even 
though those employees' risk management or compliance activities could 
be considered to have an ``influence'' on the entity's trading.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \126\ The Commission remains concerned, as stated in the 
Proposed Rule and as noted above, that a trading system, as opposed 
to a risk management system, that is not separately developed from 
another system can subvert independence because such a system could 
apply the same or similar trading strategies even without the 
sharing of trading information. See Proposed Rule, 78 FR at 68962.
    \127\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Commenters' Views
    As a general matter, some commenters said that the disaggregation 
criteria in the Proposed Rule were appropriately stated. One described 
the disaggregation criteria as a balanced and effective approach that 
gets to the heart of the Commission's aggregation policy, while another 
said the criteria provide appropriate indications of whether an owner 
has knowledge or control of the trading activity of an owned 
entity.\128\ On the other hand, another commenter believed that the 
criteria are vague and unclear, especially for global enterprises which 
are active in more than one aspect of a market (e.g., both production 
and trading activities).\129\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \128\ See CL-Sempra Nov 13 and CL-EEI Nov 13, respectively. A 
third commenter thought the criteria are reasonable and practicable, 
but cautioned that it is difficult to eliminate knowledge sharing 
between related business entities, citing Paul Volcker describing as 
na[iuml]ve the view that ``Chinese Walls can remain impermeable 
against the pressures to seek maximum profit and personal 
remuneration.'' See Chris Barnard on November 12, 2015.
    \129\ See CL-Wilmar Nov 13.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Set forth below is a brief discussion of the comments on each 
aspect of the proposed disaggregation criteria.
a. Proposed Rule 150.4(b)(2)(i)(A)--No Shared Knowledge of Trading 
Decisions
    Commenters said that passive investors in an owned entity should be 
required to certify only that they have no knowledge of the owned 
entity's trading, not whether the owned entity has knowledge of the 
trading of the passive investors (i.e., the owners), since passive 
investors would not have insight into the knowledge of the owned 
entity.\130\ One commenter asked that the Commission clarify that the 
gain of information as a counterparty to a transaction would not in 
itself violate this criterion regardless of how the information is 
transmitted.\131\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \130\ See CL-SIFMA AMG Nov 13; CL-MFA Nov 12; CL-AIMA Feb 10. 
One of these commenters said that, as a general matter, it can be 
very difficult for owners to obtain information about owned 
entities, e.g., when the owned entity is in a different country. CL-
MFA Nov 12.
    \131\ See Coalition of Physical Energy Companies on February 10, 
2014 (``CL-COPE Feb 10'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Another commenter questioned how this criterion would be applied to 
trading decisions triggered by an algorithm over which human 
intervention is rarely exercised. For example, the commenter asserted 
that the use of off-the-shelf third party algorithms by entities owned 
by a single owner could enable a de facto coordination without 
intentional indirect coordination.\132\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \132\ See Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy on February 
10, 2014 (``CL-IATP Feb 10'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

b. Proposed Rule 150.4(b)(2)(i)(B)--Have Separately Developed and 
Independent Trading Systems
    Several commenters suggested that the Commission modify this 
paragraph so that it refers to ``trading strategies'' instead of 
``trading systems.'' That is, they suggested that the paragraph require 
that the owner and the owned entity ``Trade pursuant to separately 
developed and independent trading strategies.'' One commenter was of 
the view that because proposed rule 150.4(b)(2)(i)(A) would require 
that the owner and the owned entity not have shared knowledge of 
trading decisions, there is no need for this paragraph to require 
separate ``trading systems'' when the purpose of this rule should be to 
prohibit use of ``trading strategies'' that were developed in 
coordination.\133\ The commenter believed that this change would allow 
the owner and the owned entity to utilize a single shared system for 
trading, which would be appropriate and could enhance risk management 
so long as the owner and the owned entity can demonstrate that the 
condition of no shared knowledge of trading decisions is met.\134\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \133\ See CL-IECA Nov 13. See also CL-CME Nov 13 (criteria 
should focus on ensuring that the entities do not share knowledge of 
or control over trading, which would not be implicated merely 
because they trade pursuant to commonly-developed trading systems).
    \134\ This commenter also said that, at a minimum, the 
Commission should distinguish between front-end systems (used for 
trade capture and trade booking) and back-end systems (used for risk 
management and trade reporting). See CL-IECA Nov 13.
    Another commenter described ``trade capture systems'' as 
distinct from trading strategies. This commenter said trade capture 
systems are used to track positions on an enterprise-wide basis 
across multiple affiliates for risk management, recordkeeping and 
other business purposes, but these systems do not direct trading and 
use of a shared trade capture system does not mean that the entities 
have adopted or employed identical, or even similar, trading 
strategies. See CL-EEI Nov 13.
    A third commenter referred to trade capture, trade execution, 
and related report-generation systems for the confirmation, booking 
and accounting of orders and for any other mid- and back-office 
functions. This commenter asserted that since such systems merely 
record, process, and facilitate reports of trading, but do not 
establish parameters (e.g., algorithms) for trading, their use by 
multiple entities should be permitted under this criterion so long 
as they do not enable coordinated trading. See CL-Energy Transfer 
Nov 13.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 91467]]

    Other commenters remarked that a change in the rule text from 
``trading systems'' to ``trading strategies'' would allow corporate 
groups to take advantage of economies of scale by having one trading 
system developed for multiple companies in the group, and promote 
efficient trading and risk management practices through the development 
of trading technologies that are unrelated to trading strategy.\135\ A 
commenter representing investment managers said that disaggregation 
relief should be available if the original investment decisions are 
made independently, even if trades are subsequently executed and risk 
managed on an aggregated basis using a single system.\136\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \135\ See CL-CME Nov 13; CL-FIA Nov 13; CL-FIA Feb 6.
    \136\ This commenter said it would be appropriate for trading 
strategies of separate investment vehicles to be executed via a 
single execution desk, as long as the vehicles' portfolio managers 
were not coordinating placement of the trades, in order to achieve 
risk management goals such as to avoid cross and wash trading or the 
submission of an excessive numbers of orders, to avoid having 
vehicles bid against each other, to monitor other trading 
thresholds, and to achieve fair terms of execution and aggregation. 
See CL-AIMA Nov 12.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Commenters referred to the Commission's statement in the Proposed 
Rule that it generally would not expect that this criterion would 
prevent an owner and an owned entity from both using the same ``off-
the-shelf'' system that is developed by a third party.\137\ The 
commenters asked that this guidance be reiterated in the final rule and 
be extended beyond off-the-shelf systems or other technologies 
``developed by'' third parties, to include any in-house software or 
custom modules added to third-party software, so long as these internal 
systems are not used to share trading information with day-day trading 
personnel or otherwise permit coordinated trading.\138\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \137\ See Proposed Rule, 78 FR at 68962.
    \138\ See CL-SIFMA AMG Nov 13; CL-AIMA Feb 10; CL-Energy 
Transfer Nov 13.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On the other hand, another commenter said that the application of 
this criterion, which implicitly assumes that market participants will 
self-report common trading strategies, fails to recognize that the 
participants may be reluctant to report collusive strategies, and 
therefore DCMs and SEFs should be required to analyze market data for 
trading strategy correlations.\139\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \139\ See Occupy the SEC on August 7, 2014 (``CL-Occupy the SEC 
Aug 7'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

c. Proposed Rule 150.4(b)(2)(i)(C)--Have Written Procedures To Maintain 
Independence, Including Separate Physical Locations
    A commenter said that the requirement to meet this criteria (to 
have written procedures restricting access to trading information) 
should apply only to the owner claiming the exemption from aggregation, 
and not the owned entity, because depending on the extent of an owner's 
corporate control over an owned entity, the owner may not be in a 
position to compel the owned entity to establish the written 
procedures.\140\ This commenter believes that so long as the owner has 
and enforces written procedures that preclude the owner from sharing 
trading information with, and receiving trading information from, the 
owned entity, then each entity will not have access to the information 
of the other.\141\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \140\ See FIA on July 31, 2014 (``CL-FIA July 31'') and CL-FIA 
Nov 13.
    \141\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Another commenter suggested that the second sentence of this 
provision should be deleted because, this commenter believes, it is 
subsumed by the first sentence and such prescriptive criteria are 
unnecessary in the context of a physical commodity firm as opposed to 
an IAC.\142\ The commenter also asked that the Commission clarify that 
the requirement of ``separate physical locations'' does not require 
physically separate buildings, but rather requires only restricted 
access prohibiting personnel from entering the affiliated company 
without permission or signing-in or, if on the derivatives trading 
floors, an escort.\143\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \142\ See CL-Energy Transfer Nov 13. The second sentence reads 
``Such procedures must include document routing and other procedures 
or security arrangements, including separate physical locations, 
which would maintain the independence of their activities.'' The 
commenter said that if the second sentence is retained, the 
Commission should provide guidance that the routing of documents to 
senior management or risk management personnel, and the routing of 
documents that show aggregate, non-granular, or stale trading 
positions, may be acceptable so long as such routing does not allow 
coordinated trading.
    \143\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On the other hand, another commenter said that this criterion 
should be strengthened to provide realistic guidelines for meaningful 
separations of location and information, because the statute requires 
an entity to cease trading commodity derivatives in multiple divisions 
separated by ``mere `Chinese walls' '' and it is not within the 
discretion of the Commission to waive this requirement.\144\ This 
commenter cited a research paper which asserted ``that in important 
contexts Chinese walls fail to prevent the spread of non-public 
information within financial conglomerates.'' \145\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \144\ See Better Markets, Inc. on February 10, 2014 (``CL-Better 
Markets Feb 10'').
    \145\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

d. Proposed Rule 150.4(b)(2)(i)(D)--No Shared Employees That Control 
Trading Decisions
    A commenter said that the Commission should clarify that this 
criterion may be met if a shared employee participates on the board but 
does not control, direct or participate in the trading decisions.\146\ 
Another commenter requested that the Commission clarify that guidance 
in the Proposed Rule about research personnel not influencing or 
directing the entities' trading decisions is properly interpreted to 
mean that research personnel are not precluded by this criterion from 
providing market research (including, for example, market fundamentals 
or technical indicators, support or resistance levels, and trade 
recommendations), so long as the research personnel do not direct or 
control trading decisions of the owned entities.\147\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \146\ See CL-COPE Feb 10.
    \147\ See CL-MFA Feb 7, referring to Proposed Rule, 78 FR at 
68962.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

e. Proposed Rule 150.4(b)(2)(i)(E)--No Risk Management Systems That 
Permit the Sharing of Trades or Trading Strategy
    Several commenters focused on a statement in the Proposed Rule that 
the Commission would interpret this criterion not to prohibit sharing 
of information for risk management purposes, so long as the information 
is not used for trading purposes or shared with employees that 
participate in trading decisions.\148\ These commenters asked that the 
Commission reiterate this guidance in the final rule.\149\ Other 
commenters said that the guidance should be set forth as part of the 
text of the final rule, in order to provide a safe harbor, or greater 
certainty, for the

[[Page 91468]]

sharing of risk management information.\150\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \148\ See CL-AIMA Feb 10, citing Proposed Rule, 78 FR at 68962 
(``this criterion generally would not prohibit sharing of 
information to be used only for risk management and surveillance 
purposes, when such information is not used for trading purposes and 
not shared with employees that, as noted above, control, direct or 
participate in the entities' trading decisions. Thus, sharing with 
employees who use the information solely for risk management or 
compliance purposes would generally be permitted, even though those 
employees' risk management or compliance activities could be 
considered to have an `influence' on the entity's trading.''). See 
also CL-ISDA Nov 12; CL-SIFMA AMG Nov 13; CL-PEGCC Nov 12; CL-CME 
Nov 13.
    \149\ See CL-ISDA Nov 12; CL-SIFMA AMG Nov 13; CL-PEGCC Nov 12; 
CL-CME Nov 13; CL-AIMA Feb 10.
    \150\ See CL-FIA Nov 13; CL-FIA July 31; CL-NGSA Nov 13; 
Commodity Markets Council on February 10, 2014. Another commenter 
suggested that the rule text should provide that owners and their 
affiliates may share such trading information as is necessary to 
manage risk and meet compliance obligations. See CL-Working Group 
Nov 13 (suggesting rule text allowing ``obtaining such information 
as is necessary to fulfill [the entity's] fiduciary duties or 
fulfill its duty to supervise the trading activities of an 
affiliate, or . . . establishing and monitoring compliance or risk 
policies and procedures, including position limits, for an affiliate 
or on an enterprise wide basis, or . . . sharing employees so long 
as such employees do not control, direct or participate in the 
entities' trading decisions'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A commenter asked the Commission to state that this criterion would 
not preclude disaggregation relief when there is sharing of information 
for only risk management and surveillance and other non-trading 
purposes, such as, for example, information used to assess collateral 
requirements or verify compliance with applicable credit limits or 
information maintained by a custodian or other service provider that 
does not control trading.\151\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \151\ This commenter asserted that the condition that the owner 
entity and owned entity ``do not have risk management systems that 
permit the sharing of trades or trading strategy'' is ambiguous and 
potentially overly broad. See CL-ISDA Nov 12.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Other commenters suggested various formulations for Commission 
guidance or rule text to set out circumstances in which this criterion 
would be interpreted not to preclude disaggregation relief, so long as 
the employees who have access to the shared information do not control, 
direct or participate in the entities' trading decisions. The 
circumstances suggested by commenters include:
     Information sharing as is necessary to fulfill fiduciary 
duties or duties to supervise trading, or to monitor risk limits on an 
enterprise wide basis;\152\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \152\ See CL-CMC Nov 13.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     sharing of transaction and position information with and 
among employees who perform risk management, accounting, compliance or 
similar mid- and back-office functions; \153\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \153\ See CL-CME Nov 13.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     information sharing for risk management purposes; \154\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \154\ See CL-COPE Nov 13. See also CL-AIMA Feb 10 (criterion 
should not preclude shared risk management systems from allowing 
access to share trade and trading strategies by individuals who do 
not exercise control over trading decisions); CL-ECOM Nov 13 
(criterion should not preclude information sharing for risk 
management and compliance purposes).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     continuous sharing of position information for risk 
management and surveillance purposes only, sharing of trading and 
position information for risk management purposes (even on a real-time 
basis and even if the entity's risk management systems or personnel 
have authority to require the reduction of positions to comply with 
applicable limits), and using shared risk management services, 
including real-time data sharing and position reduction mechanisms, so 
long as they do not permit coordinated or shared trading;\155\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \155\ See CL-SIFMA AMG Nov 13.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     sharing of derivative information with senior management 
or risk committee members that oversee the risks of more than one 
operating company, for risk management, accounting, compliance, or 
similar purposes (even if these personnel have authority to reduce 
exposure or comply with internal risk guidelines), and sharing of 
trading and position information for risk management purposes, even if 
such information is shared on a real-time or end-of-day basis and even 
if the risk management systems or personnel have authority to reduce 
positions to comply with applicable limits or other restrictions that 
senior management or the risk personnel may impose; \156\ and
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \156\ See CL-Energy Transfer Nov 13.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     information sharing resulting from use of an affiliated 
service provider, such as an affiliated FCM, an affiliated custodian, 
an affiliate engaged in recordkeeping or reporting information, or an 
affiliate providing clearing, custodial, or other non-trading services 
for the owned entity.\157\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \157\ See CL-ISDA Nov 12.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Commenters also asserted that employees at the owner entity who are 
not directly or indirectly involved in trading or the supervision of 
traders, and are prohibited from sharing information with owner entity 
traders, should be permitted to receive trading activity and position 
exposure information of the owned entity,\158\ and that the categories 
of employees referred to in the guidance in the Proposed Rule are not 
intended to be restrictive, so that, for example, entities could share 
sales staff without leading to shared knowledge of trading 
decisions.\159\ Another commenter said that the Commission should 
interpret this criterion not to preclude disaggregation relief when 
information sharing is limited to employees involved in risk-
management, compliance, execution or recordkeeping functions, so long 
as the functions are conducted pursuant to written procedures that 
protect the information from access by individuals involved in trading 
decisions, and there is no access by individuals who develop or execute 
trading strategies to the information shared for risk management.\160\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \158\ See id.
    \159\ See CL-AIMA Feb 10, referring to Proposed Rule, 78 FR at 
68962.
    \160\ See CL-ICE Nov 13.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Final Rule
    The Commission is adopting rule 150.4(b)(2)(i) largely as proposed, 
with certain modifications described below in response to commenters 
and other considerations.
    First, the lead in sentence of rule 150.4(b)(2)(i) includes the 
addition of the phrase ``(to the extent that such person is aware or 
should be aware of the activities and practices of the aggregated 
entity or the owned entity).'' The effect of adding this phrase is to 
apply the criteria in this rule to both the person who is required to 
aggregate positions and the aggregated or owned entity, but only to the 
extent that the person required to aggregate is aware or should be 
aware of the activities and practices of the aggregated or owned 
entity. This addition recognizes that, as commenters pointed out, an 
owner may not have knowledge of or an ability to find out about the 
trading practices of an owned entity. The Commission understands the 
phrase ``should be aware'' to mean that the owner is charged with 
awareness of the owned entity's activities if it is, in effect, able to 
control the owned entity or routinely has access to relevant 
information about the owned entity. If the owner is not aware, and 
should not be aware, of the owned entity's activities, it would not 
have to certify as to the owned entity.
    The Commission believes that this modification addresses the 
comments on subparagraph (A) to the effect that passive investors in an 
owned entity should be required to certify only that they have no 
knowledge of the owned entity's trading. Therefore, the final rule 
adopts subparagraph (A) as it was proposed.
    The final rule adopts subparagraph (B), relating to separately 
developed and independent trading systems, as it was proposed. The term 
``system'' is appropriately broad to encompass the various methods, 
procedures and plans which market participants may use to initiate 
trading. ``Trading system'' includes, for example, a program (whether 
automated or not) that provides the impetus for the initiation of 
trades. The suggested alternative, ``strategy,'' is too narrowly 
limited to the particular trading decisions a person may make based on 
particular conditions. The entire ``trading system,'' not just the 
``trading strategy,'' must be

[[Page 91469]]

separately developed and independent.\161\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \161\ The Proposed Rule noted that ``off-the-shelf'' software 
could be considered to be separately developed and independent for 
this purpose, so long as the software could not be used by multiple 
parties to indirectly coordinate their trading. See Proposed Rule, 
78 FR at 68962. The Commission reaffirms this position, and in 
response to commenters (see footnote 138, above), clarifies that 
customized software or in-house software could also be considered to 
be separately developed and independent for this purpose, so long as 
the same standard is met.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission reiterates that, as stated in the Proposed Rule, the 
purpose of this requirement is to preclude use of a trading system to 
coordinate the trading of two or more entities.\162\ Thus, it is the 
trading system that provides the impetus for the initiation of trades 
which must be separately developed and independent, not the mechanism 
or software that carries out those trades. For this reason, the 
Commission does not believe that use of a shared order execution 
platform, with appropriate firewalls, would necessarily mean that this 
condition is not met. For purposes of the final rule, an ``order 
execution platform'' is a computerized process that accepts inputs of 
terms of trades desired to be made and then uses pre-determined methods 
to specifically place those trades in the markets, while a ``trading 
system'' is a process or method for deciding on the timing and 
direction of trades.\163\ Thus, for purposes of the final rule the 
Commission understands the term ``trading system'' not to include an 
order execution platform. Nor would the term ``trading system'' include 
systems used for back-office functions such as order capture or trade 
reporting. Also, a trading system does not include broad principles to 
guide trading (e.g., principles one may learn from publicly-available 
literature).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \162\ See Proposed Rule, 78 FR at 68962.
    \163\ For example, Trader A may use a trading system to develop 
trading ideas, and then use a widely-used order execution platform 
to execute those ideas, while affiliated Trader B (with no knowledge 
of Trader A's trading system) may qualify for disaggregation when 
Trader B uses an independent trading system to develop trading 
ideas, and executes those ideas on the same order execution platform 
that Trader A uses, provided Trader B does not have access to Trader 
A's executions (and vice versa).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Subparagraph (C) of the final rule, relating to written procedures 
to maintain independence, including separate physical locations, 
reflects the deletion of the phrase ``document routing and other 
procedures or'' from the second sentence. The Commission believes that 
the concept of document routing is outmoded and possibly confusing (and 
the concept is adequately described by the general phrase ``security 
arrangements'' which is retained in the final rule).\164\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \164\ For consistency, the phrase ``document routing and other 
procedures or'' is also deleted from rule 150.4(b)(4)(i)(A).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    For the avoidance of doubt, the Commission reiterates its guidance 
from the Proposed Rule on the reference in subparagraph (C) to separate 
physical locations.\165\ Subparagraph (C) would not necessarily require 
that the relevant personnel be located in separate buildings. The 
important factor is that there be a physical barrier between the 
personnel that prevents access between the personnel that would impinge 
on their independence. For example, locked doors with restricted access 
would generally be sufficient, while merely providing the purportedly 
``independent'' personnel with desks of their own would not. Similar 
principles would apply to sharing documents or other resources.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \165\ See Proposed Rule, 78 FR at 68962.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The final rule adopts subparagraph (D), relating to sharing of 
employees that control trading decisions, as it was proposed. For the 
avoidance of doubt, the Commission reiterates, as it stated in the 
Proposed Rule, that the sharing of attorneys, accountants, risk 
managers, compliance and other mid- and back-office personnel between 
entities would generally not compromise independence so long as the 
employees do not control, direct or participate in the entities' 
trading decisions.\166\ Similarly, sharing of board or advisory 
committee members or research personnel, or sharing of employees for 
training, operational or compliance purposes, would not result in a 
violation of the criteria if the personnel do not influence (e.g., 
``have a say in'') or direct the entities' trading decisions.\167\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \166\ See id. See also the discussion above regarding the 
condition under rule 150.4(b)(2)(i)(A) (conditioning aggregation 
relief on a demonstration that the person filing for disaggregation 
relief and the owned entity do not have knowledge of the trading 
decisions of the other, and discussing what constitutes 
``knowledge'' for this purpose).
    \167\ In this respect, rule 150.4(b)(2)(i)(D) is consistent with 
the Commission's Interpretive Letter No. 92-15 (CCH ] 25,381), where 
an employee both oversaw the execution of orders for a commodity 
pool, as well as maintained delta neutral option positions in non-
agricultural commodities for the proprietary account of an affiliate 
of the sponsor of the commodity pool. In that interpretive letter, 
the Commission concluded that the use of clerical personnel who are 
dual employees of both affiliates would not require aggregation when 
the clerical personnel engage in ministerial activities and steps 
are taken to maintain independence, such as: (i) Limiting trading 
authority so that the personnel do not have responsibility for the 
two entities' activities in the same commodity; and (ii) separating 
the times at which the personnel conduct activities for the two 
entities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    One commenter asserted that personnel could provide research about 
``technical indicators, support or resistance levels, and trade 
recommendations'' without being deemed to be participating in trading 
decisions.\168\ The Commission believes this situation should be viewed 
in light of a previous interpretation, where the Commission stated that 
it ``is concerned that specific trading recommendations . . . contained 
in such information not be substituted for independently derived 
trading decisions. When the person who directs trading in an account or 
program regularly follows the trading suggestions [from another 
person], such account or program will be evidence that the account is 
controlled by the [other person].'' \169\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \168\ See CL-MFA Feb 7.
    \169\ 1979 Aggregation Policy, 44 FR at 33844.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The final rule adopts subparagraph (E), relating to risk management 
information sharing, substantially as it was proposed, but with a 
revision to clarify that the provision is focused on the sharing of 
trades or trading strategy with employees that control the trading 
decisions of the other entity.\170\ The Commission notes that 
provisions virtually identical to this rule have been used for years in 
connection with the IAC exemption, and the Commission's interpretations 
of those provisions have not changed. The Commission considers this 
revision to the rule text to be a clarification of its existing 
interpretations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \170\ For example, the rule would preclude Trader A and 
affiliated Trader B from having a risk management system that 
permits the sharing of Trader A's trades or trading strategy with 
employees that control the trading decisions of Trader B, or that 
permits the sharing of Trader B's trades or trading strategy with 
employees that control the trading decisions of Trader A.
    But, in conjunction with that limitation, the rule would not 
preclude Trader A and affiliated Trader B from having a risk 
management system that permits the sharing of Trader A's trades or 
trading strategy with employees that handle risk management 
functions for Trader B but do not control its trading decisions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Further, the Commission adopts and reiterates its guidance on this 
provision in the Proposed Rule.\171\ That is, subparagraph (E) is 
intended to address concerns that risk management systems that permit 
entities to share trades or trading strategies with each other present 
a significant risk of coordinated trading through the sharing of 
information.\172\ The Commission

[[Page 91470]]

intends that, generally speaking, subparagraph (E) would not prohibit 
sharing of information to be used only for risk management and 
surveillance purposes, when such information is not used for trading 
purposes and not shared with employees that, as noted above, control, 
direct or participate in the entities' trading decisions. Thus, sharing 
with employees who use the information solely for risk management or 
compliance purposes would generally be permitted, even though those 
employees' risk management or compliance activities could be considered 
to have an ``influence'' on the entity's trading.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \171\ See Proposed Rule, 78 FR at 68962.
    \172\ The Commission remains concerned that a trading system, as 
opposed to a risk management system, that is not separately 
developed from another system can subvert independence because such 
a system could apply the same or similar trading strategies even 
without the sharing of trading information.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In response to questions from commenters, the Commission believes 
that transaction and position information may be shared among the risk 
assessment employees of a single entity or of affiliated entities as is 
necessary for certain explicitly specified risk and compliance 
purposes, such as complying with internal credit limits or fulfilling a 
fiduciary responsibility with respect to a third party's investment. 
However, transaction and position information could not be used for 
non-hedging purposes or shared with employees who participate in non-
hedging decisions. (``Non-hedging'' is defined in this context as 
activities to take, or liquidate, positions that are not bona fide 
hedging positions.)
    So long as these restrictions are satisfied, the information may be 
shared on a real-time basis,\173\ and may be used to effect reductions 
in non-hedging positions, but such reductions should be mandated by 
pre-established credit risk management procedures or compliance 
procedures regarding permissible investment activities. Within these 
restrictions, affiliated entities may use shared risk management 
services, and the information may be used for back-office recordkeeping 
and middle-office risk assessment, so long as such functions occur 
independently of any non-hedging decisions made by other employees who 
did not have access to shared information. Companies within an 
affiliated partnership or limited liability company structure (i.e., 
where the relevant entities are under common ownership or control) may 
be considered to be affiliated for this purpose.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \173\ The Commission emphasizes that so long as the restrictions 
discussed here are satisfied, the information may be shared on a 
real-time basis, in addition to on an end-of-day basis. As noted 
above, the Commission does not consider knowledge of end-of-day 
position information to necessarily constitute knowledge of trading 
decisions, so long as the position information cannot be used to 
dictate or infer trading strategies, but has been concerned that the 
ability to monitor the development of positions on a real-time basis 
could constitute knowledge of trading decisions. See footnote 116, 
above. In response to questions from commenters, the Commission has 
considered the circumstances in which such information may be shared 
on a real-time basis, and the purpose of the discussion here is to 
explain when real-time sharing would be permissible.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Commenters proposed various alternative criteria which could be 
used to determine whether the positions of an owner and owned entity 
could be disaggregated.\174\ However, after considering these 
suggestions, the Commission does not believe that the suggested 
criteria are significantly different from the criteria in rule 
150.4(b)(2)(i). Also, some of the suggested criteria appear to be 
suitable for particular situations, but not necessarily all corporate 
groups.\175\ Overall, the Commission believes that the criteria in rule 
150.4(b)(2)(i) are appropriate and suitable for determining when 
disaggregation is permissible due to a lack of control and shared 
knowledge of trading activities.\176\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \174\ See, e.g., CL-MidAmerican Feb 7 and Commodity Markets 
Council on July 25, 2014.
    \175\ For example, one commenter recommended factors such as 
whether the owner and the owned entity have separate trading 
accounts, separate assets, separate lines of business, independent 
credit support and other specific indications of separation. See CL-
MidAmerican Feb 7. In the Commission's view, criteria such as these 
are specific manifestations of the general principles stated in 
proposed rule 150.4(b)(2)(i) that the owner and the owned entity not 
have knowledge of the trading decisions of the other and trade 
pursuant to separately developed and independent trading systems. 
Similarly, whether the two entities do or do not have separate 
assets or separate lines of business would not necessarily indicate 
whether they are engaged in coordinated trading.
    \176\ The criteria in rule 150.4(b)(2)(i) will be interpreted 
and applied in accordance with the Commission's past practices. See 
footnote 114, above.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

C. Notice Filing Requirement in Rule 150.4(c)

1. Proposed Approach
    The Commission proposed a notice filing requirement in proposed 
rule 150.4(c).\177\ The proposed rule contemplated that the filing 
would be made before the exemption from aggregation is needed, since 
the filing would be a pre-requisite for obtaining the exemption. 
However, where a prior filing is impractical (such as where a person 
lacks information regarding a newly-acquired subsidiary's activities), 
the Commission proposed that the filing should be made as promptly as 
practicable.\178\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \177\ The Commission also proposed an application procedure for 
ownership interests of more than 50 percent in proposed rule 
150.4(c)(2). However, since the Commission is not adopting proposed 
rule 150.4(b)(3), that application procedure is not relevant and the 
Commission is not adopting proposed rule 150.4(c)(2). The text of 
rule 150.4(c)(2) in the final rule is a new provision discussed 
below.
    \178\ See Proposed Rule, 78 FR at 68962.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Even though a filing under proposed rule 150.4(c) could be made 
after an ownership or equity interest is acquired, the Commission 
proposed that the exemption from aggregation would not be effective 
retroactively because the filing is a pre-requisite to the exemption. 
The Commission reasoned that retroactive application of such filings 
could result in administrative difficulty in monitoring the scope of 
exemptions from aggregation and negatively affect the Commission 
staff's surveillance efforts.\179\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \179\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Generally, the Commission proposed that entities could consolidate 
their filings in any efficient manner by, for example, discussing more 
than one owned entity in a single filing, so long as the scope of the 
filing is made clear.\180\ The Commission also emphasized that if an 
entity determines to no longer apply an exemption (or if an exemption 
is no longer available), the entity would be required to inform the 
Commission by making a filing under proposed rule 150.4(c) because this 
would constitute a material change to the prior filing. Of course, once 
an exemption no longer applies to an owned entity, the person would be 
required to subsequently aggregate the positions of the entity in 
question.\181\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \180\ In the Proposed Rule, the Commission clarified that 
section 8 of the CEA would apply to the information that the 
Commission may request under proposed rule 150.4(c), and sets out 
the extent to which such information will be treated confidentially. 
See id.
    \181\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Commenters' Views
    Commenters addressed the time limit for making the proposed notice 
filing, the situations in which subsequent filings (after the initial 
notice) should be required, the consequences for failure to make a 
timely filing, the contents of the notice filing and how the notice 
filing should be signed.
    Regarding the time limit for making the proposed notice filing, 
commenters said the rule should provide a reasonable period of time to 
file, in order to perform due diligence and gather information. Several 
commenters suggested that a three-month grace period would be 
reasonable before requiring aggregation, because this would be adequate 
to conduct the internal review to support and approve the notice 
filing.\182\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \182\ See CL-CME Nov 13; CL-PEGCC Nov 12; CL-FIA Nov 13; CL-FIA 
July 31; CL-ISDA Nov 12; CL-Energy Transfer Nov 13. One of these 
commenters allowed that aggregation would be required if, during the 
grace period, an owner entity takes active steps to control and 
direct the trading strategy of a newly acquired owned entity. See 
CL-ISDA Nov 12. The three month time period was said to be adequate 
for a new owned entity to undertake post-closing diligence and 
operational measures to confirm whether seeking or claiming the 
aggregation exemption is necessary. See CL-Energy Transfer Nov 13. 
Another commenter suggested a grace period, but did not suggest a 
specific time period. See CL-SIFMA AMG Nov 13.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 91471]]

    Regarding the situations in which subsequent filings (after the 
initial notice) should be required, several commenters stated that a 
subsequent filing should be required only in the event of a material 
change to the facts set forth in the relevant notice filing.\183\ One 
commenter thought that a subsequent filing should be required only if 
there was a change in the ability to comply with the conditions of the 
exemption so that the criteria for disaggregation are no longer met, 
but not upon a mere internal reorganization of an affiliate which does 
not affect compliance with the criterion.\184\ Another commenter said a 
subsequent filing should be required only when an owner entity is 
withdrawing the notice filing because it no longer maintains a 
requisite ownership interest in the owned entity, or in the event that 
the owner entity is no longer in compliance with the exemption criteria 
with respect to an owned entity or another material change in the 
contents of the notice filing has occurred.\185\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \183\ See CL-Working Group Nov 13; CL-EEI Nov 13; CL-FIA Nov 13; 
CL-NGSA Nov 13; CL-CME Nov 13.
    \184\ See CL-Energy Transfer Nov 13.
    \185\ See CL-ISDA Nov 12.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Regarding the consequences for failure to make a timely filing, one 
commenter proposed that the rule allow an entity five business days 
after exceeding a position limit to make the notice filing, if the 
entity is otherwise eligible to claim an exemption from aggregation and 
was deemed in excess of a position limit only because of aggregation 
from which it could have been exempt.\186\ Another commenter said that 
if an entity is eligible to claim an exemption from aggregation, but 
fails to make a timely notice filing, that should constitute only a 
single violation for failure to make the filing, not a separate 
violation of position limits.\187\ Other commenters addressed a 
slightly different situation, contending that if a market participant 
relies on an exemption from aggregation in good faith, but the 
Commission subsequently determines that an exemption was not available, 
the Commission should require aggregation only from the date of its 
determination.\188\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \186\ See CL-CME Nov 13.
    \187\ This commenter asserted that this modification would not 
undermine the Commission's aggregation rule because it would apply 
only where an entity is entitled to an exemption from the 
aggregation requirement. See CL-FIA Nov 13.
    \188\ See CL-FIA Nov 13; CL-FIA July 31; CL-CME Nov 13; CL-IECA 
Nov 13.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Regarding the contents of the notice filing, two commenters 
requested that the Commission remove the requirement to provide a 
description of the relevant circumstances that warrant disaggregation 
in proposed rule 150.4(c)(1)(i), and instead require only a 
certification that the owner entity, as of the date of the filing, 
meets the conditions of the exemption with respect to each owned entity 
specified in the filing.\189\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \189\ See CL-ISDA Nov 12 and CL-PEGCC Nov 12.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Regarding signature of the notice filing, two commenters asked that 
the Commission clarify that the specific senior officer signing or 
submitting the notice filing may be any individual appropriately 
determined within the context of a particular owner entity's governance 
structure.\190\ On the other hand, another commenter asserted that the 
rule should specifically require that the notice filing be signed by 
the CEO and the chief compliance officer or chief of risk management of 
the owner entity.\191\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \190\ See CL-ISDA Nov 12 and CL-PEGCC Nov 12.
    \191\ This commenter felt that the signature requirement in the 
proposed rule appears casual and may lead the owner entity to assume 
that granting of exemptions from aggregation would be routine, while 
they should be exceptional. See CL-IATP Feb 10.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Final Rule
    The Commission is adopting rule 150.4(c) largely as proposed, with 
certain modifications to reflect points made by commenters. Primarily, 
rule 150.4(c) includes a modification to provide for a 60-day period 
after acquisition of an ownership interest to conduct due diligence and 
prepare the notice filing.\192\ In other words, a notice filing made 
within 60 days after an acquisition would have retroactive effect as of 
the date of acquisition. The Commission believes that a 60-day period 
would be adequate for the acquirer to perform due diligence and gather 
the information necessary to make the notice filing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \192\ See rule 150.4(c)(2). Rule 150.4(c)(2) is new text that 
was not included in the Proposed Rule, but rather is adopted in 
response to commenters' suggestions. As noted in footnote 177, 
above, the Commission is not adopting proposed rule 150.4(c)(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Rule 150.4(c) has also been modified to address a situation where a 
person is eligible to claim an exemption from aggregation, but does not 
make a filing at the proper time. In this case, rule 150.4(c)(6) 
provides that the failure to timely file the notice would be a 
violation of rule 150.4(c), but there would not be a violation of the 
aggregation requirement or of a position limit so long as the required 
filing is made within five business days after the person is aware, or 
should have been aware, that the notice has not been timely filed. That 
is, since the person was eligible to claim the exemption, aggregation 
was not required, but a violation of the filing requirement has 
occurred.
    On the other hand, the Commission does not believe relief is 
appropriate if a person is not eligible to claim an exemption from 
aggregation, but erroneously believes that it is (even if the error 
occurs in good faith). In this case, the person could not ``cure'' the 
situation by taking steps to become eligible for the exemption, and 
then attempting to provide the notice filing with retroactive 
effect.\193\ Where the person is not eligible for any exemption from 
aggregation and therefore aggregation is required, the ineligibility 
cannot be cured by making a later notice filing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \193\ In this regard, the Commission disagrees with commenters 
who argued that if a market participant relies on an exemption from 
aggregation in good faith, but the Commission subsequently 
determines that an exemption was not available, the Commission 
should require aggregation only from the date of its determination. 
See CL-FIA Nov 13; CL-FIA July 31; CL-CME Nov 13; CL-IECA Nov 13.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As for a requirement to make filings subsequent to the initial 
filing, the Commission believes that a further filing is required only 
in the event of a material change to the facts set forth in the 
relevant notice filing, as is stated in rule 150.4(c)(4). The 
Commission understands that the Proposed Rule referred at one point to 
persons making one filing each year, but this was in the context of 
estimating how often filings might occur.\194\ The Commission did not 
intend that notices be filed annually in the absence of a material 
change.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \194\ See Proposed Rule, 78 FR at 68975.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As for the content of the notice filing, rule 150.4(c) includes the 
same requirements as were in the proposed rule. The Commission has not 
removed the requirement to provide a description of the relevant 
circumstances that warrant disaggregation, because it believes that a 
short description of circumstances helps the Commission and its staff 
to understand the context of the filing. In this regard, the Commission 
notes that under the earlier proposed amendment to part 151, the person 
claiming the exemption would

[[Page 91472]]

have been required to demonstrate compliance with each condition of 
relief, which would likely include an organizational chart showing the 
ownership and control structure of the involved entities, a description 
of risk management and information-sharing systems, and an explanation 
of trade data and position information distribution.\195\ The 
Commission has not specifically adopted this guidance for rule 
150.4(c). Instead, the Commission notes the distinction between rule 
150.4(c)(1)(i), which requires a description of the relevant 
circumstances that warrant disaggregation to be included in each 
filing, and rule 150.4(c)(3), which allows the Commission to obtain 
information demonstrating that the person meets the requirements of the 
exemption in those cases where the Commission calls for such 
information.\196\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \195\ See Proposed Rule, 78 FR at 68952.
    \196\ The Commission is adopting a delegation of authority to 
the Director of the Division of Market Oversight or the Director's 
designee to call under rule 150.4(c)(3) for additional information 
from a person claiming an aggregation exemption. See rule 
150.4(e)(1)(ii). This parallels a provision in proposed rule 
150.4(e)(1) delegating authority to call for additional information 
from a person claiming the exemption in proposed rule 150.4(b)(9) 
(renumbered (b)(8) in the final rule). The subparagraphs in rule 
150.4(e)(1) have been renumbered from the proposed rule, because as 
noted in footnote 77, the Commission is not adopting proposed rule 
150.4(e)(1)(i), which contained a delegation of authority 
referencing proposed rule 150.4(b)(3). Also, the cross-references in 
rule 150.4(e)(1)(i) have been corrected to refer to paragraph 
(b)(8)(iv) and paragraph (b)(8).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    With regard to signature of the notice and the certification 
requirement in rule 150.4(c)(1)(ii), the Commission believes that rule 
150.4(c) is satisfied when the notice containing the statement required 
by 150.4(c)(1)(ii) is signed by a senior officer of the entity claiming 
relief from the aggregation requirement or, if the entity does not have 
senior officers, a person of equivalent authority and responsibility 
with respect to the entity.

D. Other Issues Related to Aggregation on the Basis of Ownership

    The Proposed Rule discussed or requested comment on several other 
issues related to aggregation due to ownership of another entity, or 
relief from that requirement. In addition, commenters raised certain 
miscellaneous issues related to the rule. These issues were the 
effective date for the final rule, how entities that hold an interest 
in the entity that submits a notice should be treated (i.e., the 
treatment of ``higher-tier entities''), whether aggregation should be 
required on a basis pro rata to the ownership interest in the owned 
entity, and how the aggregation rule would interact with other 
Commission rules.
1. Proposed Approach
    Regarding the effective date for the final rule, the Commission 
discussed in the Proposed Rule a potential transition period for 
application of the requirement of aggregation based on ownership. 
However, the Commission concluded that this would not be necessary 
because the Proposed Rule would apply to existing position limits 
currently in effect and would provide further aggregation 
exemptions.\197\ Therefore, the Proposed Rule did not suggest any 
compliance period or delayed effectiveness of the final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \197\ See Proposed Rule, 78 FR at 68959.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Regarding the treatment of higher-tier entities, proposed rule 
150.4(b)(9) \198\ provided that if an owned entity has filed a notice 
under proposed rule 150.4(c), any person with an ownership or equity 
interest of 10 percent or greater in the owned entity need not file a 
separate notice identifying the same positions and accounts previously 
identified in the notice filing of the owned entity, if such person 
complies with the conditions applicable to the exemption specified in 
the owned entity's notice filing, other than the filing requirements; 
and does not otherwise control trading of the accounts or positions 
identified in the owned entity's notice. Further, proposed rule 
150.4(b)(9) provided that any person relying on the exemption for 
higher-tier entities must provide to the Commission information 
concerning the person's claim for exemption called for by the 
Commission.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \198\ As noted above, because the Commission is not adopting 
proposed rule 150.4(b)(3), paragraphs (b)(4) to (b)(9) of proposed 
rule 150.4 are renumbered in the final rule as paragraphs (b)(3) to 
(b)(8), respectively. Thus, final rule 150.4(b)(8) corresponds to 
proposed rule 150.4(b)(9).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In the Proposed Rule, the Commission noted that the proposed 
approach for higher-tier entities should significantly reduce the 
filing requirements for aggregation exemptions.\199\ The proposed 
approach would allow higher-tier entities to rely upon a notice for 
exemption filed by the owned entity, and such reliance would only go to 
the accounts or positions specifically identified in the notice.\200\ 
The proposed approach would also mean that a higher-tier entity that 
wishes to rely upon an owned entity's exemption notice would be 
required to comply with conditions of the applicable aggregation 
exemption other than the notice filing requirements.\201\ The 
Commission did not anticipate that the reduction in filing would impact 
the Commission's ability to effectively surveil the proper application 
of exemptions from aggregation. The first filing of an owned entity 
exemption notice should provide the Commission with sufficient 
information regarding the appropriateness of the exemption, while 
repetitive filings of higher-tier entities would not be expected to 
provide additional substantive information.\202\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \199\ See Proposed Rule, 78 FR at 68975.
    \200\ For example, if company A had a 30 percent interest in 
company B, and company B filed an exemption notice for the accounts 
and positions of company C, then company A could rely upon company 
B's exemption notice for the accounts and positions of company C. 
Should company A wish to disaggregate the accounts or positions of 
company B, company A would have to file a separate notice for an 
exemption. See Proposed Rule, 78 FR at 68953.
    \201\ Although higher-tier entities would not have to submit a 
separate notice to rely upon the notice filed by an owned entity, 
the Commission noted that it would be able, upon call, to request 
that a higher-tier entity submit information to the Commission, or 
allow an on-site visit, demonstrating compliance with the applicable 
conditions. See id.
    \202\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Regarding aggregation on a basis that is pro rata to the relevant 
ownership interest, the Commission preliminarily concluded in the 
Proposed Rule that a pro rata approach would be administratively 
burdensome for both owners and the Commission.\203\ For example, the 
Commission suggested that the level of ownership interest in a 
particular owned entity may change over time for a number of reasons, 
including stock repurchases, stock rights offerings, or mergers and 
acquisitions, any of which may dilute or concentrate an ownership 
interest. Thus, it may be burdensome to determine and monitor the 
appropriate pro rata allocation on a daily basis. Moreover, the 
Commission stated that it has historically interpreted the statute to 
require aggregation of all the relevant positions of owned entities, 
absent an exemption, which is consistent with the view that a holder of 
a significant ownership interest in another entity may have the ability 
to influence all the trading decisions of the entity in which such 
ownership interest is held. However, the Commission asked commenters to 
address whether the Commission should permit a person to aggregate only 
a pro rata allocation of the owned entity's positions based on that 
person's less than 100 percent ownership, including a system for 
aggregation based on ownership tiers.\204\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \203\ See Proposed Rule, 78 FR at 68958.
    \204\ See Proposed Rule, 78 FR at 68959.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 91473]]

    The Commission also invited comment on the interplay between the 
Proposed Rule and other Commission rules. In the Proposed Rule, the 
Commission asked commenters to address the issues or concerns arising 
from the Proposed Rule that would have to be addressed if the 
Commission were to adopt its proposal to establish speculative position 
limits for other exempt and agricultural commodity futures and option 
contracts, and physical commodity swaps that are ``economically 
equivalent'' to such contracts.\205\ The Commission also asked about 
implications with respect to the interplay between the proposed 
disaggregation relief and the Commission's other rules relating to 
swaps.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \205\ See Proposed Rule, 78 FR at 68963, referring to Position 
Limits for Derivatives, 78 FR 75680 (Dec. 12, 2013).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Commenters' Views
    Regarding the effective date for the final rule, several commenters 
said that the rule should provide for an initial compliance or 
transition period during which the rule would not be enforced and 
market participants would be able to adjust their positions to the new 
aggregation rules.\206\ The period of time suggested for this 
transition ranged from two and one-half months to nine months.\207\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \206\ See CL-ISDA Nov 12; CL-PEGCC Nov 12; CL-FIA Feb 6; CL-
Working Group Feb 10; CL-AIMA Feb 10; CL-ICE Nov 13.
    \207\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Commenters did not address the terms of proposed rule 150.4(b)(9), 
relating to higher-tier entities. One commenter said that an entity 
should be able to file for aggregation relief on behalf of any or all 
of its affiliates (including joint ventures) as long as the criteria 
for relief are satisfied for the entities receiving relief.\208\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \208\ See CL-Working Group Nov 13and CL-Working Group Feb 10. 
That is, all affiliates, not just higher-tier entities, could rely 
on a filing made by one entity in an affiliated group.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Regarding aggregation on a basis pro rata to the ownership interest 
in the owned entity, one commenter thought that the rule should permit 
entities to aggregate on a basis pro rata to the person's ownership or 
equity interest, because pro rata aggregation would more accurately 
reflect the positions owned by market participants and would not 
unnecessarily restrict the positions of market participants, while 
reducing the risk of an inadvertent position limits overage.\209\ 
Another commenter supporting pro rata aggregation suggested that the 
Commission obtain the pro rata percentage that should be attributed to 
the owner from the owner's filings on Form 40 and the Commission's 
special call authority.\210\ To address potential administrative 
burdens on the Commission, commenters proposed that entities that apply 
pro rata aggregation would have to commit to informing the Commission 
promptly upon a change in the relevant ownership or equity interest, or 
upon request by the Commission.\211\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \209\ See CL-FIA Feb 6. See also CL-COPE Feb 10; CL-SIFMA AMG 
Feb 10.
    \210\ See CL-MFA Feb 7.
    \211\ See CL-DBCS Feb 10 and CL-Working Group Feb 10, 
respectively.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In response to the Commission's request for information on 
implications with respect to the interplay of the aggregation 
provisions and other Commission rules, one commenter thought that the 
full implications of disaggregation relief ``will not be readily 
apparent to physical commodity market participants'' until the 
Commission finalizes the scope of contracts to be included in position 
limits, especially with regards to trade options, the treatment of 
which may have a ``dramatic impact on whether or not affiliated energy 
business units . . . require disaggregation relief.'' \212\ Further, 
this commenter said, the manner of organizing physical commodity 
contracts is likely to be distinct from how financial transactions are 
organized and executed, and a policy requiring aggregation of both 
would ``create undue hardships'' for energy end-users unless there are 
``accessible, practicable means'' of acquiring disaggregation 
relief.\213\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \212\ See American Gas Association on February 10, 2014 (``CL-
AGA Feb 10'').
    \213\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Another commenter, which is a DCM, sought clarification of how the 
proposed aggregation requirement would affect the reporting of large 
trader positions, asserting that reporting firms currently aggregate 
accounts for reporting purposes by ownership and control so that 
independently operated subsidiaries of a wholly-owned parent currently 
report such positions separately in large trader reports and open 
interest.\214\ This commenter believed that if both firms were to 
aggregate those positions, each could carry large positions on opposite 
sides of the market but would only report a small aggregate position, 
which could be highly disruptive to the markets.\215\ The commenter 
requested that the Commission make clear that ``the current reporting 
regime would be maintained and not affected by whatever form the final 
aggregation rule takes.'' \216\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \214\ See CL-ICE Feb 10.
    \215\ See id. (asserting that lifting one side of a large two-
sided spread would result in a big open interest change).
    \216\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    This same commenter also requested the Commission to confirm that 
``an exchange will continue to be permitted to grant separate 
exemptions to commonly owned affiliates when the affiliates are 
required to be aggregated,'' and that ``if firms that are aggregated 
submit separate Form 204s to the Commission, . . . the quantities 
reported roll up to the aggregate level for position limit purposes.'' 
\217\ The commenter noted that it currently permits ``commonly owned 
entities that are under separate decision-making and trading control to 
transact EFRPs and block trades with each other'' and asked the 
Commission to indicate if these entities would be required to aggregate 
for position limit purposes, and whether ``EFRPs and block trades 
executed between such firms [are] prohibited trades under the CEA.'' 
\218\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \217\ See id.
    \218\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Final Rule
    The final rule will be effective 60 days after publication in the 
Federal Register. The Commission considered comments requesting an 
additional compliance or transition period during which the rule would 
not be enforced and has determined additional time would not be 
necessary or appropriate for this rule. One effect of the final rule is 
to provide for certain exemptions from the aggregation requirement. 
Considering both the relief available under the exemptions and the 
requirements imposed by the final rule, the Commission concluded that a 
period of 60 days would be appropriate to prepare for effectiveness of 
the final rule.
    As for higher-tier entities, the Commission is adopting rule 
150.4(b)(8) largely as it was proposed,\219\ but with a modification to 
provide that one entity may file a notice for aggregation relief on 
behalf of any or all of its affiliates, as long as the criteria for 
relief are satisfied. The Commission finds merit in a commenter's 
suggestion that reliance by affiliates on a filing made by one entity 
in an affiliated group should be permitted for the same reasons that 
higher-tier entities would be permitted to rely on filings made by 
subsidiaries.

[[Page 91474]]

The Commission clarifies that, in order to meet the requirements of 
rule 150.4(c), a filing made on behalf of affiliates must be signed by 
a senior officer (or equivalent) of each such affiliate. The Commission 
intends that filing on behalf of affiliates will be optional; 
affiliates may also file individual notices.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \219\ As noted above, because the Commission is not adopting 
proposed rule 150.4(b)(3), paragraphs (b)(4) to (b)(9) of proposed 
rule 150.4 are renumbered in the final rule as paragraphs (b)(3) to 
(b)(8), respectively. Thus, final rule 150.4(b)(8) corresponds to 
proposed rule 150.4(b)(9).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Regarding aggregation on a pro rata basis, the Commission concludes 
that although the commenters point out the theoretical merits of a pro 
rata procedure, none of them explained how pro rata aggregation would 
be workable in practice. The Commission did not propose adopting pro 
rata aggregation, because it was concerned about the administrative 
burdens for both owners and the Commission.\220\ After considering the 
comments received, the Commission has determined not to adopt a pro 
rata procedure because it remains concerned about the difficulty of 
specifying a broadly applicable procedure for calculating the level of 
ownership interests and using those levels to allocate positions to the 
owner entity. The Commission also finds merit in the procedure that has 
been applied to date (under which owners aggregate all of the relevant 
positions of the owned entities for which aggregation applies) and 
concludes that the potential benefits of a pro rata procedure do not 
support changes in the current practice.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \220\ See Proposed Rule, 78 FR at 68958.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In response to the comments about the interplay of the aggregation 
provisions and other Commission rules, the Commission clarifies that, 
generally speaking, the final aggregation rules are intended for 
purposes of position limits and would not modify practices with respect 
to other rules. Exchanges will continue to be permitted to require 
separate reporting by aggregated entities, and to grant separate 
exemptions to aggregated entities. Also, exchanges will continue to be 
able to enforce separate limits on entities that are aggregated for 
federal limits.

E. Exemption for Certain Accounts Held by FCMs in Rule 150.4(b)(3)

1. Proposed Approach
    The Commission proposed to move the exemption for certain accounts 
held by FCMs in existing regulation 150.4(d) to a new proposed rule 
150.4(b)(4),\221\ so that all aggregation exemptions would be located 
in paragraph (b) of proposed rule 150.4. The text of proposed rule 
150.4(b)(4) was substantially the same as existing regulation 150.4(d), 
except that it was rephrased in the form of a positive statement of the 
availability of an exemption from the aggregation requirement, as 
contrasted to the statement in the existing regulation that the 
aggregation requirement applies unless certain conditions are met.\222\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \221\ As noted above, because the Commission is not adopting 
proposed rule 150.4(b)(3), paragraphs (b)(4) to (b)(9) of proposed 
rule 150.4 are renumbered in the final rule as paragraphs (b)(3) to 
(b)(8), respectively. Thus, final rule 150.4(b)(3) corresponds to 
proposed rule 150.4(b)(4).
    \222\ See Proposed Rule, 78 FR at 68964.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Commenters' Views and Final Rule
    No commenter addressed proposed rule 150.4(b)(4). The Commission is 
adopting it as proposed, but renumbered as rule 150.4(b)(3).

F. Exemptions From Aggregation for Underwriting and Broker-Dealer 
Activities in Rules 150.4(b)(5) and (b)(6)

1. Proposed Approach
    Proposed rule 150.4(b)(6) \223\ stated that a person need not 
aggregate the positions or accounts of an owned entity if the ownership 
or equity interest is based on the ownership of securities constituting 
the whole or a part of an unsold allotment to or subscription by such 
person as a participant in the distribution of such securities by the 
issuer or by or through an underwriter. This proposal was similar to 
regulation 151.7(g) (in the now-vacated part 151 regulations), which 
provided for an exemption from aggregation where an ownership interest 
is in an unsold allotment of securities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \223\ As noted above, because the Commission is not adopting 
proposed rule 150.4(b)(3), paragraphs (b)(4) to (b)(9) of proposed 
rule 150.4 are renumbered in the final rule as paragraphs (b)(3) to 
(b)(8), respectively. Thus, final rule 150.4(b)(5) corresponds to 
proposed rule 150.4(b)(6).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Proposed rule 150.4(b)(7) stated that a broker-dealer registered 
with the Securities and Exchange Commission,\224\ or similarly 
registered with a foreign regulatory authority, need not aggregate the 
positions or accounts of an owned entity if the ownership or equity 
interest is based on the ownership of securities acquired in the normal 
course of business as a dealer, so long as the broker-dealer does not 
have actual knowledge of the trading decisions of the owned 
entity.\225\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \224\ See 15 U.S.C. 78o. Final rule 150.4(b)(6) corresponds to 
proposed rule 150.4(b)(7).
    \225\ As initially proposed, the rule also required that the 
broker-dealer not have a greater than a 50 percent ownership or 
equity interest in the owned entity. See Proposed Rule, 78 FR at 
68977. In the Supplemental Notice, the Commission proposed to remove 
this requirement for the reasons supporting removal of the separate 
conditions for owners of a greater than a 50 percent ownership or 
equity interest in general. See Supplemental Notice, 80 FR at 58371.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In the Proposed Rule, the Commission noted that the ownership 
interest of a broker-dealer in an entity based on the ownership of 
securities acquired as part of reasonable activity in the normal course 
of business as a dealer is largely consistent with the ownership of an 
unsold allotment of securities covered by the underwriting exemption in 
regulation 151.7(g).\226\ In both circumstances, the ownership interest 
is likely not held for investment purposes.\227\ Accordingly, the 
Commission proposed to include an aggregation exemption in proposed 
rule 150.4(b)(7) for such activity.\228\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \226\ See Proposed Rule, 78 FR at 68964.
    \227\ The Commission specifically noted that this proposed 
exemption would not apply to registered broker-dealers that acquire 
an ownership interest in securities with the intent to hold for 
investment purposes. See id.
    \228\ As proposed, the exemption would encompass a broker-
dealer's ownership of securities in anticipation of demand or as 
part of routine life cycle events, if the activity was in the normal 
course of the person's business as a broker-dealer. See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Commenters' Views
    Commenters did not address proposed rule 150.4(b)(6).
    One commenter said the rationale for the broker-dealer exemption in 
proposed rule 150.4(b)(7) should be expanded and clarified, asserting 
that if a broker-dealer acquires a substantial but not controlling 
interest in a trading entity, its due diligence would reveal historical 
information while the availability of an exemption appears to be 
conditioned upon acquiring no further knowledge.\229\ The commenter 
asked that the Commission provide further explanation of what 
constitutes ``actual knowledge,'' and in particular whether it is 
limited to knowledge at the moment of acquisition, or also includes any 
knowledge of trading decisions by the newly acquired entity and other 
entities in which the broker-dealer has an equity based interest.\230\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \229\ See CL-IATP Feb 10.
    \230\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Final Rule
    The Commission is adopting rule 150.4(b)(6) as it was proposed, but 
renumbered as rule 150.4(b)(5). For purposes of this rule, the 
Commission expects to interpret the term ``unsold allotment'' along the 
lines that it is interpreted under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
    The Commission is adopting rule 150.4(b)(7) as it was proposed in 
the Supplemental Notice, but renumbered as rule 150.4(b)(6). In 
response to the commenter's question, the Commission clarifies that it 
expects traditional

[[Page 91475]]

standards of a broker-dealer's due diligence to apply for this 
provision. As stated in the Proposed Rule,\231\ the Commission would 
interpret the phrase ``reasonable activity'' to be effectively 
synonymous with the phrase ``normal course of business'' in this 
context.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \231\ See Proposed Rule, 78 FR at 68964.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

G. Exemption From Aggregation Where Information Sharing Would Violate 
Law in Rule 150.4(b)(7)

1. Proposed Approach
a. In General
    The Commission proposed rule 150.4(b)(8) \232\ to provide 
exemptions from aggregation under certain conditions where the sharing 
of information would cause a violation of state or federal law or the 
law of a foreign jurisdiction, or regulations adopted thereunder. These 
exemptions have not previously been available under the Commission's 
existing rules. The Commission intended that the proposed rule make 
clear that the exemption to the aggregation requirement would include 
circumstances in which the sharing of information would create a 
``reasonable risk'' of a violation--in addition to an actual 
violation--of law or regulations.\233\ The Commission noted that 
whether a reasonable risk exists would depend on the interconnection of 
the applicable statute and regulatory guidance, as well as the 
particular facts and circumstances as applied to the statute and 
guidance.\234\ Also, it would not be necessary to show that a 
comparable federal law exists in order for a state law to be the basis 
for an exemption.\235\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \232\ As noted above, because the Commission is not adopting 
proposed rule 150.4(b)(3), paragraphs (b)(4) to (b)(9) of proposed 
rule 150.4 are renumbered in the final rule as paragraphs (b)(3) to 
(b)(8), respectively. Thus, final rule 150.4(b)(7) corresponds to 
proposed rule 150.4(b)(8).
    \233\ See Proposed Rule, 78 FR at 68950.
    \234\ See Proposed Rule, 78 FR at 68948.
    \235\ See Proposed Rule, 78 FR at 68950.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission stated that the proposed rule was intended to 
respond to concerns that market participants could face increased 
liability under state, federal and foreign law. For example, the 
proposed rule would reduce risk of liability under antitrust or other 
laws by allowing market participants to avail themselves of the 
violation of law exemption in those circumstances where the sharing of 
information created a reasonable risk of violating the above mentioned 
bodies of law.\236\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \236\ See Proposed Rule, 78 FR at 68949.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

b. Laws of Non-U.S. Jurisdictions and International Law
    The proposed rule would not allow local law or principles of 
international law (as opposed to the specific laws of foreign 
jurisdictions) to be a basis for the exemption. With regard to local 
law, the Commission stated that an exemption for local law would be 
difficult to implement due to the number of laws and regulations that 
would need to be considered and the number of localities that might 
issue them. While the number of such laws and regulations may be large, 
the Commission was not persuaded that there would be a significant 
number of instances where these laws and regulations would prohibit 
information sharing that would otherwise be permitted under federal and 
state law.\237\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \237\ See Proposed Rule, 78 FR at 68950. In addition, in those 
instances where local law would impose an information sharing 
restriction that is not present under state or federal law, the 
Commission believed that it could be inappropriate to favor the 
local law serving a local purpose to the detriment of the position 
limits under federal law that serve a national purpose. See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Furthermore, the Commission was concerned that reviewing notices of 
exemptions based on local laws would create a substantial 
administrative burden for the Commission. That is, balancing the 
possibility that including local law as a basis for the exemption would 
be helpful to market participants against the possibility that doing so 
would lead to confusion or inappropriate results, the Commission 
concluded that the better course is not to provide for local law to be 
a basis for the exemption.\238\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \238\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    With regard to international law, the Commission believed that the 
sources of international law, such as treaties and international court 
decisions, would be unlikely to include information sharing 
prohibitions that would not otherwise apply under foreign or federal 
law, and that therefore including international law as a basis for the 
exemption is unnecessary.\239\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \239\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

c. Memorandum of Law
    Under proposed rule 150.4(b)(8), market participants would be 
required to provide a written memorandum of law (which may be prepared 
by an employee of the person or its affiliates) which explains the 
legal basis for determining that information sharing creates a 
reasonable risk that either person could violate federal, state or 
foreign law. The Commission explained that requiring a formal opinion 
of counsel may be expensive and may not provide benefits, in terms of 
the purposes of this requirement, as compared to a memorandum of law. 
The memorandum of law would allow Commission staff to review the legal 
basis for the asserted statutory or regulatory impediment to the 
sharing of information, and would be particularly helpful where the 
asserted impediment arises from laws or regulations that the Commission 
does not directly administer. Further, Commission staff would have the 
ability to consult with other federal regulators as to the accuracy of 
the memorandum, and to coordinate the development of rules surrounding 
information sharing and aggregation across accounts. The Commission 
stated its expectation that a written memorandum of law would, at a 
minimum, contain information sufficient to serve these purposes.\240\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \240\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission also noted that if there is a reasonable risk that 
persons in general could violate a provision of federal, state or 
foreign law of general applicability by sharing information associated 
with position aggregation, then the written memorandum of law may be 
prepared in a general manner (i.e., not specifically for the person 
providing the memorandum) and may be provided by more than one person 
in satisfaction of the requirement. For example, the Commission noted 
that trade associations commission law firms to provide memoranda on 
various legal issues of concern to their members. Under the Proposed 
Rule, such a memorandum (i.e., one that sets out in detail the basis 
for concluding that a certain provision of federal, state or foreign 
law of general applicability creates a reasonable risk of violation 
arising from information sharing) could be provided by various persons 
to satisfy the requirement, so long as it is clear from the memorandum 
how the risk applies to the person providing the memorandum. \241\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \241\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On the other hand, the Commission did not believe that simply 
providing a copy of the law or other legal authority would be 
sufficient, because this would not set out the basis for a conclusion 
that the law creates a reasonable risk of violation if the particular 
person providing the document shared information associated with 
position aggregation. If the effect of the law is clear, the written 
memorandum of law need not be complex, so long as it explains in detail 
the effect of the law on the person's information sharing. Also, the 
question of what legal

[[Page 91476]]

authorities, in particular, constitute ``state law'' or ``foreign 
law,'' where it is relevant, is a question to be addressed in the 
written memorandum of law. In general, any state-level or foreign legal 
authority that is binding on the person could be a basis for the 
exemption.\242\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \242\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Proposed rule 150.4(b)(8) also included a parenthetical clause to 
clarify that the types of information that may be relevant in this 
regard may include, only by way of example, information reflecting the 
transactions and positions of a such person and the owned entity. The 
Commission believed it helpful to clarify in the rule text what types 
of information may potentially be involved. The mention of transaction 
and position information as examples of this information was not 
intended to limit the types of information that may be relevant.\243\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \243\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Commenters' Views
    One commenter supported the proposal and said the Commission should 
include in the final regulatory text or preamble ``all elements'' of 
the discussion in the Proposed Rule as to what constitutes a state law, 
who can prepare the memorandum of law, and what must be included in 
such memorandum, in order to provide clarity and ensure the process for 
seeking relief has its intended effects.\244\ Another commenter called 
for the Commission to expand on this provision by granting foreign law-
based exemptions on cross-border compliance, and developing memoranda 
of understanding with foreign jurisdiction authorities concerning the 
criteria for substituted compliance for aggregation exemptions.\245\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \244\ See CL-AGA Feb 10.
    \245\ See CL-IATP Feb 10.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Other commenters said the Commission should clarify whether the 
violation of law exemption would be available for other regulations 
promulgated by the Commission, or for supranational laws, including 
those promulgated by the European Union.\246\ A commenter asked the 
Commission to clarify whether the memorandum may be prepared by an 
employee of the firm, or of an affiliate of the firm, that is seeking 
the exemption.\247\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \246\ See CL-Working Group Feb 10 and Alternative Investment 
Management Association on February 10, 2014 (``CL-AIMA Feb 10''), 
respectively.
    \247\ See (CL-AIMA Feb 10).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Another commenter suggested that the rule permit filing of a 
summary explanation of legal restrictions in lieu of a full legal 
memorandum (provided the full memorandum is available for inspection by 
the Commission upon request), to protect privileged attorney-client 
communications and confidential work-product.\248\ On the other hand, a 
commenter asserted that while a memorandum of law may entail lower 
costs it would not provide sufficient accountability, in contrast to an 
opinion of counsel that the commenter believes would be a reliable, 
thorough, and formal document that provides a distinct level of 
accountability to the firm making the attestation.\249\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \248\ See CL-FIA Feb 6.
    \249\ See CL-Better Markets Feb 10 (also arguing that the CEA 
requires an entity to obtain a legal opinion to avail itself of an 
aggregation exemption, and it is not within the discretion of the 
Commission to waive this requirement).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Final Rule
    The Commission is adopting rule 150.4(b)(8) as proposed, but 
renumbered as rule 150.4(b)(7). The Commission also adopts the 
statements from the Proposed Rule noted above, including the statements 
as to what constitutes a state law, who can prepare the memorandum of 
law, and what must be included in such memorandum.\250\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \250\ See Proposed Rule, 78 FR at 68950.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In response to comments, the Commission clarifies that 
supranational laws (such as EU laws) constitute laws of a foreign 
jurisdiction which may be a basis for the exemption, if they meet the 
standard of being the basis for a reasonable risk of violation arising 
from information sharing. Similarly, the Commission's own regulations 
may be a basis for the exemption if they meet that standard.
    Also, the Commission clarifies that the memorandum of law 
supporting an exemption may be prepared by an employee of the firm, or 
of an affiliate of the firm, that is seeking the exemption. However, 
the Commission does not agree with the commenters who suggested that a 
more summary document may support an exemption, or that a formal 
opinion of counsel should be required. Instead, the Commission 
continues to believe that, as stated in the Proposed Rule,\251\ 
requiring a formal opinion of counsel would be expensive and may not 
provide benefits, in terms of the purposes of this requirement, as 
compared to a memorandum of law. The Commission expects that a 
memorandum of law submitted in support of an exemption will contain 
information sufficient to allow Commission staff to review the legal 
basis for the asserted statutory or regulatory impediment to the 
sharing of information (particularly where the asserted impediment 
arises from laws or regulations that the Commission does not directly 
administer), to consult with other federal regulators as to the 
accuracy of the memorandum, and to coordinate the development of rules 
surrounding information sharing and aggregation across accounts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \251\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

H. Aggregation Requirement for Substantially Identical Trading in Rule 
150.4(a)(2)

1. Proposed Approach
    The Commission first adopted an aggregation requirement for 
substantially identical trading in the part 151 rules in order to 
prevent circumvention of the aggregation requirements.\252\ In adopting 
this proposal, the Commission explained that ``In [the] absence of such 
aggregation requirement, a trader can, for example, acquire a large 
long-only position in a given commodity through positions in multiple 
pools, without exceeding the applicable position limits.'' \253\ The 
Commission further explained that under this provision, no ownership 
threshold would apply and positions of any size in accounts or pools 
would require aggregation.\254\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \252\ See Position Limits for Futures and Swaps, 76 FR 71626, 
71654 (Nov. 18, 2011). The provision was adopted as rule 151.7(d) 
(since vacated).
    \253\ Id.
    \254\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Proposed Rule, adopted after the part 151 rules were vacated, 
included a similar provision in proposed rule 150.4(a)(2), noting that 
the proposed rule was intended to be consistent with the approach taken 
in vacated rule 151.7(d).\255\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \255\ See Proposed Rule, 78 FR at 68951 n 39.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Commenters' Views
    A commenter representing managers of registered investment 
companies said aggregation should not be required where a common 
investment adviser controls the activities of various registered 
investment companies, so long as the investment companies have 
different investment strategies, because restructuring of the advisory 
business to obtain an exemption from aggregation would impose costs on 
the shareholders in the investment companies.\256\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \256\ See Investment Company Institute on February 10, 2014 
(``CL-ICI Feb 10'') (asserting that investment strategies that do 
not necessarily dictate the same specific trades should not be 
considered ``substantially identical,'' noting that registered 
investment companies may be managed by unaffiliated advisors that 
follow similar strategies disclosed in their prospectuses).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Another commenter representing investment managers asked the 
Commission to provide further guidance on the situations that will be 
covered by

[[Page 91477]]

the ``substantially identical trading strategies'' provision, including 
whether the Commission may apply the provision to situations other than 
passively managed index funds.\257\ This commenter believed that the 
aggregation requirement should not apply to accounts placed in 
``separate performance composites,'' and suggested that the Commission 
consider using in this rule the term ``trading program'' as defined in 
rule 4.10(g), rather than the term ``trading strategies,'' which is not 
defined.\258\ A third commenter representing investment managers 
suggested that the Commission remove from the rule any requirement that 
a person holding or controlling the trading of positions in accounts or 
pools with substantially identical trading strategies aggregate those 
positions.\259\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \257\ See CL-AIMA Feb 10. Passively managed index funds were 
cited as an example of pools with identical trading strategies in 
the adoption of rule 151.7(d). See Position Limits for Futures and 
Swaps, 76 FR at 71654.
    A commenter representing managers of pension plans asked for 
guidance on how to determine if two investment vehicles in which an 
investor holds an interest are pursuing ``substantially identical 
trading strategies.'' See American Benefits Council, Inc. on 
February 10, 2014 (``CL-ABC Feb 10'').
    \258\ See CL-AIMA Feb 10.
    \259\ See CL-SIFMA AMG Feb 10.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Two commenters asserted that the Commission did not provide a 
statutory or policy rationale for, or consider the costs and benefits 
of, this requirement, or provide guidance regarding the meaning of 
``substantially identical trading strategies.'' \260\ Both of these 
commenters asserted that the proposed rule would result in an absurd 
consequence requiring a person to aggregate all of the positions of two 
single-commodity index funds using the same index in which the person 
invested, or in which a fund-of-funds manager invested for that 
person.\261\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \260\ See CL-SIFMA AMG Feb 10 and CL-CME Feb 10. As an 
alternative, one of these commenters suggested that the requirement 
be limited to persons that directly control the trading of positions 
in substantially identical accounts or pools. See CL-SIFMA AMG Feb 
10.
    \261\ See CL-SIFMA AMG Feb 10 and CL-CME Feb 10. One commenter 
provided an example of its reading of the requirement, asserting 
that ``a $10,000 investor in two $1 billion commodity index mutual 
funds using the same index may have to aggregate the positions in 
those two $1 billion mutual funds'' because the funds follow 
substantially identical trading strategies. See CL-SIFMA AMG Feb 10. 
This commenter posited that the investor would have to implement a 
compliance program to prevent inadvertent violations of the position 
limits rules, which (in addition to imposing significant legal and 
operational obstacles) would impose costs many times the investor's 
$10,000 investment. See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On the other hand, a commenter argued that the Commission's 
position limit aggregation regime should limit financial speculation by 
any group or class of traders in a given contract that becomes large 
enough to threaten the contract's ability to serve the needs of 
hedgers.\262\ This commenter asserted that commodity index traders, 
which the commenter believes trade en masse with respect to an explicit 
programmed common strategy, are clearly covered by the statutory 
provision on ``two or more persons acting pursuant to an expressed or 
implied agreement or understanding'' and these traders must be 
aggregated for position limit purposes.\263\ Another commenter endorsed 
the view that commodity index traders' positions should be aggregated 
because they ``operate outside of the normal operation of the commodity 
markets [and] sway market prices due to sheer volume and for exogenous, 
non-market reasons,'' so that aggregating their positions would 
significantly reduce market speculation and facilitate predictable 
commodities market operations.\264\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \262\ See CL-Better Markets Feb 10 and Better Markets, Inc. on 
March 30, 2015 (``CL-Better Markets Mar 30'').
    \263\ See CL-Better Markets Mar 30 (arguing that Congress did 
not permit the discretion of the Commission to apply position limits 
to allow for an ``abdication of responsibility'' to act with respect 
to commodity index traders).
    \264\ See CL-Occupy the SEC Aug 7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Final Rule
    The Commission is adopting rule 150.4(a)(2) substantially as it was 
proposed, but with clarifying changes discussed below. The Commission 
continues to believe that this provision is necessary to prevent 
circumvention of the aggregation requirements. In this regard, the 
Commission notes, for example, that the exemption in rule 150.4(b)(1) 
will generally permit limited partners, limited members, shareholders 
and other similar types of pool participants not to aggregate the 
accounts or positions of the pool with any other accounts or positions 
such person is required to aggregate, unless certain circumstances 
specified in rule 150.4(b)(1) are present.\265\ As a result of this 
exemption, a person could hold significant positions in multiple pools 
without any aggregation requirement, which the Commission believes to 
be acceptable so long as the pools do not have substantially identical 
trading strategies. However, in the absence of rule 150.4(a)(2) the 
exemption would also permit a trader to separate a large position in a 
given commodity derivative into positions held in pools that have 
substantially identical trading strategies (i.e., the example cited in 
the adoption of vacated regulation 151.7(d)). To ensure that this 
situation is covered by the aggregation requirement, rule 150.4(a)(2) 
requires that trader to aggregate its positions in all pools or 
accounts that have substantially identical trading strategies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \265\ See generally the discussion of rule 150.4(b)(1) in part 
II.I, below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Also, even apart from the exemption in rule 150.4(b)(1), a person 
would (in the absence of rule 150.4(a)(2)) generally not be required to 
aggregate positions in accounts or pools if those positions are below 
the 10 percent threshold in rule 150.4(a)(1) and no control is present. 
For this reason, and as was the case in vacated regulation 151.7(d), 
there is no ownership threshold in rule 150.4(a)(2), so that if the 
accounts or pools have substantially identical trading strategies, a 
person must aggregate its positions in the accounts or pools regardless 
of ownership level. Also, as was proposed, aggregation under rule 
150.4(a)(2) is not subject to the exemptions in rule 150.4(b).\266\ 
And, as is stated in the rule, aggregation under rule 150.4(a)(2) is 
required if a person either holds positions in more than one account or 
pool with substantially identical trading strategies, or controls the 
trading of such positions without directly holding them.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \266\ See Proposed Rule, 78 FR at 68959 n 109.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In response to the commenters, the Commission disagrees that this 
provision could lead to absurd results. In the example described by one 
commenter, where a person has holdings of $10,000 each in two commodity 
index funds with substantially identical strategies,\267\ the terms of 
the rule require the owner to aggregate the positions that it (i.e., 
the owner) holds in the two commodity index mutual funds, not the 
positions of the funds themselves. That is, the two holdings would be 
aggregated into one $20,000 holding.\268\ The owner is not required to 
aggregate all the positions held by the two funds. Effectively, it is 
the person's pro rata interest (held or controlled) in each account or 
pool with substantially identical trading strategies that must be 
included in the aggregation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \267\ See footnote 256.
    \268\ The commenter described the holdings in dollar amounts. 
See CL-SIFMA AMG Feb 10. The Commission notes however that the 
position limits generally are stated in terms of a number of 
contracts, not a dollar amount. To apply rule 150.4(a)(2), a person 
holding or controlling the trading of positions in more than one 
account or pool with substantially identical trading strategies must 
determine the person's pro rata interest in the number of contracts 
such accounts or pools are holding.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission also believes that proposed rule 150.4(a)(2) was 
slightly unclear when it stated that the person ``must aggregate such 
positions''

[[Page 91478]]

without stating precisely with what such positions must be aggregated. 
To clarify how aggregation under rule 150.4(a)(2) is to be effected, 
the Commission has modified the last clause of the rule so that it 
reads ``. . . must aggregate each such position (determined pro rata) 
with all other positions held and trading done by such person and the 
positions in accounts which the person must aggregate pursuant to 
paragraph (a)(1) of this section.'' That is, rules 150.4(a)(1) and 
(a)(2) are to be applied cumulatively, so that a person must aggregate 
all positions held and trading done by such person with all positions 
that must be aggregated pursuant to rule 150.4(a)(1) and all positions 
that must be aggregated pursuant to rule 150.4(a)(2).

I. Exemption for Ownership by Limited Partners, Shareholders or Other 
Pool Participants in Rule 150.4(b)(1)

1. Proposed Approach
    Proposed rule 150.4(b)(1) was substantially similar to existing 
regulation 150.4(c). The Commission proposed rule 150.4(b)(1) as part 
of an organizational revision intended to make rule 150.4 easy to 
understand and apply. In the Proposed Rule, the Commission explained 
that stating this provision as the first exemption will clarify that 
this exemption may be applied by any person that is a limited partner, 
limited member, shareholder or other similar type of pool participant 
holding positions in which the person, by power of attorney or 
otherwise, directly or indirectly, has a 10 percent or greater 
ownership or equity interest in a pooled account or positions.\269\ 
That is, if the requirements of this exemption are satisfied with 
respect to a person, then the person need not determine if the 
requirements of the exemption in paragraph (b)(2) are satisfied. The 
text of paragraph (b)(2), in turn, states that it applies to persons 
with an ownership or equity interest in an owned entity, other than an 
interest in a pooled account which is subject to paragraph (b)(1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \269\ See Proposed Rule, 78 FR at 68963.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Proposed rule 150.4(b)(1) stated that for any person that is a 
limited partner, limited member, shareholder or other similar type of 
pool participant holding positions in which the person, by power of 
attorney or otherwise, directly or indirectly, has a 10 percent or 
greater ownership or equity interest in a pooled account or positions, 
aggregation of the accounts or positions of the pool is not required, 
except as provided in paragraphs (b)(1)(i), (b)(1)(ii) or (b)(1)(iii). 
Although existing regulation 150.4(c) does not contain any explicit 
statement of this rule, the lack of an aggregation requirement in these 
circumstances is implicit in the existing regulation's statement that 
aggregation is required only in certain specified circumstances. Thus, 
proposed rule 150.4(b)(1)(i) stated explicitly a principle that is 
implicit in the existing regulation.\270\ Paragraphs (b)(1)(i), 
(b)(1)(ii) and (b)(1)(iii) of proposed rule 150.4 set out the 
circumstances in which aggregation requirements apply; these 
circumstances are substantially similar to those covered by paragraphs 
(c)(1), (c)(2) and (c)(3) of existing regulation 150.4, but the text of 
the rule was modified to simplify the wording of the provisions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \270\ The Commission stated that this modification was not 
intended to effect a substantive change. Rather, it is intended to 
state explicitly a rule that the Commission has applied since at 
least 1979. See footnote 99, above.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Proposed Rule also briefly addressed the treatment of 4.13 
pools in a manner that is equivalent to the treatment of operating 
companies.\271\ The Commission noted that the proposed amendment to the 
later-vacated part 151 regulations had proposed to expand the 
definition of independent account controller to include the managing 
member of a limited liability company, and to amend the definitions of 
eligible entity and independent account controller to specifically 
provide for 4.13 pools established as limited liability companies.\272\ 
In the Proposed Rule, the Commission stated that this is a matter that 
could be the subject of relief granted under CEA section 4a(a)(7) and 
that persons wishing to seek such relief should apply to the Commission 
stating the particular facts and circumstances that justify the 
relief.\273\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \271\ A ``4.13 pool'' is a commodity pool for which the relevant 
CPO has claimed an exemption from registration under regulation 
4.13. A commenter on the proposed amendments to part 151 had 
addressed 4.13 pools more broadly, and said that the Commission's 
rules should treat ownership of 4.13 pools in the same way that the 
rules treat ownership of operating companies. In particular, this 
commenter said that the Commission should eliminate the requirement 
that the positions of a 4.13 pool be aggregated with the positions 
of any person that owns more than 25 percent of the 4.13 pool. See 
Proposed Rule, 78 FR at 68965.
    \272\ See id.
    \273\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Commenters' Views
    Commenters did not address the proposed reorganization and 
rephrasing of proposed rule 150.4(b)(1). However, some commenters 
addressed the substance of the rule, which is the same as existing 
regulation 150.4(c).
    One commenter asked that the Commission make the following 
technical changes to the proposed rule: Expand the exemption in the 
rule to include the beneficiary of a trust, clarify that a ``limited 
member'' of a limited liability company is any person who is not a 
managing member, construe the term CPO to include a person discharging 
the function of CPO (to account for situations where the function has 
been delegated from one person to another), and confirm that a filing 
generally is not required for relief under 150.4(b)(1), with the 
exception of relief under rule 150.4(b)(1)(ii).\274\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \274\ See CL-AIMA Feb 10.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Several commenters said the Commission should provide an ownership 
exemption for interests held by a limited partner in a commodity pool--
i.e., the rule should permit disaggregation on a showing that the 
limited partner does not control trading by the commodity pool (for 
which the CPO is exempt from registration).\275\ That is, these 
commenters believed that the rule requiring aggregation when a limited 
partner owns more than 25 percent of a pool (i.e., existing regulation 
150.4(c)(3)) should be modified to allow for disaggregation following a 
filing attesting to no control by the limited partner.\276\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \275\ See CL-OTPP Nov 13; CL-PEGCC Nov 12; CL-DBCS Feb 10; CL-
SIFMA AMG Nov 13; CL-MFA Nov 12; CL-MFA Feb 7.
    \276\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    One of these commenters asserted that investors holding greater 
than 25 percent ownership interests in pools often do not have control 
of the pools' trading (or ability to monitor the pools' positions) and 
thus would qualify for disaggregation under the criteria in proposed 
rule 150.4(b)(2)(i).\277\ This commenter cited a no-action letter 
issued by the staff of the Commission, which the commenter interpreted 
to acknowledge that, in the case of a manager of a fund of funds, there 
may be a ``lack of visibility . . . regarding the positions of an 
Investee Fund,'' that ``such opaqueness'' may not allow the manager to 
have adequate data to determine a position, and when

[[Page 91479]]

investment managers of underlying investee funds provide full position 
data, such data is rarely made available on a real-time basis.\278\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \277\ The commenter believes that while the requirement to 
aggregate for pools run by exempt CPOs was adopted in 1999 when very 
few CPOs were exempt and there was a concern about small pools, this 
requirement is no longer appropriate given the expanded number of 
exempt CPOs. See CL-MFA Nov 12 and CL-MFA Feb 7.
    Another commenter said that passive investors in 4.13 pools 
should not be required to aggregate, and they should not have to 
make a filing with the Commission as a condition of such 
disaggregation, so that they would be treated the same as 
unaffiliated passive investors in non-exempt pools under rule 
150.4(b)(1). See CL-SIFMA AMG Nov 13 and CL-SIFMA AMG Feb 10.
    \278\ See CL-MFA Feb 7, citing CFTC No-Action Letter No. 12-38 
(Nov 29, 2012).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A commenter representing managers of pension fund investments 
believed that it is unclear whether proposed rule 150.4(b)(1)(iii) was 
meant to require a passive investor that holds a 25 percent or greater 
ownership interest in a 4.13 pool to aggregate the pool's 
positions.\279\ The commenter felt that the Commission had not provided 
any rationale for, or evaluated the costs of, such a requirement, with 
which compliance would be impractical, if not impossible.\280\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \279\ See CL-ABC Feb 10.
    \280\ The commenter asserted that managers of 4.13 pools will be 
reluctant to provide such information because (i) the selective 
disclosure of fund position information to only certain investors 
could raise legal liability issues under the federal securities 
laws; (ii) certain employee benefit plans could utilize position 
information provided by the fund to deduce proprietary and 
confidential investment strategies of the advisor/manager to such 
funds; and (iii) the operational burdens associated with the fund 
providing such information to certain employee benefit plans, to the 
extent not legally prohibited, may be deemed too costly. See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Final Rule
    The Commission is adopting rule 150.4(b)(1) as it was proposed. In 
response to a commenter, the Commission notes that rule 150.4(c), as 
was the case for the proposed rule, requires a filing to claim an 
aggregation exemption under paragraph (b)(1)(ii), but not the other 
subparagraphs of paragraph (b)(1).
    The commenters' other discussion of this rule goes beyond the scope 
of the proposal, because no substantive changes to the rule were 
proposed. Rather, this rule was included in the proposal as part of the 
reorganization of rule 150.4.
    The question in the proposal about treating 4.13 pools the same as 
operating companies was accompanied by a statement that ``this is a 
matter that could be the subject of relief granted under CEA section 
4a(a)(7).'' That is, this question requested comment on the 
circumstances that could justify relief that may be granted in the 
future under CEA section 4a(a)(7).

J. Exemption for Accounts Carried by an Independent Account Controller 
in Rule 150.4(b)(4) and Conforming Change in Rule 150.1

1. Proposed Approach
    The Commission proposed rule 150.4(b)(5) to take the place of the 
existing IAC provision in existing regulation 150.3(a)(4) (which was 
proposed to be deleted).\281\ The Commission also proposed conforming 
changes to the definition of the term ``eligible entity'' in proposed 
rule 150.1(d) and (e). Existing regulation 150.3(a)(4) provides an 
eligible entity with an exemption from aggregation of the eligible 
entity's customer accounts that are managed and controlled by 
IACs.\282\ The Commission stated that the reason for this 
organizational change was to place the IAC exemption in the regulatory 
section providing for aggregation of positions.\283\ Proposed rule 
150.4(b)(5) was substantially similar to existing regulation 
150.3(a)(4) except that the Commission proposed to modify it (and the 
related definition in proposed rule 150.1(d)) so that it could be 
applied with respect to any person with a role equivalent to a general 
partner in a limited liability partnership or a managing member of a 
limited liability company.\284\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \281\ See Proposed Rule, 78 FR at 68965. As noted above, because 
the Commission is not adopting proposed rule 150.4(b)(3), paragraphs 
(b)(4) to (b)(9) of proposed rule 150.4 are renumbered in the final 
rule as paragraphs (b)(3) to (b)(8), respectively. Thus, final rule 
150.4(b)(4) corresponds to proposed rule 150.4(b)(5).
    \282\ The definition of eligible entity in existing regulation 
150.1(d) includes the limited partner or shareholder in a commodity 
pool the operator of which is exempt from registration under Sec.  
4.13. However, with regard to a CPO that is exempt under regulation 
4.13, the definition of an independent account controller in 
existing regulation 150.1(e)(5) only extends to a general partner of 
a commodity pool the operator of which is exempt from registration 
under Sec.  4.13. At the time the Commission expanded the IAC 
exemption to include regulation 4.13 commodity pools, market 
participants generally structured such pools as limited 
partnerships. See Proposed Rule, 78 FR at 68964.
    \283\ See Proposed Rule, 78 FR at 68965.
    \284\ A commenter on the proposed amendments to part 151 had 
suggested that this rule be expanded to apply to any person with a 
role equivalent to a general partner in a limited partnership or 
managing member of a limited liability company, to accommodate 
various structures that are used for commodity pools in 
jurisdictions outside the U.S. See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Commenters Views'
    Commenters did not address the proposed reorganization and 
rephrasing of proposed rule 150.4(b)(5). However, some commenters 
addressed the substance of the rule, which is the same as existing 
regulation 150.3(a)(4).
    Several commenters asked that the Commission expand the definition 
of the term ``eligible entity'' to include a variety of different 
entities, such as:
     The operators of certain similar investment vehicles, such 
as governmental or pension-sponsored investment management vehicles; 
\285\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \285\ See CL-OTPP Nov 13.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     non-corporate entities that sponsor plans, such as 
governmental plans or church plans; \286\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \286\ This commenter said that the phrase ``commodity pool the 
operator of which is excluded from registration'' should be deleted 
from proposed rule 150.1(e)(5)(ii) and replaced by the following 
text from proposed rule 150.1(d): ``trading vehicle which is 
excluded, or which itself has qualified for exclusion from the 
definition of the term `pool' or `commodity pool operator,' 
respectively.'' See CL-AIMA Feb 10.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     foreign entities that perform a similar role or function 
subject to foreign regulation; \287\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \287\ This commenter said that disaggregation relief should be 
available to an affiliate which operates as a Registered Fund 
Management Company in Singapore managing non-U.S. client accounts 
holding U.S. futures, options and swaps and, thus, is not subject to 
U.S. registration requirements. See Olam International Limited on 
February 10, 2014.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     exempt CTAs, and all registered, exempt or excluded CPOs; 
\288\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \288\ See CL-AIMA Feb 10 and CL-ICI Feb 10.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     a CPO exempt from registration; all operators excluded 
from the definition of CPO; a limited partner, a limited member, 
shareholder or other pool participant of a pool whose operator is 
either registered or exempt from registration; a CTA that is exempt 
from registration; a person excluded from the definition of CTA; and a 
general partner, managing member or manager of a commodity pool whose 
operator is either registered, exempt from registration, or excluded 
from the definition of CPO.\289\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \289\ See CL-MFA Nov 12.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Two commenters suggested that the definition of the term ``eligible 
affiliate'' should include sister companies, consistent with the 
definition of the term ``eligible affiliate counterparty'' under 
existing regulation 50.52, because the proposed definition does not 
appear to cover sister affiliates in a corporate group where neither 
affiliate holds an ownership interest in the other.\290\ Another two 
commenters suggested the deletion of the proposed filing requirement 
for the IAC exemption in proposed rule 150.4(c)(1), because, they 
argued, no filing has been necessary to rely on the IAC exemption, and 
the Proposed Rule provides no justification for deviating from this 
established practice.\291\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \290\ See CL-FIA Feb 6 and Commercial Energy Working Group on 
March 30, 2015.
    \291\ See CL-ABC Feb 10 and CL-SIFMA AMG Nov 13.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Last, a commenter argued that the Commission provided no rationale 
for the proposed amendments to the IAC exemption, and asserted that 
since at least 1999 the IAC exemption is not limited to ``customer'' 
positions traded by IACs but rather is available to limited

[[Page 91480]]

partners who may be affiliates or principals of an owned-CPO.\292\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \292\ See CL-CME Feb 10.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Final Rule
    The Commission is adopting rules 150.1(d) and (e) and rule 
150.4(b)(5) as they were proposed, but proposed rule 150.4(b)(5) is 
renumbered as 150.4(b)(4).\293\ Regarding the comments that the term 
``eligible entity'' should include entities such as the operators of 
governmental or church plans, the Commission notes that rule 150.1(d) 
defines the term to include the operator of a trading vehicle which is 
excluded, or which itself has qualified for exclusion from the 
definition of the term ``pool'' or ``commodity pool operator,'' 
respectively, under Sec.  4.5, and existing regulation 4.5 has 
exclusions from the definition of ``pool'' for governmental plans and 
church plans.\294\ Thus, operators of such trading vehicles would be 
eligible entities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \293\ Rule 150.1(e)(2), as adopted, reflects two grammatical 
corrections: The phrase ``fiduciary responsibilities to the managed 
positions and accounts'' is corrected to read ``fiduciary 
responsibilities for managed positions and accounts'' and the word 
``is'' is added before the second usage of the word ``consistent.''
    Rule 150.4(b)(4)(i)(A), as adopted, reflects the deletion of the 
phrase ``document routing and other procedures or'' for consistency 
with rule 150.4(b)(2)(i)(C). See footnote 164, above.
    \294\ See existing regulations 4.5(a)(4)(iii) and 4.5(a)(4)(v), 
respectively.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The commenters' discussion of proposed rule 150.4(b)(5) (final rule 
(150.4(b)(4)) goes beyond the scope of the proposal. As proposed, this 
paragraph replaced the existing IAC rule in existing regulation 
150.3(a)(4), except that it was expanded to include any person with a 
role equivalent to a general partner in an limited partnership or 
managing member of a limited liability company. The Commission did not 
propose any other changes to the definitions of eligible entity or IAC. 
Other changes to this regulation would be a matter for future 
consideration.\295\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \295\ The Commission notes that commenters have suggested that 
registered CPOs and exempt CTAs should be included in the definition 
of the term ``eligible entity'' and the definition should clarify 
the treatment of certain persons who are exempt from registration as 
CPOs. The Commission is considering these comments and may take them 
up in a later proceeding.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission believes that the existing IAC exemption, the 
substance of which is included in the final rule, is consistent with 
the CEA and prior Commission precedents. In this regard, it is 
important to distinguish between the exemption in existing regulation 
150.4(c)(2) (e.g., for a limited partner of a CPO who is also a 
principal or affiliate of the CPO) and the IAC exemption in existing 
regulation 150.3(a)(4). These two distinct exemptions are incorporated 
into the final rule as rules 150.4(b)(1)(ii) and (b)(4), respectively. 
Thus, the comment implying that Commission precedent has not limited 
the IAC exemption to ``customer'' positions traded by IACs is 
misplaced. The discussion cited by the commenter related to the 
definitions of the terms ``eligible entity'' and ``IAC'' and was 
codified in existing regulation 150.4(c)(2); this precedent did not 
relate to the exemption language in existing regulation 
150.3(a)(4).\296\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \296\ See 1999 Amendments, 64 FR 24038 at 24045.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Regarding the potential for aggregation between ``sister 
affiliates'' where neither affiliate holds an ownership interest in the 
other, the Commission notes that an entity generally would not require 
relief in this situation because aggregation is required only when one 
entity owns an interest in, or controls, the other. Last, the 
definition of the term ``eligible affiliate'' is not part of the 
Proposed Rule and so comments on this definition are not germane to 
this rulemaking.

K. Revisions To Clarify Regulations

1. Proposed Approach
    In connection with the proposed modifications to rule 150.4, the 
Commission reviewed whether the text of existing regulation 150.4 is 
easy to understand and apply. In this regard, the Commission noted that 
the existing regulation may be unclear, especially in terms of the 
relationship between the provisions of paragraphs (a) through (d) of 
the existing regulation and whether a particular paragraph is an 
exception to another.\297\ Also, as more market participants active in 
different parts of the market have studied existing regulation 150.4, 
both in connection with the Dodd-Frank Act and otherwise, questions 
have arisen about the application of the aggregation requirements to a 
wide variety of circumstances. The Commission believed it is important 
that the rules setting forth the aggregation requirements be clear in 
their application to both the circumstances in which they currently 
apply, and the various circumstances in which they may apply in the 
future. The textual modifications in the proposed rule were not 
intended to effect any substantive change to the meaning of rule 
150.4.\298\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \297\ See Proposed Rule, 78 FR at 68953.
    \298\ See id. The textual modifications in the Proposed Rule 
related to the Commission regulations currently in effect. The 
Commission noted that its proposal regarding position limits 
includes amendments to the text of certain Commission regulations 
(See Position Limits for Derivatives, 78 FR 75680 (Dec. 12, 2013)) 
and that if the later proposal is adopted, conforming technical 
changes to reflect the interplay between the two amendments may be 
necessary.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Therefore, the Commission proposed to modify the text to clarify 
that paragraph (a) of rule 150.4 states the general requirement to 
aggregate positions a person may hold in various accounts, and 
paragraph (b) of the rule sets out the exemptions to the aggregation 
requirement that may apply. The Commission believed that this format 
clarifies that the exemptions in rule 150.4(b) are alternatives; that 
is, aggregation is not required to the extent that any of the 
exemptions in rule 150.4(b) may apply.\299\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \299\ See Proposed Rule, 78 FR at 68963.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Proposed rule 150.4(b)(1) stated that for any person that is a 
limited partner, limited member, shareholder or other similar type of 
pool participant holding positions in which the person by power of 
attorney or otherwise directly or indirectly has a 10 percent or 
greater ownership or equity interest in a pooled account or positions, 
aggregation of the accounts or positions of the pool is not required, 
except as provided in paragraphs (b)(1)(i), (b)(1)(ii) or (b)(1)(iii). 
Proposed rule 150.4(b)(2) and proposed rule 150.4(b)(3) set out 
exemptions permitting disaggregation of the positions of owned entities 
in certain circumstances.
    Paragraphs (b)(4) to (b)(8) of proposed rule 150.4 (renumbered as 
paragraphs (b)(3) to (b)(7) of the final rule) set forth other 
exemptions that may apply in various circumstances. The exemption for 
certain accounts held by FCMs in paragraph (b)(4) of the proposed rule 
(final rule (b)(3)) was substantially the same as existing regulation 
150.4(d), except that it was rephrased in a form of a statement of when 
an exemption is available, instead of the statement in the existing 
regulation that the aggregation requirement applies unless certain 
conditions are met. Paragraph (b)(5) of the proposed rule (final rule 
(b)(4)) set forth the exemption for accounts carried by an IAC that was 
substantially similar to existing regulation 150.3(a)(4). Paragraphs 
(b)(6), (b)(7) and (b)(8) of the proposed rule (final rule paragraphs 
(b)(5), (b)(6) and (b)(7), respectively) set forth the exemptions for 
underwriting, broker-dealer activity and circumstances where laws 
restrict information sharing. Paragraph (b)(9) of the proposed rule 
(final rule (b)(8)) described how higher-tier entities may apply an 
exemption pursuant to a notice filed by an owned entity.

[[Page 91481]]

2. Commenters' Views and Final Rule
    No commenters raised any problems or issues arising from these 
organizational changes, so they are reflected in the final rule adopted 
by the Commission.
    Finally, it should be noted that the amendments to part 150 adopted 
here may require further conforming technical changes if the Commission 
adopts any proposed amendments to its regulations regarding position 
limits.\300\ Such changes would be explained at the time they are 
adopted.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \300\ See Position Limits for Derivatives, 78 FR 75680 (December 
12, 2013).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

III. Related Matters

A. Considerations of Costs and Benefits

    Section 15(a) of the CEA \301\ requires the Commission to consider 
the costs and benefits of its actions before promulgating a regulation 
under the CEA or issuing certain orders. Section 15(a) further 
specifies that the costs and benefits shall be evaluated in light of 
the following five broad areas of market and public concern: (1) 
Protection of market participants and the public; (2) efficiency, 
competitiveness, and financial integrity of futures markets; (3) price 
discovery; (4) sound risk management practices; and (5) other public 
interest considerations. The Commission considers the costs and 
benefits resulting from its discretionary determinations with respect 
to the section 15(a) factors.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \301\ 7 U.S.C. 19(a).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As discussed in Section I (Background), above, the Commission 
proposed amendments to its existing aggregation rules.\302\ In November 
2013, the Commission proposed amendments to existing regulations 150.1 
and 150.4.\303\ In response to commenters, the Commission issued a 
supplemental notice in September 2015 to modify one of the proposed 
exemptions to the Commission's proposed aggregation requirement.\304\ 
The modification changed the exemption category that was tied to 
ownership and equity levels. In the main, the Commission is adopting 
all of the changes identified in the Proposed Rule, as modified by the 
Supplemental Notice. The Commission believes that the final rules are a 
reasoned approach to complying with CEA section 4a(a)(1)'s aggregation 
requirement. The Commission also believes that the final rules, via 
exemptions, give market participants opportunities and processes to 
reduce costs and burdens associated with aggregating positions that 
might hinder trading or reduce liquidity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \302\ 17 CFR part 150.
    \303\ 17 CFR 150.1 and 150.4. See Aggregation of Positions; 
Proposed Rule, 78 FR 68946 (Nov. 15, 2013) (``Proposed Rule'').
    \304\ See Aggregation of Positions: Supplemental notice of 
proposed rulemaking, 80 FR 58365 (Sept. 29, 2015) (``Supplemental 
Notice'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Current part 150 is the baseline against which the costs and 
benefits associated with these final rules will be identified and 
considered.\305\ The current regulations in part 150 require certain 
market participants to aggregate positions subject to the position 
limits.\306\ As discussed above in Section II., the Commission's 
aggregation policy under existing regulation 150.4 generally requires 
that unless a particular exemption applies, a person must aggregate all 
positions and accounts for which that person controls the trading 
decisions with all positions and accounts in which that person has a 10 
percent or greater ownership interest, and with the positions of any 
other persons with whom the person is acting pursuant to an express or 
implied agreement or understanding.\307\ There are several exemptions 
from aggregation listed, such as the ownership interests of limited 
partners in pooled accounts,\308\ discretionary accounts and customer 
trading programs of FCMs,\309\ and eligible entities with IAC that 
manage customer positions.\310\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \305\ 17 CFR part 150.
    \306\ See Proposed Rule, 78 FR at 68946; Supplemental Notice, 80 
FR at 58374 (for a discussion of the baseline).
    \307\ See 17 CFR 150.4(a) and (b).
    \308\ See 17 CFR 150.4(c).
    \309\ See 17 CFR 150.4(d).
    \310\ See 17 CFR 150.3(a)(4).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In the Proposed Rule and the Supplemental Notice, the Commission 
also requested comments on its costs-and-benefits assessments and 
sought data as well as other information in the estimation of 
quantifiable costs and benefits of the final changes to part 150.\311\ 
The commenters addressed the cost-and-benefit aspect of the Proposed 
Rule and the Supplemental Notice in a general manner; commenters did 
not provide data.\312\ Accordingly, since the data requisite to 
quantification is by-and-large proprietary, specific to individual 
market participants, and not otherwise reasonably accessible to the 
Commission, the Commission's cost-and-benefit discussion that follows 
is largely qualitative in nature. The Commission, nevertheless, 
attempts to quantify costs and benefits where possible, especially, in 
the area of market participants' filing exemption notices.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \311\ See Proposed Rule, 78 FR at 68972, and Supplemental 
Notice, 80 FR at 58375.
    \312\ See CL-Working Group Feb 10; CL-CME Feb 10; CL-SIFMA AMG 
Feb 10; CL-FIA Feb 6; CL-FIA Nov 13; CL-COPE Feb 10. Also, the 
Proposed Rule included a discussion of comments on costs related to 
the now-vacated Part 151 received prior to the 2013 proposal. See 
Proposed Rule, 78 FR at 68971.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

1. Final Rules--Summary
    The Commission is adopting final rules that, primarily, have two 
objectives. First, the final rules state the Commission's aggregation 
requirement. Second, the final rules identify exemptions that relieve 
market participants from the requirement to aggregate all held 
positions that are subject the Commission's position limits.
    Final rules 150.4(a)(1) and (a)(2) set out two aggregation 
requirements: (1) An aggregation requirement for a person exercising 
trading control or possessing certain ownership or equity interests in 
positions in accounts, which is the same as in existing regulation 
150.4(b); and (2) an aggregation requirement for a person who holds or 
controls positions in more than one account that employ substantially 
identical trading strategies, which is new under the final rule. The 
exemptions are in rules 150.4(b)(1) to (b)(8), and apply only to 
persons who fall within the first category of persons who must 
aggregate--i.e., persons subject to rule 150.4(a)(1). The exemption 
notice filing process is in rules 150.4(c) and (d). In rule 150.4(e), 
the Commission delegates authority over aggregation and exemption 
related duties to the Director of the Division of Market Oversight.
    There are eight exemptions. Three of them are largely the same as 
in existing regulations: An exemption for limited partners, 
shareholders, or other pool participants; an exemption for FCMs that 
hold certain accounts; and an exemption for independent account 
controllers that control trading by certain accounts or positions.\313\ 
Five of the exemptions are new in the final rule. There is an exemption 
from aggregation of the positions and accounts of owned entities if the 
owner meets certain conditions intended to ensure independence of 
trading.\314\ There is exemptive relief for persons who hold positions 
or accounts for the purpose of underwriting, and for certain broker-
dealers.\315\ There also is a violation-of-law exemption for persons 
who must not share trading information to avoid violating state or 
federal laws, or the law of a foreign jurisdiction.\316\ Finally,

[[Page 91482]]

there is an exemption that relieves persons who are affiliated with a 
person who has already filed an exemption notice from filing a 
duplicative exemption notice with the Commission.\317\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \313\ See rules 150.4(b)(1), (b)(3) and (b)(4), respectively. 
See also existing regulations 150.4(c), 150.4(d) and 150.3(a)(4), 
respectively.
    \314\ See rule 150.4(b)(2).
    \315\ See rules 150.4(b)(5) and (b)(6), respectively.
    \316\ See rule 150.4(b)(7).
    \317\ See rule 150.4(b)(8).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Persons seeking an exemption under most, but not all, of the 
exemptive categories must file a notice with the Commission to obtain 
relief from the aggregation requirement. Persons required to file a 
notice include the following: Certain principals or affiliates of 
commodity pool operators; persons with ownership or equity levels of 10 
percent or greater; independent account controllers, and persons who do 
not share trading information to avoid violating laws.\318\ The notice 
must describe the relevant circumstances that warrant disaggregation, 
and have a senior officer's certification.\319\ The relevant 
circumstances that may warrant disaggregation are described in rule 
150.4(b)(2)(i)(A)-(E) and include the following four factors for the 
owner entity and the owned entity: \320\ Lack trading-decision 
knowledge; trade through separately developed and independent trading 
systems; possess and enforce written procedures to preclude each from 
having knowledge of, gaining access to, or receiving data about, trades 
of the other; do not share employees that control the trading decisions 
of the owned entity or owner; and do not have a risk management system 
that permits the sharing of trades or trading strategy.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \318\ See rule 150.4(c)(1).
    \319\ See rules 150.4(c)(1)(i), (ii) and 150.4(b)(2)(ii).
    \320\ These factors apply to the owned entity to the extent that 
the owner is or should be aware of the activities and practices of 
the owned entity. The factors also apply to any other entity that 
the owner must aggregate, again to the extent the owner is or should 
be aware of its activities and practices. See rule 150.4(b)(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission also is finalizing definition changes to the term 
``eligible entity'' in rule 150.1(d), and ``independent account 
controller'' in rule 150.1(e). These changes reorganize where the 
defined terms are located in the Commission's regulations, and clarify 
that they apply not only to limited partnerships (as in the existing 
regulation), but also to limited liability companies and other 
equivalent corporate structures. The Commission believes that these 
definition changes, in and of themselves, have no cost-benefit 
concerns; their cost-benefit impact relates to implementing the 
exemptions.
2. Benefits
    The purpose of requiring positions to be aggregated among 
affiliated and otherwise connected entities is to prevent evasion of 
prescribed position limits through coordinated trading. Because the 
same reasoning applies to a person who holds or controls positions in 
more than one account or pool with substantially identical trading 
strategies, the final rule includes a new provision to require 
aggregation in these circumstances. The Commission believes that the 
new requirement to aggregate positions under substantially identical 
trading strategies will provide benefits by helping to prevent evasion 
of the position limits.
    The Commission also recognizes that an overly restrictive or 
prescriptive aggregation policy may result in unnecessary burdens or 
unintended consequences. Therefore, the final rule adopts five new 
exemptions from the aggregation requirement, as described above. The 
Commission believes that providing these exemptions will mitigate these 
burdens and consequences in situations where the risks of coordinated 
trading are low. Thus, the Commission believes the final rule provides 
benefits to market participants who would have been subject to such 
burdens and consequences, while at the same time maintaining an 
aggregation requirement that is sufficient to maintain the benefit of 
preventing evasion.
    The unnecessary burdens and unintended consequences that could 
arise from an overly restrictive or prescriptive aggregation policy 
could take the form of reduced liquidity because the imposition of 
aggregation requirements on entities that are not susceptible to 
coordinated trading would restrict their ability to trade commodity 
derivatives contracts if the aggregation requirements brought them 
close to the applicable limits. The Commission also recognizes that 
requiring passive investors to aggregate their positions may 
potentially diminish capital investments, or interfere with existing 
decentralized business structures.
    The following example illustrates how the final rule is expected to 
provide benefits by allowing new exemptions to the aggregation 
requirement. In this example, Entity A seeks to pursue a business or 
investment strategy that involves the use of futures transactions. 
Before proceeding, Entity A must consider whether the futures 
transactions would cause it to exceed any applicable position limit. 
Under the aggregation requirement in current regulations, which has 
only limited exceptions, Entity A's decision of whether to proceed 
could depend on the futures transactions of its subsidiaries or other 
entities whose positions it is required to aggregate. If one such 
entity has significant positions in place, then Entity A may be 
prevented from entering into the desired transactions, because the 
aggregation of Entity A's positions with the positions of the other 
entity would exceed a position limit.
    The final rules permit Entity A to seek disaggregation relief for 
the positions of certain of its subsidiaries and potentially other 
entities. Thus, under the final rules Entity A will have more 
flexibility to put in place a management structure that allows Entity A 
to make business and investment decisions independently of its 
subsidiaries and other potentially aggregated entities so long as 
applicable criteria (which relate to independent decision making and 
other indications of separateness) are met. This is beneficial to 
Entity A because it can focus its business and investment decisions on 
its own business needs. If disaggregation relief were not available to 
Entity A, then the requirement to aggregate other entities' positions 
might unnecessarily distort Entity A's business and investment 
decisions by requiring Entity A to consider factors that do not relate 
directly to those decisions. So by establishing exemptive relief that 
is available to market participants that take steps to establish 
independent decision making and separateness--for instance, the 
demonstration of no shared control over trading--potential negative 
effects, such as impediments to sound decision making, will be reduced.
    The exemptions added by the final rules also will benefit market 
participants by mitigating their compliance burdens associated with 
meeting the aggregation requirement as well as position limits more 
generally. Eligible market participants will not have to establish and 
maintain the infrastructure necessary to aggregate positions across 
affiliated entities where an exemption is available. Further, an 
eligible entity with legitimate hedging needs and whose aggregated 
positions are above the position limits thresholds in the absence of 
any exemption will have the option of applying for an aggregation 
exemption (if it meets the stated criteria) instead of applying for a 
bona fide hedging exemption. In other words, an eligible entity will 
have the benefit of being able to choose the exemption it deems 
appropriate, and in many cases the exemption from aggregation, which 
requires only a notice filing, may be less costly to

[[Page 91483]]

obtain than other exemptions from position limits.
    The final rules also provide legal consistency for those persons 
that own multiple entities with multiple ownership or equity interest 
levels. Because the final rules treat all persons that possess at least 
a 10 percent ownership or equity interest in another entity (other than 
persons with an interest in a pooled account subject to rule 
150.4(b)(1)) in the same way for purposes of receiving exemptive relief 
from the Commission's aggregation requirement, there is a unified 
exemptive framework. This will reduce confusion and further mitigates 
the burdens facing market participants. Consider, for example, a 
parent-holding company that has different levels of ownership or equity 
interest in its various subsidiaries. Under the final unified 
framework, it may establish and maintain one notice-filing system for 
the purpose of obtaining aggregation exemptions for any or all of these 
subsidiaries.
    The Commission also has reduced, consistent with regulatory 
objectives, the administrative and compliance burden of filing the 
notice required to receive an exemption. For example, for the 
violations-of-law exemption, the Commission will allow a memorandum of 
law prepared by internal counsel instead of a formal opinion. This 
reduces legal costs and is a benefit available to market participants. 
Finally, the Commission recognizes the benefits of notice filing. This 
will result in reduced administrative and compliance costs given that 
updates will be necessary only when there are material changes.
3. Costs
    The Commission recognizes that entities subject to the Commission's 
aggregation policy in rule 150.4, including entities seeking to apply 
one of the existing or newly-provided exemptions, will incur direct 
costs. Such costs will include: (i) Initially determining which owned 
entities, other persons, or transactions qualify for any of the 
exemptions from aggregation in rule 150.4(b); (ii) developing and 
maintaining a system of determining the scope of such exemptions over 
time; (iii) potentially amending current operational structures to 
achieve eligibility for such exemptions; (iv) preparing and filing 
notices of exemption with the Commission; and (v) developing a system 
for aggregating positions across entities, persons or transactions for 
which no exemption is available.
    The Commission has also considered whether its proposed amendments 
expanding position limits \321\ would result in an increase in the 
number of market participants that will have to consider the effects of 
the Commission's aggregation policy, as compared to the number of 
market participants that are currently subject to position limits and 
potentially subject to aggregation.\322\ If the proposed position 
limits are adopted, market participants would be required to aggregate 
the accounts and positions of owned entities and other aggregated 
entities that engage in the contracts and swap equivalents covered by 
the new position limits. Thus, the Commission's adoption of the 
proposed position limits would mean that the aggregation requirement in 
the final rule (even though it largely continues the aggregation 
requirement in the existing regulations) would apply to new market 
participants who have not previously been subject to position limits or 
the aggregation requirement.\323\ The Commission has considered the 
costs that these market participants will face.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \321\ See Position Limits for Derivatives, 78 FR 75680 (December 
12, 2013).
    \322\ See generally Proposed Rule, 78 FR at 68970, and 
Supplemental Notice, 80 FR at 58375.
    \323\ The Commission notes that market participants that are 
currently subject to the aggregation requirement in the existing 
regulations should have already a system in place for aggregating 
positions across owned entities or as otherwise required. Further, 
entities that have been transacting in futures markets have been 
subject to these aggregation requirements for decades, and have 
extant operational structures that are appropriate for their trading 
and other activities. Given these considerations, the Commission 
believes that for market participants that are currently subject to 
position limits (and, potentially, the aggregation requirement) 
prior to any adoption of new position limits, these final rules do 
not increase significantly the costs of compliance as compared to 
the status quo--that is, the aggregation requirements of existing 
part 150 of the Commission's regulations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Many of these costs--such as building out new compliance systems--
would be attributable to complying with position limits that may be 
adopted in the future and not with the final rule adopted here.\324\ 
However, the Commission has considered that as market participants 
become subject to position limits or subject to position limits 
applicable to a wider scope of their derivatives activities, the market 
participants may face more complex situations involving owned entities 
or other entities potentially subject to the aggregation requirement. 
For example, if the scope of the position limits expands, 
interpretation and application of the criteria for disaggregation 
relief in rule 150.4(b)(2) may become more complex, even though these 
criteria are largely the same as criteria previously applied with 
respect to the exemption used by eligible entities using an IAC.\325\ 
The Commission has considered the potential for these costs but cannot 
quantify them, because the costs that would be incurred by each market 
participant will depend upon its management and corporate structure, 
its trading practices, its information-sharing practices and other 
factors specific to the market participant.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \324\ The adoption of the proposed position limits for 28 exempt 
and agricultural commodity futures and options contracts and the 
physical commodity swaps that are economically equivalent to such 
contracts would be pursuant to the requirements of CEA section 
4a(a)(5). See Position Limits for Derivatives, 78 FR 75680 (December 
12, 2013). Thus, costs resulting from this statutory requirement and 
not the Commission's discretion are not subject to the consideration 
of costs and benefits required by CEA section 15(a). The costs and 
benefits attributable to the specific position limit levels that may 
be adopted by the Commission would be considered in the rulemaking 
establishing those limits.
    \325\ See footnote 118 and accompanying text, above.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission has also considered that a large part of the final 
rule (in particular, paragraphs (2), (5), (6) and (7) of rule 150.4(b)) 
adds potential exemptions from the aggregation requirement that were 
not available under the existing regulations. While market participants 
may incur some costs in determining whether to use these newly-
available exemptions and in filing the related notices, the market 
participants are also free not to use the exemptions if the costs of 
doing so are too high. In other words, if the costs attributable to 
paperwork and compliance practices that are necessary to take advantage 
of one of these exemptions do not make economic sense, market 
participants will not avail themselves of the exemptions under this 
rulemaking.
    The Commission understands that there will be some costs to 
investors in commodity pools in aggregating positions under rule 
150.4(a)(2), which is a newly adopted requirement to aggregate the 
positions of accounts or pools with substantially identical trading 
strategies. First, investors may not be able to easily determine which 
positions are held by a particular pool. Furthermore, the investors may 
not be able to easily determine their percentage ownership or equity 
interest in a pool that is open-ended and allows investors to 
continuously buy and redeem shares. The Commission is unable to 
quantify the effect of this rule because there are varying factors such 
as complicated trading strategies and changing ownership levels within 
a pool. Nonetheless, the Commission recognizes that there will be costs

[[Page 91484]]

associated with the aggregation requirement of this rule.
    In addition, DCMs and SEFs will be required to conform their 
aggregation policies, if their rules do not conform to the Commission's 
aggregation policy already. As noted above, the requirement to 
aggregate the positions of accounts or pools with substantially 
identical trading strategies, as well as the potential application of 
the aggregation requirement to a broader scope of positions and market 
participants, may increase the complexity of applying the aggregation 
requirement. The Commission recognizes that this complexity may 
increase costs for DCMs and SEFs to enforce their aggregation policies, 
but for the reasons noted above the Commission cannot quantify these 
costs at this time. The actual costs will depend on, among other 
things, the extent to which market participants may become subject to 
position limits and the characteristics of their corporate structures 
and trading practices. On the other hand, the Commission understands 
that some DCMs have made conforming rule changes already. In these 
cases, there are no incremental costs to consider.
    The Commission believes that the final rules will decrease costs by 
providing market participants new options to elect an exemption and 
obtain relief from the aggregation requirements. Consequently, the main 
direct costs associated with the changes to rule 150.4, relative to the 
standard of existing regulation 150.4, will be those incurred by 
entities as they determine whether they may be eligible for the final 
exemptions, if they modify their management or corporate structures or 
trading practices to comply with the exemptions, and if they make 
subsequent exemption filings for material changes. These costs will 
apply to market participants that pursue exemptions because they are a 
principal or affiliate of an operator of a pooled account; person with 
a 10 percent or greater owner or equity interest in another entity; a 
certain type of FCM; a certain type of independent account controller; 
or a person who must share information to avoid a violation of law.
    The Commission believes there will be insignificant costs, if any, 
for persons electing to take the underwriting and broker-dealer 
exemptions. These groups are not required to file exemption notices 
under rule 150.4(c). As a result, the cost these persons will incur 
will be those dedicated to determining whether they are eligible for 
the exemption.
    There also will be a cost-savings to entities affiliated with an 
entity who has already filed for an exemption under existing regulation 
150.4. The Commission has offered affiliated entities greater relief by 
affording them an opportunity under rule 150.4(b)(8) to reduce 
administrative costs because they will not need to file a notice if 
their affiliated entity has filed an exemption notice previously and 
updates the previous filing to include the affiliated entities. While 
there will be some associated costs to monitor records of notices filed 
by affiliated entities and make the updates, the Commission expects 
those costs will be small and will likely decline over time as tracking 
systems are maintained and automated.
    In short, the direct costs of the final rules are difficult to 
quantify in the aggregate because such costs are heavily dependent on 
each entity's characteristics. In other words, costs vary according to 
an entity's current systems, its corporate structure, its use of 
derivatives, the specific modifications it will implement in order to 
qualify for an exemption, and other circumstances. The Commission, 
nevertheless, believes that market participants will choose to incur 
the costs of qualifying for and using the exemptions in the final rules 
when doing so is less costly than complying with position limits. Thus, 
by providing these market participants with a lower cost alternative 
(i.e., qualifying for and using the exemptions) the final rules may 
ease overall compliance burdens resulting from position limits.
    There is an inherent trade-off between the benefits arising from 
aggregation exemptions in certain circumstances and maintaining the 
effectiveness of the Commission's position limits. The Commission 
believes that it has tailored the exemptions sufficiently to 
circumstances where the exemptions should not weaken the integrity of 
the Commission's position limits significantly, because, for instance, 
the exemptions apply only to accounts that pose a low risk of 
coordinated trading.
    In accordance with the Paperwork Reduction Act the Commission has 
estimated the costs of the paperwork required to claim the final 
exemptions. As stated in Section III.C., below, the Commission 
estimates that 240 entities will submit a total of 340 responses per 
year and incur a total burden of 6,850 labor hours at a cost of 
approximately $1,096,000 annually to claim exemptive relief under 
regulation 150.4.
    The Commission also considers the cross-border implications of this 
rulemaking. The Commission believes that the costs might be slightly 
higher for entities that conduct business in both domestic and foreign 
jurisdictions. Multi-jurisdictional entities will likely need to 
consider the implications of memoranda of understanding between the 
Commission and foreign regulators as well as non-U.S. privacy laws that 
might apply to them. The Commission believes, however, that while there 
may be costs for initial assessments, these costs will decline over 
time for entities as they gain more experience with the aggregation 
requirements discussed herein.
4. Comments
    The Commission received several comments on cost-benefit issues in 
response to the Proposed Rule and the Supplemental Notice. One 
commenter argued that market participants faced the burden of building 
compliance systems and programs to (i) capture the information 
necessary to determine whether they may exceed position limits and (ii) 
avoid violating such limits on an intraday basis. The commenter 
believed that the number of potential market participants at risk of 
violating limits ``is likely significantly larger'' than the number of 
those who actually exceed limits, and the obligation to aggregate where 
there is currently no information sharing increases costs associated 
with aggregation.\326\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \326\ See CL-Working Group Feb 10.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As noted above, the Commission has considered that the requirement 
to aggregate the positions of accounts or pools with substantially 
identical trading strategies, along with the potential application of 
the aggregation requirement to a broader scope of positions and market 
participants, may increase the complexity of applying the aggregation 
requirement. On the other hand, the Commission believes that it is 
important to continue to apply the aggregation requirement in the 
existing regulation (and to add the aggregation requirement related to 
substantially identical trading) in order to forestall evasion of the 
position limits through coordinated trading and to close potential 
loopholes, as discussed above. To the extent a market participant 
incurs costs in determining whether to seek an exemption or to comply 
with an exemption provided in the final rule, the market participant 
could avoid those costs if they are not sensible in relation to the 
benefits of using the exemption.
    Another commenter asserted that the Commission's cost-benefit 
consideration of the proposed aggregation rules was inadequate, 
including for investors applying the substantially identical trading 
strategies aggregation requirement in rule 150.4(a)(2) to their

[[Page 91485]]

holdings in multiple funds or funds-of-funds. The commenter also 
expressed that the Commission did not consider the costs for DCMs and 
SEFs to implement aggregation standards for all derivatives that would 
have to conform with proposed rule 150.4. These would include the costs 
of validating and approving aggregation-related notice filings made 
under proposed rule 150.4(c).\327\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \327\ See CL-CME Feb 10.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Regarding the costs faced by investors in multiple funds or funds-
of-funds, this rulemaking considers these costs qualitatively but not 
quantitatively, because quantitative costs depend upon the specific 
characteristics and activities of market participants--for example, the 
extent to which investors have to aggregate pro rata interests in 
multiple funds or funds-of-funds. The Commission recognizes that these 
costs may be significant in some situations, such as where a single 
investor transacts in derivatives subject to position limits through 
multiple entities and funds. As noted in the discussion of costs in 
Section III.A.3., above, investors may not be able to determine easily 
which positions are held by an underlying fund or their precise 
percentage interests in funds.
    However, the Commission has determined that the requirements 
resulting in these costs are appropriate in order to prevent evasion of 
the position limits through coordinated trading. For example, as noted 
above in section II.H.3., in the absence of rule 150.4(a)(2) the 
exemption in rule 150.4(b)(1) would permit an investor to separate a 
large position in a given commodity derivative into positions held in 
various funds that have substantially identical trading strategies. As 
a practical matter, if an investor's positions are near position 
limits, the investor could consider the merits of holding its positions 
in a single fund as compared to holding the positions in multiple 
funds. The investor might elect to hold its positions in a single fund 
instead of through multiple funds, in order to avoid the requirement 
under rule 150.4(a)(2) to aggregate the multiple holdings. Of course, 
the investor would have to comply with position limits whether it holds 
its positions in a single fund or in multiple funds.
    The discussion of costs in Section III.A.3., above, also covered 
costs to DCMs and SEFs that will be required to conform their 
aggregation policies to the Commission's aggregation policy. Moreover, 
the Commission had discussed this issue in the Proposed Rule, when it 
noted that because the Commission's aggregation rules would be 
precedent for aggregation rules enforced by DCMs and SEFs, it is 
important that the aggregation rules set out, to the extent feasible, 
bright line rules that are capable of easy application in a wide 
variety of circumstances, without being susceptible to 
circumvention.\328\ The Commission notes that proposed rule 
150.4(c)(2), which required a finding as to whether an applicant has 
satisfied the conditions for an exemption, is not being adopted. This 
should reduce the costs to DCMs and SEFs in reviewing filings made 
under rule 150.4(c), which was a concern to the commenter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \328\ See Proposed Rule, 78 FR at 68956, n. 103.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    One commenter claimed that when considering the costs and benefits 
of its proposed owned entity aggregation rules, the Commission assumes 
a cost-benefit baseline that requires position aggregation based solely 
on ownership, regardless of the existence of common control.\329\ The 
commenter goes further to say that this is an inappropriate baseline, 
because neither the Commission nor DCMs currently require the 
aggregation of owned entity positions regardless of the existence of 
common control, and also because speculative positions outside of the 
spot month have not been subject to position limits in 19 out of the 28 
``referenced contract'' markets.\330\ ``Aggregating non-spot-month 
positions of entities in which passive investors make investments 
presents considerable new challenges, which not been adequately 
considered,'' the commenter stated.\331\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \329\ See CL-SIFMA AMG Feb 10.
    \330\ See id.
    \331\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In response to this commenter, the Commission reiterates that the 
baseline is existing regulation 150.4, which does require aggregation 
based solely on ownership, regardless of the existence of common 
control.\332\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \332\ See the discussion in Section II.A.3, above.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Also, as noted previously, the Commission has considered that the 
requirement to aggregate the positions of accounts or pools with 
substantially identical trading strategies, as well as the potential 
application of the aggregation requirement to a broader scope of 
positions and market participants, may increase the complexity of 
applying the aggregation requirement. The Commission understands that 
passive investors may be among those market participants that are 
affected by the new requirements. In response to this commenter's 
concerns, the Commission notes that passive investors should be able to 
qualify for the exemption from aggregation in rule 150.4(b)(2), because 
if the investor were passive it would meet the conditions for that 
exemption, which relate to an absence of coordinated trading. Thus, 
rule 150.4(b)(2) will mitigate the burdens on passive investors.\333\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \333\ The Commission believes that the newly added exemption in 
rule 150.4(b)(2) will also mitigate the concerns that this commenter 
expressed about undue costs on passive investors that have no 
control over or knowledge of the commodity derivatives trading 
activities of the owned entities in which they invest. See CL-SIFMA 
AMG Feb 10. In the absence of such control or knowledge, the 
investor would be eligible for an exemption from the aggregation 
requirement. Thus, it is not the case, as the commenter argued (see 
id.), that the owned entity aggregation threshold at 10 percent is 
over-inclusive, or that it would require a purely passive investor 
to aggregate the positions of all entities in which the investor has 
beneficial equity ownership of 10 percent or more. Also, passive 
investors would not necessarily have to determine how owned entities 
transact in commodity derivatives, as the commenter argued. See id. 
Instead, passive entities would only have to ensure that they meet 
the requirements for the exemption in rule 150.4(b)(2), which the 
Commission expects they would, and file the notice required to use 
that exemption.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The commenter also criticized the exemption for ownership interests 
in rule 150.4(b)(2) because it would not extend to all ownership 
interests, and would require a ``burdensome'' notice filing in all 
investment circumstances, despite the absence of any common trading 
control, ``for no apparent benefit.'' The commenter noted that passive 
investors in a commodity pool that are not affiliated with the pool 
operator would not, under the exemption in proposed rule 150.4(b)(1), 
be required to submit a notice filing to disaggregate the positions of 
pools in which they have invested, ``regardless of their ownership 
interest in the pool,'' and the Proposed Rule provides no reason why 
passive investors in owned entities should not have at least the same 
degree of deference.\334\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \334\ See CL-SIFMA AMG Feb 10.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission disagrees with the comment. The Commission does not 
believe that a notice filing is a heavy burden on any investor, passive 
or not, because the notice filing merely requires the investor to name 
the entities involved, describe the relevant circumstances that warrant 
disaggregation, and certify that the conditions in the applicable 
aggregation exemption have been met. As discussed above, the Commission 
believes that the notice filing requirement benefits the public and 
market participants because it will allow the Commission to monitor 
usage of the aggregation exemptions and receive notice of potential red 
flags that warrant further investigation.
    Furthermore, the Commission believes that the difference in 
treatment

[[Page 91486]]

between limited partners and similar pool participants in rule 
150.4(b)(1), and owners of entities in rule 150.4(b)(2), is sensible. 
First, the Commission notes that rule 150.4(b)(1) continues the 
treatment of pool participants under the existing regulation. As the 
commenter said, rule 150.4(b)(1) does not include a notice filing 
requirement where the participant is not affiliated with the commodity 
pool operator. The Commission is comfortable that little additional 
benefit would be achieved by requiring a notice filing in this 
situation, because a separate entity is designated as the commodity 
pool operator (and may be subject to registration with the Commission). 
By contrast, rule 150.4(b)(2) applies to any type of owned entity. In 
this situation, the Commission believes that the costs incurred by the 
owner seeking an exemption to file a notice with the Commission are 
reasonable in view of the very large variety of corporate structures 
and management arrangements that may be in place. Given this variety, 
there are important benefits from a notice filing because the notices 
inform the Commission of the circumstances in which the exemption is 
being used and thereby permit the Commission to monitor use of the 
exemption.
    The commenter also maintained that the Commission inadequately 
considered the costs and benefits of the proposed substantially 
identical trading strategies requirement at proposed rule 150.4(a)(2), 
and that the requirement is unworkable in practice. The commenter 
noted, for example, ``a $10,000 investor in two $1 billion commodity 
index mutual funds using the same index may have to aggregate the 
positions in those two $1 billion mutual funds because they follow 
`substantially identical trading strategies.' '' The commenter believed 
such an investor would have to implement a compliance program to 
prevent inadvertent violations of the position limits rules, which (in 
addition to imposing significant legal and operational obstacles) would 
impose costs many times the investor's $10,000 investment.\335\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \335\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission disagrees with the commenter's view that it 
inadequately considered the costs and benefits of the substantially 
identical trading strategies requirement. The Commission has explained 
that the requirement under proposed rule 150.4 is effected on a pro 
rata basis. That is, the terms of the rule require the owner to 
aggregate the positions that it (i.e., the owner) holds in the two 
commodity index mutual funds, not the positions of the funds 
themselves, so that in the commenter's example the two holdings would 
be aggregated into one $20,000 holding.\336\ The Commission 
acknowledges that the determination of the owner's pro rata interest in 
the number of contracts such accounts or pools are holding may create 
practical difficulties for the owner--in particular when the owner is 
unaware of the underlying positions of the account or pool. However, as 
discussed above the Commission believes that the requirement in rule 
150.4(a)(2) provides important benefits by preventing circumvention of 
the aggregation requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \336\ The commenter described the holdings in dollar amounts. 
See id. The Commission notes however that the position limits 
generally are stated in terms of a number of contracts, not a dollar 
amount. To apply rule 150.4(a)(2), a person holding or controlling 
the trading of positions in more than one account or pool with 
substantially identical trading strategies must determine the 
person's pro rata interest in the number of contracts such accounts 
or pools are holding.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

5. Alternatives
    The Commission considered the cost-benefit implications of the 
following significant alternatives:
     Different ownership thresholds (e.g., 25 percent or 50 
percent) for the aggregation requirement in rule 150.4(a)(1). As 
discussed in Section II.A.3.a, the Commission recognizes that a higher 
ownership threshold would presumably decrease the number of persons 
required to aggregate or seek exemptions from aggregation. Yet, there 
is uncertainty about how beneficial this reduction would be in reducing 
burdens and how harmful it would be in reducing the amount of 
information available to the Commission. Because of this uncertainty, 
the Commission has determined not to change the 10 percent threshold in 
effect under the current regulations.
     Aggregation on a basis pro rata to the ownership interest 
in the owned entity. Commenters suggested that Commission base the 
aggregation requirement on a pro rata ownership or equity 
interest.\337\ Arguably, pro rata aggregation would more accurately 
reflect the positions owned by market participants and would not 
unnecessarily restrict the positions of market participants, while 
reducing the risk of an inadvertent position limits overage. The 
Commission has decided not to offer such an aggregation method. As 
explained above, while there are theoretical merits to a pro rata 
aggregation method as it would measure a market participant's ownership 
and equity levels more accurately, commenters did not offer suggestions 
on how such an exemption would work practically, especially when 
ownership and control may change on an inter-day basis. Nor did 
commenters provide information regarding the extent to which a pro rata 
approach would actually mitigate the aggregation requirement (e.g., how 
often entities which are subject to an aggregation requirement, and not 
eligible for an exemption, are owned at a level substantially below 100 
percent). In such circumstances, implementing a pro rata aggregation 
standard would be expensive in terms of costs related to developing and 
maintaining systems that would connect multiple market participants 
(e.g., CPOs, beneficial owners), DCMs, and SEFs, to share information 
to perform pro rata calculations. The Commission believes a pro rata 
aggregation standard would be more costly than the standard the 
Commission is finalizing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \337\ See e.g., CL-FIA Feb 6; CL-COPE Feb 10; CL-SIFMA AMG Feb 
10.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     No notice filing. A commenter suggested that the 
Commission eliminate the exemption notice filing for passive 
investors.\338\ The Commission disagrees and has not added any new 
exemption from the notice filing. A one-time notice filing (with 
updates upon any material change) is not a substantial burden. It is 
noteworthy that, as discussed above, commenters made suggestions as to 
the timing and mechanics of the notice filing, but generally did not 
object to the requirement to make an exemption-notice filing. Moreover, 
as discussed above, a notice filing increases the Commission's and 
other market regulators' abilities to monitor usage of the aggregation 
exemptions and oversee market participants benefitting from the 
exemptions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \338\ See CL-SIFMA AMG Nov 13.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     Addition of exemptions for passive investors such as 
pension plans and transitory ownership interests acquired through 
credit events.\339\ As discussed above in Section II.A.3.d., the 
Commission believes that applying rules for specific treatment of 
particular situations or classes of entity would be complex and not 
justified by the potential benefits to the entities receiving different 
treatment. For example, the Commission believes that distinguishing 
``transitory'' ownership from other forms of ownership would be more 
complicated than completing the notice required to obtain relief, and 
in such situations it is reasonable to expect that the notice filing 
would be made on a summary basis appropriate to the

[[Page 91487]]

transitory situation. Similarly, application of definitional rules to 
delineate when a class of entities such as pension plans would not have 
to apply for an exemption from aggregation would be complex as compared 
to the notice filing that a pension plan could file to receive an 
exemption from aggregation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \339\ See e.g., CL-SIFMA AMG Nov 13; CL-FIA Nov 13 CL-Working 
Group Nov 13.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

6. Section 15(a) Considerations
    As the Commission has long held, position limits are regulatory 
tools that are designed to prevent concentrated positions of sufficient 
size to manipulate or disrupt markets. The aggregation of accounts for 
purposes of applying position limits represents an integral component 
that impacts the effectiveness of those limits. The Commission believes 
the final rules will preserve the important protections of the existing 
aggregation policy, but at a lower cost for market participants.
a. Protection of Market Participants and the Public
    The Commission believes these final rules will not materially 
affect the level of protection afforded market participants and the 
public that is provided by the aggregation policy reflected currently 
in regulation 150.4. Given that the aggregation standards are necessary 
to implement effective position limits, it is important that the final 
exemptions be sufficiently tailored to exempt from aggregation only 
those positions or accounts that pose a low risk of coordinated 
trading. The owned-entity exemption will maintain the Commission's 
historical presumption threshold of 10 percent ownership or equity 
interest and make that presumption rebuttable only where several 
conditions indicative of independence are met. This final exemption 
focuses on the conditions that impact trading independence. In 
addition, by providing an avenue to apply for relief when ownership is 
greater than 10 percent of the owned entity, the final rules will allow 
market participants greater flexibility in meeting the requirements of 
the position limits regulations, provided they are eligible to apply. 
The Commission believes that all of the exemptions will allow the 
Commission to direct its resources to monitoring those entities that 
pose a higher risk of coordinated trading and thus a higher risk of 
circumventing position limits. Furthermore, the exemptions will not 
significantly reduce the protection of market participants and the 
public that the Commission's aggregation policy affords.
b. Efficiency, Competition, and Financial Integrity of Markets
    The Commission believes the final exemptions will reduce costs for 
market participants without compromising the integrity or effectiveness 
of the Commission's aggregation policy. An important rationale for 
providing aggregation exemptions is to avoid overly restricting 
commodity derivatives trading of affiliated entities not susceptible to 
coordinated trading. Such trading restrictions may potentially result 
in reduced liquidity in commodity derivatives markets, diminished 
investment by largely passive investors, or distortions of existing 
decentralized business structures. Thus, the final exemptions help 
promote efficiency and competition, and protect market integrity by 
helping to prevent these undesirable consequences.
c. Price Discovery
    The Commission expects the final rules to further the Commission's 
mission to deter and prevent manipulative behavior while maintaining 
sufficient liquidity for hedging activity and protecting the price 
discovery process. By relaxing aggregation requirements in 
circumstances not conducive to coordinated trading, the final 
exemptions may help improve liquidity by encouraging more market 
participation. Specifically, the Commission believes that these 
exemptions will help to encourage market participation on registered 
exchanges so that price discovery will not move to other market 
platforms where similar transactions could be effected, such as foreign 
boards of trade.
d. Sound Risk Management Practices
    The imposition of position limits helps to restrict market 
participants from amassing positions that are of sufficient size to 
disrupt the operation of commodity derivatives markets. The final 
exemptions will allow affiliated entities to disaggregate their 
positions in circumstances that the Commission believes present minimal 
risk of coordinated trading with potential to disrupt market 
operations. The Commission believes that the final exemptions will not 
materially inhibit the use of commodity derivatives for hedging, as 
bona fide hedging exemptions are available to any entity regardless of 
aggregation of positions and exemptions from aggregation. Where there 
is little possibility of coordinating trading, the final rules 
facilitate sound risk management by permitting an entity to manage its 
risks where risks are being generated.\340\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \340\ See earlier discussion of the example involving Entity A 
in Section III.A.2., above.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

e. Other Public Interest Considerations
    The Commission did not identify any other public interest 
considerations related to the costs and benefits in the proposed 
exemptive relief to aggregation. No commenter on the Proposed Rule or 
the Supplemental Notice identified any other public interest 
consideration, either.

B. Regulatory Flexibility Act

    The Regulatory Flexibility Act (``RFA'') requires that agencies 
consider whether the rules they propose will have a significant 
economic impact on a substantial number of small entities and, if so, 
provide a regulatory flexibility analysis respecting the impact.\341\ A 
regulatory flexibility analysis or certification typically is required 
for ``any rule for which the agency publishes a general notice of 
proposed rulemaking pursuant to'' the notice-and-comment provisions of 
the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 553(b).\342\ The 
requirements related to the proposed amendments fall mainly on 
registered entities, exchanges, FCMs, swap dealers, clearing members, 
foreign brokers, and large traders. The Commission has previously 
determined that registered DCMs, FCMs, swap dealers, major swap 
participants, eligible contract participants, SEFs, clearing members, 
foreign brokers and large traders are not small entities for purposes 
of the RFA.\343\ While the requirements under the proposed rulemaking 
may impact non-financial end users, the Commission notes that position 
limits levels apply only to large traders.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \341\ 44 U.S.C. 601 et seq.
    \342\ 5 U.S.C. 601(2), 603-05.
    \343\ See Policy Statement and Establishment of Definitions of 
``Small Entities'' for Purposes of the Regulatory Flexibility Act, 
47 FR 18618, 18619 (Apr. 30, 1982) (DCMs, FCMs, and large traders); 
Opting Out of Segregation, 66 FR 20740, 20743 (Apr. 25, 2001) 
(eligible contract participants); Position Limits for Futures and 
Swaps; Final Rule and Interim Final Rule, 76 FR 71626, 71680 (Nov. 
18, 2011) (clearing members); Core Principles and Other Requirements 
for Swap Execution Facilities, 78 FR 33476, 33548 (June 4, 2013) 
(SEFs); A New Regulatory Framework for Clearing Organizations, 66 FR 
45604, 45609 (Aug. 29, 2001) (DCOs); Registration of Swap Dealers 
and Major Swap Participants, 77 FR 2613 (Jan. 19, 2012) (swap 
dealers and major swap participants); and Special Calls, 72 FR 50209 
(Aug. 31, 2007) (foreign brokers).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Accordingly, the Chairman, on behalf of the Commission, hereby 
certifies, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 605(b), that the actions taken herein 
will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of 
small entities.

[[Page 91488]]

The Chairman made the same certification in the Proposed Rule and the 
Supplemental Notice,\344\ and the Commission did not receive any 
comments on the RFA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \344\ See Proposed Rule, 78 FR at 68973, and Supplemental 
Notice, 80 FR at 58377.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

C. Paperwork Reduction Act

1. Overview
    The Paperwork Reduction Act (``PRA''), 44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq., 
imposes certain requirements on Federal agencies in connection with 
their conducting or sponsoring any collection of information as defined 
by the PRA. An agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not 
required to respond to, a collection of information unless it displays 
a currently valid control number issued by the Office of Management and 
Budget (``OMB''). Certain provisions of the final rules will result in 
amendments to previously-approved collection of information 
requirements within the meaning of the PRA. Therefore, the Commission 
submitted to OMB for review, in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 3507(d) and 5 
CFR 1320.11, the information collection requirements in this 
rulemaking, as an amendment to the previously-approved collection 
associated with OMB control number 3038-0013.
    Responses to this collection of information will be mandatory. The 
Commission will protect proprietary information according to the 
Freedom of Information Act and 17 CFR part 145, titled ``Commission 
Records and Information.'' In addition, the Commission emphasizes that 
section 8(a)(1) of the Act strictly prohibits the Commission, unless 
specifically authorized by the Act, from making public ``data and 
information that would separately disclose the business transactions or 
market positions of any person and trade secrets or names of 
customers.'' The Commission also is required to protect certain 
information contained in a government system of records pursuant to the 
Privacy Act of 1974.
    On November 15, 2013, the Commission published in the Federal 
Register a notice of proposed modifications to part 150 of the 
Commission's regulations (i.e., the Proposed Rule). The modifications 
addressed the policy for aggregation under the Commission's position 
limits regime for futures and option contracts on nine agricultural 
commodities set forth in part 150, and noted that the modifications 
would also apply to the position limits regimes for other exempt and 
agricultural commodity futures and options contracts and the physical 
commodity swaps that are economically equivalent to such contracts, if 
such regimes are finalized. On September 29, 2015, the Commission 
published in the Federal Register a revision to the Proposed Rule 
(i.e., the Supplemental Notice).
    The Commission final rule provides that all persons holding a 
greater than 10 percent ownership or equity interest in another entity 
could avail themselves of an exemption in rule 150.4(b)(2) to 
disaggregate the positions of the owned entity. To claim the exemption, 
a person needs to meet certain criteria and file a notice with the 
Commission in accordance with proposed rule 150.4(c). The notice filing 
needs to demonstrate compliance with certain conditions set forth in 
rule 150.4(b)(2)(i)(A)-(E). Similar to other exemptions from 
aggregation, the notice filing is effective upon submission to the 
Commission (or earlier, as provided in rule 150.4(c)(2)), but the 
Commission may call for additional information as well as reject, 
modify or otherwise condition such relief. Further, such person is 
obligated to amend the notice filing in the event of a material change 
to the filing.
2. Methodology and Assumptions
    It is not possible at this time to precisely determine the number 
of respondents affected by the final rule. The final rule relates to 
exemptions that a market participant may elect to take advantage of, 
meaning that without intimate knowledge of the day-to-day business 
decisions of all its market participants, the Commission could not know 
which participants, or how many, may elect to obtain such an exemption. 
Further, the Commission is unsure of how many participants not 
currently in the market may be required to or may elect to incur the 
estimated burdens in the future.
    These limitations notwithstanding, the Commission has made best-
effort estimations regarding the likely number of affected entities for 
the purposes of calculating burdens under the PRA. The Commission used 
its proprietary data, collected from market participants, to estimate 
the number of respondents for each of the proposed obligations subject 
to the PRA by estimating the number of respondents who may be close to 
a position limit and thus may file for relief from aggregation 
requirements.
    The Commission's estimates concerning wage rates are based on 2013 
salary information for the securities industry compiled by the 
Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (``SIFMA''). The 
Commission is using a figure of $160 per hour, which is derived from a 
weighted average of salaries across different professions from the 
SIFMA Report on Management & Professional Earnings in the Securities 
Industry 2013, modified to account for an 1800-hour work-year, adjusted 
to account for the average rate of inflation in through April 2016. 
This figure was then multiplied by 1.33 to account for benefits \345\ 
and further by 1.5 to account for overhead and administrative expenses, 
and rounded to the nearest ten dollars.\346\ The Commission anticipates 
that compliance with the provisions would require the work of an 
information technology professional; a compliance manager; an 
accounting professional; and an associate general counsel. Thus, the 
wage rate is a weighted national average of salary for professionals 
with the following titles (and their relative weight); ``programmer 
(average of senior and non-senior)'' (15 percent weight), ``senior 
accountant'' (15 percent), ``compliance manager'' (30 percent), and 
``assistant/associate general counsel'' (40 percent).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \345\ The Bureau of Labor Statistics reports that an average of 
32.8 percent of all compensation in the financial services industry 
is related to benefits. This figure may be obtained on the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics Web site, at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/ecec.t06.htm. The Commission rounded this number to 33 percent to 
use in its calculations.
    \346\ Other estimates of this figure have varied dramatically 
depending on the categorization of the expense and the type of 
industry classification used (see, e.g., BizStats at http://www.bizstats.com/corporation-industry-financials/finance-insurance-52/securities-commodity-contracts-other-financial-investments-523/commodity-contracts-dealing-and-brokerage-523135/show and Damodaran 
Online at http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/pc/datasets/
uValuedata.xls. The Commission has chosen to use a figure of 50 
percent for overhead and administrative expenses to attempt to 
conservatively estimate the average for the industry.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission requested comment on its assumptions and estimates 
in the Proposed Rule and the Supplemental Notice,\347\ but did not 
receive any comments.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \347\ See Proposed Rule, 78 FR at 68975 and Supplemental Notice, 
80 FR at 58378.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Collections of Information
    Rule 150.4(b)(2) requires qualified persons to file a notice in 
order to claim exemptive relief from aggregation. Further, rule 
150.4(b)(2)(ii) states that the notice is to be filed in accordance 
with rule 150.4(c), which requires a description of the relevant 
circumstances that warrant disaggregation and a statement that 
certifies that the conditions set forth in the exemptive provision have 
been met. Persons claiming these exemptions would be required to submit 
to the

[[Page 91489]]

Commission, as requested, such information as relates to the claim for 
exemption. An updated or amended notice must be filed with the 
Commission upon any material change.
    The final rule also extends relief available under rule 150.4(b)(4) 
to additional entities; so the Commission expects that, as a result of 
the expanded exemptive relief available to these entities, a greater 
number of persons will file exemptive notices under 150.4(b)(4). The 
Commission also expects entities to file for relief under rule 
150.4(b)(7), which allows for entities to file a notice, including a 
memorandum of law, in order to claim the exemption.
    Given the expansion of the exemptions that market participants may 
claim, the Commission anticipates an increase in the number of notice 
filings. However, because of the relief for ``higher-tier'' entities 
under rule 150.4(b)(8) the Commission expects that increase to be 
offset partially by a reduction in the number of filings by ``higher-
tier'' entities. Thus, the Commission anticipates a net increase in the 
number of filings under regulation 150.4 as a result of the adoption of 
these final rules. The Commission believes that this increase will 
create an increase in the annual labor burden. However, because 
entities have already incurred the capital, start-up, operating, and 
maintenance costs to file other exemptive notices--such as those 
currently allowed for independent account controllers and futures 
commission merchants under regulation 150.4--the Commission does not 
anticipate an increase in those costs.
    In the Supplemental Notice, the Commission estimated that 100 
entities will each file two notices annually, and 25 entities will each 
file one notice annually,\348\ under proposed rule 150.4(b)(2), at an 
average of 20 hours per filing. Thus, the Commission approximated a 
total per entity average burden of 36 labor hours annually.\349\ At an 
estimated labor cost of $120 per hour, the Commission estimated a cost 
of approximately $4,320 per entity on average for filings under rule 
150.4(b)(2). For this final rule, while the Commission maintains its 
estimates of the number of entities and number of filings, its update 
of the estimated labor cost to $160 per hour, as noted above, increases 
the estimated cost to approximately $5,760 per entity on average for 
filings under rule 150.4(b)(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \348\ The Commission's estimate that 25 entities will each file 
one notice annually reflected those entities which had been 
estimated to each file one notice annually under proposed rule 
150.4(b)(3), which the Commission is not adopting. Therefore, the 
Commission estimated that each of these 25 entities would file one 
notice annually under rule 150.4(b)(2), in place of the assumed 
filing under proposed rule 150.4(b)(3). See Supplemental Notice, 80 
FR at 58378.
    \349\ That is, the Commission estimated that a total of 225 
filings would be made each year. At 20 hours per filing, the total 
burden would be 4,500 labor hours, which divided among the 125 
entities results in an average burden of 36 labor hours per entity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As in the Proposed Rule and the Supplemental Notice, the Commission 
estimates that 75 entities will each file one notice annually under 
rule 150.4(b)(4) (proposed paragraph (b)(5)), at an average of 10 hours 
per filing. Thus, the Commission approximates a total per entity burden 
of 10 labor hours annually. At an estimated labor cost of $160 per 
hour, the Commission estimates a cost of approximately $1,600 per 
entity for filings under rule 150.4(b)(4).
    And, again as in the Proposed Rule and the Supplemental Notice, the 
Commission estimates that 40 entities will each file one notice 
annually under rule 150.4(b)(7) (proposed paragraph (b)(8)), including 
the requisite memorandum of law, at an average of 40 hours per filing. 
Thus, the Commission approximates a total per entity burden of 40 labor 
hours annually. At an estimated labor cost of $160 per hour, the 
Commission estimates a cost of approximately $6,400 per entity for 
filings under rule 150.4(b)(7).
    In sum, the Commission estimates that 240 entities will submit a 
total of 340 responses per year and incur a total burden of 6,850 labor 
hours. At the updated cost of $160 per hour, this results in a cost of 
approximately $1,096,000 annually in order to claim exemptive relief 
under rule 150.4.

List of Subjects in 17 CFR Part 150

    Position limits, Bona fide hedging, Referenced contracts.

    For the reasons discussed in the preamble, the Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission amends 17 CFR part 150 as follows:

PART 150--LIMITS ON POSITIONS

0
1. The authority citation for part 150 is revised to read as follows:

    Authority: 7 U.S.C. 6a, 6c, and 12a(5), as amended by Title VII 
of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 
Pub. L. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).


0
2. In Sec.  150.1, revise paragraphs (d), (e)(2), and (e)(5) to read as 
follows:


Sec.  150.1   Definitions.

* * * * *
    (d) Eligible entity means a commodity pool operator; the operator 
of a trading vehicle which is excluded, or which itself has qualified 
for exclusion from the definition of the term ``pool'' or ``commodity 
pool operator,'' respectively, under Sec.  4.5 of this chapter; the 
limited partner, limited member or shareholder in a commodity pool the 
operator of which is exempt from registration under Sec.  4.13 of this 
chapter; a commodity trading advisor; a bank or trust company; a 
savings association; an insurance company; or the separately organized 
affiliates of any of the above entities:
    (1) Which authorizes an independent account controller 
independently to control all trading decisions with respect to the 
eligible entity's client positions and accounts that the independent 
account controller holds directly or indirectly, or on the eligible 
entity's behalf, but without the eligible entity's day-to-day 
direction; and
    (2) Which maintains:
    (i) Only such minimum control over the independent account 
controller as is consistent with its fiduciary responsibilities to the 
managed positions and accounts, and necessary to fulfill its duty to 
supervise diligently the trading done on its behalf; or
    (ii) If a limited partner, limited member or shareholder of a 
commodity pool the operator of which is exempt from registration under 
Sec.  4.13 of this chapter, only such limited control as is consistent 
with its status.
    (e) * * *
    (2) Over whose trading the eligible entity maintains only such 
minimum control as is consistent with its fiduciary responsibilities 
for managed positions and accounts to fulfill its duty to supervise 
diligently the trading done on its behalf or as is consistent with such 
other legal rights or obligations which may be incumbent upon the 
eligible entity to fulfill;
* * * * *
    (5) Who is:
    (i) Registered as a futures commission merchant, an introducing 
broker, a commodity trading advisor, or an associated person of any 
such registrant, or
    (ii) A general partner, managing member or manager of a commodity 
pool the operator of which is excluded from registration under Sec.  
4.5(a)(4) of this chapter or Sec.  4.13 of this chapter, provided that 
such general partner, managing member or manager complies with the 
requirements of Sec.  150.4(c).
* * * * *


Sec.  150.3  [Amended]

0
3. Amend Sec.  150.3 as follows:

[[Page 91490]]

0
a. Remove the semicolon and the word ``or'' at the end of paragraph 
(a)(3) and add a period in their place; and
0
b. Remove paragraph (a)(4).

0
4. Revise Sec.  150.4 to read as follows:


Sec.  150.4   Aggregation of positions.

    (a) Positions to be aggregated--(1) Trading control or 10 percent 
or greater ownership or equity interest. For the purpose of applying 
the position limits set forth in Sec.  150.2, unless an exemption set 
forth in paragraph (b) of this section applies, all positions in 
accounts for which any person, by power of attorney or otherwise, 
directly or indirectly controls trading or holds a 10 percent or 
greater ownership or equity interest must be aggregated with the 
positions held and trading done by such person. For the purpose of 
determining the positions in accounts for which any person controls 
trading or holds a 10 percent or greater ownership or equity interest, 
positions or ownership or equity interests held by, and trading done or 
controlled by, two or more persons acting pursuant to an expressed or 
implied agreement or understanding shall be treated the same as if the 
positions or ownership or equity interests were held by, or the trading 
were done or controlled by, a single person.
    (2) Substantially identical trading. Notwithstanding the provisions 
of paragraph (b) of this section, for the purpose of applying the 
position limits set forth in Sec.  150.2, any person that, by power of 
attorney or otherwise, holds or controls the trading of positions in 
more than one account or pool with substantially identical trading 
strategies, must aggregate all such positions (determined pro rata) 
with all other positions held and trading done by such person and the 
positions in accounts which the person must aggregate pursuant to 
paragraph (a)(1) of this section.
    (b) Exemptions from aggregation. For the purpose of applying the 
position limits set forth in Sec.  150.2, and notwithstanding the 
provisions of paragraph (a)(1) of this section, but subject to the 
provisions of paragraph (a)(2) of this section, the aggregation 
requirements of this section shall not apply in the circumstances set 
forth in this paragraph (b).
    (1) Exemption for ownership by limited partners, shareholders or 
other pool participants. Any person that is a limited partner, limited 
member, shareholder or other similar type of pool participant holding 
positions in which the person by power of attorney or otherwise 
directly or indirectly has a 10 percent or greater ownership or equity 
interest in a pooled account or positions need not aggregate the 
accounts or positions of the pool with any other accounts or positions 
such person is required to aggregate, except that such person must 
aggregate the pooled account or positions with all other accounts or 
positions owned or controlled by such person if such person:
    (i) Is the commodity pool operator of the pooled account;
    (ii) Is a principal or affiliate of the operator of the pooled 
account, unless:
    (A) The pool operator has, and enforces, written procedures to 
preclude the person from having knowledge of, gaining access to, or 
receiving data about the trading or positions of the pool;
    (B) The person does not have direct, day-to-day supervisory 
authority or control over the pool's trading decisions;
    (C) The person, if a principal of the operator of the pooled 
account, maintains only such minimum control over the commodity pool 
operator as is consistent with its responsibilities as a principal and 
necessary to fulfill its duty to supervise the trading activities of 
the commodity pool; and
    (D) The pool operator has complied with the requirements of 
paragraph (c) of this section on behalf of the person or class of 
persons; or
    (iii) Has, by power of attorney or otherwise directly or 
indirectly, a 25 percent or greater ownership or equity interest in a 
commodity pool, the operator of which is exempt from registration under 
Sec.  4.13 of this chapter.
    (2) Exemption for certain ownership of greater than 10 percent in 
an owned entity. Any person with an ownership or equity interest in an 
owned entity of 10 percent or greater (other than an interest in a 
pooled account subject to paragraph (b)(1) of this section), need not 
aggregate the accounts or positions of the owned entity with any other 
accounts or positions such person is required to aggregate, provided 
that:
    (i) Such person, including any entity that such person must 
aggregate, and the owned entity (to the extent that such person is 
aware or should be aware of the activities and practices of the 
aggregated entity or the owned entity):
    (A) Do not have knowledge of the trading decisions of the other;
    (B) Trade pursuant to separately developed and independent trading 
systems;
    (C) Have and enforce written procedures to preclude each from 
having knowledge of, gaining access to, or receiving data about, trades 
of the other. Such procedures must include security arrangements, 
including separate physical locations, which would maintain the 
independence of their activities;
    (D) Do not share employees that control the trading decisions of 
either; and
    (E) Do not have risk management systems that permit the sharing of 
its trades or its trading strategy with employees that control the 
trading decisions of the other; and
    (ii) Such person complies with the requirements of paragraph (c) of 
this section.
    (3) Exemption for accounts held by futures commission merchants. A 
futures commission merchant or any affiliate of a futures commission 
merchant need not aggregate positions it holds in a discretionary 
account, or in an account which is part of, or participates in, or 
receives trading advice from a customer trading program of a futures 
commission merchant or any of the officers, partners, or employees of 
such futures commission merchant or of its affiliates, if:
    (i) A person other than the futures commission merchant or the 
affiliate directs trading in such an account;
    (ii) The futures commission merchant or the affiliate maintains 
only such minimum control over the trading in such an account as is 
necessary to fulfill its duty to supervise diligently trading in the 
account;
    (iii) Each trading decision of the discretionary account or the 
customer trading program is determined independently of all trading 
decisions in other accounts which the futures commission merchant or 
the affiliate holds, has a financial interest of 10 percent or more in, 
or controls; and
    (iv) The futures commission merchant or the affiliate has complied 
with the requirements of paragraph (c) of this section.
    (4) Exemption for accounts carried by an independent account 
controller. An eligible entity need not aggregate its positions with 
the eligible entity's client positions or accounts carried by an 
authorized independent account controller, as defined in Sec.  
150.1(e), except for the spot month in physical-delivery commodity 
contracts, provided that the eligible entity has complied with the 
requirements of paragraph (c) of this section, and that the overall 
positions held or controlled by such independent account controller may 
not exceed the limits specified in Sec.  150.2.
    (i) Additional requirements for exemption of affiliated entities. 
If the independent account controller is affiliated with the eligible 
entity or

[[Page 91491]]

another independent account controller, each of the affiliated entities 
must:
    (A) Have, and enforce, written procedures to preclude the 
affiliated entities from having knowledge of, gaining access to, or 
receiving data about, trades of the other. Such procedures must include 
security arrangements, including separate physical locations, which 
would maintain the independence of their activities; provided, however, 
that such procedures may provide for the disclosure of information 
which is reasonably necessary for an eligible entity to maintain the 
level of control consistent with its fiduciary responsibilities to the 
managed positions and accounts and necessary to fulfill its duty to 
supervise diligently the trading done on its behalf;
    (B) Trade such accounts pursuant to separately developed and 
independent trading systems;
    (C) Market such trading systems separately; and
    (D) Solicit funds for such trading by separate disclosure documents 
that meet the standards of Sec.  4.24 or Sec.  4.34 of this chapter, as 
applicable, where such disclosure documents are required under part 4 
of this chapter.
    (ii) [Reserved].
    (5) Exemption for underwriting. A person need not aggregate the 
positions or accounts of an owned entity if the ownership or equity 
interest is based on the ownership of securities constituting the whole 
or a part of an unsold allotment to or subscription by such person as a 
participant in the distribution of such securities by the issuer or by 
or through an underwriter.
    (6) Exemption for broker-dealer activity. A broker-dealer 
registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission, or similarly 
registered with a foreign regulatory authority, need not aggregate the 
positions or accounts of an owned entity if the ownership or equity 
interest is based on the ownership of securities acquired in the normal 
course of business as a dealer, provided that such person does not have 
actual knowledge of the trading decisions of the owned entity.
    (7) Exemption for information sharing restriction. A person need 
not aggregate the positions or accounts of an owned entity if the 
sharing of information associated with such aggregation (such as, only 
by way of example, information reflecting the transactions and 
positions of a such person and the owned entity) creates a reasonable 
risk that either person could violate state or federal law or the law 
of a foreign jurisdiction, or regulations adopted thereunder, provided 
that such person does not have actual knowledge of information 
associated with such aggregation, and provided further that such person 
has filed a prior notice pursuant to paragraph (c) of this section and 
included with such notice a written memorandum of law explaining in 
detail the basis for the conclusion that the sharing of information 
creates a reasonable risk that either person could violate state or 
federal law or the law of a foreign jurisdiction, or regulations 
adopted thereunder. However, the exemption in this paragraph shall not 
apply where the law or regulation serves as a means to evade the 
aggregation of accounts or positions. All documents submitted pursuant 
to this paragraph shall be in English, or if not, accompanied by an 
official English translation.
    (8) Exemption for affiliated entities. After a person has filed a 
notice under paragraph (c) of this section, another person need not 
file a separate notice identifying any position or account identified 
in such notice filing, provided that:
    (i) Such other person has an ownership or equity interest of 10 
percent or greater in the person that filed the notice, or the person 
that filed the notice has an ownership or equity interest of 10 percent 
or greater in such other person, or an ownership or equity interest of 
10 percent or greater is held in such other person by a third person 
who holds an ownership or equity interest of 10 percent or greater in 
the person that has filed the notice (in any such case, the ownership 
or equity interest may be held directly or indirectly);
    (ii) Such other person complies with the conditions applicable to 
the exemption specified in such notice filing, other than the filing 
requirements; and
    (iii) Such other person does not otherwise control trading of any 
account or position identified in such notice filing.
    (iv) Upon call by the Commission, any person relying on the 
exemption in this paragraph (b)(8) shall provide to the Commission such 
information concerning the person's claim for exemption. Upon notice 
and opportunity for the affected person to respond, the Commission may 
amend, suspend, terminate, or otherwise modify a person's aggregation 
exemption for failure to comply with the provisions of this section.
    (c) Notice filing for exemption. (1) Persons seeking an aggregation 
exemption under paragraph (b)(1)(ii), (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(4), or (b)(7) 
of this section shall file a notice with the Commission, which shall be 
effective upon submission of the notice (or earlier, as provided in 
paragraph (c)(2) of this section), and shall include:
    (i) A description of the relevant circumstances that warrant 
disaggregation; and
    (ii) A statement of a senior officer of the entity certifying that 
the conditions set forth in the applicable aggregation exemption 
provision have been met.
    (2) If a person newly acquires an ownership or equity interest in 
an owned entity of 10 percent or greater and is eligible for the 
aggregation exemption under paragraph (b)(2) of this section, the 
person may elect that a notice filed under this paragraph (c) shall be 
effective as of the date of such acquisition if such notice is filed no 
later than 60 days after such acquisition.
    (3) Upon call by the Commission, any person claiming an aggregation 
exemption under this section shall provide such information 
demonstrating that the person meets the requirements of the exemption, 
as is requested by the Commission. Upon notice and opportunity for the 
affected person to respond, the Commission may amend, suspend, 
terminate, or otherwise modify a person's aggregation exemption for 
failure to comply with the provisions of this section.
    (4) In the event of a material change to the information provided 
in any notice filed under this paragraph (c), an updated or amended 
notice shall promptly be filed detailing the material change.
    (5) Any notice filed under this paragraph (c) shall be submitted in 
the form and manner provided for in paragraph (d) of this section.
    (6) If a person is eligible for an aggregation exemption under 
paragraph (b)(1)(ii), (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(4), or (b)(7) of this 
section, a failure to timely file a notice under this paragraph (c) 
shall not constitute a violation of paragraph (a)(1) of this section or 
any position limit set forth in Sec.  150.2 if such notice is filed no 
later than five business days after the person is aware, or should be 
aware, that such notice has not been timely filed.
    (d) Form and manner of reporting and submitting information or 
filings. Unless otherwise instructed by the Commission or its 
designees, any person submitting reports under this section shall 
submit the corresponding required filings and any other information 
required under this part to the Commission using the format, coding 
structure, and electronic data transmission procedures approved in 
writing by the Commission. Unless otherwise provided in this section, 
the notice shall be effective upon filing.

[[Page 91492]]

When the reporting entity discovers errors or omissions to past 
reports, the entity shall so notify the Commission and file corrected 
information in a form and manner and at a time as may be instructed by 
the Commission or its designee.
    (e) Delegation of authority to the Director of the Division of 
Market Oversight. (1) The Commission hereby delegates, until it orders 
otherwise, to the Director of the Division of Market Oversight or such 
other employee or employees as the Director may designate from time to 
time, the authority:
    (i) In paragraph (b)(8)(iv) of this section to call for additional 
information from a person claiming the exemption in paragraph (b)(8) of 
this section.
    (ii) In paragraph (c)(3) of this section to call for additional 
information from a person claiming an aggregation exemption under this 
section.
    (iii) In paragraph (d) of this section for providing instructions 
or determining the format, coding structure, and electronic data 
transmission procedures for submitting data records and any other 
information required under this part.
    (2) The Director of the Division of Market Oversight may submit to 
the Commission for its consideration any matter which has been 
delegated in this section.
    (3) Nothing in this section prohibits the Commission, at its 
election, from exercising the authority delegated in this section.

    Issued in Washington, DC, on December 6, 2016, by the 
Commission.
Christopher J. Kirkpatrick,
Secretary of the Commission.

    Note: The following appendix will not appear in the Code of 
Federal Regulations.

Appendix to Aggregation of Positions--Commission Voting Summary

    On this matter, Chairman Massad and Commissioners Bowen and 
Giancarlo voted in the affirmative. No Commissioner voted in the 
negative.

[FR Doc. 2016-29582 Filed 12-15-16; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6351-01-P