[Federal Register Volume 81, Number 240 (Wednesday, December 14, 2016)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 90229-90240]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2016-29902]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SURFACE TRANSPORTATION BOARD

49 CFR Part 1122

[Docket No. EP 731]


Rules Relating to Board-Initiated Investigations

AGENCY: Surface Transportation Board.

ACTION: Final rules.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The Surface Transportation Board (Board or STB) is adopting 
final rules for investigations conducted on the Board's own initiative 
pursuant to Section 12 of the Surface Transportation Board 
Reauthorization Act of 2015.

DATES: These rules are effective on January 13, 2017.

ADDRESSES: Information or questions regarding these final rules should 
reference Docket No. EP 731 and be in writing addressed to Chief, 
Section of Administration, Office of Proceedings, Surface 
Transportation Board, 395 E Street SW., Washington, DC 20423-0001.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Scott M. Zimmerman at (202) 245-0386. 
[Assistance for the hearing impaired is available through the Federal 
Information Relay Service (FIRS) at 1-800-877-8339.]

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Section 12 of the Surface Transportation 
Board Reauthorization Act of 2015, Public Law 114-110, 129 Stat. 2228 
(2015) (STB Reauthorization Act or Act) (see 49 U.S.C. 11701) 
authorizes the Board to investigate, on its own initiative, issues that 
are ``of national or regional significance'' and are subject to the 
Board's jurisdiction under 49 U.S.C. Subtitle IV, Part A. Under Section 
12, the Board must issue rules implementing this investigative 
authority not later than one year after the date of enactment of the 
STB Reauthorization Act (by December 18, 2016).
    By decision served on May 16, 2016, the Board issued a Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) in which the Board proposed rules for 
investigations conducted on the Board's own initiative pursuant to 
Section 12 of the STB Reauthorization Act. The proposed rules were 
published in the Federal Register, 81 FR 30,510 (May 17, 2016), and 
comments were submitted in response to the NPRM.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ The Board received comments and replies from the following: 
Association of American Railroads (AAR); City of Jersey City, Rails 
to Trails Conservancy (Jersey City) (comments only); National Grain 
and Feed Association (NGFA); The National Industrial Transportation 
League (NITL) (comments only); Norfolk Southern Railway Company 
(NSR); and SMART/Transportation Division, New York State Legislative 
Board (SMART/TD-NY).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    After consideration of parties' comments, the Board is adopting 
final rules, to be set forth at 49 CFR part 1122, that establish the 
procedures for Board investigations conducted pursuant to Section 12 of 
the STB Reauthorization Act. These final rules do not apply to other 
types of investigations that the Board may conduct.

Introduction

    The STB Reauthorization Act provides a basic framework for 
conducting investigations on the Board's own initiative, as follows:
    Within 30 days after initiating an investigation, the Board must 
provide notice to parties under investigation stating the basis for 
such investigation. The Board may only investigate issues that are of 
national or regional significance. Parties under investigation have a 
right to file a written statement describing all or any facts and 
circumstances concerning a matter under investigation. The Board should 
separate the investigative and decisionmaking functions of Board staff 
to the extent practicable.
    Investigations must be dismissed if they are not concluded with 
administrative finality within one year after commencement.\2\ In any 
such investigation, Board staff must make available to the parties 
under investigation and the Board Members any recommendations made as a 
result of the investigation and a summary of the findings that support 
such recommendations. Within 90 days of receiving the recommendations 
and summary of findings, the Board must either dismiss the 
investigation if no further action is warranted, or initiate a 
proceeding to determine whether a provision of 49 U.S.C. Subtitle IV, 
Part A has been violated. Any remedy that the Board may order as a 
result of such a proceeding may only be applied prospectively.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \2\ The one-year deadline for investigations conducted on the 
Board's own initiative does not include any Board proceeding 
conducted subsequent to the investigation. S. Rep. No. 114-52, at 13 
(2015).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The STB Reauthorization Act further requires that the rules issued 
under Section 12 comply with the requirements of 49 U.S.C. 11701(d) (as 
amended by the STB Reauthorization Act), satisfy due process 
requirements, and take into account ex parte constraints.

Discussion of Issues Raised in Response to the NPRM

    In the NPRM, the Board proposed a three-stage process, consisting 
of (1) Preliminary Fact-Finding, (2) Board-Initiated Investigations, 
and (3) Formal Board Proceedings. Having considered the comments, the 
Board will adopt this three-stage process in the final rules, subject 
to certain modifications from what was proposed in the NPRM. Below we 
address the comments received in response to the NPRM pertaining to 
each stage, as well as other related issues, and the Board's responses, 
including modifications from the NPRM. The final rules are below.

A. Preliminary Fact-Finding

    As proposed in the NPRM, Preliminary Fact-Finding refers to the 
process in which Board staff would conduct, at their discretion, an 
initial, informal, nonpublic inquiry regarding an issue. The purpose of 
the Preliminary Fact-Finding would be to determine if there is enough 
information to warrant

[[Page 90230]]

a request for authorization to open a Board-Initiated Investigation 
into whether there may be a potential violation of 49 U.S.C. Subtitle 
IV, Part A, of national or regional significance. In this section, we 
address parties' comments on (1) whether the Board should adopt a time 
limit for Preliminary Fact-Finding, (2) whether Preliminary Fact-
Finding should be confidential, (3) how the Board should decide to 
commence Preliminary Fact-Finding, and (4) fact-gathering.
    Time Limit for Preliminary Fact-Finding. In the NPRM, the Board did 
not impose a time limit on Preliminary Fact-Finding. Because Board 
staff would be solely determining whether a matter merits seeking 
authorization to pursue a Board-Initiated Investigation, and would not 
be able to issue subpoenas to compel testimony or the production of 
information or documents, the Board does not consider this stage to be 
part of the one-year period for an investigation. Some commenters, 
however, contend that the statutorily-mandated one-year time limit for 
investigations should include Preliminary Fact-Finding. Other 
commenters disagree with including Preliminary Fact-Finding in the 
statutorily-mandated one-year time limit for investigations, arguing 
that the Board should instead impose a ``reasonable time limit'' on 
Preliminary Fact-Finding.
    In particular, AAR asserts that the one-year time limit for 
investigations should apply to Preliminary Fact-Finding because an 
``open-ended, limitless Preliminary Fact-Finding phase'' would 
undermine the ``purpose of the statutory scheme'' and would force 
parties to ``endure the burdens and uncertainty of an open-ended 
inquiry that could last for years.'' \3\ (AAR Comment 4.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \3\ AAR, however, supports the Board's proposal to have a 
Preliminary Fact-Finding phase preceding Board-Initiated 
Investigations, stating that ``providing for a Preliminary Fact-
Finding phase makes practical sense and should be maintained in the 
final rules.'' (AAR Comment 5.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    NSR asserts two arguments in support of including Preliminary Fact-
Finding in the one-year time limit. First, NSR states that the plain 
language of the statute ``expressly provides that the Board has one 
year to conclude any `investigation' with administrative finality.'' 
Therefore, the Board's proposed ``Preliminary Fact-Finding phase is a 
blatant attempt to buy itself more time to conduct an investigation 
than afforded'' by Section 12 of the STB Reauthorization Act. (NSR 
Comment 5.) Second, NSR argues that Preliminary Fact-Finding should be 
included in the statutorily-mandated one-year time limit so that the 
Board's proposed investigatory process is subject to ``durational 
restraints'' in accordance with other agencies' best practices. 
According to NSR, ``other administrative agencies do not permit 
indefinite `pre-investigation' phases'' and the Securities Exchange 
Commission requires that its ``pre-investigation'' phase, called 
``Matters Under Inquiry,'' be completed within 60 days. (NSR Comment 5-
6.)
    NGFA and NITL disagree with including Preliminary Fact-Finding in 
the statutorily-mandated one-year time limit for investigations, but 
argue that the Board should instead impose a reasonable time limit on 
Preliminary Fact-Finding. NGFA supports the Board imposing a time limit 
of 60 days. (NGFA Reply 5.) NITL supports a 45-day deadline for 
Preliminary Fact-Finding. (NITL Comment 2.)
    SMART-TD argues that ``there is always `preliminary' work'' before 
an ``official'' agency action and, therefore, the Board should delete 
the provision for Preliminary Fact-Finding from the final rules. 
(SMART-TD Comment 11.)
    Although 49 U.S.C. 11701 requires that the Board dismiss any 
investigation that is not concluded with administrative finality within 
one year, Preliminary Fact-Finding does not constitute part of an 
investigation; rather, it is the Board's informal process of 
determining whether an investigation should be commenced. The Board 
must have a mechanism to gather information on a preliminary basis to 
determine whether an investigation is warranted. The Preliminary Fact-
Finding period is intended to allow the Board to dismiss unfounded 
complaints without unnecessarily expending limited Board or party 
resources. This approach is in the best interest of our stakeholders, 
as the Board would be able to more effectively allocate its resources 
to only investigate potential violations of sufficient gravity to 
warrant Board action. This approach would also alleviate the burden on 
parties potentially subject to Board-Initiated Investigations by 
limiting such investigations only to situations where, in the Board's 
discretion, investigation into a matter of national or regional 
significance is warranted. Although SMART-TD argues that the Board 
should delete the concept of Preliminary Fact-Finding from the rules 
and merely conduct any such preliminary work without making it an 
official part of the process, the Board finds that it is in the public 
interest that our regulations notify stakeholders of the existence of 
this stage. Accordingly, in the interest of transparency, the Board 
will not delete this provision from the regulations.
    Although there is no limitation in the statute as to how long 
Preliminary Fact-Finding should occur, the Board understands the 
concern from the parties that the Board not allow the Preliminary Fact-
Finding phase to continue ``indefinitely.'' The final rules, 
accordingly, require that Preliminary Fact-Finding be concluded within 
a reasonable period of time. As a matter of policy, we determine ``a 
reasonable period of time'' to be approximately 60 days from the date 
the Board notifies the party subject to Preliminary Fact-Finding that 
Preliminary-Fact Finding has commenced. See 49 CFR 1122.5(a).
    Confidentiality. The NPRM proposed that Preliminary Fact-Finding 
generally would be nonpublic and confidential, subject to certain 
exceptions. Several commenters oppose this proposal and request that 
all of, or certain parts of, Preliminary Fact-Finding be made public.
    Jersey City requests that the Board publish notice of commencement 
of Preliminary Fact-Finding in the Federal Register, make information 
submitted by parties during Preliminary Fact-Finding publicly 
available, and publish Board staff's findings from Preliminary Fact-
Finding so that third parties may comment on such information. (Jersey 
City Comment 13.) NITL asks that the Board publish notice of 
commencement of Preliminary Fact-Finding--which should include a ``high 
level summary'' of the issue being investigated--as well as Board 
staff's conclusions from Preliminary Fact-Finding. (NITL Comment 2.) 
Similarly, NGFA asks that the Board publish on its Web site, or in the 
Federal Register, a description of any issues subject to Preliminary 
Fact-Finding, and the outcomes of such inquiries, with any sensitive 
information such as party names redacted. (NGFA Comment 6; NGFA Reply 
3.)
    AAR opposes making Preliminary Fact-Finding public, stating that to 
do so would make parties ``reluctant to volunteer information'' and 
subject to ``unwarranted reputational damage or other harm.'' (See AAR 
Reply 1-2, 4.) Moreover, AAR states that a publicly available 
description of an issue subject to Preliminary Fact-Finding, even one 
in which sensitive information is redacted, would be insufficient to 
protect a railroad's identity given the nature of the industry. (AAR 
Reply 4-5.) AAR further notes that shippers' justifications for making 
Preliminary Fact-Finding public--namely, transparency and public 
participation--could be satisfied

[[Page 90231]]

during a Formal Board Proceeding, if one were opened. (AAR Reply 2.)
    The Board will adopt the proposal in the NPRM to keep the 
Preliminary Fact-Finding confidential, subject to certain limited 
exceptions (discussed below). Having considered the parties' arguments, 
we are not convinced the potential benefits of making Preliminary Fact-
Finding public outweigh the risks. During Preliminary Fact-Finding, 
Board staff would only be ascertaining whether a matter warrants an 
investigation by the Board. Preliminary Fact-Finding would not be a 
formal, evidence-gathering process, and, if the Board were to make 
Preliminary Fact-Finding public, parties subject to Preliminary Fact-
Finding could possibly be subject to unwarranted reputational damage or 
other harm. NGFA suggests that concerns about confidentiality could be 
avoided by redacting the parties' names, but even a general description 
of the issues subject to Preliminary Fact-Finding might effectively 
disclose the identity of involved parties, regardless of whether the 
name(s) of the parties were redacted. Therefore, the final rules 
presume that Preliminary Fact-Finding would be nonpublic and 
confidential, unless the Board otherwise finds it necessary to make 
certain information related to, or the fact of, Preliminary Fact-
Finding public.
    As previously proposed in the NPRM, the final rules would continue 
to allow the Board to make aspects of Preliminary Fact-Finding public. 
See section 1122.6(a)(1). In instances where the Board chooses to 
exercise this discretion, the Board would weigh, on a case-by-case 
basis, potential harm to innocent parties, markets, or the integrity of 
the inquiry and subsequent investigation. However, because of the risks 
associated with making Preliminary Fact-Finding public, we will not 
adopt a mechanism through which a party may request that Preliminary 
Fact-Finding be made public pursuant to section 1122.6(a)(1). The same 
reasoning applies to confidentiality of Board-Initiated Investigations, 
as discussed later.
    Commencement. The NPRM proposed that Board staff would commence 
Preliminary Fact-Finding, at its discretion, to determine if an alleged 
violation could be of national or regional significance and subject to 
the Board's jurisdiction under 49 U.S.C. Subtitle IV, Part A, and 
warrant a Board-Initiated Investigation. AAR proposes three 
modifications to the Board's regulations. We discuss each in turn.
    First, AAR asserts that the Board or the Director of the Office of 
Proceedings, as opposed to Board staff, should approve commencement of 
Preliminary Fact-Finding, ``given the potentially significant 
consequences on regulated parties'' from Preliminary Fact-Finding, or 
from a Board-Initiated Investigation or Formal Board Proceeding opened 
as a result of Preliminary Fact-Finding. (AAR Comment 6.) We decline to 
incorporate the suggestion that the Board or the Director of the Office 
of Proceedings should approve commencement of Preliminary Fact-Finding. 
The Board must gather information concerning potentially qualifying 
violations to determine whether it should commence a Board-Initiated 
Investigation. For the reasons discussed earlier,\4\ such activities 
are informal and preliminary, and, thus, we find that the initiation of 
Preliminary Fact-Finding does not merit a formal Board action or 
finding, although the Board would be aware of the commencement of 
Preliminary Fact-Finding.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \4\ See supra Part A: Time Limit for Preliminary Fact-Finding.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Second, AAR suggests that the Board should notify parties subject 
to Preliminary Fact-Finding that Preliminary Fact-Finding has 
commenced. AAR argues that, without such notice, railroads may not be 
willing to coordinate and share information with the Board's Office of 
Public Assistance, Governmental Affairs, and Compliance (OPAGAC) out of 
concern that such information could be used by Board staff in 
Preliminary Fact-Finding against them. (AAR Comment 7-8.) To address 
AAR's concerns regarding OPAGAC, we are modifying section 1122.3 to 
include a requirement that Board staff notify parties subject to 
Preliminary Fact-Finding that Preliminary Fact-Finding has commenced. 
See section 1122.3 (stating that ``Board staff shall inform the subject 
of Preliminary Fact-Finding that Preliminary Fact-Finding has 
commenced''). The Board finds that it is necessary to maintain railroad 
confidence in OPAGAC, as OPAGAC's Rail Customer and Public Assistance 
Program (RCPA) provides a valuable informal venue for the private-
sector resolution of shipper-railroad disputes, and, without railroad 
participation, RCPA would be less effective at facilitating 
communication among the various segments of the rail-transportation 
industry and encouraging the resolution of rail-shipper operational or 
service issues. Thus, the final rules incorporate AAR's request that 
the Board provide notice to parties subject to Preliminary Fact-Finding 
that Preliminary Fact-Finding has commenced.
    Third, AAR argues that section 1122.3 should use the terminology 
``warranted'' or ``not warranted'' (instead of ``appropriate'' or ``not 
appropriate''), as both the NPRM's preamble and the statute use the 
word ``warranted.'' (AAR Comment 9 n.3.) The final rules incorporate 
this suggestion, adopting the terminology of ``warranted'' or ``not 
warranted,'' instead of ``appropriate'' or ``not appropriate.'' See 49 
CFR 1122.3.
    Fact Gathering. The NPRM proposed that, during Preliminary Fact-
Finding, Board staff could request that parties voluntarily provide 
testimony, information, or documents to assist in Board staff's 
informal inquiry, but could not issue subpoenas to compel the 
submission of evidence. In response to this proposal, AAR, NITL, and 
NGFA suggest that certain clarifications are needed regarding the 
collection of information during Preliminary Fact-Finding. We address 
these comments below.
    AAR seeks clarification that (1) the production of documents during 
Preliminary Fact-Finding is voluntary, (2) the requirement to certify a 
production of documents applies to Preliminary Fact-Finding, (3) the 
Board retains its right to demand to inspect and copy any record of a 
rail carrier pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 11144(b) during Preliminary Fact-
Finding, and (4) the information submitted during Preliminary Fact-
Finding will be ``subject to disclosure in any subsequent Board-
Initiated Investigation on the same terms as other materials gathered 
during Board-Initiated Investigations.'' (AAR Comment 5, 7-8.)
    In response to AAR's comments, the Board provides the following 
clarifications. First, the production of documents during Preliminary 
Fact-Finding would be voluntary. See section 1122.9 (granting 
Investigating Officer(s) the right to compel the submission of evidence 
only in Board-Initiated Investigations). Second, parties that choose to 
voluntarily produce documents during Preliminary Fact-Finding would not 
be required to certify such productions. Whereas the NPRM proposed to 
require a producing party to submit a statement certifying that such 
person made a diligent search for responsive documents ``[w]hen 
producing documents under this part,'' the final rules at section 
1122.12(a) now limit that to ``[w]hen producing documents under section 
1122.4,'' the regulation governing Board-Initiated Investigations only. 
Third, as a matter of policy, the Board would not demand to inspect and 
copy any record--relating to

[[Page 90232]]

the subject of Preliminary Fact-Finding--of a rail carrier pursuant to 
49 U.S.C. 11144(b) during Preliminary Fact-Finding by Board staff. 
Finally, information submitted during Preliminary Fact-Finding would be 
subject to disclosure in any subsequent Board-Initiated Investigation 
on the same terms as materials gathered during Board-Initiated 
Investigations. This is provided for in the final rules at section 
1122.6, which states that all information and documents obtained under 
section 1122.3 (referring to Preliminary Fact-Finding) or section 
1122.4 (referring to Board-Initiated Investigations) whether or not 
obtained pursuant to a Board request or subpoena, shall be treated as 
nonpublic by the Board and its staff, subject to the exceptions 
described in section 1122.6(a)-(c).
    NITL and NGFA state that the Board should provide staff the 
``appropriate tools'' to obtain information needed during Preliminary 
Fact-Finding. (NITL Comment 2; NGFA Reply 5-6.) NGFA also suggests that 
the Board should adopt deadlines for a party subject to Preliminary 
Fact-Finding to submit evidence to the Board. (NGFA Reply 6.)
    The Board declines to give Board staff additional authority to 
obtain information during Preliminary Fact-Finding. As previously 
noted, Preliminary Fact-Finding is an initial, informal inquiry to 
determine whether a Board-Initiated Investigation is warranted. The 
Board, thus, has intentionally limited Board staff's authority to 
collect evidence in order to prevent undue burden on anyone. However, 
during Preliminary Fact-Finding, Board staff would be able to request 
that parties produce information and documents on a voluntary basis and 
request that any evidence submitted be provided by a certain deadline. 
Although Board staff would not be able to issue subpoenas to compel the 
production of evidence during Preliminary Fact-Finding, parties would 
have an incentive to provide information or documents to show that a 
Board-Initiated Investigation is not warranted. For these reasons, the 
Board declines to grant Board staff any further authority to obtain 
information during Preliminary Fact-Finding.

B. Board-Initiated Investigation

    As proposed in the NPRM, Board-Initiated Investigation refers to an 
investigation, conducted in accordance with Section 12 of the STB 
Reauthorization Act, to decide whether to recommend to the Board that 
it open a proceeding to determine if a violation of 49 U.S.C. Subtitle 
IV, Part A occurred. The NPRM stated that a Board-Initiated 
Investigation would begin with the Board issuing an Order of 
Investigation and providing a copy of the order to the parties under 
investigation within 30 days of issuance. The NPRM also provided that 
Board-Initiated Investigations would be nonpublic and confidential, 
subject to certain exceptions, to protect both the integrity of the 
process and the parties under investigation from any unwarranted 
reputational damage or other harm. Finally, the NPRM stated that 
parties who are not the subject of the investigation would not be able 
to intervene or participate as a matter of right in Board-Initiated 
Investigations.
    In this section, we address parties' comments on (1) the standard 
for opening a Board-Initiated Investigation, (2) the definition of 
``national or regional significance,'' (3) timing of providing the 
Order of Investigation to parties under investigation, (4) 
confidentiality of Board-Initiated Investigations, (5) parties' 
requests for the right to intervene in Board-Initiated Investigations, 
(6) railroads' request for access to exculpatory evidence, (7) parties' 
comments relating to the collection of information and documentation, 
and (8) the process for providing Board staff's recommendations and 
summary of findings to a party under investigation.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \5\ Jersey City requests the Board also address the 
``institutional structure, staffing, and resources'' it has related 
to investigations conducted pursuant to Section 12 of the STB 
Reauthorization Act. As this issue is not pertinent to the 
regulations, we decline to comment on internal Board staffing 
issues. (Jersey City Comment 7.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Standard for Opening a Board-Initiated Investigation. The NPRM 
stated that the Board could commence a Board-Initiated Investigation of 
any matter of national or regional significance that is subject to the 
jurisdiction of the Board under 49 U.S.C. Subtitle IV, Part A when it 
appears that the statute may have been violated. The NPRM further 
stated that, in instances where Preliminary Fact-Finding had been 
conducted,\6\ in order to seek authorization to commence a Board-
Initiated Investigation, Board staff would have to determine that (1) a 
violation of 49 U.S.C. Subtitle IV, Part A subject to the Board's 
jurisdiction may have occurred and (2) that the potential violation may 
be of national or regional significance warranting the opening of an 
investigation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \6\ NGFA asks the Board to change Sec.  1122.4 to clarify that 
Preliminary Fact-Finding is not required in order to commence a 
Board-Initiated Investigation. (NGFA Comment 7.) However, there was 
no requirement in the regulations that Preliminary Fact-Finding must 
precede a Board-Initiated Investigation, and the NPRM's preamble was 
clear that Preliminary Fact-Finding was not required in order to 
commence a Board-Initiated Investigation. We, therefore, decline to 
make this change to the final rules.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In comments, AAR asks the Board to clarify the standard for 
commencing a Board-Initiated Investigation and require that (1) ``the 
issue [be] of national or regional significance'' and (2) ``there [be] 
reasonable cause to believe that there may be a violation of 49 U.S.C. 
Subtitle IV, Part A.'' (AAR Comment 9-11.) (emphasis added.) Under 49 
U.S.C. 11701, however, the Board may begin an investigation of alleged 
violations of 49 U.S.C. Subtitle IV, Part A as long as the issue is of 
national or regional significance. As a result, AAR's proposal would 
require a higher standard for commencing a Board-Initiated 
Investigation than imposed by the statute--i.e., by requiring 
``reasonable cause to believe'' that a violation under 49 U.S.C. 
Subtitle IV, Part A occurred. Accordingly, we decline to adopt AAR's 
proposed standard and will maintain in the final rules the statutory 
standard, which provides that the Board may, in its discretion, 
commence a Board-Initiated Investigation of any matter of national or 
regional significance that is subject to the jurisdiction of the Board 
under 49 U.S.C. Subtitle IV, Part A. See section 1122.4.
    AAR further asks that the Board require that any Order of 
Investigation issued state that ``the matter at issue `is' of national 
or regional significance'' (instead of ``may be'' of national or 
regional significance). (AAR Comment 9.) Relatedly, NSR asks that the 
Board clarify that any issue subject to a Board-Initiated Investigation 
must ``remain of national or regional significance throughout the 
Board-Initiated Investigation and related Formal Board Proceeding.'' 
(NSR Comment 3.)
    The final rules will continue to require that an alleged violation 
subject to a Board-Initiated Investigation be of national or regional 
significance. See section 1122.4. Section 12 of the STB Reauthorization 
Act permits the Board to investigate issues that ``are of national or 
regional significance.'' We interpret this language to mean that an 
alleged violation of 49 U.S.C. Subtitle IV, Part A that is of national 
or regional significance upon commencement of the investigation may 
continue to be subject to Board-Initiated Investigation even if the 
conduct that created the alleged violation ceases. Similarly, conduct 
underlying an alleged violation does not have to be of ongoing national 
or regional significance so long as the Board determines that the 
alleged violation created an issue of national or regional significance 
at the time the

[[Page 90233]]

investigation was initiated. Otherwise, conduct that is capable of 
repetition could create future crises without redress. The final rules 
thus will adopt the language proposed in the NPRM. See section 1122.4.
    Definition of ``National or Regional Significance.'' In the NPRM, 
the Board did not define the phrase ``of national or regional 
significance.'' As a result, some commenters request that the Board 
define this phrase or provide examples of issues that would be 
considered of national or regional significance.
    In particular, AAR states that the Board should define ``national 
or regional significance'' as ``widespread and significant effects on 
transportation service or markets in a region or across the nation.'' 
AAR also asks that the Board clarify that issues of national or 
regional significance do not include individual rate disputes or 
disputes involving a single shipper. (AAR Comment 10.) Similarly, 
Jersey City states that the Board should define ``national or regional 
significance'' in order to avoid litigation on jurisdictional issues 
stemming from this phrase. (Jersey City Comment 11-12.)
    We decline to adopt a definition of ``national or regional 
significance.'' The Board finds that AAR's proposed definition does not 
provide significantly more insight than the phrase itself as to what 
constitutes a matter ``of national or regional significance.'' In 
addition, there is no need to expressly exclude rate disputes in these 
rules--such disputes are not subject to Board-Initiated Investigation 
under the statute (whether or not they are of national or regional 
significance). Section 11701(a) of Title 49 of the United States Code 
states that the Board may begin an investigation on its own initiative, 
``[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this part.'' Rate disputes are 
governed by 49 U.S.C. 10704, which specifically states that rate 
disputes may only be commenced ``on complaint.'' 49 U.S.C. 10704(b). 
Therefore, rate disputes fall outside the purview of the investigatory 
authority conferred to the Board under Section 12 of the STB 
Reauthorization Act.
    As to disputes involving a single shipper, the Board declines to 
adopt a blanket approach as to whether such issues are of national or 
regional significance. Such a determination would be fact-dependent and 
require the Board to make a determination based on the specific 
situation and various factors (such as the dispute's impact on national 
or regional rail traffic), which are discussed further below.
    NSR and NGFA also ask that the Board provide clarification related 
to the definition of ``national or regional significance.'' 
Specifically, NSR asks the Board to explain how it ``intends to apply 
the jurisdictional standard of `national or regional significance.' '' 
(NSR Comment 3.) NGFA requests that the Board ``provide a discussion of 
the types of rail practices or issues the Board would consider to be of 
national or regional significance.'' (NGFA Comment 3-4; NGFA Reply 6.)
    Under the final rules, the Board would apply the jurisdictional 
standard of national or regional significance on a case-by-case basis, 
considering, for instance, the extent of the impacts of the potential 
violation on national or regional rail traffic, customers, or third 
parties, or the geographic scope of the alleged violation. Examples of 
recent matters that the Board might consider to be of national or 
regional significance include (but are not limited to): Fertilizer 
shipment delays; rail car supply issues that impact grain shipments; or 
extensive congestion at strategic interchange points such as Chicago, 
Ill.
    Confidentiality. As with Preliminary Fact-Finding, the NPRM 
proposed that Board-Initiated Investigations generally would be 
nonpublic and confidential, subject to certain exceptions,\7\ in order 
to protect the integrity of the process and to protect parties under 
investigation from possibly unwarranted reputational damage or other 
harm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \7\ See Sec.  1122.6(a)-(c). See also infra note 10.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In comments, NGFA asks that the Board publish Orders of 
Investigation in the Federal Register or on the Board's Web site, so 
that third parties may request access to documents produced during a 
Board-Initiated Investigation, and NGFA and Jersey City ask the Board 
to inform the public as to the outcome of a Board-Initiated 
Investigation.\8\ (NGFA Comment 6-7.) Similarly, NITL asks that the 
Board make the Order of Investigation available to the public, and 
SMART-TD asks the Board to delete the ``automatic `nonpublic' 
process.'' (NITL Comment 3; SMART-TD Comment 11.) On reply, AAR opposes 
making Board-Initiated Investigations public for the same reasons it 
opposes making Preliminary Fact-Finding public.\9\ (AAR Reply 4-5.) For 
instance, AAR states that public disclosure of the subject of a Board-
Initiated Investigation could cause ``unwarranted reputational damage 
or other harm'' and that ``the threat of public disclosure w[ould] 
create the incentive to be less cooperative in the discovery process.'' 
(AAR Reply 4.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \8\ NGFA and Jersey City make the same request with respect to 
Preliminary Fact-Finding. (NGFA Comment 6-7; Jersey City Comment 
14.) NGFA further asks that the Order of Investigation identify a 
point of contact for Preliminary Fact-Finding and the Board-
Initiated Investigation and request from third parties information 
related to the issue being investigated. (NGFA Comment 6; NGFA Reply 
3.) NGFA states that Board could redact information identifying the 
party subject to the investigation. For the reasons provided above, 
the final rules maintain that Preliminary Fact-Finding and Board-
Initiated Investigations generally would be nonpublic and 
confidential, subject to the exceptions described in Sec.  
1122.6(a)-(c).
    \9\ See supra Part A: Confidentiality.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We find that the risks of making Board-Initiated Investigations 
public outweigh the potential benefits, absent extraordinary 
circumstances.\10\ If, after conducting a Board-Initiated 
Investigation, the Board believes that a Formal Board Proceeding should 
be commenced to determine if a qualifying violation occurred, the Board 
would open such a proceeding. At that time, any Formal Board Proceeding 
would be public, subject to the Board's existing rules protecting 
confidential information. See 49 CFR 1104.14. However, if the Board 
determines that no further action is warranted and therefore dismisses 
the Board-Initiated Investigation with no further action, the Board 
generally would seek to maintain the confidentiality of the party 
subject to the Board-Initiated Investigation, in order to prevent the 
party from being subject to any stigma that may be associated with 
having been investigated. For these reasons, the final rules maintain 
that Board-Initiated Investigations are presumptively nonpublic and 
confidential.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \10\ The Board recognizes that there may be instances where it 
is necessary to make a Board-Initiated Investigation, or aspects of 
a Board-Initiated Investigation, public, in which case the Board 
would rely on Sec.  1122.6(a)(1) to release such information.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    With respect to confidentiality, AAR asks that the Board clarify 
that it is ``not claiming unbounded discretion to make confidential 
information and documents public'' and that it revise the NPRM's 
confidentiality provision to include the protections provided by 49 CFR 
1001.4, which governs predisclosure notification procedures for 
confidential commercial information. (AAR Comment 17-18.) NSR also asks 
that the Board ``create a reasonable opportunity for the person 
claiming confidentiality to respond to the Board's denial of a request 
for confidential treatment prior to any public disclosure of the 
purportedly confidential information.'' (NSR Comment 4, 28-29.)
    The Board will grant these requests to clarify that parties will be 
given notice and the ability to respond to the potential disclosure of 
confidential commercial information prior to its release. Specifically, 
the final rules at

[[Page 90234]]

section 1122.6(a)(1) now expressly incorporate 49 CFR 1001.4(c), (d) 
and (e), which require that the Board notify the person claiming 
confidential treatment prior to publicly disclosing any purportedly 
confidential commercial information and provide such persons an 
opportunity to object to the disclosure. The Board's final rules at 
section 1122.7 also continue to require that, if a Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA) request seeks information that a party has 
claimed constitutes trade secrets and commercial or financial 
information within the exception in 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(4), the Board shall 
give the party an opportunity to respond pursuant to 49 CFR 1001.4.
    Order of Investigation. As proposed in the NPRM, the Board would 
issue an Order of Investigation in order to commence a Board-Initiated 
Investigation. The Board then would provide a copy of the Order of 
Investigation to the party under investigation within 30 days of 
issuance.
    In its comments, AAR asks that the Board instead provide a copy of 
the Order of Investigation to the parties under investigation within 10 
days of its issuance. (AAR Comment 12.) Similarly, NGFA asks that the 
Board provide a copy of the Order of Investigation to the public within 
10 or 15 days of its issuance. (NGFA Reply 7.)
    Under 49 U.S.C. 11701(d)(1), the Board is required to provide 
written notice to the parties under investigation by not later than 30 
days after initiating the investigation. Although in practice the Board 
intends to provide copies of the Order of Investigation to parties 
within a shorter timeframe as requested by AAR and NGFA, the Board 
declines to adopt regulations that are stricter than the requirements 
of Section 12 of the STB Reauthorization Act. The final rules therefore 
maintain the statutory requirement of providing notice to parties under 
investigation within 30 days.
    Intervention. The NPRM provided that third parties, who are not the 
subject of a Board-Initiated Investigation, may not intervene or 
participate as a matter of right in any Board-Initiated Investigation. 
Commenters, mostly shippers, ask that the Board either permit third 
parties to intervene in Board-Initiated Investigations or comment on an 
ongoing investigation. These commenters assert, among other arguments, 
that third parties have a statutory right to intervene and that 
intervention would promote transparency and assist Board staff in 
compiling a more complete record. (NITL Comment 3; NGFA Comment 5-7; 
NGFA Reply 4, 8; Jersey City Comment 15; SMART-TD 11.) AAR opposes 
allowing third parties to intervene in Board-Initiated Investigations. 
(AAR Reply 2, 9.)
    We decline to permit third parties to intervene or participate as a 
matter of right in Board-Initiated Investigations. Although NGFA and 
Jersey City argue that interventions could increase transparency and 
assist Investigative Officers in developing a more complete record and 
determining whether a qualifying violation occurred, a final, binding 
determination in that regard is not made during a Board-Initiated 
Investigation. (See NGFA Comment 7; Jersey City Comment 15.) Rather, 
that decision would be made during the Formal Board Proceeding, where, 
as AAR notes, third parties could move to intervene and participate in 
a proceeding. Therefore, shippers' objectives in intervening in Board-
Initiated Investigations would be satisfied during a Formal Board 
Proceeding. In addition, there is a statutory one-year time limitation 
on Board-Initiated Investigations. Allowing third parties to intervene 
as of right could make it difficult for the Board to complete its 
investigation in the required time frame.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \11\ Shippers also request that third parties be allowed to 
intervene in Preliminary Fact-Finding. We reject this request for 
the same reasons we reject the request that third parties be allowed 
to intervene in the Board-Initiated Investigations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Finally, we disagree with Jersey City's argument that 28 U.S.C. 
2323 grants interested ``[c]ommunities, associations, firms, and 
individuals'' a right to intervene in any Board-Initiated 
Investigation. As AAR points out, section 2323 applies only to federal 
court proceedings arising from challenges to Board rulemakings or 
attempts to enforce Board orders. (AAR Reply 9.) For these reasons, the 
final rules continue to prohibit intervention or participation by third 
parties in any Board-Initiated Investigation.
    Information and Documentation Collection. Parties raise several 
concerns with respect to the production of documents and testimony 
under the proposed rules. In the NPRM, the Board proposed that, if any 
transcripts were taken of investigative testimony, they would be 
recorded by an official reporter or other authorized means. In 
comments, AAR asks that parties under investigation be given full 
access to transcripts of their testimony, while NSR asks that 
subpoenaed witnesses be able to obtain copies of their evidence and 
transcripts of their testimony. (AAR Comment 14; NSR Comment 22.) AAR 
also asks that the Board revise the proposed regulation governing 
transcripts to always require a transcript of investigative testimony. 
(AAR Comment 14.) AAR further requests that Investigating Officers be 
limited in the amount of information and documents that they can 
request of parties and also limited to requesting ``documents that are 
likely to be directly relevant to the investigation.'' (AAR Comment 
15.) NSR asks that the Board ``ensure that subpoenas are issued only 
where they are likely to lead to admissible evidence regarding the 
investigated issue . . . and are otherwise limited in scope, specific 
in directive, and in good faith.'' (NSR Comment 4.)
    In response to AAR and NSR's comments pertaining to transcripts, 
the Board declines to always require a transcript of investigative 
testimony, but will require that witnesses be given access to any 
transcript of their investigative testimony--either by receiving a copy 
of the transcript or by inspecting the transcript. Specifically, the 
final rules now provide that ``[a] witness who has given testimony 
pursuant to [part 1122 of the regulations] shall be entitled, upon 
written request, to procure a transcript of the witness' own testimony 
or, upon proper identification, shall have the right to inspect the 
official transcript of the witness' own testimony.'' See section 
1122.10.
    As to Investigating Officers' right to request documents, we will 
adopt AAR's suggestion that Investigating Officers be limited to 
request documents that are likely to be directly relevant to the 
investigation. (AAR Comment 15.) Thus, we have modified the language of 
section 1122.9 to state that Investigating Officer(s) may interview or 
depose witnesses, inspect property and facilities, and request and 
require the production of any information, documents, books, papers, 
correspondence, memoranda, agreements, or other records, in any form or 
media, ``that are likely to be directly relevant to the issues of the 
Board-Initiated Investigation.'' This change also sufficiently 
addresses NSR's concern that Investigating Officers' requests for 
evidence be ``limited in scope, specific in directive, and in good 
faith.'' (NSR Comment 4.) The Board declines to otherwise limit the 
Investigating Officers' right to request evidence.
    AAR and NSR also ask that the Board provide parties under 
investigation the right to seek discovery.\12\ (See AAR

[[Page 90235]]

Comment 14; NSR Comment 4, 35-37.) On reply, NGFA opposes the 
railroads' request that parties under investigation be provided the 
right to seek discovery, stating that the ``final rules should not 
impose complex requirements and associated legal and other costs on 
rail customers.'' (NGFA Reply 3.) NGFA adds that, if the Board were to 
allow railroads to conduct discovery in Board-Initiated Investigations, 
such discovery ``should be limited to entities that elect to become 
parties by formally intervening in the proceeding.'' (NGFA Reply 3, 8.) 
We agree with NGFA that permitting parties under investigation to seek 
discovery could impose unnecessary legal and other costs on parties 
that are not subject to investigation, and we find that permitting such 
discovery, even of materials gathered by the Board, also could 
unnecessarily obstruct and delay a Board-Initiated Investigation, which 
must be concluded within a specific timeline. We therefore decline to 
permit parties under investigation the right to seek discovery. In the 
event a party under investigation believes that a third party has 
information likely to be directly relevant to the investigation, the 
party under investigation should convey that to the Investigating 
Officer(s), who may then request that information from the relevant 
third parties.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \12\ AAR also asks for the right to obtain discovery during a 
Formal Board Proceeding, which we decline to provide for in the 
final rules, but which may be considered on a case-by-case basis 
during Formal Board Proceedings.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Finally, AAR and NSR request that the Board eliminate or add 
certain other provisions related to the Board's collection of 
information and documentation during a Board-Initiated Investigation. 
First, AAR asks that the Board entirely eliminate the proposed 
regulation (proposed in the NPRM as 49 CFR 1122.11) titled 
``Certifications and false statements,'' including subparagraph (b), 
which requires a party from whom documents are sought to submit a list 
of all documents withheld due to privilege, and subparagraph (c), which 
sets forth the criminal penalty for perjury. (AAR Comment 16-17.) 
Alternatively, AAR asks the Board to revise the ``Certifications and 
false statements'' provision to ``require the person [producing 
documents] to confirm that it produced all responsive, non-privileged 
documents located after reasonable search and subject to any agreed-
upon protocols regarding reduction of duplicative documents.'' (AAR 
Comment 16.) AAR claims its language would allow a party to only have 
to produce one copy of a document, even if duplicative digital versions 
exist. Its language would also require a party to perform a 
``reasonable'' search, rather than a ``diligent'' search, as proposed 
in the NPRM. Additionally, AAR asks that the Board adopt a ``witness 
rights'' provision in accordance with other agencies' practices. (AAR 
Comment 17.) NGFA opposes AAR's request to remove the ``Certifications 
and false statements'' provision. (NGFA Reply 8.)
    We decline to eliminate the ``Certifications and false statements'' 
provision in its entirety, or its subparagraph (b) relating to the 
privilege log requirements. Subparagraphs (a) and (b) are necessary, as 
they would be the Investigating Officers' primary means of ensuring 
that parties under investigation have conducted their due diligence and 
provided the Board with the information requested. However, we will 
grant AAR's request regarding agreed-upon protocols for duplicative 
documents. Accordingly, the final rules now expressly subject the 
``Certifications and false statements'' provision to any search 
protocols that the Investigating Officer(s) and producing parties may 
agree upon. See section 1122.12. We also will change the description of 
the search from ``diligent'' to ``reasonable.'' In addition, at AAR's 
suggestion (AAR Comment 16-17), we will remove the criminal penalty for 
perjury provision, as it is redundant in light of already-applicable 
federal law, see 18 U.S.C. 1001, 1621, and add a witness rights 
provision, which is included in the final rules at section 1122.11, in 
order to clarify the rights and responsibilities of witnesses. See also 
section 1122.10 (addressing the right of a witness to review his or her 
transcript).
    Second, AAR and NSR request that the Board remove the attorney 
disqualification provision, proposed in the NPRM as section 1122.9(b), 
in which the Board would have the authority to exclude a particular 
attorney from further participation in any Board-Initiated 
Investigation in which the attorney is obstructing the Board-Initiated 
Investigation. (AAR Comment 18; NSR Comment 26-27.) After considering 
the comments, we will remove the attorney disqualification provision 
from the final rules, as the Board's current rules governing attorney 
conduct sufficiently protect the integrity of any investigation. See 
e.g., 49 CFR 1103.12.
    Exculpatory Evidence. AAR and NSR ask that the Board adopt in its 
final rules a mandatory disclosure provision, modeled after Brady v. 
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 88 (1963), to provide a party subject to 
investigation exculpatory and potentially exculpatory evidence. (AAR 
Comment 13; NSR Comment 4, 32-35.) In Brady, the United States Supreme 
Court, in criminal proceedings, held that the Due Process clause of the 
Fifth Amendment requires the prosecutor to disclose exculpatory 
evidence material to guilt or punishment, known to the government but 
not known to the defendant. Currently, no statute or case law mandates 
the application of the Brady Rule to administrative agencies,\13\ 
though some agencies such as the Securities and Exchange Commission and 
the Commodities Futures Trading Commission have adopted varying 
versions of the Brady Rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \13\ Mister Discount Stockbrokers v. SEC, 768 F.2d 875, 878 (7th 
Cir. 1985); Zandford v. NASD, 30 F. Supp. 2d 1, 22 n.12 (D.C. Cir. 
1998), NLRB v. Nueva Eng'g, Inc., 761 F.2d 961, 969 (4th Cir. 1985).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Board recognizes the merits of the Brady Rule and expects to 
employ the practice of disclosing exculpatory evidence if the Board 
were to open a Formal Board Proceeding following the conclusion of a 
Board-Initiated Investigation involving any criminal provisions of 49 
U.S.C. Subtitle IV, Part A. However, because (1) most Board-Initiated 
Investigations will not likely involve any such criminal provisions, 
(2) Board-Initiated Investigations only determine if the Board should 
open a Formal Board Proceeding, and (3) any remedy that may result from 
an investigation must be prospective only, the Brady Rule does not 
appear directly applicable, and the Board will not codify it in the 
final rules adopted here.
    Recommendations and Summary of Findings. As proposed in the NPRM, 
Investigating Officer(s) would be required to conclude the Board-
Initiated Investigation no later than 275 days after issuance of the 
Order of Investigation and, at that time, submit to the Board and 
parties under investigation any recommendations made as a result of the 
Board-Initiated Investigation and a summary of findings that support 
such recommendations.
    The NPRM also provided an optional process whereby Investigating 
Officer(s), in their discretion and time permitting, could present 
(orally or in writing) their recommendations and/or summary of findings 
to parties under investigation prior to submitting this information to 
the Board Members. The NPRM stated that, in such cases, the 
Investigating Officer(s) would be required to permit the parties under 
investigation to submit a written response to the recommendations and/
or summary of findings. The Investigating Officer(s) would then submit 
their recommendations and summary of

[[Page 90236]]

findings, as well as any response from the parties under investigation, 
to the Board members and parties under investigation.
    In response, AAR and NSR request that the Board make this optional 
process mandatory.\14\ (AAR Comment 19; NSR Comment 4, 23-25.) 
Alternatively, AAR asks that if the Board does not make this process 
mandatory, the Board require Investigating Officer(s) to provide their 
recommendations and summary of findings to parties at the same time 
they are submitted to Board Members.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \14\ NSR cites to 5 U.S.C. 557(c) as requiring this process to 
be mandatory. However, 5 U.S.C. 557 applies to hearings in 
rulemakings or adjudications. See 5 U.S.C. 553, 554, 556, & 557(a). 
Because the recommendations and findings at issue here address only 
whether to open a proceeding in which the Board would make a 
decision, 5 U.S.C. 557(c) is not applicable.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Board intends that Investigating Officer(s), when possible, 
will utilize the optional process of presenting their recommendations 
and summary of findings to parties under investigation prior to 
submitting them to the Board Members. However, given the one-year 
deadline for concluding Board-Initiated Investigations, the Board will 
not make this process mandatory, as there may be circumstances in which 
Investigating Officer(s) cannot complete their recommendations and 
summary of findings sufficiently in advance of the one-year deadline to 
allow them to be presented to the party under investigation prior to 
submission to the Board. In such cases, the Investigating Officer(s) 
will provide their recommendations and summary of findings to parties 
at the same time they are submitted to the Board Members. This is 
provided for in the final rules at section 1122.5(c), which states that 
the Investigating Officer(s) must submit their recommendations and 
summary of findings to the Board and parties under investigation within 
275 days.
    With respect to parties' responses to Investigating Officers' 
recommendations and summary of findings, AAR also requests that the 
Board clarify that parties have the right to submit arguments in their 
response to Board staff's recommendations and summary of findings. AAR 
also argues that the Board should increase the 15-page limit for 
parties' responses to Board staff's recommendations and summary of 
findings, but if not, then clarify that the party's supporting data, 
evidence, and verified statements would not count towards the 15-page 
limit. We will grant AAR's requests, as they would provide the Board 
with more information in determining whether further action is 
warranted following a Board-Initiated Investigation. The final rules 
now provide that: parties have the right to submit arguments in their 
response to Board staff's recommendations and summary of findings; 
supporting data, evidence, and verified statements do not count towards 
the page limit of such responses; and parties may submit written 
statements responding to the Investigating Officers' recommendations 
and summary of findings of up to 20 pages. See App. A to Pt. 1122 
(stating ``parties under investigation may submit a written statement . 
. . [that] shall be no more than 20 pages, not including any supporting 
data, evidence, and verified statements that may be attached . . . 
setting forth the views of the parties under investigation of factual 
or legal matters or other arguments relevant to the commencement of a 
Formal Board Proceeding'').

C. Formal Board Proceeding

    As proposed in the NPRM, the Formal Board Proceeding refers to a 
public proceeding that may be instituted by the Board pursuant to an 
Order to Show Cause after a Board-Initiated Investigation has been 
conducted. With respect to the Formal Board Proceeding phase, 
commenters express concerns relating to (1) the duration of the Formal 
Board Proceeding, (2) the standard for commencing a Formal Board 
Proceeding, and (3) the Order to Show Cause.
    Duration of the Formal Board Proceeding. As proposed in the NPRM, 
there are no time limits for the Formal Board Proceeding. However, NSR 
argues that the Formal Board Proceeding should be included in the 
statutorily-mandated one-year time limit on investigations, based on 
the plain language of Section 12 of the STB Reauthorization Act, 
federal court precedent interpreting administrative finality, and other 
provisions in the Board's governing statute. (NSR Comment 6-8.) We 
address each of NSR's arguments in turn.
    According to NSR, because 49 U.S.C. 11701(d)(6) states that the 
Board must ``dismiss any investigation that is not concluded by the 
Board with administrative finality within 1 year after the date on 
which it was commenced,'' the Board must either dismiss the Board-
Initiated Investigation or decide on the merits of the Formal Board 
Proceeding within one year of opening the Board-Initiated 
Investigation. (NSR Comment 6-7.) However, such an interpretation 
directly contradicts the Senate Report for the STB Reauthorization Act, 
which clearly excludes the Formal Board Proceeding from the statute's 
one-year deadline on Board-Initiated Investigations, stating:

    The requirement to dismiss any investigation that is not 
concluded within 1 year after the date on which it was commenced 
would only include the time period needed to generate 
recommendations and summary of findings. The time period needed to 
complete a proceeding, after receipt of the recommendations and 
summary of findings, would not be included in the 1 year timeline 
for investigations.

S. Rep. No. 114-52, at 13 (2015).
    NSR nonetheless states that the Senate Report ``is trumped by the 
unambiguous new section 11701(d)(6),'' arguing that ``administrative 
finality'' is ``a known term of art with a specific definition, thus 
precluding any need to rely on legislative history.'' As support, NSR, 
among other cases, compares the Board's proposed investigation process 
to Newport Galleria Group v. Deland, 618 F. Supp. 1179 (D.C. Cir. 
1985), in which the court found that the Environmental Protection 
Agency's commencement of an investigation did not constitute final 
agency action. (NSR Comment 6-7.) \15\ In Newport Galleria Group, 
however, the question was whether judicial review of the initiation of 
an investigation was proper. Newport Galleria Group, 618 F. Supp. at 
1185. Here, under 49 U.S.C. 11701(d)(6), the question is whether the 
Board's conclusion of an investigation and opening of a Formal Board 
Proceeding--as opposed to the initiation of an investigation--
constitutes administratively final action for purposes of Section 12 of 
the STB Reauthorization Act.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \15\ NSR also cites Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas 
Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944) (determining that findings from an 
investigation are preliminary), Reliable Automatic Sprinkler Co. v. 
Consumer Prod. Safety Commission, 324 F.3d 726 (D.C. Cir. 2003) 
(finding that the Consumer Product Safety Commission's (1) 
investigation of a manufacturer's product, (2) statement of 
``intention to make a preliminary determination that the [product] 
present[ed] a substantial hazard'' and (3) ``request for voluntary 
corrective action'' did not constitute final agency action under the 
Administrative Procedure Act), and Tenneco, Inc. v. FERC, 688 F.2d 
1018 (5th Cir. 1982) (finding the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission's decision terminating an adjudicatory proceeding and 
instituting an investigation of the matter to be a non-final order 
for purposes of judicial review). These cases are not controlling as 
to the definition of ``administrative finality'' for Board-Initiated 
Investigations for the same reasons as discussed below with respect 
to Newport Galleria Group involving 49 U.S.C. 11701(d)(6) & (7).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Moreover, under 49 U.S.C. 11701(d)(7), which immediately follows 
the requirement that the Board conclude a Board-Initiated Investigation 
with administrative finality within one year, the Board's options for 
concluding the Board-Initiated Investigation, and thus

[[Page 90237]]

satisfying the requirement in section 11701(d)(6), are to ``dismiss the 
investigation if no further action is warranted'' or ``initiate a 
proceeding to determine if a provision under this part has been 
violated.'' We read section 11701(d)(6), in conjunction with section 
11701(d)(7), as stating that the Board must dismiss investigations that 
have not been concluded within a year (i.e., concluded either by 
dismissal because no further action is warranted, or by the opening of 
a Formal Board Proceeding). While the meaning of ``administrative 
finality'' within section 10701(d)(6) may need to be defined in the 
future, the language of the statute and the Senate Report support not 
including the Formal Board Proceeding in the one-year deadline for 
concluding the Board-Initiated Investigation pursuant to Section 12(b) 
of the STB Reauthorization Act.
    Additionally, NSR states that ``other provisions of the Board's 
governing statute reinforce that administrative finality occurs only 
with [a] Board decision.'' (NSR Comment 8.) Specifically, NSR cites 49 
U.S.C. 11701(e)(7), which ``permits judicial review upon conclusion of 
the Formal Board Proceeding,'' and 49 U.S.C. 722(d),\16\ which states 
that ``an action of the Board under this section is final on the date 
on which it is served,'' for the proposition that ``administrative 
finality occurs only with the Board decision'' issued upon conclusion 
of the Formal Board Proceeding. (NSR Comment 8.) However, the relevant 
governing statutory provisions for concluding a Board-Initiated 
Investigation--which are more specific to the process at issue than 
those cited by NSR--are 49 U.S.C. 11701(d)(6) & (7), which, as 
previously explained, provide that the Board conclude an investigation 
with administrative finality within one year by either ``dismiss[ing] 
the investigation if no further action is warranted'' or ``initiat[ing] 
a proceeding to determine if a provision under this part has been 
violated.'' The final rules, therefore, continue to impose no time 
limit on Formal Board Proceedings. See sections 1122.1(b) & 1122.5(e).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \16\ The STB Reauthorization Act redesignated 49 U.S.C. 722(d) 
as 49 U.S.C. 1322(d).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Standard for Opening a Formal Board Proceeding. AAR asks the Board 
to clarify the standard for commencing a Formal Board Proceeding, 
specifically requesting that the Board require that there be 
``reasonable cause'' to believe that a violation of 49 U.S.C. Subtitle 
IV, Part A occurred.\17\ (AAR Comment 20-21.) As discussed above,\18\ 
the Board declines to adopt this ``reasonable cause'' standard for 
initiating a Board-Initiated Investigations because it would require a 
higher standard than imposed by the statute. For that same reason, the 
Board declines to adopt this standard for opening a Formal Board 
Proceeding. The final rules therefore maintain, in accordance with 
Section 12 of the STB Reauthorization Act, that the Board shall dismiss 
a Board-Initiated Investigation if no further action is warranted, or 
shall initiate a Formal Board Proceeding to determine whether any 
provision of 49 U.S.C. Subtitle IV, Part A has been violated.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \17\ AAR also requests that the Board include in the standard 
for opening a Formal Board Proceeding that the Board base its 
decision on the results of the Board-Initiated Investigation. (AAR 
Comment 20-21.) The Board declines to expressly include such a 
requirement in the final rules, as the final rules mirror the 
statutory standard for opening a Formal Board Proceeding.
    \18\ See supra Part B: Standard for Opening a Board-Initiated 
Investigation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Order to Show Cause. With respect to the Order to Show Cause, AAR 
asks that the Board clarify that the burden of proof remains on the 
agency to prove that a violation of 49 U.S.C. Subtitle IV, Part A 
occurred. (AAR Comment 20-21.) We affirm that the Order to Show Cause 
does not change the burden of proof from the requirements of Section 12 
of the STB Reauthorization Act for proving that a violation of 49 
U.S.C. Subtitle IV, Part A occurred.
    Additionally, NSR asks that the Board require that the Order to 
Show Cause state the issues to be considered in the Formal Board 
Proceeding. (NSR Comment 4, 30-32.) We find this request to be 
reasonable, as a party subject to a Formal Board Proceeding should have 
notice as to the issues that will be publicly considered by the Board. 
Based on NSR's comment, the final rules include a requirement that the 
Order to Show Cause state the issues to be considered during the Formal 
Board Proceeding. See section 1122.5(e) (stating ``[t]he Order to Show 
Cause shall state the basis for, and the issues to be considered 
during, the Formal Board Proceeding and set forth a procedural 
schedule'').

D. Other Related Issues

    Separation of Investigative and Decisionmaking Functions. In the 
NPRM, the Board proposed to separate the investigative and 
decisionmaking functions of Board staff to the extent practicable, in 
accordance with the requirements of Section 12 of the STB 
Reauthorization Act. Although NGFA supports the Board's proposal, AAR 
requests that the ``rules expressly state that the Board will separate 
investigative and decisionmaking functions of staff'' and NSR requests 
that the Board remove from the final rules the phrase ``to the extent 
practicable.'' (AAR Comment 11-12; NSR Comments 13, 20.)
    The NPRM's proposed language expressly tracked 49 U.S.C. 
11701(d)(5), which states that in any investigation commenced on the 
Board's own initiative, the Board must ``to the extent practicable, 
separate the investigative and decisionmaking functions of staff.'' 
Although AAR argues that this is insufficient, as it is merely a 
``ritualistic incantation of [the] statutory language,'' the NPRM also 
proposed that the Order of Investigation would identify the 
Investigating Officer(s) and provided that parties subject to 
investigation could submit written materials to the Board Members at 
any time. As a result, parties that feel that the investigative and 
decisionmaking functions of staff are not properly separated may 
express their concerns in writing directly to the Board during the 
course of a Board-Initiated Investigation or Formal Board Proceeding. 
See section 1122.13. Moreover, the Board declines to remove the phrase 
``to the extent practicable'' from the final rules because doing so 
would not be in full compliance with the statutory language of Section 
12 of the STB Reauthorization Act.
    AAR further asks that the Board explain ``any instances where it 
may not be practicable to separate these functions.'' AAR also requests 
that the Board include in the final rules provisions ensuring the 
separation of investigatory and decisionmaking functions, such as 
requirements that the Board ``[i]dentify all staff who work in an 
investigation, not just the Investigating Officers'' and ``[n]otify 
Board Members, decisional staff within the Board, and parties subject 
to investigation who has been designated investigation staff for any 
particular Board-Initiated Investigation.'' (AAR Comment 11-12.)
    The Board declines to describe instances where it may not be 
practicable to separate these functions. Based on AAR's comment, 
however, we clarify that our intent is that any Board staff 
substantively working on a Board-Initiated Investigation would be 
identified as an Investigating Officer. To better reflect this intent, 
the final rules now require that the Order of Investigation ``identify 
all Board staff who are authorized to conduct the investigation as 
Investigating Officer(s).'' See section 1122.4. Additionally, Board 
Members would be notified regarding who has been designated as 
investigative staff for any

[[Page 90238]]

particular Board-Initiated Investigation because Board Members would 
have to issue an Order of Investigation, which, according to the final 
rules at section 1122.4, would include the names of the Investigating 
Officers.
    Ex Parte Communications. Section 12(c)(3) of the STB 
Reauthorization Act requires the Board, in issuing rules implementing 
its investigatory authority, to take into account ex parte constraints. 
Consistent with analogous ex parte constraints in other proceedings at 
the Board, the NPRM proposed that, as a matter of policy, the Board 
Members would not engage in off-the-record verbal communications 
concerning the matters under investigation with parties subject to 
Board-Initiated Investigations. However, the NPRM provided that parties 
under investigation would have the right to submit written statements 
to the Board at any time.
    Jersey City and NSR ask the Board to revise the NPRM's approach to 
ex parte communications. First, Jersey City asks that the Board remove 
the NPRM's provision allowing any party subject to a Board-Initiated 
Investigation to submit to the Board written statements at any time 
during the Board-Initiated Investigation. (Jersey City Comment 16.) 
Second, NSR requests that the Board restrict ex parte communications 
between Investigating Officers and Board staff conducting Preliminary-
Fact Finding and other Board staff, as well as Board Members involved 
in the Formal Board Proceeding. Finally, NSR states that, should such 
communications occur, Section 5 and Section 12 of the STB 
Reauthorization Act should apply. (NSR Comment 3, 20-21.)
    The Board declines to adopt Jersey City's and NSR's proposals 
regarding ex parte communications. As explained above, the final rules 
require the Board to identify in the Order of Investigation (which 
would be voted on by the Board Members) all Board staff conducting a 
Board-Initiated Investigation. Therefore, Board Members and their 
staffs would know with whom to restrict their communications to avoid 
ex parte issues. Additionally, the final rules continue to provide 
parties under investigation with the ability to notify the Board in 
writing of any facts or circumstances relating to the investigation, 
including potentially prohibited ex parte communications. See 49 CFR 
1122.13. As such, the Board would address any ex parte issues that may 
arise on a case-by-case basis as raised by the parties subject to 
investigation.
    Settlement. The NPRM proposed that, during Board-Initiated 
Investigations, the Investigating Officer(s) would be able to engage in 
settlement negotiations with parties under investigation and that, if 
at any time during the investigation, the Investigating Officer(s) and 
parties under investigation were to reach a tentative settlement 
agreement, the Investigating Officer(s) would submit the settlement 
agreement as part of their proposed recommendations to the Board 
Members for approval or disapproval, along with the summary of findings 
supporting the proposed agreement. As proposed in the NPRM, the Board 
would then decide whether to approve the agreement and/or dismiss the 
investigation or open a Formal Board Proceeding in accordance with the 
NPRM's proposed procedural rules. In response to this proposal, NGFA 
comments that the settlement process is too ``nontransparent.'' 
However, for the reasons provided above with respect to 
confidentiality,\19\ the Board declines to require that the settlement 
process be public or to permit third-party involvement in the process. 
Therefore, as a matter of policy, the Board maintains the settlement 
process as proposed in the NPRM.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \19\ See supra Part B: Confidentiality.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Regulatory Flexibility Act

    The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (RFA), 5 U.S.C. 601-612, 
generally requires a description and analysis of new rules that would 
have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small 
entities. In drafting a rule, an agency is required to: (1) Assess the 
effect that its regulation will have on small entities; (2) analyze 
effective alternatives that may minimize a regulation's impact; and (3) 
make the analysis available for public comment. 5 U.S.C. 601-604. Under 
section 605(b), an agency is not required to perform an initial or 
final regulatory flexibility analysis if it certifies that the proposed 
or final rules will not have a ``significant impact on a substantial 
number of small entities.''
    Because the goal of the RFA is to reduce the cost to small entities 
of complying with federal regulations, the RFA requires an agency to 
perform a regulatory flexibility analysis of small entity impacts only 
when a rule directly regulates those entities. In other words, the 
impact must be a direct impact on small entities ``whose conduct is 
circumscribed or mandate'' by the proposed rule. White Eagle Coop. 
Ass'n v. Conner, 553 F.3d 467, 478, 480 (7th Cir. 2009). An agency has 
no obligation to conduct a small entity impact analysis of effects on 
entities that it does not regulate. United Distrib. Cos. v. FERC, 88 
F.3d 1105, 1170 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
    In the NPRM, the Board certified under 5 U.S.C. 605(b) that the 
proposed rule would not have a significant economic impact on a 
substantial number of small entities within the meaning of the RFA. The 
Board explained that the proposed rule would not place any additional 
burden on small entities, but rather clarify an existing obligation. 
The Board further explained that, even assuming for the sake of 
argument that the proposed regulation were to create an impact on small 
entities, which it would not, the number of small entities so affected 
would not be substantial. No parties submitted comments on this issue. 
A copy of the NPRM was served on the U.S. Small Business Administration 
(SBA).
    The final rule adopted here revises the rules proposed in the NPRM. 
However, the same basis for the Board's certification of the proposed 
rule applies to the final rules adopted here. The final rules would not 
create a significant impact on a substantial number of small entities, 
as the regulations would only specify procedures related to 
investigations of matters of regional or national significance 
conducted on the Board's own initiative and do not mandate or 
circumscribe the conduct of small entities. Therefore, the Board 
certifies under 5 U.S.C. 605(b) that the final rules will not have a 
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities 
within the meaning of the RFA. A copy of this decision will be served 
upon the Chief Counsel for Advocacy, Office of Advocacy, U.S. Small 
Business Administration, Washington, DC 20416.

List of Subjects in 49 CFR Part 1122

    Investigations.

    It is ordered:
    1. The final rules set forth below are adopted and will be 
effective on January 13, 2017.
    2. A copy of this decision will be served upon the Chief Counsel 
for Advocacy, Office of Advocacy, U.S. Small Business Administration.
    3. This decision is effective on January 13, 2017.

    Decided: December 7, 2016.

    By the Board, Chairman Elliott, Vice Chairman Miller, and 
Commissioner Begeman.
Jeffrey Herzig,
Clearance Clerk.

0
For the reasons set forth in the preamble, the Surface Transportation 
Board amends title 49, chapter X, subchapter B, of the Code of Federal

[[Page 90239]]

Regulations by adding part 1122 to read as follows:

PART 1122--BOARD-INITIATED INVESTIGATIONS

Sec.
1122.1 Definitions.
1122.2 Scope and applicability of this part.
1122.3 Preliminary Fact-Finding.
1122.4 Board-Initiated Investigations.
1122.5 Procedural rules.
1122.6 Confidentiality.
1122.7 Request for confidential treatment.
1122.8 Limitation on participation.
1122.9 Power of persons conducting Board-Initiated Investigations.
1122.10 Transcripts.
1122.11 Rights of witnesses.
1122.12 Certifications and false statements.
1122.13 Right to submit statements.
Appendix A to Part 1122--Informal Procedure Relating to 
Recommendations and Summary of Findings from the Board-Initiated 
Investigation

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 1321, 11144, 11701.


Sec.  1122.1  Definitions.

    (a) Board-Initiated Investigation means an investigation instituted 
by the Board pursuant to an Order of Investigation and conducted in 
accordance with Section 12 of the Surface Transportation Board 
Reauthorization Act of 2015, now incorporated and codified at 49 U.S.C. 
11701.
    (b) Formal Board Proceeding means a public proceeding instituted by 
the Board pursuant to an Order to Show Cause after a Board-Initiated 
Investigation has been conducted.
    (c) Investigating officer(s) means the individual(s) designated by 
the Board in an Order of Investigation to conduct a Board-Initiated 
Investigation.
    (d) Preliminary Fact-Finding means an informal fact-gathering 
inquiry conducted by Board staff prior to the opening of a Board-
Initiated Investigation.


Sec.  1122.2  Scope and applicability of this part.

    This part applies only to matters subject to Section 12 of the 
Surface Transportation Board Reauthorization Act of 2015, 49 U.S.C. 
11701.


Sec.  1122.3  Preliminary Fact-Finding.

    The Board staff may, in its discretion, conduct nonpublic 
Preliminary Fact-Finding, subject to the provisions of Sec.  1122.6, to 
determine if a matter presents an alleged violation that could be of 
national or regional significance and subject to the Board's 
jurisdiction under 49 U.S.C. Subtitle IV, Part A, and warrants a Board-
Initiated Investigation. Board staff shall inform the subject of 
Preliminary Fact-Finding that Preliminary Fact-Finding has commenced. 
Where it appears from Preliminary Fact-Finding that a Board-Initiated 
Investigation is warranted, staff shall so recommend to the Board. 
Where it appears from the Preliminary Fact-Finding that a Board-
Initiated Investigation is not warranted, staff shall conclude its 
Preliminary Fact-Finding and notify any parties involved that the 
process has been terminated.


Sec.  1122.4  Board-Initiated Investigations.

    The Board may, in its discretion, commence a nonpublic Board-
Initiated Investigation of any matter of national or regional 
significance that is subject to the jurisdiction of the Board under 49 
U.S.C. Subtitle IV, Part A, subject to the provisions of Sec.  1122.6, 
by issuing an Order of Investigation. Orders of Investigation shall 
state the basis for the Board-Initiated Investigation and identify all 
Board staff who are authorized to conduct the investigation as 
Investigating Officer(s). The Board may add or remove Investigating 
Officer(s) during the course of a Board-Initiated Investigation. To the 
extent practicable, an Investigating Officer shall not participate in 
any decisionmaking functions in any Formal Board Proceeding(s) opened 
as a result of any Board-Initiated Investigation(s) that he or she 
conducted.


Sec.  1122.5  Procedural rules.

    (a) After notifying the party subject to Preliminary Fact-Finding 
that Preliminary Fact-Finding has commenced, the Board staff shall, 
within a reasonable period of time, either:
    (1) Conclude Preliminary Fact-Finding and notify any parties 
involved that the process has been terminated; or
    (2) Recommend to the Board that a Board-Initiated Investigation is 
warranted.
    (b) Not later than 30 days after commencing a Board-Initiated 
Investigation, the Investigating Officer(s) shall provide the parties 
under investigation a copy of the Order of Investigation. If the Board 
adds or removes Investigating Officer(s) during the course of the 
Board-Initiated Investigation, it shall provide written notification to 
the parties under investigation.
    (c) Not later than 275 days after issuance of the Order of 
Investigation, the Investigating Officer(s) shall submit to the Board 
and the parties under investigation:
    (1) Any recommendations made as a result of the Board-Initiated 
Investigation; and
    (2) A summary of the findings that support such recommendations.
    (d) Not later than 90 days after receiving the recommendations and 
summary of findings, the Board shall decide whether to dismiss the 
Board-Initiated Investigation if no further action is warranted or 
initiate a Formal Board Proceeding to determine whether any provision 
of 49 U.S.C. Subtitle IV, Part A, has been violated in accordance with 
section 12 of the Surface Transportation Board Reauthorization Act of 
2015. The Board shall dismiss any Board-Initiated Investigation that is 
not concluded with administrative finality within one year after the 
date on which it was commenced.
    (e) A Formal Board Proceeding commences upon issuance of a public 
Order to Show Cause. The Order to Show Cause shall state the basis for, 
and the issues to be considered during, the Formal Board Proceeding and 
set forth a procedural schedule.


Sec.  1122.6  Confidentiality.

    (a) All information and documents obtained under Sec.  1122.3 or 
Sec.  1122.4, whether or not obtained pursuant to a Board request or 
subpoena, and all activities conducted by the Board under this part 
prior to the opening of a Formal Board Proceeding, shall be treated as 
nonpublic by the Board and its staff except to the extent that:
    (1) The Board, in accordance with 49 CFR 1001.4(c), (d), and (e), 
directs or authorizes the public disclosure of activities conducted 
under this part prior to the opening of a Formal Board Proceeding. If 
any of the activities being publicly disclosed implicate records 
claimed to be confidential commercial information, the Board shall 
notify the submitter prior to disclosure in accordance with 49 CFR 
1001.4(b) and provide an opportunity to object to disclosure in 
accordance with 49 CFR 1001.4(d);
    (2) The information or documents are made a matter of public record 
during the course of an administrative proceeding; or
    (3) Disclosure is required by the Freedom of Information Act, 5 
U.S.C. 552 or other relevant provision of law.
    (b) Procedures by which persons submitting information to the Board 
pursuant to this part of title 49, chapter X, subchapter B, of the Code 
of Federal Regulations may specifically seek confidential treatment of 
information for purposes of the Freedom of Information Act disclosure 
are set forth in Sec.  1122.7. A request for confidential treatment of 
information for purposes of Freedom of Information Act disclosure shall 
not, however, prevent disclosure for law

[[Page 90240]]

enforcement purposes or when disclosure is otherwise found appropriate 
in the public interest and permitted by law.


Sec.  1122.7  Request for confidential treatment.

    Any person that produces documents to the Board pursuant to Sec.  
1122.3 or Sec.  1122.4 may claim that some or all of the information 
contained in a particular document or documents is exempt from the 
mandatory public disclosure requirements of the Freedom of Information 
Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552, is information referred to in 18 U.S.C. 1905, 
or is otherwise exempt by law from public disclosure. In such case, the 
person making such a claim shall, at the time the person produces the 
document to the Board, indicate on the document that a request for 
confidential treatment is being made for some or all of the information 
in the document. In such case, the person making such a claim also 
shall file a brief statement specifying the specific statutory 
justification for non-disclosure of the information in the document for 
which confidential treatment is claimed. If the person states that the 
information comes within the exception in 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(4) for trade 
secrets and commercial or financial information, and the information is 
responsive to a subsequent FOIA request to the Board, 49 CFR 1001.4 
shall apply.


Sec.  1122.8  Limitation on participation.

    No party who is not the subject of a Board-Initiated Investigation 
may intervene or participate as a matter of right in any such Board-
Initiated Investigation under this part.


Sec.  1122.9  Power of persons conducting Board-Initiated 
Investigations.

    The Investigating Officer(s), in connection with any Board-
Initiated Investigation, may interview or depose witnesses, inspect 
property and facilities, and request and require the production of any 
information, documents, books, papers, correspondence, memoranda, 
agreements, or other records, in any form or media, that are likely to 
be directly relevant to the issues of the Board-Initiated 
Investigation. The Investigating Officer(s), in connection with a 
Board-Initiated Investigation, also may issue subpoenas, in accordance 
with 49 U.S.C. 1321, to compel the attendance of witnesses, the 
production of any of the records and other documentary evidence listed 
above, and access to property and facilities.


Sec.  1122.10  Transcripts.

    Transcripts, if any, of investigative testimony shall be recorded 
solely by the official reporter or other person or by means authorized 
by the Board or by the Investigating Officer(s). A witness who has 
given testimony pursuant to this part shall be entitled, upon written 
request, to procure a transcript of the witness' own testimony or, upon 
proper identification, shall have the right to inspect the official 
transcript of the witness' own testimony.


Sec.  1122.11  Rights of witnesses.

    (a) Any person who is compelled or requested to furnish documentary 
evidence or testimony in a Board-Initiated Investigation shall, upon 
request, be shown the Order of Investigation. Copies of Orders of 
Investigation shall not be furnished, for their retention, to such 
persons requesting the same except with the express approval of the 
Chairman.
    (b) Any person compelled to appear, or who appears in person at a 
Board-Initiated Investigation by request or permission of the 
Investigating Officer may be accompanied, represented, and advised by 
counsel, as provided by the Board's regulations.
    (c) The right to be accompanied, represented, and advised by 
counsel shall mean the right of a person testifying to have an attorney 
present with him during any aspect of a Board-Initiated Investigation 
and to have this attorney advise his client before, during and after 
the conclusion of such examination.


Sec.  1122.12  Certifications and false statements.

    (a) When producing documents under Sec.  1122.4, the producing 
party shall submit a statement certifying that such person has made a 
reasonable search for the responsive documents and is producing all the 
documents called for by the Investigating Officer(s), subject to any 
search protocols agreed to by the Investigating Officer(s) and 
producing parties. If any responsive document(s) are not produced for 
any reason, the producing party shall state the reason therefor.
    (b) If any responsive documents are withheld because of a claim of 
the attorney-client privilege, work product privilege, or other 
applicable privilege, the producing party shall submit a list of such 
documents which shall, for each document, identify the attorney 
involved, the client involved, the date of the document, the person(s) 
shown on the document to have prepared and/or sent the document, and 
the person(s) shown on the document to have received copies of the 
document.


Sec.  1122.13  Right to submit statements.

    Any party subject to a Board-Initiated Investigation may, at any 
time during the course of a Board-Initiated Investigation, submit to 
the Board written statements of facts or circumstances, with any 
relevant supporting evidence, concerning the subject of that 
investigation.

Appendix A to Part 1122--Informal Procedure Relating to Recommendations 
and Summary of Findings From the Board-Initiated Investigation

    (a) After conducting sufficient investigation and prior to 
submitting recommendations and a summary of findings to the Board, 
the Investigating Officer, in his or her discretion, may inform the 
parties under investigation (orally or in writing) of the proposed 
recommendations and summary of findings that may be submitted to the 
Board. If the Investigating Officer so chooses, he or she shall also 
advise the parties under investigation that they may submit a 
written statement, as explained below, to the Investigating Officer 
prior to the consideration by the Board of the recommendations and 
summary of findings. This optional process is in addition to, and 
does not limit in any way, the rights of parties under investigation 
otherwise provided for in this part.
    (b) Unless otherwise provided for by the Investigating Officer, 
parties under investigation may submit a written statement, as 
described above, within 14 days after of being informed by the 
Investigating Officer of the proposed recommendation(s) and summary 
of findings. Such statements shall be no more than 20 pages, not 
including any supporting data, evidence, and verified statements 
that may be attached to the written statement, double spaced on 8\1/
2\ by 11 inch paper, setting forth the views of the parties under 
investigation of factual or legal matters or other arguments 
relevant to the commencement of a Formal Board Proceeding. Any 
statement of fact included in the submission must be sworn to by a 
person with personal knowledge of such fact.
    (c) Such written statements, if the parties under investigation 
choose to submit, shall be submitted to the Investigating Officer. 
The Investigating Officer shall provide any written statement(s) 
from the parties under investigation to the Board at the same time 
that he or she submits his or her recommendations and summary of 
findings to the Board.

[FR Doc. 2016-29902 Filed 12-13-16; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4915-01-P