[Federal Register Volume 81, Number 226 (Wednesday, November 23, 2016)]
[Notices]
[Pages 84637-84652]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2016-28197]



[[Page 84637]]

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SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

[Release No. 34-79347; File No. SR-MSRB-2016-12]


Self-Regulatory Organizations; Municipal Securities Rulemaking 
Board; Notice of Filing of Amendment No. 1 and Order Granting 
Accelerated Approval of a Proposed Rule Change, as Modified by 
Amendment No. 1, to MSRB Rules G-15 and G-30 To Require Disclosure of 
Mark-Ups and Mark-Downs to Retail Customers on Certain Principal 
Transactions and To Provide Guidance on Prevailing Market Price

November 17, 2016.

I. Introduction

    On September 2, 2016, the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board 
(``MSRB'') filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(``Commission''), pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 (``Act'') \1\ and Rule 19b-4 thereunder,\2\ a 
proposed rule change to amend MSRB Rule G-15 (``Rule G-15''), on 
confirmation, clearance, settlement and other uniform practice 
requirements with respect to retail customer (i.e., non-institutional) 
transactions, and MSRB Rule G-30 (``Rule G-30''), on prices and 
commissions to require brokers, dealers and municipal securities 
dealers (collectively, ``dealers'') to disclose mark-ups and mark-downs 
(collectively, ``mark-ups'' unless the context requires otherwise) to 
retail customers on certain principal transactions and to provide 
dealers guidance on prevailing market price (``PMP'' or ``prevailing 
market price'') for the purpose of calculating mark-ups and mark-downs 
and other Rule G-30 determinations (collectively, the ``proposed rule 
change''). The proposed rule change was published for comment in the 
Federal Register on September 13, 2016.\3\ The Commission received 
seven comment letters in response to the proposal.\4\ The Commission 
also received a letter from the Office of the Investor Advocate 
(``Investor Advocate'') recommending approval of the proposed rule 
change.\5\ On November 14, 2016, the MSRB responded to the comments \6\ 
and filed Amendment No. 1 to the proposal.\7\ The Commission is 
publishing this notice to solicit comment on Amendment No. 1 to the 
proposal from interested persons and is approving the proposed rule 
change, as modified by Amendment No. 1, on an accelerated basis.
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    \1\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1).
    \2\ 17 CFR 240.19b-4.
    \3\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 78777 (Sep. 7, 
2016), 81 FR 62947 (Sep. 13, 2016) (``Notice'').
    \4\ See Letter from Mike Nicholas, Chief Executive Officer, Bond 
Dealers of America (Oct. 4, 2016) (``BDA Letter''); Letter from 
Leslie M. Norwood, Managing Director and Associate General Counsel 
and Sean Davy, Managing Director, Capital Markets Division, 
Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (Oct. 3, 2016) 
(``SIFMA Letter''); Letter from Manisha Kimmel, Chief Regulatory 
Officer, Wealth Management, Thomson Reuters (Sept. 19, 2016) 
(``Thomson Reuters Letter''); Letter from Mary Lou Von Kaenel, 
Managing Director, Financial Information Forum (Oct. 4, 2016) (``FIF 
Letter''); Letter from Paige W. Pierce, President & CEO, RW Smith & 
Associates, LLC (Oct. 4, 2016) (``RW Smith Letter''); Letter from 
Robert J. McCarthy, Director of Regulatory Policy, Wells Fargo 
Advisors, LLC (Oct. 4, 2016) (``Wells Fargo Letter''); Letter from 
Norman L. Ashkenas, Chief Compliance Officer, Fidelity Brokerage 
Services, LLC, and Richard J. O'Brien, Chief Compliance Officer, 
National Financial Services, LLC, Fidelity Investments (Oct. 4, 
2016) (``Fidelity Letter'').
    \5\ See Letter from Rick A. Fleming, Investor Advocate, Office 
of the Investor Advocate, to Commission (Nov. 7, 2016) (``Investor 
Advocate Letter'').
    \6\ See Letter from Michael L. Post, General Counsel-Regulatory 
Affairs, MSRB, to Secretary, Commission, dated November 14, 2016 
(``MSRB Response'').
    \7\ Amendment No. 1 is available on the Commission's Web site 
at: https://www.sec.gov/comments/sr-msrb-2016-12/msrb2016-12-11.pdf.
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II. Description of the Proposal, as Modified by Amendment No. 1

A. Background

    The MSRB proposes to amend Rule G-15, on confirmation, clearance 
and other uniform practice requirements with respect to customer 
transactions, and Rule G-30, on prices and commissions to require 
dealers to disclose mark-ups and mark-downs to retail customers on 
certain principal transactions and to provide dealers guidance on 
prevailing market price for the purpose of calculating mark-ups and 
mark-downs and other Rule G-30 determinations.\8\ The MSRB also 
proposes to require for all transactions in municipal securities with 
retail customers, irrespective of whether mark-up/mark-down disclosure 
is required, that a dealer provide on the confirmation (1) a reference, 
and hyperlink if the confirmation is electronic, to a Web page hosted 
by the MSRB that contains publicly available trading data from the 
MSRB's Electronic Municipal Market Access (``EMMA'') system for the 
specific security that was traded, in a format specified by the MSRB, 
along with a brief description of the type of information available on 
that page; and (2) the execution time of the customer transaction, 
expressed to the minute.\9\
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    \8\ See Notice, supra note 3. For ease of reference, a ``non-
institutional customer'' is also alternatively referred to as a 
``retail customer'' or ``retail investor,'' which, among others is 
not included in the definition of an institutional customer.
    \9\ See Amendment No. 1, supra note 7, at 4-5. See also Notice, 
supra note 3, at 16 n.29. The MSRB also proposes in Amendment No. 1. 
to add the term ``offsetting'' to proposed Rule G-15(a)(i)(F)(1)(b) 
to conform the rule language to the language used to discuss 
conditions that trigger the disclosure requirement, and extend the 
implementation period of the proposal from no later than one year to 
no later than 18 months.
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    The MSRB developed this proposal, as modified by Amendment No. 1, 
in coordination with the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority 
(``FINRA'') to advance the goal of providing additional pricing 
information, including transaction cost information, to retail 
customers in corporate, agency, and municipal debt securities.\10\ The 
MSRB and FINRA have worked toward consistent rule requirements in this 
area, as appropriate, to minimize the operational burdens for dealers 
that are registered with the MSRB and FINRA members that transact in 
multiple types of fixed income securities.\11\ The MSRB's proposal, as 
modified by Amendment No. 1, is before the Commission following a 
process in which the MSRB solicited comment on related proposals on 
three separate occasions and subsequently incorporated modifications 
designed to address commenters' concerns after each solicitation.\12\
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    \10\ See, e.g., Notice, supra note 3, at 62949, 62962.
    \11\ FINRA has filed with the Commission a proposal and 
amendment that is substantially similar to this proposal, as 
modified by Amendment No. 1. See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 
78573 (Aug. 15, 2016), 81 FR 55500 (Aug. 19, 2016) (SR-FINRA-2016-
032) (``FINRA Proposal''); see also FINRA Amendment No. 1, available 
at: https://www.sec.gov/comments/sr-finra-2016-032/finra2016032-13.pdf.
    \12\ See MSRB Response, supra note 6, at 2.
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1. Confirmation Disclosure of Pricing Information
    In November, 2014, the MSRB, concurrently with FINRA, published a 
regulatory notice requesting comment on a proposal (the ``Initial 
Proposal'') to require disclosure of pricing information for certain 
same-day, retail-sized principal transactions.\13\ In the Initial 
Proposal, the MSRB proposed to

[[Page 84638]]

require a dealer to disclose on the customer confirmation its trade 
price for a defined ``reference transaction'' as well as the difference 
in price between the reference transaction and the customer trade.\14\ 
The MSRB characterized a reference transaction generally as one in 
which the dealer, as principal, purchases or sells the same security 
that is the subject of the confirmation on the same date as the 
customer trade.\15\ Under the Initial Proposal, the disclosure 
obligation would have been triggered only where the dealer was on the 
same side of the transaction as the customer (as purchaser or seller) 
and the size of such dealer transaction(s), in total, equaled or 
exceeded the size of the customer transaction.\16\ Designed to capture 
transactions with retail investors, the Initial Proposal's proposed 
disclosure obligation was limited to transactions of 100 bonds or less 
or bonds with a face value of $100,000 or less.\17\
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    \13\ See MSRB Regulatory Notice 2014-20, Request for Comment on 
Draft Rule Amendments to Require Dealers to Provide Pricing 
Reference Information on Retail Customer Confirmations (Nov. 17, 
2014), available at: http://www.msrb.org/~/media/files/regulatory-
notices/rfcs/2014-20.ashx. The Initial Proposal was published 
concurrently with a similar proposal by FINRA. See also FINRA 
Regulatory Notice 14-52, Pricing Disclosure in the Fixed Income 
Markets: FINRA Requests Comment on a Proposed Rule Requiring 
Confirmation Disclosure of Pricing Information in Fixed Income 
Securities Transactions (Nov. 2014), available at: http://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/notice_doc_file_ref/Notice_Regulatory_14-52.pdf.
    \14\ See Initial Proposal, supra note 13, at 8.
    \15\ Id.
    \16\ Id.
    \17\ Id. at 9-10.
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    As more fully summarized in the Notice, the MSRB received a number 
of comments on the Initial Proposal.\18\ Some commenters supported the 
Initial Proposal, stating that the proposed confirmation disclosure 
would put investors in a better position to assess both whether they 
are paying fair prices and the quality of the services provided by 
their dealer, and also could assist investors in detecting improper 
practices.\19\ Some of these commenters urged the MSRB to expand the 
Initial Proposal so that it would apply to all trades involving retail 
investors.\20\ But many commenters were critical of the Initial 
Proposal. Some commenters critical of the Initial Proposal believed 
that the proposed disclosure obligation would confuse retail investors, 
fail in its attempt to provide investors with useful information, be 
overly complex and costly for dealers to implement, and impair 
liquidity in the municipal securities market.\21\
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    \18\ See Notice, supra note 3, at 62958 (summarizing comments 
received by the MSRB on the Initial Proposal).
    \19\ Id.
    \20\ Id.
    \21\ Id.
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    In response to the comments received on the Initial Proposal, the 
MSRB made several modifications and solicited comment on a revised 
proposal (the ``Revised Proposal'').\22\ In the Revised Proposal, the 
MSRB proposed to depart from the ``reference price'' approach and 
instead require that dealers disclose the amount of mark-up/mark-down 
from the prevailing market price for certain retail customer 
transactions.\23\ Specifically, the MSRB proposed to require a dealer 
to disclose its mark-up/mark-down if the dealer bought (sold) the 
security in one or more transactions in an aggregate trade size that 
met or exceeded the size of the sale (purchase) to (from) the non-
institutional customer within two hours of the customer 
transaction.\24\ The disclosed mark-up/mark-down would be required to 
be expressed both as a total dollar amount and as a percentage of the 
PMP.\25\ Additionally, the MSRB proposed to require the disclosure of 
two additional data points on all trade confirmations, even those for 
which mark-up/mark-down disclosure was not required: a security-
specific hyperlink to the publicly available municipal security trade 
data on EMMA, and the time of execution of the customer's trade.\26\
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    \22\ See MSRB Regulatory Notice 15-16, Request for Comment on 
Draft Rule Amendments to Require Confirmation Disclosure of Mark-ups 
for Specified Principal Transactions with Retail Customers (Sept. 
24, 2015) (``Revised Proposal''), available at: http://www.msrb.org/
~/media/files/regulatory-notices/rfcs/2015-16.ashx.
    \23\ Id. at 5-6.
    \24\ Id. at 7-8.
    \25\ Id. at 24.
    \26\ Id. at 7-8.
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    In response to similar comments received on its initial proposal, 
FINRA also made several modifications and solicited comment on a 
revised proposal.\27\ These modifications, reflected in FINRA's revised 
proposal, were designed to ensure that the disclosure applied to 
transactions with retail investors, enhanced the utility of the 
disclosure, and reduced the operational complexity of providing the 
disclosure.\28\
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    \27\ FINRA Regulatory Notice 15-36, Pricing Disclosure in the 
Fixed Income Markets: FINRA Requests Comment on a Revised Proposal 
Requiring Confirmation Disclosure of Pricing Information in 
Corporate and Agency Debt Securities Transactions (Oct. 2015) 
(``FINRA Revised Proposal''), available at: http://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/notice_doc_file_ref/Regulatory-Notice-15-36.pdf.
    \28\ See FINRA Proposal, supra note 11, at 55508 (explaining 
FINRA's modifications to its initial proposal in its revised 
proposal). FINRA's Revised Proposal included the following 
revisions: (i) Replacing the ``qualifying size'' requirement with an 
exclusion for transactions with institutional accounts, as defined 
in FINRA Rule 4512(c); (ii) excluding transactions which are part of 
fixed-price offerings on the first trading day and which are sold at 
the fixed-price offering price; (iii) excluding firm-side 
transactions that are conducted by a department or trading desk that 
is functionally separate from the retail-side trading desk; (iv) 
excluding trades where the member's principal trade was executed 
with an affiliate of the member and the affiliate's position that 
satisfied this trade was not acquired on the same trading day; (v) 
requiring members to provide a hyperlink to publicly available 
corporate and agency debt security trade data disseminated from 
TRACE on the customer confirmation; (vi) permitting members to omit 
the reference price in the event of a material change in the price 
of the security between the time of the member's principal trade and 
the customer trade; and (vii) permitting members to use alternative 
methodologies to determine the reference price in complex trade 
scenarios, provided the methodologies were adequately documented, 
and consistently applied. See FINRA Revised Proposal, supra note 27.
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    Although the MSRB and FINRA took different approaches in their 
revised proposals--diverging primarily on the questions of whether to 
require disclosure of reference price or mark-up/mark-down, and whether 
to specify a same-day or two-hour time frame--each acknowledged the 
importance of achieving a consistent approach and invited comments on 
the relative merits and shortcomings of both approaches.\29\ Following 
a second round of comments, publication of a third related proposal by 
the MSRB,\30\ as well as investor testing conducted jointly by the MSRB 
and FINRA in mid-2016, the MSRB and FINRA made a third round of 
revisions to achieve a consistent approach and filed the proposed rule 
changes that are before the Commission.
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    \29\ See Revised Proposal, supra note 22. In the Revised 
Proposal, consistent with FINRA, proposed that certain categories of 
transactions be excluded from the disclosure requirement, including 
(i) transactions with institutional accounts; (ii) firm-side 
transactions if conducted by a ``functionally separate principal 
trading desk'' that had no knowledge of the non-institutional 
customer transaction; and (iii) customer transactions at list 
offering prices. For trades with an affiliate of the firm, the MSRB 
also proposed to ``look through'' the firm's trade with the 
affiliate to the affiliate's trade with the third party for purposes 
of determining whether disclosure would be required. See id. at 9, 
23.; see also FINRA Revised Proposal, supra note 27.
    \30\ See MSRB Regulatory Notice 2016-07, Request for Comment on 
Draft Amendments to MSRB Rule G-30 to Provide Guidance on Prevailing 
Market Price (Feb. 18, 2016), (``PMP Proposal''), available at: 
http://www.msrb.org/~/media/Files/Regulatory-Notices/RFCs/2016-
07.ashx.
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2. Prevailing Market Price Guidance
    In February, 2016, the MSRB published the PMP Proposal soliciting 
comment on proposed amendments to Rule G-30 to incorporate therein 
supplemental material to provide guidance on establishing the 
prevailing market price and calculating mark-ups and mark-downs for 
principal transactions in municipal securities.\31\ In the PMP 
Proposal, the MSRB generally proposed that the prevailing market price 
of a municipal security be presumptively established by referring to 
the dealer's contemporaneous cost as incurred, or contemporaneous 
proceeds as obtained.\32\ If this presumption is either inapplicable or 
successfully rebutted, the prevailing market price would generally be 
determined by

[[Page 84639]]

referring in sequence to: (1) A hierarchy of pricing factors, including 
contemporaneous inter-dealer transaction prices, and, if the subject 
security is an actively traded security, contemporaneous inter-dealer 
quotations; (2) prices or yields of contemporaneous inter-dealer or 
institutional transactions in similar securities, and yields from 
validated contemporaneous quotations in similar securities; and (3) 
economic models.\33\
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    \31\ Id.
    \32\ Id. at 4.
    \33\ Id. at 6-7.
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    As more fully summarized in the Notice, the MSRB received a number 
of comments on the PMP Proposal.\34\ One commenter supported the PMP 
Proposal, stating that the proposed guidance was generally useful, 
clear, and consistent with the existing FINRA prevailing market price 
guidance, but also noted its concern that the PMP Proposal could permit 
a dealer to determine a misleading prevailing market price when a 
dealer sources a municipal security from an affiliated entity.\35\ 
Other commenters were critical of the PMP Proposal. Some commenters 
argued that the hierarchical approach was inappropriate, that the 
guidance should incorporate more factors for dealers to consider, and 
that the guidance should have a more limited scope of 
applicability.\36\ More generally, commenters suggested that the MSRB 
coordinate its efforts with respect to the PMP Proposal with FINRA to 
develop prevailing market price guidance that is consistent with 
FINRA's existing guidance in the supplementary material to FINRA Rule 
2121.\37\ In response to comments received, the MSRB modified or 
clarified several aspects of the PMP Proposal and filed the proposed 
rule change that is before the Commission.\38\ The modifications and 
clarifications reflected in the Notice were designed to make the 
prevailing market price guidance generally less subjective and more 
easily susceptible to programming, and, at the same time, provide 
dealers with a greater degree of flexibility with respect to certain 
elements of the prevailing market price guidance, thus making the PMP 
Proposal's hierarchical approach more appropriate for the municipal 
securities market.\39\
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    \34\ See Notice, supra note 3, at 62961-62.
    \35\ Id. at 62961.
    \36\ Id. at 62961-62.
    \37\ Id. at 62962.
    \38\ Id.
    \39\ Id.
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B. Proposed Amendments to Rule G-15 and Rule G-30

1. Mark-Up/Mark-Down Proposal
a. Overview
    The MSRB proposes to amend Rule G-15, on confirmation, clearance, 
settlement and other uniform practice requirements with respect to 
customer transactions. In particular, proposed Rule G-15(a) would 
require that a retail customer confirmation for a transaction in a 
municipal security includes the dealer's mark-up/mark-down, to be 
calculated from the prevailing market price (as determined in 
compliance with the proposed amendments to Rule G-30) and expressed as 
a total dollar amount and as a percentage of the prevailing market 
price, if the dealer also executes one or more offsetting principal 
transaction(s) on the same trading day as the retail customer, on the 
same side of the market as the retail customer, in an aggregate size 
that meets or exceeds the size of the retail customer trade.\40\ The 
MSRB also proposes to require for all transactions in municipal 
securities with retail customers, irrespective of whether mark-up 
disclosure is required, that the dealer provide on the confirmation (1) 
a reference, and if the confirmation is electronic, a hyperlink, to a 
Web page hosted by the MSRB that contains publicly available trading 
data from the MSRB's EMMA system for the specific security that was 
traded, in a format specified by the MSRB, along with a brief 
description of the type of information available on that page; and (2) 
the execution time of the customer transaction, expressed to the 
minute.\41\
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    \40\ See Amendment No. 1, supra note 7, at 15.
    \41\ Id. at 14. As the MSRB indicated in the MSRB Response, a 
dealer's existing obligation to disclose the time to trade execution 
to an institutional customer upon written request is not affected by 
the proposed rule change. See MSRB Response, supra note 6, at 5-6.
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    Proposed Rule G-15(a) would specify limited exceptions to the mark-
up disclosure obligation,\42\ and would address how a dealer's 
transaction with an affiliate is to be considered.\43\
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    \42\ See Notice, supra note 3, at 62949-50.
    \43\ Id. at 62949.
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b. Scope
    Under proposed Rule G-15(a), the mark-up disclosure requirement 
would, subject to certain exceptions, apply to transactions in 
municipal securities where the dealer buys (or sells) a municipal 
security on a principal basis from (or to) a retail customer and 
engages in one or more offsetting principal trade(s) on the same 
trading day in the same security where the size of the dealer's 
offsetting principal trade(s), in aggregate, equals or exceeds the size 
of the retail customer trade.\44\ A retail customer would be a customer 
with an account that is not an institutional account, as defined in 
Rule G-8(a)(xi) (i.e., a non-institutional account).\45\ The proposed 
mark-up disclosure requirement would apply to transactions in municipal 
securities, other than municipal fund securities (as defined in MSRB 
Rule D-12).\46\ The disclosure obligation would similarly not be 
required to be disclosed if the retail customer transaction is a list 
offering transaction (as defined in paragraph (d)(vii)(A) of Rule G-14 
RTRS Procedures), or if a dealer's offsetting same-day principal 
transaction was executed by a trading desk that is functionally 
separate from the dealer's trading desk that executed the transaction 
with the retail customer.\47\
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    \44\ Id. at 62947.
    \45\ Id. at 62948 & n.14.
    \46\ Id. at 62950.
    \47\ Id. at 62949-50.
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    Discussing the rationale for the mark-up disclosure requirement, 
the MSRB states that the proposed rule change would provide meaningful 
pricing information to retail investors, who would most benefit from 
such disclosure, while not imposing unduly burdensome disclosure 
requirements on dealers.\48\ Furthermore, the MSRB states its belief 
that requiring disclosure for retail customers would be appropriate 
because such customers typically have less ready access to market and 
pricing information than institutional customers.\49\
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    \48\ Id. at 62948.
    \49\ Id. at 62948-49.
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    With respect to the same-trading-day timeframe of the proposed 
disclosure obligation, the MSRB states that it believes that the 
timeframe is appropriate because it will generally make a dealer's 
determination of the prevailing market price easier.\50\ Additionally, 
the MSRB emphasizes that the same-trading-day timeframe, as opposed to 
the two-hour timeframe previously proposed, would produce the added 
benefits of ensuring that more investors receive the disclosure and 
reducing the likelihood that dealers would alter their trading behavior 
to avoid the proposed disclosure requirement.\51\
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    \50\ Id. at 62949.
    \51\ Id. at 62949 & n.18.
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    For purposes of determining whether the mark-up disclosure 
requirement is triggered, proposed Rule G-15(a) also addresses how 
dealer transactions with affiliates are to be considered. If a dealer

[[Page 84640]]

executes an offsetting principal trade(s) with an affiliate, the rule 
would require the dealer to determine whether the transaction was an 
``arms-length transaction.'' \52\ The proposed rule defines an arms-
length transaction as ``a transaction that was conducted through a 
competitive process in which non-affiliate dealers could also 
participate, and where the affiliate relationship did not influence the 
price paid or proceeds received by the dealer.'' \53\ If the 
transaction is not an arms-length transaction, the proposed rule would 
require the dealer to ``look through'' its transaction in a security 
with its affiliate to the affiliate's transaction(s) with a third-party 
in the security to determine whether the proposed mark-up disclosure 
requirement would apply.\54\ The MSRB states that sourcing liquidity 
through a non-arms-length transaction with an affiliate is functionally 
equivalent to selling out of a dealer's inventory for purposes of the 
proposed disclosure requirement, and, therefore, it would be 
appropriate in those circumstances to require a dealer to ``look 
through'' to the affiliate's transaction(s) with a third-party to 
determine whether the proposed disclosure requirement is triggered.\55\
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    \52\ Id. at 62949.
    \53\ See Amendment No. 1, supra note 7, at 16.
    \54\ See Notice, supra note 3, at 62949. The MSRB adds that, in 
a non-arm's length transaction with an affiliate, the dealer also 
would be required to ``look through'' to the affiliate's transaction 
with a third-party and related cost or proceeds by the affiliate as 
the basis for determining the dealer's calculation of the mark-up/
mark-down pursuant to the proposed guidance. See id.
    \55\ Id.
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    The proposed rule change also specifies three exceptions from the 
proposed disclosure requirement. First, if the offsetting same-day 
principal trade was executed by a trading desk that is functionally 
separate from the dealer's trading desk that executed the transaction 
with the retail customer, the principal trade by the functionally 
separate trading desk would not trigger the mark-up disclosure 
requirement.\56\ To avail itself of this exception, the dealer must 
have in place policies and procedures reasonably designed to ensure 
that the functionally separate trading desk through which the dealer 
purchase or sale was executed had no knowledge of the retail customer 
transaction.\57\ According to the MSRB, this exception would allow an 
institutional desk within a dealer to service an institutional customer 
without triggering the disclosure requirement for an unrelated trade 
performed by a separate retail desk with the dealer.\58\ The MSRB 
states that this exception is appropriate because it recognizes the 
operational cost and complexity that may result from using a dealer 
principal trade executed by a separate, unrelated trading desk as the 
basis for determining whether the mark-up disclosure requirement would 
be triggered.\59\ Moreover, the MSRB notes its belief that requiring 
dealers to have policies and procedures in place that are reasonably 
designed to ensure that the separate trading desk had no knowledge of 
the retail customer transaction is a sufficiently rigorous safeguard to 
protect against potential abuse of this exception.\60\
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    \56\ Id. at 62949-50.
    \57\ Id. at 62950.
    \58\ Id. at 62949-50.
    \59\ Id. at 62949.
    \60\ Id. at 62950.
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    The second exception to the proposed mark-up disclosure requirement 
arises in the context of list-offering price transactions (as defined 
in paragraph (d)(vii)(A) of MSRB Rule G-14 RTRS Procedures).\61\ 
According to the MSRB, municipal securities purchased as part of a 
list-offering transaction are sold at the same published list offering 
price to all investors and the compensation paid to a dealer is paid by 
the issuer of the municipal securities and is typically described in 
the offering document for such securities.\62\ The MSRB notes, 
therefore, that the proposed mark-up disclosure would not be warranted 
for list-offering price transactions.\63\
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    \61\ Id.
    \62\ Id.
    \63\ Id.
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    The third exception to the proposed mark-up disclosure requirement 
arises when a dealer transacts in municipal fund securities.\64\ 
Specifically, the proposed mark-up disclosure requirement would not 
apply to transactions in municipal fund securities.\65\ According to 
the MSRB, dealer compensation for municipal fund securities 
transactions is typically not in the form of a mark-up or mark-down 
and, therefore, the MSRB believes that the proposed mark-up disclosure 
requirement would not have application for transactions in municipal 
fund securities.\66\
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    \64\ Id.
    \65\ Id.
    \66\ Id.
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c. Information To Be Disclosed and/or Provided
i. Mark-Up/Mark-Down
    Proposed Rule G-15(a) would require the dealer's mark-up or mark-
down to be calculated in compliance with Rule G-30 and supplementary 
material thereunder, including proposed Supplementary Material .06, and 
expressed as a total dollar amount and as a percentage of the 
prevailing market price.\67\ The MSRB notes that disclosure of both the 
total dollar amount and the percentage of the PMP is supported by 
investor testing, which found the investors believed such disclosures 
would be useful.\68\ According to the MSRB, it would be appropriate to 
require dealers to calculate the mark-up in compliance with Rule G-30, 
as new Supplementary Material .06 would provide extensive guidance on 
how to calculate the mark-up for transactions in municipal securities, 
including transactions for which disclosure would be required under the 
proposed rule change, and incorporates a presumption that prevailing 
market price is established by reference to contemporaneous cost or 
proceeds.\69\ The MSRB recognizes that the determination of prevailing 
market price for a particular security may not be identical across 
dealers, but adds that dealers would be expected to have reasonable 
policies and procedures in place to determine prevailing market price 
in a manner consistent with Rule G-30, and that such policies and 
procedures would be applied consistently across customers.\70\
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    \67\ Id.
    \68\ Id. at 62956.
    \69\ Id. at 62950.
    \70\ Id.
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    In the Notice, the MSRB acknowledges that certain dealers provide 
trade confirmations on an intra-day basis, and states that nothing in 
the proposed rule change is meant to delay a dealer's confirmation 
generation process.\71\ To that end, the MSRB states that a dealer may 
determine, as a final matter for disclosure purposes, the prevailing 
market price based on the information the dealer has, based on the use 
of reasonable diligence as required by proposed Rule G-30, at the time 
of the dealer's generation of the disclosure.\72\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \71\ Id.
    \72\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

ii. Reference/Hyperlink to EMMA and Time of Trade
    The proposed rule change, as modified by Amendment No. 1, would 
require a dealer to provide, in a format specified by the MSRB, a 
reference and, if the confirmation is electronic, a hyperlink to a Web 
page on EMMA that contains publicly available trading data for the 
specific security that was traded, along with a brief description of 
the type of information available on the

[[Page 84641]]

page.\73\ This disclosure requirement would be limited to transactions 
with retail customers, but would apply to all such transactions 
regardless of whether a mark-up disclosure is required for the 
transaction.\74\ According to the MSRB, providing a security-specific 
URL on a trade confirmation would provide retail investors with a broad 
picture of the market for a security on a given day and would increase 
retail investor awareness of, and ability to access, this 
information.\75\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \73\ See Amendment No. 1, supra note 7, at 14.
    \74\ See Notice, supra note 3, at 62950-51.
    \75\ Id. at 62951.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposed rule change, as modified by Amendment No. 1, would 
also require a dealer to disclose the time of trade execution 
(expressed to the minute) on all retail customer trade confirmations, 
other than those for transactions in municipal fund securities.\76\ 
According to the MSRB, dealers are currently obligated to either 
disclose the time of execution to their customers or include a 
statement on trade confirmations that such information is available 
upon written request thereof, and the proposed rule change essentially 
deletes the option to provide this information upon request with 
respect to retail customers.\77\ The MSRB believes that time of 
execution disclosure, together with the provision of a security-
specific reference or hyperlink to EMMA on retail customer 
confirmations, would provide a retail customer a comprehensive view of 
the market for its security, including the market at the time of 
trade.\78\ Moreover, the MSRB states that these disclosures would also 
reduce the risk that a customer may overly focus on dealer compensation 
at the expense of other factors relevant to the investment 
decision.\79\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \76\ Id.; See Amendment No. 1, supra note 7, at 14.
    \77\ See Notice, supra note 3, at 62951.
    \78\ Id.
    \79\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Prevailing Market Price Proposal
a. Overview
    The MSRB proposes to add new supplementary material (paragraph .06 
entitled--``Mark-up Policy'') and amend existing supplementary material 
under Rule G-30, on prices and commissions, to provide guidance on 
determining the prevailing market price and calculating mark-ups and 
mark-downs for principal transactions in municipal securities (the 
``proposed guidance'').\80\ According to the MSRB, the proposed 
guidance would promote consistent compliance by dealers with their 
existing fair-pricing obligations under MSRB rules in a manner that 
would be generally harmonized with the approach taken in other fixed 
income markets, and would support effective compliance with the 
proposed amendments to Rule G-15(a).\81\ The proposed guidance sets 
forth a sequence of criteria and procedures that a dealer must consider 
when determining the prevailing market price for a municipal security.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \80\ Id.
    \81\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In general, the proposed guidance provides that the prevailing 
market price of a municipal security be presumptively determined by 
referring to the dealer's contemporaneous cost as incurred, or 
contemporaneous proceeds as obtained; provided, however, if this 
presumption is either inapplicable or successfully rebutted, the dealer 
must, among other things, consider, in order (1) a hierarchy of pricing 
factors, including contemporaneous inter-dealer transaction prices, 
and, if the subject security is an actively traded security, 
contemporaneous inter-dealer quotations; (2) prices or yields from 
contemporaneous inter-dealer or institutional transactions in similar 
securities, and yields from validated contemporaneous quotations in 
similar securities; and (3) economic models.\82\ The MSRB states that 
the presumption in favor of contemporaneous costs incurred or proceeds 
obtained could be overcome in limited circumstances.\83\ Moreover, the 
MSRB notes that the proposed guidance is substantially similar to and 
generally harmonized with FINRA's existing prevailing market price 
guidance in the supplementary material to FINRA Rule 2121.\84\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \82\ Id. at 62952-54.
    \83\ Id. at 62952.
    \84\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

b. Presumptive Use of Contemporaneous Cost
    The proposed guidance provides that the best measure of prevailing 
market price is presumptively established by referring to the dealer's 
contemporaneous cost (proceeds).\85\ Under the proposed guidance, a 
dealer's cost is (or proceeds are) considered contemporaneous if the 
transaction occurs close enough in time to the subject transaction that 
it would reasonably be expected to reflect the current market price for 
the municipal security.\86\ According to the MSRB, reference to a 
dealer's contemporaneous cost or proceeds in determining the prevailing 
market price reflects a recognition of the principle that the prices 
paid or received for a security by a dealer in actual transactions 
closely related in time are normally a highly reliable indicator of the 
prevailing market price and that the burden is appropriately on the 
dealer to establish the contrary.\87\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \85\ Id.
    \86\ Id.
    \87\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In the Notice, the MSRB provides guidance to dealers for 
determining the prevailing market price for a municipal security when a 
dealer does not have contemporaneous cost or proceeds from an inter-
dealer transaction, but instead has contemporaneous cost or proceeds 
from a retail customer transaction. According to the MSRB, when a 
dealer's contemporaneous cost or proceeds are derived from a retail 
customer transaction, the dealer should refer to such contemporaneous 
cost or proceeds and make an adjustment for any mark-up or mark-down 
charged in that customer transaction.\88\ The MSRB notes that this 
approach is supported by relevant case law and is consistent with the 
text of the proposed guidance because under the proposed guidance the 
presumptive prevailing market price is, through this methodology, 
established ``by referring to'' the dealer's contemporaneous cost or 
proceeds.\89\ Moreover, the MSRB notes that this approach is consistent 
with the fundamental principle underlying the proposed guidance because 
it results in a reasonable proxy for what the dealer's contemporaneous 
cost or proceeds would have been in an inter-dealer transaction.\90\ 
Finally, the MSRB states that because this adjustment occurs at the 
first level of the analysis, the prevailing market price so determined 
from this methodology by the dealer would be presumed to be the 
prevailing market price for any contemporaneous transactions with the 
same strength of the presumption that applies to prices from inter-
dealer transactions.\91\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \88\ Id. at 62954.
    \89\ Id.
    \90\ Id.
    \91\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

c. Criteria for Overcoming Presumption
    The proposed guidance recognizes that a dealer may look to other 
evidence of the prevailing market price (other than contemporaneous 
cost or contemporaneous proceeds) only where the dealer, when selling 
(or buying) the security, made no contemporaneous purchases (sales) in 
the municipal security or can show that in the particular circumstances 
the dealer's contemporaneous cost (proceeds) is not indicative of the 
prevailing market

[[Page 84642]]

price.\92\ In such circumstances, the dealer may be able to show that 
its contemporaneous cost (when it is making a sale to a customer) or 
proceeds (when it is making a purchase from a customer) are not 
indicative of the prevailing market price, and thus overcome the 
presumption, in instances where: (i) Interest rates changed to a degree 
that such change would reasonably cause a change in the municipal 
security's pricing; (ii) the credit quality of the municipal security 
changed significantly; or (iii) news was issued or otherwise 
distributed and known to the marketplace that had an effect on the 
perceived value of the municipal security.\93\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \92\ Id. at 62952.
    \93\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

d. Pricing Alternatives to Contemporaneous Cost
    Under the proposed guidance, if a dealer establishes that its cost 
is (or proceeds are) not contemporaneous or if the dealer has overcome 
the presumption that its contemporaneous cost (proceeds) provides the 
best measure of the prevailing market price, the dealer must consider, 
in the order listed (subject to Supplementary Material .06(a)(viii), on 
isolated transactions and quotations), a hierarchy of three additional 
types of pricing information, referred to herein as the hierarchy of 
pricing factors: (i) Prices of any contemporaneous inter-dealer 
transactions in the municipal security; (ii) prices of contemporaneous 
dealer purchases (or sales) in the municipal security from (or to) 
institutional accounts with which any dealer regularly effects 
transactions in the same municipal security; or (iii) if an actively 
traded security, contemporaneous bid (or offer) quotations for the 
municipal security made through an inter-dealer mechanism, through 
which transactions generally occur at displayed quotations.\94\ The 
proposed guidance further provides that in reviewing the available 
pricing information for each level in the hierarchy of pricing factors, 
the relative weight of the information depends on the facts and 
circumstances of the comparison transaction or quotation.\95\ The MSRB 
also states that because of the lack of active trading in many 
municipal securities, these factors may frequently not be available, 
and, as such, dealers may often need to consult factors further down 
the sequence of criteria, such as ``similar'' securities or economic 
models to identify sufficient relevant and probative pricing 
information to establish the prevailing market price of a municipal 
security.\96\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \94\ Id.
    \95\ Id.
    \96\ Id. at 62952-53.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

e. Additional Alternatives to Contemporaneous Cost
    If none of the three ``hierarchy of pricing factors'' is available, 
the proposed guidance provides that a dealer may take into 
consideration a non-exclusive list of factors that are generally 
analogous to those set forth under the hierarchy of pricing factors, 
but applied here to prices and yields of specifically defined 
``similar'' securities.\97\ Unlike the factors set forth in the 
hierarchy of pricing factors, which must be considered in specified 
order, the factors related to similar securities are not required to be 
considered in any particular order or combination.\98\ The non-
exclusive factors are:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \97\ Id. at 62953.
    \98\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     Prices, or yields calculated from prices, of 
contemporaneous inter-dealer transactions in a specifically defined 
``similar'' municipal security;
     Prices, or yields calculated from prices, of 
contemporaneous dealer purchase (sale) transactions in a ``similar'' 
municipal security with institutional accounts with which any dealer 
regularly effects transactions in the ``similar'' municipal security 
with respect to customer mark-ups (mark-downs); and
     Yields calculated from validated contemporaneous inter-
dealer bid (offer) quotations in ``similar'' municipal securities for 
customer mark-ups (mark-downs).\99\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \99\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    With respect to the similar security analysis, the MSRB states that 
the relative weight of the pricing information obtained through this 
analysis depends on the facts and circumstances surrounding the 
comparison transaction, such as whether the dealer in the comparison 
transaction was on the same side of the market as the dealer in the 
subject transaction, the timeliness of the information, and, with 
respect to the final bulleted factor, the relative spread of the 
quotations in the similar municipal security to the quotations in the 
subject security.\100\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \100\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposed guidance provides that a ``similar'' municipal 
security should be sufficiently similar to the subject security that it 
would serve as a reasonable alternative investment for the 
investor.\101\ At a minimum, the municipal security or securities 
should be sufficiently similar that a market yield for the subject 
security can be fairly estimated from the yields of the ``similar'' 
security or securities.\102\ The proposed guidance also sets forth a 
set of non-exclusive factors that a dealer may use in determining the 
degree to which a security is ``similar.'' \103\ These include: (i) 
Credit quality considerations; (ii) the extent to which the spread at 
which the ``similar'' municipal security trades is comparable to the 
spread at which the subject security trades; (iii) general structural 
characteristics and provisions of the issue; (iv) technical factors 
such as the size of the issue, the float or recent turnover of the 
issue, and legal restrictions on transferability as compared to the 
subject security; and (v) the extent to which the federal and/or state 
tax treatment of the ``similar'' municipal security is comparable to 
such tax treatment of the subject security.\104\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \101\ Id.
    \102\ Id.
    \103\ Id.
    \104\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Due to the unique characteristics of the municipal securities 
market, the MSRB expects that in order for a security to qualify as 
sufficiently ``similar'' to the subject security, such security will 
have to be at least highly similar to the subject security with respect 
to nearly all of the listed ``similar'' security factors that are 
relevant to the subject security at issue.\105\ The MSRB believes that 
recognizing this practical aspect of the municipal securities market 
supports a more rational comparison of a municipal security to only 
those that are likely to produce relevant and probative pricing 
information in determining the prevailing market price of the subject 
security.\106\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \105\ Id.
    \106\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

f. Economic Models
    If it is not possible to obtain information concerning the 
prevailing market price of the subject security by applying any of the 
factors discussed above, the proposed guidance permits a dealer to 
consider as a factor in assessing the prevailing market price of a 
security the prices or yields derived from economic models.\107\ Under 
the proposed guidance, such economic models may take into account 
measures such as reported trade prices, credit quality, interest rates, 
industry sector, time to maturity, call provisions and any other 
embedded options, coupon

[[Page 84643]]

rate, face value, and may consider all applicable pricing terms and 
conventions used.\108\ Further, the proposed guidance, as clarified in 
the MSRB Response, requires that when a dealer utilizes a third-party 
pricing model it must have a reasonable basis for believing that the 
third-party pricing service's pricing methodologies produce evaluated 
prices that reflect actual prevailing market prices.\109\ In the MSRB 
Response, the MSRB cautions dealers that they have the ultimate 
responsibility to determine the market value of a security and ensure 
the fairness and reasonableness of a price and any related mark-up or 
mark-down, and suggests that a dealer, in conducting its due diligence 
on a pricing service, may wish to consider the inputs, methods, models, 
and assumptions used by the pricing service to determine its evaluated 
prices, and how these criteria are affected as market conditions 
change.\110\ The MSRB contrasts its treatment of a dealer's use of an 
economic model provided by a third-party with the standard for a 
dealer's use of an economic model that the dealer uses or has developed 
internally. If a dealer relies on pricing information from an economic 
model the dealer uses or developed internally, the dealer must be able 
to provide information that was used on the day of the transaction to 
develop the pricing information (i.e., the data that were input and the 
data that the model generated and the dealer used to arrive at the 
prevailing market price).\111\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \107\ Id.
    \108\ Id.
    \109\ See MSRB Response, supra note 6, at 9.
    \110\ Id. at 8-9.
    \111\ Id. at 8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

g. Isolated Transactions or Quotations
    Under the proposed guidance, isolated transactions or isolated 
quotations would generally have little or no weight or relevance in 
establishing the prevailing market price of a municipal security.\112\ 
The MSRB notes that due to the unique nature of the municipal 
securities market, isolated transactions and quotations may be more 
prevalent therein than in other fixed income markets, and explicitly 
recognizes that an off-market transaction may qualify as an ``isolated 
transaction'' under the proposed guidance.\113\ Furthermore, the 
proposed guidance also provides that in considering yields of 
``similar'' securities, except in extraordinary circumstances, a dealer 
may not rely exclusively on isolated transactions or a limited number 
of transactions that are not fairly representative of the yields in 
``similar'' municipal securities taken as a whole.\114\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \112\ See Notice, supra note 3, at 62954.
    \113\ Id.
    \114\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

C. Description of Proposed Amendment No. 1

    In response to commenters' suggestions and, in part, to harmonize 
the proposed rule change with the FINRA Proposal, the MSRB proposes in 
Amendment No. 1 to amend the proposed rule change. Specifically, the 
MSRB proposes to amend the proposed rule change to: (1) Clarify the 
trigger requirements for the proposed mark-up disclosure obligation by 
inserting the term ``offsetting'' to proposed Rule G-15(a)(i)(F)(1)(b) 
and thereby make clear the conditions precedent for triggering the 
mark-up disclosure obligation; \115\ (2) replace the requirement for 
dealers to disclose a hyperlink to a specific existing page on EMMA--
the ``Security Details'' page--with a more generic requirement to 
disclose, in a format specified by the MSRB, a reference and, if the 
confirmation is electronic, a hyperlink to a Web page on EMMA that 
contains publicly available trading data for the specific security that 
was traded; \116\ (3) limit a dealer's obligation to disclose the time 
of trade execution to only retail customers, as opposed to retail and 
institutional customers (as proposed in the Notice); \117\ (4) revise 
proposed Supplementary Material .06(b)(ii)(B) under Rule G-30 to 
include reference to ``an applicable index'' and thereby include 
language to address an appropriate spread relied upon for tax-exempt 
municipal securities; \118\ and (5) extend the implementation date for 
the proposed rule change from no later than one year following 
Commission approval of the proposed rule change to no later than 18 
months following the Commission's approval thereof.\119\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \115\ See Amendment No. 1, supra note 7, at 4, 15.
    \116\ Id. at 4-5, 14.
    \117\ Id. at 5, 14.
    \118\ Id. at 5, 20.
    \119\ Id. at 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

D. Effective Date of the Proposed Rule Change

    The MSRB represents that it will announce an effective date of the 
proposed rule change in a regulatory notice to be published no later 
than 90 days following Commission approval of the proposed rule 
change.\120\ The MSRB initially proposed that the effective date would 
be no later than 12 months following Commission approval of the 
proposed rule change. In Amendment No. 1, the MSRB proposes to extend 
the effective date so that it would be 18 months following Commission 
approval of the proposed rule change.\121\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \120\ See Notice, supra note 3, at 62947.
    \121\ See Amendment No. 1, supra note 7, at 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

III. Summary of Comments, MSRB's Response and the Investor Advocate's 
Recommendation

    The Commission received seven comment letters regarding the 
proposed rule change.\122\ Many of the commenters expressed support for 
the goals of the proposal.\123\ Many commenters, however, expressed 
some concern about implementing the proposal and requested guidance or 
certain changes to the proposal to facilitate and reduce the costs of 
implementation.\124\ Areas of concern included: (1) The scope of the 
proposal; (2) methodology and timing for determining the PMP; (3) 
acceptable ways to present mark-up/mark-down disclosure information on 
the customer confirmations; (4) areas of inconsistency with FINRA's 
mark-up disclosure proposal; \125\ and (5) the effective date of the 
proposed rule change and the costs of implementation. Additionally, the 
Investor Advocate submitted to the public comment file its 
recommendation letter (the ``Investor Advocate Letter''), in which the 
Investor Advocate recommended that the Commission approve the proposed 
rule change.\126\ The comments received with respect to this proposal, 
as well as the MSRB's responses, are summarized below, followed by a 
summary of the Investor Advocate Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \122\ See supra note 4 (for list of comment letters).
    \123\ See SIFMA Letter, at 2 (expressing support for the MSRB's 
objective to enhance price transparency for retail investors); Wells 
Fargo Letter, at 3 (supporting the MSRB's efforts to improve price 
transparency in municipal markets); Fidelity Letter, at 2 (noting 
Fidelity's appreciation of regulatory efforts to improve price 
transparency in the fixed income markets); BDA Letter, at 1 
(accepting the value of increasing market and price transparency for 
investors); RW Smith Letter, at 1 (supporting the objective of 
enhancing price transparency for market participants).
    \124\ Two commenters suggested that the MSRB would be best 
served by implementing an alternative disclosure regime focused on 
providing information about prevailing market conditions through 
EMMA. See SIFMA Letter, at 2; Wells Fargo Letter, at 2.
    \125\ See FINRA Proposal, supra note 11.
    \126\ See Investor Advocate Letter, supra note 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

A. Scope of the Proposal

    Several commenters addressed the same-day offsetting trade aspect 
of the proposal's scope. Specifically, commenters raised concerns that 
the same-day nature of the proposal would require a member to look 
forward to transactions occurring after the execution of a retail 
customer trade to determine whether that trade requires mark-up/mark-
down disclosure, and

[[Page 84644]]

that this would impose costs on members and disrupt the confirmation 
process.\127\ One commenter urged the MSRB to eliminate the ``look-
forward requirement'' so dealers could determine the need for 
disclosure at the time of trade.\128\ Another commenter advocated for 
eliminating not only the look-forward aspect of the proposal, but also 
the look-back aspect.\129\ According to this commenter, mark-up/mark-
down disclosure should be calculated by reference to PMP in ``all 
instances'' and provided for all retail customer transactions 
``regardless of their origins.'' \130\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \127\ See Thomson Reuters Letter, at 3; FIF Letter, at 4-6.
    \128\ See Thomson Reuters Letter, at 3. This commenter also 
noted that members choosing to provide mark-up/mark-down disclosure 
on all confirmations in order to ease implementation of the rule 
might hesitate to do so unless they could provide additional text on 
customer confirmations to put the mark-up/mark-down disclosure ``in 
context.'' Id.
    \129\ See FIF Letter, at 4-6.
    \130\ Id. at 4-6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In response, the MSRB stated that, while dealers could incur costs 
to identify trades subject to disclosure, it believed that disclosure 
based on a same-day trigger would deliver important benefits associated 
with increased pricing transparency.\131\ The MSRB also noted that it 
provided guidance in the Notice intended to clarify the timing of the 
mark-up determination for dealers that voluntarily determine to provide 
mark-up disclosure more broadly than specifically required by the 
proposed rule change.\132\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \131\ See MSRB Response, supra note 6, at 3.
    \132\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    One commenter asked whether the confirmation disclosure requirement 
is triggered only when a customer trade has an offsetting principal 
trade or if a dealer must continue to disclose its mark-up/mark-down 
until the triggering trade has been exhausted, at which point the 
dealer may choose to continue to disclose or not.\133\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \133\ See SIFMA Letter, at 1. SIFMA made the identical comment 
in response to the FINRA Proposal. See SIFMA Letter to FINRA 
Proposal (Sept. 9, 2016), at 8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In its response, the MSRB confirmed that there must be offsetting 
customer and principal trades in order to trigger the mark-up 
disclosure obligation.\134\ The MSRB stated that it was submitting 
Amendment No. 1 to ensure rule text clarity on this point by adding the 
word ``offsetting'' to the trigger language.\135\ By way of example, 
the MSRB explained that if a dealer purchased 100 bonds at 9:30 a.m., 
and then satisfied three customer buy orders for 50 bonds each in the 
same security on the same day without purchasing any more of the bonds, 
the proposal would require mark-up disclosure on two of the three 
trades, since one of the trades would have been satisfied by selling 
out of the dealer's inventory rather than through an offsetting 
principal transaction by the dealer.\136\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \134\ See MSRB Response, supra note 6, at 3-4.
    \135\ Id. at 4; see also Amendment No. 1, supra note 7, at 4, 
15.
    \136\ See MSRB Response, supra note 6, at 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    One commenter questioned how the proposal would apply to certain 
small institutions that may fit within the MSRB's definition of ``non-
institutional customer,'' but trade via accounts that settle on a 
delivery versus payment/receive versus payment (DVP/RVP) basis and rely 
on confirmations generated through the Depository Trust and Clearing 
Corporation's institutional delivery (DTCC ID) system.\137\ Because it 
is possible for those institutions to receive confirms through the DTCC 
ID process, the commenter asked the MSRB to clarify whether its 
proposal requires modifications to the DTCC ID system, or, in the 
alternative, to exempt DVP/RVP accounts from the proposed rule 
change.\138\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \137\ See Thomson Reuters Letter, at 2.
    \138\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The MSRB responded that it believes that investors who do not meet 
the ``institutional account'' definition should gain the benefits and 
protections of the proposed disclosures.\139\ Accordingly, the MSRB 
stated that it does not believe exempting certain classes of ``non-
institutional investors'' from receiving the proposed disclosures is 
desirable or consistent with the intended goals of the proposed rule 
change.\140\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \139\ See MSRB Response, supra note 6, at 15.
    \140\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

B. Mark-Up/Mark-Down Disclosure

1. Determination of PMP and Calculation of Mark-Up/Mark-Down in 
Accordance With Rule G-30
    Commenters expressed concern about the need to determine PMP in 
accordance with Rule G-30, believing that this requirement would be 
operationally burdensome.\141\ These commenters requested that the MSRB 
provide additional guidance on how dealers may determine PMP and 
calculate mark-ups/mark-downs to facilitate compliance with this 
rule.\142\ Specifically, two commenters believed that dealers would 
need to automate the determination of PMP, but that automation of 
certain factors in the proposed guidance would be impracticable.\143\ 
One commenter believed that it would be ``simply not practicable'' to 
automate the PMP guidance set forth in Rule G-30 in a manner that would 
allow dealers to calculate and disclose mark-ups/mark-downs on an 
automated basis.\144\ In particular, these commenters emphasized that 
it would be difficult to automate factors in the waterfall that require 
a subjective analysis of facts and circumstances.\145\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \141\ See, e.g., BDA Letter, at 2-3; SIFMA Letter, at 6-8.
    \142\ See BDA Letter, at 2-3; SIFMA Letter, at 6-8.
    \143\ See BDA Letter, at 2-3; SIFMA Letter, at 6.
    \144\ See SIFMA Letter, at 6.
    \145\ See BDA Letter, at 2-3 (identifying the portion of Rule G-
30 that directs dealers to consider ``similar securities'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition, a commenter also requested clarification from the MSRB 
that dealers may adopt ``a variety of other reasonable methodologies to 
automate the calculation of PMP for disclosure purposes, including but 
not limited to pulling prices from . . . third-party pricing vendors, 
the dealer's trading book or inventory market-to-market and 
contemporaneous trades by the dealer in the given security, or some 
variation thereof.'' \146\ This commenter further requested that it be 
deemed reasonable that dealers may ``calculate PMP solely on the 
contemporaneous cost of the offsetting transaction(s) without further 
automating the waterfall.'' \147\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \146\ See SIFMA Letter, at 6-7.
    \147\ Id. at 7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The MSRB responded by initially noting that dealers are not 
required to automate the PMP determination to comply with the proposed 
rule change.\148\ The MSRB acknowledged, however, that many dealers may 
need to enhance existing technology to determine PMP in a consistent 
and efficient manner.\149\ To help these dealers determine PMP, the 
MSRB cited to explanations given in the proposed rule change as well as 
additional clarifications contained in the MSRB Response on such topics 
as the determination of similar securities and the use of economic 
models.\150\ The MSRB also stated that it may be reasonable for a 
dealer that chooses largely to automate the process of determining 
prevailing market price to establish, in its policies and procedures, 
objective criteria reasonably designed to implement aspects of the PMP 
waterfall that are not prescribed and for which dealers would have 
discretion to

[[Page 84645]]

exercise a degree of subjectivity if the determination were not 
automated.\151\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \148\ See MSRB Response, supra note 6, at 7.
    \149\ Id.
    \150\ Id. at 7-8.
    \151\ Id. at 12-13.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On the subject of economic models, the MSRB explained that if a 
dealer considers economic models as a factor in determining the PMP of 
a security (which it is permitted to do if the PMP cannot be obtained 
by applying any of the factors at the higher levels of the waterfall), 
the dealer, if using an internal economic model, must be able to 
provide the information that was used on the day of the transaction to 
develop the pricing information.\152\ If the dealer is using a third-
party economic model, then the dealer would typically not have access 
to such information but the dealer still retains the ultimate 
responsibility to ensure the fairness and reasonableness of a price and 
any mark-up or mark-down under Rule G-30.\153\ The MSRB also explained 
that, before using a third-party pricing service, a dealer should have 
a reasonable basis for believing that third-party's pricing service 
produces evaluated prices that reflect actual prevailing market prices. 
The MSRB cautioned that such basis would not exist if a periodic review 
revealed a substantial difference between evaluated prices generated by 
the third-party pricing service and the prices at which actual 
transactions in the relevant securities occurred.\154\ The MSRB also 
provided a list of factors for dealers to consider in conducting its 
due diligence and selecting a price service.\155\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \152\ Id. at 8.
    \153\ Id.
    \154\ Id. at 8-9.
    \155\ Id. at 9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On the subject of alternative methods of determining PMP, the MSRB 
reaffirmed that dealers must have reasonable policies and procedures in 
place to determine PMP, and that those policies and procedures must be 
designed to implement the prevailing market price guidance, not to 
create an alternative manner of determining PMP.\156\ The MSRB also 
stated that such policies and procedures must be reasonably designed to 
implement all applicable components of the proposed guidance, such as 
provisions regarding functionally separate trading desks, inter-
affiliate transactions, the calculation of imputed mark-ups and mark-
downs, the determination of similar securities, and the use of economic 
models.\157\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \156\ Id. at 12.
    \157\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Additionally, one commenter sought acknowledgment that different 
dealers may reach different conclusions as to whether securities are 
similar and that dealers may adopt reasonable policies and procedures 
to make that determination.\158\ Another commenter sought clarification 
on the use of ``isolated'' transactions under the proposed guidance, 
noting that rule text in the proposed rule change provided that a 
dealer may give isolated transactions little consideration in 
establishing PMP, but the language in the proposal suggested a more 
restrictive approach.\159\ Several commenters also requested that the 
MSRB revise the proposed guidance to more accurately describe the 
concept of spread in the municipal market.\160\ The proposed guidance 
(as provided in the Notice) includes as one of its non-exclusive list 
of relevant factors to determine the degree to which a municipal 
security is similar, the factor of ``the extent to which the spread 
(i.e., the spread over U.S. Treasury securities of a similar duration) 
at which the `similar' municipal security trades is comparable to the 
spread at which the subject security trades.'' Commenters noted that 
only taxable municipal bonds trade at a spread to Treasuries.\161\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \158\ See SIFMA Letter, at 9.
    \159\ See BDA Letter, at 3-4.
    \160\ See SIFMA Letter, at 10; BDA Letter, at 4; RW Smith 
Letter, at 2.
    \161\ See SIFMA Letter, at 10; BDA Letter, at 4; RW Smith 
Letter, at 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On the subject of similar securities, the MSRB confirmed that 
different dealers may reasonably reach different conclusions as to 
whether securities are similar, and that dealers may adopt reasonable 
policies and procedures to consistently implement the guidance.\162\ On 
the ``isolated'' transactions issue, the MSRB noted that the 
descriptive language included in the filing paraphrased the rule text 
and the actual rule text controls.\163\ The MSRB clarified that a 
dealer may give little or no weight to pricing information resulting 
from an isolated transaction; the weight, if any, given to such a 
transaction is dependent on the facts and circumstances surrounding the 
transaction.\164\ With respect to the proposed guidance's suggestion 
that a similar security analysis consider the spread over U.S. Treasury 
securities, the MSRB agreed to amend the proposed guidance to include 
language relevant to the appropriate spread relied upon for non-taxable 
municipal bonds.\165\ The MSRB also agreed to amend the proposed 
guidance language to clarify that a dealer may also consider the extent 
to which a spread over the ``applicable index'' at which the similar 
municipal security trades is comparable.\166\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \162\ See MSRB Response, supra note 6, at 13.
    \163\ Id. at 15.
    \164\ Id.
    \165\ Id. at 7; see also Amendment No. 1, supra note 7, at 5.
    \166\ See MSRB Response, supra note 6, at 7; see also Amendment 
No. 1, supra note 7, at 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Fair Pricing and Time of Determination of Prevailing Market Price
    Commenters stated that the proposed guidance in the proposed rule 
change should apply solely for the purposes of calculating the mark-up 
or mark-down to be disclosed, and not ``as an overarching fair pricing 
methodology under Rule G-30.'' \167\ In particular, one commenter 
stated its belief that the proposed guidance ``originated as a 
necessary technical clarification solely as part of the retail 
disclosure requirement,'' and was not general guidance applicable to 
all trades.\168\ In the alternative, such commenter requested that if 
the MSRB planned to apply the proposed guidance for fair pricing 
purposes, it should only apply for retail customers, because such a 
limitation would be consistent with the terms of the proposed mark-up 
disclosure requirement and be more closely aligned with the prevailing 
market price guidance provided by FINRA in the supplementary material 
to FINRA Rule 2121.\169\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \167\ See SIFMA Letter, at 4; see also RW Smith Letter, at 2.
    \168\ See SIFMA Letter, at 4.
    \169\ Id. at 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition, one commenter addressed the issue of timing of the PMP 
determination, requesting that the MSRB proposal allow determination of 
the PMP at the time of trade for all processes, including those that 
capture confirm-related data in real-time, even if the actual issuance 
of the confirm is not until the end of the day.\170\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \170\ See Thomson Reuters Letter, at 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The MSRB responded to the fair pricing issue by stating that a 
dealer that uses reasonable diligence to determine the PMP of a 
municipal security in accordance with the proposed guidance, and then 
discloses a mark-up based on such determination, should generally be 
able to rely on that determination for fair pricing purposes.\171\ The 
MSRB explained that it would be confusing for investors to learn that 
the mark-up or mark-down disclosed on customer confirmations is not 
necessarily the mark-up or mark-down examined by regulators for fair 
pricing analysis.\172\

[[Page 84646]]

The MSRB also rejected commenter request to limit use of the proposed 
guidance for fair pricing purposes to retail customers.\173\ The MSRB 
explained that such request was inappropriate because while certain 
institutional customers, like sophisticated municipal market 
professionals, could opt out of certain fair pricing protections for 
agency transactions, such opt-out was not possible for principal 
transactions.\174\ Because the determination of PMP is critical to fair 
pricing determinations in principal transactions, the MSRB stated that 
it was not appropriate to limit the proposed guidance to transactions 
with retail customers only.\175\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \171\ See MSRB Response, supra note 6, at 10.
    \172\ Id.
    \173\ Id. at 11.
    \174\ Id.
    \175\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Responding to commenter concern, the MSRB confirmed that a dealer 
may determine the PMP for disclosure purposes based on information the 
dealer has at the time the dealer inputs the information into its 
systems to generate the mark-up disclosure, even when the actual 
issuance of the confirmation is not until the end of the day, as long 
as the dealer consistently applies its relevant policies and procedures 
in the same manner for all retail customers.\176\ The MSRB also 
provided an example providing guidance on both timing and fair pricing 
issues.\177\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \176\ Id. at 10 & n.16.
    \177\ Id. at 10-11.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

C. Presentation of Mark-Up/Mark-Down Information on Customer 
Confirmations

    The MSRB proposes to require that mark-ups/mark-downs be disclosed 
on confirmations as a total dollar amount (i.e., the dollar difference 
between the customer's price and the security's PMP, and as a 
percentage amount, (i.e., the mark-up's percentage of the security's 
PMP). Several commenters noted that the new disclosures required by the 
proposal might cause investor confusion, as different members may 
determine the PMP for the same security differently, resulting in a 
lack of comparability or consistency across customer 
confirmations.\178\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \178\ See BDA Letter, at 3; Wells Fargo Letter, at 4; SIFMA 
Letter, at 8; Fidelity Letter, at 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Commenters suggested different approaches to resolve potential 
investor confusion. Several commenters, for instance, argued that 
dealers should be permitted to label or qualify the mark-up/mark-down 
disclosed on the confirmation as ``estimated'' or ``approximate.'' 
\179\ Other commenters suggested that dealers be allowed to add a 
description of the dealer's process for calculating mark-ups and mark-
downs.\180\ Others suggested that dealers be permitted to describe the 
meaning of the mark-up/mark-down,\181\ or to indicate that it may not 
reflect profit to the dealer \182\ or the exact compensation to the 
dealer.\183\ Two commenters suggested that to ensure consistent 
disclosure, any explanatory text that dealers may include on customer 
confirmations should be drafted and prepared by the MSRB.\184\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \179\ See Fidelity Letter, at 3; SIFMA Letter, at 8.
    \180\ See BDA Letter, at 3; Fidelity Letter, at 3; SIFMA Letter, 
at 8.
    \181\ See Fidelity Letter, at 3.
    \182\ See Wells Fargo Letter, at 4. See also Thomson Reuters 
Letter, at 3 (noting that dealers may not want to provide mark-up/
mark-down disclosure on all confirms without the ability to include 
text indicating that the mark-up/mark-down may not reflect the 
profit to the firm).
    \183\ See Fidelity Letter, at 3.
    \184\ See Fidelity Letter, at 3; BDA Letter, at 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The MSRB responded by stating that dealers should not be permitted 
to label the required mark-up/mark-down disclosure as ``estimated'' or 
``approximate'', because such labels have the potential to unduly 
suggest an unreliability of the disclosures or otherwise diminish their 
value.\185\ However, the MSRB agreed that a dealer should be permitted 
to include explanatory language or disclosures on confirmations to 
provide context and understanding for investors receiving mark-up and 
mark-down disclosures, such as an explanation of how the disclosure was 
derived.\186\ In response to commenters' requests for the MSRB to 
provide standardized or sample disclosures that would be appropriate 
under the proposal, the MSRB stated that dealers should have the 
flexibility to determine how to craft such language for their 
customers, as long as such explanatory language is accurate and not 
misleading.\187\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \185\ See MSRB Response, supra note 6, at 11.
    \186\ Id.
    \187\ Id. at 11-12.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

D. Time of Execution, Hyperlink to EMMA, and Harmonization With the 
FINRA Proposal
    The MSRB's proposed rule change, as provided in the Notice, 
requires dealers to include on all trade confirmations a time-of-trade 
disclosure and on all trade confirmations a CUSIP-specific hyperlink to 
EMMA's ``security details'' page for that relevant municipal security. 
Notably, these disclosure requirements exist irrespective of whether 
the dealer has an obligation to disclose its mark-up or mark-down on a 
particular transaction. As originally proposed, the FINRA rule change 
did not contain a similar disclosure requirement. Several commenters, 
citing a desire for greater harmonization between FINRA and the MSRB, 
suggested that the MSRB remove or delay implementation of the time-of-
trade and CUSIP-specific hyperlink requirements.\188\ Other commenters 
suggested changes to the requirement, including replacing the CUSIP-
specific hyperlink with a more general hyperlink to EMMA, which they 
argued would: Reduce confusion by minimizing the risk of typographical 
errors made by investors who receive paper confirmations and have to 
manually type of the hyperlink in a web browser, avoid issues that 
arise if the web addresses to security-specific pages change, reduce 
the amount of space needed on the confirmation to fulfill the 
disclosure requirement, and generally ease the programming and 
operational burden of compliance.\189\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \188\ See Fidelity Letter, at 4-5; FIF Letter, at 1-2; Thomson 
Reuters Letter, at 3; Wells Fargo Letter, at 2; FIF Letter, at 8.
    \189\ See SIFMA Letter, at 13; Thomson Reuters Letter, at 3; BDA 
Letter, at 4; FIF Letter, at 8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    One commenter also sought guidance on how dealers should implement 
the time-of-execution disclosure in adviser block-trade executions that 
are later allocated to that adviser's customers.\190\ That same 
commenter also recommended that dealers should be permitted to combine 
the security-specific hyperlink disclosure with the official statement 
delivery obligation for primary issues under MSRB Rule G-32 in order to 
avoid potentially lengthy and duplicative disclosures.\191\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \190\ See Fidelity Letter, at 5.
    \191\ Id. at 5-6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In response, the MSRB modified the proposed rule change in 
Amendment No. 1 to harmonize the MSRB's and FINRA's hyperlink and time 
of execution standards in all relevant, substantive, and technical 
respects.\192\ The harmonized proposals would require the disclosure of 
the time of trade or time of execution on retail customer 
confirmations, regardless of whether the dealer would be required to 
disclosure the mark-up or mark-down on the customer transaction.\193\ 
The proposals would also require a reference and hyperlink to a Web 
page on FINRA's Trade Reporting Compliance Engine (``TRACE'') or EMMA, 
as applicable, containing trading data for the specific security that 
was traded, along with a brief description of the type of information 
available on that page.\194\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \192\ See MSRB Response, supra note 6, at 4-5; see also 
Amendment No. 1, supra note 7, at 4-5.
    \193\ See MSRB Response, supra note 6, at 5.
    \194\ Id.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 84647]]

    Further, to promote harmonization and enhance the user experience, 
the MSRB agreed to make a technical amendment to its proposed hyperlink 
requirement, replacing the requirement for a specific Web page 
hyperlink with a more generic requirement to hyperlink to a Web page on 
EMMA, in a format specified by the MSRB, containing publicly available 
trading data for the traded security.\195\ The MSRB explained that this 
change in language is meant to more closely harmonize with the language 
in FINRA's proposal, and that, by using more general language to 
describe the hyperlink requirement, the MSRB and FINRA retain some 
flexibility to consider ways to make the landing page for investors 
accessing EMMA and TRACE via the hyperlink on confirmations more 
accessible and user friendly.\196\ The MSRB also agreed, in the 
interest of harmonization and to provide some implementation relief, to 
amend the proposed rule change to require dealers to disclose time of 
execution for only retail customer confirmations, explaining that 
institutional customers are already likely to know the time of 
execution of their transaction.\197\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \195\ Id.; see also Amendment No. 1, supra note 7, at 4-5.
    \196\ See MSRB Response, supra note 6, at 5.
    \197\ Id. at 5-6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In response to comments about investor confusion and potential 
error caused by the difficulty in typing in a lengthy hyperlink, the 
MSRB developed a more succinct EMMA URL for direct access to a 
security-specific page on EMMA. The MSRB stated its belief that this 
succinct URL, which can be used for the proposed disclosure, is easier 
to use and would decrease the number of characters an investor may need 
to type or input to access to relevant page on EMMA.\198\ Addressing 
commenter concerns that such a hyperlink may expire, the MSRB also 
stated that it does not anticipate any future changes to the protocol 
for the succinct URL, and therefore it believes that hyperlinks that 
use the succinct URL will continue to function indefinitely.\199\ The 
MSRB also confirmed that the disclosure of a security-specific 
hyperlink to EMMA would satisfy a dealer's official statement delivery 
obligation for primary issues under Rule G-32, as long as the hyperlink 
and URL are accompanied by the information required under Rule G-
32(a)(iii).\200\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \198\ Id. at 6.
    \199\ Id.
    \200\ Id. at 6-7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

E. Anticipated Costs of Implementing the Proposed Rule Change by the 
Proposed Effective Date
    Most commenters stated that the proposed rule change was too 
complex and costly to implement by the proposed effective date--one 
year from Commission approval of the proposed rule change. Commenters 
particularly emphasized the significant systems and programming 
modifications that they believed dealers and their third-party vendors 
would need to undertake in order to implement the proposal.\201\ They 
also asserted that it would be particularly challenging to implement 
such changes in light of other regulatory initiatives slated to become 
effective in the near future.\202\ As a result, commenters suggested 
implementation periods of at least two years and often longer.\203\ In 
response, the MSRB agreed to extend the implementation time to provide 
that the effective date of the proposed rule change will be no later 
than eighteen months following Commission approval.\204\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \201\ See, e.g., FIF Letter, at 1-2; Fidelity Letter, at 6-7.
    \202\ See BDA Letter, at 4-5; SIFMA Letter, at 11-12; Fidelity 
Letter, at 6-7; Thomson Reuters Letter, at 3-4; FIF Letter, at 2-4. 
Commenters identified the following initiatives: (1) the U.S. 
Department of Labor's conflict of interest rule, see 81 FR 20946 
(Apr. 8, 2016); (2) the Consolidated Audit Trail, see Securities 
Exchange Act Release No. 77724 (Apr. 27, 2016), 81 FR 30614 (May 17, 
2016); (3) the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network's Customer Due 
Diligence Requirements for Financial Institutions, see 81 FR 29398 
(May 11, 2016); and (4) additional other MSRB, FINRA, and Commission 
rule changes.
    \203\ See Wells Fargo Letter, at 4 (requesting an implementation 
period of three years but no less than two); Fidelity Letter, at 6 
(two years); BDA Letter, at 4 (two years); Thomson Reuters Letter, 
at 4 (two years); SIFMA Letter, at 11 (three years); and FIF Letter, 
at 2 (requesting an implementation date ``well into 2018'').
    \204\ See MSRB Response, supra note 6, at 13.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Numerous commenters also expressed concern about the total cost of 
the proposed rule change.\205\ Two commenters questioned whether the 
costs of implementing the rule may outweigh the benefits, and one 
questioned whether FINRA and the MSRB had conducted a cost-benefit 
analysis.\206\ Several commenters also expressed the belief that the 
heaviest costs and burdens would fall on smaller dealers and may lead 
to dealers to reduce head count or exit the industry.\207\ Commenters 
suggested alternative proposals that they viewed as achieving similar 
goals in a less costly manner, including focusing more on developing 
EMMA to achieve greater transparency.\208\ One commenter also noted its 
belief that there was no evidence the MSRB considered or measured the 
risk that its proposal would impair liquidity in the municipal security 
market, or that the proposal would cause some principal-holding dealers 
to shift towards a riskless principal model.\209\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \205\ See, e.g., RW Smith Letter, at 2; SIFMA Letter, at 2-3.
    \206\ See FIF Letter, at 4; SIFMA Letter, at 3.
    \207\ See FIF Letter, at 4; BDA Letter, at 4-5. See also RW 
Smith Letter, at 2 (noting that ``reputable small firms close their 
doors and people lose their jobs, and not because they didn't serve 
their clients well, but instead because decision makers did not stop 
long enough to consider the unequal and unfair burden being placed 
on small firms through rule-making'').
    \208\ See RW Smith Letter, at 2; SIFMA Letter, at 2; Wells Fargo 
Letter, at 2.
    \209\ See SIFMA Letter, at 3-4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The MSRB acknowledged that the proposed rule change would impose 
burdens and costs on dealers.\210\ The MSRB also noted that, in 
response to earlier comments it had received, it had already 
acknowledged and recognized the costs in its filing supporting the 
proposed rule change.\211\ These costs included those that would be 
incurred by dealers to develop a methodology to satisfy the disclosure 
requirement, identify the trades subject to the disclosure requirement, 
and convey the required mark-up and disclosure information to the 
customer.\212\ The MSRB also acknowledged that it had received some 
cost estimates from one commenter.\213\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \210\ See MSRB Response, supra note 6, at 14.
    \211\ Id.
    \212\ Id.
    \213\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    However, while recognizing these costs, the MSRB reiterated its 
belief that the proposed rule change reflects the lowest overall cost 
approach to achieving a worthy regulatory objective. It noted that 
retail investors are currently limited in their ability to compare 
transaction costs associated with transactions in municipal 
securities.\214\ It also noted that mark-up and mark-down disclosure 
may improve investor confidence, allow customers to better evaluate the 
services provided by dealers, promote pricing transparency, improve 
communication between dealers and customers, and make the enforcement 
of Rule G-30 more efficient.\215\ Finally, the MSRB noted that it had 
engaged in a multi-year rulemaking process on this proposal, had 
evaluated numerous reasonable regulatory alternatives, and had 
implemented several changes to make the rule less costly and 
burdensome.\216\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \214\ Id.
    \215\ Id.
    \216\ Id.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 84648]]

F. Recommendation of the Investor Advocate

    As noted above, the Investor Advocate submitted to the public 
comment file its recommendation to the Commission that the Commission 
approve the proposed rule change.\217\ In its recommendation, the 
Investor Advocate stated its belief that the proposed rule change's 
``enhancements to pricing disclosure in the fixed income markets are 
long overdue and will greatly benefit retail investors.'' \218\ 
Specifically, the Investor Advocate noted that the required mark-up 
disclosures will better equip retail investors ``to evaluate 
transactions and the quality of service provided to them by a firm,'' 
help regulators and retail investors detect improper dealer practices, 
and make it less likely that dealers will charge excessive mark-
ups.\219\ Ultimately, the Investor Advocate focused its attention on 
``four key issues''--consistency of approach between the MSRB and 
FINRA; same-day disclosure window; the use of prevailing market price 
as the basis for calculating mark-ups; and the need for dealers to look 
through transactions with affiliates--as the focus of its review, and 
stated ``each of these issues has been resolved to our satisfaction'' 
in the proposed rule change.\220\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \217\ See Investor Advocate Letter, supra note 5.
    \218\ Id. at 2.
    \219\ Id.
    \220\ Id. at 6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    With respect to the MSRB and FINRA adopting consistent rules 
related to confirmation disclosure, the Investor Advocate highlighted 
that the proposed rule change and the FINRA Proposal ``provide a 
coordinated and consistent approach to mark-up disclosure in corporate 
and municipal bond transactions.'' \221\ Accordingly, the Investor 
Advocate concluded that ``this deliberative approach will lead to 
consistent disclosures across the fixed income markets and will provide 
retail investors with better post-trade price transparency.'' \222\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \221\ Id.
    \222\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Addressing the same-day disclosure window, the Investor Advocate 
noted its agreement ``that the window of time for disclosure should be 
the full trading day.'' \223\ According to the Investor Advocate, a 
shorter time-frame--e.g., the two-hour window previously proposed by 
the MSRB--could inappropriately incentivize dealers to alter their 
trading practices to avoid the obligation to disclose mark-ups.\224\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \223\ Id. at 7.
    \224\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Discussing the proposed rule change's use of prevailing market 
price as the basis for mark-up disclosure, the Investor Advocate stated 
its belief that the prevailing market price-based disclosure has 
advantages over the initially proposed reference price-based 
disclosure.\225\ Specifically, the Investor Advocate noted that though 
the ``PMP-based disclosure may lead to disclosure of a smaller cost to 
retail investors under certain circumstances . . . the PMP-based 
approach provides retail investors with the relevant information about 
the actual compensation the retail investor is paying the dealer for 
the transaction . . . [and] . . . [i]t reflects market conditions and 
has the potential to provide a more accurate benchmark for calculating 
transaction costs.'' \226\ Moreover, the Investor Advocate noted that 
the prevailing market price-based disclosure regime could more easily 
be expanded beyond the presently contemplated same-day disclosure 
window.\227\ As a result, the Investor Advocate stated its support for 
the MSRB's use of the prevailing market price-based disclosure 
regime.\228\ Finally, the Investor Advocate stated its support for the 
proposed rule change's requirement that dealers express the mark-up 
both as a total dollar amount and as a percentage of the prevailing 
market price.\229\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \225\ Id.
    \226\ Id. at 7-8.
    \227\ Id. at 8.
    \228\ Id. at 8-9.
    \229\ Id. at 9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    With respect to dealer transactions with affiliates, the Investor 
Advocate highlighted its concern with dealer-affiliate trading 
arrangements, and concluded that the proposed rule change ``satisfies 
[the Investor Advocate's] concerns by making clear that a dealer must 
look through non-arms-length transactions with affiliates to calculate 
PMP.'' \230\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \230\ Id. at 9-10.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Finally, with respect to the implementation of the proposed rule 
change, the Investor Advocate stated its support for a one-year 
implementation period, noting that such period would be reasonable 
despite the technical and system changes that might be required for 
compliance with the proposed rule change.\231\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \231\ Id. at 10-11.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

IV. Discussion and Commission Findings

    After carefully considering the proposed rule change, the comments 
received, the MSRB Response Letter, and Amendment No. 1, the Commission 
finds that the proposed rule change, as modified by Amendment No. 1, is 
consistent with the requirements of the Act and the rules and 
regulations thereunder applicable to the MSRB. In particular, the 
Commission finds that the proposed rule change, as modified by 
Amendment No. 1, is consistent with Section 15B(b)(2)(C) of the 
Act,\232\ which requires, among other things, that the MSRB's rules be 
designed to prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices, to 
promote just and equitable principles of trade, to foster cooperation 
and coordination with persons engaged in regulating, clearing, 
settling, processing information with respect to, and facilitating 
transactions in municipal securities and municipal financial products, 
to remove impediments to and perfect the mechanism of a free and open 
market in municipal securities and municipal financial products, and, 
in general, to protect investors, municipal entities, obligated 
persons, and the public interest, and not be designed to impose any 
burden on competition not necessary or appropriate in furtherance of 
the purposes of the Act.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \232\ 15 U.S.C. 78o-4(b)(2)(C).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

A. Mark-Up/Mark-Down Disclosure

    The Commission notes that the goal of improving transaction cost 
transparency in fixed-income markets for retail investors has long been 
pursued by the Commission.\233\ In particular, in the

[[Page 84649]]

2012 Report, the Commission stated that the MSRB should consider 
possible rule changes that would require dealers acting as riskless 
principal to disclose on customer confirmations the amount of any mark-
up/mark-down.\234\ The Commission believes that the establishment of a 
requirement that dealers disclose mark-ups/mark-downs to retail 
investors, as proposed, will advance the goal of providing retail 
investors with meaningful and useful information about the pricing of 
their municipal securities transactions.\235\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \233\ See Securities & Exchange Commission, Report on the 
Municipal Securities Market (July 31, 2012) (``2012 Report''), 
available at: https://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2012/munireport073112.pdf (recommending that the MSRB consider possible 
rule changes that would require dealers acting as riskless principal 
to disclose on the customer confirmation the amount of any mark-up 
or mark-down and that the Commission consider whether a comparable 
change should be made to Rule 10b-10 with respect to confirmation 
disclosure of mark-ups and mark-downs in riskless principal 
transactions for corporate bonds); Chair Mary Jo White, Securities 
and Exchange Commission, Intermediation in the Modern Securities 
Markets: Putting Technology and Competition to Work for Investors 
(June 20, 2014), available at: https://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370542122012 (Chair White noting that to help 
investors better understand the cost of their fixed income 
transactions, staff will work with FINRA and the MSRB in their 
efforts to develop rules regarding disclosure of mark-ups in certain 
principal transactions for both corporate and municipal bonds); 
Statement on Edward D. Jones Enforcement Action (August 13, 2015), 
available at: https://www.sec.gov/news/statement/statement-on-edward-jones-enforcement-action.html (Commissioners Luis A. Aguilar, 
Daniel M. Gallagher, Kara M. Stein, and Michael S. Piwowar stating, 
``We encourage the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) 
and the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB) to complete 
rules mandating transparency of mark-ups and mark-downs, even in 
riskless principal trades.''). See also Investor Advocate Letter, 
supra note 5, at 2 (supporting the proposed rule change and stating 
that enhancements to pricing disclosure in the fixed-income markets 
are ``long overdue and will greatly benefit retail investors''); 
Recommendation of the Investor Advisory Committee to Enhance 
Information for Bond Market Investors (June 7, 2016), available at: 
https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/investor-advisory-committee-2012/recommendation-enhance-information-bond-market-investors-060716.pdf 
(recommending that the Commission work with FINRA and the MSRB to 
finalize mark-up/mark-down disclosure proposals).
    \234\ See 2012 Report, supra note 233, at 148.
    \235\ While MSRB Rule G-15 generally requires a dealer to 
disclose to customers on the transaction confirmation the amount of 
any remuneration to be received from the customer, if the dealer is 
acting as agent, there is no comparable requirement if the dealer is 
acting as principal. See MSRB Rule G-15(a)(i)(A)(1)(e).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission believes the proposed rule change, as modified by 
Amendment No. 1, is reasonably designed to ensure that mark-ups/mark-
downs are disclosed to retail investors, at least when a dealer has 
effected a same-day off-setting transaction, while limiting the impact 
of operational challenges for dealers. For example, with respect to 
dealers that generate intra-day trade confirmations, the Commission 
notes that the MSRB stated that dealers need not delay the confirmation 
process.\236\ The Commission further notes that the MSRB stated that 
dealers would not be expected to cancel and resend a confirmation to 
revise the mark-up or mark-down disclosure solely based on the 
occurrence of a subsequent transaction or event that would otherwise be 
relevant to the calculation of the mark-up or mark-down under the 
proposed guidance.\237\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \236\ See Notice, supra note 3, at 62955.
    \237\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Under the proposed rule change, disclosed mark-ups/mark-downs are 
to be calculated in compliance with the proposed guidance, and 
expressed as a total dollar amount and as a percentage of the PMP of 
the subject security.\238\ The Commission believes that this 
information will, for example, promote transparency of dealers' pricing 
practices and encourage dialogue between dealers and retail investors 
about the costs associated with their transactions, thereby better 
enabling retail investors to evaluate their transaction costs and 
potentially promoting price competition among dealers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \238\ Id. at 62950.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As discussed above, concerns were raised that the proposed rule 
change's requirement to determine PMP in compliance with the proposed 
guidance would make it difficult for dealers to automate PMP 
determinations at the time of the trade.\239\ The Commission believes 
that the MSRB has adequately responded to these concerns, and that the 
price and mark-up/mark-down disclosed to the customer on a confirmation 
must reflect the actual PMP the dealer used to price and mark-up/mark-
down the transaction at the time of the trade. The Commission believes 
that it is feasible to automate the determination of PMP in accordance 
with the proposed guidance to the extent a dealer chooses to do so, and 
agrees with the MSRB. The Commission further believes that a dealer's 
election to use automated processes to support pricing of retail 
trades, and thus determine the PMP, would not justify departure from 
the proposed requirement that dealers price municipal securities in 
accordance with the proposed guidance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \239\ See notes 141-147, and accompanying text, supra.

    When the Commission approved the prevailing market price guidance 
contained in FINRA Rule 2121.02 \240\ (which is substantially similar 
to and generally harmonized with the proposed guidance being approved 
by the Commission in this Order \241\), the Commission stated that such 
guidance is consistent with long-standing Commission and judicial 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
precedent regarding fair mark-ups, and that it:

    \240\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 55638 (Apr. 16, 
2007), 72 FR 20150, 20154 (Apr. 23, 2007) (SR-NASD-2003-141) (the 
``2007 PMP Order''). When the Commission approved this prevailing 
market price guidance, such guidance was found in the supplementary 
material to the then-existing NASD Rule 2440.
    \241\ For description of the proposed guidance, see notes 80-
119, and accompanying text, supra.
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provides a framework that specifically establishes contemporaneous 
cost as the presumptive prevailing market price, but also identifies 
certain dynamic factors that are relevant to whether contemporaneous 
cost or alternative values provide the most appropriate measure of 
prevailing market price. The Commission believes that the factors 
that govern when a dealer may depart from contemporaneous cost and 
that set forth alternative measures the dealer may use are 
reasonably designed to provide greater certainty to dealers and 
investors while providing an appropriate level of flexibility for 
dealers to consider alternative market factors when pricing debt 
securities.\242\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \242\ See 2007 PMP Order, supra note 240.

    The Commission believes this reasoning remains sound and is not 
persuaded that the proposed requirement to disclose mark-ups/mark-downs 
on customer confirmations necessitates an approach contrary to the 
proposed guidance.
    Further, in response to commenters that requested confirmation or 
clarification that firms may adopt reasonable policies and procedures 
regarding the implementation of particular aspects of the guidance, the 
MSRB stated its expectation that dealers will have reasonable policies 
and procedures in place to determine PMP, and that such policies and 
procedures are consistently applied across customers.\243\ The MSRB 
further explained that it expects those policies and procedures to be 
designed to implement the proposed guidance, not to create an 
alternative manner of determining PMP.\244\ More specifically, the MSRB 
stated its expectation that such policies and procedures will be 
reasonably designed to implement all applicable components of the PMP 
determination.\245\ The MSRB also proposed to extend the implementation 
date of the proposal, as modified by Amendment No. 1, from one year to 
18 months following Commission approval,\246\ and represented that it 
will continue to engage with FINRA with the goal of promoting generally 
harmonized interpretations of the proposed guidance and the FINRA 
guidance, as applicable and to the extent appropriate in light of the 
differences between the markets.\247\ The Commission believes that the 
MSRB's responses appropriately address commenters' concerns regarding 
implementation of the proposed rule change.
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    \243\ See MSRB Response, supra note 6, at 12.
    \244\ Id.
    \245\ Id.
    \246\ Id. at 13.
    \247\ See Notice, supra note 3, at 62952.
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    Also, as discussed above, commenters had questions regarding the 
presentation of mark-up/mark-down information on customer 
confirmations, and, in particular, sought the MSRB's concurrence that 
it would be acceptable to label the required mark-up/mark-down 
disclosure as an ``estimate'' or an ``approximate'' figure.\248\ The 
Commission agrees with the MSRB,\249\ and does not believe that it 
would be consistent with the Act or the proposed rule change for 
dealers to label the

[[Page 84650]]

required mark-up/mark-down disclosure as an ``estimate'' or an 
``approximate'' figure, or to otherwise suggest that the dealer is not 
disclosing the actual amount of the mark-up/mark-down it determined to 
charge the customer. However, the proposed rule change is appropriately 
flexible to permit a dealer to include language on confirmations that 
explains PMP as a concept, or that details the dealer's methodology for 
determining PMP, or that notes the availability of information about 
methodology upon request, provided such statements are accurate. The 
Commission emphasizes that dealers will be required to disclose the 
actual amount of the mark-up/mark-down that they have determined to 
charge the customer, in accordance with the proposed amendments to 
Rules G-15 and G-30 being approved in this Order.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \248\ See note 179, and accompanying text, supra.
    \249\ See MSRB Response, supra note 6, at 11.
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B. Requirement To Provide EMMA Reference/Hyperlink and Time of 
Execution on All Retail Customer Confirmations

    The Commission also believes that the MSRB's proposal to require 
dealers to disclose, in a format specified by the MSRB, a reference 
and, if the confirmation is electronic, a hyperlink to Web page on EMMA 
that contains publicly available trading data for the specific security 
that was traded is reasonably designed to prevent fraudulent and 
manipulative acts and practices, to promote just and equitable 
principles of trade, to protect investors, is in the public interest, 
and does not impose any burden on competition not necessary or 
appropriate in furtherance of the Act, and is therefore consistent with 
the Act.
    In the Commission's view, providing a retail investor with a 
security-specific reference or hyperlink on the trade confirmation and 
the time of trade execution will facilitate retail customers obtaining 
a comprehensive view of the market for their securities, including the 
market as of the time of trade. The Commission believes that these 
items will complement the MSRB's existing order-handling obligations 
(e.g., best execution) by providing retail investors with meaningful 
and useful information with which they will be able to independently 
evaluate the quality of execution obtained from a dealer.
    Some commenters urged the MSRB to require a general hyperlink to 
EMMA, rather than a security-specific hyperlink.\250\ According to the 
MSRB, a security-specific hyperlink would provide retail investors, who 
typically have less ready access to market and pricing information than 
institutional customers, with a more comprehensive picture of the 
market for a security on a given day, and would increase investors' 
awareness of, and ability to access, this information.\251\ Further, in 
Amendment No. 1, the MSRB made a technical amendment to its proposed 
hyperlink disclosure requirement that mitigates concerns raised by 
commenters. The MSRB asserted that the use of such language, which, 
based on coordination between the MSRB and FINRA, is similar to the 
language used by FINRA in its related proposal, is responsive to 
commenter requests for more harmonization and would reduce the 
potential for confusion.\252\ The Commission has carefully considered 
Amendment No. 1 in light of comments received urging the MSRB and FINRA 
to harmonize both the substance and timing of their proposals. The 
Commission concurs with the MSRB that the time of execution along with 
a security-specific reference or hyperlink on a customer confirmation 
would provide customers with the ability to obtain a comprehensive view 
of the market for their security at the time of trade.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \250\ See notes 189, and accompanying text, supra.
    \251\ See Notice, supra note 3, at 62949, 62956.
    \252\ See MSRB Response, supra note 6, at 5.
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C. Prevailing Market Price Guidance

    In 2007, the Commission approved detailed interpretive guidance 
that establishes a framework for how a dealer should determine the PMP 
for non-municipal debt securities in a variety of scenarios.\253\ In 
the 2012 Report, the Commission recommended that the MSRB should 
consider possible rule changes that would set forth more detailed 
guidance as to how dealers should establish the PMP for municipal 
securities, and that is consistent with that provided by FINRA for non-
municipal debt securities.\254\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \253\ See 2007 PMP Order, supra note 240.
    \254\ See 2012 Report, supra note 233, at 148.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposed guidance is designed to provide a clear and consistent 
framework to dealers for determining PMP to aid in compliance with 
their fair-pricing obligations under Rule G-30 and their mark-up/mark-
down disclosure obligations under Rule G-15. The proposed guidance 
provides a framework that specifically establishes contemporaneous cost 
as the presumptive PMP, but also identifies certain factors that are 
relevant to whether contemporaneous cost or alternative values provide 
the most appropriate measure of PMP. The Commission believes that the 
factors that govern when a dealer may depart from contemporaneous cost 
and that set forth alterative measures the dealer may use are 
reasonably designed to provide greater certainty to dealers and 
investors while providing an appropriate level of flexibility for 
dealers to consider alternative market factors when pricing municipal 
securities. As noted in the 2012 Report, providing dealers a clear and 
consistent framework as to how they should approach the complex task of 
establishing the PMP of municipal securities should enhance their 
ability to comply with fair pricing obligations, facilitate regulators' 
ability to enforce those obligations, and better protect 
customers.\255\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \255\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition, by recognizing the facts-and-circumstances nature of 
the analysis and by setting forth a logical series of factors to be 
used when a dealer departs from contemporaneous cost, the MSRB has 
proposed an approach for determining the PMP of a municipal security 
that is reasonable and practical in addressing the interests of dealers 
and investors and is consistent with the Act and longstanding 
Commission and judicial precedent relating to determining PMP and mark-
ups. The Commission also notes that the MSRB represented that the 
proposed guidance is substantially similar to and generally harmonized 
with the FINRA guidance for non-municipal fixed income securities that 
is set forth in FINRA Rule 2121.02.\256\ While several commenters 
raised concerns with respect to implementing the proposed 
guidance,\257\ the Commission believes that the MSRB has reasonably 
addressed the comments.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \256\ See Notice, supra note 3, at 62952.
    \257\ See notes 141-147, and accompanying text, supra.
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D. Efficiency, Competition, and Capital Formation

    In approving the proposed rule change, as modified by Amendment No. 
1, the Commission has considered its impact on efficiency, competition, 
and capital formation.\258\ The Commission believes that the proposed 
rule change, as modified by Amendment No. 1, could affect efficiency, 
competition, and capital formation in several ways.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \258\ 15 U.S.C. 78c(f).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission believes that the proposed rule change could have an 
impact on competition among dealers. For instance, costs associated 
with the proposed rule change could raise barriers to entry in the 
retail trading market. The MSRB acknowledges that the proposed rule 
change may

[[Page 84651]]

disproportionately impact less active dealers that, as indicated by 
data, currently charge relatively higher mark-ups than more active 
dealers; however, overall, the MSRB believes that the burdens on 
competition will be limited and the proposed rule change will not 
impose any additional burdens on competition that are not necessary or 
appropriate in furtherance of the purposes of the Act.\259\ The MSRB 
recognizes that the proposed rule change could lead dealers to 
consolidate with other dealers, or to exit the market, however, the 
MSRB does not believe--and is not aware of any data that suggest--that 
the number of dealers exiting the market or consolidating would 
materially impact competition.\260\ Additionally, the Commission 
believes that the proposed rule change provides dealers with the 
flexibility to develop cost-effective policies and procedures for 
complying with the proposed rule change that reflect their business 
needs and are consistent with the regulatory objectives of the proposed 
rule change.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \259\ See Notice, supra note 3, at 62956-57.
    \260\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    By increasing disclosure requirements for retail customer 
confirmations, the proposed rule change could improve efficiency--in 
particular, price efficiency--and the improvement in pricing efficiency 
could promote capital formation. The Commission believes that mark-up/
mark-down disclosure and the inclusion of a reference/hyperlink to 
security-specific transaction information on EMMA on retail customer 
confirmations will promote price competition among dealers and improve 
trade execution quality. An increase in price competition among dealers 
would lower transaction costs on retail customer trades. To the extent 
that the proposed rule change lowers transaction costs on retail 
customer trades, the proposed rule change could improve the pricing 
efficiency and price discovery process. The quality of the price 
discovery process has implications for efficiency and capital 
formation, as prices that accurately convey information about 
fundamental value could better facilitate capital allocations across 
municipalities and capital projects. Furthermore, to the extent that 
the proposed rule change would lower transaction costs on retail 
customer trades, the proposed rule change could lower bond financing 
costs for municipalities and capital projects. Lower transaction costs 
could attract more investors to the municipal securities market, which 
could increase the demand for municipal securities. Higher demand could 
lead to higher municipal security prices and higher municipal security 
prices could contribute to increased funding opportunities for 
municipalities and capital projects.
    As noted above, the Commission received seven comment letters on 
the filing. The Commission believes that the MSRB considered carefully 
and responded adequately to the concerns raised by commenters. For all 
the foregoing reasons, including those discussed in the MSRB Response, 
the Commission believes the proposed rule change, as modified by 
Amendment No. 1, is reasonably designed to help the MSRB fulfill its 
mandate in Section 15B(b)(2)(C) of the Act which requires, among other 
things, that MSRB's rules be designed to prevent fraudulent and 
manipulative acts and practices, to promote just and equitable 
principles of trade, to foster cooperation and coordination with 
persons engaged in regulating, clearing, settling, processing 
information with respect to, and facilitating transactions in municipal 
securities and municipal financial products, to remove impediments to 
and perfect the mechanism of a free and open market in municipal 
securities and municipal financial products, and, in general, to 
protect investors, municipal entities, obligated persons, and the 
public interest, and not be designed to impose any burden on 
competition not necessary or appropriate in furtherance of the purposes 
of the Act.\261\
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    \261\ 15 U.S.C. 78o-4(b)(2)(C).
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V. Solicitation of Comments on Amendment No. 1

    Interested persons are invited to submit written data, views, and 
arguments concerning the foregoing, including whether Amendment No. 1 
to the proposed rule change is consistent with the Act. Comments may be 
submitted by any of the following methods:

Electronic Comments

     Use the Commission's Internet comment form (http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml); or
     Send an email to [email protected]. Please include 
File Number SR-MSRB-2016-12 on the subject line.

Paper Comments

     Send paper comments in triplicate to Brent J. Fields, 
Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street NE., 
Washington, DC 20549-1090.

All submissions should refer to File Number SR-MSRB-2016-12. This file 
number should be included on the subject line if email is used. To help 
the Commission process and review your comments more efficiently, 
please use only one method. The Commission will post all comments on 
the Commission's Internet Web site (http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml). Copies of the submission, all subsequent amendments, all 
written statements with respect to the proposed rule change that are 
filed with the Commission, and all written communications relating to 
the proposed rule change between the Commission and any person, other 
than those that may be withheld from the public in accordance with the 
provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552, will be available for Web site viewing and 
printing in the Commission's Public Reference Room, 100 F Street NE., 
Washington, DC 20549, on official business days between the hours of 
10:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m. Copies of the filing will also be available 
for inspection and copying at the principal office of MSRB. All 
comments received will be posted without change; the Commission does 
not edit personal identifying information from submissions. You should 
submit only information that you wish to make available publicly. All 
submissions should refer to File Number SR-MSRB-2016-12 and should be 
submitted on or before December 14, 2016.

VI. Accelerated Approval of Proposed Rule Change, as Modified by 
Amendment No. 1

    The Commission finds good cause to approve the proposed rule 
change, as modified by Amendment No. 1, prior to the 30th day after the 
date of publication of notice of the filing of Amendment No. 1 in the 
Federal Register. Amendment No. 1 amends the proposed rule change to 
(1) replace the requirement that dealers supply a hyperlink to the 
``Security Details'' page on EMMA of specific security that was traded 
with a requirement to provide, in a format specified by the MSRB, a 
reference, and if the confirmation is electronic, a hyperlink to a Web 
page on EMMA that contains publicly available trading data for the 
specific security that was traded; (2) limit the time of execution 
disclosure requirement to retail investors; (3) add the term 
``offsetting'' to proposed Rule G-15(a)(i)(F)(1)(b) to conform the rule 
language to the language used to discuss conditions that trigger the 
disclosure requirement; (4) add the phrase ``an applicable index'' to 
proposed Supplementary Material .06(b)(ii)(B) of Rule G-30 to ensure 
that the proposed guidance contemplates an appropriate

[[Page 84652]]

spread relied upon for tax-exempt municipal securities; and (5) extend 
the implementation period of the proposed rule change from no later 
than one year to no later than 18 months.
    According to the MSRB, it has proposed the revisions included in 
Amendment No. 1 in response to specific commenter suggestions and 
commenters' general preference for the MSRB and FINRA to adopt 
harmonized mark-up disclosure rules and prevailing market price 
guidance. The Commission notes that the addition of the terms ``off-
setting'' and ``an applicable index'' to the proposed rule change is 
solely a clarification amendment for the avoidance of doubt and that 
the amendment does not alter the substance of the rule. Furthermore, 
extension of the implementation period of the proposal from no later 
than one year to no later than 18 months is appropriate and responsive 
to the operational and implementation concerns raised by commenters. 
The Commission also notes that after consideration of the comments the 
MSRB received on its proposal to require a security-specific hyperlink 
to EMMA and the execution time of the transaction, the MSRB amended its 
proposal in a manner that is identical to the Amendment No. 1 that 
FINRA has filed.\262\ Based on the foregoing, the Commission finds that 
the proposed rule change, as modified by Amendment No. 1, is consistent 
with Section 15B(b)(2)(C) of the Act, which requires, among other 
things, that the MSRB's rules be designed to prevent fraudulent and 
manipulative acts and practices, to promote just and equitable 
principles of trade, to foster cooperation and coordination with 
persons engaged in regulating, clearing, settling, processing 
information with respect to, and facilitating transactions in municipal 
securities and municipal financial products, to remove impediments to 
and perfect the mechanism of a free and open market in municipal 
securities and municipal financial products, and, in general, to 
protect investors, municipal entities, obligated persons, and the 
public interest, and not be designed to impose any burden on 
competition not necessary or appropriate in furtherance of the purposes 
of the Act.\263\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \262\ See FINRA Amendment No. 1, supra note 11.
    \263\ 15 U.S.C. 78o-4(b)(2)(C).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission notes that it today has approved the FINRA Proposal, 
as modified by FINRA Amendment No. 1, and believes that in the 
interests of promoting efficiency in the implementation of both 
proposals, it is appropriate to approve the proposed rule change, as 
modified by Amendment No. 1, concurrently. Accordingly, the Commission 
finds good cause, pursuant to Section 19(b)(2) of the Exchange 
Act,\264\ to approve the proposed rule change, as modified by Amendment 
No. 1, on an accelerated basis.
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    \264\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

VII. Conclusion

    It is therefore ordered, pursuant to Section 19(b)(2) of the 
Act,\265\ that the proposed rule change (SR-MSRB-2016-12), as modified 
by Amendment No. 1, is approved on an accelerated basis.
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    \265\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(2).

    For the Commission, pursuant to delegated authority.\266\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \266\ 17 CFR 200.30-3(a)(12).
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Brent J. Fields,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2016-28197 Filed 11-22-16; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 8011-01-P