[Federal Register Volume 81, Number 224 (Monday, November 21, 2016)]
[Notices]
[Pages 83308-83312]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2016-27894]
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SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
[Release No. 34-79314; File No. SR-NYSEMKT-2016-101]
Self-Regulatory Organizations; NYSE MKT LLC; Notice of Filing and
Immediate Effectiveness of Proposed Change Amending the Fees for NYSE
MKT BBO and NYSE MKT Trades To Lower the Enterprise Fee
November 15, 2016.
Pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) \1\ of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (the ``Act'') \2\ and Rule 19b-4 thereunder,\3\ notice is hereby
given that, on November 1, 2016, NYSE MKT LLC (the ``Exchange'' or
``NYSE MKT'') filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the
``Commission'') the proposed rule change as described in Items I, II,
and III below, which Items have been prepared by the self-regulatory
organization. The Commission is publishing this notice to solicit
comments on the proposed rule change from interested persons.
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\1\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1).
\2\ 15 U.S.C. 78a.
\3\ 17 CFR 240.19b-4.
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I. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Terms of Substance
of the Proposed Rule Change
The Exchange proposes to amend the fees for NYSE MKT BBO and NYSE
MKT Trades to lower the Enterprise Fee. The proposed change is
available on the Exchange's Web site at www.nyse.com, at the principal
office of the Exchange, and at the Commission's Public Reference Room.
[[Page 83309]]
I. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Purpose of, and
Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule Change
In its filing with the Commission, the self-regulatory organization
included statements concerning the purpose of, and basis for, the
proposed rule change and discussed any comments it received on the
proposed rule change. The text of those statements may be examined at
the places specified in Item IV below. The Exchange has prepared
summaries, set forth in sections A, B, and C below, of the most
significant parts of such statements.
A. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Purpose of, and the
Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule Change
1. Purpose
The Exchange proposes to amend the fees for NYSE MKT BBO and NYSE
MKT Trades market data products,\4\ as set forth on the NYSE MKT
Equities Proprietary Market Data Fee Schedule (``Fee Schedule'').
Specifically, the Exchange proposes to lower the Enterprise Fee. The
Exchange proposes to make the fee change effective November 1, 2016.
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\4\ See Securities Exchange Act Release Nos. 61936 (April 16,
2010), 74 [sic] FR 21088 (April 22, 2010) (SR-NYSEAmex-2010-35)
(notice--NYSE MKT BBO and NYSE MKT Trades) and 62187 (May 27, 2010),
75 FR 31500 (June 3, 2010) (SR-NYSEAmex-2010-35) (approval order--
NYSE MKT BBO and NYSE MKT Trades).
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The Exchange currently charges an enterprise fee of $15,000 per
month for an unlimited number of professional and non-professional
users for each of NYSE MKT BBO and NYSE MKT Trades.\5\ A single
Enterprise Fee applies for clients receiving both NYSE MKT BBO and NYSE
MKT Trades.\6\ The Exchange proposes to lower the enterprise fee to
$3,000 per month.
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\5\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 76906 (January 14,
2016), 81 FR 3500 (January 21, 2016) (SR-NYSEMKT-2016-04).
\6\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 70212 (August 15,
2013), 78 FR 51775 (August 21, 2013) (SR-NYSEMKT-2013-69).
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As an example, under the current fee structure for per user fees,
if a firm had 10,000 professional users who each received NYSE MKT
Trades at $1 per month and NYSE MKT BBO at $1 per month, without the
Enterprise Fee, the firm would be subject to $20,000 per month in
professional user fees. Under the current pricing structure, the charge
would be capped at $15,000 and effective November 1, 2016 it would be
capped at $3,000.
Under the proposed enterprise fee, the firm would pay a flat fee of
$3,000 for an unlimited number of professional and non-professional
users for both products. As is the case currently, a data recipient
that pays the enterprise fee would not have to report the number of
such users on a monthly basis.\7\ However, every six months, a data
recipient must provide the Exchange with a count of the total number of
natural person users of each product, including both professional and
non-professional users.
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\7\ Professional users currently are subject to a per display
device count. See Securities [sic] Act Release No. 73986 (January 5,
2015), 80 FR 1444 (January 9, 2015) (SR-NYSEMKT-2014-113).
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2. Statutory Basis
The Exchange believes that the proposed rule change is consistent
with the provisions of Section 6 of the Act,\8\ in general, and
Sections 6(b)(4) and 6(b)(5) of the Act,\9\ in particular, in that it
provides an equitable allocation of reasonable fees among users and
recipients of the data and is not designed to permit unfair
discrimination among customers, issuers, and brokers.
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\8\ 15 U.S.C. 78f(b).
\9\ 15 U.S.C. 78f(b)(4), (5).
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The proposed fee change is also equitable and not unfairly
discriminatory because it would apply to all data recipients that
choose to subscribe to NYSE MKT BBO and NYSE MKT Trades.
The proposed enterprise fees for NYSE MKT BBO and NYSE MKT Trades
are reasonable because they could result in a fee reduction for data
recipients with a large number of professional and nonprofessional
users, as described in the example above. If a data recipient has a
smaller number of professional users of NYSE MKT BBO and/or NYSE MKT
Trades, then it may continue to use the per user fee structure. By
reducing prices for data recipient with a large number of professional
and non-professional users, the Exchange believes that more data
recipients may choose to offer NYSE MKT BBO and NYSE MKT Trades,
thereby expanding the distribution of this market data for the benefit
of investors. The Exchange also believes that offering an enterprise
fee expands the range of options for offering NYSE MKT BBO and NYSE MKT
Trades and allows data recipients greater choice in selecting the most
appropriate level of data and fees for the professional and non-
professional users they are servicing.
The Exchange notes that NYSE MKT BBO and NYSE MKT Trades are
entirely optional. The Exchange is not required to make NYSE MKT BBO
and NYSE MKT Trades available or to offer any specific pricing
alternatives to any customers, nor is any firm required to purchase
NYSE MKT BBO and NYSE MKT Trades. Firms that do purchase NYSE MKT BBO
and NYSE MKT Trades do so for the primary goals of using them to
increase revenues, reduce expenses, and in some instances compete
directly with the Exchange (including for order flow); those firms are
able to determine for themselves whether NYSE MKT BBO and NYSE MKT
Trades or any other similar products are attractively priced or
not.\10\
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\10\ See, e.g., Proposing Release on Regulation of NMS Stock
Alternative Trading Systems, Securities Exchange Act Release No.
76474 (Nov. 18, 2015) (File No. S7-23-15). See also, ``Brokers
Warned Not to Steer Clients' Stock Trades Into Slow Lane,''
Bloomberg Business, December 14, 2015 (Sigma X dark pool to use
direct exchange feeds as the primary source of price data).
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Firms that do not wish to purchase NYSE MKT BBO and NYSE MKT Trades
have a variety of alternative market data products from which to
choose,\11\ or if NYSE MKT BBO and NYSE MKT Trades do not provide
sufficient value to firms as offered based on the uses those firms have
or planned to make of it, such firms may simply choose to conduct their
business operations in ways that do not use NYSE MKT BBO and NYSE MKT
Trades or use them at different levels or in different configurations.
The Exchange notes that broker-dealers are not required to purchase
proprietary market data to comply with their best execution
obligations.\12\
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\11\ See NASDAQ Rule 7047 (Nasdaq Basic) and BATS [sic] Rule
11.22 (BATS TOP and Last Sale).
\12\ See FINRA Regulatory Notice 15-46, ``Best Execution,''
November 2015.
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The decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit in NetCoalition v. SEC, 615 F.3d 525 (D.C. Cir.
2010), upheld reliance by the Securities and Exchange Commission
(``Commission'') upon the existence of competitive market mechanisms to
set reasonable and equitably allocated fees for proprietary market
data:
In fact, the legislative history indicates that the Congress
intended that the market system `evolve through the interplay of
competitive forces as unnecessary regulatory restrictions are
removed' and that the SEC wield its regulatory power `in those
situations where competition may not be sufficient,' such as in the
creation of a `consolidated transactional reporting system.'
Id. at 535 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 94-229 at 92 (1975), as reprinted in
1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 323). The court agreed with the Commission's
conclusion that ``Congress intended that `competitive forces should
dictate the services and
[[Page 83310]]
practices that constitute the U.S. national market system for trading
equity securities.' '' \13\
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\13\ NetCoalition, 615 F.3d at 535.
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As explained below in the Exchange's Statement on Burden on
Competition, the Exchange believes that there is substantial evidence
of competition in the marketplace for proprietary market data and that
the Commission can rely upon such evidence in concluding that the fees
established in this filing are the product of competition and therefore
satisfy the relevant statutory standards. In addition, the existence of
alternatives to these data products, such as consolidated data and
proprietary data from other sources, as described below, further
ensures that the Exchange cannot set unreasonable fees, or fees that
are unreasonably discriminatory, when vendors and subscribers can
select such alternatives.
As the NetCoalition decision noted, the Commission is not required
to undertake a cost-of-service or ratemaking approach. The Exchange
believes that, even if it were possible as a matter of economic theory,
cost-based pricing for proprietary market data would be so complicated
that it could not be done practically or offer any significant
benefits.\14\
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\14\ The Exchange believes that cost-based pricing would be
impractical because it would create enormous administrative burdens
for all parties and the Commission to cost-regulate a large number
of participants and standardize and analyze extraordinary amounts of
information, accounts, and reports. In addition, and as described
below, it is impossible to regulate market data prices in isolation
from prices charged by markets for other services that are joint
products. Cost-based rate regulation would also lead to litigation
and may distort incentives, including those to minimize costs and to
innovate, leading to further waste. Under cost-based pricing, the
Commission would be burdened with determining a fair rate of return,
and the industry could experience frequent rate increases based on
escalating expense levels. Even in industries historically subject
to utility regulation, cost-based ratemaking has been discredited.
As such, the Exchange believes that cost-based ratemaking would be
inappropriate for proprietary market data and inconsistent with
Congress's direction that the Commission use its authority to foster
the development of the national market system, and that market
forces will continue to provide appropriate pricing discipline. See
Appendix C to NYSE's comments to the Commission's 2000 Concept
Release on the Regulation of Market Information Fees and Revenues,
which can be found on the Commission's Web site at http://www.sec.gov/rules/concept/s72899/buck1.htm.
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In addition, the Exchange believes that the proposed fees are
reasonable when compared to fees for comparable products offered by at
least one other exchange. For example, Bats BYX Exchange (``BYX'')
charges an enterprise fee of $10,000 per month for each of BYX Top and
BYX Last Sale, which includes best bid and offer and last sale data,
respectively.\15\ The Exchange is proposing enterprise fees that are
less than the fees currently charged by BYX.
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\15\ See Market Data Fees at https://www.batstrading.com/support/fee_schedule/byx/.
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For these reasons, the Exchange believes that the proposed fees are
reasonable, equitable, and not unfairly discriminatory.
B. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement on Burden on Competition
The Exchange does not believe that the proposed rule change will
impose any burden on competition that is not necessary or appropriate
in furtherance of the purposes of the Act. An exchange's ability to
price its proprietary market data feed products is constrained by
actual competition for the sale of proprietary market data products,
the joint product nature of exchange platforms, and the existence of
alternatives to the Exchange's proprietary data.
The Existence of Actual Competition
The market for proprietary data products is currently competitive
and inherently contestable because there is fierce competition for the
inputs necessary for the creation of proprietary data and strict
pricing discipline for the proprietary products themselves. Numerous
exchanges compete with one another for listings and order flow and
sales of market data itself, providing ample opportunities for
entrepreneurs who wish to compete in any or all of those areas,
including producing and distributing their own market data. Proprietary
data products are produced and distributed by each individual exchange,
as well as other entities, in a vigorously competitive market. Indeed,
the U.S. Department of Justice (``DOJ'') (the primary antitrust
regulator) has expressly acknowledged the aggressive actual competition
among exchanges, including for the sale of proprietary market data. In
2011, the DOJ stated that exchanges ``compete head to head to offer
real-time equity data products. These data products include the best
bid and offer of every exchange and information on each equity trade,
including the last sale.'' \16\
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\16\ Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice, Assistant
Attorney General Christine Varney Holds Conference Call Regarding
NASDAQ OMX Group Inc. and IntercontinentalExchange Inc. Abandoning
Their Bid for NYSE Euronext (May 16, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/atr/speeches/2011/at-speech-110516.html; see
also Complaint in U.S. v. Deutsche Borse AG and NYSE Euronext, Case
No. 11-cv-2280 (D.C. Dist.) ] 24 (``NYSE and Direct Edge compete
head-to-head . . . in the provision of real-time proprietary equity
data products.'').
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Moreover, competitive markets for listings, order flow, executions,
and transaction reports provide pricing discipline for the inputs of
proprietary data products and therefore constrain markets from
overpricing proprietary market data. Broker-dealers send their order
flow and transaction reports to multiple venues, rather than providing
them all to a single venue, which in turn reinforces this competitive
constraint. As a 2010 Commission Concept Release noted, the ``current
market structure can be described as dispersed and complex'' with
``trading volume . . . dispersed among many highly automated trading
centers that compete for order flow in the same stocks'' and ``trading
centers offer[ing] a wide range of services that are designed to
attract different types of market participants with varying trading
needs.'' \17\ More recently, SEC Chair Mary Jo White has noted that
competition for order flow in exchange-listed equities is ``intense''
and divided among many trading venues, including exchanges, more than
40 alternative trading systems, and more than 250 broker-dealers.\18\
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\17\ Concept Release on Equity Market Structure, Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 61358 (Jan. 14, 2010), 75 FR 3594 (Jan. 21,
2010) (File No. S7-02-10). This Concept Release included data from
the third quarter of 2009 showing that no market center traded more
than 20% of the volume of listed stocks, further evidencing the
dispersal of and competition for trading activity. Id. at 3598. Data
available on ArcaVision show that from June 30, 2013 to June 30,
2014, no exchange traded more than 12% of the volume of listed
stocks by either trade or dollar volume, further evidencing the
continued dispersal of and fierce competition for trading activity.
See https://www.arcavision.com/Arcavision/arcalogin.jsp.
\18\ Mary Jo White, Enhancing Our Equity Market Structure,
Sandler O'Neill & Partners, L.P. Global Exchange and Brokerage
Conference (June 5, 2014) (available on the Commission Web site),
citing Tuttle, Laura, 2014, ``OTC Trading: Description of Non-ATS
OTC Trading in National Market System Stocks,'' at 7-8.
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If an exchange succeeds in competing for quotations, order flow,
and trade executions, then it earns trading revenues and increases the
value of its proprietary market data products because they will contain
greater quote and trade information. Conversely, if an exchange is less
successful in attracting quotes, order flow, and trade executions, then
its market data products may be less desirable to customers in light of
the diminished content and data products offered by competing venues
may become more attractive. Thus, competition for quotations, order
flow, and trade executions puts significant pressure on an exchange to
maintain both execution and data fees at reasonable levels.
In addition, in the case of products that are also redistributed
through market data vendors, such as Bloomberg and Thompson Reuters,
the vendors
[[Page 83311]]
themselves provide additional price discipline for proprietary data
products because they control the primary means of access to certain
end users. These vendors impose price discipline based upon their
business models. For example, vendors that assess a surcharge on data
they sell are able to refuse to offer proprietary products that their
end users do not or will not purchase in sufficient numbers. Vendors
will not elect to make available NYSE MKT BBO or NYSE MKT Trades unless
their customers request it, and customers will not elect to pay the
proposed fees unless NYSE MKT BBO and NYSE MKT Trades can provide value
by sufficiently increasing revenues or reducing costs in the customer's
business in a manner that will offset the fees. All of these factors
operate as constraints on pricing proprietary data products.
Joint Product Nature of Exchange Platform
Transaction execution and proprietary data products are
complementary in that market data is both an input and a byproduct of
the execution service. In fact, proprietary market data and trade
executions are a paradigmatic example of joint products with joint
costs. The decision of whether and on which platform to post an order
will depend on the attributes of the platforms where the order can be
posted, including the execution fees, data availability and quality,
and price and distribution of data products. Without a platform to post
quotations, receive orders, and execute trades, exchange data products
would not exist.
The costs of producing market data include not only the costs of
the data distribution infrastructure, but also the costs of designing,
maintaining, and operating the exchange's platform for posting quotes,
accepting orders, and executing transactions and the cost of regulating
the exchange to ensure its fair operation and maintain investor
confidence. The total return that a trading platform earns reflects the
revenues it receives from both products and the joint costs it incurs.
Moreover, an exchange's broker-dealer customers generally view the
costs of transaction executions and market data as a unified cost of
doing business with the exchange. A broker-dealer will only choose to
direct orders to an exchange if the revenue from the transaction
exceeds its cost, including the cost of any market data that the
broker-dealer chooses to buy in support of its order routing and
trading decisions. If the costs of the transaction are not offset by
its value, then the broker-dealer may choose instead not to purchase
the product and trade away from that exchange.
Other market participants have noted that proprietary market data
and trade executions are joint products of a joint platform and have
common costs.\19\ The Exchange agrees with and adopts those discussions
and the arguments therein. The Exchange also notes that the economics
literature confirms that there is no way to allocate common costs
between joint products that would shed any light on competitive or
efficient pricing.\20\
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\19\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 72153 (May 12,
2014), 79 FR 28575, 28578 n.15 [sic] (May 16, 2014) (SR-NASDAQ-2014-
045) (``[A]ll of the exchange's costs are incurred for the unified
purposes of attracting order flow, executing and/or routing orders,
and generating and selling data about market activity. The total
return that an exchange earns reflects the revenues it receives from
the joint products and the total costs of the joint products.'').
See also Securities Exchange Act Release No. 62907 (Sept. 14, 2010),
75 FR 57314, 57317 (Sept. 20, 2010) (SR-NASDAQ-2010-110), and
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 62908 (Sept. 14, 2010), 75 FR
57321, 57324 (Sept. 20, 2010) (SR-NASDAQ-2010-111).
\20\ See generally Mark Hirschey, Fundamentals of Managerial
Economics, at 600 (2009) (``It is important to note, however, that
although it is possible to determine the separate marginal costs of
goods produced in variable proportions, it is impossible to
determine their individual average costs. This is because common
costs are expenses necessary for manufacture of a joint product.
Common costs of production--raw material and equipment costs,
management expenses, and other overhead--cannot be allocated to each
individual by-product on any economically sound basis. . . . Any
allocation of common costs is wrong and arbitrary.''). This is not
new economic theory. See, e.g., F.W. Taussig, ``A Contribution to
the Theory of Railway Rates,'' Quarterly Journal of Economics V(4)
438, 465 (July 1891) (``Yet, surely, the division is purely
arbitrary. These items of cost, in fact, are jointly incurred for
both sorts of traffic; and I cannot share the hope entertained by
the statistician of the Commission, Professor Henry C. Adams, that
we shall ever reach a mode of apportionment that will lead to
trustworthy results.'').
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Analyzing the cost of market data product production and
distribution in isolation from the cost of all of the inputs supporting
the creation of market data and market data products will inevitably
underestimate the cost of the data and data products because it is
impossible to obtain the data inputs to create market data products
without a fast, technologically robust, and well-regulated execution
system, and system and regulatory costs affect the price of both
obtaining the market data itself and creating and distributing market
data products. It would be equally misleading, however, to attribute
all of an exchange's costs to the market data portion of an exchange's
joint products. Rather, all of an exchange's costs are incurred for the
unified purposes of attracting order flow, executing and/or routing
orders, and generating and selling data about market activity. The
total return that an exchange earns reflects the revenues it receives
from the joint products and the total costs of the joint products.
As noted above, the level of competition and contestability in the
market is evident in the numerous alternative venues that compete for
order flow, including 13 equities self-regulatory organization
(``SRO'') markets, as well as various forms of alternative trading
systems (``ATSs''), including dark pools and electronic communication
networks (``ECNs''), and internalizing broker-dealers. SRO markets
compete to attract order flow and produce transaction reports via trade
executions, and two FINRA-regulated Trade Reporting Facilities compete
to attract transaction reports from the non-SRO venues.
Competition among trading platforms can be expected to constrain
the aggregate return that each platform earns from the sale of its
joint products, but different trading platforms may choose from a range
of possible, and equally reasonable, pricing strategies as the means of
recovering total costs. For example, some platforms may choose to pay
rebates to attract orders, charge relatively low prices for market data
products (or provide market data products free of charge), and charge
relatively high prices for accessing posted liquidity. Other platforms
may choose a strategy of paying lower rebates (or no rebates) to
attract orders, setting relatively high prices for market data
products, and setting relatively low prices for accessing posted
liquidity. For example, Bats Global Markets (``Bats'') and Direct Edge,
which previously operated as ATSs and obtained exchange status in 2008
and 2010, respectively, provided certain market data at no charge on
their Web sites in order to attract more order flow, and used revenue
rebates from resulting additional executions to maintain low execution
charges for their users.\21\ In this environment, there is no economic
basis for regulating maximum prices for one of the joint products in an
industry in which suppliers face competitive constraints with regard to
the joint offering.
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\21\ This is simply a securities market-specific example of the
well-established principle that in certain circumstances more sales
at lower margins can be more profitable than fewer sales at higher
margins; this example is additional evidence that market data is an
inherent part of a market's joint platform.
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Existence of Alternatives
The large number of SROs, ATSs, and internalizing broker-dealers
that
[[Page 83312]]
currently produce proprietary data or are currently capable of
producing it provides further pricing discipline for proprietary data
products. Each SRO, ATS, and broker-dealer is currently permitted to
produce and sell proprietary data products, and many currently do,
including but not limited to the Exchange, New York Stock Exchange LLC,
NYSE Arca, Inc. (``NYSE Arca''), NASDAQ, Bats [sic], and Direct Edge.
The fact that proprietary data from ATSs, internalizing broker-
dealers, and vendors can bypass SROs is significant in two respects.
First, non-SROs can compete directly with SROs for the production and
sale of proprietary data products. By way of example, Bats [sic] and
NYSE Arca both published proprietary data on the Internet before
registering as exchanges. Second, because a single order or transaction
report can appear in an SRO proprietary product, a non-SRO proprietary
product, or both, the amount of data available via proprietary products
is greater in size than the actual number of orders and transaction
reports that exist in the marketplace. Indeed, in the case of NYSE MKT
BBO and NYSE MKT Trades, the data provided through these products
appears both in (i) real-time core data products offered by the
Securities Information Processors (SIPs) for a fee, and (ii) free SIP
data products with a 15-minute time delay, and finds a close substitute
in similar products of competing venues.\22\ Because market data users
can find suitable substitutes for most proprietary market data
products, a market that overprices its market data products stands a
high risk that users may substitute another source of market data
information for its own.
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\22\ See supra note 15.
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Those competitive pressures imposed by available alternatives are
evident in the Exchange's proposed pricing.
In addition to the competition and price discipline described
above, the market for proprietary data products is also highly
contestable because market entry is rapid and inexpensive. The history
of electronic trading is replete with examples of entrants that swiftly
grew into some of the largest electronic trading platforms and
proprietary data producers: Archipelago, Bloomberg Tradebook, Island,
RediBook, Attain, TrackECN, BATS Trading and Direct Edge. A
proliferation of dark pools and other ATSs operate profitably with
fragmentary share of consolidated market volume.
In determining the proposed changes to the fees for the NYSE MKT
BBO and NYSE MKT Trades, the Exchange considered the competitiveness of
the market for proprietary data and all of the implications of that
competition. The Exchange believes that it has considered all relevant
factors and has not considered irrelevant factors in order to establish
fair, reasonable, and not unreasonably discriminatory fees and an
equitable allocation of fees among all users. The existence of numerous
alternatives to the Exchange's products, including proprietary data
from other sources, ensures that the Exchange cannot set unreasonable
fees, or fees that are unreasonably discriminatory, when vendors and
subscribers can elect these alternatives or choose not to purchase a
specific proprietary data product if the attendant fees are not
justified by the returns that any particular vendor or data recipient
would achieve through the purchase.
C. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement on Comments on the Proposed
Rule Change Received From Members, Participants, or Others
No written comments were solicited or received with respect to the
proposed rule change.
III. Date of Effectiveness of the Proposed Rule Change and Timing for
Commission Action
The foregoing rule change is effective upon filing pursuant to
Section 19(b)(3)(A) \23\ of the Act and subparagraph (f)(2) of Rule
19b-4 \24\ thereunder, because it establishes a due, fee, or other
charge imposed by the Exchange.
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\23\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(3)(A).
\24\ 17 CFR 240.19b-4(f)(2).
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At any time within 60 days of the filing of such proposed rule
change, the Commission summarily may temporarily suspend such rule
change if it appears to the Commission that such action is necessary or
appropriate in the public interest, for the protection of investors, or
otherwise in furtherance of the purposes of the Act. If the Commission
takes such action, the Commission shall institute proceedings under
Section 19(b)(2)(B) \25\ of the Act to determine whether the proposed
rule change should be approved or disapproved.
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\25\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(2)(B).
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IV. Solicitation of Comments
Interested persons are invited to submit written data, views, and
arguments concerning the foregoing, including whether the proposed rule
change is consistent with the Act. Comments may be submitted by any of
the following methods:
Electronic Comments
Use the Commission's Internet comment form (http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml); or
Send an email to [email protected]. Please include
File Number SR-NYSEMKT-2016-101 on the subject line.
Paper Comments
Send paper comments in triplicate to Brent J. Fields,
Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street NE.,
Washington, DC 20549-1090.
All submissions should refer to File Number SR-NYSEMKT-2016-101. This
file number should be included on the subject line if email is used. To
help the Commission process and review your comments more efficiently,
please use only one method. The Commission will post all comments on
the Commission's Internet Web site (http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml). Copies of the submission, all subsequent amendments, all
written statements with respect to the proposed rule change that are
filed with the Commission, and all written communications relating to
the proposed rule change between the Commission and any person, other
than those that may be withheld from the public in accordance with the
provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552, will be available for Web site viewing and
printing in the Commission's Public Reference Room, 100 F Street NE.,
Washington, DC 20549 on official business days between the hours of
10:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m. Copies of the filing also will be available
for inspection and copying at the principal office of the Exchange. All
comments received will be posted without change; the Commission does
not edit personal identifying information from submissions. You should
submit only information that you wish to make available publicly. All
submissions should refer to File Number SR-NYSEMKT-2016-101 and should
be submitted on or before December 12, 2016.
For the Commission, by the Division of Trading and Markets,
pursuant to delegated authority.\26\
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\26\ 17 CFR 200.30-3(a)(12).
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Brent J. Fields,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2016-27894 Filed 11-18-16; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8011-01-P