[Federal Register Volume 81, Number 192 (Tuesday, October 4, 2016)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 68312-68317]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2016-23968]


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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Office of the Secretary

32 CFR Part 236

[DOD-2014-OS-0097/RIN 0790-AJ29]


Department of Defense (DoD)'s Defense Industrial Base (DIB) 
Cybersecurity (CS) Activities

AGENCY: Office of the DoD Chief Information Officer, DoD.

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: This final rule responds to public comments and updates DoD's 
Defense Industrial Base (DIB) Cybersecurity (CS) Activities. This rule 
implements mandatory cyber incident reporting requirements for DoD 
contractors and subcontractors who have agreements with DoD. In 
addition, the rule modifies eligibility criteria to permit greater 
participation in the voluntary DIB CS information sharing program.

DATES: Effective Date: This rule is effective on November 3, 2016.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Vicki Michetti, DoD's DIB 
Cybersecurity Program Office: (703) 604-3167, toll free (855) 363-4227, 
or [email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
    Purpose: This final rule responds to public comments to the interim 
final rule published on October 2, 2015. This rule implements statutory 
requirements for DoD contractors and subcontractors to report cyber 
incidents that result in an actual or potentially adverse effect on a 
covered contractor information system or covered defense information 
residing therein, or on a contractor's ability to provide operationally 
critical support. The mandatory reporting applies to all forms of 
agreements between DoD and DIB companies (contracts, grants, 
cooperative agreements, other transaction agreements, technology 
investment agreements, and any other type of legal instrument or 
agreement). The revisions provided are part of DoD's efforts to 
establish a single reporting mechanism for such cyber incidents on 
unclassified DoD contractor networks or information systems. Reporting 
under this rule does not abrogate the contractor's responsibility for 
any other applicable cyber incident reporting requirement. Cyber 
incident reporting involving classified information on classified 
contractor systems will be in accordance with the National Industrial 
Security Program Operating Manual (DoD-M 5220.22 (http://dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/522022M.pdf)).
    The rule also addresses the voluntary DIB CS information sharing 
program that is outside the scope of the mandatory reporting 
requirements. By modifying the eligibility criteria for the DIB CS 
program, the rule enables greater participation in the voluntary 
program. Expanding participation in the DIB CS program is part of DoD's 
comprehensive approach to counter cyber threats through information 
sharing between the Government and DIB participants.
    Benefits: The DIB CS program allows eligible DIB participants to 
receive Government furnished information and cyber threat information 
from other DIB participants, thereby providing greater insights into 
adversarial activity targeting the DIB. The program builds trust 
between DoD and DIB and provides a collaborative environment for 
participating companies and DoD to share actionable unclassified cyber 
threat information that may be used to

[[Page 68313]]

bolster cybersecurity posture. The program also offers access to 
government classified cyber threat information to better understand the 
threat, as well as providing technical assistance from the DoD Cyber 
Crime Center (DC3) including analyst-to-analyst exchanges, mitigation 
and remediation strategies, and best practices. Through cyber incident 
reporting and voluntary cyber threat information sharing, both DoD and 
the DIB have a better understanding of adversary actions and the impact 
on DoD information and warfighting capabilities.
    Related Regulations: The definitions in the rule are consistent 
with Controlled Unclassified Information as used by the National 
Archives and Records Administration pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 
13556 ``Controlled Unclassified Information'' (November 4, 2010) and 32 
Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 2002, ``Controlled Unclassified 
Information'' (September 14, 2016). The rule is also harmonized with 
Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) Case 2013-
D018, ``Network Penetration Reporting and Contracting for Cloud 
Services'' and FAR Case 2011-020, ``Basic Safeguarding of Contractor 
Information Systems.''
    Authorities: The mandatory cyber incident reporting requirements 
support implementation of sections 391, 393, and 2224 of Title 10, 
United States Code (U.S.C); the Federal Information Security 
Modernization Act (FISMA), codified at 44 U.S.C. 3551 et seq.; and 50 
U.S.C. 3330(e), and the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2014. Cyber threat information sharing activities under this rule 
fulfill important elements of DoD's critical infrastructure protection 
responsibilities, as the sector specific agency for the DIB (see 
Presidential Policy Directive 21 (PPD-21), ``Critical Infrastructure 
Security and Resilience,'' available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/02/12/presidential-policy-directive-critical-infrastructure-security-and-resil).
    Associated Costs: Under this rule, contractors will incur costs 
associated with identifying and analyzing cyber incidents and their 
impact on covered defense information, or a contractor's ability to 
provide operationally critical support, and reporting those incidents 
to DoD. Contractors must obtain DoD-approved medium assurance 
certificates to ensure authentication and identification when reporting 
cyber incidents to DoD. Medium assurance certificates are individually 
issued digital identity credentials used to ensure the identity of the 
user in online environments. Certificates typically cost about $175 
each. If a contractor submits five cyber incident reports and 
participates in the voluntary DIB CS program, the annual cost to the 
contractor is estimated at $1,045. If the contractor elects to receive 
classified information electronically, the cost to establish the 
capability is approximately $4,500. The Government incurs cost to 
collect and analyze cyber incident information and develop trends and 
other analysis products, analyze malicious software, analyze media, 
onboard new companies into the voluntary DIB CS information sharing 
program, and facilitate collaboration activities related to the cyber 
threat information sharing.
    Cybersecurity and Privacy: A foundational element of the mandatory 
reporting requirements, as well as the voluntary DIB CS program, is the 
recognition that the information being shared between the parties 
includes extremely sensitive information that requires protection. For 
additional information regarding the Government's safeguarding of 
information received from the contractors that require protection, see 
the Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) for DoD's DIB Cybersecurity 
Activities located at http://dodcio.defense.gov/IntheNews/PrivacyImpactAssessments.aspx. The PIA provides detailed procedures for 
handling personally identifiable information (PII), attributional 
information about the strengths or vulnerabilities of specific covered 
contractor information systems, information providing a perceived or 
real competitive advantage on future procurement action, and contractor 
information marked as proprietary or commercial or financial 
information.

Public Comments

    DoD published an interim final rule on October 2, 2015 (80 FR 
59581). Twenty-eight comments were received and reviewed by DoD in the 
development of this final rule. A discussion of the comments received 
and changes made to the rule as a result of those comments follows:
    Comment: One respondent recommended that the rule be clarified to 
confirm the requirements in the rule are prospective to be implemented 
in new agreements or in modifying an existing agreement.
    Response: There should be no confusion regarding the prospective 
effect and effective date of the rule, nor is there basis to infer or 
interpret the rule as being intended to apply retroactively or 
otherwise to mandate the modification of pre-existing agreements; 
however, DoD agrees that the rule enables the option to modify such 
pre-existing agreements where deemed appropriate. No change is made to 
the rule.
    Comment: One respondent expressed concern about being unable to 
locate the text of Section 941 of the National Defense Authorization 
Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2013 in the U.S. Code.
    Response: Section 941 of NDAA for FY13 has been codified at 10 
U.S.C. 393 and all citations to this law have been updated accordingly.
    Comment: One respondent recommended regularly conducting and 
releasing PIAs.
    Response: DoD updates PIAs in accordance with DoD regulations and 
policy. DoD revised the PIA and published it in October 2015 (see 
http://dodcio.defense.gov/IntheNews/PrivacyImpactAssessments.aspx). No 
change is made to the rule.
    Comment: Two respondents recommended publishing a report on the 
program's privacy implications and addressing personal information in 
internal contractor systems and that DoD address special procedures and 
protections for personal information.
    Response: DIB CS program activities are in compliance with DoD and 
national policies for collecting, handling, safeguarding, and sharing 
sensitive information in accordance with DoD Directive 5400.11, ``DoD 
Privacy Program'' and 5400.11- Regulation, ``Department of Defense 
Privacy Program,'' which prescribes uniform procedures for 
implementation of and compliance with the DoD Privacy Program. Also, as 
noted in the immediately preceding response, the PIA for this program 
is also publicly available at http://dodcio.defense.gov/IntheNews/PrivacyImpactAssessments.aspx. In addition, DoD submits a privacy and 
civil liberties assessment of the DIB CS voluntary program for the 
annual Privacy and Civil Liberties Assessment Report required by E.O. 
13636. No change is made to the rule.
    Comment: One respondent stated that contractors are faced with 
multiple and sometimes conflicting reporting requirements for reporting 
cyber incidents from across the Government and even within DoD, and 
asserts that these reporting requirements should be clearly set forth 
in agreements with the Government. The respondent did not specifically 
identify any other cyber incident reporting requirements that might 
conflict with this rule.

[[Page 68314]]

    Response: This rule consolidates and streamlines mandatory cyber 
incident reporting requirements and procedures originating from 
multiple separate statutory bases (e.g., 10 U.S.C. 391 and 393, and 50 
U.S.C. 3330(e))--however, reporting under these procedures in no way 
abrogates the contractor's responsibility to meet other cyber incident 
reporting requirements that may be applicable based on other contract 
requirements, or other U.S. Government statutory or regulatory 
requirements (see Sec.  236.4(p)). DoD is working to streamline 
reporting procedures within the Department, including by designating 
the DoD Cyber Crime Center (DC3) as the single DoD focal point for 
receiving cyber incident reporting affecting unclassified networks of 
DoD contractors. No change is made to the rule.
    Comment: One respondent recommended that Congress repeal the 
requirement to establish procedures for mandatory cyber incident 
reporting.
    Response: This rule implements mandatory statutory requirements for 
mandatory cyber incident reporting set forth in 10 U.S.C. 391 and 393 
(Sec.  236.4(b)-(d)). No change is made to the rule.
    Comment: Two respondents questioned the Department's use of 
specific terms and definitions in the rule. One respondent stated that 
``a violation of security policy of a system'' that is a subset of the 
definition of ``compromise'' is very broad and could result in over 
reporting and overwhelming DoD's resources. Another respondent 
recommended that the scope of the rule should be narrowed to only 
information that relates to a ``successful penetration.''
    Response: The rule leverages established definitions from the 
Committee on National Security Systems Instruction No. 4009, ``National 
Information (IA) Assurance Glossary,'' (https://www.ncsc.gov/nittf/docs/CNSSI-4009_National_Information_Assurance.pdf). The term 
``successful penetration'' is not in the CNSS glossary. However, the 
rule uses the established terms ``cyber incident'' and ``compromise'' 
from the CNSS glossary, which are widely accepted and understood 
Government definitions. Adhering to this definition will not overwhelm 
DoD resources. No change is made to the rule.
    Comment: One respondent stated that the four categories of covered 
defense information are unclear and will hamper timely reporting.
    Response: The definition of covered defense information has been 
clarified to more closely align with, and leverage, the Controlled 
Unclassified Information (CUI) Registry at http://www.archives.gov/cui/registry/category-list.html (Sec.  236.2).
    Comment: One respondent stated the scope of a cyber incident 
``affecting the contractor's ability to provide operationally critical 
support'' is so vague that it may result in over reporting.
    Response: DoD designates the supplies or services that qualify as 
operationally critical support, and is developing procedures to ensure 
that contractors are notified when they are providing supplies or 
services designated as operationally critical support. If the 
contractor is unclear as to what specific supplies or services being 
provided have been designated as operationally critical, the contractor 
should request clarification from the DoD point of contact (e.g., 
contracting officer or agreements officer) for the agreement(s) 
governing the activity in question. No change is made to the rule.
    Comment: One respondent stated that it is not clear why the rule 
now distinguishes information ``created by or for DoD'' from 
information ``not created by DoD.''
    Response: The distinction regarding whether information has been 
created by or for DoD originates from that distinction being an element 
of the underlying statutes that are implemented in this rule (e.g., 10 
U.S.C. 391 and 393). The distinction is made in a variety of contexts--
generally to reinforce the underlying reason for requiring the 
contractor to share information with DoD (e.g., as it relates to a 
potential compromise of information created by or for DoD in support of 
a DoD program), and to minimize the requirement to share or provide 
access to information that is not related to DoD programs or activities 
(e.g., except as necessary for forensics analysis regarding an incident 
in which DoD information may have been compromised). No change is made 
to the rule.
    Comment: One respondent requested clarification of the purpose of, 
``Applicability and Order of Precedence,'' and the meaning of the 
phrase ``applicable laws and regulations'' in Sec.  236.4 of this rule.
    Response: Section 236.4(a) mandates that the cyber incident 
reporting requirements of this rule be incorporated into all relevant 
types of agreements between DoD, but recognizes that in some cases an 
individual agreement may have terms or conditions that may be 
inconsistent with this rule, and allows the terms of the agreement to 
take precedence over the requirements of this rule only when the terms 
of the agreement ``are authorized to have been included in the 
agreement in accordance with applicable laws and regulations.'' The 
laws and regulations that are applicable to any individual agreement 
will depend on the nature and context of the agreement. For example, in 
the context of procurement contracts, the requirements of this rule are 
implemented through Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement 
(DFARS) Subpart 204.73, ``Safeguarding Covered Defense Information and 
Cyber Incident Reporting,'' and its associated clauses (e.g., DFARS 
252.204-7009, and -7012). However, the FAR and DFARS also permit 
deviations from otherwise prescribed contract requirements under 
certain conditions, but not including cases when the deviation would be 
``precluded by law, executive order, or regulation'' (see FAR 1.402). 
No change is made to the rule.
    Comment: One respondent recommended that the phrase ``all 
applicable agreements'' in Sec.  236.4(a) be clarified to identify the 
agreements that DoD intends to be covered by the rule.
    Response: Section 236.4(a) has been revised to clarify that the 
rule applies to ``all forms of agreements (e.g., contracts, grants, 
cooperative agreements, other transaction agreements, technology 
investment agreements, and any other type of legal instrument or 
agreement).'' For example, these requirements are implemented for DoD 
procurement contracts through DFARS Subpart 204.73 and its associated 
clauses (e.g., DFARS 252.204-7009, and -7012).
    Comment: One respondent raised issue about the practicality of the 
72 hour reporting requirement.
    Response: Timeliness in reporting cyber incidents is a key element 
in cybersecurity and provides the clearest understanding of the cyber 
threat targeting DoD information and the ability of companies to 
provide operationally critical support. The 72 hour reporting standard 
has been a part of the DIB CS program since it was first established as 
a pilot activity in 2008, and throughout its evolution into a permanent 
program and ultimate codification in the CFR in 2012. Based on this 
history, the 72 hour period has proven to be an effective balance of 
the need for timely reporting while recognizing the challenges inherent 
in the initial phases of investigating a cyber incident. Contractors 
should report available information within the 72 hour period and 
provide updates if more information becomes available. No change is 
made to the rule.

[[Page 68315]]

    Comment: One respondent questioned the reporting by subcontractors 
and how DoD intends to enforce flow down of the clause and does DoD 
consider Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to fall in the category of 
subcontractors.
    Response: Section 236.4(d) of the rule has been revised to clarify 
that contractors must flow down the reporting requirements to 
``subcontractors that are providing operationally critical support or 
for which subcontract performance will involve a covered contractor 
information system.'' Whether these requirements would be required to 
flow down to an ISP would depend on whether the particular service(s) 
being provided would meet the flowdown criteria, and the implementation 
of these requirements for any specific type of agreement (e.g., for 
procurement contracts governed by the DFARS) may provide additional 
guidance regarding flowdown. The contractor should consult with the DoD 
point of contact for the relevant agreement (e.g., contracting officer 
or agreements officer) when it is uncertain if the requirements should 
flow down. Section 236.4(d) has been revised.
    Comment: One respondent recommended that the rule establish what 
information a contractor must share with the Government under mandatory 
reporting.
    Response: Contractors are required to report in accordance with 
Sec.  236.4(b). A list of the reporting fields can be found at http://dibnet.dod.mil. These reporting fields include the statutory 
requirements set forth in 10 U.S.C. 391 and 393, including but not 
limited to an assessment of the impact of the cyber incident, 
description of the technique or method used, summary of information 
compromised. No change is made to the rule.
    Comment: One respondent commented that the rule does not provide 
any mechanism for a contractor to raise concerns about, object to, or 
limit the data being provided due to its sensitivity.
    Response: This rule implements mandatory information sharing 
requirements of 10 U.S.C. 391 and 393 by requiring DoD contractors to 
report key information regarding cyber incidents, and to provide access 
to equipment or information enabling DoD to conduct forensic analysis 
to determine if or how DoD information was impacted in a cyber 
incident. The rule's implementation of these requirements is tailored 
to minimize the sharing of unnecessary information (whether sensitive 
or not), including by carefully tailoring the information required in 
the initial incident reports (Sec.  236.4(c)), by expressly limiting 
the scope of the requirement to provide DoD with access to additional 
information to only such information that is ``necessary to conduct a 
forensic analysis,'' and by affirmatively requiring the Government to 
safeguard any contractor attributional/proprietary information that has 
been shared (or derived from information that has been shared) against 
any unauthorized access or use. In the event that the contractor 
believes that there is information that meets the criteria for 
mandatory reporting, but the contractor desires not to share that 
information due to its sensitivity, then the contractor should 
immediately raise that issue to the DoD point of contact (e.g., 
contracting officer or agreements officer) for the agreement(s) 
governing the activity in question, and if necessary, follow the 
dispute resolution procedures that are applicable to the agreement(s). 
No change is made to the rule.
    Comment: One respondent asked how DoD will safeguard any contractor 
data provided as part of media once in DoD's possession, and what are 
the recourses for contractors in the event of a breach of those 
safeguards.
    Response: DoD uses a wide variety of mechanisms to safeguard all 
forms of sensitive information, including information received from 
contractors, to ensure that information is accessed, used, and shared 
only with authorized persons for authorized purposes. For example, the 
DIB CS PIA addresses how PII and other sensitive information will be 
protected. No change is made to the rule.
    Comment: One respondent stated that the rule lacks sufficient 
protections for contractor sensitive information that is provided to 
government support contractors, and the rule should provide such 
protections consistent with 10 U.S.C. 2320(f)(2) and DFARS 252.227-
7025, ``Limitations on the Use or Disclosure of Government-Furnished 
Information Marked with Restrictive Legends.''
    Response: Responsibilities of government support contractors to 
protect sensitive information received from other contractors under 
this rule are addressed in Sec.  236.4(m)(5) and are largely consistent 
with, although not identical to, the statutory provision and DFARS 
Clause cited by the commenter. In addition, the support contractor 
providing support for DoD's activities under this rule may also qualify 
as a ``covered Government support contractor'' under the cited DFARS 
clause, and thereby would already be subject to the cited DFARS clause. 
No change is made to the rule.
    Comment: One respondent stated the information shared with the 
Government should only be used for cybersecurity purposes.
    Response: 10 U.S.C. 391 and 393 provide specific authorization for 
sharing information received in cyber incident reports for a range of 
important activities that include, but are not limited to, 
cybersecurity activities (see Sec.  236.4(m)(1)-(5)). Limiting the 
sharing of information to cybersecurity purposes only would be 
inconsistent with the statutory framework and would unnecessarily limit 
the use of information for critical activities such as law enforcement, 
counterintelligence, and national security. No change is made to the 
rule.
    Comment: One respondent stated the rule provides no limitations on 
DoD's ability to share information with third-party contractors. It 
also imposes a confidentiality obligation upon receiving contractors 
but does not address measures needed to mitigate any potential 
conflicts of interest stemming from third-party access.
    Response: Section 236.4(m)(5) authorizes sharing with government 
support contractors that are ``directly supporting'' Government 
activities under this rule, and applies a comprehensive set of use and 
non-disclosure restrictions and responsibilities for those government 
support contractors to safeguard the information they receive, 
including prohibiting the support contractor from using the information 
for any other purpose, making the reporting contractor a third-party 
beneficiary of the non-disclosure agreement with direct remedies for 
any breach of the restrictions by the support contractor. No change is 
made to the rule.
    Comment: One respondent recommended the proposed rule should 
establish requirements for companies to remove PII before sharing with 
the Government and for the Government to remove upon receipt.
    Response: The DIB CS program has implemented procedures to minimize 
the collection and sharing of PII. Companies are always asked to remove 
unnecessary PII, and only share information if it is relevant to a 
cyber incident (e.g., for forensics or cyber intrusion damage 
assessment). The PIA for DoD's DIB CS Activities provides procedures on 
how the Government handles PII, as well as other forms of sensitive 
contractor information (e.g., contractor attributional/proprietary). 
The PIA was updated and published in October 2015 (http://

[[Page 68316]]

dodcio.defense.gov/IntheNews/PrivacyImpactAssessments.aspx). No change 
is made to the rule.
    Comment: One respondent stated the rule places burden on the 
contractor to mark information as, ``contractor attributional/
proprietary,'' but if it is not marked and subsequently submitted in 
response to request for images at the time of the cyber incident, 
Government must ensure, in absence of marking, obligation to protect 
information as contractor/attributional/proprietary.
    Response: The rule requires that, to the maximum extent 
practicable, the contractor shall identify and mark attributional/
proprietary information, but it does not condition the Government's 
safeguarding of such information on that identification or marking. The 
Government has established procedures for receiving, evaluating, 
anonymizing, safeguarding and sharing of such reported information in 
connection with cyber incidents involving contractor information and 
information systems. The DIB CS PIA provides more details regarding 
processes for handling PII and other sensitive information. No change 
is made to the rule.
    Comment: One respondent stated that the rule should include 
provisions for liability protection.
    Response: Liability protections established by 10 U.S.C. 391 and 
393 became effective after the publication of the interim rule. The 
regulatory implementation of these new statutory elements will be 
addressed through future rulemaking activities to ensure the 
opportunity for public comment.
    Comment: One respondent recommended expanding the number of 
commercial service providers under the Enhanced Cybersecurity Service 
(ECS) program, as part of the DIB CS program.
    Response: The ECS program is managed by the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS). Recommendations regarding ECS should be forwarded to 
DHS at [email protected]. No change is made to the rule.
    Comment: One respondent cautioned against expanding the types of 
companies eligible for the DIB CS program until addressing all relevant 
operational, privacy, and security concerns. This expansion could 
encompass companies who provide services and products to the general 
public and current defense contractors who are not currently eligible 
to participate in the program.
    Response: DoD has established eligibility requirements (Sec.  
236.7) for participation in the DIB CS program and thus any future 
expansion or revision of this eligibility criteria will be accomplished 
in accordance with federal rulemaking requirements to allow for public 
review and comment. No change is made to the rule.
    Comment: One respondent expressed concern about the burden of cost 
due to increased participation in the DIB CS program.
    Response: The burden of cost for companies participating in the DIB 
CS program has been reduced. Under the revised rule, DoD removed the 
requirement for DIB CS participants to obtain access to DoD's secure 
voice and transmission systems supporting the program. All companies 
participating in the DIB CS program are still required to have a DoD-
approved medium assurance certificate to enable encrypted unclassified 
information sharing between the Government and DIB CS participants. The 
cost of a DoD-approved medium assurance certificate has not changed and 
is approximately $175. No change is made to the rule.

Regulatory Procedures

Executive Orders 12866, ``Regulatory Planning and Review'' and 13563, 
``Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review''

    Executive Orders 12866 and 13563 direct agencies to assess all 
costs and benefits of available regulatory alternatives and, if 
regulation is necessary, to select regulatory approaches that maximize 
net benefits (including potential economic, environmental, public 
health and safety effects, distribute impacts, and equity). Executive 
Order 13563 emphasizes the importance of quantifying both costs and 
benefits, of reducing costs, of harmonizing rules, and of promoting 
flexibility. This rule has been designated a ``significant regulatory 
action,'' although not economically significant, under section 3(f) of 
Executive Order 12866. Accordingly, the rule has been reviewed by the 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB).

Public Law 104-121, ``Congressional Review Act'' (5 U.S.C. 801)

    It has been determined that this rule is not a ``major'' rule under 
5 U.S.C. 801, enacted by Public Law 104-121, because it will not result 
in an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more; a major 
increase in costs or prices for consumers, individual industries, 
Federal, State, or local Government agencies, or geographic regions; or 
significant adverse effects on competition, employment, investment, 
productivity, innovation, or on the ability of United States-based 
enterprises to compete with foreign-based enterprises in domestic and 
export markets.

2 U.S.C. Ch. 25, ``Unfunded Mandates Reform Act''

    It has been determined that this rule does not contain a Federal 
mandate that may result in expenditure by State, local and tribal 
Governments, in aggregate, or by the private sector, of $100 million or 
more in any one year.

Public Law 96-354, ``Regulatory Flexibility Act'' (5 U.S.C. Ch. 6)

    It has been certified that this rule is not subject to the 
Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. Ch. 6) because it would not, if 
promulgated, have a significant economic impact on a substantial number 
of small entities. Therefore, the Regulatory Flexibility Act, as 
amended, does not require us to prepare a regulatory flexibility 
analysis.

Public Law 96-511, ``Paperwork Reduction Act'' (44 U.S.C. Chapter 35)

    This rule does contain reporting requirements under the Paperwork 
Reduction Act (PRA) of 1995. The collection requirements were published 
in the preamble of the interim final rule that was published on October 
2, 2015 (80 FR 59581) for public comment. No comments were received for 
these collections. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Control 
Numbers are: 0704-0489, ``DoD's Defense Industrial Base (DIB) 
Cybersecurity (CS) Activities Cyber Incident Reporting,'' and 0704-
0490, ``DoD's Defense Industrial Base (DIB) Cybersecurity (CS) Program 
Points of Contact (POC) Information.''

Executive Order 13132, ``Federalism''

    It has been determined that this rule does not have federalism 
implications, as set forth in Executive Order 13132. This rule does not 
have substantial direct effects on:
    (a) The States;
    (b) The relationship between the National Government and the 
States; or
    (c) The distribution of power and responsibilities among the 
various levels of Government.

List of Subjects in 32 CFR Part 236

    Government contracts, Security measures.

    Accordingly, the interim final rule published at 80 FR 59581 on 
October 2, 2015, is adopted as a final rule with the following changes:

[[Page 68317]]

PART 236--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (DoD)'s DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE 
(DIB) CYBERSECURITY (CS) ACTIVITIES

0
1. The authority citation is revised to read as follows:

    Authority: 10 U.S.C. 391, 393, and 2224; 44 U.S.C. 3506 and 
3544; 50 U.S.C. 3330.


0
2. Amend Sec.  236.1 by revising the last two sentences in the section 
to read as follows:


Sec.  236.1  Purpose.

    * * * The part also permits eligible DIB participants to 
participate in the voluntary DIB CS program to share cyber threat 
information and cybersecurity best practices with DIB CS participants. 
The DIB CS program enhances and supplements DIB participants' 
capabilities to safeguard DoD information that resides on, or transits, 
DIB unclassified information systems.

0
3. Amend Sec.  236.2 by:
0
a. Revising the definition of ``Covered contractor information 
system''.
0
b. Revising the definition of ``Covered defense information''.
0
c. Revising the definition of ``Cyber incident''.
0
d. Revising the definition of ``DIB participant''.
0
e. Removing ``DoD-DIB CS information sharing program'' and adding in 
its place ``DIB CS program'' in the definition of ``Government 
furnished information''.
0
f. Removing ``Contractor'' and adding in its place ``contractor'' in 
the definition of ``Media''.
    The revisions read as follows:


Sec.  236.2   Definitions.

* * * * *
    Covered contractor information system means an unclassified 
information system that is owned or operated by or for a contractor and 
that processes, stores, or transmits covered defense information.
    Covered defense information means unclassified controlled technical 
information or other information (as described in the Controlled 
Unclassified Information (CUI) Registry at http://www.archives.gov/cui/registry/category-list.html) that requires safeguarding or 
dissemination controls pursuant to and consistent with law, 
regulations, and Government wide policies, and is:
    (1) Marked or otherwise identified in an agreement and provided to 
the contractor by or on behalf of the DoD in support of the performance 
of the agreement; or
    (2) Collected, developed, received, transmitted, used, or stored by 
or on behalf of the contractor in support of the performance of the 
agreement.
* * * * *
    DIB participant means a contractor that has met all of the 
eligibility requirements to participate in the voluntary DIB CS program 
as set forth in this part (see Sec.  236.7).
* * * * *


Sec.  236.3   [Amended]

0
4. Amend Sec.  236.3 by:
0
a. In paragraph (b)(1), removing ``DoD-DIB CS information sharing 
program'' and adding in its place ``DIB CS program.''
0
b. In paragraph (c), removing ``DoD-DIB CS information sharing 
program'' and adding in its place ``DIB CS program.''


Sec.  236.4  [Amended]

0
5. Amend Sec.  236.4 by:
0
a. In paragraph (a), removing ``applicable agreements'' and adding in 
its place ``forms of agreements (e.g., contracts, grants, cooperative 
agreements, other transaction agreements, technology investment 
agreements, and any other type of legal instrument or agreement).''
0
b. In paragraph (d), removing ``, as appropriate'' and adding in its 
place ``that are providing operationally critical support or for which 
subcontract performance will involve a covered contractor information 
system.''
0
c. In paragraph (e), removing ``http://iase.disa.mil/pki/eca/
certificate.html'' and adding in its place ``http://iase.disa.mil/pki/
eca/Pages/index.aspx.''
0
d. In paragraph (m)(4), adding ``non-attributional cyber threat 
information'' after ``sharing.''
0
e. Redesignating paragraphs (n) through (p) as paragraphs (o) through 
(q).
0
f. Redesignating paragraph (m)(6) as paragraph (n).

0
6. Amend Sec.  236.5 by:
0
a. Revising the section heading.
0
b. In paragraph (a), removing ``DoD-DIB CS information sharing 
program'' and adding in its place ``DIB CS program.''
0
c. In paragraph (b), removing ``DoD-DIB CS information sharing 
program'' and adding in its place ``DIB CS program.''
0
d. Revising paragraph (d).
0
e. In paragraph (g), removing ``DoD-DIB CS information sharing 
program'' and adding in its place ``DIB CS program.''
    The revisions read as follows:


Sec.  236.5   DoD's DIB CS program.

* * * * *
    (d) DoD's DIB CS Program Office is the overall point of contact for 
the program. The DC3 managed DoD DIB Collaborative Information Sharing 
Environment (DCISE) is the operational focal point for cyber threat 
information sharing and incident reporting under the DIB CS program.
* * * * *

0
7. Amend Sec.  236.6 by:
0
a. Revising the section heading.
0
b. In paragraph (a):
0
i. Removing ``DoD-DIB CS information sharing program'' and adding in 
its place ``DIB CS program'' in the first sentence.
0
ii. Removing ``DoD-DIB CS information sharing program'' and adding in 
its place ``DIB CS program'' in the second sentence.
0
c. In paragraph (c), removing ``DoD-DIB CS information sharing 
program'' and adding in its place ``DIB CS program.''
0
d. In paragraph (d), removing ``DoD-DIB CS information sharing 
program'' and adding in its place ``DIB CS program.''
0
e. In paragraph (e), removing ``DoD-DIB CS information sharing 
program'' and adding in its place ``DIB CS program.''
0
f. In paragraph (g), removing ``DoD-DIB CS information sharing 
program'' and adding in its place ``DIB CS program.''
    The revisions read as follows:


Sec.  236.6   General provisions of DoD's DIB CS program.

* * * * *

0
8. Amend Sec.  236.7 by:
0
a. Revising the section heading.
0
b. In paragraph (a) introductory text, removing ``DoD-DIB CS 
information sharing program'' and adding in its place ``DIB CS 
program.''
0
c. In paragraph (a)(1), adding ``to at least the Secret level'' after 
``FCL.''
0
d. In paragraph (a)(2), removing ``DoD-DIB CS information sharing 
program'' and adding in its place ``DIB CS program.''
0
e. In paragraph (a)(3)(iii), removing ``DoD-DIB CS information sharing 
program'' and adding in its place ``DIB CS program.''
    The revisions read as follows:


Sec.  236.7   DoD's DIB CS program requirements.

* * * * *

    Dated: September 29, 2016.
Patricia L. Toppings,
OSD Federal Register, Liaison Officer, Department of Defense.
[FR Doc. 2016-23968 Filed 10-3-16; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 5001-06-P