[Federal Register Volume 81, Number 180 (Friday, September 16, 2016)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 63682-63688]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2016-21970]
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FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM
12 CFR Part 217
[Docket No. R-1529; RIN 7100 AE-43]
Regulatory Capital Rules: The Federal Reserve Board's Framework
for Implementing the U.S. Basel III Countercyclical Capital Buffer
AGENCY: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
ACTION: Final policy statement.
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SUMMARY: The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Board)
is adopting a final policy statement (Policy Statement) describing the
framework that the Board will follow under its Regulation Q in setting
the amount of the U.S. countercyclical capital buffer for advanced
approaches bank holding companies, savings and loan holding companies,
and state member banks.
DATES: The Policy Statement is effective October 14, 2016.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: William Bassett, Deputy Associate
Director, (202) 736-5644, or Rochelle Edge, Deputy Associate Director,
(202) 452-2339, Division of Financial Stability; Sean Campbell,
Associate Director, (202) 452-3760, Division of Banking Supervision and
Regulation; Benjamin W. McDonough, Special Counsel, (202) 452-2036,
Mark Buresh, Senior Attorney, (202) 452-5270, or Mary Watkins,
Attorney, (202) 452-3722, Legal Division.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Table of Contents
I. Background
II. Summary of Comments on the Proposal
III. Policy Statement
IV. Administrative Law Matters
A. Use of Plain Language
B. Paperwork Reduction Act Analysis
C. Regulatory Flexibility Act Analysis
I. Background
In December 2015, the Board invited public comment on a proposed
policy statement describing the framework that the Board would use to
set the amount of the U.S. countercyclical capital buffer (CCyB) under
the Board's capital rules (Regulation Q).\1\ The CCyB is a
macroprudential policy tool that the Board can increase during periods
of rising vulnerabilities in the financial system and reduce when
vulnerabilities recede or when the release of the CCyB would promote
financial stability.\2\ The CCyB supplements the minimum capital
requirements and other capital buffers included in Regulation Q, which
themselves are designed to provide substantial resilience to unexpected
losses created by normal fluctuations in economic and financial
conditions.
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\1\ 12 CFR part 217. See also 81 FR 5661 (February 3, 2016).
\2\ See 12 CFR 217.11(b). Implementation of the CCyB also helps
respond to the provision in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act) that the agencies ``shall
seek to make such [capital] requirements countercyclical, so that
the amount of capital required to be maintained by a company
increases in times of economic expansion and decreases in times of
economic contraction, consistent with the safety and soundness of
the company.'' See 12 U.S.C. 1467a; 12 U.S.C. 1844; 12 U.S.C. 3907
(as amended by section 616 of the Dodd-Frank Act).
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The proposed policy statement outlined the factors the Board would
consider in setting the level of the CCyB, and the indicators it would
monitor to help determine whether an adjustment to the CCyB is
appropriate. The proposed policy statement also described the effects
the Board will monitor in determining whether the CCyB is achieving the
desired purposes of the CCyB.
The Board received two comments on the proposed policy statement.
Commenters raised concerns about the process that the Board would
follow in setting the CCyB pursuant to the policy statement, the
potential economic impact of the CCyB, and the efficacy and
appropriateness of the CCyB as a policy tool. Commenters also made
various specific suggestions as to the indicators and standards that
the Board should consider in determining whether to activate the CCyB.
After reviewing comments, the Board is revising the final Policy
Statement to clarify the following key items: (1) That the Board
expects that the CCyB will be activated when systemic vulnerabilities
are meaningfully above normal and that the Board generally intends to
increase the CCyB gradually, (2) that the Board expects to remove or
reduce the CCyB when the conditions that led to its activation abate or
lessen and when the release of CCyB capital would promote financial
stability. The discussion in Sections II and IV below responds to
comments on the proposal regarding the Board's process for setting the
CCyB. In particular, as indicated below, the Board would seek comment
on any proposed change to the CCyB amount and include a discussion of
the reasons for the change.
II. Purpose of CCyB
The CCyB is designed to increase the resilience of large banking
organizations when the Board sees an elevated risk of above-normal
losses. Increasing the resilience of large banking organizations
should, in turn, improve the resilience of the broader financial
system. Above-normal losses often follow periods of rapid asset price
appreciation or credit growth that are not well supported by underlying
economic fundamentals. As stated in the proposed policy statement, the
circumstances in which the Board would most likely use the CCyB as a
supplemental, macroprudential tool to augment minimum capital
requirements and other capital buffers would be to address
circumstances when systemic vulnerabilities are somewhat above normal.
By requiring institutions to hold a larger capital buffer during
periods when systemic risk is increasing and reducing the buffer
requirement as vulnerabilities diminish, the CCyB also has the
potential to moderate fluctuations in the supply of credit over time.
The CCyB functions as an expansion of the Capital Conservation
Buffer (CCB), which is applicable to all banking organizations subject
to Regulation Q. To avoid limits on capital distributions and certain
discretionary bonus payments,\3\ the CCB requires that a banking
organization hold a buffer of common equity tier 1 capital that is at
least 2.5 percent of the risk-weighted assets in addition to the
minimum risk-based capital ratios. The CCB is divided into quartiles,
each associated with increasingly stringent limitations on capital
distributions and certain discretionary bonus payments as the firm's
risk-based capital ratios approach regulatory minimums.\4\ The CCyB is
an additional, countercyclical buffer that has the same limitations on
dividends and capital distributions as the CCB.
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\3\ 12 CFR 217.11(b)(1)(i).
\4\ 12 CFR 217.11(a).
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[[Page 63683]]
The CCyB was introduced for large, internationally active banking
organizations (advanced approaches institutions) in June 2013 as part
of the revised regulatory capital rules issued by the Board in
coordination with the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC)
and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC).\5\ The Board's
CCyB rule applies to bank holding companies, savings and loan holding
companies, and state member banks subject to the advanced approaches
capital rules (advanced approaches institutions).\6\ The advanced
approaches capital rules generally apply to banking organizations with
greater than $250 billion in total assets or $10 billion in on-balance-
sheet foreign exposure and to any depository institution subsidiary of
such banking organizations.\7\
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\5\ See 78 FR 62018 (October 11, 2013) (Board and OCC); 79 FR
20754 (April 14, 2014) (FDIC). The Board's Regulation Q applies
generally to bank holding companies with more than $1 billion in
total consolidated assets and savings and loan holding companies
with more than $1 billion in total consolidated assets that are not
substantially engaged in commercial or insurance underwriting
activities. See 12 CFR 217.1(c)(1).
\6\ An advanced approaches institution is subject to the CCyB
regardless of whether it has completed the parallel run process and
received notification from its primary Federal supervisor pursuant
to section 217.121(d) of Regulation Q.
\7\ 12 CFR 217.100(b)(1).
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Because the CCyB is intended to address elevated risks from
activity that is not well supported by underlying economic
fundamentals, the location of the activity and the economic conditions
where the activity take place provide important context. Accordingly,
the CCyB applies based on the location of private-sector credit
exposures by national jurisdiction.\8\ Specifically, the applicable
CCyB amount for a banking organization is equal to the weighted average
of CCyB amounts established by the Board for the national jurisdictions
where the banking organization has private-sector credit exposures.\9\
The CCyB amount applicable to a banking organization is weighted by
jurisdiction according to the firm's risk-weighted private-sector
credit exposures for a specific jurisdiction as a percentage of the
firm's total risk-weighted private-sector credit exposures.\10\
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\8\ 12 CFR 217.11(b)(1). The Board may adjust the CCyB amount to
reflect decisions made by foreign jurisdictions. See 12 CFR
217.11(b)(3).
\9\ 12 CFR 217.11(b)(1).
\10\ Id.
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Regulation Q established the initial CCyB amount with respect to
private-sector credit exposures located in the United States (U.S.-
based credit exposures) at zero percent.\11\ The CCyB will not exceed
2.5 percent of risk-weighted assets. This cap on the CCyB will be
phased in, with the maximum potential amount of the CCyB for U.S.-based
credit exposures 0.625 percentage points in 2016, 1.25 percentage
points in 2017, 1.875 percentage points in 2018, and 2.5 percentage
points in 2019 and thereafter.\12\
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\11\ The Board affirmed the CCyB amount at the current level of
0 percent contemporaneously with issuance of the proposed policy
statement. See http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20151221b.htm.
\12\ 12 CFR 217.300(a)(2).
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In order to provide banking organizations with sufficient time to
adjust to any change in the CCyB, Regulation Q provides that a
determination to increase the countercyclical capital buffer amount
generally will be effective 12 months from the date of announcement.
However, economic conditions may warrant an earlier or later effective
date.\13\ For example, it may be appropriate for an increase in the
countercyclical capital buffer amount to take effect 12 months from the
date that the Board proposes the increase, rather than 12 months from
the issuance of a final rule.
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\13\ 12 CFR 217.11(b)(2)(v)(A).
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Regulation Q states that a decision by the Board to decrease the
amount of the CCyB for U.S.-based credit exposures would become
effective the day after the Board decides to decrease the CCyB or the
earliest date permissible under applicable law or regulation, whichever
is later.\14\ Moreover, the amount of the CCyB for U.S.-based credit
exposures will return to 0 percent 12 months after the effective date
of any CCyB adjustment, unless the Board announces a decision to
maintain the current amount or adjust it again before the expiration of
the 12-month period.\15\
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\14\ 12 CFR 217.11(b)(2)(v)(B).
\15\ 12 CFR 217.11(b)(2)(vi).
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The Board expects to make decisions about the appropriate level of
the CCyB on U.S.-based credit exposures jointly with the OCC and FDIC.
In addition, the Board expects that the CCyB amount for U.S.-based
credit exposures would be the same for covered insured depository
institutions as for covered depository institution holding companies.
The CCyB is designed to take into account the broad macroeconomic and
financial environment in which banking organizations function and the
degree to which that environment impacts the resilience of advanced
approaches institutions. Therefore, the Board's determination of the
appropriate level of the CCyB for U.S.-based credit exposures would be
most directly linked to the condition of the overall financial
environment rather than the condition of any individual banking
organization. However, the impact of the CCyB requirement on a
particular banking organization will vary based on the organization's
particular composition of private-sector credit exposures located
across national jurisdictions.
III. Description of the Final Policy Statement
The final policy statement (Policy Statement) describes the
framework that the Board would follow in setting the amount of the CCyB
for U.S.-based credit exposures. The framework consists of a set of
principles for translating assessments of financial system
vulnerabilities that are regularly undertaken at the Board into the
appropriate level of the CCyB. Those assessments are informed by a
broad array of quantitative indicators of financial and economic
performance and a set of empirical models. In addition, the framework
includes a discussion of how the Board would assess whether the CCyB is
the most appropriate policy instrument (among available policy
instruments) to address the highlighted financial system
vulnerabilities.
The Policy Statement is organized as follows. Section 1 provides
background on the Policy Statement. Section 2 is an outline of the
Policy Statement and describes its scope. Section 3 provides a broad
description of the objectives of the CCyB, including a description of
the ways in which the CCyB is expected to protect large banking
organizations and the broader financial system. Section 4 provides a
broad description of the factors that the Board considers in setting
the CCyB, including specific financial system vulnerabilities and types
of quantitative indicators of financial and economic performance, and
outlines of empirical models the Board may use as inputs to that
decision. Further, section 4 describes a set of principles that the
Board expects to use for combining judgmental assessments with
quantitative indicators to determine the appropriate level of the CCyB.
Section 5 discusses how the Board will communicate the level of the
CCyB and any changes to the CCyB. Section 6 describes how the Board
plans to monitor the effects of the CCyB, including what indicators and
effects will be monitored.
The Board has revised the Policy Statement to clarify that (1) the
Board expects that the CCyB will be activated when systemic
vulnerabilities are meaningfully above normal and the Board generally
intends to increase the CCyB gradually, and (2) the Board
[[Page 63684]]
expects to remove or reduce the CCyB when the conditions that led to
its activation abate or lessen and when release of CCyB capital would
promote financial stability. These changes were made to sections 1, 3,
and 4. In addition, minor clarifying and technical edits were made
throughout the Policy Statement.
IV. Changes To Address Comments on the Proposal
As noted, the Board received two comments regarding the proposed
policy statement. Commenters expressed concerns about the process that
the Board would follow in setting the CCyB pursuant to the Policy
Statement, the potential economic impact of the CCyB, and the
appropriate uses of the CCyB.
A. Comments Regarding the Board's Process for Setting the CCyB
Commenters expressed concern that the Board would apply the CCyB
without completing the procedures required by the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA).\16\ In particular, commenters argued that notice
and comment rulemaking procedures should be used to increase the CCyB
above zero, and for each future increase.
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\16\ 5 U.S.C. 551 et seq.
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The Board's rule implementing the CCyB specifically provides that
the Board will adjust the CCyB amount in accordance with applicable
law.\17\ In accordance with this provision of its rules, the Board
expects to set the level of the CCyB above zero through a public notice
and comment rulemaking, or through an order issued in accordance with
the APA that provides each affected institution with actual notice and
an opportunity for comment. In setting the level of the CCyB above zero
through a public rulemaking, the Board generally expects that the
notice and comment period would be at least 30 days. The Policy
Statement is intended to provide insight on the framework that the
Board will use to determine the appropriate level of the CCyB, not to
alter procedures necessary to increase the CCyB in the future.
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\17\ 12 CFR 217.11(b)(2)(ii).
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A commenter suggested that the Board should commit to act jointly
with the OCC and FDIC in any decision to activate the CCyB. Consistent
with Regulation Q and the proposal, the Board expects that any decision
to adjust the CCyB will be made jointly by the OCC, FDIC, and Board.
However, the Board will make decisions regarding the appropriate amount
of the CCyB for the firms that it supervises based on its judgment of
the facts and circumstances presented.
A commenter argued that the Board generally should not reciprocate
decisions by foreign jurisdictions regarding the level of the CCyB in
such jurisdictions. If the Board did decide to incorporate CCyB
decisions of foreign jurisdictions, the commenter argued that the Board
should implement a de minimis threshold below which U.S. banking
organizations would not have to recognize the CCyB established in the
foreign jurisdiction. The Policy Statement describes the framework that
the Board will follow in determining the CCyB for U.S. private-sector
credit exposures. The Board will address separately CCyB adjustments
made by foreign jurisdictions as needed.
B. Comments Regarding the Calibration of, Inputs Into, and Impact of
the CCyB
A commenter argued that the CCyB should be increased only when
credit growth was considered excessive, rather than when systemic
vulnerabilities were somewhat above normal, as suggested by the
proposal.
The CCyB is a macroprudential policy tool intended to strengthen
banking organizations' resilience against the build-up of systemic
vulnerabilities and reduce fluctuations in the supply of credit. As
stated in the proposed policy statement, activation of the CCyB at a
time when systemic vulnerabilities are somewhat above normal reflects
the prophylactic and countercyclical goals of this tool as well as the
process and 12-month phase-in period that generally applies before any
activation of the CCyB amount would take effect. Moreover, activation
of the CCyB at a time when systemic vulnerabilities are somewhat above
normal rather than delaying until systemic vulnerabilities are
excessive would allow gradual increases in the CCyB, which would
provide additional flexibility (over and above the 12-month phase-in
period) to banking organizations as they adjust to any increases. That
is, activation of the CCyB at a time when systemic vulnerabilities are
somewhat above normal would likely not be associated with an activation
of the CCyB to the upper end of its possible range. Further, the Board
considers ``systemic vulnerabilities'' to be the appropriate reference
point because the CCyB could be an effective tool in addressing a
variety of financial system vulnerabilities, not merely credit growth.
To further clarify when the Board would expect to increase the
CCyB, the Policy Statement has been modified to state that the CCyB
would be increased when systemic vulnerabilities are ``meaningfully
above normal.'' For these purposes ``meaningfully above normal'' would
reflect an assessment by the Board that financial system
vulnerabilities were above normal and were either already at, or
expected to build to, levels sufficient to generate material unexpected
losses in the event of an unfavorable development in financial markets
or the economy. The text in the policy statement has also been modified
to clarify that systemic vulnerabilities being meaningfully above
normal would correspond to the Board beginning to increase the CCyB
above zero and to provide additional discussion of when and how the
Board would deactivate or reduce the CCyB.
Commenters argued that the Board should conduct and release
analyses of the economic impact and costs and benefits of the CCyB in
connection with the proposed policy statement as well as with any
decision to increase the level of the CCyB. Commenters contended that
such analyses should take into account other existing prudential
regulation, including other regulatory capital requirements, and
consider whether alternative policy tools may be more effective for a
particular situation. The commenters expressed concern that there could
be material adverse economic consequences to activation of the CCyB.
Similarly, one commenter argued that the Board should conduct a
comprehensive analysis of the costs and benefits of regulatory capital
requirements, including the CCyB, as well as prudential liquidity
regulations and regulations established by other agencies.
Commenters also argued that the Board should provide additional
detail regarding the data, models, and metrics that would inform a
decision to activate the CCyB, as well as the standards that would be
applied to determine the calibration of the CCyB. Additionally,
commenters raised issues with certain of the indicators identified in
the Policy Statement. For instance, a commenter cautioned that no
academic consensus had been reached with regard to the usefulness of a
credit-to-GDP ratio gap as an indicator of economic conditions.
The final Policy Statement provides additional information to the
public regarding the framework that the Board will follow in setting
the CCyB. The Policy Statement itself does not change either the CCyB
or the capital requirements applicable to advanced approaches banking
organizations. As described above, the Board generally would expect to
provide notice to the public and seek comment on the proposed level of
the CCyB as part of
[[Page 63685]]
making any final determination to change the CCyB. Any proposed change
in the level of the CCyB would include a discussion of the reasons for
the proposed action as determined by the particular circumstances.
One commenter stated that the FFIEC 009 reporting form requires
firms to report information that is not aligned with the information
needed to determine the CCyB amount applicable to a firm and that the
Board should amend the FFIEC 009 to align with CCyB in order to reduce
burden. The Board may consider reporting for purposes of the CCyB at a
later date.
The Board recognizes that no single data point or indicator can
provide a comprehensive understanding of economic conditions or
systemic vulnerabilities. The items for consideration listed in the
Policy Statement are a non-exclusive list of quantitative and
qualitative indicators that may inform the Board's assessment of
economic conditions and determinations regarding the appropriate level
of the CCyB. As explained in the proposed and final Policy Statement,
some academic research has shown the credit-to-GDP ratio to be useful
in identifying periods of financial excess followed by a period of
crisis. However, the Board does not expect this indicator to be used in
isolation. Furthermore, as noted, any proposal to increase the CCyB
will include a discussion of the indicators informing the proposal, and
will seek comment on the interpretation of these indicators. As noted
above, the Board expects that the types of indicators and models
considered will evolve over time, based on advances in research and the
experience of the Board with this tool.
Commenters argued that the CCyB would not be effective in
containing asset bubbles or excessive credit risks because these tend
to occur within sectors as opposed to across the financial system
equally. A commenter suggested that targeted guidance for particular
sectors would likely be more effective at containing risks of this type
than a broad based capital charge imposed by the CCyB.
Commenters also argued that the CCyB would not be effective in
addressing many systemic vulnerabilities because it applies only to
advanced approaches banking organizations, which, while significant,
represent a relatively small percentage of the total provision of
credit in the U.S. economy. A commenter contended that activation of
the CCyB might exacerbate risk in the financial system by shifting
lending activity away from large and closely regulated commercial banks
and into the shadow banking system. In addition, a commenter argued
that advanced approaches banking organizations were subject to
significant capital, liquidity, and other prudential requirements such
that they were likely to be resilient in the event of adverse economic
conditions. As a result, the commenter argued, advanced approaches
banking organizations were unlikely to be made materially more
resilient as a result of imposition of the CCyB.
As reflected in the Policy Statement, the pace and magnitude of
changes in the CCyB will depend on the underlying conditions in the
financial sector and the economy, the desired effects of the proposed
change in the CCyB, and consideration of whether the CCyB is the most
appropriate of the Board's available policy instruments to address the
financial system vulnerabilities. A natural corollary to this analysis
would be consideration of whether the CCyB could be expected to
increase other systemic vulnerabilities. The CCyB is one of several
policy tools available to the Board. In determining whether or not to
change the CCyB, the Board will consider whether the CCyB is the most
appropriate of available policy tools, and whether the CCyB would be
most effective if used in conjunction with other policy tools.
V. Administrative Law Matters
A. Use of Plain Language
Section 722 of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (Pub. L. 106-102, 113
Stat. 1338, 1471, 12 U.S.C. 4809) requires the Federal banking agencies
to use plain language in all proposed and final rules published after
January 1, 2000. The Board received no comments on the use of plain
language.
B. Paperwork Reduction Act Analysis
In accordance with the requirements of the Paperwork Reduction Act
of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3506), the Board has reviewed the Policy Statement
to assess any information collections. There are no collections of
information as defined by the Paperwork Reduction Act in the proposal.
C. Regulatory Flexibility Act Analysis
The Board is providing a final regulatory flexibility analysis with
respect to this Policy Statement. The Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5
U.S.C. 601 et seq. (RFA), generally requires that an agency provide a
regulatory flexibility analysis in connection with a final rulemaking.
The Board sought comment on whether the proposal would impose undue
burdens on, or have unintended consequences for, small banking
organizations. The Board received one comment on this aspect of the
proposal, which argued that the Board's initial regulatory flexibility
analysis was flawed in asserting that small banking organizations would
not be affected by the proposal because of the broader impact that the
CCyB could have on lending and economic growth in general.
This Policy Statement will be added as an appendix to Regulation Q
to describe the framework that the Board will follow in setting the
amount of the CCyB for U.S.-based credit exposures. The CCyB only
applies to bank holding companies, savings and loan holding companies,
and state member banks that are advanced approaches Board-regulated
institutions for purposes of the Board's Regulation Q (advanced
approaches banking organizations). The Regulatory Flexibility Act
requires consideration only of the impact of the proposed rule on small
entities that are subject to the requirements of the rule, as opposed
to small entities indirectly affected by the rule through its impact on
the national economy.\18\ Generally, advanced approaches banking
organizations are those with total consolidated assets of $250 billion
or more, that have total consolidated on-balance sheet foreign
exposures of $10 billion or more, that have subsidiary depository
institutions that are advanced approaches institutions, or that elect
to use the advanced approaches framework.\19\ Under regulations issued
by the Small Business Administration, a small entity includes a
depository institution, bank holding company, or savings and loan
holding company with assets of $550 million or less (small banking
organizations).\20\ As of June 30, 2016, there were approximately 3,204
small bank holding companies, 157 small savings and loan holding
companies, and 594 small state member banks. Banking organizations that
are subject to the final rule therefore are expected to substantially
exceed the $550 million asset threshold at which a banking entity would
qualify as a small bank
[[Page 63686]]
holding company. As a result, the final rule is not expected to apply
directly to any small banking organizations for purposes of the RFA.
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\18\ See e.g., Aeronautical Repair Station Association v.
Federal Aviation Administration, 494 F.3d 161, 174-178 (D.C. Cir.
2007).
\19\ See 12 CFR 217.100.
\20\ See 13 CFR 121.201. Effective July 14, 2014, the Small
Business Administration revised the size standards for banking
organizations to $550 million in assets from $500 million in assets.
79 FR 33647 (June 12, 2014). The Small Business Administration's
June 12, 2014, interim final rule was adopted without change as a
final rule by the Small Business Administration on January 12, 2016.
81 FR 3949 (January 25, 2016).
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Therefore, there are no significant alternatives to the final rule
that would have less economic impact on small bank holding companies.
As discussed above, there are no projected reporting, recordkeeping,
and other compliance requirements of the final rule. The Board does not
believe that the final rule duplicates, overlaps, or conflicts with any
other Federal rules. In light of the foregoing, the Board does not
believe that the final rule would have a significant economic impact on
a substantial number of small entities.
In light of the foregoing, the Board does not believe that the
final rule will have a significant impact on small entities.
List of Subjects in 12 CFR Part 217
Administrative practice and procedure, Banks, banking. Holding
companies, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Securities.
Authority and Issuance
For the reasons stated in the preamble, the Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System amends 12 CFR part 217 as follows:
PART 217--CAPITAL ADEQUACY OF BANK HOLDING COMPANIES, SAVINGS AND
LOAN HOLDING COMPANIES, AND STATE MEMBER BANKS (REGULATION Q)
0
1. The authority citation for part 217 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 12 U.S.C. 248(a), 321-338a, 481-486, 1462a, 1467a,
1818, 1828, 1831n, 1831o, 1831p-l, 1831w, 1835, 1844(b), 1851, 3904,
3906-3909, 4808, 5365, 5368, 5371.
0
2. Appendix A to part 217 is added to read as follows:
Appendix A to Part 217--The Federal Reserve Board's Framework for
Implementing the Countercyclical Capital Buffer
1. Background
(a) In 2013, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System (Board) issued a final regulatory capital rule (Regulation Q)
in coordination with the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
(OCC) and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) that
strengthened risk-based and leverage capital requirements applicable
to insured depository institutions and depository institution
holding companies (banking organizations).\1\ Among those changes
was the introduction of a countercyclical capital buffer (CCyB) for
large, internationally active banking organizations.\2\
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\1\ See 12 CFR part 217; Federal Reserve Board Approves Final
Rule To Help Ensure Banks Maintain Strong Capital Positions (July 2,
2013), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov; Agencies Adopt
Supplementary Leverage Ratio Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (July 9,
2013), available at http://www.occ.gov; and FDIC Board Approves
Basel III Interim Final Rule and Supplementary Leverage Ratio Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking (July 9, 2013) available at https://www.fdic.gov.
\2\ 12 CFR 217.11(b). The CCyB applies only to banking
organizations subject to the advanced approaches capital rules,
which generally apply to those banking organizations with greater
than $250 billion in assets or more than $10 billion in on-balance-
sheet foreign exposures. See 12 CFR 217.100(b). An advanced
approaches institution is subject to the CCyB regardless of whether
it has completed the parallel run process and received notification
from its primary Federal supervisor. See 12 CFR 217.121(d).
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(b) The CCyB is a supplemental, macroprudential policy tool that
the Board can increase during periods of rising vulnerabilities in
the financial system and reduce when vulnerabilities recede. It is
designed to increase the resilience of large banking organizations
when there is an elevated risk of above-normal losses. Increasing
the resilience of large banking organizations will, in turn, improve
the resilience of the broader financial system. Above-normal losses
often follow periods of rapid asset price appreciation or credit
growth that are not well supported by underlying economic
fundamentals. The circumstances in which the Board would most likely
begin to increase the CCyB above zero percent to augment minimum
capital requirements and other capital buffers would be when
systemic vulnerabilities are meaningfully above normal. By requiring
large banking organizations to hold additional capital during those
periods of excess and removing the requirement to hold additional
capital when the vulnerabilities have diminished, the CCyB also is
expected to moderate fluctuations in the supply of credit over time.
Moderating the supply of credit may mitigate or prevent the
conditions that contribute to above-normal losses, such as elevated
asset prices and excessive leverage, and prevent or mitigate
reductions in lending to creditworthy borrowers that can amplify an
economic downturn. In this way, implementation of the CCyB also
responds to the Dodd-Frank Act's requirement that the Board seek to
make its capital requirements countercyclical.\3\
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\3\ 12 U.S.C. 1844(b), 1464a(g)(1), and 3907(a)(1) (codifying
sections 616(a), (b), and (c) of the Dodd-Frank Act).
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(c) Regulation Q established the initial CCyB amount with
respect to private sector credit exposures located in the United
States (U.S.-based credit exposures) at zero percent and provided
that the maximum potential amount of the CCyB for credit exposures
in the United States was 2.5 percent of risk-weighted assets.\4\ The
Board expects to make decisions about the appropriate level of the
CCyB for U.S.-based credit exposures jointly with the OCC and FDIC,
and expects that the CCyB amount for U.S.-based credit exposures
will be the same for covered depository institution holding
companies and insured depository institutions. The CCyB is designed
to take into account the macrofinancial environment in which banking
organizations function and the degree to which that environment
impacts the resilience of advanced approaches institutions.
Therefore, the appropriate level of the CCyB for U.S.-based credit
exposures is not closely linked to the characteristics of an
individual institution. Rather, the impact of the CCyB on any single
institution will depend on the particular composition of the
private-sector credit exposures of the institution across national
jurisdictions.
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\4\ The CCyB is subject to a phase-in arrangement between 2016
and 2019. See 12 CFR 217.300(a)(2).
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2. Overview and Scope of the Policy Statement
This Policy Statement describes the framework that the Board
will follow in setting the amount of the CCyB for U.S.-based credit
exposures. The framework consists of a set of principles for
translating assessments of financial system vulnerabilities that are
regularly undertaken by the Board into the appropriate level of the
CCyB. Those assessments are informed by a broad array of
quantitative indicators of financial and economic performance and a
set of empirical models. In addition, the framework includes an
assessment of whether the CCyB is the most appropriate policy
instrument (among available policy instruments) to address the
highlighted financial system vulnerabilities.
3. The Objectives of the CCyB
(a) The objectives of the CCyB are to strengthen banking
organizations' resilience against the build-up of systemic
vulnerabilities and reduce fluctuations in the supply of credit. The
CCyB supplements the minimum capital requirements and the capital
conservation buffer, which themselves are designed to provide
substantial resilience to unexpected losses created by normal
fluctuations in economic and financial conditions. The capital
surcharge on global systemically important banking organizations
adds an additional layer of defense for the largest and most
systemically important institutions, whose financial distress can
have outsized effects on the rest of the financial system and the
real economy.\5\ However, periods of financial excesses, for example
as reflected in episodes of rapid asset price appreciation or credit
growth not well supported by underlying economic fundamentals, are
often followed by above-normal losses that leave banking
organizations and other financial institutions undercapitalized.
Therefore, the Board would most likely begin to increase the CCyB
above zero in those circumstances when systemic vulnerabilities
become meaningfully above normal and progressively raise the CCyB
level if vulnerabilities become more severe.
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\5\ See, Federal Reserve Board Approves Final Rule Requiring The
Largest, Most Systemically Important U.S. Bank Holding Companies To
Further Strengthen Their Capital Positions (July 20, 2015),
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov.
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(b) The CCyB is expected to help provide additional resilience
for advanced approaches institutions, and by extension the
[[Page 63687]]
broader financial system, against elevated vulnerabilities primarily
in two ways. First, advanced approaches institutions will likely
hold more capital to avoid limitations on capital distributions and
discretionary bonus payments resulting from implementation of the
CCyB. Strengthening their capital positions when financial
conditions are accommodative would increase the capacity of advanced
approaches institutions to absorb outsized losses during a future
significant economic downturn or period of financial instability,
thus making them more resilient.
(c) The second and related goal of the CCyB is to promote a more
sustainable supply of credit over the economic cycle. During a
credit cycle downturn, better-capitalized institutions have been
shown to be more likely than weaker institutions to have continued
access to funding. Better-capitalized institutions also are less
likely to take actions that lead to broader financial-sector
distress and its associated macroeconomic costs, such as large-scale
sales of assets at prices below their fundamental value and sharp
contractions in credit supply.\6\ Therefore, it is likely that as a
result of the CCyB having been put into place during the preceding
period of rapid credit creation, advanced approaches institutions
would be better positioned to continue their important intermediary
functions during a subsequent economic contraction. A timely and
credible reduction in the CCyB requirement during a period of high
credit losses could reinforce those beneficial effects of a higher
base level of capital, because it would permit advanced approaches
institutions either to realize loan losses promptly and remove them
from their balance sheets or to expand their balance sheets, for
example by continuing to lend to creditworthy borrowers.
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\6\ For additional background on the relationship between
financial distress and economic outcomes, see Carmen Reinhart and
Kenneth Rogoff (2009), This Time is Different. Princeton University
Press; [Ograve]scar Jord[agrave] & Moritz Schularick & Alan M Taylor
(2011), ``Financial Crises, Credit Booms, and External Imbalances:
140 Years of Lessons,'' IMF Economic Review, Palgrave Macmillan,
vol. 59(2), pages 340-378; and Bank for International Settlements
(2010), ``Assessing the Long-Run Economic Impact of Higher Capital
and Liquidity Requirements.''
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(d) During a period of cyclically increasing vulnerabilities,
advanced approaches institutions might react to an increase in the
CCyB by raising lending standards, otherwise reducing their risk
exposure, augmenting their capital, or some combination of those
actions. They may choose to raise capital by taking actions that
would increase net income, reducing capital distributions such as
share repurchases or dividends, or issuing new equity. In this
regard, an increase in the CCyB would not prevent advanced
approaches institutions from maintaining their important role as
credit intermediaries, but would reduce the likelihood that banking
organizations with insufficient capital would foster unsustainable
credit growth or engage in imprudent risk taking. The specific
combination of adjustments and the relative size of each adjustment
will depend in part on the initial capital positions of advanced
approaches institutions, the cost of debt and equity financing, and
the earnings opportunities presented by the economic situation at
the time.\7\
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\7\ For estimates of the size of certain adjustments, see Samuel
G. Hanson, Anil K. Kashyap, and Jeremy C. Stein (2011), ``A
Macroprudential Approach to Financial Regulation,'' Journal of
Economic Perspectives 25(1), pp. 3-28; Skander J. Van den Heuvel
(2008), ``The Welfare Cost of Bank Capital Requirements.'' Journal
of Monetary Economics 55, pp. 298-320.
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4. The Framework for Setting the U.S. CCyB
(a) The Board regularly monitors and assesses threats to
financial stability by synthesizing information from a comprehensive
set of financial-sector and macroeconomic indicators, supervisory
information, surveys, and other interactions with market
participants.\8\ In forming its view about the appropriate size of
the U.S. CCyB, the Board will consider a number of financial system
vulnerabilities, including but not limited to, asset valuation
pressures and risk appetite, leverage in the nonfinancial sector,
leverage in the financial sector, and maturity and liquidity
transformation in the financial sector. The decision will reflect
the implications of the assessment of overall financial system
vulnerabilities as well as any concerns related to one or more
classes of vulnerabilities. The specific combination of
vulnerabilities is important because an adverse shock to one class
of vulnerabilities could be more likely than another to exacerbate
existing pressures in other parts of the economy or financial
system.
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\8\ Tobias Adrian, Daniel Covitz, and Nellie Liang (2014),
``Financial Stability Monitoring.'' Finance and Economics Discussion
Series 2013-021. Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2013/201321/201321pap.pdf.
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(b) The Board intends to monitor a wide range of financial and
macroeconomic quantitative indicators including, but not limited to,
measures of relative credit and liquidity expansion or contraction,
a variety of asset prices, funding spreads, credit condition
surveys, indices based on credit default swap spreads, option
implied volatilities, and measures of systemic risk.\9\ In addition,
empirical models that translate a manageable set of quantitative
indicators of financial and economic performance into potential
settings for the CCyB, when used as part of a comprehensive
judgmental assessment of all available information, can be a useful
input to the Board's deliberations. Such models may include, but are
not limited to, those that rely on small sets of indicators--such as
the nonfinancial credit-to-GDP ratio, its growth rate, and
combinations of the credit-to-GDP ratio with trends in the prices of
residential and commercial real estate--which some academic research
has shown to be useful in identifying periods of financial excess
followed by a period of crisis on a cross-country basis.\10\ Such
models may also include those that consider larger sets of
indicators, which have the advantage of representing conditions in
all key sectors of the economy, especially those specific to risk-
taking, performance, and the financial condition of large banks.\11\
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\9\ See 12 CFR 217.11(b)(2)(iv).
\10\ See, e.g., Jorda, Oscar, Moritz Schularick and Alan Taylor,
2013. ``When Credit Bites Back: Leverage, Business Cycles and
Crises,'' Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 45(2), pp. 3-28,
and Drehmann, Mathias, Claudio Borio, and Kostas Tsatsaronis, 2012.
``Characterizing the Financial Cycle: Don't Lose Sight of the Medium
Term!'' BIS Working Papers 380, Bank for International Settlements.
Jorda, Oscar, Moritz Schularick and Alan Taylor, 2015. ``Leveraged
Bubbles,'' Center for Economic Policy Research Discussion Paper No.
DP10781. BCBS (2010), ``Guidance for National Authorities Operating
the Countercyclical Capital Buffer,'' BIS.
\11\ See, e.g., Aikman, David, Michael T. Kiley, Seung Jung Lee,
Michael G. Palumbo, and Missaka N. Warusawitharana (2015), ``Mapping
Heat in the U.S. Financial System,'' Finance and Economics
Discussion Series 2015-059. Washington: Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, http://dx.doi.org/10.17016/FEDS.2015.059
(providing an example of the range of indicators used and type of
analysis possible).
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(c) However, no single indictor or fixed set of indicators can
adequately capture all the vulnerabilities in the U.S. economy and
financial system. Moreover, adjustments in the CCyB that were
tightly linked to a specific model or set of models could be
imprecise due to the relatively short period that some indicators
are available, the limited number of past crises against which the
models can be calibrated, and limited experience with the CCyB as a
macroprudential tool. As a result, the types of indicators and
models considered in assessments of the appropriate level of the
CCyB are likely to change over time based on advances in research
and the experience of the Board with this new macroprudential tool.
(d) The Board will determine the appropriate level of the CCyB
for U.S.-based credit exposures based on its analysis of the above
factors. Generally, a zero percent U.S. CCyB amount would reflect an
assessment that U.S. economic and financial conditions are broadly
consistent with a financial system in which levels of system-wide
vulnerabilities are within or near their normal range of values. The
Board could increase the CCyB as vulnerabilities build. A 2.5
percent CCyB amount for U.S.-based credit exposures, which is the
maximum level under the Board's rule, would reflect an assessment
that the U.S. financial sector is experiencing a period of
significantly elevated or rapidly increasing system-wide
vulnerabilities. Importantly, as a macroprudential policy tool, the
CCyB will be activated and deactivated based on broad developments
and trends in the U.S. financial system, rather than the activities
of any individual banking organization.
(e) Similarly, the Board would remove or reduce the CCyB when
the conditions that led to its activation abate or lessen.
Additionally, the Board would remove or reduce the CCyB when release
of CCyB capital would promote financial stability. Indeed, for the
CCyB to be most effective, the CCyB should be deactivated or reduced
in a timely manner. Deactivating the CCyB in a timely manner could,
for example, promote
[[Page 63688]]
the prompt realization of loan losses by advanced approaches
institutions and the removal of such loans from their balance sheets
and would reduce the likelihood that advanced approaches
institutions would significantly pare their risk-weighted assets in
order to maintain their capital ratios during a downturn.
(f) The pace and magnitude of changes in the CCyB will depend
importantly on the underlying conditions in the financial sector and
the economy as well as the desired effects of the proposed change in
the CCyB. If vulnerabilities are rising gradually, then incremental
increases in the level of the CCyB may be appropriate. Incremental
increases would allow banks to augment their capital primarily
through retained earnings and allow policymakers additional time to
assess the effects of the policy change before making subsequent
adjustments. However, if vulnerabilities in the financial system are
building rapidly, then larger or more frequent adjustments may be
necessary to increase loss-absorbing capacity sooner and potentially
to mitigate the rise in vulnerabilities.
(g) The Board will also consider whether the CCyB is the most
appropriate of its available policy instruments to address the
financial system vulnerabilities highlighted by the framework's
judgmental assessments and empirical models. The CCyB primarily is
intended to address cyclical vulnerabilities, rather than structural
vulnerabilities that do not vary significantly over time. Structural
vulnerabilities are better addressed through targeted reforms or
permanent increases in financial system resilience. Two central
factors for the Board to consider are whether advanced approaches
institutions are exposed--either directly or indirectly--to the
vulnerabilities identified in the comprehensive judgmental
assessment or by the quantitative indicators that suggest activation
of the CCyB and whether advanced approaches institutions are
contributing--either directly or indirectly--to these highlighted
vulnerabilities.
(h) In setting the CCyB for advanced approaches institutions
that it supervises, the Board plans to consult with the OCC and FDIC
on their analyses of financial system vulnerabilities and on the
extent to which advanced approaches banking organizations are either
exposed to or contributing to these vulnerabilities.
5. Communication of the U.S. CCyB With the Public
(a) The Board expects to consider at least once per year the
applicable level of the U.S. CCyB. The Board will review financial
conditions regularly throughout the year and may adjust the CCyB
more frequently as a result of those monitoring activities.
(b) Further, the Board will continue to communicate with the
public in other formats regarding its assessment of U.S. financial
stability, including financial system vulnerabilities. In the event
that the Board considered that a change in the CCyB were
appropriate, it would, in proposing the change, include a discussion
of the reasons for the proposed action as determined by the
particular circumstances. In addition, the Board's biannual Monetary
Policy Report to Congress, usually published in February and July,
will continue to contain a section that reports on developments
pertaining to the stability of the U.S. financial system.\12\ That
portion of the report will be an important vehicle for updating the
public on how the Board's current assessment of financial system
vulnerabilities bears on the setting of the CCyB.
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\12\ For the most recent discussion in this format, see box
titled ``Developments Related to Financial Stability'' in Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Monetary Policy Report to
Congress, June 2016, pp. 20-21.
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6. Monitoring the Effects of the U.S. CCyB
(a) The effects of the U.S. CCyB ultimately will depend on the
level at which it is set, the size and nature of any adjustments in
the level, and the timeliness with which it is increased or
decreased. The extent to which the CCyB may affect vulnerabilities
in the broader financial system depends upon a complex set of
interactions between required capital levels at the largest banking
organizations and the economy and financial markets. In addition to
the direct effects, the secondary economic effects could be
amplified if financial markets extract a signal from the
announcement of a change in the CCyB about subsequent actions that
might be taken by the Board. Moreover, financial market participants
might react by updating their expectations about future asset prices
in specific markets or broader economic activity based on the
concerns expressed by the regulators in communications announcing a
policy change.
(b) The Board will monitor and analyze adjustments by banking
organizations and other financial institutions to the CCyB: whether
a change in the CCyB leads to observed changes in risk-based capital
ratios at advanced approaches institutions, as well as whether those
adjustments are achieved passively through retained earnings, or
actively through changes in capital distributions or in risk-
weighted assets. Other factors to be monitored include the extent to
which loan growth and interest rate spreads on loans made by
affected banking organizations change relative to loan growth and
loan spreads at banking organizations that are not subject to the
buffer. Another consideration in setting the CCyB and other
macroprudential tools is the extent to which the adjustments by
advanced approaches institutions to higher capital buffers lead to
migration of credit market activity outside of those banking
organizations, especially to the nonbank financial sector. Depending
on the amount of migration, which institutions are affected by it,
and the remaining exposures of advanced approaches institutions,
those adjustments could cause the Board to favor either a higher or
a lower value of the CCyB.
(c) The Board will also monitor information regarding the levels
of and changes in the CCyB in other countries. The Basel Committee
on Banking Supervision is expected to maintain this information for
member countries in a publically available form on its Web site.\13\
Using that data in conjunction with supervisory and publicly
available datasets, the Board will be able to draw not only upon the
experience of the United States but also that of other countries to
refine estimates of the effects of changes in the CCyB.
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\13\ BIS, Countercyclical capital buffer (CCyB), www.bis.org/bcbs/ccyb/index.htm.
By order of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, September 8, 2016.
Robert deV. Frierson,
Secretary of the Board.
[FR Doc. 2016-21970 Filed 9-15-16; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6210-01-P