[Federal Register Volume 81, Number 164 (Wednesday, August 24, 2016)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 57758-57761]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2016-19991]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 25

[Docket No. FAA-2015-5391; Special Conditions No. 25-630-SC]


Special Conditions: The Boeing Company, Boeing Model 767-2C 
Airplane; Non-Rechargeable Lithium Battery Installations

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Final special conditions.

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SUMMARY: These special conditions are issued for the Boeing Model 767-
2C airplane. This airplane will have a novel or unusual design feature 
when compared to the state of technology envisioned in the 
airworthiness standards for transport-category airplanes. This design 
feature is associated with non-rechargeable lithium battery 
installations. The applicable airworthiness regulations do not contain 
adequate or appropriate safety standards for this design feature. These 
special conditions contain the additional safety standards that the 
Administrator considers necessary to establish a level of safety 
equivalent to that established by the existing airworthiness standards.

DATES: Effective April 22, 2017.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Nazih Khaouly, Airplane and Flight 
Crew Interface Branch, ANM-111, Transport Airplane Directorate, 
Aircraft Certification Service, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, 
Washington 98057-3356; telephone 425-227-2432; facsimile 425-227-1149.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Future Requests for Installation of Non-Rechargeable Lithium Batteries

    The FAA anticipates that non-rechargeable lithium batteries will be 
installed in other makes and models of airplanes. We have determined to 
require special conditions for all applications requesting non-
rechargeable lithium battery installations, except the installations 
excluded in the Applicability section, until the airworthiness 
requirements can be revised to address this issue. Applying special 
conditions to these installations across the range of all transport-
airplane makes and models ensures regulatory consistency among 
applicants.
    The FAA issued special conditions no. 25-612-SC to Gulfstream 
Aerospace Corporation for their GVI airplane. Those are the first 
special conditions the FAA issued for non-rechargeable lithium battery 
installations. We explained in that document our determination to make 
those special conditions effective one year after publication of those 
special conditions in the Federal Register, and our intention for other 
special conditions for other makes and models to be effective on this 
same date or 30 days after their publication, whichever is later.

Background

    On January 18, 2010, The Boeing Company (Boeing) applied for an 
amendment to type certificate no. A1NM to include a new Model 767-2C 
airplane. The Model 767-2C airplane is a twin-engine, transport-
category freighter derivative of the Model 767-200 airplane currently 
approved under type certificate no. A1NM. This freighter has a maximum 
takeoff weight of 415,000 pounds and can be configured to carry up to 
11 supernumeraries.
    The Model 767-2C airplane incorporates provisions to support 
subsequent supplemental type

[[Page 57759]]

certificate (STC) modifications, which are intended to provide 
additional mission capabilities, including provisions to support 
conversion into an aerial refueling platform (i.e., tanker) 
configuration.

Type Certification Basis

    Under the provisions of Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations, (14 
CFR) 21.101, Boeing must show that the Model 767-2C airplane meets the 
applicable provisions of the regulations listed in type certificate no. 
A1NM or the applicable regulations in effect on the date of application 
for the change, except for earlier amendments as agreed upon by the 
FAA. The regulations listed in the type certificate are commonly 
referred to as the ``original type certification basis.'' The 
regulations listed in type certificate no. A1NM are 14 CFR part 25, 
effective February 1, 1965, including Amendments 25-1 through 25-37, 
with exceptions listed in the type certificate. In addition, the 
certification basis includes other regulations, special conditions, and 
exemptions that are not relevant to these special conditions. Type 
certificate no. A1NM will be updated to include a complete description 
of the certification basis for this airplane model.
    If the Administrator finds that the applicable airworthiness 
regulations (i.e., 14 CFR part 25) do not contain adequate or 
appropriate safety standards for the Model 767-2C airplane because of a 
novel or unusual design feature, special conditions are prescribed 
under the provisions of Sec.  21.16.
    Special conditions are initially applicable to the airplane model 
for which they are issued. Should the type certificate for that model 
be amended later to include any other model that incorporates the same 
novel or unusual design feature, or should any other model already 
included on the same type certificate be modified to incorporate the 
same novel or unusual design feature, these special conditions would 
also apply to the other model under Sec.  21.101.
    In addition to the applicable airworthiness regulations and special 
conditions, the Model 767-2C airplane must comply with the fuel-vent 
and exhaust-emission requirements of 14 CFR part 34, and the noise-
certification requirements of 14 CFR part 36.
    The FAA issues special conditions, as defined in 14 CFR 11.19, in 
accordance with Sec.  11.38, and they become part of the type-
certification basis under Sec.  21.101.

Novel or Unusual Design Features

    The Boeing Model 767-2C airplane will incorporate non-rechargeable 
lithium batteries.
    A battery system consists of the battery and any protective, 
monitoring, and alerting circuitry or hardware inside or outside of the 
battery. It also includes vents (where necessary) and packaging. For 
the purpose of these special conditions, a ``battery'' and ``battery 
system'' are referred to as a battery.

Discussion

    The FAA derived the current regulations governing installation of 
batteries in transport-category airplanes from Civil Air Regulations 
(CAR) 4b.625(d) as part of the re-codification of CAR 4b that 
established 14 CFR part 25 in February 1965. We basically reworded the 
battery requirements, which are currently in Sec.  25.1353(b)(1) 
through (b)(4), from the CAR requirements. Non-rechargeable lithium 
batteries are novel and unusual with respect to the state of technology 
considered when these requirements were codified. These batteries 
introduce higher energy levels into airplane systems through new 
chemical compositions in various battery-cell sizes and construction. 
Interconnection of these cells in battery packs introduces failure 
modes that require unique design considerations, such as provisions for 
thermal management.
    Recent events involving rechargeable and non-rechargeable lithium 
batteries prompted the FAA to initiate a broad evaluation of these 
energy-storage technologies. In January 2013, two independent events 
involving rechargeable lithium-ion batteries demonstrated unanticipated 
failure modes. A National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) letter to 
the FAA, dated May 22, 2014, which is available at http://www.ntsb.gov, 
filename A-14-032-036.pdf, describes these events.
    On July 12, 2013, an event involving a non-rechargeable lithium 
battery in an emergency-locator-transmitter installation demonstrated 
unanticipated failure modes. The United Kingdom's Air Accidents 
Investigation Branch Bulletin S5/2013 describes this event.
    Some known uses of rechargeable and non-rechargeable lithium 
batteries on airplanes include:
     Flight deck and avionics systems such as displays, global 
positioning systems, cockpit voice recorders, flight data recorders, 
underwater locator beacons, navigation computers, integrated avionics 
computers, satellite network and communication systems, communication-
management units, and remote-monitor electronic line-replaceable units;
     Cabin safety, entertainment, and communications equipment, 
including emergency-locator transmitters, life rafts, escape slides, 
seatbelt air bags, cabin management systems, Ethernet switches, routers 
and media servers, wireless systems, internet and in-flight 
entertainment systems, satellite televisions, remotes, and handsets;
     Systems in cargo areas including door controls, sensors, 
video surveillance equipment, and security systems.
    Some known potential hazards and failure modes associated with non-
rechargeable lithium batteries are:
     Internal failures: In general, these batteries are 
significantly more susceptible to internal failures that can result in 
self-sustaining increases in temperature and pressure (i.e., thermal 
runaway) than their nickel-cadmium or lead-acid counterparts. The 
metallic lithium can ignite, resulting in a self-sustaining fire or 
explosion.
     Fast or imbalanced discharging: Fast discharging or an 
imbalanced discharge of one cell of a multi-cell battery may create an 
overheating condition that results in an uncontrollable venting 
condition, which in turn leads to a thermal event or an explosion.
     Flammability: Unlike nickel-cadmium and lead-acid 
batteries, lithium batteries use higher energy and current in an 
electrochemical system that can be configured to maximize energy 
storage of lithium. They also use liquid electrolytes that can be 
extremely flammable. The electrolyte, as well as the electrodes, can 
serve as a source of fuel for an external fire if the battery casing is 
breached.
    Special condition no. 1 requires that each individual cell within a 
non-rechargeable lithium battery be designed to maintain safe 
temperatures and pressures. Special condition no. 2 addresses these 
same issues but for the entire battery. Special condition no. 2 
requires that the battery be designed to prevent propagation of a 
thermal event, such as self-sustained, uncontrolled increases in 
temperature or pressure from one cell to adjacent cells.
    Special condition nos. 1 and 2 are intended to ensure that the non-
rechargeable lithium battery and its cells are designed to eliminate 
the potential for uncontrolled failures. However, a certain number of 
failures will occur due to various factors beyond the control of the 
designer. Therefore, other special conditions are intended to protect 
the airplane and its occupants if failure occurs.

[[Page 57760]]

    Special condition nos. 3, 7, and 8 are self-explanatory, and the 
FAA does not provide further explanation for them at this time.
    Special condition no. 4 makes it clear that the flammable-fluid 
fire-protection requirements of Sec.  25.863 apply to non-rechargeable 
lithium battery installations. Section 25.863 is applicable to areas of 
the airplane that could be exposed to flammable fluid leakage from 
airplane systems. Non-rechargeable lithium batteries contain 
electrolyte that is a flammable fluid.
    Special condition no. 5 requires each non-rechargeable lithium 
battery installation to not damage surrounding structure or adjacent 
systems, equipment, or electrical wiring from corrosive fluids or gases 
that may escape. Special condition no. 6 requires each non-rechargeable 
lithium battery installation to have provisions to prevent any 
hazardous effect on airplane structure or systems caused by the maximum 
amount of heat it can generate due to any failure of it or its 
individual cells. The means of meeting these special conditions may be 
the same, but they are independent requirements addressing different 
hazards. Special condition no. 5 addresses corrosive fluids and gases, 
whereas special condition no. 6 addresses heat.
    These special conditions will apply to all non-rechargeable lithium 
battery installations in lieu of Sec.  25.1353(b)(1) through (b)(4) at 
Amendment 25-123. Sections 25.1353(b)(1) through (b)(4) at Amendment 
25-123 will remain in effect for other battery installations.
    These special conditions contain the additional safety standards 
that the Administrator considers necessary to establish a level of 
safety equivalent to that established by the existing airworthiness 
standards.

Discussion of Comments

    Notice of proposed special conditions no. 25-16-01-SC, for the 
Boeing 767-2C airplane, was published in the Federal Register on 
January 27, 2016 [81 FR 4596]. We received four substantive comments.
    The Aerospace Industries Association (AIA) provided several 
comments that were identical to their comments for special conditions 
no. 25-612-SC, which we issued to Gulfstream Aerospace Corporation for 
non-rechargeable lithium battery installations on Gulfstream GVI 
airplanes. The FAA responded to each of these comments in that final 
special conditions document. We incorporated the same revisions into 
these Boeing 767-2C special conditions that we incorporated into the 
Gulfstream GVI special conditions as a result of AIA's comments.
    Boeing commented that they fully support AIA's comments.
    Boeing requested that the FAA provide adequate time before non-
rechargeable lithium battery special conditions become effective to 
support validation activities by foreign civil airworthiness 
authorities (FCAA) and to not adversely impact future airplane 
deliveries by all applicants. The FAA considered this same comment from 
Boeing for special conditions no. 25-612-SC and provided a detailed 
response in that document. We determined the effective date for these 
Boeing 767-2C special conditions based on Boeing's comment and other 
factors stated in special conditions no. 25-612-SC.
    Boeing commented that the FAA needs to clearly define the 
applicability of these special conditions. Boeing's comment is similar 
to their comment on special conditions no. 25-612-SC. We provided a 
detailed response in special conditions no. 25-612-SC and have clearly 
defined the applicability for these Boeing 767-2C special conditions. 
One aspect of Boeing's comment that we did not address in special 
conditions no. 25-612-SC is that some design changes may not change a 
lithium battery installation but affect it, which results in these 
special conditions being applicable. For example, adding a heat source 
next to a lithium battery can increase its possibility of entering into 
thermal runaway. Lithium battery installations affected by design 
changes must meet these special conditions. Some examples of changes 
that affect lithium battery installations are those that:
     Increase the temperatures or pressures in a battery,
     Increase the electrical load on a battery,
     Increase potential for imbalance between battery cells,
     Modify protective circuitry for a lithium battery,
     Increase the airplane level risk due to the location of an 
existing lithium battery. An example is installation of a new oxygen 
line next to an existing part that has a lithium battery. The airplane 
level risk may increase due to the potential hazard of a lithium 
battery fire in the proximity of oxygen.
    Gulfstream Aerospace Corporation commented that they agree with 
Boeing's comments and requested that the FAA consider incorporating 
their proposed changes into this document.
    AmSafe recommended that the FAA state in the preamble that design 
mitigation or analysis at the airplane level may be applied to show 
that designs meet these special conditions. The FAA has determined that 
these special conditions are to require the battery to be designed to 
minimize the potential of uncontrollable failure, and to not only rely 
on mitigation of a battery failure at the airplane level. Therefore, we 
have not incorporated the proposed revision into the preamble of these 
special conditions.
    AmSafe commented that they concur with proposed special condition 
no. 1 with an understanding that ``foreseeable operating conditions'' 
equates to the full normal operating envelope of the airplane. However, 
this is not a correct understanding of proposed special condition no. 
1. The FAA intends for the term ``foreseeable operating conditions,'' 
in these special conditions, to apply at the cell level and not only at 
the airplane level. In addition, ``foreseeable'' includes anticipated 
abnormal operating conditions.
    AmSafe recommended revising proposed special condition no. 2 to 
read, ``Battery installation and/or equipment containing any non-
rechargeable lithium battery must preclude the occurrence of, or 
mitigate the effect of self-sustaining, uncontrolled increases in 
temperature or pressure.'' Amsafe's rationale was based on their 
recommendation that design mitigation or analysis at the airplane level 
be acceptable. As explained above, the FAA has determined that these 
special conditions are to require the battery to be designed to 
minimize the potential of uncontrollable failure, and to not only rely 
on mitigation of a battery failure at the airplane level. The FAA has 
not incorporated the proposed revision into special condition no. 2.
    AmSafe recommended adding the phrase ``. . . failure which is not 
shown to be extremely remote . . .'' to proposed special condition no. 
3. The FAA responds that service history shows that battery failure is 
not extremely remote. Therefore, to ensure that failures are properly 
anticipated and accounted for, we have not revised proposed special 
condition no. 3 to include these words.
    AmSafe recommended deleting Sec.  25.863(c)(d) from proposed 
special condition no 4. The FAA does not concur. Section 25.863 already 
applies to non-rechargeable lithium batteries since they contain 
electrolyte that is a flammable fluid. Since Sec.  25.863 has 
historically been applied to flammable fluids related to propulsion and 
hydraulic systems, the FAA is including special condition no. 4 to 
ensure that

[[Page 57761]]

there is no misunderstanding that Sec.  25.863 also applies to these 
batteries.
    AmSafe recommended revising proposed special condition no. 5 to 
prohibit damage to surrounding structure or adjacent systems, 
equipment, or electrical wiring from corrosive fluids or gases that may 
escape ``in such a way as to cause a hazardous or catastrophic failure 
condition.'' AIA also recommended this revision. The FAA intends for 
special condition no. 5 to be consistent with Sec.  25.1309. So, we 
added the words ``. . . in such a way as to cause a major or more-
severe failure condition.'' The revised special condition now reads, 
``. . . each non-rechargeable lithium battery installation must not 
damage surrounding structure or adjacent systems, equipment, or 
electrical wiring from corrosive fluids or gases that may escape in 
such a way as to cause a major or more-severe failure condition.'' The 
FAA does not concur with excluding major failure conditions.
    AmSafe concurred with proposed special condition no. 6.
    AmSafe concurred with proposed special condition no. 7 and 
recommended revising proposed special condition no. 8. However, the FAA 
deleted these proposed special conditions as explained in our response 
to AIA's comments in special conditions no. 25-612-SC.
    AmSafe recommended revising ``safe operation of the airplane'' in 
proposed special condition nos. 9 and 10 to ``continued safe operation 
of the airplane.'' The phrase ``continued safe operation of the 
airplane'' is used to refer to safe operation of the airplane after a 
failure has occurred. The phrase ``safe operation of the airplane'' is 
more general and appropriate for these special conditions. We did not 
incorporate AmSafe's proposed revision into these special conditions.
    The FAA has determined that ``uncontrolled'' in special condition 
no. 2 should be ``uncontrollable'' to more accurately describe the 
concern. This revision does not change the intended meaning of this 
special condition.
    Except as discussed above, the special conditions are adopted as 
proposed.

Applicability

    As discussed above, these special conditions are applicable to the 
Model 767-2C airplane. Should the applicant apply at a later date for a 
change to the type certificate to include another model incorporating 
the same novel or unusual design feature, or should any other model 
already included on the same type certificate be modified to 
incorporate the same novel or unusual design feature, these special 
conditions would apply to that model as well.
    These special conditions are only applicable to design changes 
applied for after their effective date. The existing airplane fleet and 
follow-on deliveries of airplanes with previously certified non-
rechargeable lithium battery installations are not affected.
    These special conditions are not applicable to previously certified 
non-rechargeable lithium battery installations where the only change is 
either cosmetic or relocating the installation to improve the safety of 
the airplane and occupants. The FAA determined that this exclusion is 
in the public interest because the need to meet all of the special 
conditions might otherwise deter such design changes that involve 
relocating batteries. A cosmetic change is a change in appearance only, 
and does not change any function or safety characteristic of the 
battery installation.

Conclusion

    This action affects only certain novel or unusual design features 
on one model of airplane. It is not a rule of general applicability.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 25

    Aircraft, Aviation safety, Reporting and record keeping 
requirements.

    The authority citation for these special conditions is as follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701, 44702, 44704.

The Special Conditions

    Accordingly, the following special conditions are part of the type 
certification basis for the Boeing Model 767-2C airplane.

Non-Rechargeable Lithium Battery Installations

    In lieu of Sec.  25.1353(b)(1) through (b)(4) at Amendment 25-123, 
each non-rechargeable lithium battery installation must:
    1. Maintain safe cell temperatures and pressures under all 
foreseeable operating conditions to prevent fire and explosion.
    2. Prevent the occurrence of self-sustaining, uncontrollable 
increases in temperature or pressure.
    3. Not emit explosive or toxic gases, either in normal operation or 
as a result of its failure, that may accumulate in hazardous quantities 
within the airplane.
    4. Meet the requirements of Sec.  25.863.
    5. Not damage surrounding structure or adjacent systems, equipment, 
or electrical wiring from corrosive fluids or gases that may escape in 
such a way as to cause a major or more-severe failure condition.
    6. Have provisions to prevent any hazardous effect on airplane 
structure or systems caused by the maximum amount of heat it can 
generate due to any failure of it or its individual cells.
    7. Have a failure sensing and warning system to alert the 
flightcrew if its failure affects safe operation of the airplane.
    8. Have a means for the flightcrew or maintenance personnel to 
determine the battery charge state if the battery's function is 
required for safe operation of the airplane.
    Note: A battery system consists of the battery and any protective, 
monitoring, and alerting circuitry or hardware inside or outside of the 
battery. It also includes vents (where necessary) and packaging. For 
the purpose of these special conditions, a ``battery'' and ``battery 
system'' are referred to as a battery.

    Issued in Renton, Washington, on August 11, 2016.
Paul Bernado,
Acting Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification 
Service.
[FR Doc. 2016-19991 Filed 8-23-16; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 4910-13-P