1. Average Hours per Response: 30 minutes per response.
2. Needs and Use: The information collected from defense contractors and suppliers on Form BIS-999, Request for Special Priorities Assistance, is required for the enforcement and administration of special priorities assistance under the Defense Production Act, the Selective Service Act and the Defense Priorities and Allocation System regulation.

3. Affected Public: Businesses and other for-profit institutions.


5. Respondent's Obligation: Required to obtain benefits.

This information collection request may be viewed at www.reginfo.gov. Follow the instructions to view the Department of Commerce collections currently under review by OMB. Written comments and recommendations for the proposed information collection should be sent within 30 days of publication of this notice to OIRA Submission@OMB.eop.gov or fax to (202) 395–5806.

Dated: July 7, 2016.

Gienna Mickelson,
Management Analyst, Office of the Chief Information Officer.

[FR Doc. 2016–16475 Filed 7–12–16; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 3510–33–P

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCe
Economic Development Administration

Notice of Petitions by Firms for Determination of Eligibility To Apply for Trade Adjustment Assistance

AGENCY: Economic Development Administration, Department of Commerce.

Any party having a substantial interest in these proceedings may request a public hearing on the matter. A written request for a hearing must be submitted to the Trade Adjustment Assistance for Firms Division, Room 71030, Economic Development Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, Washington, DC 20230, no later than ten (10) calendar days following publication of this notice.

Please follow the requirements set forth in EDA’s regulations at 13 CFR 315.9 for procedures to request a public hearing. The Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance official number and title for the program under which these petitions are submitted is 11.313, Trade Adjustment Assistance for Firms.

 Miriam J. Kearse,
Lead Program Analyst.

[FR Doc. 2016–16527 Filed 7–12–16; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 3510–33–P

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
Bureau of Industry and Security

Order Renewing Order Temporarily Denying Export Privileges

Mahan Airways, Mahan Tower, No. 21, Azadegan St., M.A. Jenah Exp. Way, Tehran, Iran;
Pejman Mahmood Kosaraynifard, a/k/a Kosarian Fard, P.O. Box 52404, Dubai, United Arab Emirates;
Mahmoud Amini, G#22 Dubai Airport Free Zone, P.O. Box 393754, Dubai, United Arab Emirates and P.O. Box 52404, Dubai, United Arab Emirates; and Mohamed Abdulla Alqaz Building, Al Maktoum Street, Al Rigga, Dubai, United Arab Emirates;
Kerman Aviation, a/k/a GIE Kerman Aviation, Avenue 42, Avenue Montaigne 75008, Paris, France;
Sirjanco Trading LLC, P.O. Box 8709, Dubai, United Arab Emirates;
Ali Eslamian, 33 Cavendish Square, 4th Floor, London, W1G0PW, United Kingdom and 2 Bentinck Close, Prince Albert Road St. Johns Wood, London NW87RY, United Kingdom;
Mahan Air General Trading LLC, 19th Floor Al Moosa Tower One, Sheikh Zayed Road, Dubai 40594, United Arab Emirates;
Skyco (UK) Ltd., 33 Cavendish Square, 4th Floor, London, W1G0PV, United Kingdom;
Equipsco (UK) Ltd., 2 Bentinck Close, Prince Albert Road, London, NW8 7RY, United Kingdom;
Al Naser Airlines, a/k/a al-Naser Airlines, a/k/a Alnaser Airlines and, Air Freight Ltd., Home 46, Al-Karrada, Babil Region, District 929, St 21 Beside Al Jadiyra Private Hospital, Baghdad, Iraq and Al Amirat Street, Section 309, St. 3/H:20 Al Mansour Baghdad, Iraq, and P.O. Box 28360, Dubai, United Arab Emirates and P.O. Box 911399, Amman 11191, Jordan;
Ali Abdullah Alhay, a/k/a Ali Alhay, a/k/a Ali Abdullah Ahmed Alhay, Home 46, Al-Karrada, Babil Region, District 929, St 21, Beside Al Jadiyra Private Hospital, Baghdad, Iraq and Anak Street, Qatar, Saudi Arabia 61177;
Pursuant to Section 766.24 of the Export Administration Regulations, 15 CFR parts 730–774 (2016) (“EAR” or the “Regulations”), I hereby grant the request of the Office of Export Enforcement (“OEE”) to renew the January 7, 2016 Temporary Denial Order (the “TDO”). The January 7, 2016 Order denied the export privileges of Mahan Airways, Pejman Mahmood Kosarayanifard, Mahmoud Amini, Kerman Aviation, Sirjanco Trading LLC, Ali Esfamian, Mahan Air General Trading LLC, Skyco (UK) Ltd., Skyco (UK) Ltd., and Equipco (UK) Ltd. as related persons in accordance with Section 766.23 of the Regulations.

On July 1, 2011, the TDO was modified by adding Zarand Aviation as a respondent in order to prevent an imminent violation. As part of the August 24, 2011 renewal, Kerman Aviation, Sirjanco Trading LLC, Ali Esfamian were added to the TDO as related persons. Mahan Air General Trading LLC, Skyco (UK) Ltd., and Equipco (UK) Ltd. were added as related persons on April 9, 2012.

Furthermore, no appeal of the related person determination in accordance with Section 766.24(d) has been received. Pursuant to Section 766.24, BIS may renew an order temporarily denying a respondent’s export privileges upon a showing that the order is necessary in the public interest to prevent an “imminent violation” of the Regulations. 15 CFR 766.24(d). “A violation may be ‘imminent’ either in time or degree of likelihood.” 15 CFR 766.24(b)(3). BIS may show “either that a violation is about to occur, or that the general circumstances of the matter under investigation or case under criminal or administrative charges demonstrate a likelihood of future violations.” Id. As to the likelihood of future violations, BIS may show that the violation under investigation or charge “is significant, deliberate, covert and/or likely to occur again, rather than technical or negligent.” Id.

A “lack of information in establishing the precise time a violation may occur does not preclude a finding that a violation is imminent, so long as


2 On August 13, 2014, BIS and Gatewick LLC resolved administrative charges against Gatewick, including a charge for acting contrary to the terms of a BIS denial order (15 CFR 764.2(k)). In addition to the payment of a civil penalty, the settlement includes a seven-year denial order. The first two years of the denial period are active, with the remaining five years suspended on condition that Gatewick LLC pays the civil penalty in full and settles an investigation or case under criminal or administrative charges.

3 The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) designated Sky Blue Bird and Issam Shammout as Specially Designated Global Terrorists (“SDGTs”) on March 21, 2008, pursuant to Executive Order 13324, for “providing support to Iran’s Mahan Air.” See 80 FR 43246 (May 22, 2015).

4 A party named or added as a related person may not oppose the issuance or renewal of the underlying temporary denial order, but may file an appeal of the related person determination in accordance with Section 766.23(c).

5 As of July 22, 2014, Zarand Aviation was no longer subject to the TDO.

6 On June 15, 2016, BIS, through its Office of Export Enforcement (“OEE”), submitted a written request for renewal of the TDO. The written request was made more than 20 days before the scheduled expiration of the current TDO, which issued on January 7, 2016. Notice of the renewal request also was provided to Mahan Airways, Al Naser Airlines, Ali Abdullah Alhay, and Bahar Safwa General Trading in accordance with Sections 766.5 and 766.24(d) of the Regulations. No opposition to the renewal of the TDO has been received.

I. Procedural History

On March 17, 2008, Darryl W. Jackson, the then-Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export Enforcement (“Assistant Secretary”), signed a TDO denying Mahan Airways’ export privileges for a period of 180 days on the grounds that its issuance was necessary in the public interest to prevent an imminent violation of the Regulations. The TDO also named as denied persons Blue Airways, of Yerevan, Armenia (“Blue Airways of Armenia”), as well as the “Balli Group Respondents,” namely, Balli Group PLC, Balli Aviation, Balli Holdings, Vahid Alaghband, Hassan Alaghband, Blue Sky One Ltd., Blue Sky Two Ltd., Blue Sky Three Ltd., Blue Sky Four Ltd., Blue Sky Five Ltd., and Blue Sky Six Ltd., all of the United Kingdom. The TDO was issued ex parte pursuant to Section 766.24(a), and went into effect on March 21, 2008, the date it was published in the Federal Register.

The TDO subsequently has been renewed in accordance with Section 766.24(d), including most recently on January 7, 2016. As of March 9, 2010, the Balli Group Respondents and Blue Airways were no longer subject to the TDO. As part of the February 25, 2011 TDO renewal, Gatewick LLC (a/k/a Gatewick Freight and Cargo Services, a/k/a Gatewick Aviation Services), Mahmoud Amini, and Pejman Mahmood Kosarayanifard (“Kosarian Fard”) were added as related persons in accordance with Section 766.23 of the Regulations.

On July 1, 2011, the TDO was modified by adding Zarand Aviation as a respondent in order to prevent an imminent violation. As part of the August 24, 2011 renewal, Kerman Aviation, Sirjanco Trading LLC, Ali Esfamian were added to the TDO as related persons. Mahan Air General Trading LLC, Skyco (UK) Ltd., and Equipco (UK) Ltd. were added as related persons on April 9, 2012. Mehdi Bahrami was added to the TDO as a related person as part of the February 4, 2013 renewal order.

On May 21, 2015, the TDO was modified to add Al Naser Airlines, Ali Abdullah Alhay, and Bahar Safwa General Trading as respondents. Sky Blue Bird Group and its chief executive officer Issam Shammout were added to the TDO as related persons as part of the July 13, 2015 renewal order.

II. Renewal of the TDO

A. Legal Standard

Pursuant to Section 766.24, BIS may issue or renew an order temporarily denying a respondent’s export privileges upon a showing that the order is necessary in the public interest to prevent an “imminent violation” of the Regulations. 15 CFR 766.24(b)(1) and 766.24(d). “A violation may be ‘imminent’ either in time or degree of likelihood.” 15 CFR 766.24(b)(3). BIS may show “either that a violation is about to occur, or that the general circumstances of the matter under investigation or case under criminal or administrative charges demonstrate a likelihood of future violations.” Id. As to the likelihood of future violations, BIS may show that the violation under investigation or charge “is significant, deliberate, covert and/or likely to occur again, rather than technical or negligent.” Id.

A “lack of information in establishing the precise time a violation may occur does not preclude a finding that a violation is imminent, so long as
there is sufficient reason to believe the likelihood of a violation.”’’ Id.

B. The TDO and BIS’s Request for Renewal

OEE’s request for renewal is based upon the facts underlying the issuance of the initial TDO and the TDO renewals in this matter and the evidence developed over the course of this investigation indicating a blatant disregard of U.S. export controls and the TDO. The initial TDO was issued as a result of evidence that showed that Mahan Airways and other parties engaged in conduct prohibited by the EAR by knowingly re-exporting to Iran three U.S.-origin aircraft, specifically Boeing 747s (“Aircraft 1–3’’), items subject to the EAR and classified under Export Control Classification Number (“ECCN”) 9A991.b, without the required U.S. Government authorization. Further evidence submitted by BIS indicated that Mahan Airways was involved in the attempted re-export of three additional U.S.-origin Boeing 747s (“Aircraft 4–6”) to Iran.

As discussed in the September 17, 2008 renewal order, evidence presented by BIS indicated that Aircraft 1–3 continued to be flown on Mahan Airway’s routes after issuance of the TDO, in violation of the Regulations and the TDO itself.8 It also showed that Aircraft 1–3 had been flown in further violation of the Regulations and the TDO on the routes of Iran Air, an Iranian Government airline. Moreover, as discussed in the March 16, 2009, September 11, 2009 and March 9, 2010 Renewal Orders, Mahan Airway registered Aircraft 1–3 in Iran, obtained Iranian tail numbers for them (EP–MNA, EP–MNB, and EP–MNE, respectively), and continued to operate at least two of them in violation of the Regulations and the TDO,9 while also committing an additional knowing and willful violation when it negotiated for and acquired an additional U.S.-origin aircraft. The additional acquired aircraft was an MD–82 aircraft, which subsequently was painted in Mahan Airway’s livery and flown on multiple Mahan Airway’s routes under tail number TC–TUA.

The March 9, 2010 Renewal Order also noted that a court in the United Kingdom (“U.K.”) had found Mahan Airways in contempt of court on February 1, 2010, for failing to comply with that court’s December 21, 2009 and January 12, 2010 orders compelling Mahan Airways to remove the Boeing 747s from Iran and ground them in the Netherlands. Mahan Airways and the Balli Group Respondents had been litigating before the U.K. court concerning ownership and control of Aircraft 1–3. In a letter to the U.K. court dated January 12, 2010, Mahan Airway’s Chairman indicated, inter alia, that Mahan Airway opposes U.S. Government actions against Iran, that it continued to operate the aircraft on its routes in and out of Tehran (and had 158,000 “forward bookings” for these aircraft), and that it wished to continue to do so and would pay damages if required by that court, rather than ground the aircraft.

The September 3, 2010 renewal order discussed the fact that Mahan Airway’s violations of the TDO extended beyond operating U.S.-origin aircraft and attempting to acquire additional U.S.-origin aircraft. In February 2009, while subject to the TDO, Mahan Airway participated in the export of computer motherboards, items subject to the Regulations and designated as EAR99, from the United States to Iran, via the United Arab Emirates (“UAE”), in violation of both the TDO and the Regulations, by transporting and/or forwarding the computer motherboards, items subject to the EAR and designated as EAR99 from the UAE to Iran. Mahan Airway’s violations were facilitated by Gatewick LLC, which not only participated in the transaction, but also has stated to BIS that it acted as Mahan Airway’s sole booking agent for cargo and freight forwarding services in the UAE.

Moreover, in a January 24, 2011 filing in the U.K. court, Mahan Airway asserted that Aircraft 1–3 were not being used, but stated in pertinent part that the aircraft were being maintained in Iran especially “in an airworthy condition” and that, depending on the outcome of its U.K. court appeal, the aircraft “could immediately go back into service . . . on international routes into and out of Iran.” Mahan Airway’s January 24, 2011 submission to U.K. Court of Appeal, at p. 25, ¶¶ 108, 110. This clearly stated intent, both on its own and in conjunction with Mahan Airway’s prior misconduct and statements, demonstrated the need to renew the TDO in order to prevent imminent future violations. Two of these three 747s subsequently were removed from Iran and are no longer in Mahan Airway’s possession. The third of these 747s, with Manufacturer’s Serial Number (“MSN”) 34480 and Iranian tail number EP–MNE, remained in Iran under Mahan Airway’s control. Pursuant to Executive Order 13324, it was designated a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (“SDGT”) by the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) on September 19, 2012.10 Furthermore, as discussed in the February 4, 2013 Order, open source information indicated that this 747, painted in the livery and logo of Mahan Airway, had been flown between Iran and Syria, and was suspected of ferrying weapons and/or other equipment to the Syrian Government from Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Open source information showed that this aircraft had flown from Iran to Syria as recently as June 30, 2013, and continues to show that it remains in active operation in Mahan Airway’s fleet.

In addition, as first detailed in the July 1, 2011 and August 24, 2011 orders, and discussed in subsequent renewal orders in this matter, Mahan Airways also continued to evade U.S. export control laws by operating two Airbus A310 aircraft, bearing Mahan Airway’s livery and logo, on flights into and out of Iran.11 At the time of the July 1, 2011 and August 24, 2011 Orders, these Airbus A310s were registered in France, with tail numbers F-OJHH and F-OJJI, respectively.12

The August 2012 renewal order also found that Mahan Airways had acquired another Airbus A310 aircraft subject to the Regulations, with MSN 499 and Iranian tail number EP–VIP, in violation of the TDO and the Regulations.13 On September 19, 2012, all three Airbus A310 (tail numbers F-OJHH, F-OJJI, and EP–VIP) were designated as SDGTs.14

8 Engaging in conduct prohibited by a denial order violates the Regulations. 15 CFR 746.2(a) and (k).
9 The third Boeing 747 appeared to have undergone significant service maintenance and may not have been operational at the time of the March 9, 2010 renewal order.
11 The Airbus A310s are powered with U.S.-origin engines. The engines are subject to the EAR and classified under Export Control Classification (“ECCN”) 9A991.d. The Airbus A310s contain controlled U.S.-origin items valued at more than 10 percent of the total value of the aircraft and as a result are subject to the EAR. They are classified under ECCN 9A991.b. The export or reexport of these aircraft to Iran requires U.S. Government authorization pursuant to Sections 742.8 and 746.7 of the Regulations.
12 OEE subsequently presented evidence that after the August 24, 2011 renewal, Mahan Airways worked along with Kerman Aviation and others to de-register the two Airbus A310 aircraft in France and to register both aircraft in Iran (with, respectively, Iranian tail numbers EP–MH4 and EP–MHL). It was determined subsequent to the February 15, 2012 renewal order that the registration switch for these A310s was cancelled and that Mahan Airway then continued to fly the aircraft under the original French tail numbers (F-OJHH and F-OJJI, respectively). Both aircraft apparently remain in Mahan Airway’s possession.
13 See note 12, supra.
14 See http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/pages/20120919.aspx. Mahan Airways was previously designated a Specially Designated Global Terrorist ("SDGT") by the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control ("OFAC") on September 19, 2012. Furthermore, as discussed in the February 4, 2013 Order, open source information indicated that this 747, painted in the livery and logo of Mahan Airway, had been flown between Iran and Syria, and was suspected of ferrying weapons and/or other equipment to the Syrian Government from Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Open source information showed that this aircraft had flown from Iran to Syria as recently as June 30, 2013, and continues to show that it remains in active operation in Mahan Airway’s fleet.

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The February 4, 2013 Order laid out further evidence of continued and additional efforts by Mahan Airways and other persons acting in concert with Mahan, including Kral Avia
tion and another Turkish company, to procure U.S.-origin engines—two GE CF6–50C2 engines, with MSNs 517621 and 517738, respectively—and other aircraft parts in violation of the TDO and the Regu
lations. The February 4, 2013 renewal order also added Mehdi Bahrami as a related person in accordance with Section 766.23 of the Regulations. Bahrami, a Mahan Vice-
President and the head of Mahan’s Istanbul Office, also was involved in Mahan’s acquisition of the original three Boeing 747s (Aircraft 1–3) that resulted in the original TDO, and has had a business relationship with Mahan dating back to 1997.

The July 31, 2013 Order detailed additional evidence obtained by OEE showing efforts by Mahan Airways to obtain another GE CF6–50C2 aircraft engine (MSN 528350) from the United States. Multiple Mahan employees, including Mehdi Bahrami, were involved in or aware of matters related to the engine’s arrival in Turkey from the United States, plans to visually inspect the engine, and prepare it for shipment from Turkey.

Mahan sought to obtain this U.S.-
origin engine through Pioneer Logistics Havacilik Turizm Yetenim Danismanlik ("Pioneer Logistics"), an aircraft parts supplier located in Turkey, and its
director/operator, Gulnihal Yegane, a Turk. OEE previously had conducted Mahan related business with Mehdi Bahrami and Ali Eslamian. Moreover, as referenced in the July 31, 2013 Order, a sworn affidavit by Kosol Surinandha, Managing Director of Mahan’s General Sales Agent in
Thailand, stated that the shares of Pioneer Logistics for which he was the listed owner were “actually the property of and owned by Mahan.” He further stated that he held “legal title to the shares until otherwise required by Mahan” but would “exercise the rights granted to [him] exactly and only as instructed by Mahan and [his] vote and/ or decisions [would] only and exclusively reflect the wills and demands of Mahan.”

The July 22, 2014 Order outlined OEE’s continued investigation of Mahan Airways’ activities and detailed an attempt by Mahan, which OEE thwarted, to obtain, via an Indonesian aircraft parts supplier, two U.S.-origin Honeywell ALF–502R–5 aircraft engines (MSNs LF55660 and LF53525), items subject to the Regulations, from a U.S. company located in Texas. An invoice of the Indonesian aircraft parts supplier dated March 27, 2013, listed Mahan Airways as the purchaser of the engines and Mahan paid a $50,000 deposit to add the items. OEE also obtained a Mahan air waybill dated March 12, 2013, listing numerous U.S.-origin aircraft parts subject to the Regulations—including, among other items, a vertical navigation gyroscope, a transmitter, and a power control unit—being transported by Mahan from Turkey to Iran in violation of the TDO.

The July 22, 2014 Order discussed open source evidence from the March-June 2014 time period regarding two BAe regional jets, items subject to the Regulations, that were painted in the livery and logo of Mahan Airways and operating under Iranian tail numbers EP–MOK and EP–MOI, respectively. In addition, aviation industry resources indicated that these aircraft were obtained by Mahan Airways in late November 2013 and June 2014, from Ukrainian Mediterranean Airline, a Ukrainian airline that was added to BIS’s Entity List (Supplement No. 4 to Part 744 of the Regulations) on August 15, 2011, for acting contrary to the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States.

Designated by OFAC as a SDGT on October 18, 2011. 77 FR 64,427 (October 18, 2011).

Kral Aviation was referenced in the February 4, 2013 Order as “Turkish Company No. 1.” Kral Aviation purchased a GE CF6–50C2 aircraft engine (MSN 517621) from the United States in July 2012, on behalf of Mahan Airways. OEE was able to prevent this engine from reaching Mahan by issuing a redelivery order to the freight forwarder in accordance with Section 758.8 of the Regulations. OEE also issued Kral Aviation a redelivery order for the second CF6–50C2 engine (MSN 517738) on July 30, 2012. The owner of the second engine subsequently cancelled the item’s sale to Kral Aviation. In September 2012, OEE was alerted by a U.S. exporter that another Turkish company ("Turkish Company No. 2") was attempting to purchase aircraft spare parts intended for re-export by Turkish Company No. 2 to Mahan Airways. See February 4, 2013 Order.

On December 31, 2013, Kral Aviation was added to BIS’s Entity List, Supplement No. 4 to Part 744 of the Export Administration Regulations (Dec. 12, 2013). Companies and individuals are added to the Entity List for engaging in activities contrary to the national security or foreign policy interests of the United States. See 15 CFR 744.11.

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On December 31, 2013, Kral Aviation was added to BIS’s Entity List, Supplement No. 4 to Part 744 of the Export Administration Regulations (Dec. 12, 2013). Companies and individuals are added to the Entity List for engaging in activities contrary to the national security or foreign policy interests of the United States. See 15 CFR 744.11.
The May 21, 2015 modification order detailed the acquisition of two aircraft, specifically an Airbus A340 bearing MSN 164 and an Airbus A321 bearing MSN 550, that were purchased by Al Naser Airlines in late 2014/early 2015 and are currently located in Iran under the possession, control, and/or ownership of Mahan Airways. The sales agreements for these two aircraft were signed by Ali Abdullah Alhay for Al Naser Airlines. Payment information reveals that multiple electronic funds transfers ("EFT") were made by Ali Abdullah Alhay and Bahar Safwa General Trading in order to acquire MSNs 164 and 550.

The May 21, 2015 modification order also laid out evidence showing the respondents’ attempts to obtain other controlled aircraft, including aircraft physically located in the United States in similarly-patterned transactions during the same recent time period. Transactional documents involving two Airbus A320s bearing MSNs 82 and 99, respectively, again showed Ali Abdullah Alhay signing sales agreements for Al Naser Airlines. A review of the payment information for these aircraft similarly revealed EFTs from Ali Abdullah Alhay and Bahar Safwa General Trading that follow the pattern described for MSNs 164 and 550, respectively.

The May 21, 2015 modification order also detailed the acquisition of two aircraft, specifically an Airbus A340 bearing MSN 164 and an Airbus A321 bearing MSN 550, that were purchased by Al Naser Airlines in late 2014/early 2015 and are currently located in Iran under the possession, control, and/or ownership of Mahan Airways. The sales agreements for these two aircraft were signed by Ali Abdullah Alhay for Al Naser Airlines. Payment information reveals that multiple electronic funds transfers ("EFT") were made by Ali Abdullah Alhay and Bahar Safwa General Trading in order to acquire MSNs 164 and 550. Additional evidence obtained by OEE since the January 7, 2016 renewal shows that in or about November 2015, Mahan Airways acquired a BAE Avro RJ–85 aircraft (MSN E2392) in violation of the TDO and that the aircraft now bears Iranian tail number EP–MMR. This evidence includes information available on the Web site of Iran’s civil aviation authority.

C. Findings

Under the applicable standard set forth in Section 766.24 of the Regulations and my review of the entire record, I find that the evidence presented by BIS convincingly demonstrates that the denied persons have acted in violation of the EAR and the TDO, that such violations have been significant, deliberate, and covert, and that there is a likelihood of future violations. Therefore, renewal of the TDO is necessary to prevent imminent violation of the EAR and to give notice to companies and individuals in the United States and abroad that they should continue to cease dealing with Mahan Airways and the other denied persons under the TDO in connection with export and reexport transactions involving items subject to the EAR.

IV. Order

It is therefore ordered: First, that MAHAN AIRWAYS, Mahan Tower, No. 21, Azadegan St., M.A. Jenah Exp. Way, Tehran, Iran; PEJMAN MAHMOOD KOSARAYANIFARD A/K/A KOSARIAN FARD, P.O. Box 52404, Dubai, United Arab Emirates;

22 This evidence included a press release dated May 9, 2015, that appeared on Mahan Airways’ Web site and stated that Mahan “added 9 modern aircraft to its air fleet[,]” and that the newly acquired aircraft included eight Airbus A340s and one Airbus A321. See http://www.mahan.aero/iran/ mahan-air/press-room/44. The press release was subsequently removed from Mahan Airways’ Web site. Publicly available flight databases similarly showed that Mahan had obtained nine additional aircraft from Al Naser Airlines in May 2015, including MSNs 164 and 550. As also discussed in the July 13, 2015 renewal order, Sky Blue Bird Group, via Issam Shamout, was actively involved in Al Naser Airlines’ acquisition of MSNs 164 and 550, and the attempted acquisition of MSNs 82 and 99 (which were detained by OEE).

23 This evidence included information available on the Web site of Iran’s civil aviation authority.

24 The Airbus A340s are powered by U.S.-origin engines that are subject to the Regulations and classified under ECCN 9A991.d. The Airbus A340s contain controlled U.S.-origin items valued at more than 10 percent of the total value of the aircraft and as a result are subject to the EAR regardless of the their location. The aircraft are classified under ECCN 9A991.d.

25 There is some publically available information indicating that the aircraft Mahan Airways is flying under Iranian tail number EP–MMR is now MSN 615, rather than MSN 416. Both aircraft are Airbus A340 aircraft that Mahan acquired from Al Naser Airlines, and were obtained by Mahan from Al Naser Airlines, had been issued the following Iranian tail numbers: EP–MMD (MSN 164), EP–MMG (MSN 383), EP–MMH (MSN 391) and EP–MMR (MSN 416), respectively. Publicly available flight tracking information shows that at the time of the July 13, 2015 renewal, both EP–MMH and EP–MMR were being actively flown on routes into and out of Iran in violation of the TDO and Regulations.

26 The BAE Avro RJ–85 is powered by U.S.-origin engines that are subject to the Regulations and classified under ECCN 9A991.d. The BAE Avro RJ–85 contains controlled U.S.-origin items valued at more than 10 percent of the total value of the aircraft and as a result is subject to the EAR regardless of the its location. The aircraft is classified under ECCN 9A991.d. and its export or re-export to Iran requires U.S. Government authorization pursuant to Sections 742.8 and 746.7 of the Regulations.
MAHMoud AMini, G822 Dubai AirPort Free Zone, P.O. Box 93754, Dubai, United Arab Emirates, and P.O. Box 52404, Dubai, United Arab Emirates, and Mohamed Abdulla Alqaz Building, Al Maktoum Street, Al Rigga, Dubai, United Arab Emirates; KerMan AViAtiOn A/K/A GIE KerMan AViAtiOn, 42 Avenue Montaigne 75008, Paris, France; SIRjanco TRADING LLC, P.O. Box 8709, Dubai, United Arab Emirates; AlEiSliMan, 33 Cavendish Square, 4th Floor, London W1G0PW, United Kingdom, and 2 Bentinck Close, Prince Albert Road St. Johns Wood, London NW87RY, United Kingdom; MAHAn GEnErAl TRADING LLC, 19th Floor Al Moosa Tower One, Sheik Zayed Road, Dubai 40594, United Arab Emirates; Skyco (UK) LTD., 33 Cavendish Square, 4th Floor, London, W1G 0PV, United Kingdom; EquIPco (UK) LTD., 2 Bentinck Close, Prince Albert Road, London, NW8 7RY, United Kingdom; and MehDi Bahrami, Mahan Airways—Istanbul Office, Cumhuriyte Cad. Sibil Apt No: 101 D:6, 34374 Emadad, Sisli Istanbul, Turkey; Al NAser AIRLINES A/K/A Al—NAser AIRLINES AND AIR FREIGHT LTD., Home 46, Al-Karrada, Babil Region, District 929, St 21, Beside Al Jadirya Private Hospital, Baghdad, Iraq, and Al Amirat Street, Section 309, St. 3/H:20, Al Mansour, Baghdad, Iraq, and P.O. Box 28360, Dubai, United Arab Emirates, and P.O. Box 911399, Amman 11191, Jordan; Al iSSAm Shammout May, at any time, appeal this order by filing a full written statement in support of the Appeal with the Office of the Administrative Law Judge, U.S. Coast Guard ALJ Docketing Center, 40 South Gay Street, Baltimore, Maryland 21202–4022. In accordance with the provisions of Sections 766.23(c)(2) and 766.24(e)(3) of the EAR, Mahan Airways, Al Naser Airlines, Ali Abdullah Alhay, and/or Bahar Safwa, Sirjanco Trading LLC, Ali Eslamian, Mahan Air General Trading LLC, Skyco (UK) Ltd., Equipo (UK) Ltd., Mehdi Bahrami, Sky Blue Bird Group, and/or Issam Shammout may, at any time, appeal their inclusion as a related person by filing a full written statement in support of the appeal with the Office of the Administrative Law Judge, U.S. Coast Guard ALJ Docketing Center, 40 South Gay Street, Baltimore, Maryland 21202–4022. In accordance with the provisions of Section 766.24(d) of the EAR, Bis may seek renewal of this order by filing a written request not later than 20 days before the expiration date. A renewal request may be opposed by Mahan Airways, Al Naser Airlines, Ali Abdullah Alhay, and/or Bahar Safwa General Trading as provided in Section 766.24(d), by filing a written submission with the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export Enforcement, which must be received not later than seven days before the expiration date of the Order. A copy of this Order shall be provided to Mahan Airways, Al Naser Airlines, Ali Abdullah Alhay, and Bahar Safwa General Trading and each related person, and shall be published in the Federal Register. This Order is effective on their behalf, any successors or assigns, agents, or employees (each a “Denied Person” and collectively the “Denied Persons”) may not, directly or indirectly, participate in any way in any transaction involving any commodity, software or technology (hereinafter collectively referred to as “item”) exported to be exported from the United States that is subject to the Export Administration Regulations (“EAR”), or in any other activity subject to the EAR including, but not limited to: A. Applying for, obtaining, or using any license, License Exception, or export control document; B. Carrying on negotiations concerning, or ordering, buying, receiving, using, selling, delivering, storing, disposing of, forwarding, transporting, financing, or otherwise servicing in any way, any transaction involving any item exported or to be exported from the United States that is subject to the EAR, or in any other activity subject to the EAR; or C. Benefitting in any way from any transaction any item exported or to be exported from the United States that is subject to the EAR, or in any other activity subject to the EAR. Second, that no person may, directly or indirectly, do any of the following: A. Export or reexport to or on behalf of a Denied Person any item subject to the EAR; B. Take any action that facilitates the acquisition or attempted acquisition by a Denied Person of the ownership, possession, or control of any item subject to the EAR that has been or will be exported from the United States, including financing or other support activities related to a transaction whereby a Denied Person acquires or attempts to acquire such ownership, possession, or control; C. Take any action to acquire from or to facilitate the acquisition or attempted acquisition from a Denied Person of any item subject to the EAR that has been or will be exported from the United States. For purposes of this paragraph, servicing means installation, maintenance, repair, modification or testing. Third, that, after notice and opportunity for comment as provided in section 766.23 of the EAR, any other person, firm, corporation, or business organization related to a Denied Person by affiliation, ownership, control, or position of responsibility in the conduct of trade or related services may also be made subject to the provisions of this Order. Fourth, that this Order does not prohibit any export, reexport, or other transaction subject to the EAR where the only items involved that are subject to the EAR are the foreign-produced direct product of U.S.-origin technology.
immediately and shall remain in effect for 180 days.27

Dated: July 7, 2016.
Richard R. Majauskas,
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Enforcement.

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DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
International Trade Administration
[A–570–601]
Tapered Roller Bearings and Parts Thereof, Finished and Unfinished, From the People’s Republic of China: Preliminary Results of Changed Circumstances Review and Intent To Reinstate Shanghai General Bearing Co., Ltd. in the Antidumping Duty Order

AGENCY: Enforcement and Compliance, International Trade Administration, Department of Commerce.

SUMMARY: The Department of Commerce (the Department) is conducting a changed circumstances review of the antidumping duty order on tapered roller bearings and parts thereof, from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to determine whether Shanghai General Bearing Co., Ltd. (SGBC/SKF) has resumed dumping TRBs and whether the antidumping order should be reinstated for TRBs from the PRC manufactured and exported by SGBC/SKF. The period of review is June 1, 2014, through May 31, 2015.

We preliminarily determine that SGBC/SKF has sold TRBs at less than normal value (NV) and that TRBs produced and exported by SGBC/SKF should be reinstated in the antidumping order on TRBs from the PRC. We will instruct U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to suspend liquidation of all entries of TRBs manufactured and exported by SGBC/SKF and entered, or withdrawn from warehouse, for consumption on or after the date of publication of this notice in the Federal Register. Interested parties are invited to comment on these preliminary results.

DATES: Effective Date: July 13, 2016.


27 Review and consideration of this matter have been delegated to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export Enforcement.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Scope of the Order

The merchandise covered by the order includes tapered roller bearings and parts thereof. The subject merchandise is currently classifiable under Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTSUS) subheadings: 8482.20.00, 8482.91.00.50, 8482.99.15, 8482.99.45, 8483.20.40, 8483.20.80, 8483.30.80, 8483.90.20, 8483.90.30, 8483.90.80, 8708.70.6600, 8708.99.2300, 8708.99.4850, 8708.99.6800, 8708.99.8115, and 8708.99.8180. The HTSUS subheadings are provided for convenience and customs purposes only; the written description of the scope of the order is dispositive.1

Tolling of Deadlines for Preliminary Results

As explained in the memorandum from the Acting Assistant Secretary for Enforcement and Compliance, the Department exercised its discretion to toll all administrative deadlines for the duration of the closure of the Federal Government during Snowstorm “Jonas.” 2 Therefore, all deadlines in this segment of the proceeding have been extended by four days. The revised deadline for the preliminary results of this review is now July 5, 2016.3

Basis for Reinstatement

In requesting revocation, pursuant to 19 CFR 351.222(b)(2)(i)(B), SGBC/SKF agreed to immediate reinstatement of the order, so long as any exporter or producer is subject to the order, if the Secretary concludes that subsequent to the revocation, SGBC/SKF sold TRBs at less than NV.4 Under 19 CFR 351.222(b)(2)(i)(B) as long as any exporter or producer is subject to an antidumping duty order which remains in force, an entity previously granted a revocation may be reinstated under that order if it is established that the entity has resumed the dumping of subject merchandise.

In this case, because other exporters in the PRC remain subject to the TRBs order, the order remains in effect, and SGBC/SKF may be reinstated in the order. The Department granted SGBC/SKF revocation based in part upon its agreement to immediate reinstatement in the antidumping duty order if the Department were to find that the company resumed dumping of TRBs from the PRC.5

As discussed in the Preliminary Decision Memorandum, we have examined SGBC/SKF’s response and have preliminarily found that SGBC/SKF’s dumping margin for the review period is greater than de minimis. Accordingly, we preliminarily intend to reinstate SGBC/SKF in the antidumping duty order on TRBs from the PRC.

Methodology

The Department is conducting this changed circumstances review in accordance with section 751(b)(1) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended (the Act), and 19 CFR 351.216(d). As noted above, this changed circumstances review is being conducted with respect to TRBs from the PRC manufactured and exported by SGBC/SKF. For SGBC/SKF, we calculated constructed export prices in accordance with section 772 of the Act. Because the PRC is a non-market economy (NME) within the meaning of section 771(18) of the Act, NV has been calculated in accordance with section 773(c) of the Act.

For a full description of the methodology underlying our conclusions, see the Preliminary Decision Memorandum. The Preliminary Decision Memorandum is a public document and is on file electronically via Enforcement and Compliance’s Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Centralized Electronic Service System (ACCESS). ACCESS is available to registered users.

2 For a complete description of the scope of the order, see memorandum from Gary Taverman, Associate Deputy Assistant Secretary for Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Operations, to Ronald K. Lorentzen, Acting Assistant Secretary for Enforcement and Compliance, dated July 5, 2016 entitled “Decision Memorandum for the Preliminary Results of the Antidumping Duty Changed Circumstances Review of Tapered Roller Bearings and Parts Thereof, Finished and Unfinished, from the People’s Republic of China” (Preliminary Decision Memorandum), issued concurrently with and hereby adopted by this notice.

3 See Memorandum to the Record from Ron Lorentzen, Acting Assistant Secretary for Enforcement and Compliance, regarding “Tolling of Administrative Deadlines As a Result of the Government Closure During Snowstorm Jonas,” dated January 27, 2016.


5 See SGBC/SKF Revocation, 62 FR at 6214.