[Federal Register Volume 81, Number 122 (Friday, June 24, 2016)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 41258-41262]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2016-14998]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
10 CFR Part 72
[Docket No. PRM-72-6; NRC-2008-0649]
Petition for Rulemaking Submitted by C-10 Research and Education
Foundation, Inc.
AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
ACTION: Petition for rulemaking; denial.
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SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is denying
Requests 4 and 9 of a petition for rulemaking (PRM), dated November 24,
2008, filed by Ms. Sandra Gavutis, Executive Director of C-10 Research
and Education Foundation, Inc. (the petitioner). The petitioner
requested that the NRC amend its regulations concerning dry cask
safety, security, transferability, and longevity. The petitioner made
12 specific requests. The NRC previously denied 9 of these requests and
accepted 1 request for consideration in the rulemaking process. Two
remaining requests were reserved for future rulemaking determinations.
The purpose of this Federal Register notice is to announce the NRC's
final decision to deny these two remaining requests.
DATES: The docket for the petition for rulemaking, PRM-72-6, is closed
on June 24, 2016.
ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID NRC-2008-0649 when contacting the
NRC about the availability of information for this action. You may
obtain publicly-available information related to this action by any of
the following methods:
Federal Rulemaking Web site: Go to http://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2008-0649. Address
questions about NRC dockets to Carol Gallagher; telephone: 301-415-
3463; email: [email protected]. For technical questions, contact
the individuals listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section
of this document.
NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System
(ADAMS): You may obtain publicly-available documents online in the
ADAMS Public Documents collection at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To begin the search, select ``ADAMS Public Documents'' and
then select ``Begin Web-based ADAMS Search.'' For problems with ADAMS,
please contact the NRC's Public Document Room (PDR) reference staff at
1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737, or by email to [email protected]. The
ADAMS accession number for each document referenced (if it is available
in ADAMS) is provided the first time that it is mentioned in the
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section.
NRC's PDR: You may examine and purchase copies of public
documents at the NRC's PDR, Room O1-F21, One White Flint North, 11555
Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Torre Taylor, telephone: 301-415-7900,
email: [email protected]; or Haile Lindsay, telephone: 301-415-0616,
email: [email protected]; both of the Office of Nuclear Material
Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington
DC 20555-0001.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. The Petition
Section 2.802 of title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10
CFR), ``Petition for rulemaking,'' provides an
[[Page 41259]]
opportunity for any interested person to petition the Commission to
issue, amend, or rescind any regulation. The NRC received a PRM, dated
November 24, 2008, filed by Ms. Sandra Gavutis, Executive Director of
C-10 Research and Education Foundation, Inc. (ADAMS Accession No.
ML083470148). The petitioner requested that the NRC amend its
regulations concerning dry cask safety, security, transferability, and
longevity. The petitioner made 12 specific requests in the petition.
The petition was noticed in the Federal Register for public comment on
March 3, 2009 (74 FR 9178). The NRC received over 9,000 comment
letters, including comments from industry, the American Society of
Mechanical Engineers (ASME), non-governmental organizations, and
members of the public. The overwhelming majority of the comment letters
received were identical (form) emails. The Nuclear Energy Institute and
the Strategic Team and Resource Sharing organization opposed the
petition. All form email comments, ASME, and the Berkeley Fellowship of
Unitarian Universalists Social Justice Committee supported the
petition. The NRC staff discussed its review of the petition and the
comments received in SECY-12-0079, ``Partial Closure of Petition for
Rulemaking (PRM-72-6) C-10 Research and Education Foundation, Inc.,''
dated June 1, 2012 (ADAMS Package Accession No. ML12068A090).
The comments were summarized in a Federal Register notice, dated
October 16, 2012 (77 FR 63254). The NRC denied 9 of the petitioner's 12
requests (Requests 1, 2, 3, 5-8, 10, and 12), accepted one request
(Request 11) for consideration as part of the ongoing independent spent
fuel storage installation (ISFSI) security rulemaking effort (RIN 3150-
A178; Docket ID NRC-2009-0558), and reserved 2 requests for future
rulemaking determination (Requests 4 and 9) in that Federal Register
notice. The two reserved requests, as stated in the petition, are:
(1) Request 4: ``To require that dry casks are qualified for
transport at the time of onsite storage approval certification.
Transport capacity for shipment offsite must be required in the event
of a future environmental emergency or for matters of security to an
alternative storage location or repository and must be part of the
approval criteria. NRC Chapter 1 of the Standard Review Plan (NUREG-
1567) should clearly define Part 72.122(i); 72.236(h); and in
72.236(m).''
(2) Request 9: ``To require a safe and secure hot cell transfer
station coupled with an auxiliary pool to be built as part of an
upgraded ISFSI design certification and licensing process. The utility
must have dry cask transfer capability for maintenance as well as
emergency situations after decommissioning for as long as the spent
fuel remains onsite. The NRC has to date not approved a dry cask
transfer system.''
II. Reasons for Denial
The NRC is denying the petitioner's Requests 4 and 9, because the
proposed changes to the NRC requirements are unnecessary to ensure safe
and secure storage and transportation of spent fuel. The NRC had
reserved a decision on these two requests, because the NRC staff was
conducting an ongoing analysis of: (1) Spent fuel storage and
transportation compatibility; (2) regulatory changes that might be
necessary to continue safe storage of fuel in casks beyond the initial
storage period over multiple renewal periods; (3) the behavior of high
burnup fuel during extended storage periods; and (4) regulation of
stand-alone ISFSIs. This analysis was being done as part of the NRC
staff's work related to COMSECY-10-0007, ``Project Plan for the
Regulatory Program Review to Support Extended Storage and
Transportation of Spent Nuclear Fuel'' (ADAMS Accession No.
ML101390413). Part of this analysis also involved evaluating the
licensing programs for spent fuel storage for any improvements. As a
consequence of this work, as well as considering information and
insight from other sources, the NRC can now resolve the outstanding
requests from the petitioner.
Petitioner Request 4
The NRC is denying Request 4 for the following reasons. In
reviewing Request 4, the NRC staff interpreted the petition to request
that the NRC require that a transportation package certificate of
compliance be approved at the same time as the onsite storage approval
certification. The NRC's decision to deny Request 4 is based on this
understanding of the request. In addition to the ongoing work related
to COMSECY-10-0007 discussed above, the following efforts discussed in
the project plan in COMSECY-10-0007 also relate specifically to Request
4:
The staff will evaluate the compatibility of 10 CFR part 71,
`Packaging and Transportation of Radioactive Material,' and 10 CFR
part 72, `Licensing Requirements for the Independent Storage of
Spent Nuclear Fuel, High-Level Radioactive Waste, and Reactor-
Related Greater than Class C Waste,' requirements to identify (1)
areas of overlap where the requirements are substantially similar,
(2) areas where the performance requirements are significantly
different, (3) specific regulations that must be met for
transportation for which there is no similar storage regulation, and
(4) recommendations for improving the compatibility and efficiency
of the 10 CFR parts 71 and 72 review processes. The staff will also
evaluate the different types of currently authorized dry cask
storage systems to identify any potential unique compatibility
issues. This assessment will also consider potential integration of
the storage and transportation safety reviews conducted under 10 CFR
parts 71 and 72.
As indicated above, there were four areas in which the staff was
evaluating the compatibility of the requirements within 10 CFR part 71
and 10 CFR part 72 related to storage and transportation of spent
nuclear fuel. The NRC reserved its decision on Request 4 until the NRC
staff had made sufficient progress on the four areas identified above.
These efforts have provided the NRC with sufficient information to now
make a decision on Request 4.
The NRC staff's consideration of the compatibility of 10 CFR part
71 and 10 CFR part 72, as part of the NRC staff's efforts related to
COMSECY-10-0007, has informed recent safety evaluation reviews
performed by the NRC staff of storage design certifications, such as
new applications and renewals. Since the petition was received in 2008,
the NRC staff has completed the review of 12 storage design
applications; information on these reviews can be found at http://www.nrc.gov/waste/spent-fuel-storage/designs.html. The NRC staff's work
on these storage and transportation compatibility considerations may be
further documented in future revisions to the Standard Review Plans for
Storage--NUREG-1536, Rev. 1, ``Standard Review Plan for Dry Cask
Storage Systems'' (ADAMS Accession No. ML101040620); and NUREG-1567,
``Standard Review Plan for Spent Fuel Dry Storage Facilities'' (ADAMS
Accession No. ML003686776).
The petitioner noted the potential for an environmental emergency
or matter of security that would require transport of the spent fuel
from storage to an alternate location as a basis for why transportation
certification approval should be required at the time of storage
certification. By design, dry storage systems are robust, passive
systems and, as discussed above, transport is unlikely to be the best
course of action in an emergency. These systems have been evaluated for
several design basis events, including malicious acts. As the first
step in addressing an environmental emergency or matter of security,
the staff would not recommend
[[Page 41260]]
removal of the spent fuel from storage. The storage requirements in 10
CFR part 72, in combination with the packaging and transportation
requirements in 10 CFR part 71, are adequate to ensure safety. In the
case of an environmental emergency, the best course of action would
likely be to secure the area, contain the spent fuel, assess the
situation, and to keep the spent fuel in storage until a more thorough
evaluation of the situation has been completed. There are interim
measures that can be taken to contain the spent fuel and to provide
safety, such as restricting access to the area, putting up temporary
physical barriers, and using temporary shielding. If it is determined
that the spent fuel must be moved, the NRC has several regulatory
options to ensure the safe transportation of the spent fuel, including
issuing license amendments, issuing immediately effective orders, or
evaluating requests for exemptions to the spent fuel transportation
regulations in 10 CFR part 71. Under 10 CFR 71.12, ``Specific
exemptions,'' the Commission may grant an exemption from the
transportation requirements if it determines the exemption is
authorized by law and will not endanger life or property or the common
defense and security. This allows flexibility for the design and
construction of transportation packaging if the controls proposed in
the shipping procedures are demonstrated to be adequate to provide an
equivalent level of safety of the shipment and its content.
Dry storage system designs have become more standardized and many
designs use a welded canister to provide one of the confinement
barriers of the spent nuclear fuel. Because the welded canister
provides confinement of the spent nuclear fuel, as required under 10
CFR 72.122(h), removal of the fuel during storage should be unnecessary
so long as the licensee is complying with the regulations to ensure
safety measures are met. Additionally, for packaging and transporting
welded canisters containing spent fuel, under 10 CFR part 71, most
spent fuel cask vendors have compatible transportation packaging
designs either approved or under development. For those limited, older
systems that may not have been designed with transportation packaging
as a consideration, an exemption can be issued in accordance with 10
CFR 71.12 if the Commission determines that doing so will not endanger
life or property or the common defense and security. This allows
flexibility for the design and construction of transportation
packaging, if the controls proposed in the shipping procedures are
demonstrated to be adequate to provide an equivalent level of safety of
the shipment and its content.
In association with efforts related to COMSECY-10-0007, the NRC
staff conducted a comparison of the requirements for storage systems in
10 CFR part 72 and those for transportation packaging in 10 CFR part 71
to identify any areas of incompatibility. This work began before
receipt of the petition. The NRC staff found from this comparison that
there are differences between these requirements, such as differences
in thermal design criteria, confinement/containment design criteria,
criticality design criteria and specific accident conditions design
criteria. However, these differences do not preclude the safe packaging
and transportation of spent fuel in casks designed for storage. As an
example, there is a difference between the temperature criteria for
transportation accident conditions and those for storage accident
conditions. If it became necessary to remove the spent fuel casks from
storage and transport them, in most cases the temperature criteria
differences would not preclude the safe transport. Alternatively, an
exemption could be issued in accordance with 10 CFR 71.12 if the
transportation criteria were not met but the Commission determined that
the transportation would not endanger life or property or the common
defense and security.
As required by 10 CFR part 72, cask storage systems must be
designed to provide for safe and secure storage taking into
consideration natural and human-induced events. For a specific license,
the design basis events that must be evaluated are provided in: (1) 10
CFR 72.92, ``Design basis external natural events,'' and (2) 10 CFR
72.94, ``Design basis external man-induced events.'' Nuclear power
reactor licensees are authorized to store spent fuel under the general
license in 10 CFR 72.210, ``General license issued.'' A general
licensee must choose a storage cask that has an NRC-issued certificate
of compliance. The list of approved storage casks is provided in 10 CFR
72.214, ``List of approved spent fuel storage casks.'' For these
storage casks, the vendor has already evaluated the cask design against
normal, off-normal, and accident conditions as required by 10 CFR
72.236, ``Specific requirements for spent fuel storage cask approval
and fabrication.'' The general licensees must meet the specific
requirements found in 10 CFR 72.212, ``Conditions of general license
issued under 10 CFR 72.210.'' The regulations in 10 CFR 72.212(b)(6)
require the general licensee to review the safety analysis report
referenced in the certificate or amended certificate and the related
NRC safety evaluation report prior to use of the general license. The
licensee must determine whether the reactor site parameters, including
analyses of earthquake intensity and tornado missiles, are included
within the cask design bases. In addition, the licensee must establish
that the stored spent fuel will meet the design requirements for
natural and human-induced events: (1) 10 CFR 72.212(b)(5)(ii) for
static and dynamic loads and (2) 10 CFR 72.212(b)(9) which requires the
general licensee to protect the spent fuel against the design basis
threat of radiological sabotage in accordance with the requirements set
forth in the licensee's physical security plan under 10 CFR 73.55,
``Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities in
nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage.'' These
requirements provide assurance that spent fuel storage casks are
sufficiently robust to withstand environmental and security events
included within the design bases.
The safety of spent fuel storage has been demonstrated by operating
experience. Subsequent to the NRC's earlier review of this petition, an
earthquake occurred in the vicinity of the North Anna Nuclear Power
Plant in Virginia. This earthquake was beyond the design basis event
for which the spent fuel storage designs were evaluated. After the
earthquake, North Anna Nuclear Power Plant personnel and
representatives from the spent fuel storage system manufacturer
conducted detailed inspections and monitoring. The NRC staff also
conducted several inspections through an Augmented Inspection Team
(ADAMS Accession No. ML113040031) at North Anna Nuclear Power Plant to
evaluate and assess the plant conditions as well as the integrity and
safety of onsite spent fuel storage systems. These inspections
confirmed that there was no damage that had any impact on safety-
related features. Some casks experienced minor shifting on the pad that
did not impact safety. The spent fuel continued to be surrounded by
several tons of steel and concrete and the storage system seals were
intact. Radiation surveys indicated no changes to cask surface dose
rates, and there were no releases due to the shifting of the systems.
As part of the outcome of the NRC's inspections, the licensee sought,
and the NRC approved, an amendment to allow the casks that had shifted
to remain in place rather than moving them back to the original
location. Documentation related to these inspections is publicly
available in
[[Page 41261]]
ADAMS and includes (1) information submitted as part of the amendment
request submitted by the licensee (ADAMS Accession No. ML14160A707),
(2) the Final Environmental Assessment (ADAMS Accession No.
ML15022A575), and (3) the documentation related to Amendment 4 (ADAMS
Package Accession No. ML15050A395) of the ISFSI license. The NRC's
assessment of the earthquake at the North Anna Power Plant confirmed
that the spent fuel storage casks could safely remain in place.
The petitioner also stated that transport capacity for shipment
offsite must be required for matters of security. As stated earlier in
this document, moving the spent fuel offsite after an environmental
emergency or security incident would likely not be the best course of
action. Moving the spent fuel from storage onto a public highway or
rail system represents a higher risk than protecting the spent fuel
storage casks in place, because it increases the potential for
unnecessary dose to workers or the public. Storage licensees must have
security provisions in place that include physical barriers;
surveillance; intrusion detection and response; and, if needed,
assistance from local law enforcement, in accordance with 10 CFR part
73, ``Physical Protection of Plants and Materials.'' These measures
provide an adequate level of safety and security.
Finally, the petitioner also stated that ``NRC Chapter 1 of the
Standard Review Plan (NUREG-1567) should clearly define Part 72.122(i);
72.236(h); and in 72.236(m).'' The petitioner did not provide any
additional information regarding this statement. The NUREG-1567
provides guidance to the NRC staff for reviewing applications for
specific license approval for commercial ISFSIs. Granting the
petitioner's request would not result in a rulemaking. The NRC staff
will consider making the clarification when it works on the next
revision of NUREG-1567.
Petitioner Request 9
The NRC is denying Request 9 for the following reasons. After
further evaluation of Request 9, and considering the information
resulting from the NRC staff's work on COMSECY-10-0007, the NRC staff
concludes that a hot cell transfer station coupled with an auxiliary
pool is not needed because the requirements currently in place in 10
CFR part 72 are adequate to ensure safety. In the Federal Register
notice published in October 2012 that addressed the other requests in
the petition, the NRC indicated that the need for a hot cell transfer
station coupled with an auxiliary pool was still being evaluated as
part of the NRC staff's review of the regulatory changes that might be
necessary to safely store fuel for multiple renewal periods. The NRC
staff stated that, ``as discussed in Section 3.1 of Enclosure 1 of
COMSECY-10-0007, research is needed to develop the safety basis for the
behavior of high burnup fuel during extended storage periods. Whether
the fuel retains sufficient structural integrity for extended storage
and eventual transportation may affect whether the NRC would require
dry transfer capability at decommissioned reactors storing high burnup
fuel.''
The NRC periodically conducts research activities related to the
storage of spent nuclear fuel to confirm the safety of operations and
enhance the regulatory framework to address any changes in technology,
science, and policies. The NRC conducts analyses of beyond design basis
conditions to confirm that regulatory requirements continue to provide
reasonable assurance for safe storage and transportation of spent
nuclear fuel. Additionally, the NRC evaluates the performance of spent
nuclear fuel under normal and accident conditions. Recent analyses
included evaluation of the effects of high burnup fuel. Two recent
studies related to these research activities were completed and
published in 2015: (1) NUREG/CR-7198, ``Mechanical Fatigue Testing of
High-Burnup Fuel for Transportation Applications,'' published in May
2015 (ADAMS Accession No. ML15139A389), and (2) NUREG/CR-7203, ``A
Quantitative Impact Assessment of Hypothetical Spent Fuel
Reconfiguration in Spent Fuel Storage Casks and Transportation
Packages,'' published in September 2015 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML15266A413).
The NUREG/CR-7198 documents an evaluation of the ability for high
burnup fuel containing mostly circumferential hydrides to maintain its
integrity under normal conditions of transport. Using an innovative
testing system that imposes pure bending loads on the spent fuel rod,
high burnup spent fuel rods underwent bending tests to simulate
conditions relevant to both storage and transportation. The test
results demonstrated that despite complexities and non-uniformities in
the fuel cladding system, the high burnup fuel behaved in a manner that
would be expected of more uniform materials.
The NUREG/CR-7203 documents a quantitative assessment of the impact
on the safety of spent nuclear fuel storage casks and transportation
packages of bounding and very unlikely beyond design basis hypothetical
changes of fuel geometry. The study examined the potential changes to
criticality, shielding, confinement/containment, and thermal
characteristics of the systems due to changes in fuel geometry. The
purpose of this study was to determine whether high burnup fuel is safe
for storage and transport under normal, off-normal, and hypothetical
accident conditions. The detailed conclusions from this study are quite
lengthy; however, in summary, the study concluded that:
Overall, the safety impacts of fuel reconfiguration are system
design, content type, and loading dependent. The areas and magnitude
of the impact vary from cask/package design to cask/package design.
It should also be noted that some of the scenarios are extreme and
physically unlikely to occur; they represent bounding values. The
spent fuel storage systems and transportation packages approved by
the NRC to date provide reasonable assurance that they are safe
under normal, off-normal, and hypothetical accident conditions as
prescribed in 10 CFR part 71 and 72 regulations.
The NRC staff recognized at the time of the initial review of the
petition that ongoing research into the material properties of high
burnup fuel could potentially result in a determination that high
burnup fuel would require repackaging after a certain storage period.
Therefore, this issue warranted further evaluation to determine if a
regulatory requirement for dry transfer capability was needed before a
final decision could be made on the petitioner's request. The NRC staff
also recognized a potential issue with respect to degradation from
aging of high burnup fuel that could cause damage to spent fuel
cladding in storage. Based on evaluations of these potential issues in
NUREG/CR-7198 and NUREG/CR-7203 the NRC has further evidence of
reasonable assurance of adequate safety related to the mechanical
behavior and potential degradation of high burnup fuel during extended
storage and transportation for the systems approved to date.
The NRC continuously monitors safety and security issues related to
the storage of spent nuclear fuel, including results from safety
inspections and additional studies, when applicable. If the NRC became
aware of any safety or security issues that could impact public health
and safety, or security, the NRC would take action. This could include
issuing Orders, rulemaking, or revising guidance to clarify
requirements.
Additionally, when an ISFSI license is being evaluated for renewal,
the licensee must establish an Aging Management Program (AMP) that
[[Page 41262]]
manages aging effects. The intent of the AMP is to detect, monitor, and
mitigate aging effects that could impact the safe storage of spent
fuel. The AMP is required under the provisions of Section 72.42,
``Duration of license; renewal,'' paragraph (a)(2) and Section 72.240,
``Conditions for spent fuel storage cask renewal,'' paragraph (c)(3),
for storage cask renewals. An AMP includes subcomponents such as: (1)
Dry shielded canister external surfaces, (2) concrete cask, (3)
transfer cask, (4) transfer cask lifting yoke, (5) cask support
platform, and (6) high burnup fuel. Since high burnup fuel is included
as an AMP for license renewal, this provides defense-in-depth in
ensuring the integrity of the fuel cladding during periods of extended
operation.
The NRC staff uses the guidance in NUREG-1927, ``Standard Review
Plan for Renewal of Spent Fuel Dry Cask Storage System Licenses and
Certificates of Compliance,'' published in March 2011 (ADAMS Accession
No. ML111020115) in reviewing renewal applications for spent fuel dry
cask storage systems and certificates of compliance.
The NUREG-1927 is currently being revised to update guidance and to
include information gained from the work previously discussed in this
document. The revision to NUREG-1927 was noticed for public comment in
the Federal Register on July 7, 2015 (80 FR 38780). The AMPs are
consistent with 10 program elements that are described in NUREG-1927,
including items such as the scope; preventive actions; parameters
monitored or inspected; and detection of aging effects before there is
a loss of any structure and component function, etc. The AMPs will help
ensure timely detection, mitigation, and monitoring of any degradation
mechanisms.
An example of NRC staff's review of license renewal applications
that include an AMP for high burnup fuel is the recently completed
review of the license renewal application for the Calvert Cliffs ISFSI
in October 2014 (ADAMS Package Accession No. ML14274A022). From this
review, the NRC staff determined that the Calvert Cliffs ISFSI had met
the requirements of 10 CFR 72.42(a), which addresses the duration of a
license and renewal of such license. As previously discussed in this
document, 10 CFR 72.42(a)(2) has a specific requirement for an AMP. The
NRC staff concluded in the safety evaluation for this renewal (ADAMS
Accession No. ML14274A038) that the dry cask storage systems are still
robust and could be renewed.
Additionally, the NRC has a defense-in-depth approach to safety
that includes (1) requirements to design and operate spent fuel storage
systems that minimize the possibility of degradation; (2) requirements
to establish competent organizations staffed with experienced, trained,
and qualified personnel; and (3) NRC inspections to confirm safety and
compliance with requirements. Based on the NRC's current requirements,
licensee maintenance and review programs, and NRC inspections, the NRC
staff is confident that issues will be identified early to allow
corrective actions to be taken in a timely fashion.
In summary, the NRC has made significant progress on relevant
regulatory efforts and evaluations discussed earlier in this document
and information gained from that work contributed to current revisions
of regulatory guidance, standard review plans, and the NRC staff's
reviews of renewal applications. Based on the work performed to date,
the results do not indicate a need to revise the regulations. Based on
the NRC's review of the petition, the specific changes requested by the
petitioner are not necessary to ensure safety and security. The storage
and transportation regulations are robust, adequate, and sufficiently
compatible to ensure safe and secure storage and transportation of
spent nuclear fuel. The NRC staff continues to review and evaluate the
storage of spent nuclear fuel and the safety of storage casks and
ISFSIs. If a potential health, safety, or security issue is identified,
the NRC will take action to address the concern.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons cited in this document, the NRC is denying the
petitioner's two requests from PRM-72-6 that were deferred pending
additional research and evaluation on the storage of spent fuel
storage. After completing its research, the NRC has concluded that the
current regulatory requirements are adequate to protect public health
and safety.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 20th day of June, 2016.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Annette L. Vietti-Cook,
Secretary of the Commission.
[FR Doc. 2016-14998 Filed 6-23-16; 8:45 am]
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