[Federal Register Volume 81, Number 95 (Tuesday, May 17, 2016)]
[Notices]
[Pages 30604-30605]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2016-11580]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Transit Administration

[Safety Advisory 16-2]


Contact Rail (Third Rail) System Hazards

AGENCY: Federal Transit Administration (FTA), Department of 
Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Notice of Safety Advisory.

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SUMMARY: The Federal Transit Administration (FTA) issued Safety 
Advisory 16-2 regarding contact rail system hazards on rail fixed 
guideway public transportation systems (RFGPTSs). A letter to the 
Managers of State Safety Oversight (SSO) programs with RFGPTSs that use 
a contact rail system, was also issued requesting data and information 
on contact rail system hazards occurring during calendar year 2015. 
Safety Advisory 16-2 and the accompanying letter are available in their 
entirety on the FTA public Web site at http://www.fta.dot.gov/tso.html.

DATES: FTA is asking the managers of the SSO programs to submit the 
requested data and information 90 days from issuance of the advisory.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For program matters, Sam Shelton, 
Office of System Safety, telephone (202) 366-0815 or 
[email protected]. For legal matters, Scott Biehl, Senior Counsel, 
telephone (202) 366-0826 or [email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Nationwide, 13 RFGPTS operate and maintain 
contact rail traction power electrification (TPE) systems to power 
trains that move millions of daily passengers in some of the nation's 
largest cities. Recently, the FTA has investigated several safety 
events related to failures of contact rail TPE systems, including:
     Smoke events caused by arcing insulators and traction 
power cable fires;
     An explosion caused by a flashover on porcelain 
insulators;
     A high-intensity fire caused by an electrical short 
circuit that resulted in the total loss of a traction power substation 
and major service disruptions;
     Damage to electrical propulsion equipment on dozens of 
railcars caused by spiking voltage that significantly impacted 
passenger service; and
     Poor track conditions exacerbated by electrolysis and 
corrosion from stray current, which degraded anchor bolts and fasteners 
to the point of failure in a tunnel.
    The FTA finds sufficient evidence that each SSOA with an RFGPTS 
operating and maintaining a contact rail TPE system should investigate 
potential hazards associated with these systems through its hazard 
management program specified at 49 CFR 659.31. Further, in accordance 
with its authority at 49 CFR 659.39(d) to periodically request program 
information from the SSOAs,\1\ the FTA asks these SSOAs to collect the 
information requested below.
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    \1\ Please note, on March 16, 2016, FTA issued a final rule for 
State Safety Oversight that will eventually replace the longstanding 
regulations at 49 CFR part 659. See, 81 FR 14230-62. SSOAs and 
RFGPTSs must continue to comply with 49 CFR part 659, however, until 
they come into compliance with the new regulations, which have been 
codified at 49 CFR part 674.
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    (1) A brief description of the RFGPTS contact rail TPE system and 
components.
    (2) A brief description regarding any major changes or upgrades to 
the contact rail TPE system made over the last 10 years and whether the 
traction power cables were also upgraded.
    (3) A brief description of the RFGPTS preventive maintenance 
program in place to determine the insulation integrity of traction 
power feeder cables (i.e., meggering, hipot testing, metering or other 
testing program). If such a program does not exist, or has been 
modified or eliminated, please explain in the response.
    (4) The approximate percentage of traction power feeder cables used 
by the RFGPTS that are low smoke and zero halogen emission cables. 
Please specify the type and manufacturer.
    (5) A brief description of the construction and installation 
processes used to manage potential impacts of vibration, friction, 
rubbing, etc. on traction power cables, and whether protective matting 
is used for cables lying along the ballast and tunnel invert.
    (6) A listing of any corrective action plans (CAPs) required and 
approved by the SSOA related to the traction power electrification 
system since calendar year 2012 and their status, to include both open 
and closed CAPs.
    (7) A copy of the RFGPTS inspection, testing, and maintenance 
program manual for its contact rail TPE system.
    (8) The RFGPTS definition of ``arcing insulator.''

[[Page 30605]]

    (9) The following safety event information for calendar year 2015:
    a. The total number of times a fire department responded to smoke 
conditions at the RFGPTS related to the contact rail TPE system;
    b. The total number of smoke/fire events related to the contact 
rail TPE system that resulted in evacuations for fire/life safety 
reasons at the RFGPTS; and
    c. The total number of fatalities and injuries and the total amount 
of property damage at the RFGPTS resulting from smoke/fire events 
related to the contact rail TPE system.
    (10) A description of any hazards, issues, or concerns related to 
the contact rail TPE system reported to, identified and/or investigated 
by the SSOA during calendar year 2015.
    The cooperation of the rail transit industry would be very helpful 
in developing a better understanding of contact rail system hazards, 
and in due course, a strategy for mitigating the safety risks created 
by these hazards.

    Issued in Washington, DC, this 12th day of May, 2016.
Carolyn Flowers,
Acting Administrator.
[FR Doc. 2016-11580 Filed 5-16-16; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE P