[Federal Register Volume 81, Number 93 (Friday, May 13, 2016)]
[Notices]
[Pages 29943-29950]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2016-11304]



[[Page 29943]]

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

[Docket No. PHMSA-2015-0205]


Pipeline Safety: Information Collection Activities

AGENCY: Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), 
DOT.

ACTION: Notice and request for comments.

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SUMMARY: In accordance with the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, PHMSA 
invites comments on proposed revisions to the following incident and 
accident report forms and associated instructions currently under OMB 
Control No. 2137-0522:
     PHMSA F 7100.1 Incident Report--Gas Distribution System.
     PHMSA F 7100.2 Incident Report--Natural and Other Gas 
Transmission and Gathering Pipeline Systems.
     PHMSA F 7100.3 Incident Report--Liquefied Natural Gas 
(LNG) Facilities.
    PHMSA also intends to request a new Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB) Control Number to cover the collection of these forms.
    PHMSA also proposes revisions be made to the following form 
currently under OMB Control No. 2137-0047; Accident Report--Hazardous 
Liquid Pipeline Systems.

DATES: Interested persons are invited to submit comments on or before 
July 12, 2016.

ADDRESSES: Comments may be submitted in the following ways:
    E-Gov Web site: http://www.regulations.gov. This site allows the 
public to enter comments on any Federal Register notice issued by any 
agency.
    Fax: 1-202-493-2251.
    Mail: Docket Management Facility; U.S. Department of Transportation 
(DOT), 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., West Building, Room W12-140, 
Washington, DC 20590-0001.
    Hand Delivery: Room W12-140 on the ground level of DOT, West 
Building, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC, between 9:00 a.m. 
and 5:00 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.
    Instructions: Identify the docket number, PHMSA-2015-0205 at the 
beginning of your comments. Note that all comments received will be 
posted without change to http://www.regulations.gov, including any 
personal information provided. You should know that anyone is able to 
search the electronic form of all comments received into any of our 
dockets by the name of the individual submitting the comment (or 
signing the comment, if submitted on behalf of an association, 
business, labor union, etc.). Therefore, you may want to review DOT's 
complete Privacy Act Statement in the Federal Register published on 
April 11, 2000, (65 FR 19477) or visit http://www.regulations.gov 
before submitting any such comments.
    Docket: For access to the docket or to read background documents or 
comments, go to http://www.regulations.gov at any time or to Room W12-
140 on the ground level of DOT, West Building, 1200 New Jersey Avenue 
SE., Washington, DC, between 9:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m., Monday through 
Friday, except Federal holidays. If you wish to receive confirmation of 
receipt of your written comments, please include a self-addressed, 
stamped postcard with the following statement: ``Comments on: PHMSA-
2015-0205.'' The Docket Clerk will date stamp the postcard prior to 
returning it to you via the U.S. mail. Please note that due to delays 
in the delivery of U.S. mail to Federal offices in Washington, DC, we 
recommend that persons consider an alternative method (internet, fax, 
or professional delivery service) of submitting comments to the docket 
and ensuring their timely receipt at DOT.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Angela Dow by telephone at 202-366-
1246, by email at [email protected], by fax at 202-366-4566, or by 
mail at DOT, PHMSA, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., PHP-30, Washington, DC 
20590-0001.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Background

    Section 1320.8(d), Title 5, Code of Federal Regulations, requires 
PHMSA to provide interested members of the public and affected entities 
an opportunity to comment on information collection and recordkeeping 
requests. This notice identifies proposed changes to information 
collections that PHMSA will submit to OMB for approval. In order to 
streamline and improve the data collection processes, PHMSA is revising 
the incident report forms for both hazardous liquid and natural gas 
operators.
    OMB Control Number 2137-0047, which covers the collection of 
hazardous liquid incident data, expires on December 31, 2016. OMB 
Control Number 2137-0522, which currently covers the collection of both 
annual report and incident data for natural gas operators, expires on 
October 31, 2017. To simplify the renewal process of these data 
collections in the future, PHMSA proposes collecting incident and 
annual reports under separate OMB control numbers. To achieve this, 
PHMSA plans to request a new OMB control number for the three gas 
incident forms currently under OMB Control No. 2137-0522. The remaining 
reports under this information collection, the Gas Transmission, LNG, 
and Mechanical Fitting Failure annual reports will remain under their 
current OMB control number.

A. PHMSA F 7100.1 Incident Report--Gas Distribution System

    PHMSA proposes to reorganize the existing questions and add more 
detailed questions about incident response, incident consequences, 
operating conditions, cause, and contributing factors.
1. Time Zone and Daylight Savings
    PHMSA proposes adding the time zone and daylight savings status at 
the location and time of the incident. This data would help PHMSA 
correlate our incident investigation findings with the form.
2. Remove ``Incident Resulted From'' Question
    PHMSA proposes removing the question which prompts operators to 
characterize an incident as an unintentional release, intentional 
release, or no release. The data we collect on the form is sufficient 
to answer this question. This change would reduce redundancies on the 
form.
3. Volume Released
    PHMSA proposes dividing reports of volume released into categories 
of ``unintentional'' and ``intentional''. During incident response, 
operators often intentionally release gas from the pipeline system to 
reduce the pressure remaining within the pipeline. This change would 
allow stakeholders to understand the volume released both before and 
after the operator begins responding to the incident.
4. Part A Reorganization and Detailed Questions About Incident Response
    PHMSA proposes reorganizing the existing questions to reflect the 
sequence of operator actions and events that take place during an 
incident response. For example, the manner in which an operator first 
learns of a pipeline failure is currently collected in Part E. PHMSA 
proposes to move this item to Part A. PHMSA also proposes to add new 
data fields to help build a

[[Page 29944]]

complete timeline of events. This includes adding fields to collect 
data on operators' interactions with emergency responders and details 
about ignition. This data would help stakeholders develop a more 
thorough understanding of the incident.
5. Multiple National Response Center Reports
    The vast majority of pipeline incidents have only one National 
Response Center (NRC) report. However, during a response to protracted 
incidents, pipeline operators may submit multiple reports to the NRC. 
In these rare instances, PHMSA proposes to collect each NRC report 
number. This change would help PHMSA ensure that our incident report 
data correlates with our incident investigation findings.
6. Flow Control Instead of Shutdown
    PHMSA proposes removing questions about a pipeline shutdown and 
adding a question about methods of flow control. Gas distribution 
systems are typically the only source of gas to customers. Rather than 
shutting down gas distribution systems, pipeline operators typically 
control the flow of gas in the smallest possible portion of the system. 
This change would allow stakeholders to understand the actions taken by 
the operator to control the flow of gas during incident response.
7. Area of Incident Selections
    PHMSA proposes adding ``exposed due to loss of cover'' as an option 
to describe the area of an incident when ``underground'' is selected. 
For pipelines installed underground and eventually exposed, the current 
form is not clear about whether ``underground'' or ``above ground'' 
should be selected. Adding ``exposed due to loss of cover'' as an 
underground option will clarify how to report the incident. This change 
would improve the consistency of reports.
8. Other Underground Facilities
    PHMSA proposes adding a question to determine whether other 
underground facilities are found within twelve inches of the failure 
location. We know from experience that other underground facilities can 
damage pipeline systems. The most common cause of this damage is 
electrical arcing from electric facilities to gas systems. Generally, 
twelve inches of underground separation is considered adequate to 
prevent damage from non-pipeline facilities. This change would allow 
stakeholders to verify if twelve inches of separation is adequate.
9. Water Crossing Details
    PHMSA proposes to collect additional data regarding water 
crossings. This data would help stakeholders understand the failure 
location along the crossing.
10. Part of System and Age of Failed Item
    PHMSA proposes to modify the selections used to describe the part 
of the system responsible for a pipeline failure. These modifications 
would reduce the number of times ``other'' is selected and allow a more 
meaningful analysis of the data.
    PHMSA also proposes collecting both the date of manufacture and the 
date of installation for the failed item. This would allow stakeholders 
to understand both the age of the failed item and how long it had been 
in service.
11. Service Line Excess Flow and Shut-Off Valves
    PHMSA proposes adding questions about Excess Flow Valves (EFV) and 
shut-off valves when the failure occurs on the service line. Our 
regulations require EFVs in certain circumstances and shut-off valves 
on all service lines. The collection of this data would help PHMSA 
address the requirements in Section 22 of the Pipeline Safety, 
Regulatory Certainty, and Job Creation Act of 2011 (Pub. L. 112-90) 
which requires EFVs on service lines serving a single-family residence. 
It would also help to implement the National Transportation Safety 
Board's (NTSB) recommendation P-01-2 which urges the installation of 
EFVs on branch services, multi-family facility services, and small 
commercial facility services. The proposed change would help 
stakeholders determine if EFV requirements are adequate and effective.
12. Cost of Gas
    PHMSA proposes to collect the cost of gas per million standard 
cubic feet (mcf) in order to calculate the cost of gas released. 
Currently, the form collects the volume of gas released and the cost of 
the gas released. The cost per mcf in our current incident data ranges 
from cents to hundreds of dollars. By providing the gas cost per mcf, 
operators will achieve greater accuracy when converting the per mcf gas 
cost to released gas costs.
13. Details About Consequences
    Our departmental guidelines for determining the benefit of proposed 
regulations (http://www.transportation.gov/sites/dot.dev/files/docs/VSL%20Guidance%202013.pdf) includes a table of relative values based on 
injury severity. Our forms currently collect the number of injured 
persons requiring in-patient, overnight hospitalization. We propose 
adding two less severe categories to the forms. This data would enable 
a more thorough determination of the benefits of proposed regulations.
    We are proposing to collect the volume of product consumed by fire. 
We already collect data about the volume of product released and 
whether ignition occurred. However, we cannot identify the volume of 
product burned. This data would allow us to more accurately determine 
the social cost of carbon and benefit of proposed regulations.
    We are proposing to collect the number of buildings affected by the 
incident. On the current forms, the property damage values do not 
include any details about the type of property damaged. This data would 
provide more details about the consequences of the incident and enable 
a more thorough determination of the benefit of proposed regulations.
    We propose collecting data about the length of building 
evacuations. On the current form, we collect the number of persons 
evacuated from buildings. To implement DOT guidelines (http://www.transportation.gov/office-policy/transportation-policy/guidance-value-time) on the value of time, we need to know the length of the 
evacuation. This data would enable a more thorough determination of the 
benefit of proposed regulations.
14. Method and Date of Establishing Maximum Pressure
    We propose adding the method used by the operator to establish the 
maximum pressure for the pipeline system. We also propose adding the 
date the maximum pressure was established. This data would help 
stakeholders determine the maximum pressure methods posing a greater 
risk and if the risk changes over time.
15. Odorization
    We propose adding questions about the odorization of the gas. This 
change would help PHMSA correlate our incident investigation findings 
with the form.
16. External Corrosion and Stray Current
    We propose collecting additional details when stray current is the 
cause of external corrosion. We have also clarified the conditions 
under which external corrosion cathodic protection is expected. This 
data would help

[[Page 29945]]

stakeholders better understand the cause of external corrosion.
17. Natural Force Damage Additional Sub-Causes
    We propose adding snow/ice and tree root damage as sub-causes in 
the natural force damage cause category. This addition would reduce the 
number of incidents reported with a cause of ``other.''
18. Excavation Details for All Excavation Damage
    In the current form, when a third party causes the excavation 
damage, we collect details about the excavation work. We propose 
collecting details about the excavation work when the cause of the 
damage is first, second, or third party. When pipeline operator 
employees are excavating and damage their own pipeline, the damage is 
considered first party. When an excavator is working under contract for 
the pipeline operator and damages the operator's pipeline, they are 
considered a second party. First and second party excavation details 
would allow stakeholders to understand the type of excavation work 
being performed by any party causing the excavation damage.
19. State Damage Prevention Law Exemptions
    We propose adding data about exemptions from state damage 
prevention laws when the cause of the incident is excavation damage. 
This data would help stakeholders determine states in which damage 
prevention law exemptions may be leading to more frequent excavation 
damage of pipelines.
20. Other Outside Force Damage Additional Sub-Cause
    We propose adding ``erosion of support due to other utilities'' as 
a sub-cause in the other outside force damage cause category. This 
addition would reduce the number of incidents reported with a cause of 
``other.''
21. Vehicular Damage Additional Details
    We propose collecting details about driver performance and 
protection from damage when the cause is identified as ``damage by car, 
truck, or other motorized vehicle/equipment not engaged in 
excavation.'' These questions will not include personally identifiable 
information or anything that violates the privacy of the driver. PHMSA 
will request information such as whether the driver violated state or 
local driving laws, whether they were in control of the vehicle at the 
time of the collision, and the estimated speed at time of collision. 
``Unknown'' will be allowed for all driver performance questions.
    Often times, the narrative section of these incident reports 
mentions reckless or intoxicated drivers. By adding questions about 
driver performance and protective barriers, stakeholders can discern 
incidents that could have been prevented by the operator and incidents 
where the driver's performance may have been a factor.
22. Overhaul Mechanical and Compression Fittings
    We propose combining ``mechanical fitting'' and ``compression 
fitting'' sub-causes into a single sub-cause and collecting additional 
details. We are combining the sub-causes because compression fittings 
are a type of mechanical fitting. When a mechanical fitting fails and 
causes a hazardous leak, operators are required submit form PHMSA F 
7100.1-2--MECHANICAL FITTING FAILURE REPORT FORM FOR CALENDAR YEAR 
20___ FOR DISTRIBUTION OPERATORS. We modified the incident report to 
collect the same data collected for hazardous leaks on PHMSA F 7100.1-
2. This change would ensure consistency between data for hazardous 
leaks and incidents when a joint formed by a mechanical fitting fails.
23. Valve Material
    We propose adding a question for the valve material when a valve is 
the sub-cause. This change would allow stakeholders to assess the risk 
posed by various valve materials.
24. Contributing Factors
    Pipeline operators currently select only one cause on the form. 
Factors contributing to, but not causing an incident are often relevant 
to preventing future incidents. We propose collecting data about 
contributing factors. The proposal is similar to a recommendation made 
by the NTSB in their January 2015 safety study report ``Integrity 
Management of Gas Transmission Pipelines in High Consequence Areas'' 
(http://www.ntsb.gov/safety/safety-studies/Documents/SS1501.pdf). The 
NTSB recommended revising the gas transmission incident form to collect 
multiple root causes. We are proposing to collect contributing factors 
in addition to the apparent cause on all four forms. This data would 
help stakeholders develop a more thorough understanding of the incident 
and ways to prevent future incidents.

B. PHMSA F 7100.2 Incident Report--Natural and Other Gas Transmission 
and Gathering Pipeline Systems

    PHMSA proposes to reorganize existing questions and add more 
detailed questions about gas transmission pipeline incident response, 
incident consequences, operating conditions, cause, and contributing 
factors. Many of these changes are similar to those proposed for gas 
distribution pipelines in section A above.
1. Change Form Name
    We propose shortening the name of the form to ``Incident Report--
Gas Transmission and Gathering Systems''. This change would remove 
extraneous words from the form name.
2. Time Zone and Daylight Savings
    We propose adding the time zone and daylight savings status at the 
location and time of the incident. This data would help PHMSA correlate 
our incident investigation findings with the form.
3. Remove ``incident resulted from''
    We propose removing the question characterizing the incident as 
unintentional release, intentional release, or no release. We collect 
adequate data on the form to answer this question. This change would 
eliminate a redundant question from the form.
4. Operational Status
    We propose collecting the operational status of the pipeline system 
at the time the operator identified the failure. On the current form, 
there is an assumption that the pipeline was in service at the time the 
operator identified the failure, but this is often not true. This 
change would help stakeholders understand the status of the pipeline 
and clarify the shutdown data.
5. Part A Reorganization and Detailed Questions About Incident Response
    We reorganized existing questions to display the sequence of 
operator actions and interactions as the incident proceeds. For 
example, how the operator first learned of the pipeline failure is 
currently collected in Part E. PHMSA proposes to move this item to Part 
A. New items being added to build a complete timeline include 
interactions with emergency responders and details about ignition. This 
data would help stakeholders develop a more thorough understanding of 
the incident.
6. Multiple NRC Reports
    The vast majority of pipeline incidents have only one NRC report.

[[Page 29946]]

During response to protracted incidents, pipeline operators may submit 
multiple reports to the NRC. In these rare instances, we are proposing 
to collect each NRC report number. This change would help PHMSA 
correlate our incident investigation findings with the form.
7. Flow Control and Valve Closures
    We propose adding questions about initial actions the operator took 
to control the flow of product to the failure location. When valves are 
used, we propose collecting the date and time of the valve closure. 
This change implements a GAO recommendation from GAO-13-168, ``Pipeline 
Safety: Better Data and Guidance Needed to Improve Pipeline Operator 
Incident Response.'' This change would allow stakeholders to understand 
the actions taken by the operator to control the flow of gas during 
incident response and collect data about the elapsed time to valve 
closure.
8. Area of Incident Selections
    We propose adding ``exposed due to loss of cover'' as a selection 
for the area of incident when underground is selected. For pipelines 
installed underground and eventually exposed, the current form is not 
clear about whether underground or above ground should be selected. 
Adding ``exposed due to loss of cover'' as an underground option 
clarifies how to report the incident. This change would improve the 
consistency of reports.
9. Other Underground Facilities
    We propose adding a question for whether other underground 
facilities are found within 12 inches of the failure location. We know 
from experience that other underground facilities can damage pipeline 
systems. The most common cause is electrical arcing from electric 
facilities to gas systems. Generally, 12 inches of underground 
separation is considered adequate to prevent damage from non-pipeline 
facilities. This change would allow stakeholders to verify if 12 inches 
of separation is adequate.
10. Outer Continental Shelf Regions
    We propose collecting the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) region when 
an incident occurs on the OCS. This change would provide stakeholders 
with a more precise location of the incident.
11. Item Involved and Age of Failed Item
    We propose modifying the selections for the item that failed. We 
also propose collecting data about plastic pipe, which is quite common 
in gas gathering systems. These modifications would reduce the number 
of times ``other'' is selected and allow a more meaningful analysis of 
the data.
    We propose collecting both the date of manufacture and the date of 
installation for the failed item. This would allow stakeholders to 
understand both the age of the failed item and how long it had been in 
service.
12. Additional Integrity Management Consequences
    We propose adding a description of the cause of fatality or injury 
outside of the Potential Impact Radius (PIR) and impacts to wildlife 
when ignition occurs. Harm to people outside of a PIR is an important 
safety issue, and the new question will collect a text description of 
the cause. The cause of fatality or injury outside the PIR could help 
stakeholders determine if the PIR concept is suitable for continued 
use. The value of burnt wildlife habitat is important in calculating 
the benefit of proposed regulations.
13. Cost of Gas
    We propose collecting the cost of gas per mcf and calculating the 
cost of gas released. Currently, the form collects the volume of gas 
released and the cost of the gas released. The cost per mcf in our 
current incident data ranges from cents to hundreds of dollars. By 
providing the gas cost per mcf, operators will achieve greater accuracy 
when converting the per mcf gas cost to released gas costs.
14. Details About Consequences
    Our departmental guidelines for determining the benefit of proposed 
regulations (http://www.transportation.gov/sites/dot.dev/files/docs/VSL%20Guidance%202013.pdf) includes a table of relative values based on 
injury severity. Our forms currently collect the number of injured 
persons requiring in-patient, overnight hospitalization. We propose 
adding two less severe categories to the forms. This data would enable 
a more thorough determination of the benefit of proposed regulations.
    We are proposing to collect the volume of product consumed by fire. 
We already collect data about the volume of product released and 
whether ignition occurred. However, we cannot identify the volume of 
product burned. This data would allow us to more accurately determine 
the social cost of carbon and benefit of proposed regulations.
    We are proposing to collect the number of buildings affected by the 
incident. On the current forms, the property damage values do not 
include any details about the type of property damaged. This data would 
provide more details about the consequences of the incident and enable 
a more thorough determination of the benefit of proposed regulations.
    We propose collecting data about the length of building 
evacuations. On the current form, we collect the number of person 
evacuated from buildings. To implement DOT guidelines (http://www.transportation.gov/office-policy/transportation-policy/guidance-value-time) on the value of time, we need to know the length of the 
evacuation. This data would enable a more thorough determination of the 
benefit of proposed regulations.
15. Gas Flow Rate
    We propose adding the gas flow rate at the point and time of the 
incident. This change would help stakeholders better understand the 
operating conditions at the time of the failure.
16. Date of Establishing Maximum Pressure and Flow Reversals
    We propose adding the date the operator established the maximum 
pressure for the pipeline system. We also propose adding a question 
about flow reversals. This data would help stakeholders have a better 
understanding of the maximum pressure determination method and whether 
a flow reversal may have invalidated the maximum pressure.
17. Odorization
    We propose adding a question about whether the gas was odorized. 
This change would help stakeholders understand if people near the 
failure location should have been able to smell the escaping gas.
18. Length of Segment Isolated
    We propose modifying the question about the length of pipeline 
isolated during incident response. In the current form, an assumption 
is made that valve closures will always be used to initially control 
flow to the failure location. This change would clarify the length to 
be reported when valves are not used to initially control flow to the 
failure location.
19. Function Choice Change
    If a gas transmission failure occurs on a pipeline within a storage 
field, the current instructions are to select ``storage gathering'' as 
the function. Since this question first appeared in

[[Page 29947]]

2010, both operators submitting reports and analysts using our data 
have assumed ``storage gathering'' is a type of gas gathering, not gas 
transmission. To ensure this data is used for reports and analysis on 
systems having a transmission function, not gathering reports and 
analysis, we propose renaming this function from ``storage gathering'' 
to ``transmission in storage field.'' PHMSA also intends to apply this 
re-designation to the data collected in all reports submitted since 1/
1/2010, This would facilitate the proper flow of data through to 
PHMSA's public displays and data downloads. This change would help 
improve the accuracy of both gathering and transmission reports and 
analysis since the data will better correspond to the function of the 
pipeline system.
20. External Corrosion and Stray Current
    We propose collecting additional details when stray current is the 
cause of external corrosion. We have also clarified the conditions 
under which external corrosion cathodic protection is expected. This 
data would help stakeholders better understand the cause of external 
corrosion.
21. Natural Force Damage Additional Sub-Cause
    We propose adding tree root damage as a sub-cause in the natural 
force damage cause category. This addition would reduce the number of 
incidents reported with a cause of ``other.''
22. Excavation Details for All Excavation Damage
    In the current form, when a third party causes the excavation 
damage, we collect details about the excavation work. We propose 
collecting details about the excavation work when the cause of the 
damage is first, second, or third party. When pipeline operator 
employees are excavating and damage their own pipeline, the damage is 
considered first party. When an excavator is working under contract for 
the pipeline operator and damages the operator's pipeline, they are 
considered a second party. First and second party excavation details 
would allow stakeholders to understand the type of excavation work 
being performed by any party causing the excavation damage.
23. State Damage Prevention Law Exemptions
    We propose adding data about exemptions from state damage 
prevention laws when the cause of the incident is excavation damage. 
This data would help stakeholders determine states in which damage 
prevention law exemptions may be leading to more frequent excavation 
damage of pipelines.
24. Vehicular Damage Additional Details
    We propose collecting details about driver performance and 
protection from damage when the cause is identified as ``damage by car, 
truck, or other motorized vehicle/equipment not engaged in 
excavation.'' These questions will not include personally identifiable 
information or anything that violates the privacy of the driver. PHMSA 
will request information such as whether the driver violated state or 
local driving laws, whether they were in control of the vehicle at the 
time of the collision, and the estimated speed at time of collision. 
``Unknown'' will be allowed for all driver performance questions.
    Often times, the narrative section of these incident reports 
mention reckless or intoxicated drivers. By adding questions about 
driver performance and protective barriers, stakeholders can discern 
incidents that could have been prevented by the operator and incidents 
where the driver's performance may have been a factor.
25. Material Failure Cause Changes
    When material failure of pipe or weld causes the incident, a sub-
cause must be chosen. Errors in the design of pipeline facilities cause 
some incidents, but design is not included in any sub-cause. We propose 
adding a design to the ``Construction-, Installation-, or Fabrication-
related'' sub-cause. This change would reduce the number of reports 
with cause of ``other.''
    We propose adding another environmental cracking option, ``hard 
spot.'' This is another type of environmental cracking that should be 
available for selection. This change would reduce the number of reports 
with cause of ``other.''
    We propose adding a question to collect the post-construction 
pressure test value. When the pipe or a weld fails, the value of the 
post-construction pressure test is important to determining if the 
cause of the failure might have been present since original 
construction. This change would provide additional data to diagnose the 
cause of the pipe or weld failure.
26. Additional Integrity Inspection Data
    In the current form, the same set of integrity inspection questions 
appear in four different cause sections. Only one cause can be selected 
so three sets of these questions are redundant. We propose having the 
questions appear once. For each report submitted since January 1, 2010, 
PHMSA would modify the database to have the questions appear only once. 
This change would simplify the form by reducing the number of distinct 
data fields.
    We propose collecting two sets of in-line inspection results. Under 
PHMSA regulations, operators are conducting a second round of integrity 
inspections. This change would provide a history of in-line inspections 
rather than just the most recent. The additional inspection data may 
provide insights about the effectiveness of the various types of in-
line inspections.
    We propose collecting the type of direct assessment when this 
inspection method has been implemented. The additional inspection data 
may provide insights about the effectiveness of the various types of 
direct assessments.
27. Contributing Factors
    Pipeline operators currently select only one cause on the form. 
Factors contributing to, but not causing an incident are often relevant 
to preventing future incidents. We propose collecting data about 
contributing factors. The proposal is similar to a recommendation made 
by NTSB in their January 2015 safety study report. NTSB recommended 
revising the Gas Transmission/Gas Gathering Form to collect multiple 
root causes. We are proposing to collect contributing factors in 
addition to the apparent cause on all four forms. This data would help 
stakeholders develop a more thorough understanding of the incident and 
ways to prevent future incidents.

C. PHMSA F 7100.3 Incident Report--Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) 
Facilities

    PHMSA proposes to add more detailed questions about LNG incidents 
and their consequences.
1. Multiple NRC Reports
    The vast majority of pipeline incidents have only one NRC report. 
During response to protracted incidents, pipeline operators may submit 
multiple reports to the NRC. In these rare instances, we are proposing 
to collect each NRC report number. This change would help PHMSA 
correlate our incident investigation findings with the form.
2. Details About Consequences
    Our departmental guidelines for determining the benefit of proposed 
regulations (http://www.transportation.gov/sites/dot.dev/files/docs/VSL%20Guidance%202013.pdf)

[[Page 29948]]

includes a table of relative values based on injury severity. Our forms 
currently collect the number of injured persons requiring in-patient, 
overnight hospitalization. We propose adding two less severe categories 
to the forms. This data would enable a more thorough determination of 
the benefit of proposed regulations.
    We are proposing to collect the volume of product consumed by fire. 
We already collect data about the volume of product released and 
whether ignition occurred. However, we cannot identify the volume of 
product burned. This data would allow us to more accurately determine 
the social cost of carbon and benefit of proposed regulations.
    We are proposing to collect the number of buildings affected by the 
incident. On the current forms, the property damage values do not 
include any details about the type of property damaged. This data would 
provide more details about the consequences of the incident and enable 
a more thorough determination of the benefit of proposed regulations.
    We propose collecting data about the length of building 
evacuations. On the current form, we collect the number of persons 
evacuated from buildings. To implement DOT guidelines (http://www.transportation.gov/office-policy/transportation-policy/guidance-value-time) on the value of time, we need to know the length of the 
evacuation. This data would enable a more thorough determination of the 
benefit of proposed regulations.
3. Contributing Factors
    Pipeline operators currently select only one cause on the form. 
Factors contributing to, but not causing an incident are often relevant 
to preventing future incidents. We propose collecting data about 
contributing factors. The proposal is similar to a recommendation made 
by NTSB in their January 2015 safety study report. The NTSB recommended 
revising the GT/GG Form to collect multiple root causes. We are 
proposing to collect contributing factors in addition to the apparent 
cause on all four forms. This data would help stakeholders develop a 
more thorough understanding of the incident and ways to prevent future 
incidents.

D. PHMSA F 7000-1 Accident Report--Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Systems

    PHMSA proposes to reorganize existing questions and add more 
detailed questions about incident response, incident consequences, 
operating conditions, cause, and contributing factors.
1. Change Form Name
    We propose changing the name of the form to ``Accident Report--
Hazardous Liquid and Carbon Dioxide Systems.'' This change more 
accurately describes the types of pipelines using the form.
2. Time Zone and Daylight Savings
    We propose adding the time zone and daylight savings status at the 
location and time of the incident. This data would help PHMSA correlate 
our incident investigation findings with the form.
3. Operational Status
    We propose collecting the operational status of the pipeline system 
at the time the operator identified the failure. On the current form, 
there is an assumption that the pipeline was in service at the time the 
operator identified the failure, but this is often not true. This 
change would help stakeholders understand the status of the pipeline 
and clarify the shutdown data.
4. Part A Reorganization and Detailed Questions About Incident Response
    We reorganized existing questions to display the sequence of 
operator actions and interactions as the incident proceeds. For 
example, how the operator first learned of the pipeline failure is 
currently collected in Part E. PHMSA proposes to move this item to Part 
A. New items being added to build a complete timeline include 
interactions with emergency responders, spill response resources, and 
details about ignition. This data would help stakeholders develop a 
more thorough understanding of the incident.
5. Multiple NRC Reports
    The vast majority of pipeline incidents have only one NRC report. 
During response to protracted incidents, pipeline operators may submit 
multiple reports to the NRC. In these rare instances, we are proposing 
to collect each NRC report number. This change would help PHMSA 
correlate our incident investigation findings with the form.
6. Flow Control and Valve Closures
    We propose adding questions about initial actions the operator took 
to control the flow of product to the failure location. When valves are 
used, we propose collecting the date and time of the valve closure. 
This change implements a GAO recommendation from GAO-13-168 ``Pipeline 
Safety: Better Data and Guidance needed to Improve Pipeline Operator 
Incident Response.'' This change would allow stakeholders to understand 
the actions taken by the operator to control the flow of gas during 
incident response and collect data about the elapsed time to valve 
closure.
7. Area of Incident Selections
    We propose adding ``exposed due to loss of cover'' as a selection 
for the area of incident when underground is selected. For pipelines 
installed underground and eventually exposed, the current form is not 
clear about whether underground or above ground should be selected. 
Adding ``exposed due to loss of cover'' as an underground option 
clarifies how to report the incident. This change would improve the 
consistency of reports.
8. Water Crossing Evaluation
    We propose adding a question to collect the date of the most recent 
evaluation of the water crossing. These evaluations can provide 
information critical to protecting the integrity of water crossings. 
This change would provide stakeholders with this critical information.
9. OCS Regions
    We propose collecting the OCS region when an incident occurs on the 
OCS. This change would provide stakeholders with a more precise 
location of the incident.
10. Item Involved and Age of Failed Item
    We propose modifying the selections for the item that failed. These 
modifications would reduce the number of times ``other'' is selected 
and allow a more meaningful analysis of the data.
    We propose collecting both the date of manufacture and the date of 
installation for the failed item. This would allow stakeholders to 
understand both the age of the failed item and how long it had been in 
service.
11. Volume of Soil
    We propose adding a question for the volume of contaminated soil. 
The amount of soil contaminated provides an indication of the spread of 
the liquid product.
12. Details About Consequences
    Our departmental guidelines for determining the benefit of proposed 
regulations (http://www.transportation.gov/sites/dot.dev/files/docs/VSL%20Guidance%202013.pdf) includes a table of relative values based on 
injury severity. Our forms currently collect the number of injured 
persons

[[Page 29949]]

requiring in-patient, overnight hospitalization. We propose adding two 
less-severe categories to the forms. This data would enable a more 
thorough determination of the benefit of proposed regulations.
    We are proposing to collect the volume of product consumed by fire. 
We already collect data about the volume of product released and 
whether ignition occurred. However, we cannot identify the volume of 
product burned. This data would allow us to more accurately determine 
the social cost of carbon and benefit of proposed regulations.
    We are proposing to collect the number of buildings affected by the 
incident. On the current forms, the property damage values do not 
include any details about the type of property damaged. This data would 
provide more details about the consequences of the incident and enable 
a more thorough determination of the benefit of proposed regulations.
    We propose collecting data about the length of building 
evacuations. On the current form, we collect the number of persons 
evacuated from buildings. To implement DOT guidelines (http://www.transportation.gov/office-policy/transportation-policy/guidance-value-time) on the value of time, we need to know the length of the 
evacuation. This data would enable a more thorough determination of the 
benefit of proposed regulations.
13. Establishing Maximum Pressure and Flow Reversals
    We propose adding the method used by the operator to establish the 
maximum pressure for the pipeline system. We also propose adding the 
date the maximum pressure was established. This data would help 
stakeholders determine the maximum pressure methods posing a greater 
risk and if the risk changes over time.
    We also propose adding a question about flow reversals. This data 
would help stakeholders have a better understanding of whether a flow 
reversal may have invalidated the maximum pressure.
14. Length of Segment Isolated
    We propose modifying the question about the length of pipeline 
isolated during incident response. In the current form, an assumption 
is made that valve closures will always be used to initially control 
flow to the failure location. This change would clarify the length to 
be reported when valves are not used to initially control flow to the 
failure location.
15. External Corrosion and Stray Current
    We propose collecting additional details when stray current is the 
cause of external corrosion. We have also clarified the conditions 
under which external corrosion cathodic protection is expected. This 
data would help stakeholders better understand the cause of external 
corrosion.
16. Natural Force Damage Additional Sub-Cause
    We propose adding tree root damage as a sub-cause in the natural 
force damage cause category. This addition would reduce the number of 
incidents reported with a cause of ``other.''
17. Excavation Details for All Excavation Damage
    In the current form, when a third party causes the excavation 
damage, we collect details about the excavation work. We propose 
collecting details about the excavation work when the cause of the 
damage is first, second, or third party. When pipeline operator 
employees are excavating and damage their own pipeline, the damage is 
considered first party. When an excavator is working under contract for 
the pipeline operator and damages the operator's pipeline, they are 
considered a second party. First and second party excavation details 
would allow stakeholders to understand the type of excavation work 
being performed by any party causing the excavation damage.
18. State Damage Prevention Law Exemptions
    We propose adding data about exemptions from state damage 
prevention laws when the cause of the incident is excavation damage. 
This data would help stakeholders determine states in which damage 
prevention law exemptions may be leading to more frequent excavation 
damage of pipelines.
19. Material Failure Cause Changes
    When material failure of pipe or weld causes the incident, a sub-
cause must be chosen. Errors in the design of pipeline facilities cause 
some incidents, but design is not included in any sub-cause. We propose 
adding a design to the ``Construction-, Installation-, or Fabrication-
related'' sub-cause. This change would reduce the number of reports 
with cause of ``other.''
    We propose adding another environmental cracking option, ``hard 
spot''. This is another type of environmental cracking that should be 
available for selection. This change would reduce the number of reports 
with cause of ``other.''
    We propose adding a question to collect the post-construction 
pressure test value. When the pipe or a weld fails, the value is the 
post-construction pressure test is important in determining if the 
cause of the failure might have been present since original 
construction. This change would provide additional data to diagnose the 
cause of the pipe or weld failure.
20. Vehicular Damage Additional Details
    We propose collecting details about driver performance and 
protection from damage when the cause is identified as ``damage by car, 
truck, or other motorized vehicle/equipment not engaged in 
excavation.'' These questions will not include personally identifiable 
information or anything that violates the privacy of the driver. PHMSA 
will request information such as whether the driver violated state or 
local driving laws, whether they were in control of the vehicle at the 
time of the collision, and the estimated speed at time of collision. 
``Unknown'' will be allowed for all driver performance questions.
    Often times, the narrative section of these incident reports 
mention reckless or intoxicated drivers. By adding questions about 
driver performance and protective barriers, stakeholders can discern 
incidents that could have been prevented by the operator and incidents 
where the driver's performance may have been a factor.
21. Additional Integrity Inspection Data
    In the current form, the same set of integrity inspection questions 
appear in four different cause sections. Only one cause can be 
selected, so three sets of these questions are redundant. We propose 
having the questions appear once. For each report submitted since 
January 1, 2010, PHMSA would modify the database to have the questions 
appear only once. This change would simplify the form by reducing the 
number of distinct data fields.
    We propose collecting two sets of in-line inspection results. Under 
PHMSA regulations, operators are conducting a second round of integrity 
inspections. This change would provide a history of in-line inspections 
rather than just the most recent. The additional inspection data may 
provide insights about the effectiveness of the various types of inline 
inspections.
    We propose collecting the type of direct assessment when this 
inspection method has been implemented. The additional inspection data 
may provide

[[Page 29950]]

insights about the effectiveness of the various types of direct 
assessments.
22. Contributing Factors
    Pipeline operators currently select only one cause on the form. 
Factors contributing to, but not causing an incident are often relevant 
to preventing future incidents. We propose collecting data about 
contributing factors. The proposal is similar to a recommendation made 
by NTSB in their January 2015 safety study report. The NTSB recommended 
revising the GT/GG Form to collect multiple root causes. We are 
proposing to collect contributing factors in addition to the apparent 
cause on all four forms. This data would help stakeholders develop a 
more thorough understanding of the incident and ways to prevent future 
incidents.

II. Summary of Impacted Collection

    Section 1320.8(d), Title 5, Code of Federal Regulations, requires 
PHMSA to provide interested members of the public and affected agencies 
an opportunity to comment on information collection and recordkeeping 
requests. This notice identifies several information collection 
requests that PHMSA will submit to OMB for renewal. PHMSA expects many 
of the new data elements are already known by the operator and no 
report requires the completion of all fields on the forms. PHMSA has 
estimated the burdens below by adding 20% to the previous burdens--12 
hours instead of 10.
    The following information is provided for each information 
collection: (1) Title of the information collection; (2) OMB control 
number; (3) Current expiration date; (4) Type of request; (5) Abstract 
of the information collection activity; (6) Description of affected 
public; (7) Estimate of total annual reporting and recordkeeping 
burden; and (8) Frequency of collection. PHMSA will request a three-
year term of approval for each information collection activity. PHMSA 
requests comments on the following information collections:
    1. Title: Incident Reporting for Gas and LNG.
    OMB Control Number: PHMSA will request from OMB.
    Current Expiration Date: N/A.
    Type of Request: Approval of a new collection.
    Abstract: PHMSA is proposing revision to the following incident 
report forms to improve the granularity of the data collected in 
several areas: Gas Distribution Incident Report (PHMSA F. 7100.1); 
Incident Report--Natural and Other Gas Transmission and Gathering 
Pipeline System (PHMSA F 7100.2); and Incident Report--Liquefied 
Natural Gas Facilities (PHMSA F 7100.3). PHMSA is also requesting a new 
OMB Control Number to collectively cover these forms.
    Affected Public: Pipeline Operators.
    Annual Reporting and Recordkeeping Burden:
    Estimated number of responses: 301.
    Estimated annual burden hours: 3,612.
    Frequency of collection: On occasion.
    2. Title: Transportation of Hazardous Liquids by Pipeline: 
Recordkeeping and Accident Reporting.
    OMB Control Number: 2137-0047.
    Current Expiration Date: 7/31/2015.
    Type of Request: Revision.
    Abstract: This information collection covers recordkeeping and 
accident reporting by hazardous liquid pipeline operators who are 
subject to 49 CFR part 195. PHMSA is proposing to revise the form PHMSA 
F7000-1 to improve the granularity of the data collected in several 
areas.
    Affected Public: Hazardous liquid pipeline operators.
    Annual Reporting and Recordkeeping Burden:
    Annual Responses: 847.
    Annual Burden Hours: 56,229.
    Frequency of collection: On occasion.
    Comments are invited on:
    (a) The need for the renewal and revision of these collections of 
information for the proper performance of the functions of the agency, 
including whether the information will have practical utility;
    (b) The accuracy of the agency's estimate of the burden of the 
proposed collection of information, including the validity of the 
methodology and assumptions used;
    (c) Ways to enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of the 
information to be collected; and
    (d) Ways to minimize the burden of the collection of information on 
those who are to respond, including the use of appropriate automated, 
electronic, mechanical, or other technological collection techniques.

    Authority:  The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995; 44 U.S.C. 
Chapter 35, as amended; and 49 CFR 1.48.

    Issued in Washington, DC, on May 9, 2016, under authority 
delegated in 49 CFR 1.97.
Alan K. Mayberry,
Acting Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety.
[FR Doc. 2016-11304 Filed 5-12-16; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 4910-60-P