[Federal Register Volume 81, Number 93 (Friday, May 13, 2016)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 29761-29765]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2016-11212]
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Rules and Regulations
Federal Register
________________________________________________________________________
This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER contains regulatory documents
having general applicability and legal effect, most of which are keyed
to and codified in the Code of Federal Regulations, which is published
under 50 titles pursuant to 44 U.S.C. 1510.
The Code of Federal Regulations is sold by the Superintendent of Documents.
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Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 93 / Friday, May 13, 2016 / Rules and
Regulations
[[Page 29761]]
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
10 CFR Part 50
[Docket Nos. PRM-50-108; NRC-2014-0171]
Fuel-Cladding Issues in Postulated Spent Fuel Pool Accidents
AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
ACTION: Petition for rulemaking; denial.
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SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is denying a
petition for rulemaking (PRM or the petition), PRM-50-108, submitted by
Mr. Mark Edward Leyse (the petitioner). The petitioner requested that
the NRC require power reactor licensees to perform evaluations to
determine the potential consequences of various postulated spent fuel
pool (SFP) accident scenarios. The evaluations would be required to be
submitted to the NRC for informational purposes. The NRC is denying the
petition because the NRC does not believe the information is needed for
effective NRC regulatory decisionmaking with respect to SFPs or for
public safety, environmental protection, or common defense and
security.
DATES: The docket for the petition, PRM-50-108, is closed on May 13,
2016.
ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID NRC-2014-0171 when contacting the
NRC about the availability of information for this petition. You may
obtain publicly-available information related to this petition by any
of the following methods:
Federal Rulemaking Web site: Go to http://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2014-0171. Address
questions about NRC dockets to Carol Gallagher; telephone: 301-415-
3463; email: [email protected]. For technical questions, contact
the individual listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section of
this document.
The NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management
System (ADAMS): You may obtain publicly-available documents online in
the ADAMS Public Document collection at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To begin the search, select ``ADAMS Public Documents'' and
then select ``Begin Web-Based ADAMS Search.'' For problems with ADAMS,
please contact the NRC's Public Document Room (PDR) reference staff at
1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737, or by email to [email protected]. The
ADAMS accession number for each document referenced (if it is available
in ADAMS) is provided the first time that it is mentioned in the
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section. For the convenience of the reader,
instructions about obtaining materials referenced in this document are
provided in Section IV, ``Availability of Documents,'' of this
document.
The NRC's PDR: You may examine and purchase copies of
public documents at the NRC's PDR, O1-F21, One White Flint North, 11555
Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Daniel Doyle, Office of Nuclear
Reactor Regulation; U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC
20555-0001; telephone: 301-415-3748; email: [email protected].
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Table of Contents
I. The Petition
II. Reasons for Denial
III. Conclusion
IV. Availability of Documents
I. The Petition
Section 2.802 of title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10
CFR), ``Petition for rulemaking--requirements for filing,'' provides an
opportunity for any interested person to petition the Commission to
issue, amend, or rescind any regulation. The NRC received a petition
dated June 19, 2014, from Mr. Mark Edward Leyse and assigned it Docket
No. PRM-50-108 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14195A388). The NRC published a
notice of docketing in the Federal Register (FR) on October 7, 2014 (79
FR 60383). The NRC did not request public comment on the petition
because sufficient information was available for the NRC staff to form
a technical opinion regarding the merits of the petition.
The petitioner requested that the NRC develop new regulations
requiring that: (1) SFP accident evaluation models use data from multi-
rod bundle (assembly) severe accident experiments for calculating the
rates of energy release, hydrogen generation, and fuel cladding
oxidation from the zirconium-steam reaction; (2) SFP accident
evaluation models use data from multi-rod bundle (assembly) severe
accident experiments conducted with pre-oxidized fuel cladding for
calculating the rates of energy release (from both fuel cladding
oxidation and fuel cladding nitriding), fuel cladding oxidation, and
fuel cladding nitriding from the zirconium-air reaction; (3) SFP
accident evaluation models be required to conservatively model
nitrogen-induced breakaway oxidation behavior; and (4) licensees be
required to use conservative SFP accident evaluation models to perform
annual SFP safety evaluations of: postulated complete loss-of-coolant
accident (LOCA) scenarios, postulated partial LOCA scenarios, and
postulated boil-off accident scenarios.
The petitioner referenced recent NRC post-Fukushima MELCOR
simulations of boiling-water reactor Mark I SFP accident/fire
scenarios. The petitioner stated that the conclusions from the NRC's
MELCOR simulations are non-conservative and misleading because their
conclusions underestimate the probabilities of large radiological
releases from SFP accidents.
The petitioner asserted that in actual SFP fires, there would be
quicker fuel-cladding temperature escalations, releasing more heat, and
quicker axial and radial propagation of zirconium (Zr) fires than
MELCOR simulations predict. The petitioner stated that the NRC's
philosophy of defense-in-depth requires the application of conservative
models, and, therefore, it is necessary to improve the performance of
MELCOR and any other computer safety models that are intended to
accurately simulate SFP accident/fire scenarios.
The petitioner stated that the new regulations would help improve
public and plant-worker safety. The petitioner asserted that the first
three requested regulations, regarding zirconium fuel cladding
oxidation and nitriding, as
[[Page 29762]]
well as nitrogen-induced breakaway oxidation behavior, are intended to
improve the performance of computer safety models that simulate
postulated SFP accident/fire scenarios. The petitioner stated that the
fourth requested regulation would require that licensees use
conservative SFP accident evaluation models to perform annual SFP
safety evaluations of postulated complete LOCA scenarios, postulated
partial LOCA scenarios, and postulated boil-off accident scenarios. The
petitioner stated that the purpose of these evaluations would be to
keep the NRC informed of the potential consequences of postulated SFP
accident/fire scenarios as fuel assembles were added, removed, or
reconfigured in licensees' SFPs. The petitioner stated that the
requested regulations are needed because the probability of the type of
events that could lead to SFP accidents is relatively high.
The NRC staff reviewed the petition and, based on its understanding
of the overall argument in the petition, identified and evaluated the
following three issues:
Issue 1: The requested regulations pertaining to SFP
accident evaluation models are needed because the probability of the
type of events that could lead to SFP accidents is relatively high.
Issue 2: Annual licensee SFP safety evaluations and
submission of results to the NRC is necessary so that the NRC is aware
of potential consequences of postulated SFP accident/fire scenarios as
fuel assemblies are added, removed, or reconfigured in licensees' SFPs.
Issue 3: MELCOR is not currently sufficient to provide a
conservative evaluation of postulated SFP accident/fire scenarios for
use in the PRM-proposed annual SFP evaluations.
Detailed NRC responses to the three issues are provided in Section
II, ``Reasons for Denial,'' of this document.
II. Reasons for Denial
The NRC is denying the petition because the petitioner failed to
present any significant information or arguments that would warrant the
requested regulations. The first three requested regulations would
establish requirements for how the detailed annual evaluations that
would be required by the fourth requested regulation would be
performed. It is not necessary to require detailed annual evaluations
of the progression of SFP severe accidents because the risk of an SFP
severe accident is low. The NRC defines risk as the product of the
probability and the consequences of an accident. The requested annual
evaluations are not needed for regulatory decisionmaking, and the
evaluations would not prevent or mitigate an SFP accident. The
petitioner described multiple ways that an extended loss of offsite
electrical power could occur and how this could lead to an SFP fire. In
order for an SFP fire to occur, all SFP systems, backup systems, and
operator actions that are intended to prevent the spent fuel in the
pool from being uncovered would have to fail. The NRC does not agree
that more detailed accident evaluation models need to be developed for
this purpose, as requested by the petitioner, because the requested
annual evaluations are not needed for regulatory decisionmaking. The
NRC recognizes that the consequences of an SFP fire could be large and
that is why there are numerous requirements in place to prevent a
situation where the spent fuel is uncovered.
This section provides detailed NRC responses to the three issues
identified in the petition.
Issue 1: The Requested Regulations Pertaining to SFP Accident
Evaluation Models Are Needed Because the Probability of the Type of
Events That Could Lead to SFP Accidents Is Relatively High
The petitioner stated that the requested regulations pertaining to
SFP accident evaluation models are needed because the probability of
the type of events that could lead to SFP accidents is relatively high.
The petitioner stated that an SFP accident could happen as a result of
a leak (rapid drain down) or boil-off scenario. Furthermore, the
petitioner notes that in the event of a long-term station blackout,
emergency diesel generators could run out of fuel and SFP cooling would
be lost, resulting in a boil-off of SFP water inventory and a
subsequent release of radioactive materials from the spent fuel. The
petitioner also provided several examples of events that could lead to
a long-term station blackout and, ultimately, an SFP accident, such as
a strong geomagnetic disturbance, a nuclear device detonated in the
earth's atmosphere, a pandemic, or a cyber or physical attack.
NRC Response
Spent nuclear fuel offloaded from a reactor is initially stored in
an SFP. The SFPs at all nuclear plants in the United States are robust
structures constructed with thick, reinforced, concrete walls and
welded stainless-steel liners. They are designed to safely contain the
spent fuel discharged from a nuclear reactor under a variety of normal,
off-normal, and hypothetical accident conditions (e.g., loss of
electrical power, loss of cooling, fuel or cask drop incidents, floods,
earthquakes, or extreme weather events). Racks fitted in the SFPs store
the fuel assemblies in a controlled configuration so that the fuel is
maintained in a sub-critical and coolable geometry. Redundant
monitoring, cooling, and water makeup systems are provided. The spent
fuel assemblies are typically covered by at least 25-feet of water,
which provides passive cooling as well as radiation shielding.
Penetrations to pools are limited to prevent inadvertent drainage, and
the penetrations are generally located well above spent fuel storage
elevations to prevent uncovering of fuel from drainage.
Studies conducted over the last four decades have consistently
shown the risk of an accident causing a zirconium fire in an SFP to be
low. The risk of an SFP accident was examined in the 1980s as Generic
Issue 82, ``Beyond Design Basis Accidents in Spent Fuel Pools,'' in
light of increased use of high-density storage racks and laboratory
studies that indicated the possibility of zirconium fire propagation
between assemblies in an air-cooled environment (Section 3 of NUREG-
0933, ``Resolution of Generic Safety Issues,'' http://nureg.nrc.gov/sr0933/). The risk assessment and cost-benefit analyses developed
through this effort, Section 6.2 of NUREG-1353, ``Regulatory Analysis
for the Resolution of Generic Issue 82, Beyond Design Basis Accidents
in Spent Fuel Pools'' (ADAMS Accession No. ML082330232), concluded that
the risk of a severe accident in the SFP was low and appeared to meet
the objectives of the Commission's Safety Goal Policy Statement public
health objectives (51 FR 30028; August 21, 1986) and that no new
regulatory requirements were warranted.
The risk of an SFP accident was re-assessed in the late 1990s to
support a risk-informed rulemaking for permanently shutdown, or
decommissioned, nuclear power plants in the United States. The study,
NUREG-1738, ``Technical Study of Spent Fuel Pool Accident Risk at
Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants'' (ADAMS Accession No.
ML010430066), conservatively assumed that if the water level in the SFP
dropped below the top of the spent fuel, an SFP zirconium fire
involving all of the spent fuel would occur, and thereby bounded those
conditions associated with air cooling of the fuel (including partial-
drain down scenarios) and fire propagation. Even with this conservative
assumption, the study
[[Page 29763]]
found the risk of an SFP fire to be low and well within the
Commission's Safety Goals.
Additional mechanisms to mitigate the potential loss of SFP water
inventory were implemented following the terrorist attacks of September
11, 2001, which have enhanced spent fuel coolability and the potential
to recover SFP water level and cooling prior to a potential SFP
zirconium fire (73 FR 76204; August 8, 2008). Based on the
implementation of these additional strategies, the probability and,
accordingly, the risk of an SFP zirconium fire initiation has decreased
and is expected to be less than previously analyzed in NUREG-1738 and
previous studies.
Following the 2011 accident at Fukushima Dai-ichi, the NRC took
extensive actions to ensure that portable equipment is available to
mitigate a loss of cooling water in the SFP. On March 12, 2012, the NRC
issued Order EA-12-049, ``Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to
Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External
Events'' (ADAMS Accession No. ML12054A735). This order required
licensees to develop, implement, and maintain guidance and strategies
to maintain or restore core cooling, containment, and SFP cooling
capabilities following a beyond-design-basis external event. The NRC
endorsed the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) guidance to meet the
requirements of this order.\1\ That guidance establishes additional
mechanisms for mitigating a loss of SFP cooling water beyond the
requirements in 10 CFR 50.54(hh)(2), such as installing a remote
connection for SFP makeup water that can be accessed away from the SFP
refueling floor.
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\1\ See NEI 12-06, ``Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies
(FLEX) Implementation Guide,'' dated August 2012 (ADAMS Accession
No. ML12242A378), and JLD-ISG-2012-01, ``Compliance with Order EA-
12-049, Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for
Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events,''
dated August 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12229A174).
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Also, in 2014, the NRC documented a regulatory analysis in COMSECY-
13-0030, ``Staff Evaluation and Recommendation for Japan Lessons
Learned Tier 3 Issue on Expedited Transfer of Spent Fuel'' (ADAMS
Accession No. ML13329A918), which considered a broad history of the
NRC's oversight of spent fuel storage, SFP operating experience
(domestic and international), as well as information compiled in NUREG-
2161, ``Consequence Study of a Beyond-Design-Basis Earthquake Affecting
the Spent Fuel Pool for a U.S. Mark I Boiling Water Reactor'' (ADAMS
Accession No. ML14255A365). In COMSECY-13-0030, the NRC staff concluded
that SFPs are robust structures with large safety margins and
recommended to the Commission that assessments of possible regulatory
actions to require the expedited transfer of spent fuel from SFPs to
dry cask storage were not warranted. The Commission subsequently
approved the staff's recommendation in the Staff Requirements
Memorandum to COMSECY-13-0030 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14143A360).
As supported by numerous evaluations referenced in this document,
the NRC has determined that the risk of an SFP severe accident is low.
While the risk of a severe accident in an SFP is not negligible, the
NRC believes that the risk is low because of the conservative design of
SFPs; operational criteria to control spent fuel movement, monitor
pertinent parameters, and maintain cooling capability; mitigation
measures in place if there is loss of cooling capability or water; and
emergency preparedness measures to protect the public. The information
proposed to be provided to the NRC is not needed for the effectiveness
of NRC's approach for ensuring SFP safety. The NRC notes that the issue
of long-term cooling of SFPs is the subject of PRM-50-96, which was
accepted for consideration in the rulemaking process (77 FR 74788;
December 18, 2012) and is being addressed by the NRC's rulemaking
regarding mitigation of beyond design-basis events (RIN 3150-AJ49; NRC-
2014-0240).
Issue 2: Annual Licensee SFP Safety Evaluations and Submission of
Results to the NRC Is Necessary So That the NRC Is Aware of Potential
Consequences of Postulated SFP Accident/Fire Scenarios as Fuel
Assemblies Are Added, Removed, or Reconfigured in Licensees' SFPs
The petitioner stated that the purpose of the proposed requirement
is to keep the NRC informed of the potential consequences of postulated
SFP accident/fire scenarios as fuel assemblies are added, removed, or
reconfigured in licensees' SFPs.
NRC Response
The NRC does not agree that this is necessary because the NRC
already evaluates SFP systems and structures during initial licensing
and license amendment reviews. In addition, baseline NRC inspections
provide ongoing oversight to ensure adequate protection. There are not
sufficient benefits that would justify the new requirement proposed in
the petition for SFP accident evaluations. The proposed new requirement
for licensees to perform SFP evaluations would not prevent or mitigate
an SFP accident or provide information that is necessary for regulatory
decisionmaking. The annual licensee SFP safety evaluations and their
results proposed to be provided to the NRC are not needed for the
effectiveness of the NRC's approach to ensuring SFP safety.
The NRC issues licenses after reviewing and approving the design
and licensing bases contained in the plant's safety analysis report.
Licensees are required to operate the plant, including performing
operations and surveillances related to spent fuel, in accordance with
technical specifications and established practices and procedures for
that plant. Any licensee changes to design, operational or surveillance
practices, or approved spent fuel inventory limits or configuration
changes must be evaluated using the criteria in 10 CFR 50.59,
documented and retained for the duration of the operating license, and,
if warranted, submitted to the NRC for prior approval.
The general design criteria (GDC) in appendix A to 10 CFR part 50
establish general expectations that licensees must meet through
compliance with their plant-specific licensing basis. Several GDC apply
to SFPs:
Protecting against natural phenomena and equipment
failures (GDC 2 and GDC 4);
Preventing a substantial loss-of-coolant inventory under
accident conditions (e.g., equipment failure or loss of decay and
residual heat removal) (GDC 61);
Preventing criticality of the spent fuel (GDC 62); and
Adequately monitoring the SFP conditions for loss of decay
heat removal and radiation (GDC 63).
Additionally, emergency procedures and mitigating strategies are in
place to address unexpected challenges to spent fuel safety. Multiple
requirements in 10 CFR part 50, as well as recent NRC orders following
the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident, require redundant equipment and
strategies to address loss of cooling to SFPs and protective actions
for plant personnel and the public to limit exposure to radioactive
materials.
The NRC provides oversight of the licensee's overall plant
operations and the SFP in several ways. The NRC inspectors ensure that
spent fuel is stored safely by regularly inspecting reactor and
equipment vendors; inspecting the design, construction, and
[[Page 29764]]
use of equipment; and observing ``dry runs'' of procedures. At least
two NRC resident inspectors are assigned to each site to provide
monitoring and inspection of routine and special activities. They are
aware of, and routinely observe, SFP activities involving fuel
manipulation. The NRC inspectors use inspection procedures to guide
periodic inspection activities, and the results are published in
publicly-available inspection reports. Special inspections may be
conducted, as necessary, to evaluate root causes and licensee
corrective actions if site-specific events occur. Special inspections
may also evaluate generic actions taken by some or all licensees as a
result of an NRC order or a change in regulations.
In accordance with 10 CFR part 21, the NRC is informed of defects
and noncompliances associated with basic components, which include SFPs
and associated drain pipes and safety-related systems, structures, and
components for makeup water. This information allows the NRC to take
additional regulatory action as necessary with respect to defects and
noncompliances. The NRC is also informed of events and conditions at
nuclear power plants, as set forth in Sec. Sec. 50.72 and 50.73.
Depending upon the nature of the event or condition, a nuclear power
plant licensee must inform the NRC within a specified period of time of
the licensee's corrective action taken or planned to be taken. These
reports also facilitate effective and timely NRC regulatory oversight.
Finally, information identified by a nuclear power plant applicant or
licensee as having a significant implication for public health and
safety or common defense and security must be reported to the NRC
within 2 days of the applicant's or licensee's identification of the
information.
The annual evaluations requested in the petition would not provide
information that is necessary for regulatory decisionmaking. The
evaluations requested in the petition would postulate scenarios in
which the normal cooling systems, the backup cooling methods, and the
mitigation strategies have all failed to cool the stored fuel and would
require the calculation of the time it would take for the stored fuel
to ignite and how much of it would ignite. Due to the robustness of
this equipment, the NRC views this sequence of events as extremely
unlikely to occur. Since the current regulations require that the pool
be designed to prevent the loss-of-coolant and subsequent uncovering of
the fuel, the information that would be obtained from the proposed
requirement in the petition would not impact the current design basis.
Moreover, as discussed previously, the NRC's current regulatory
infrastructure relevant to SFPs at nuclear power plants in the United
States already contains information collection and reporting
requirements that support effective NRC regulatory oversight of SFPs.
The NRC does not agree that it is necessary to impose a new
requirement for licensees to perform annual evaluations of their SFPs
because existing requirements and oversight are sufficient to ensure
adequate protection of public health and safety.
Issue 3: MELCOR Is Not Currently Sufficient To Provide a Conservative
Evaluation of Postulated SFP Accident/Fire Scenarios
The petitioner requested that the NRC establish requirements for
SFP accident evaluation computer models to be used in the annual SFP
evaluations requested in Issue 2. The petitioner stated that there are
serious flaws with MELCOR, which has been used by the NRC to model
severe accident progression in SFPs, and, therefore, MELCOR is not
sufficient.
NRC Response
The NRC does not agree that it is necessary to establish
requirements for SFP accident evaluation computer models because the
annual SFP evaluations requested in Issue 2 are not necessary for
regulatory decisionmaking. Therefore, it is not necessary for the NRC
to establish requirements for how such an evaluation should be
conducted. Furthermore, the NRC disagrees with the petitioner's
statements that MELCOR is flawed.
There are inherent uncertainties in the progression of severe
accidents. There are many interrelated phenomena that need to be
properly understood; otherwise, conservatism in one area may lead to
overall non-conservative results. Conservatism can be meaningfully
introduced into the relevant analysis after the best estimate analysis
is done and uncertainties are properly taken into account.
The important question for a severe accident analysis is whether
the uncertainties are appropriately considered in the analysis results.
For example, Section 9 of the SFP study (NUREG-2161) is devoted to
discussing the major uncertainties that can affect the radiological
releases (e.g., hydrogen combustion, core concrete interaction, multi-
unit or concurrent accident, or fuel loading). In addition, the
regulatory analysis in COMSECY-13-0030 only relied on SFP study
insights for the boiling-water reactors with Mark I and II
containments, and, even then, the results were conservatively biased
towards higher radiological releases. For other designs, the release
fractions were based on previous studies (i.e., NUREG-1738) that used
bounding or conservative estimates.
The MELCOR computer code is the NRC's best estimate tool for severe
accident analysis. It has been validated against experimental data, and
it represents the current state of the art in severe accident analysis.
In NUREG-2161, the NRC stated that ``MELCOR has been developed through
the NRC and international research performed since the accident at
Three Mile Island in 1979. MELCOR is a fully integrated, engineering-
level computer code and includes a broad spectrum of severe accident
phenomena with capabilities to model core heatup and degradation,
fission product release and transport within the primary system and
containment, core relocation to the vessel lower head, and ex-vessel
core concrete interaction.'' Furthermore, MELCOR has been benchmarked
against many experiments, including separate and integral effects tests
for a wide range of phenomena. Therefore, the NRC has determined that
MELCOR is acceptable for its intended use.
Additional information about the capabilities of the MELCOR code to
model SFP accidents can be found in the NRC response to stakeholder
comments in Appendix E to NUREG-2161. The NRC also addressed questions
regarding MELCOR in Appendix D to NUREG-2157, Volume 2, ``Generic
Environmental Impact Statement for Continued Storage of Spent Nuclear
Fuel'' (ADAMS Accession No. ML14196A107).
III. Conclusion
For the reasons described in Section II, ``Reasons for Denial,'' of
this document, the NRC is denying the petition under 10 CFR 2.803. The
petitioner failed to present any information or arguments that would
warrant the requested amendments. The NRC does not believe that the
information that would be reported to the NRC as requested by the
petitioner is necessary for effective NRC regulatory decisionmaking
with respect to SFPs. The NRC continues to conclude that the current
design and licensing requirements for SFPs provide adequate protection
of public health and safety.
[[Page 29765]]
IV. Availability of Documents
The documents identified in the following table are available to
interested persons as indicated. For more information on accessing
ADAMS, see the ADDRESSES section of this document.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ADAMS accession number/Federal Register
Date Document citation
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
August 21, 1986...................... Safety Goals for the 51 FR 30028.
Operations of Nuclear Power
Plants; Policy Statement;
Republication.
April 1989........................... NUREG-1353, ``Regulatory ML082330232.
Analysis for the Resolution
of Generic Issue 82, Beyond
Design Basis Accidents in
Spent Fuel Pools''.
February 2001........................ NUREG-1738, ``Technical Study ML010430066.
of Spent Fuel Pool Accident
Risk at Decommissioning
Nuclear Power Plants''.
March 12, 2012....................... EA-12-049, ``Order Modifying ML12054A735.
Licenses with Regard to
Requirements for Mitigation
Strategies for Beyond-Design-
Basis External Events''.
August 2012.......................... NEI 12-06, ``Diverse and ML12242A378.
Flexible Coping Strategies
(FLEX) Implementation
Guide''.
August 2012.......................... JLD-ISG-2012-01, ``Compliance ML12229A174.
with Order EA-12-049, Order
Modifying Licenses with
Regard to Requirements for
Mitigation Strategies for
Beyond-Design-Basis External
Events''.
December 18, 2012.................... Long-Term Cooling and 77 FR 74788.
Unattended Water Makeup of
Spent Fuel Pools.
November 12, 2013.................... COMSECY-13-0030, ``Staff ML13329A918.
Evaluation and
Recommendation for Japan
Lessons Learned Tier 3 Issue
on Expedited Transfer of
Spent Fuel''.
May 23, 2014......................... SRM-COMSECY-13-0030, ``Staff ML14143A360.
Requirements--COMSECY-13-003
0--Staff Evaluation and
Recommendation for Japan
Lessons-Learned Tier 3 Issue
on Expedited Transfer of
Spent Fuel''.
June 19, 2014........................ Incoming Petition (PRM-50- ML14195A388.
108) from Mr. Mark Edward
Leyse.
September 2014....................... NUREG-2157, ``Generic ML14196A107.
Environmental Impact
Statement for Continued
Storage of Spent Nuclear
Fuel,'' Volume 2.
September 2014....................... NUREG-2161, ``Consequence ML14255A365.
Study of a Beyond-Design-
Basis Earthquake Affecting
the Spent Fuel Pool for a
U.S. Mark I Boiling-Water
Reactor''.
October 7, 2014...................... Notice of Docketing for PRM- 79 FR 60383.
50-108.
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Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 5th day of May, 2016.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Annette L. Vietti-Cook,
Secretary of the Commission.
[FR Doc. 2016-11212 Filed 5-12-16; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P