[Federal Register Volume 81, Number 79 (Monday, April 25, 2016)]
[Notices]
[Pages 24141-24145]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2016-09556]
[[Page 24141]]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket No. 50-271; NRC-2016-0017]
Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.; Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power
Station
AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
ACTION: Exemption; issuance.
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SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing an
exemption in response to a letter from Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.
(ENO), dated April 17, 2014, requesting an exemption from the NRC's
regulations regarding the required level of primary financial
protection. An exemption from these regulations would permit Vermont
Yankee Nuclear Power Station (VY) to reduce the required level of
primary financial protection from $375,000,000 to $100,000,000, and to
withdraw from participation in the secondary layer of financial
protection, no earlier than April 15, 2016.
DATES: April 25, 2016.
ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID NRC-2016-0017 when contacting the
NRC about the availability of information regarding this document. You
may obtain publicly-available information related to this document
using any of the following methods:
Federal Rulemaking Web site: Go to http://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2016-0017. Address
questions about NRC dockets to Carol Gallagher; telephone: 301-415-
3463; email: [email protected]. For technical questions, contact
the individual listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section of
this document.
NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System
(ADAMS): You may obtain publicly-available documents online in the
ADAMS Public Documents collection at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To begin the search, select ``ADAMS Public Documents'' and
then select ``Begin Web-based ADAMS Search.'' For problems with ADAMS,
please contact the NRC's Public Document Room (PDR) reference staff at
1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737, or by email to [email protected]. The
ADAMS Accession number for each document referenced (if it is available
in ADAMS) is provided the first time that a document is referenced.
NRC's PDR: You may examine and purchase copies of public
documents at the NRC's PDR, Room O1-F21, One White Flint North, 11555
Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Jack D. Parrott, Office of Nuclear
Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, DC 20555-0001; telephone: 301-415-6634, email:
[email protected].
I. Background
The VY site is a single unit facility located near the town of
Vernon, Vermont. The site is situated in Windham County on the western
shore of the Connecticut River, immediately upstream of the Vernon
Hydroelectric Station. The VY facility employs a General Electric
boiling water reactor nuclear steam supply system licensed to generate
1,912 megawatts-thermal. The boiling water reactor and supporting
facilities are owned and operated by Entergy Vermont Yankee, a
subsidiary of ENO. The licensee, ENO, is the holder of the Vermont
Yankee Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-28. The license
provides, among other things, that the facility is subject to all
rules, regulations, and orders of the NRC now or hereafter in effect.
By letter dated September 23, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML13273A204), ENO submitted a notification to the NRC indicating that
it would permanently shut down Vermont Yankee in the fourth calendar
quarter of 2014. On December 29, 2014, ENO permanently ceased power
operations at VY. On January 12, 2015, ENO certified that it had
permanently defueled the Vermont Yankee reactor vessel and placed the
fuel in the Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) (ADAMS Accession No. ML15013A426).
Accordingly, pursuant to Sec. 50.82(a)(2) of title 10 of the Code of
Federal Regulations (10 CFR), the VY renewed facility operating license
no longer authorizes operation of the reactor or emplacement or
retention of fuel in the reactor vessel. However, the licensee is still
authorized to possess and store irradiated nuclear fuel. Irradiated
fuel is currently being stored onsite in a SFP and in independent spent
fuel storage installation dry casks.
II. Request/Action
Pursuant to 10 CFR 140.8, ``Specific exemptions,'' ENO has
requested an exemption from 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4), by letter dated April
17, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14111A400). The exemption from 10 CFR
140.11(a)(4) would permit the licensee to reduce the required level of
primary financial protection from $375,000,000 to $100,000,000, and to
withdraw from participation in the secondary layer of financial
protection (also known as the secondary retrospective rating pool for
deferred premium charges), no earlier than April 15, 2016.
The regulation in 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4) requires each licensee to
have and maintain financial protection. For a single unit reactor site,
which has a rated capacity of 100,000 kilowatts electric or more, 10
CFR 140.11(a)(4) requires the licensee to maintain $375 million in
primary financial protection. In addition, the licensee is required to
participate in a secondary retrospective rating pool (secondary
financial protection) that commits each licensee to additional
indemnification for damages that may exceed primary insurance coverage.
Participation in the secondary retrospective rating pool could
potentially subject ENO to deferred premium charges up to a maximum
total deferred premium of $121,255,000 with respect to any nuclear
incident at any operating nuclear power plant, and up to a maximum
annual deferred premium of $18,963,000 per incident.
The licensee states that the risk of an offsite radiological
release is significantly lower at a nuclear power reactor that has
permanently shut down and defueled, when compared to an operating power
reactor. Similarly, it states that the associated risk of offsite
liability damages that require insurance indemnification is
commensurately lower for permanently shut down and defueled plants. The
licensee has therefore requested an exemption from 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4)
to allow a reduction in offsite liability insurance coverage
commensurate with the significantly reduced risks associated with a
permanently defueled reactor.
III. Discussion
Pursuant to 10 CFR 140.8, the Commission may, upon application of
any interested person or upon its own initiative, grant such exemptions
from the requirements of the regulations in 10 CFR part 140, when the
exemptions are authorized by law and are otherwise in the public
interest. The NRC staff has reviewed ENO's request for an exemption
from 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4) and has concluded that the requested exemption
is authorized by law and is otherwise in the public interest.
The Price Anderson Act of 1957 (PAA) requires that nuclear power
reactor licensees have insurance to compensate the public for damages
arising from a nuclear incident. Specifically, the PAA requires
licensees of facilities with a ``rated capacity of 100,000 electrical
kilowatts or more'' to maintain the maximum amount of primary offsite
liability insurance commercially available (currently,
[[Page 24142]]
$375,000,000) and a specified amount of secondary insurance coverage
(currently, up to $121,255,000 per reactor). In the event of an
accident causing offsite damages in excess of $375,000,000, each
licensee would be assessed a prorated share of the excess damages, up
to $121,255,000 per reactor, for a total of approximately $13 billion
per nuclear incident. The NRC's regulations at 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4)
implement these PAA insurance requirements and set forth the amount of
primary and secondary insurance each power reactor licensee must have.
As noted above, the PAA requirements with respect to primary and
secondary insurance, and the implementing regulations at 10 CFR
140.11(a)(4), apply to licensees of facilities with a ``rated capacity
of 100,000 electrical kilowatts or more.'' When the NRC issues a
license amendment to a decommissioning licensee to reflect the defueled
status of the facility, the license amendment includes removal of the
rated capacity of the reactor from the license. Accordingly, a reactor
that is undergoing decommissioning has no ``rated capacity.'' Removal
of the rated capacity from the facility of a decommissioning licensee,
thus, allows the NRC to take the reactor licensee out of the category
of reactor licensees that are required to maintain the maximum
available insurance and to participate in the secondary retrospective
insurance pool under the PAA, subject to a technical finding that
lesser potential hazards exist at the facility after termination of
operations.
The financial protection limits of 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4) were
established to require a licensee to maintain sufficient insurance, as
specified under the PAA, to satisfy liability claims by members of the
public for personal injury, property damage, and the legal cost
associated with lawsuits, as the result of a nuclear accident at an
operating reactor with a rated capacity of 100,000 kilowatts electric
(or greater). Thus, the insurance levels established by this
regulation, as required by the PAA, were associated with the risks and
potential consequences of an accident at an operating reactor with a
rated capacity of 100,000 kilowatts electric (or greater). The legal
and associated technical basis for granting exemptions from 10 CFR part
140 is set forth in SECY-93-127. The legal analysis underlying SECY-93-
127 concluded that, upon a technical finding that lesser potential
hazards exist after termination of operations (and removal of the rated
capacity), the Commission has the discretion under the PAA to reduce
the amount of insurance required of a licensee undergoing
decommissioning.
As a technical matter, the fact that a reactor has permanently
ceased operation is not itself determinative as to whether a licensee
may cease providing the offsite liability coverage required by the PAA
and 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4). In light of the presence of freshly discharged
irradiated fuel in the spent fuel pool at a recently shutdown reactor,
the primary consideration is the risk of offsite radiological release
from a zirconium fire. That risk generally remains for about 15 to 18
months of decay time for the fuel used in the last cycle of power
operation. After that time, the offsite consequences of an offsite
radiological release from a zirconium fire are negligible for shutdown
reactors, but the spent fuel pool is still operational and an inventory
of radioactive materials still exists onsite. Therefore, an evaluation
of the potential for offsite damage is necessary to determine the
appropriate level of offsite insurance post shutdown, in accordance
with the Commission's discretionary authority under the PAA to
establish an appropriate level of required financial protection for
such shutdown facilities.
The NRC staff has conducted an evaluation and concluded that, aside
from the handling, storage, and transportation of spent fuel and
radioactive materials for a permanently shut down and defueled reactor,
no reasonably conceivable potential accident exists that could cause
significant offsite damage. During normal power reactor operations, the
forced flow of water through the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) removes
heat generated by the reactor. The RCS transfers this heat away from
the reactor core by converting reactor feedwater to steam, which then
flows to the main turbine generator to produce electricity. Most of the
accident scenarios postulated for operating power reactors involve
failures or malfunctions of systems that could affect the fuel in the
reactor core, which in the most severe postulated accidents, would
involve the release of large quantities of fission products. With the
permanent cessation of reactor operations at VY and the permanent
removal of the fuel from the reactor core, such accidents are no longer
possible. The reactor, RCS, and supporting systems no longer operate
and have no function related to the storage of the irradiated fuel.
Therefore, postulated accidents involving failure or malfunction of the
reactor, RCS, or supporting systems are no longer applicable.
During reactor decommissioning, the principal radiological risks
are associated with the storage of spent fuel onsite. On a case-by-case
basis, licensees undergoing decommissioning have been granted
permission to reduce the required amount of primary offsite liability
insurance coverage from $375,000,000 to $100,000,000 and to withdraw
from the secondary insurance pool.\1\ One of the technical criteria for
granting the exemption is that the possibility of a design-basis event
that could cause significant offsite damage has been eliminated. In its
April 17, 2014, exemption request, ENO describes both design-basis and
beyond-design-basis events involving irradiated fuel stored in the SFP.
The staff independently evaluated the offsite consequences associated
with various decommissioning activities, design basis accidents, and
beyond design basis accidents at VY, in consideration of its
permanently shut down and defueled status. The possible design-basis
and beyond design basis accident scenarios at VY show that the
radiological consequences of these accidents are greatly reduced at a
permanently shut down and defueled reactor, in comparison to a fueled
reactor. Further, the staff has used the offsite radiological release
limits established by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
early-phase Protective Action Guidelines (PAGs) of one roentgen
equivalent man (rem) at the exclusion area boundary in determining that
any possible radiological releases would be minimal and would not
require precautionary protective actions (e.g., sheltering in place or
evacuation), which could result in offsite liability.
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\1\ See Memorandum from William D. Travers, Executive Director
for Operations, to the Commission (August 16, 2002) (ADAMS Accession
No. ML030550706).
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The only design-basis accident that could potentially result in an
offsite radiological release at VY, following its permanent shutdown
and defueling, is a Fuel Handling Accident (FHA). However, ENO
performed an analysis demonstrating that 17 days after shutdown, the
radiological consequences of a FHA would not exceed the limits
established by the EPA PAGs at the exclusion area boundary.
Accordingly, based on the time that VY has been permanently shutdown
(approximately 15 months), the staff has determined that the
possibility of an offsite radiological release from a design-basis
accident that could exceed the EPA PAGs has been eliminated. Therefore,
any offsite consequence from a design basis radiological release is
[[Page 24143]]
unlikely, and a significant amount of offsite liability insurance
coverage is not required.
The only beyond design-basis event that has the potential to lead
to a significant radiological release at a permanently shut down and
defueled (decommissioning) reactor is a zirconium fire. The zirconium
fire scenario is a postulated, but highly unlikely, accident scenario
that involves the loss of water inventory from the SFP, resulting in a
significant heat-up of the spent fuel and culminating in substantial
zirconium cladding oxidation and fuel damage. The probability of a
zirconium fire scenario is related to the decay heat of the irradiated
fuel stored in the SFP. Therefore, the risks from a zirconium fire
scenario continue to decrease as a function of the time that VY has
been permanently shut down. The licensee's adiabatic heat-up analyses
demonstrate that as of April 15, 2016, there would be at least 10 hours
after the loss of all means of cooling (both air and/or water), before
the spent fuel cladding would reach a temperature where the potential
for a significant offsite radiological release could occur. The NRC
staff has confirmed the reduced risks at VY by comparing the generic
risk assumptions in the analyses in NUREG-1738, ``Technical Study of
Spent Fuel Pool Accident Risk at Decommissioning Nuclear Power
Plants,'' dated February 28, 2001 (ADAMS Accession No. ML010430066) to
site-specific conditions at VY; based on this assessment, the staff
determined that the risk values in NUREG-1738 bound the risks presented
by VY. As indicated by the results of research conducted for NUREG-1738
and more recently, for NUREG-2161, ``Consequence Study of a Beyond-
Design-Basis Earthquake Affecting the Spent Fuel Pool for a U.S. Mark I
Boiling Water Reactor'' (ADAMS Accession No. ML14255A365), ENO's
analysis of a beyond-design-basis accident involving a complete loss of
SFP water inventory, where adequate fuel handling building air exchange
with the environment and air cooling of the stored fuel are available,
the analyses show that within 15.4 months after shutdown, air cooling
of the spent fuel assemblies was sufficient to keep the fuel within a
safe temperature range, indefinitely, without fuel cladding damage or
offsite radiological release.
In this regard, one technical criterion for relieving
decommissioning reactor licensees from the insurance obligations
applicable to an operating reactor is a finding that the heat generated
by the SFP has decayed to the point where the possibility of a
zirconium fire is highly unlikely. This was addressed in SECY-93-127,
where the NRC staff concluded that there was a low likelihood and
reduced short-term public health consequences of a zirconium fire once
a decommissioning plant's spent fuel has sufficiently decayed. In its
Staff Requirements Memorandum ``Financial Protection Required of
Licensees of Large Nuclear Power Plants during Decommissioning,'' dated
July 13, 1993 (ADAMS Accession No. ML003760936), the Commission
approved a policy that authorized, through the exemption process,
withdrawal from participation in the secondary insurance layer and a
reduction in commercial liability insurance coverage to $100 million,
when a licensee is able to demonstrate that the spent fuel could be
air-cooled if the SFP was drained of water. The staff has used this
technical criterion to grant similar exemptions to other
decommissioning reactors (e.g., Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station,
published in the Federal Register on January 19, 1999 (64 FR 2920);
Zion Nuclear Power Station, published in the Federal Register on
December 28, 1999 (64 FR 72700); Kewaunee Power Station, published in
the Federal Register on March 24, 2015 (80 FR 15638); and Crystal River
Unit 3 Nuclear Generation Plant, published in the Federal Register on
May 6, 2015 (80 FR 26100)). Additional discussions of other
decommissioning reactor licensees that have received exemptions to
reduce their primary insurance level to $100 million are provided in
SECY-96-256, ``Changes to the Financial Protection Requirements for
Permanently Shutdown Nuclear Power Reactors, 10 CFR 50.54(w) and 10 CFR
140.11,'' dated December 17, 1996 (ADAMS Accession No. ML15062A483).
These prior exemptions were based on the licensee demonstrating that
the SFP could be air-cooled, consistent with the technical criterion
discussed above.
The NRC staff has determined that the fuel stored in the VY SFP
will have decayed sufficiently by the requested effective exemption
date of April 15, 2016, to support a reduction in the required
insurance. The licensee determined that by April 15, 2016, the fuel
removed from the reactor would have sufficiently decayed by 15.4 months
after shutdown so as to significantly reduce the risk from SFP draining
events (ADAMS Accession No. ML14080A141). The NRC staff has evaluated
the issue of zirconium fires in SFPs and presented an independent
evaluation of a SFP subject to a severe earthquake in NUREG-2161,
``Consequence Study of a Beyond-Design-Basis Earthquake Affecting the
Spent Fuel Pool for a U.S. Mark l Boiling Water Reactor,'' dated
September 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14255A365). This evaluation
concluded that, for a representative Boiling-Water Reactor (BWR), fuel
in a dispersed high-density configuration would be adequately cooled by
natural circulation air flow within several months after discharge from
a reactor if the pool was drained of water. By letter dated November
23, 2015 (ADAMS Accession No. ML15329A167), ENO confirmed that the
plant design and fuel storage configuration considered in NUREG-2161
were consistent with the VY plant design and fuel storage
configurations to be used in the decommissioning of VY. The staff
independently confirmed that the VY fuel assembly decay levels are also
consistent with the spent fuel considered in NUREG-2161. Thus, the
staff has determined that after 15.4 months decay, which will be
reached by the requested effective date of April 15, 2016, the fuel
stored in the VY SFP will be able to adequately be cooled by air in the
unlikely event of pool drainage.
In SECY-00-0145, ``Integrated Rulemaking Plan for Nuclear Power
Plant Decommissioning,'' dated June 28, 2000, and SECY-01-0100,
``Policy Issues Related to Safeguards, Insurance, and Emergency
Preparedness Regulations at Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants
Storing Fuel in Spent Fuel Pools,'' dated June 4, 2001 (ADAMS Accession
Nos. ML003721626 and ML011450420, respectively), the staff discussed
additional information concerning SFP zirconium fire risks at
decommissioning reactors and associated implications for offsite
insurance. Analyzing when the spent fuel stored in the SFP is capable
of adequate air-cooling is one measure that demonstrates when the
probability of a zirconium fire would be exceedingly low.
The licensee's analyses referenced in its exemption request
demonstrate that under conditions where the SFP water inventory has
drained and only air-cooling of the stored irradiated fuel is
available, there is reasonable assurance as of April 15, 2016, that the
VY spent fuel will remain at temperatures far below those associated
with a significant radiological release. In addition, the licensee
performed adiabatic heat-up analyses, in which a complete drainage of
the SFP is combined with rearrangement of spent fuel rack geometry and/
or the addition of rubble to the SFP; this type of analysis postulates
that decay heat
[[Page 24144]]
transfer from the spent fuel via conduction, convection, or radiation
would be impeded. The licensee's adiabatic heat-up analyses demonstrate
that as of April 15, 2016, there would be at least 10 hours after the
loss of all means of cooling (both air and/or water), before the spent
fuel cladding would reach a temperature where the potential for a
significant offsite radiological release could occur. In ENO's letter
dated March 14, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14080A141), the licensee
furnished information concerning its SFP inventory makeup strategies.
Several sources of makeup to the pool are available, such as the
Service Water (SW) system, which has redundant pumping capability and
power supplies to ensure alternative SFP makeup function. The SW system
runs continuously, thus allowing for constant monitoring. Additionally,
there are electric-driven and diesel-driven fire pumps that can supply
makeup water to the SFP via the SW system or the fire water system. In
its letter dated August 29, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14246A176), the
licensee also stated that, considering the very low-probability of
beyond design-basis accidents affecting the SFP, these diverse
strategies provide defense-in-depth and time to mitigate and prevent a
zirconium fire, using makeup or spray into the SFP before the onset of
zirconium cladding rapid oxidation.
In the NRC staff's safety evaluation of the licensee's March 14,
2014 (as later supplemented) request for exemptions from certain
emergency planning requirements dated December 10, 2015 (ADAMS
Accession No. ML15180A054), the NRC staff assessed the ENO accident
analyses associated with the radiological risks from a zirconium fire
at the permanently shut down and defueled VY site. For the very
unlikely beyond design-basis accident scenario where the SFP coolant
inventory is lost in such a manner that all methods of heat removal
from the spent fuel are no longer available, the staff found there will
be a minimum of 10 hours from the initiation of the accident until the
cladding reaches a temperature where offsite radiological release might
occur. The staff finds that 10 hours is sufficient time to support
deployment of mitigation equipment, consistent with plant conditions,
to prevent the zirconium cladding from reaching a point of rapid
oxidation.
The staff has determined that the licensee's proposed reduction in
primary offsite liability coverage to a level of $100 million, and the
licensee's proposed withdrawal from participation in the secondary
insurance pool for offsite financial protection, are consistent with
the policy established in SECY-93-127 and subsequent insurance
considerations resulting from zirconium fire risks, as discussed in
SECY-00-0145 and SECY-01-0100. The NRC has previously determined in
SECY-00-0145 that the minimum offsite financial protection requirement
may be reduced to $100 million and that secondary insurance is not
required, once it is determined that the spent fuel in the spent fuel
pool is no longer thermal-hydraulically capable of sustaining a
zirconium fire based on a plant-specific analysis. In addition, the NRC
staff notes that there is a well-established precedent of granting a
similar exemption from these insurance requirements, to other
permanently shutdown and defueled power reactors, upon satisfactory
demonstration that zirconium fire risk from the irradiated fuel stored
in the SFP is of negligible concern.
A. Authorized by Law
The PAA, and its implementing regulations in 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4),
require licensees of nuclear reactors that have a rated capacity of
100,000 kilowatts electric or more to have and maintain $375 million in
primary financial protection and to participate in a secondary
retrospective insurance pool. In accordance with 10 CFR 140.8, the
Commission may grant exemptions from the regulations in 10 CFR part
140, as the Commission determines are authorized by law. The legal and
associated technical basis for granting exemptions from 10 CFR part 140
are set forth in SECY-93-127. The legal analysis underlying SECY-93-127
concluded that, upon a technical finding that lesser potential hazards
exist after termination of operations, the Commission has the
discretion under the Price-Anderson Act to reduce the amount of
insurance required of a licensee undergoing decommissioning.
Based on its review of ENO's exemption request, the staff concludes
that the technical criteria for relieving ENO from its existing primary
and secondary insurance obligations have been met. As explained above,
the staff has concluded that no reasonably conceivable design-basis
accident exists that could cause an offsite release greater than the
EPA PAGs, and therefore, that any offsite consequence from a design
basis radiological release is unlikely, and the need for a significant
amount of offsite liability insurance coverage is unwarranted.
Additionally, the Staff determined that, after 15.4 months decay, which
will be reached by the requested effective date of April 15, 2016, the
fuel stored in the VY SFP will be able to adequately be cooled by air
in the unlikely event of pool drainage. Moreover, in the very unlikely
beyond design-basis accident scenario where the SFP coolant inventory
is lost in such a manner that all methods of heat removal from the
spent fuel are no longer available, the staff has determined that 10
hours would be available and is sufficient time to support deployment
of mitigation equipment, consistent with plant conditions, to prevent
the zirconium cladding from reaching a point of rapid oxidation. Thus,
the staff concludes that the fuel stored in the VY SFP will have
decayed sufficiently by the requested effective exemption date of April
15, 2016, to support a reduction in the required insurance consistent
with SECY-00-0145.
The NRC staff has determined that granting of the licensee's
proposed exemption will not result in a violation of the Atomic Energy
Act of 1954, Section 170, or other laws, as amended, which require
licensees to maintain adequate financial protection. Accordingly,
consistent with the legal standard presented in SECY-93-127, under
which decommissioning reactor licensees may be relieved of the
requirements to carry the maximum amount of insurance available and to
participate in the secondary retrospective premium pool where there is
sufficient technical justification, the NRC staff concludes that the
requested exemption is authorized by law.
B. Is Otherwise in the Public Interest
The financial protection limits of 10 CFR 140.11 were established
to require licensees to maintain sufficient offsite liability insurance
to ensure adequate funding for offsite liability claims, following an
accident at an operating reactor. However, the regulation does not
consider the reduced potential for and consequence of nuclear incidents
at permanently shutdown and decommissioning reactors.
SECY-93-127, SECY-00-0145, and SECY-01-0100 provide a basis for
allowing licensees of decommissioning plants to reduce their primary
offsite liability insurance and to withdraw from participation in the
retrospective rating pool for deferred premium charges. As discussed in
these documents, once the zirconium fire concern is determined to be
negligible, possible accident scenario risks at permanently shutdown
and defueled reactors are greatly reduced, when compared to the risks
at operating reactors, and the associated potential for offsite
financial liabilities from an
[[Page 24145]]
accident are commensurately less. The licensee has analyzed and the
staff has confirmed that the risks of accidents that could result in an
offsite radiological risk are minimal, thereby justifying the proposed
reductions in offsite primary liability insurance and withdrawal from
participation in the secondary retrospective rating pool for deferred
premium charges.
Additionally, participation in the secondary retrospective rating
pool could potentially have adverse consequences on the safe and timely
completion of decommissioning. If a nuclear incident sufficient to
trigger the secondary insurance layer occurred at another nuclear power
plant, the licensee could incur financial liability of up to
$121,255,000. However, because VY is permanently shut down, it cannot
produce revenue from electricity generation sales to cover such a
liability. Therefore, such liability if subsequently incurred, could
significantly affect the ability of the facility to conduct and
complete timely radiological decontamination and decommissioning
activities. In addition, as SECY-93-127 concluded, the shared financial
risk exposure to ENO is greatly disproportionate to the radiological
risk posed by VY, when compared to operating reactors.
The reduced overall risk to the public at decommissioning power
plants does not warrant that ENO be required to carry full operating
reactor insurance coverage, after the requisite spent fuel cooling
period has elapsed following final reactor shutdown. The licensee's
proposed financial protection limits will maintain a level of liability
insurance coverage commensurate with the risk to the public. These
changes are consistent with previous NRC policy as discussed in NUREG-
00-0145, and exemptions approved for other decommissioning reactors.
Thus, the underlying purpose of the regulations will not be adversely
affected by the reductions in insurance coverage. Accordingly, an
exemption from participation in the secondary insurance pool and a
reduction in the primary insurance to $100 million, a value more in
line with the potential consequences of accidents, would be in the
public interest in that this assures there will be adequate funds to
address any of those consequences and helps to assure the safe and
timely decommissioning of the reactor.
Therefore, the NRC staff has concluded that an exemption from 10
CFR 140.11(a)(4), which would permit ENO to lower the VY primary
insurance levels and to withdraw from the secondary retrospective
premium pool at the requested effective date of April 15, 2016, is in
the public interest.
C. Environmental Considerations
NRC approval of an exemption from insurance or indemnity
requirements belongs to a category of actions that the Commission, by
rule or regulation, has declared to be a categorical exclusion, after
first finding that the category of actions does not individually or
cumulatively have a significant effect on the human environment.
Specifically, the exemption is categorically excluded from the
requirement to prepare an environmental assessment or environmental
impact statement, in accordance with 10 CFR 51.22(c)(25).
Under 10 CFR 51.22(c)(25), granting of an exemption from the
requirements of any regulation of Chapter I to 10 CFR is a categorical
exclusion provided that: (i) There is no significant hazards
consideration; (ii) there is no significant change in the types or
significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be
released offsite; (iii) there is no significant increase in individual
or cumulative public or occupational radiation exposure; (iv) there is
no significant construction impact; (v) there is no significant
increase in the potential for or consequences from radiological
accidents; and (vi) the requirements from which an exemption is sought
involve surety, insurance, or indemnity requirements.
The Director, Division of Decommissioning, Uranium Recovery and
Waste Programs, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, has
determined that approval of the exemption request involves no
significant hazards consideration, as defined in 10 CFR 50.92, because
reducing a licensee's offsite liability requirements at VY does not:
(1) Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences
of an accident previously evaluated; (2) create the possibility of a
new or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated; or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of
safety. The exempted financial protection regulation is unrelated to
the operation of VY or site activities. Accordingly, there is no
significant change in the types or significant increase in the amounts
of any effluents that may be released offsite, and no significant
increase in individual or cumulative public or occupational radiation
exposure. The exempted regulation is not associated with construction,
so there is no significant construction impact. The exempted regulation
does not concern the source term (i.e., potential amount of radiation
in an accident), nor any activities conducted at the site. Therefore,
there is no significant increase in the potential for, or consequences
of, a radiological accident. In addition, there would be no significant
impacts to biota, water resources, historic properties, cultural
resources, or socioeconomic conditions in the region resulting from
issuance of the requested exemption. The requirement for offsite
liability insurance involves surety, insurance, or indemnity matters
only.
Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) and 51.22(c)(25), no
environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be
prepared in connection with the approval of this exemption request.
IV. Conclusions
Accordingly, the Commission has determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR
140.8, the exemption is authorized by law, and is otherwise in the
public interest. Therefore, the Commission hereby grants ENO an
exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4) for VY. The
exemption from 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4) permits VY to reduce the required
level of primary financial protection, from $375,000,000 to
$100,000,000, and to withdraw from participation in the secondary layer
of financial protection no earlier than April 15, 2016.
The exemption is effective upon issuance.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 15th day of April, 2016.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
John R. Tappert,
Director, Division of Decommissioning, Uranium Recovery and Waste
Programs, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards.
[FR Doc. 2016-09556 Filed 4-22-16; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P