[Federal Register Volume 81, Number 68 (Friday, April 8, 2016)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 21181-21208]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2016-07929]


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DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

Employee Benefits Security Administration

29 CFR Part 2550

[Application Number D-11327]
ZRIN 1210-ZA25


Amendment to and Partial Revocation of Prohibited Transaction 
Exemption (PTE) 86-128 for Securities Transactions Involving Employee 
Benefit Plans and Broker-Dealers; Amendment to and Partial Revocation 
of PTE 75-1, Exemptions From Prohibitions Respecting Certain Classes of 
Transactions Involving Employee Benefits Plans and Certain Broker-
Dealers, Reporting Dealers and Banks.

AGENCY: Employee Benefits Security Administration (EBSA), Department of 
Labor.

ACTION: Adoption of amendments to and partial revocations of PTEs 86-
128 and 75-1.

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SUMMARY: This document contains amendments to Prohibited Transaction 
Exemptions (PTEs) 86-128 and 75-1, exemptions from certain prohibited 
transaction provisions of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
of 1974 (ERISA) and the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (the Code). The 
ERISA and Code provisions at issue generally prohibit fiduciaries with 
respect to employee benefit plans and individual retirement accounts 
(IRAs) from engaging in self-dealing in connection with transactions 
involving plans and IRAs. PTE 86-128 allows fiduciaries to receive 
compensation in connection with certain securities transactions entered 
into by plans and IRAs. The amendments increase the safeguards of the 
exemption. This document also contains a revocation of PTE 86-128 with 
respect to transactions involving investment advice fiduciaries and 
IRAs, and of PTE 75-1, Part II(2), and PTE 75-1, Parts I(b) and I(c), 
in light of existing or newly finalized relief, including the relief 
provided in the ``Best Interest Contract Exemption,'' published 
elsewhere in this issue of the Federal Register. The amendments and 
revocations affect participants and beneficiaries of plans, IRA owners 
and certain fiduciaries of plans and IRAs.

DATES: Issance date: These amendments and partial revocations are 
issued June 7, 2016.
    Applicability date: These amendments are applicable to transactions 
occurring on or after April 10, 2017. For more information, see 
Applicability Date, below.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Brian Shiker or Erin Hesse, Office of 
Exemption Determinations, Employee Benefits Security Administration, 
U.S. Department of Labor, 200 Constitution Avenue NW., Suite 400, 
Washington DC 20210, (202) 693-8540 (not a toll-free number).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The Department is amending and partially 
revoking PTEs 86-128 and 75-1 on its own motion, pursuant to ERISA 
section 408(a) and Code section 4975(c)(2), and in accordance with the 
procedures set forth in 29 CFR part 2570, subpart B (76 FR 66637 
(October 27, 2011)).

Executive Summary

Purpose of Regulatory Action

    These amendments and revocations are being granted in connection 
with its publication today, elsewhere in this issue of the Federal 
Register, of a final regulation defining who is a ``fiduciary'' of an 
employee benefit plan under ERISA as a result of giving investment 
advice to a plan or its participants or beneficiaries (Regulation). The 
Regulation also applies to the definition of a ``fiduciary'' of a plan 
(including an IRA) under the Code. The Regulation amends a prior 
regulation, dating to 1975, specifying when a person is a ``fiduciary'' 
under ERISA and the Code by reason of the provision of investment 
advice for a fee or other compensation regarding assets of a plan or 
IRA. The Regulation takes into account the advent of 401(k) plans and 
IRAs, the dramatic increase in rollovers, and other developments that 
have transformed the retirement plan landscape and the associated 
investment market over the four decades since the existing regulation 
was issued. In light of the extensive changes in retirement investment 
practices and relationships, the Regulation updates existing rules to 
distinguish more appropriately between the sorts of advice 
relationships that should be treated as fiduciary in nature and those 
that should not.
    PTE 86-128 permits certain fiduciaries to receive fees in 
connection with certain mutual fund and other securities transactions 
entered into by plans and IRAs. A number of changes are finalized with 
respect to the scope of the exemption and of another existing 
exemption, PTE 75-1, including revocation of many transactions 
originally permitted with respect to IRAs. These amendments and 
revocations affect the conditions under which fiduciaries may receive 
fees and compensation when they transact with plans and IRAs.
    The amendments and the partial revocations to PTEs 86-128 and 75-1 
are part of the Department's regulatory initiative to mitigate the 
effects of harmful conflicts of interest associated with fiduciary 
investment advice. In the absence of an exemption, ERISA and the Code 
generally prohibit fiduciaries from using their authority to affect or 
increase their own compensation. A new exemption for receipt of 
compensation by fiduciaries that provide investment advice to IRA 
owners,\1\ plan participants and beneficiaries, and certain plan 
fiduciaries, is adopted elsewhere in this issue of the Federal 
Register, in the ``Best Interest Contract Exemption.'' In the 
Department's view, the provisions of the Best Interest Contract 
Exemption better protect the interests of IRAs with respect to 
investment advice regarding the transactions for which relief was 
revoked.
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    \1\ For purposes of this amendment, the terms ``Individual 
Retirement Account'' or ``IRA'' mean any account or annuity 
described in Code section 4975(e)(1)(B) through (F), including, for 
example, an individual retirement account described in section 
408(a) of the Code and a health savings account described in section 
223(d) of the Code.
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    ERISA section 408(a) specifically authorizes the Secretary of Labor 
to grant administrative exemptions from ERISA's prohibited transaction 
provisions.\2\ Regulations at 29 CFR

[[Page 21182]]

2570.30 to 2570.52 describe the procedures for applying for an 
administrative exemption. The Department has determined that the 
amended exemptions are administratively feasible, in the interests of 
plans and their participants and beneficiaries and IRA owners, and 
protective of the rights of participants and beneficiaries of plans and 
IRA owners.
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    \2\ Code section 4975(c)(2) authorizes the Secretary of the 
Treasury to grant exemptions from the parallel prohibited 
transaction provisions of the Code. Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 
1978 (5 U.S.C. app. at 214 (2000)) (Reorganization Plan) generally 
transferred the authority of the Secretary of the Treasury to grant 
administrative exemptions under Code section 4975 to the Secretary 
of Labor. To rationalize the administration and interpretation of 
dual provisions under ERISA and the Code, the Reorganization Plan 
divided the interpretive and rulemaking authority for these 
provisions between the Secretaries of Labor and of the Treasury, so 
that, in general, the agency with responsibility for a given 
provision of Title I of ERISA would also have responsibility for the 
corresponding provision in the Code. Among the sections transferred 
to the Department were the prohibited transaction provisions and the 
definition of a fiduciary in both Title I of ERISA and in the Code. 
ERISA's prohibited transaction rules, 29 U.S.C. 1106-1108, apply to 
ERISA-covered plans, and the Code's corresponding prohibited 
transaction rules, 26 U.S.C. 4975(c), apply both to ERISA-covered 
pension plans that are tax-qualified pension plans, as well as other 
tax-advantaged arrangements, such as IRAs, that are not subject to 
the fiduciary responsibility and prohibited transaction rules in 
ERISA. Specifically, section 102(a) of the Reorganization Plan 
provides the Department of Labor with ``all authority'' for 
``regulations, rulings, opinions, and exemptions under section 4975 
[of the Code]'' subject to certain exceptions not relevant here. 
Reorganization Plan section 102. In President Carter's message to 
Congress regarding the Reorganization Plan, he made explicitly clear 
that as a result of the plan, ``Labor will have statutory authority 
for fiduciary obligations. . . . Labor will be responsible for 
overseeing fiduciary conduct under these provisions.'' 
Reorganization Plan, Message of the President. These amended 
exemptions provide relief from the indicated prohibited transaction 
provisions of both ERISA and the Code.
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Summary of the Major Provisions

    PTE 86-128, as amended, permits certain fiduciaries, including both 
investment advice fiduciaries as defined under the Regulation and 
fiduciaries with discretionary authority or control over plan assets 
(i.e., investment management fiduciaries), and their affiliates, to 
receive a fee directly from a plan for effecting or executing 
securities transactions as an agent on behalf of a plan. It also allows 
such fiduciaries to act in an ``agency cross transaction''--as an agent 
both for the plan and for another party--and receive reasonable 
compensation from the other party. Relief is also provided for 
investment advice fiduciaries and investment management fiduciaries to 
receive commissions from a plan or a mutual fund in connection with 
mutual fund transactions involving plans. This relief was originally 
available in another exemption, PTE 75-1, Part II(2), which is revoked 
today.
    The Department has amended the exemption to protect IRA investors 
from the harmful impact of conflicts of interest. Before these 
amendments, the exemption granted broad relief to transactions 
involving IRAs, without protective conditions. We have determined that 
this approach is unprotective of these retirement investors and 
incompatible with this regulatory initiative's goal of guarding 
retirement investors against the harms caused by conflicts of interest. 
Therefore, the amendment requires investment managers to meet the terms 
of the exemption before engaging in covered transactions with respect 
to IRAs, and revokes relief for investment advice fiduciaries with 
respect to IRAs. Investment advice fiduciaries with respect to IRAs may 
rely instead on the Best Interest Contract Exemption finalized today 
elsewhere in this issue of the Federal Register, which has conditions 
specifically tailored to protect the interests of IRA investors.
    The amendment requires fiduciaries relying on PTE 86-128 to adhere 
to ``Impartial Conduct Standards,'' including acting in the best 
interest of plans and IRAs, when they exercise their fiduciary 
authority. The amendment also adopts the proposed definition of 
Commission which sets forth the limited types of payments that are 
permitted under the exemption, and revises the disclosure and 
recordkeeping requirements under the exemption.
    Finally, other changes are adopted with respect to PTE 75-1. PTE 
75-1, Part II, is amended to revise the recordkeeping requirement of 
that exemption. Part I(b) and (c) of PTE 75-1, which provided relief 
for certain non-fiduciary services to plans and IRAs, is revoked. Upon 
revocation, persons seeking to engage in such transactions should look 
to the existing statutory exemptions provided in ERISA section 
408(b)(2) and Code section 4975(d)(2), and the Department's 
implementing regulations at 29 CFR 2550.408b-2, for relief.

Executive Order 12866 and 13563 Statement

    Under Executive Orders 12866 and 13563, the Department must 
determine whether a regulatory action is ``significant'' and therefore 
subject to the requirements of the Executive Order and subject to 
review by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). Executive Orders 
12866 and 13563 direct agencies to assess all costs and benefits of 
available regulatory alternatives and, if regulation is necessary, to 
select regulatory approaches that maximize net benefits (including 
potential economic, environmental, public health and safety effects, 
distributive impacts, and equity). Executive Order 13563 emphasizes the 
importance of quantifying both costs and benefits, of reducing costs, 
of harmonizing and streamlining rules, and of promoting flexibility. It 
also requires federal agencies to develop a plan under which the 
agencies will periodically review their existing significant 
regulations to make the agencies' regulatory programs more effective or 
less burdensome in achieving their regulatory objectives.
    Under Executive Order 12866, ``significant'' regulatory actions are 
subject to the requirements of the Executive Order and review by the 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB). Section 3(f) of Executive Order 
12866, defines a ``significant regulatory action'' as an action that is 
likely to result in a rule (1) having an annual effect on the economy 
of $100 million or more, or adversely and materially affecting a sector 
of the economy, productivity, competition, jobs, the environment, 
public health or safety, or State, local or tribal governments or 
communities (also referred to as ``economically significant'' 
regulatory actions); (2) creating serious inconsistency or otherwise 
interfering with an action taken or planned by another agency; (3) 
materially altering the budgetary impacts of entitlement grants, user 
fees, or loan programs or the rights and obligations of recipients 
thereof; or (4) raising novel legal or policy issues arising out of 
legal mandates, the President's priorities, or the principles set forth 
in the Executive Order. Pursuant to the terms of the Executive Order, 
OMB has determined that this action is ``significant'' within the 
meaning of Section 3(f)(4) of the Executive Order. Accordingly, the 
Department has undertaken an assessment of the costs and benefits of 
the proposal, and OMB has reviewed this regulatory action. The 
Department's complete Regulatory Impact Analysis is available at 
www.dol.gov/ebsa.

Background

Regulation Defining a Fiduciary

    As explained more fully in the preamble to the Regulation, ERISA is 
a comprehensive statute designed to protect the interests of plan 
participants and beneficiaries, the integrity of employee benefit 
plans, and the security of retirement, health, and other critical 
benefits. The broad public interest in ERISA-covered plans is reflected 
in its imposition of fiduciary responsibilities on parties engaging in 
important plan activities, as well as in the tax-favored status of plan 
assets and investments. One of the chief ways in which ERISA protects 
employee benefit plans is by requiring that plan fiduciaries comply 
with fundamental obligations rooted in the law of trusts. In 
particular, plan fiduciaries must manage plan assets prudently and with 
undivided loyalty to the plans and their participants and 
beneficiaries.\3\ In addition, they must refrain from engaging in 
``prohibited transactions,'' which ERISA does not permit because of the 
dangers posed by the fiduciaries' conflicts of interest with respect to 
the transactions.\4\ When fiduciaries violate ERISA's fiduciary duties 
or the prohibited transaction rules, they may be held personally liable

[[Page 21183]]

for the breach.\5\ In addition, violations of the prohibited 
transaction rules are subject to excise taxes under the Code.
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    \3\ ERISA section 404(a).
    \4\ ERISA section 406. ERISA also prohibits certain transactions 
between a plan and a ``party in interest.''
    \5\ ERISA section 409; see also ERISA section 405.
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    The Code also has rules regarding fiduciary conduct with respect to 
tax-favored accounts that are not generally covered by ERISA, such as 
IRAs. In particular, fiduciaries of these arrangements, including IRAs, 
are subject to the prohibited transaction rules and, when they violate 
the rules, to the imposition of an excise tax enforced by the Internal 
Revenue Service. Unlike participants in plans covered by Title I of 
ERISA, IRA owners do not have a statutory right to bring suit against 
fiduciaries for violation of the prohibited transaction rules.
    Under this statutory framework, the determination of who is a 
``fiduciary'' is of central importance. Many of ERISA's and the Code's 
protections, duties, and liabilities hinge on fiduciary status. In 
relevant part, ERISA section 3(21)(A) and Code section 4975(e)(3) 
provide that a person is a fiduciary with respect to a plan or IRA to 
the extent he or she (i) exercises any discretionary authority or 
discretionary control with respect to management of such plan or IRA, 
or exercises any authority or control with respect to management or 
disposition of its assets; (ii) renders investment advice for a fee or 
other compensation, direct or indirect, with respect to any moneys or 
other property of such plan or IRA, or has any authority or 
responsibility to do so; or, (iii) has any discretionary authority or 
discretionary responsibility in the administration of such plan or IRA.
    The statutory definition deliberately casts a wide net in assigning 
fiduciary responsibility with respect to plan and IRA assets. Thus, 
``any authority or control'' over plan or IRA assets is sufficient to 
confer fiduciary status, and any persons who render ``investment advice 
for a fee or other compensation, direct or indirect'' are fiduciaries, 
regardless of whether they have direct control over the plan's or IRA's 
assets and regardless of their status as an investment adviser or 
broker under the federal securities laws. The statutory definition and 
associated responsibilities were enacted to ensure that plans, plan 
participants, and IRA owners can depend on persons who provide 
investment advice for a fee to provide recommendations that are 
untainted by conflicts of interest. In the absence of fiduciary status, 
the providers of investment advice are neither subject to ERISA's 
fundamental fiduciary standards, nor accountable under ERISA or the 
Code for imprudent, disloyal, or biased advice.
    In 1975, the Department issued a regulation, at 29 CFR 2510.3-
21(c)(1975), defining the circumstances under which a person is treated 
as providing ``investment advice'' to an employee benefit plan within 
the meaning of ERISA section 3(21)(A)(ii) (the ``1975 regulation'').\6\ 
The 1975 regulation narrowed the scope of the statutory definition of 
fiduciary investment advice by creating a five-part test for fiduciary 
advice. Under the 1975 regulation, for advice to constitute 
``investment advice,'' an adviser \7\ must (1) render advice as to the 
value of securities or other property, or make recommendations as to 
the advisability of investing in, purchasing or selling securities or 
other property (2) on a regular basis (3) pursuant to a mutual 
agreement, arrangement or understanding, with the plan or a plan 
fiduciary that (4) the advice will serve as a primary basis for 
investment decisions with respect to plan assets, and that (5) the 
advice will be individualized based on the particular needs of the 
plan. The regulation provided that an adviser is a fiduciary with 
respect to any particular instance of advice only if he or she meets 
each and every element of the five-part test with respect to the 
particular advice recipient or plan at issue.
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    \6\ The Department of Treasury issued a virtually identical 
regulation, at 26 CFR 54.4975-9(c), which interprets Code section 
4975(e)(3).
    \7\ When using the term ``adviser,'' the Department does not 
refer only to investment advisers registered under the Investment 
Advisers Act of 1940 or under state law, but rather to any person 
rendering fiduciary investment advice under the Regulation. For 
example, as used herein, an adviser can be an individual who is, 
among other things, a representative of a registered investment 
adviser, a bank or similar financial institution, an insurance 
company, or a broker-dealer.
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    The market for retirement advice has changed dramatically since the 
Department first promulgated the 1975 regulation. Individuals, rather 
than large employers and professional money managers, have become 
increasingly responsible for managing retirement assets as IRAs and 
participant-directed plans, such as 401(k) plans, have supplanted 
defined benefit pensions. At the same time, the variety and complexity 
of financial products have increased, widening the information gap 
between advisers and their clients. Plan fiduciaries, plan participants 
and IRA investors must often rely on experts for advice, but are unable 
to assess the quality of the expert's advice or effectively guard 
against the adviser's conflicts of interest. This challenge is 
especially true of retail investors who typically do not have financial 
expertise, and can ill-afford lower returns to their retirement savings 
caused by conflicts. The IRA accounts of these investors often account 
for all or the lion's share of their assets, and can represent all of 
savings earned for a lifetime of work. Losses and reduced returns can 
be devastating to the investors who depend upon such savings for 
support in their old age. As baby boomers retire, they are increasingly 
moving money from ERISA-covered plans, where their employer has both 
the incentive and the fiduciary duty to facilitate sound investment 
choices, to IRAs where both good and bad investment choices are myriad 
and advice that is conflicted is commonplace. These rollovers are 
expected to approach $2.4 trillion cumulatively from 2016 through 
2020.\8\ These trends were not apparent when the Department promulgated 
the 1975 rule. At that time, 401(k) plans did not yet exist and IRAs 
had only just been authorized.
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    \8\ Cerulli Associates, ``Retirement Markets 2015.''
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    As the marketplace for financial services has developed in the 
years since 1975, the five-part test has now come to undermine, rather 
than promote, the statutes' text and purposes. The narrowness of the 
1975 regulation has allowed advisers, brokers, consultants and 
valuation firms to play a central role in shaping plan and IRA 
investments, without ensuring the accountability that Congress intended 
for persons having such influence and responsibility. Even when plan 
sponsors, participants, beneficiaries, and IRA owners clearly relied on 
paid advisers for impartial guidance, the 1975 regulation has allowed 
many advisers to avoid fiduciary status and disregard basic fiduciary 
obligations of care and prohibitions on disloyal and conflicted 
transactions. As a consequence, these advisers have been able to steer 
customers to investments based on their own self-interest (e.g., 
products that generate higher fees for the adviser even if there are 
identical lower-fee products available), give imprudent advice, and 
engage in transactions that would otherwise be prohibited by ERISA and 
the Code without fear of accountability under either ERISA or the Code.
    In the Department's amendments to the regulation defining fiduciary 
advice within the meaning of ERISA section 3(21)(A)(ii) and Code 
section 4975(e)(3)(B), (the ``Regulation'') which are also published in 
this issue of the Federal Register, the Department is replacing the 
existing regulation with

[[Page 21184]]

one that more appropriately distinguishes between the sorts of advice 
relationships that should be treated as fiduciary in nature and those 
that should not, in light of the legal framework and financial 
marketplace in which IRAs and plans currently operate.\9\
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    \9\ The Department initially proposed an amendment to its 
regulation defining a fiduciary within the meaning of ERISA section 
3(21)(A)(ii) and Code section 4975(e)(3)(B) on October 22, 2010, at 
75 FR 65263. It subsequently announced its intention to withdraw the 
proposal and propose a new rule, consistent with the President's 
Executive Orders 12866 and 13563, in order to give the public a full 
opportunity to evaluate and comment on the new proposal and updated 
economic analysis. The first proposed amendment to the rule was 
withdrawn on April 20, 2015, see 80 FR 21927.
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    The Regulation describes the types of advice that constitute 
``investment advice'' with respect to plan or IRA assets for purposes 
of the definition of a fiduciary at ERISA section 3(21)(A)(ii) and Code 
section 4975(e)(3)(B). The Regulation covers ERISA-covered plans, IRAs, 
and other plans not covered by Title I, such as Keogh plans, and health 
savings accounts described in section 223(d) of the Code.
    As amended, the Regulation provides that a person renders 
investment advice with respect to assets of a plan or IRA if, among 
other things, the person provides, directly to a plan, a plan 
fiduciary, plan participant or beneficiary, IRA or IRA owner, the 
following types of advice, for a fee or other compensation, whether 
direct or indirect:
    (i) A recommendation as to the advisability of acquiring, holding, 
disposing of, or exchanging, securities or other investment property, 
or a recommendation as to how securities or other investment property 
should be invested after the securities or other investment property 
are rolled over, transferred or distributed from the plan or IRA; and
    (ii) A recommendation as to the management of securities or other 
investment property, including, among other things, recommendations on 
investment policies or strategies, portfolio composition, selection of 
other persons to provide investment advice or investment management 
services, types of investment account arrangements (brokerage vs. 
advisory); or recommendations with respect to rollovers, transfers or 
distributions from a plan or IRA including whether, in what amount, in 
what form, and to what destination such a rollover, transfer or 
distribution should be made.
    In addition, in order to be treated as a fiduciary, such person, 
either directly or indirectly (e.g., through or together with any 
affiliate), must: Represent or acknowledge that it is acting as a 
fiduciary within the meaning of ERISA or the Code with respect to the 
advice described; represent or acknowledge that it is acting as a 
fiduciary within the meaning of ERISA or the Code; render the advice 
pursuant to a written or verbal agreement, arrangement or understanding 
that the advice is based on the particular investment needs of the 
advice recipient; or direct the advice to a specific advice recipient 
or recipients regarding the advisability of a particular investment or 
management decision with respect to securities or other investment 
property of the plan or IRA.
    The Regulation also provides that as a threshold matter in order to 
be fiduciary advice, the communication must be a ``recommendation'' as 
defined therein. The Regulation, as a matter of clarification, provides 
that a variety of other communications do not constitute 
``recommendations,'' including non-fiduciary investment education; 
general communications; and specified communications by platform 
providers. These communications which do not rise to the level of 
``recommendations'' under the regulation are discussed more fully in 
the preamble to the final Regulation.
    The Regulation also specifies certain circumstances where the 
Department has determined that a person will not be treated as an 
investment advice fiduciary even though the person's activities 
technically may satisfy the definition of investment advice. For 
example, the Regulation contains a provision excluding recommendations 
to independent fiduciaries with financial expertise that are acting on 
behalf of plans or IRAs in arm's length transactions, if certain 
conditions are met. The independent fiduciary must be a bank, insurance 
carrier qualified to do business in more than one state, investment 
adviser registered under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 or by a 
state, broker-dealer registered under the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 (Exchange Act), or any other independent fiduciary that holds, or 
has under management or control, assets of at least $50 million, and: 
(1) The person making the recommendation must know or reasonably 
believe that the independent fiduciary of the plan or IRA is capable of 
evaluating investment risks independently, both in general and with 
regard to particular transactions and investment strategies (the person 
may rely on written representations from the plan or independent 
fiduciary to satisfy this condition); (2) the person must fairly inform 
the independent fiduciary that the person is not undertaking to provide 
impartial investment advice, or to give advice in a fiduciary capacity, 
in connection with the transaction and must fairly inform the 
independent fiduciary of the existence and nature of the person's 
financial interests in the transaction; (3) the person must know or 
reasonably believe that the independent fiduciary of the plan or IRA is 
a fiduciary under ERISA or the Code, or both, with respect to the 
transaction and is responsible for exercising independent judgment in 
evaluating the transaction (the person may rely on written 
representations from the plan or independent fiduciary to satisfy this 
condition); and (4) the person cannot receive a fee or other 
compensation directly from the plan, plan fiduciary, plan participant 
or beneficiary, IRA, or IRA owner for the provision of investment 
advice (as opposed to other services) in connection with the 
transaction.
    Similarly, the Regulation provides that the provision of any advice 
to an employee benefit plan (as described in section 3(3) of ERISA) by 
a person who is a swap dealer, security-based swap dealer, major swap 
participant, major security-based swap participant, or a swap clearing 
firm in connection with a swap or security-based swap, as defined in 
section 1a of the Commodity Exchange Act (7 U.S.C. 1a) and section 3(a) 
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78c(a)) is not 
investment advice if certain conditions are met. Finally, the 
Regulation describes certain communications by employees of a plan 
sponsor, plan, or plan fiduciary that would not cause the employee to 
be an investment advice fiduciary if certain conditions are met.

Prohibited Transactions

    The Department anticipates that the Regulation will cover many 
investment professionals who did not previously consider themselves to 
be fiduciaries under ERISA or the Code. Under the Regulation, these 
entities will be subject to the prohibited transaction restrictions in 
ERISA and the Code that apply specifically to fiduciaries. ERISA 
section 406(b)(1) and Code section 4975(c)(1)(E) prohibit a fiduciary 
from dealing with the income or assets of a plan or IRA in his own 
interest or his own account. ERISA section 406(b)(2), which does not 
apply to IRAs, provides that a fiduciary shall not ``in his individual 
or in any other capacity act in any transaction involving the plan on 
behalf of a party (or represent a party) whose interests are adverse to 
the interests of the plan or the interests of its participants or 
beneficiaries.'' ERISA

[[Page 21185]]

section 406(b)(3) and Code section 4975(c)(1)(F) prohibit a fiduciary 
from receiving any consideration for his own personal account from any 
party dealing with the plan or IRA in connection with a transaction 
involving assets of the plan or IRA.
    Parallel regulations issued by the Departments of Labor and the 
Treasury explain that these provisions impose on fiduciaries of plans 
and IRAs a duty not to act on conflicts of interest that may affect the 
fiduciary's best judgment on behalf of the plan or IRA.\10\ The 
prohibitions extend to a fiduciary causing a plan or IRA to pay an 
additional fee to such fiduciary, or to a person in which such 
fiduciary has an interest that may affect the exercise of the 
fiduciary's best judgment as a fiduciary. Likewise, a fiduciary is 
prohibited from receiving compensation from third parties in connection 
with a transaction involving the plan or IRA.\11\
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    \10\ Subsequent to the issuance of these regulations, 
Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1978, 5 U.S.C. App. (2010), divided 
rulemaking and interpretive authority between the Secretaries of 
Labor and the Treasury. The Secretary of Labor was given 
interpretive and rulemaking authority regarding the definition of 
fiduciary under both Title I of ERISA and the Internal Revenue Code. 
Id. section 102(a) (``all authority of the Secretary of the Treasury 
to issue [regulations, rulings opinions, and exemptions under 
section 4975 of the Code] is hereby transferred to the Secretary of 
Labor'').
    \11\ 29 CFR 2550.408b-2(e); 26 CFR 54.4975-6(a)(5).
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    Investment professionals are often compensated on a commission 
basis for effecting or executing securities transactions for plans, 
plan participants and beneficiaries, and IRAs. Because such payments 
vary based on the advice provided, the Department views a fiduciary 
that recommends to a plan or IRA a securities transaction and then 
receives a commission for itself or a related party as violating the 
prohibited transaction provisions of ERISA section 406(b) and Code 
section 4975(c)(1)(E).

Prohibited Transaction Exemptions 86-128 and 75-1, Part II

    As the prohibited transaction provisions demonstrate, ERISA and the 
Code strongly disfavor conflicts of interest. In appropriate cases, 
however, the statutes provide exemptions from their broad prohibitions 
on conflicts of interest. For example, ERISA section 408(b)(14) and 
Code section 4975(d)(17) specifically exempt transactions involving the 
provision of fiduciary investment advice to a participant or 
beneficiary of an individual account plan or IRA owner if the advice, 
resulting transaction, and the adviser's fees meet stringent conditions 
carefully designed to guard against conflicts of interest.
    In addition, the Secretary of Labor has discretionary authority to 
grant administrative exemptions under ERISA and the Code on an 
individual or class basis, but only if the Secretary first finds that 
the exemptions are (1) administratively feasible, (2) in the interests 
of plans and their participants and beneficiaries and IRA owners, and 
(3) protective of the rights of the participants and beneficiaries of 
such plans and IRA owners. Accordingly, fiduciary advisers may always 
give advice without need of an exemption if they avoid the sorts of 
conflicts of interest that result in prohibited transactions. However, 
when they choose to give advice in which they have a conflict of 
interest, they must rely upon an exemption.
    Pursuant to its exemption authority, the Department has previously 
granted several conditional administrative class exemptions that are 
available to fiduciary advisers in defined circumstances. PTE 86-128 
\12\ historically provided an exemption from these prohibited 
transactions provisions for certain types of fiduciaries to use their 
authority to cause a plan or IRA to pay a fee to the fiduciary, or its 
affiliate, for effecting or executing securities transactions as agent 
for the plan. The exemption further provided relief for these types of 
fiduciaries to act as agent in an ``agency cross transaction'' for both 
a plan or IRA and one or more other parties to the transaction, and for 
such fiduciaries or their affiliates to receive fees from the other 
party(ies) in connection with the agency cross transaction. An agency 
cross transaction is defined in the exemption as a securities 
transaction in which the same person acts as agent for both any seller 
and any buyer for the purchase or sale of a security.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \12\ PTE 86-128, 51 FR 41686 (November 18, 1986), replaced PTE 
79-1, 44 FR 5963 (January 30, 1979) and PTE 84-46, 49 FR 22157 (May 
25, 1984).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As originally granted, the exemption in PTE 86-128 could be used 
only by fiduciaries who were not discretionary trustees, plan 
administrators, or employers of any employees covered by the plan.\13\ 
PTE 86-128 was amended in 2002 to permit use of the exemption by 
discretionary trustees, and their affiliates subject to certain 
additional requirements.\14\ Additionally, in 2011 the Department 
specifically noted in an Advisory Opinion that PTE 86-128 provides 
relief for covered transactions engaged in by fiduciaries who provide 
investment advice for a fee.\15\
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    \13\ Plan trustees, plan administrators and employers were 
permitted to rely on the exemption if they returned or credited to 
the plan all profits (recapture of profits) earned in connection 
with the transactions covered by the exemption.
    \14\ 67 FR 64137 (October 17, 2002).
    \15\ See Advisory Opinion 2011-08A (June 21, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Prohibited Transaction Exemption 75-1, Part II(2), provided relief 
for the purchase or sale by a plan of securities issued by an open-end 
investment company registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940 
(15 U.S.C. 80a-1 et seq.), provided that no fiduciary with respect to 
the plan who made the decision on behalf of the plan to enter into the 
transaction was a principal underwriter for, or affiliated with, such 
investment company within the meaning of sections 2(a)(29) and 2(a)(3) 
of the Investment Company Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80a-2(a)(29) and 80a-
2(a)(3)). The exemption permitted a fiduciary to receive a commission 
in connection with the purchase.
    The conditions of the exemption required that the fiduciary 
customarily purchase and sell securities for its own account in the 
ordinary course of its business, that the transaction occur on terms at 
least as favorable to the plan as an arm's length transaction with an 
unrelated party, and that records be maintained. Contrary to our 
current approach to recordkeeping, the exemption imposed the 
recordkeeping burden on the plan or IRA involved in the transaction, 
rather than the fiduciary.
    In connection with the proposed Regulation, the Department proposed 
an amendment to PTE 86-128. First, the Department proposed to increase 
the safeguards of the exemption by requiring fiduciaries that rely on 
the exemption to adhere to certain ``Impartial Conduct Standards,'' 
including acting in the best interest of the plans and IRAs when 
exercising fiduciary authority, and by more precisely defining the 
types of payments that are permitted under the exemption.\16\ Second, 
on a going forward basis, the Department proposed to restrict relief to 
IRA fiduciaries with discretionary authority or control over the 
management of the IRA's assets (i.e., investment managers) and to 
impose the exemption's protective conditions on investment management 
fiduciaries when they engage in transactions with IRAs. Finally, the 
Department proposed

[[Page 21186]]

to revoke relief for investment advice fiduciaries with respect to 
IRAs.
    The Department also proposed that PTE 86-128 would apply to the 
transactions originally permitted under PTE 75-1, Part II(2). In this 
connection, we proposed to revoke PTE 75-1, Part II(2). We also 
proposed to revoke PTE 75-1, Part I(b) and (c), which provided relief 
for certain non-fiduciary services to plans and IRAs, in light of the 
existing statutory exemptions provided in ERISA section 408(b)(2) and 
Code section 4975(d)(2) and the Department's implementing regulations 
at 29 CFR 2550.408b-2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \16\ As noted above, for purposes of this amendment, the terms 
``Individual Retirement Account'' or ``IRA'' mean any account or 
annuity described in Code section 4975(e)(1)(B) through (F), 
including, for example, an individual retirement account described 
in section 408(a) of the Code and a health savings account described 
in section 223(d) of the Code.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    These amendments and partial revocations follow a lengthy public 
notice and comment period, which gave interested persons an extensive 
opportunity to comment on the proposed Regulation, amendments and other 
related exemption proposals. The proposals initially provided for 75-
day comment periods, ending on July 6, 2015, but the Department 
extended the comment periods to July 21, 2015. The Department then held 
four days of public hearings on the new regulatory package, including 
the proposed exemptions, in Washington, DC from August 10 to 13, 2015, 
at which over 75 speakers testified. The transcript of the hearing was 
made available on September 8, 2015, and the Department provided 
additional opportunity for interested persons to comment on the 
proposals or hearing transcript until September 24, 2015. A total of 
over 3000 comment letters were received on the new proposals. There 
were also over 300,000 submissions made as part of 30 separate 
petitions submitted on the proposal. These comments and petitions came 
from consumer groups, plan sponsors, financial services companies, 
academics, elected government officials, trade and industry 
associations, and others, both in support and in opposition to the 
rule.\17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \17\ As used throughout this preamble, the term ``comment'' 
refers to information provided through these various sources, 
including written comments, petitions and witnesses at the public 
hearing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Department has reviewed all comments, and after careful 
consideration of comments received, has decided to grant the amendments 
to and partial revocations of PTEs 86-128 and 75-1, Part II, as 
described below.

Description of the Amendments and Partial Revocations

    As amended, PTE 86-128 preserves originally granted relief for 
mutual fund and securities transactions involving plans, with the added 
safeguards of the Impartial Conduct Standards and a clearer definition 
of the types of payments that are permitted. The amendment also adopts 
the proposed approach to relief for fiduciaries with respect to IRAs, 
which significantly increased the safeguards to these retirement 
investors. Investment management fiduciaries to IRAs may rely on 
Section I(a) of PTE 86-128 if they satisfy the conditions of the 
exemption, including the Impartial Conduct Standards, the disclosures 
and the authorizations. However, relief for investment advice 
fiduciaries is revoked. Also revoked is PTE 75-1, Part II(2), which 
permitted fiduciaries to receive compensation in connection with 
certain mutual fund transactions, under very few applicable safeguards, 
and PTE 75-1, Part I(b) and (c), in light of the statutory exemptions 
in ERISA section 408(b)(2) and Code section 4975(d)(2).
    The Department revised PTE 86-128 and 75-1, Part II, in these ways 
in conjunction with the grant of a new exemption, the Best Interest 
Contract Exemption, adopted elsewhere in this issue of the Federal 
Register, that is specifically applicable to advice to certain 
``retirement investors''--generally retail investors such as plan 
participants and beneficiaries, IRA owners, and certain plan 
fiduciaries. The Best Interest Contract Exemption provides broader 
relief for investment advice fiduciaries recommending mutual fund and 
other securities transactions to retirement investors. The conditions 
of the Best Interest Contract Exemption more appropriately address 
these arrangements.
    With respect to IRA owners and participants and beneficiaries in 
non-ERISA plans, the Best Interest Contract Exemption requires the 
investment advice fiduciary to contractually acknowledge fiduciary 
status and commit to adhere to the Impartial Conduct Standards. As a 
result, the Best Interest Contract Exemption ensures that IRA owners 
and the non-ERISA plan participants and beneficiaries have a contract-
based claim if their advisers violate the fundamental fiduciary 
obligations of prudence and loyalty, a protection that is not present 
in PTE 86-128 and 75-1, Part II.
    More generally, the Best Interest Contract Exemption includes 
safeguards that are uniquely protective of both plans and IRAs in 
today's complex financial marketplace, including the requirement that 
financial institutions relying on the exemption adopt anti-conflict 
policies and procedures designed to ensure that advisers satisfy the 
Impartial Conduct Standards. The Best Interest Contract Exemption is 
specifically tailored to address, among other things, the particular 
conflicts of interest associated with third party payments such as 
revenue sharing and 12b-1 fees that may not be readily apparent to the 
retirement investor but can provide powerful incentives to investment 
advice fiduciaries.
    In addition to the Best Interest Contract Exemption, the Regulation 
adopted today makes provision for certain parties to avoid fiduciary 
status when they engage in arm's length transactions with plans or IRAs 
that are independently represented by a fiduciary with financial 
expertise. Such independent fiduciaries generally include banks, 
insurance carriers, registered investment advisers, broker-dealers and 
other fiduciaries with $50 million or more in assets under management 
or control. This provision in the Regulation complements the 
limitations in the Best Interest Contract Exemption and is available 
for transactions involving mutual fund and other securities 
transactions.
    A number of commenters objected generally to changes to PTE 86-128 
and PTE 75-1, Part II(2), on the basis that the originally granted 
exemptions provided sufficient protections to retirement investors. 
Commenters said there is no demonstrated harm to these consumers under 
the existing approach. The Department does not agree. The extensive 
changes in the retirement plan landscape and the associated investment 
market in recent decades undermine the continued adequacy of our 
original approach in PTE 86-128 and PTE 75-1, Part II(2). As noted in 
the accompanying Regulatory Impact Analysis, the Department has 
determined that investors saving for retirement lose billions of 
dollars each year as a result of conflicts of interest. PTE 86-128 and 
PTE 75-1 did not adequately safeguard against these losses, and indeed, 
in some cases, imposed no protective conditions whatsoever with respect 
to conflicted investment advice. The changes to these exemptions, 
discussed below, respond to the ongoing harms caused by conflicts of 
interest.
    The Department did not fully revoke PTE 86-128 and PTE 75-1, Part 
II, however, where it determined that the conditions of those 
exemptions continued to be appropriate in connection with the narrow 
scope of relief provided. PTE 75-1, Part II, remains available for 
transactions involving non-fiduciary service providers and PTE 86-128 
continues to provide narrow relief for commission payments to 
fiduciaries, in transactions involving ERISA plans and managed

[[Page 21187]]

IRAs, subject to the Impartial Conduct Standards as additional 
conditions of relief. Broader relief, for more types of payments to 
investment advice fiduciaries, is provided in the Best Interest 
Contract Exemption for transactions involving plans, IRAs, and non-
ERISA plans. The Best Interest Contract Exemption is designed to 
address the fiduciary conflicts of interest associated with the variety 
of payments received in connection with transactions involving all 
plans and IRAs.

Scope of the Amended PTE 86-128

    As amended, PTE 86-128 applies to the following transactions set 
forth in Section I of the exemption:
    (a) (1) A plan fiduciary's using its authority to cause a plan to 
pay a Commission directly to that person or a Related Entity as agent 
for the plan in a securities transaction, but only to the extent that 
the securities transactions are not excessive, under the circumstances, 
in either amount or frequency; and (2) A plan fiduciary's acting as the 
agent in an agency cross transaction for both the plan and one or more 
other parties to the transaction and the receipt by such person of a 
Commission from one or more other parties to the transaction; and
    (b) A plan fiduciary's using its authority to cause the plan to 
purchase shares of an open end investment company registered under the 
Investment Company Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80a-1 et seq.) (Mutual Fund) 
from such fiduciary, and to the receipt of a Commission by such person 
in connection with such transaction, but only to the extent that such 
transactions are not excessive, under the circumstances, in either 
amount or frequency; provided that, the fiduciary (1) is a broker-
dealer registered under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 
78a et seq.) acting in its capacity as a broker-dealer, and (2) is not 
a principal underwriter for, or affiliated with, such Mutual Fund, 
within the meaning of sections 2(a)(29) and 2(a)(3) of the Investment 
Company Act of 1940.
    Thus, Section I(a) provides relief for transactions involving 
securities where a Commission, as defined in the exemption, is paid 
directly by the plan or IRA. Section I(b) provides relief for mutual 
fund transactions where a Commission is received but it does not have 
to be paid directly by the plan; the relief in Section I(b) extends to 
Commissions paid by a mutual fund or its affiliate. The final exemption 
makes clear that the relief provided in Section I(b) was intended to 
apply to broker-dealers acting in their capacity as broker-dealers.
    Section I(c) establishes certain limitations on the relief 
provided, with respect to transactions involving IRAs. Section I(c)(1) 
provides that the exemption in Section I(a) does not apply if (A) the 
plan is an IRA \18\ and (B) the fiduciary engaging in the transaction 
is a fiduciary by reason of the provision of investment advice for a 
fee, as described in Code section 4975(e)(3)(B) and the applicable 
regulations. Section I(c)(2) provides that the exemption in Section 
I(b) does not apply to transactions involving IRAs. Relief for 
investment advice fiduciaries (including broker-dealers) providing 
investment advice to IRAs is available under the Best Interest Contract 
Exemption.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \18\ For purposes of this amendment, the terms ``Individual 
Retirement Account'' or ``IRA'' mean any account or annuity 
described in Code section 4975(e)(1)(B) through (F), including, for 
example, an individual retirement account described in section 
408(a) of the Code and a health savings account described in section 
223(d) of the Code.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Section I(c) was revised from the proposal, which stated: ``The 
exemptions set forth in Section I(a) and (b) do not apply to a 
transaction if (1) the plan is an Individual Retirement Account and (2) 
the fiduciary engaging in the transaction is a fiduciary by reason of 
the provision of investment advice for a fee, as described in Code 
section 4975(e)(3)(B) and the applicable regulations.'' The revision 
was made to clarify the intent of the proposal that, as amended, the 
exemption should be relied on for transactions involving IRAs only by 
fiduciaries with full investment discretion. As a result, the exemption 
in Section I(b) effectively would have been unavailable with respect to 
IRAs, since Section I(b) provides relief only to broker-dealers acting 
in their capacities as broker dealers. The final exemption makes that 
restriction explicit.
    In addition, the exclusion from conditions of the exemption for 
certain plans not covering employees, including IRAs, contained in 
Section IV(a), was eliminated. Therefore, while investment advice 
fiduciaries to IRAs must rely on another exemption, fiduciaries that 
exercise full discretionary authority or control with respect to IRAs 
as described in Code section 4975(e)(3)(A) (i.e., investment managers) 
may continue to rely on Section I(a) of the amended exemption, as long 
as they comply with the Impartial Conduct Standards and make the 
disclosures and receive the approvals that were originally required by 
the exemption with respect to other types of plans.
    The Department notes that the transaction description set forth in 
Section I(a) of the proposal has been revised to refer to a 
``securities transaction.'' The addition of the language is simply to 
ensure clarity with respect to the scope of the relief. PTE 86-128 has 
always been limited to securities transactions, and the Department 
added the language to remove any doubt that may have been created by 
its absence from the proposed language. Comments on issues of scope are 
discussed below.

IRAs

    Commenters have broadly argued that no changes should be made with 
respect to the relief originally provided to and conditions imposed on 
IRA fiduciaries. The commenters stated that the Department has offered 
no evidence that a change is necessary. Further, they argued that 
excluding only certain IRA fiduciaries from PTE 86-128 will increase 
cost and create confusion.
    As reflected in the Regulatory Impact Analysis, the prevalence of 
conflicts of interest in the marketplace for retirement investments is 
causing ongoing harm to retirement investors. Developments since the 
Department granted PTE 86-128, and its predecessor PTE 75-1, Part I, 
have exacerbated the dangers posed by conflicts of interest in the IRA 
marketplace. The amount of assets held in IRAs has grown dramatically, 
as the financial services marketplace and financial products have 
become more complex, and compensation structures have become 
increasingly conflicted.
    To put the changes in the market place in context, IRAs were only 
established in 1975 (the same year as PTE 75-1 was issued). By 1984, 
IRAs still held just $159 billion in assets, compared with $589 billion 
in private-sector defined benefit plans and $287 billion in private-
sector defined contribution plans. By the end of the 2014 third 
quarter, in contrast, IRAs held $6.3 trillion, far surpassing both 
defined benefit plans ($3.0 trillion) and defined contribution plans 
($5.3 trillion). If current trends continue, defined benefit plans' 
role will decline further, and IRA growth will continue to outstrip 
that of defined contribution plans, as the workforce ages and the baby 
boom generation retires and more defined contribution accounts (and 
sometimes lump sum payouts of defined benefit benefits) are rolled into 
IRAs. Almost $2.5 trillion is projected to be rolled over from ERISA 
plans to IRAs between 2015 and 2019. The growth of IRAs has made more 
middle- and lower-income families into investors, and sound investing 
more critical to such families' retirement security.

[[Page 21188]]

    Further, as more families have invested, investing has become more 
complicated. As IRAs grew during the 1980s and 1990s, their investment 
pattern changed, shifting away from bank products and toward mutual 
funds. Bank products typically provide a specified investment return, 
and perhaps charge an explicit fee. Single issue securities lack 
diversification and have uncertain returns, but the expenses associated 
with acquiring and holding them typically take the form of explicit up-
front commissions and perhaps some ongoing account fees. Mutual funds 
are more diversified (and in this respect can simplify investing), but 
also have uncertain returns, and their fee arrangements can be more 
complex, and can include a variety of revenue sharing and other 
arrangements that can introduce conflicts into investment advice and 
that usually are not fully transparent to investors. The growth in IRAs 
and the shift in how IRA assets are invested point toward a growing 
risk that conflicts of interest will taint investment advice regarding 
IRAs and thereby compromise retirement security.
    Prior to these amendments, PTE 86-128 did not protect IRA investors 
with respect to the transactions it covered, but rather gave 
fiduciaries a broad unconditional pass from the prohibited transaction 
rules, which Congress enacted to protect retirement investors from the 
dangers posed by conflicts of interest. Continuing to give free reign 
to conflicts of interest in this manner cannot be squared with the 
important anti-conflict purposes of the prohibited transaction rules, 
nor would it be in the interests of the IRAs or protective of the 
rights of IRA owners.\19\ The amendments and revocations finalized 
today protect IRA investors from the abuses posed by conflicts of 
interest and the injuries identified in the Regulatory Impact Analysis. 
The decision to eliminate relief for investment advice fiduciaries in 
PTE 86-128 with respect to IRAs is consistent with the global approach 
that the Department has crafted to address the unique issues presented 
by investors in IRAs. Specifically, rather than increasing confusion 
and cost, the revocation of relief for such advisers from PTE 86-128 
and the provision of relief for such advisers in the Best Interest 
Contract Exemption will ensure that IRA owners are treated consistently 
by those fiduciaries, as the fiduciaries comply with a common set of 
standards. The Best Interest Contract Exemption was crafted to more 
specifically address and protect the interests of retail retirement 
investors--plan participants and beneficiaries, IRA owners and certain 
plan fiduciaries--that rely on investment advice fiduciaries to engage 
in securities transactions, and it contains safeguards specifically 
crafted for these investors.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \19\ Code section 4975(c)(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The amendments to PTE 86-128, by incorporating the same Impartial 
Conduct Standards as are required in the Best Interest Contract 
Exemption, will result in fiduciaries adhering to a common set of 
fiduciary norms across exemptions, covering multiple products and types 
of transactions. The uniform imposition of the standards will also 
reduce confusion to those consumers who already think their advisers 
owe them a fiduciary duty.\20\ These amendments ensure that plans and 
IRAs receive advice that is subject to prudence and is in their best 
interest, and is not tilted to particular products, recommendations, or 
fees because they are less regulated, even though just as dangerous.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \20\ Angela A. Hung, Noreen Clancy, Jeff Dominitz, Eric Talley, 
Claude Berrebi, Farrukh Suvankulov, Investor and Industry 
Perspectives on Investment Advisers and Broker-Dealers, RAND 
Institute for Civil Justice, commissioned by the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission, 2008, at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-1_randiabdreport.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    One commenter suggested that ``sophisticated'' IRA owners should 
not be subject to the exemption's amendments. The commenter argued that 
large or sophisticated investors are not in need of the protections and 
disclosures the amended exemption provides to IRAs, whether through PTE 
86-128 or the Best Interest Contract Exemption. The Department does not 
agree, however, that the size of the account balance or the wealth of 
the retirement invest are strong indicators of investment expertise. 
Nor does the Department believe that large accounts or wealthy 
investors are less deserving of protection from losses caused by 
imprudent or disloyal advice. Individuals may have large account 
balances as a result of years of hard work and careful savings, 
rollover of an account balance from a defined benefit plan, or 
inheritance. None of these pathways to large accounts necessarily 
correlate with financial acumen or the ability to bear losses. 
Similarly, the Department does not believe that any particular level of 
income or amount of net assets renders disclosures of fees and 
conflicts of interest unnecessary or negates the importance of 
adherence to basic fiduciary norms when giving advice. In the 
Department's view, all IRAs would benefit from consistent adherence to 
fiduciary norms and basic disclosure.
    Finally, a commenter requested assurances that this revocation of 
relief with respect to IRA investment advisers was not applicable to 
investment advice fiduciaries that provide advice to non-IRA plan 
clients. The language of Section I(c)(1) and (2) is specifically 
limited to IRAs (as defined in the exemption). If a plan is not an IRA, 
it is not subject to the exclusion set forth in that section, and the 
fiduciary may rely upon the exemption to the extent the transaction 
falls within the exemption's scope and the fiduciary complies with the 
exemption's conditions, further described below, such as the Impartial 
Conduct Standards, disclosure, and consent requirements. However, the 
Department notes the exemption, as amended, will not provide relief for 
a recommended rollover from an ERISA plan to an IRA, where the 
resulting compensation is a Commission on the IRA investments.

Mutual Fund Exemption

    Section I(b) of PTE 86-128, as amended, includes relief for mutual 
fund transactions, originally permitted under PTE 75-1, Part II(2). 
Granted under the heading ``Principal transactions,'' PTE 75-1, Part 
II(2) contained an exemption for mutual fund purchases between 
fiduciaries and plans or IRAs. Although it provided relief for 
fiduciary self-dealing and conflicts of interest, the exemption was 
only available if the fiduciary who decides on behalf of the plan or 
IRA to enter into the transaction was not a principal underwriter for, 
or affiliated with, the mutual fund. As set forth above, it was subject 
to minimal safeguards for retirement investors.
    The new covered transaction in Section I(b) applies to broker-
dealers acting in their capacity as broker-dealers. The exemption is 
subject to the general prohibition in PTE 86-128 on churning, and the 
new Impartial Conduct Standards in Section II. In addition, a new 
Section IV to PTE 86-128 sets forth conditions applicable solely to the 
proposed new covered transaction. The new Section IV incorporates 
conditions originally applicable to PTE 75-1, Part II(2).
    Specifically, the conditions applicable to the new covered 
transaction in Section I(b), as set forth in Section IV, are: (1) The 
fiduciary customarily sells securities for its own account in the 
ordinary course of its business as a broker-dealer; (2) the transaction 
is at least as favorable to the plan or IRA as an arm's length 
transaction with an unrelated party would be; and (3) unless

[[Page 21189]]

rendered inapplicable by Section V of the exemption, the requirements 
of Sections III(a) through III(f), III(h) and III(i) (if applicable), 
and III(j), governing who may rely on the exemption, and requiring 
certain disclosures and authorizations, are satisfied with respect to 
the transaction. The exceptions contained in Section V are applicable 
to this new covered transaction as well.\21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \21\ Relief was not proposed in the new Section I(b) for sales 
by a plan or IRA to a fiduciary due to the Department's belief that 
it is not necessary for a plan to sell a mutual fund share to a 
fiduciary. The Department requested comment on this limitation but 
no comments were received. As a result, in the final amendment, the 
Department has not expanded the description of the covered 
transaction in this respect.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    One commenter expressed the broad belief that no changes should be 
made to the existing exemptive relief. The commenter indicated that no 
evidence of harm exists and no policy reason could justify the change, 
arguing that the only result will be increased burdens and costs. The 
Department disagrees. As outlined in the proposal and as described 
above, the movement of the existing exemption from PTE 75-1, Part 
II(2), to PTE 86-128 for plans, or the Best Interest Contract 
Exemption, for IRAs, is fitting based on the nature of the transaction, 
the ongoing injury that conflicts of interest cause to retirement 
investors, and the additional protections that can be provided to 
retirement investors. The Department's accompanying Regulatory Impact 
Analysis indicates that the status quo is harming investors.
    Beyond a general objection, the same commenter suggested that the 
scope of the relief provided by Section I(b) should be significantly 
expanded. As originally proposed, Section I(b) was limited to 
transactions involving shares in an open end investment company 
registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940, in which the 
fiduciary was acting as ``principal.'' The commenter indicated that the 
exemption should include Unit Investment Trusts, which are registered 
investment companies but not open end investment companies, as well as 
other products that are traded on a principal basis.
    The Department does not disagree with the commenter's premise that 
relief may be necessary for certain principal transactions and 
transactions involving Unit Investment Trusts. However, such relief is 
provided through separate exemptions under specifically tailored 
conditions, the Best Interest Contract Exemption and the Principal 
Transactions Exemption, published elsewhere in this issue of the 
Federal Register. Both of these exemptions cover Unit Investment Trusts 
and the Principal Transactions Exemption provides relief for principal 
transactions in certain other assets.
    One commenter reacted to the Department's description of the 
transaction described in PTE 75-1, Part II(2) as a ``riskless 
principal'' transaction. The commenter indicated that the language of 
proposed Section I(b) required the transaction to be a ``principal'' 
transaction and would require the fiduciary engaged in the transaction 
to report the transaction as a principal transaction, while some market 
participants confirm these sales as agency trades. Although agency 
trades are covered by the relief in Section I(a), the relief in Section 
I(b) is broader in the sense that it covers the receipt of a commission 
from either the plan or the mutual fund.
    The Department has revised the language of Section I(b) to 
eliminate the reference to the fiduciary acting as ``principal.'' The 
Department did not intend to require market participants to change the 
nomenclature in their confirmations or to exclude any transactions 
based solely on the nomenclature. To avoid any resulting confusion, the 
mutual fund exemption in PTE 86-128, as amended, is not limited to 
riskless principal transactions, and provides relief with respect to 
covered transactions regardless of whether they are technically 
confirmed as ``principal'' transactions.
    In connection with the new covered transaction, the Department is 
revoking PTE 75-1, Part II(2), which had provided relief for a plan 
fiduciary's using its authority to cause the plan to purchase shares of 
a mutual fund from the fiduciary, because those transactions are now 
covered by PTE 86-128.

Related Entities

    As originally promulgated, PTE 86-128 provided relief for a 
fiduciary to use its authority to cause a plan or IRA to pay a fee to 
that person for effecting or executing securities transactions. The 
term ``person'' was defined to include the person and its affiliates, 
which are: (1) Any person directly or indirectly, through one or more 
intermediaries, controlling, controlled by, or under common control 
with, the person; (2) any officer, director, partner, employee, 
relative (as defined in ERISA section 3(15)), brother, sister, or 
spouse of a brother or sister, of the person; and (3) any corporation 
or partnership of which the person is an officer, director or employee 
or in which such person is a partner.
    In the amended exemption, relief extends beyond the person and its 
affiliates, to ``related entities.'' \22\ The term ``related entity'' 
is defined as an entity, other than an affiliate, in which a fiduciary 
has an interest that may affect the exercise of its best judgment as a 
fiduciary. This aspect of the proposal was designed to address concern 
that the relief provided by the exemption to persons (including their 
affiliates) would otherwise be too narrow to give adequate relief for 
covered transactions. In this regard, it is a prohibited transaction 
for a fiduciary to use the ``authority, control, or responsibility 
which makes such a person a fiduciary to cause a plan to pay an 
additional fee to such fiduciary (or to a person in which such 
fiduciary has an interest which may affect the exercise of such 
fiduciary's best judgment as a fiduciary) to provide a service.'' \23\ 
It is not necessary, however, for a fiduciary to have control over or 
be under control by an entity (as contemplated by the definition of 
``affiliate'') in order for the fiduciary to have an interest in the 
entity that may arguably affect the exercise of the fiduciary's best 
judgment as a fiduciary. As a result, the exemption might not have 
given full relief for some covered transactions because they generated 
compensation for related entities that fell outside the definition of 
``affiliate.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \22\ See Section VII(m).
    \23\ ERISA section 406(b); Code section 4975(c)(1)(E).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Accordingly, the Department proposed revising the exemption to 
encompass such related parties, and requested comment on the necessity 
of incorporating relief for related entities in PTE 86-128, and the 
approach taken in the proposal to do so. A single commenter responded 
to the Department's call for comment, and it supported incorporating 
relief for related entities and expressed its general agreement with 
the necessity of such action. The Department has finalized these 
amendments without change.

Impartial Conduct Standards

    Section II of PTE 86-128, as amended, requires that the fiduciary 
engaging in a covered transaction comply with fundamental Impartial 
Conduct Standards. Generally stated, the Impartial Conduct Standards 
require that, with respect to the transaction, the fiduciary must act 
in the plan's or IRA's Best Interest; receive no more than reasonable 
compensation, and make no misleading statements to the plan or IRA. As 
defined in the exemption, a fiduciary acts in the Best Interest of a

[[Page 21190]]

plan or IRA when the fiduciary acts with the care, skill, prudence, and 
diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent person 
acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would use in 
the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with like aims, 
based on the investment objectives, risk tolerance, financial 
circumstances, and needs of the plan or IRA, without regard to the 
financial or other interests of the fiduciary, its affiliate, a Related 
Entity or other party.
    The Impartial Conduct Standards represent fundamental obligations 
of fair dealing and fiduciary conduct. The concepts of prudence, 
undivided loyalty and reasonable compensation are all deeply rooted in 
ERISA and the common law of agency and trusts.\24\ These longstanding 
concepts of law and equity were developed in significant part to deal 
with the issues that arise when agents and persons in a position of 
trust have conflicting loyalties, and accordingly, are well-suited to 
the problems posed by conflicted investment advice. The phrase 
``without regard to'' is a concise expression of ERISA's duty of 
loyalty, as expressed in section 404(a)(1)(A) of ERISA and applied in 
the context of advice. It is consistent with the formulation stated in 
the common law, and it is consistent with the language used by Congress 
in Section 913(g)(1) of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act (the Dodd-Frank Act),\25\ and cited in the Staff of the 
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission ``Study on Investment Advisers 
and Broker-Dealers, as required under the Dodd-Frank Act'' (Jan. 2011) 
(SEC staff Dodd-Frank Study).\26\ Further, the ``reasonable 
compensation'' obligation is already required under ERISA section 
408(b)(2) and Code section 4975(d)(2) of financial services providers, 
including financial services providers, whether fiduciaries or not.\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \24\ See generally ERISA sections 404(a), 408(b)(2); Restatement 
(Third) of Trusts section 78 (2007), and Restatement (Third) of 
Agency section 8.01.
    \25\ Section 913(g) governs ``Standard of Conduct'' and 
subsection (1) provides that ``The Commission may promulgate rules 
to provide that the standard of conduct for all brokers, dealers, 
and investment advisers, when providing personalized investment 
advice about securities to retail customers (and such other 
customers as the Commission may by rule provide), shall be to act in 
the best interest of the customer without regard to the financial or 
other interest of the broker, dealer, or investment adviser 
providing the advice.''
    \26\ SEC Staff Study on Investment Advisers and Broker-Dealers, 
January 2011, available at https://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2011/913studyfinal.pdf, pp.109-110.
    \27\ ERISA section 408(b)(2) and Code section 4975(d)(2) exempt 
certain arrangements between ERISA plans, IRAs, and non-ERISA plans, 
and service providers, that otherwise would be prohibited 
transactions under ERISA section 406 and Code section 4975. 
Specifically, ERISA section 408(b)(2) and Code section 4975(d)(2) 
provide relief from the prohibited transaction rules for service 
contracts or arrangements if the contract or arrangement is 
reasonable, the services are necessary for the establishment or 
operation of the plan or IRA, and no more than reasonable 
compensation is paid for the services.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Under ERISA section 408(a) and Code section 4975(c)(2), the 
Department cannot grant an exemption unless it first finds that the 
exemption is administratively feasible, in the interests of plans and 
their participants and beneficiaries and IRA owners, and protective of 
the rights of participants and beneficiaries of plans and IRA owners. 
Imposition of the Impartial Conduct Standards as a condition of this 
exemption is critical to the Department's ability to make these 
findings.
    The Impartial Conduct Standards are conditions of the amended 
exemption for the provision of advice with respect to all plans and 
IRAs. However, in contrast to the Best Interest Contract Exemption and 
the Principal Transactions Exemption, there is no contract requirement 
for advice to plans or IRAs under this amended exemption.
    The Department received many comments on the proposal to include 
the Impartial Conduct Standards as part of these existing exemptions. A 
number of commenters focused on the Department's authority to impose 
the Impartial Conduct Standards as conditions of the exemption. 
Commenters' arguments regarding the Impartial Conduct Standards as 
applicable to IRAs and non-ERISA plans were based generally on the fact 
that the standards, as noted above, are consistent with longstanding 
principles of prudence and loyalty set forth in ERISA section 404, but 
which have no counterpart in the Code. Commenters took the position 
that because Congress did not choose to impose the standards of 
prudence and loyalty on fiduciaries with respect to IRAs and non-ERISA 
plans, the Department exceeded its authority in proposing similar 
standards as a condition of relief in a prohibited transaction 
exemption.
    With respect to ERISA plans, commenters stated that Congress' 
separation of the duties of prudence and loyalty (in ERISA section 404) 
from the prohibited transaction provisions (in ERISA section 406), 
showed an intent that the two should remain separate. Commenters 
additionally questioned why the conduct standards were necessary for 
ERISA plans, when such plans already have an enforceable right to 
fiduciary conduct that is both prudent and loyal. Commenters asserted 
that imposing the Impartial Conduct Standards as conditions of the 
exemption created strict liability for prudence violations.
    Some commenters additionally took the position that Congress, in 
the Dodd-Frank Act, gave the SEC the authority to establish standards 
for broker-dealers and investment advisers and therefore, the 
Department did not have the authority to act in that area.
    The Department disagrees that this amendment to the exemption 
exceeds its authority. The Department has clear authority under ERISA 
section 408(a) and the Reorganization Plan \28\ to grant administrative 
exemptions from the prohibited transaction provisions of both ERISA and 
the Code. Congress gave the Department broad discretion to grant or 
deny exemptions and to craft conditions for those exemptions, subject 
only to the overarching requirement that the exemption be 
administratively feasible, in the interests of plans, plan participants 
and beneficiaries and IRA owners, and protective of their rights.\29\ 
Nothing in ERISA or the Code suggests that the Department is forbidden 
to borrow from time-honored trust-law standards and principles 
developed by the courts to ensure proper fiduciary conduct.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \28\ See fn. 2, supra, discussing Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 
1978 (5 U.S.C. app. at 214 (2000)).
    \29\ See ERISA section 408(a) and Code section 4975(c)(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Impartial Conduct Standards represent, in the Department's 
view, baseline standards of fundamental fair dealing that must be 
present when fiduciaries make conflicted investment recommendations to 
retirement investors. After careful consideration, the Department 
determined that broad relief could be provided to investment advice 
fiduciaries receiving conflicted compensation only if such fiduciaries 
provided advice in accordance with the Impartial Conduct Standards--
i.e., if they provided prudent advice without regard to the interests 
of such fiduciaries and their affiliates and related entities, in 
exchange for reasonable compensation and without misleading the 
investors.
    These Impartial Conduct Standards are necessary to ensure that 
advisers' recommendations reflect the best interest of their retirement 
investor customers, rather than the conflicting financial interests of 
the advisers and their financial institutions. As a result, advisers 
and financial institutions bear the burden of showing compliance with 
the exemption and face liability for engaging in a non-exempt 
prohibited

[[Page 21191]]

transaction if they fail to provide advice that is prudent or otherwise 
in violation of the standards. The Department does not view this as a 
flaw in the exemptions, as commenters suggested, but rather as a 
significant deterrent to violations of important conditions under the 
exemptions.
    The Department similarly disagrees that Congress' directive to the 
SEC in the Dodd-Frank Act limits its authority to establish appropriate 
and protective conditions in the context of a prohibited transaction 
exemption. Section 913 of that Act directs the SEC to conduct a study 
on the standards of care applicable to brokers-dealers and investment 
advisers, and issue a report containing, among other things:

an analysis of whether [sic] any identified legal or regulatory 
gaps, shortcomings, or overlap in legal or regulatory standards in 
the protection of retail customers relating to the standards of care 
for brokers, dealers, investment advisers, persons associated with 
brokers or dealers, and persons associated with investment advisers 
for providing personalized investment advice about securities to 
retail customers.\30\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \30\ Dodd-Frank Act, sec. 913(d)(2)(B).

    Section 913 authorizes, but does not require, the SEC to issue 
rules addressing standards of care for broker-dealers and investment 
advisers for providing personalized investment advice about securities 
to retail customers.\31\ Nothing in the Dodd-Frank Act indicates that 
Congress meant to preclude the Department's regulation of fiduciary 
investment advice under ERISA or its application of such a regulation 
to securities brokers or dealers. To the contrary, Dodd-Frank in 
directing the SEC study specifically directed the SEC to consider the 
effectiveness of existing legal and regulatory standards of care under 
other federal and state authorities. Dodd-Frank Act, sec. 913(b)(1) and 
(c)(1). The Dodd-Frank Act did not take away the Department's 
responsibility with respect the definition of fiduciary under ERISA and 
in the Code; nor did it qualify the Department's authority to issue 
exemptions that are administratively feasible, in the interests of 
plans, participants and beneficiaries, and IRA owners, and protective 
of the rights of participants and beneficiaries of the plans and IRA 
owners.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \31\ 15 U.S.C. 80b-11(g)(1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Some commenters suggested that it would be unnecessary to impose 
the Impartial Conduct Standards on advisers with respect to ERISA 
plans, as fiduciaries to these Plans already are required to operate 
within similar statutory fiduciary obligations. The Department 
considered this comment but has determined not to eliminate the conduct 
standards as conditions of the exemptions for ERISA plans. One of the 
Department's goals is to ensure equal footing for all retirement 
investors. The SEC staff study required by section 913 of the Dodd-
Frank Act found that investors were frequently confused by the 
differing standards of care applicable to broker-dealers and registered 
investment advisers. The Department hopes to minimize such confusion in 
the market for retirement advice by holding fiduciaries to similar 
standards, regardless of whether they are giving the advice to an ERISA 
plan, IRA, or a non-ERISA plan.
    Moreover, inclusion of the standards as conditions of these 
existing exemptions adds an important additional safeguard for ERISA 
and IRA investors alike because the party engaging in a prohibited 
transaction has the burden of showing compliance with an applicable 
exemption, when violations are alleged.\32\ In the Department's view, 
this burden-shifting is appropriate because of the dangers posed by 
conflicts of interest, as reflected in the Department's Regulatory 
Impact Analysis and the difficulties retirement investors have in 
effectively policing such violations.\33\ One important way for 
financial institutions to ensure that they can meet this burden is by 
implementing strong anti-conflict policies and procedures, and by 
refraining from creating incentives to violate the Impartial Conduct 
Standards. Thus, the Standards' treatment as exemption conditions 
creates an important incentive for financial institutions to carefully 
monitor and oversee their advisers' conduct for adherence with 
fiduciary norms.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \32\ See e.g., Fish v. GreatBanc Trust Company, 749 F.3d 671 
(7th Cir. 2014).
    \33\ See Regulatory Impact Analysis, available at www.dol.gov/ebsa.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Other commenters generally asserted that the Impartial Conduct 
Standards were too vague and would result in the exemption failing to 
meet the ``administratively feasible'' requirement under ERISA section 
408(a) and Code section 4975(c)(2). The Department disagrees with these 
commenters' suggestion that ERISA section 408(a) and Code section 
4975(c)(2) fail to be satisfied by a principles-based approach, or that 
standards are unduly vague. It is worth repeating that the Impartial 
Conduct Standards are built on concepts that are longstanding and 
familiar in ERISA and the common law of trusts and agency. Far from 
requiring adherence to novel standards with no antecedents, the 
exemptions primarily require adherence to well-established fundamental 
obligations of fair dealing and fiduciary conduct. This preamble 
provides specific interpretations and responses to a number of issues 
raised in connection with a number of the Impartial Conduct Standards.
    Comments on each of the Impartial Conduct Standards are discussed 
below. In this regard, some commenters focused their comments on the 
Impartial Conduct Standards in the proposed Best Interest Contract 
Exemption and other proposals, as opposed to the proposed amendment to 
PTE 86-128. The Department determined it was important that the 
provisions of the exemptions, including the Impartial Conduct 
Standards, be uniform and compatible across exemptions. For this 
reason, the Department considered all comments made on any of the 
exemption proposals on a consolidated basis, and made corresponding 
changes across the projects. For ease of use, this preamble includes 
the same general discussion of comments as in the Best Interest 
Contract Exemption, despite the fact that some comments discussed below 
were not made directly with respect to this exemption.
a. Best Interest Standard
    Under Section II(a), when exercising fiduciary authority described 
in ERISA section 3(21)(A)(i) or (ii), or Code section 4975(e)(3)(A) or 
(B), with respect to the assets involved in the transaction, a 
fiduciary relying on the amended exemption must act in the Best 
Interest of the plan or IRA, at the time of the exercise of authority 
(including, in the case of an investment advice fiduciary, the 
recommendation). A fiduciary acts in the Best Interest of the plan or 
IRA when:

the fiduciary acts with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence 
under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent person acting 
in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would use in the 
conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with like aims, 
based on the investment objectives, risk tolerance, financial 
circumstances, and needs of the plan [or IRA], without regard to the 
financial or other interests of the fiduciary, its affiliate, a 
Related Entity, or other party.

    This Best Interest standard set forth in the final amendment is 
based on longstanding concepts derived from ERISA and the law of 
trusts. It is meant to express the concept, set forth in ERISA section 
404, that a fiduciary is required to act ``solely in the interest of 
the participants . . . with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence 
under the circumstances then prevailing that a

[[Page 21192]]

prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters 
would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with 
like aims.'' Similarly, both ERISA section 404(a)(1)(A) and the trust-
law duty of loyalty require fiduciaries to put the interests of trust 
beneficiaries first, without regard to the fiduciaries' own self-
interest. Under this standard, for example, an investment advice 
fiduciary, in choosing between two investments, could not select an 
investment because it is better for the investment advice fiduciary's 
bottom line even though it is a worse choice for the plan or IRA.
    A wide range of commenters indicated support for a broad ``best 
interest'' standard. Some comments indicated that the best interest 
standard is consistent with the way advisers provide investment advice 
to clients today. However, a number of these commenters expressed 
misgivings as to the definition used in the proposed amendment, in 
particular, the ``without regard to'' formulation. The commenters 
indicated uncertainty as to the meaning of the phrase, including 
whether it permitted the fiduciary engaging the in the transaction to 
be paid.
    Other commenters asked the Department to use a different definition 
of Best Interest, or simply use the exact language from ERISA's section 
404 duty of loyalty. Others suggested definitional approaches that 
would require that the fiduciary ``not subordinate'' their customers' 
interests to their own interests, or that the fiduciary ``put their 
customers' interests ahead of their own interests,'' or similar 
constructs.\34\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \34\ The alternative approaches are discussed in greater detail 
in the preamble to the Best Interest Contract Exemption, finalized 
elsewhere in this issue of the Federal Register.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) \35\ suggested 
that the federal securities laws should form the foundation of the Best 
Interest standard. Specifically, FINRA urged that the Best Interest 
definition in the exemption incorporate the ``suitability'' standard 
applicable to investment advisers and broker dealers under securities 
laws. According to FINRA, this would facilitate customer enforcement of 
the Best Interest standard by providing adjudicators with a well-
established basis on which to find a violation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \35\ FINRA is registered with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) as a national securities association and is a self-
regulatory organization, as those terms are defined in the Exchange 
Act, which operates under SEC oversight.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Other commenters found the Best Interest standard to be an 
appropriate statement of the obligations of a fiduciary investment 
advice provider and believed it would provide concrete protections 
against conflicted recommendations. These commenters asked the 
Department to maintain the Best Interest definition as proposed. One 
commenter wrote that the term ``best interest'' is commonly used in 
connection with a fiduciary's duty of loyalty and cautioned the 
Department against creating an exemption that failed to include the 
duty of loyalty. Others urged the Department to avoid definitional 
changes that would reduce current protections to plans and IRAs. Some 
commenters also noted that the ``without regard to'' language is 
consistent with the recommended standard in the SEC staff Dodd-Frank 
Study, and suggested that it had the added benefit of potentially 
harmonizing with a future securities law standard for broker-dealers.
    The final amendment retains the Best Interest definition as 
proposed, with minor adjustments. The first prong of the standard was 
revised to more closely track the statutory language of ERISA section 
404(a), and, is consistent with the Department's intent to hold 
investment advice fiduciaries to a prudent investment professional 
standard. Accordingly, the definition of Best Interest now requires 
advice that reflects ``the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under 
the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent person acting in a 
like capacity and familiar with such matters would use in the conduct 
of an enterprise of a like character and with like aims, based on the 
investment objectives, risk tolerance, financial circumstances, and 
needs of the plan [or IRA]. . .'' The exemption adopts the second prong 
of the proposed definition, ``without regard to the financial or other 
interests of the fiduciary, affiliate, or other party,'' without 
change.
    The Department continues to believe that the ``without regard to'' 
language sets forth the appropriate, protective standard under which a 
fiduciary investment adviser should act. Although the exemption 
provides broad relief for fiduciaries to receive commissions and other 
payments based on their advice, the standard ensures that the advice 
will not be tainted by self-interest. Many of the alternative 
approaches suggested by commenters pose their own ambiguities and 
interpretive challenges, and lower standards run the risk of 
undermining this regulatory initiative's goal of reducing the impact of 
conflicts of interest on plans and IRAs.
    The Department has not specifically incorporated the suitability 
obligation as an element of the Best Interest standard, as suggested by 
FINRA, but many aspects of suitability are also elements of the Best 
Interest standard. An investment recommendation that is not suitable 
under the securities laws would not meet the Best Interest standard. 
Under FINRA's Rule 2111(a) on suitability, broker-dealers ``must have a 
reasonable basis to believe that a recommended transaction or 
investment strategy involving a security or securities is suitable for 
the customer.'' The text of rule 2111(a), however, does not do any of 
the following: Reference a best interest standard, clearly require 
brokers to put their client's interests ahead of their own, expressly 
prohibit the selection of the least suitable (but more remunerative) of 
available investments, or require them to take the kind of measures to 
avoid or mitigate conflicts of interests that are required as 
conditions of this amended exemption.
    The Department recognizes that FINRA issued guidance on Rule 2111 
in which it explains that ``in interpreting the suitability rule, 
numerous cases explicitly state that a broker's recommendations must be 
consistent with his customers' best interests,'' and provided examples 
of conduct that would be prohibited under this standard, including 
conduct that this exemption would not allow.\36\ The guidance goes on 
to state that ``[t]he suitability requirement that a broker make only 
those recommendations that are consistent with the customer's best 
interests prohibits a broker from placing his or her interests ahead of 
the customer's interests.'' The Department, however, is reluctant to 
adopt as an express standard such guidance, which has not been 
formalized as a clear rule and that may be subject to change. 
Additionally, FINRA's suitability rule may be subject to 
interpretations which could conflict with interpretations by the 
Department, and the cases cited in the FINRA guidance, as read by the 
Department, involved egregious fact patterns that one would have 
thought violated the suitability standard, even without reference to 
the customer's ``best interest.'' Accordingly, after review of the 
issue, the Department has decided not to accept the comment. The 
Department has concluded that its articulation of a clear loyalty 
standard within the exemption, rather than by reference to the FINRA 
guidance, will provide clarity and certainty to investors and better 
protect their interests.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \36\ FINRA Regulatory Notice 12-25, p. 3 (2012).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Best Interest standard, as set forth in the exemption, is 
intended to effectively incorporate the objective

[[Page 21193]]

standards of care and undivided loyalty that have been applied under 
ERISA for more than forty years. Under these objective standards, the 
fiduciary must adhere to a professional standard of care in making 
investment management decisions, executing transactions, or providing 
investment recommendations that are in the plan's or IRA's Best 
Interest. The fiduciary may not base his or her decisions or 
recommendations on the fiduciary's own financial interest. Nor may the 
fiduciary make or recommend the investment, unless it meets the 
objective prudent person standard of care. Additionally, the duties of 
loyalty and prudence embodied in ERISA are objective obligations that 
do not require proof of fraud or misrepresentation, and full disclosure 
is not a defense to making an imprudent recommendation or favoring 
one's own interests at the plan's or IRA's expense.
    Several commenters requested additional guidance on the Best 
Interest standard. Investment advice fiduciaries that are concerned 
about satisfying the standard may wish to consult the policies and 
procedures requirement in Section II(d) of the Best Interest Contract 
Exemption. While these policies and procedures are not an express 
condition of PTE 86-128, they may provide useful guidance for financial 
institutions wishing to ensure that individual advisers adhere to the 
Impartial Conduct Standards. The preamble to the Best Interest Contract 
Exemption provides examples of policies and procedures prudently 
designed to ensure that advisers adhere to the Impartial Conduct 
Standards. The examples are not intended to be exhaustive or mutually 
exclusive, and range from examples that focus on eliminating or nearly 
eliminating compensation differentials to examples that permit, but 
police, the differentials.
    A few commenters also questioned the requirement in the Best 
Interest standard that the fiduciary's actions be made without regard 
to the interest of the fiduciary, its affiliate, a Related Entity or 
``other party.'' The commenters indicated they did not know the purpose 
of the reference to ``other party'' and asked that it be deleted. The 
Department intends the reference to make clear that a fiduciary 
operating within the Impartial Conduct Standards should not take into 
account the interests of any party other than the plan or IRA--whether 
the other party is related to the fiduciary engaging in the covered 
transaction or not--in exercising fiduciary authority. For example, an 
entity that may be unrelated to the fiduciary but could still 
constitute an ``other party,'' for these purposes, is the manufacturer 
of the investment product being recommended or purchased.
    Other commenters asked for confirmation that the Best Interest 
standard is applied based on the facts and circumstances as they 
existed at the time of the recommendation, and not based on hindsight. 
Consistent with the well-established legal principles that exist under 
ERISA today, the Department confirms that the Best Interest standard is 
not a hindsight standard, but rather is based on the facts as they 
existed at the time of the recommendation. Thus, the courts have 
evaluated the prudence of a fiduciary's actions under ERISA by focusing 
on the process the fiduciary used to reach its determination or 
recommendation--whether the fiduciaries, ``at the time they engaged in 
the challenged transactions, employed the proper procedures to 
investigate the merits of the investment and to structure the 
investment.'' \37\ The standard does not measure compliance by 
reference to how investments subsequently performed or turn fiduciaries 
into guarantors of investment performance, even though they gave advice 
that was prudent and loyal at the time of transaction.\38\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \37\ Donovan v. Mazzola, 716 F.2d 1226, 1232 (9th Cir. 1983).
    \38\ One commenter requested an adjustment to the ``prudence'' 
component of the Best Interest Standard, under which the standard 
would be that of a ``prudent person serving clients with similar 
retirement needs and offering a similar array of products.'' In this 
way, the commenter sought to accommodate varying perspectives and 
opinions on particular investment products and business practices. 
The Department disagrees with the comment, which could be read as 
qualifying the stringency of the prudence obligation based on the 
fiduciary's independent decisions on which products to offer, rather 
than on the needs of the particular retirement investor. Therefore, 
the Department did not adopt this suggestion.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    This is not to suggest that the ERISA section 404 prudence standard 
or Best Interest standard, are solely procedural standards. Thus, the 
prudence standard, as incorporated in the Best Interest standard, is an 
objective standard of care that requires fiduciaries to investigate and 
evaluate investments, make recommendations, and exercise sound judgment 
in the same way that knowledgeable and impartial professionals would. 
``[T]his is not a search for subjective good faith--a pure heart and an 
empty head are not enough.'' \39\ Whether or not the fiduciary is 
actually familiar with the sound investment principles necessary to 
make particular recommendations, the fiduciary must adhere to an 
objective professional standard. Additionally, fiduciaries are held to 
a particularly stringent standard of prudence when they have a conflict 
of interest.\40\ For this reason, the Department declines to provide a 
safe harbor based solely on ``procedural prudence'' as requested by a 
commenter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \39\ Donovan v. Cunningham, 716 F.2d 1455, 1467 (5th Cir. 1983), 
cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1251 (1984); see also DiFelice v. U.S. 
Airways, Inc., 497 F.3d 410, 418 (4th Cir. 2007) (``Good faith does 
not provide a defense to a claim of a breach of these fiduciary 
duties; `a pure heart and an empty head are not enough.' '').
    \40\ Donovan v. Bierwirth, 680 F.2d 263, 271 (2d Cir. 1982) 
(``the decisions [of the fiduciary] must be made with an eye single 
to the interests of the participants and beneficiaries''); see also 
Bussian v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 223 F.3d 286, 298 (5th Cir. 2000); 
Leigh v. Engle, 727 F.2d 113, 126 (7th Cir. 1984).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Department additionally confirms its intent that the phrase 
``without regard to'' be given the same meaning as the language in 
ERISA section 404 that requires a fiduciary to act ``solely in the 
interest of'' participants and beneficiaries, as such standard has been 
interpreted by the Department and the courts. Accordingly, the standard 
would not, as some commenters suggested, foreclose the fiduciary from 
being paid ``reasonable compensation,'' and the exemption specifically 
contemplates such compensation.
    In response to commenter concerns, the Department also confirms 
that the Best Interest standard does not impose an unattainable 
obligation on fiduciaries to somehow identify the single ``best'' 
investment for the plan or IRA out of all the investments in the 
national or international marketplace, assuming such advice were even 
possible. Instead, as discussed above, the Best Interest standard set 
out in the exemption, incorporates two fundamental and well-established 
fiduciary obligations: The duties of prudence and loyalty. Thus, the 
fiduciary's obligation under the Best Interest standard is to manage or 
give advice that adheres to professional standards of prudence, and to 
put the plan's or IRA's financial interests in the driver's seat, 
rather than the competing interests of the fiduciary or other parties.
    Finally, in response to questions regarding the extent to which 
this Best Interest standard or other provisions of the exemption impose 
an ongoing monitoring obligation on fiduciaries, the text does not 
impose a monitoring requirement, but instead leaves that to the 
parties' arrangements, agreements, and understandings. This is 
consistent with the Department's interpretation of an investment advice 
fiduciary's monitoring responsibility as articulated in the preamble to 
the Regulation.

[[Page 21194]]

b. Reasonable Compensation
    The Impartial Conduct Standards also include the reasonable 
compensation standard, set forth in Section II(b). Under this standard, 
the fiduciary engaging in the covered transaction and any Related 
Entity must not receive compensation in excess of reasonable 
compensation within the meaning of ERISA section 408(b)(2) and Code 
section 4975(d)(2).
    The obligation to pay no more than reasonable compensation to 
service providers is long recognized under ERISA and the Code. ERISA 
section 408(b)(2) and Code section 4975(d)(2) require that services 
arrangements involving plans and IRAs result in no more than reasonable 
compensation to the service provider. Accordingly, fiduciaries--as 
service providers--have long been subject to this requirement, 
regardless of their fiduciary status. At bottom, the standard simply 
requires that compensation not be excessive relative to the value of 
the particular services, rights, and benefits the fiduciary is 
delivering to the plan or IRA. Given the conflicts of interest 
associated with the commissions, it is particularly important that 
fiduciaries adhere to these statutory standards which are rooted in 
common law principles.\41\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \41\ See generally Restatement (Third) of Trusts section 38 
(2003).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Several commenters supported this standard and said that the 
reasonable compensation requirement is an important and well-
established protection. A number of other commenters requested greater 
specificity as to the meaning of the reasonable compensation standard. 
As proposed, the standard stated:

    All compensation received by the [fiduciary] and any Related 
Entity in connection with the transaction is reasonable in relation 
to the total services the person and any Related Entity provide to 
the plan.

    Some commenters stated that the proposed reasonable compensation 
standard was too vague. Because the language of the proposal did not 
reference ERISA section 408(b)(2) and Code section 4975(d)(2), 
commenters asked whether the standard differed from those statutory 
provisions. In particular, a commenter questioned the meaning of the 
proposed language ``in relation to the total services the person and 
any Related Entity provide to the plan.'' The commenter indicated that 
the proposal did not adequately explain this formulation of reasonable 
compensation.
    There was concern that the standard could be applied retroactively 
rather than based on the parties' reasonable beliefs as to the 
reasonableness of the compensation as determined at the time the 
fiduciary exercised authority over plan assets or made an investment 
recommendation. Commenters also indicated uncertainty as to how to 
comply with the condition and asked whether it would be necessary to 
survey the market to determine market rates. Some commenters requested 
that the Department include the words ``and customary,'' in the 
reasonable compensation definition, to specifically permit existing 
compensation arrangements. One commenter raised the concern that the 
reasonable compensation determination raised antitrust concerns because 
it would require investment advice fiduciaries to agree upon a market 
rate and result in anti-competitive behavior.
    Commenters also asked the Department to provide examples of 
scenarios that met the reasonable compensation standard and safe 
harbors and others requested examples of scenarios that would fail to 
meet these standards. FINRA and other commenters suggested that the 
Department incorporate existing FINRA rules 2121 and 2122, and NASD 
rule 2830 regarding the reasonableness of compensation for broker-
dealers.\42\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \42\ FINRA's comment letter described NASD rule 2830 as imposing 
specific caps on compensation with respect to investment company 
securities that broker-dealers may sell. While the Department views 
this cap as an important protection of investors, it establishes an 
outside limit rather than a standard of reasonable compensation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Finally, a few commenters took the position that the reasonable 
compensation determination should not be a requirement of the 
exemption. In their view, a plan fiduciary that is not the fiduciary 
engaging in the covered transaction (perhaps the authorizing fiduciary) 
should decide the reasonableness of the compensation. Another commenter 
suggested that if an independent plan fiduciary sets the menu this 
should be sufficient to comply with the reasonable compensation 
standard.
    In response to comments on this requirement, the Department has 
retained the reasonable compensation standard as a condition of the 
exemption. As noted above, the obligation that service providers 
receive no more than ``reasonable compensation'' for their services is 
already established by ERISA and the Code, and has long applied to 
financial services providers, whether fiduciaries or not. The condition 
is also consistent with other class exemptions granted and amended 
today. It is particularly important that fiduciaries adhere to these 
standards when engaging in the transactions covered under this 
exemption, so as to avoid exposing plans and IRAs to harms associated 
with conflicts of interest.
    Some commenters suggested that the reasonable compensation 
determination be made by another plan fiduciary. However, the exemption 
(like the statutory obligation) obligates investment advice fiduciaries 
to avoid overcharging their plan and IRA customers, despite any 
conflicts of interest associated with their compensation. Fiduciaries 
and other service providers may not charge more than reasonable 
compensation regardless of whether another fiduciary has signed off on 
the compensation. Nothing in the exemption, however, precludes 
fiduciaries from seeking impartial review of their fee structures to 
safeguard against abuse, and they may well want to include such reviews 
as part of their supervisory practices.
    Further, the Department disagrees that the requirement is 
inconsistent with antitrust laws. Nothing in the exemption contemplates 
or requires that Advisers or Financial Institutions agree upon a price 
with their competitors. The focus of the reasonable compensation 
condition is on preventing overcharges to Retirement Investors, not 
promoting anti-competitive practices. Indeed, if Advisors and Financial 
Institutions consulted with competitors to set prices, the agreed-upon 
prices could well violate the condition.
    In response to comments, however, the operative text of the final 
exemption was clarified to adopt the well-established reasonable 
compensation standard, as set out in ERISA section 408(b)(2) and Code 
section 4975(d)(2), and the regulations thereunder. The reasonableness 
of the fees depends on the particular facts and circumstances at the 
time of the fiduciary investment recommendation or exercise of 
fiduciary authority. Several factors inform whether compensation is 
reasonable including, inter alia, the market pricing of service(s) 
provided and the underlying asset(s), the scope of monitoring, and the 
complexity of the product. No single factor is dispositive in 
determining whether compensation is reasonable; the essential question 
is whether the charges are reasonable in relation to what the plan or 
IRA receives. Consistent with the Department's prior interpretations of 
this standard, the Department confirms that a fiduciary does not have 
to recommend the transaction that is the

[[Page 21195]]

lowest cost or that generates the lowest fees without regard to other 
relevant factors. In this regard, the Department declines to 
specifically reference FINRA's standard in the exemption, but rather 
relies on ERISA's own longstanding reasonable compensation formulation.
    In response to concerns about application of the standard to 
investment products that bundle together services and investment 
guarantees or other benefits, the Department responds that the 
reasonable compensation condition is intended to apply to the 
compensation received by the Financial Institution, Adviser, 
Affiliates, and Related Entities in same manner as the reasonable 
compensation condition set forth in ERISA section 408(b)(2) and Code 
section 4975(d)(2). Accordingly, the exemption's reasonable 
compensation standard covers compensation received directly from the 
plan or IRA and indirect compensation received from any source other 
than the plan or IRA in connection with the recommended 
transaction.\43\ When assessing the reasonableness of a charge, one 
generally needs to consider the value of all the services and benefits 
provided for the charge, not just some. If parties need additional 
guidance in this respect, they should refer to the Department's 
interpretations under ERISA section 408(b)(2) and Code section 
4975(d)(2) and the Department will provide additional guidance if 
necessary.
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    \43\ Such compensation includes, for example charges against the 
investment, such as commissions, sales loads, sales charges, 
redemption fees, surrender charges, exchange fees, account fees and 
purchase fees, as well as compensation included in operating 
expenses and other ongoing charges, such as wrap fees.
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    The Department declines suggestions to provide specific examples of 
``reasonable'' amounts or specific safe harbors. Ultimately, the 
``reasonable compensation'' standard is a market based standard. As 
noted above, the standard incorporates the familiar ERISA section 
408(b)(2) and Code section 4975(d)(2) standards. The Department is 
unwilling to condone all ``customary'' compensation arrangements and 
declines to adopt a standard that turns on whether the agreement is 
``customary.'' For example, it may in some instances be ``customary'' 
to charge customers fees that are not transparent or that bear little 
relationship to the value of the services actually rendered, but that 
does not make the charges reasonable. Similarly, the Department 
declines to provide that the reasonable compensation condition is 
automatically satisfied as long as the charges do not exceed specific 
pricing ceilings or restrictions imposed by other regulators or self-
regulatory organizations. Certainly, charging an investor even more 
than permitted under such a ceiling or restriction would generally 
violate the prohibition on ``unreasonable compensation.'' But the 
reasonable compensation standard does not merely forbid fiduciaries 
from charging amounts that are per se illegal under other regulatory 
regimes. Finally, the Department notes that all recommendations are 
subject to the overarching Best Interest standard, which incorporates 
the fundamental fiduciary obligations of prudence and loyalty. An 
imprudent recommendation for an investor to overpay for an investment 
transaction would violate that standard, regardless of whether the 
overpayment was attributable to compensation for services, a charge for 
benefits or guarantees, or something else.
c. Misleading Statements
    The final Impartial Conduct Standard, set forth in Section II(c), 
requires that the fiduciary's statements about the transaction, fees 
and compensation, Material Conflicts of Interest, and any other matters 
relevant to a plan's or IRA's investment decisions, may not be 
materially misleading at the time they are made. For this purpose, a 
fiduciary's failure to disclose a Material Conflict of Interest 
relevant to the services the fiduciary is providing or other actions it 
is taking in relation to a plan's investment decisions is deemed to be 
a misleading statement. In response to commenters, the Department 
adjusted the text to clarify that the standard is measured at the time 
of the representations, i.e., the statements must not be misleading 
``at the time they are made.'' Similarly, the Department added a 
materiality standard in response to comments.
    Some comments focused on the proposed definition of Material 
Conflict of Interest. As proposed, a Material Conflict of Interest was 
defined to exist when a person has a financial interest that could 
affect the exercise of its best judgment as a fiduciary in rendering 
advice to a plan or IRA. Some commenters took the position that the 
proposal did not adequately explain the term ``material'' or 
incorporate a ``materiality'' standard into the definition. A commenter 
wrote that the proposed definition was so broad it would be difficult 
for financial institutions to comply with the various aspects of the 
exemption related to Material Conflicts of Interest, such as provisions 
requiring disclosures of Material Conflicts of Interest.
    Another commenter indicated that the Department should not use the 
term ``material'' in defining conflicts of interest. The commenter 
believed that it could result in a standard that was too subjective 
from the perspective of the fiduciary and could undermine the 
protectiveness of the exemption.
    After consideration of the comments, the Department adjusted the 
definition of Material Conflict of Interest to provide that a material 
conflict of interest exists when a fiduciary has a ``financial interest 
that a reasonable person would conclude could affect the exercise of 
its best judgment as a fiduciary in rendering advice to a plan or 
IRA.'' This language responds to concerns about the breadth and 
potential subjectivity of the standard.
    The Department did not accept certain other comments, however. One 
commenter requested that the Department add a qualifier providing that 
the standard is violated only if the statement was ``reasonably 
relied'' on by the retirement investor. The Department rejected the 
comment. The Department's aim is to ensure that fiduciaries uniformly 
adhere to the Impartial Conduct Standards, including the obligation to 
avoid materially misleading statements.
    One commenter asked the Department to require only that the 
fiduciary ``reasonably believe'' the statements are not misleading. The 
Department is concerned that this standard too could undermine the 
protections of this condition, by requiring retirement investors to 
prove the fiduciary's actual knowledge rather than focusing on whether 
the statement is objectively misleading. However, to address 
commenters' concerns about the risks of engaging in a prohibited 
transaction, as noted above, the Department has clarified that the 
standard is measured at the time of the representations and has added a 
materiality standard.
    The Department believes that plans and IRAs are best served by 
statements and representations that are free from material 
misstatements. Fiduciaries best avoid liability--and best promote the 
interests of plans and IRA--by ensuring that accurate communications 
are a consistent standard in all their interactions with their 
customers.
    A commenter suggested that the Department adopt FINRA's 
``Frequently Asked Questions regarding Rule 2210'' regarding the term 
misleading.\44\

[[Page 21196]]

FINRA's Rule 2210, Communications with the Public, sets forth a number 
of procedural rules and standards that are designed to, among other 
things, prevent broker-dealer communications from being misleading. The 
Department agrees that adherence to FINRA's standards can promote 
materially accurate communications, and certainly believes that 
fiduciaries should pay careful attention to such guidance documents. 
After review of the rule and FAQs, however, the Department declines to 
simply adopt FINRA's guidance, which addresses written communications, 
since the condition of the exemption is broader in this respect. In the 
Department's view, the meaning of the standard is clear, and is already 
part of a plan fiduciary's obligations under ERISA. If, however, issues 
arise in implementation of the exemption, the Department will consider 
requests for additional guidance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \44\ Currently available at http://www.finra.org/industry/finra-rule-2210-questions-and-answers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Commissions

    To provide certainty with respect to the payments permitted by the 
exemption in both Section I(a) and new Section I(b), the amendment adds 
a new defined term ``Commission.'' This term replaces the language 
originally in the exemption that permits a fiduciary to cause a plan or 
IRA to pay a ``fee for effecting or executing securities 
transactions.'' The term ``Commission'' is defined to mean a brokerage 
commission or sales load paid for the service of effecting or executing 
the transaction, but not a 12b-1 fee, revenue sharing payment, 
marketing fee, administrative fee, sub-TA fee, or sub-accounting 
fee.\45\ Further, based on the language of Section I(a)(1), the term 
``Commission'' as used in that section is limited to payments directly 
from the plan or IRA.\46\ The Department has clarified this by adding 
the word ``directly'' to the language of the final exemption for the 
avoidance of doubt. On the other hand, the Commission payment described 
in Section I(b) is not limited to payments directly from the plan or 
IRA and includes payments from the mutual fund. The Department 
understands that sales load payments in connection with mutual fund 
transactions are commonly made by the mutual fund.
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    \45\ In light of the proposed language referencing ``brokerage 
commission'' and ``sales loads,'' terms commonly associated with 
equity securities and mutual funds, this definition does not extend 
to a commission on a variable annuity contract or any other annuity 
contract that is a non-exempt security under federal securities 
laws.
    \46\ Section I(a)(2) of the amended exemption clarifies that 
relief for plan fiduciaries acting as agents in agency cross 
transactions is limited to compensation paid in the form of 
Commissions, although the Commission may be paid by the other party 
to the transaction.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In connection with this clarifying amendment to the definition of 
commission, two commenters requested that the Commission definition 
specifically include, not exclude, 12b-1 fees, revenue sharing 
payments, marketing fees, administrative fees, sub-TA fees, sub-
accounting fees and other consideration. The commenters indicate that 
these forms of compensation are inherent to agency transactions and 
without documented harm. Further, these forms of compensation are used 
to pay for services. Without this compensation, the commenters argue, 
brokers will cease offering agency services to plans and IRAs.
    The Department agrees that many of these forms of compensation may 
be commonly associated with agency transactions, particularly with 
respect to mutual fund purchases, holdings and sales. However, as 
stated above, such forms of compensation do raise substantial conflict 
of interest concerns that are not addressed by this exemption. PTE 86-
128 was originally granted in 1975 and amended several times over the 
years. The exemption narrowly applied to fees from a plan or IRA for 
effecting or executing securities transactions. The Department has 
never formally interpreted or amended PTE 86-128 to provide relief for 
the forms of indirect compensation suggested by commenters, such as 
12b-1 fees and revenue sharing payments. In the Department's view, it 
does not contain conditions that adequately address the particular 
conflicts associated with such payments. On the other hand, the Best 
Interest Contract Exemption was designed for such payments and includes 
conditions to address them. The Department intends that parties seeking 
a wider scope of relief should rely on the Best Interest Contract 
Exemption as opposed to PTE 86-128, as amended.

Conditions of the Exemption in Section III

    Section III of the exemption establishes conditions applicable to 
the covered transactions. Among the conditions is the requirement in 
Section III(b) that the covered transaction occur under a written 
authorization executed in advance by an independent fiduciary of each 
plan whose assets are involved in the transaction. A commenter asked us 
to clarify whether an IRA owner could satisfy the authorization 
requirements applicable to the independent plan fiduciary. In response, 
we have added ``or IRA owner'' throughout the requirements in Section 
III related to plan fiduciary authorization, to make clear that an IRA 
owner may authorize the covered transaction with respect to the IRA. We 
did not, however, add the IRA owner to the provision requiring the plan 
fiduciary to be ``independent'' of the person engaging in the covered 
transaction. Therefore, an IRA owner employed by the investment 
management fiduciary relying on the exemption will still be able to 
satisfy the authorization requirement. This reflects the Department's 
view that the interaction of the employer and employee with regard to 
an IRA that is not employer sponsored is likely to be voluntary and 
less likely to have the heightened conflicts of interest associated 
with an employer providing advice to an employer-sponsored plan, and 
earning a profit. Accordingly, an investment management fiduciary may 
provide advice to the beneficial owner of an IRA who is employed by the 
fiduciary and receive prohibited compensation as a result, provided the 
IRA is not covered by Title I of ERISA.
    For IRAs and non-ERISA plans that are existing customers as of the 
Applicability Date of this amendment, the Department has provided that 
the fiduciary engaging in the transaction need not receive the 
affirmative consent generally required by Section III(b), but may 
instead rely on the IRA's or non-ERISA plan's negative consent, as long 
as the disclosures and consent termination form are provided to the IRA 
or non-ERISA plan by the Applicability Date.
    The Department received other comments on conditions in Section III 
of PTE 86-128 that touch on discreet concerns. One commenter raised the 
bulk of these concerns. The comments related to the annual 
reauthorization requirement in Section III(c) and the portfolio 
turnover ratio requirement in Section III(f)(4), and are discussed 
below.

Annual Reauthorization

    Section III(c) provides that an annual reauthorization is necessary 
for a fiduciary to engage in transactions pursuant to the exemption. As 
an alternative to affirmative reauthorization, the fiduciary may supply 
a form expressly providing an election to terminate the authorization 
with instructions on the use of the form. The instructions must provide 
for a 30-day window after which failure to return the form or some 
other written notification of the plan's intent to terminate the 
authorization will result in continued authorization.

[[Page 21197]]

    A commenter first asked for clarification regarding the ability of 
a fiduciary to rely on the exemption's relief during the 30-day 
reauthorization window established in Section III(c). In response, the 
Department states that relief is available until the point at which a 
fiduciary fails to comply with a condition of the exemption. Since a 
fiduciary will not be in breach of a condition until the expiration of 
the 30-day window, the fiduciary may rely on the exemption's relief 
until the closing of that window, and it will not retroactively lose 
the relief relied upon by the fiduciary during the 30-day window.
    Second, the commenter argued that the termination notice 
contemplated by Section III(c) should be effective only if the customer 
uses a specific termination form. The Department disagrees. The 
exemption provides that the termination notice must be a written notice 
(whether first class mail, personal delivery or email). Requiring a 
written notice should avoid the problems created by oral notices (e.g., 
miscommunication, misremembering, etc.), without creating inappropriate 
impediments for the investor seeking to terminate the arrangement. The 
fiduciary's obligations rightly extend to ensuring that the plan's or 
IRA's decisions to terminate an arrangement are honored, rather than 
disregarded. The Department does not want to create technical hurdles 
that could prevent faithful adherence to the investor's decisions, or 
permit otherwise prohibited transactions to proceed without the 
investor's assent.

Portfolio Turnover Ratio

    Section III(f)(4) establishes the requirement that the fiduciary 
provide a portfolio turnover ratio at least once per year. The 
portfolio turnover ratio is a disclosure designed to assist the 
authorizing fiduciary or IRA owner by disclosing the amount of turnover 
or churning in the portfolio during the applicable period. Section 
III(f)(4)(B) describes the ``annualized portfolio turnover ratio'' as 
calculated as a percentage of the plan assets over which the fiduciary 
had discretionary investment authority at any time during the period 
covered by the report.
    The commenter addressed the application of the portfolio turnover 
ratio disclosure requirement to investment advice fiduciaries. The 
commenter argued that the provision of the portfolio turnover ratio was 
not originally required under the exemption and was not workable in the 
investment adviser context since the adviser does not manage the 
investor's portfolio.
    The Department acknowledges that Section III(f), prior to the 
amendment, included potentially contradictory language regarding the 
applicability of the portfolio turnover ratio disclosure to investment 
advice fiduciaries. In addition, the Department concurs with the 
commenter that the portfolio turnover ratio may not be as necessary to 
plans and participants and beneficiaries in the context of an 
investment advice relationship, as opposed to an investment management 
relationship where the fiduciary is making discretionary investment 
decisions. As a result, the final exemption makes clear that the 
portfolio turnover ratio is not required from fiduciaries that have not 
exercised discretionary authority over trading in the plan's account 
during the applicable year.

Exceptions From Conditions in Section V

Recapture of Profits Exception

    Section V(b) of the amended exemption provides that certain 
conditions in Section III do not apply in any case where the person who 
is engaging in a covered transaction returns or credits to the plan all 
profits earned by that person and any Related Entity in connection with 
the securities transactions associated with the covered transaction. 
This provision is referred to as the recapture of profits exception. 
The Department provided an exception from the conditions in Section III 
for the recapture of profits due to the benefits to the plans and IRAs 
of such arrangements.
    As explained above, discretionary trustees were first permitted to 
rely on PTE 86-128 without meeting the ``recapture of profits'' 
provision pursuant to an amendment in 2002 (2002 Amendment). The 2002 
Amendment imposed additional conditions on such trustees. However, the 
2002 Amendment also introduced uncertainty as to whether trustees could 
continue to rely on the recapture of profits exception instead of 
complying with the additional conditions. The Department did not intend 
to call such arrangements into question, and, accordingly, has modified 
the exemption to permit trustees to utilize the exception as originally 
permitted in PTE 86-128 for the recapture of profits.
    The Department received a supportive comment on these provisions 
and has finalized the amendments as proposed.

Pooled Funds

    Section V(c) provides special rules for pooled funds. Under that 
provision, the disclosure and authorization conditions set forth in 
Section III(b), (c) and (d) do not apply to pooled funds, if the 
alternate conditions in Section V(c) are satisfied. One such condition, 
in Section V(c)(1)(B), is that

[t]he authorizing fiduciary is furnished with any reasonably 
available information that the person engaging or proposing to 
engage in the covered transaction reasonably believes to be 
necessary to determine whether the authorization should be given or 
continued, not less than 30 days prior to implementation of the 
arrangement or material change thereto, including (but not limited 
to) a description of the person's brokerage placement practices, 
and, where requested any other reasonably available information 
regarding the matter upon the reasonable request of the authorizing 
fiduciary at any time.

    The proposed amendment to PTE 86-128 included a revision to this 
provision, under which the authorizing fiduciary would be furnished 
with information ``reasonably necessary'' to determine whether the 
authorization should be given or continued, rather than ``reasonably 
available information'' that the investment advice fiduciary or 
investment management fiduciary reasonably believed is necessary to 
determine whether the authorization should be given or continued. One 
commenter objected to this proposed revision, on the basis that this 
new standard might require the fiduciary to provide information not in 
its possession or to prove that it had provided all information others 
might find relevant, and as a result, could cause fiduciaries to stop 
relying on the exemption.
    The Department proposed the revision with a ``reasonableness'' 
qualifier to avoid overbroad application. However, the Department 
understands market participants' preference for a longstanding 
standard. As a practical matter, the Department does not believe that 
there will be much difference in the materials provided under this 
standard than under the one proposed. The authorizing fiduciary must 
still review sufficient information to determine whether the 
authorization should be given or continued. The Department, therefore, 
has accepted the comment, and the final amendment reverts back to the 
original language.

Recordkeeping Requirements

    A new Section VI to PTE 86-128 requires the fiduciary engaging in a 
transaction covered by the exemption to maintain for six years records 
necessary to enable certain persons (described in Section VI(b)) to 
determine whether the conditions of this exemption have been

[[Page 21198]]

met with respect to the transaction. The recordkeeping requirement is 
consistent with other existing class exemptions as well as the 
recordkeeping provisions of the other exemptions published in this 
issue of the Federal Register.
    One commenter addressed the proposed record keeping requirement. 
The commenter suggested that the requirement should contain a 
``reasonableness'' standard. The commenter also suggested that the 
exemption make clear that access by plans and participants and 
beneficiaries is limited to their own plans and their own accounts, and 
that any failure to maintain the required records with respect to a 
given transaction or set of transactions does not affect exemptive 
relief for other transactions. Lastly, the commenter indicated that the 
30 day requirement for notice with respect to a refusal of disclosure 
of records, on the basis that the records involve privileged trade 
secrets or other privileged commercial or financial information, was 
not sufficient. The commenter sought a 90-day period.
    The Department has modified the recordkeeping provision to include 
a reasonableness standard for making the records available, and clarify 
which parties may view the records that are maintained by the fiduciary 
engaging in the covered transaction. As revised, the exemption requires 
the records be ``reasonably'' available, rather than ``unconditionally 
available'' and does not authorize plan fiduciaries, participants, 
beneficiaries, contributing employers, employee organizations with 
members covered by the plan, and IRA owners to examine records 
regarding another plan or IRA. In addition, fiduciaries are not 
required to disclose privileged trade secrets or privileged commercial 
or financial information to any of the parties other than the 
Department, as was also true of the proposal.
    The Department also added new language to the recordkeeping 
condition to indicate that the consequences of failure to comply with 
the recordkeeping requirement are limited to the transactions affected 
by the failure. Therefore, a new Section VI(b)(4) provides that

    Failure to maintain the required records necessary to determine 
whether the conditions of this exemption have been met will result 
in the loss of the exemption only for the transaction or 
transactions for which records are missing or have not been 
maintained. It does not affect the relief for other transactions.

    Finally, in accordance with other exemptions granted and amended 
today, Financial Institutions are also not required to disclose records 
if such disclosure would be precluded by 12 U.S.C. 484, relating to 
visitorial powers over national banks and federal savings 
associations.\47\ The Department has not accepted the commenter's 
request to extend the response period from 30 days to 90 days for 
notifying a party seeking records that the records are exempt from 
disclosure based on the assertion that disclosure would divulge trade 
secrets or privileged information. The Department notes that this 
provision is standard in many prohibited transaction exemptions.\48\ 
The Department does not anticipate that this provision will be widely 
used and believes the 30 day period is sufficient for the unusual 
circumstance in which it is invoked.
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    \47\ A commenter with respect to the Best Interest Contract 
Exemption raised concerns that the Department's right to review a 
bank's records under that exemption could conflict with federal 
banking laws that prohibit agencies other than the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) from exercising ``visitorial'' 
powers over national banks and federal savings associations. To 
address the comment, Financial Institutions are not required to 
disclose records if the disclosure would be precluded by 12 U.S.C. 
484. A corresponding change was made in this exemption.
    \48\ See e.g., PTE 2015-08, 80 FR 44753 (July 27, 2015) (Wells 
Fargo Company); PTE 2015-09, 80 FR 44760 (July 27, 2015) (Robert W. 
Baird & Co., Inc.); PTE 2014-06, 79 FR 3072 (July 24, 2014) (AT&T 
Inc.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Definitions

    Section VII of PTE 86-128 sets forth definitions applicable to the 
exemption. One commenter suggested revisions to the definition of 
``independent'' in Section VII(f). This term is used in connection with 
the authorization requirements under the exemption and it requires that 
the person making the authorizations be independent of the investment 
advice fiduciary or investment management fiduciary seeking to rely on 
the exemption. As proposed, the definition of independent would have 
precluded the authorizing entity from receiving any compensation or 
other consideration for his or her own account from the investment 
advice fiduciary or investment management fiduciary.
    A commenter indicated that the definition might inadvertently 
disqualify certain entities that provide services (e.g., accounting, 
legal or consulting) to the fiduciary from utilizing the services of 
the fiduciary because they could not provide the independent 
authorizations required under the exemption. The commenter suggested 
defining entities that receive less than 5% of their gross income from 
the fiduciary as ``independent.''
    The Department agrees with the commenter; provided, however, that 
the expanded definition is determined based on the current tax year and 
may not be in excess of 2% of the fiduciary's annual revenues based on 
the prior year. This approach is consistent with the Department's 
general approach to fiduciary independence. For example, the prohibited 
transaction exemption procedures provide a presumption of independence 
for appraisers and fiduciaries if the revenue they receive from a party 
is not more than 2% of their total annual revenue.\49\ We have revised 
the definition accordingly.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \49\ 29 CFR 2570.31(j).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The same commenter indicated that the exemption's definition of IRA 
in Section VII(k) should not include other non-ERISA plans covered by 
Code section 4975, such as Health Savings Accounts (HSAs), Archer 
Medical Savings Accounts and Coverdell Education Savings Accounts. 
However, in response, the Department notes that these accounts, like 
IRAs, are tax-preferred. Further, some of the accounts, such as HSAs, 
can be used as long term savings accounts for retiree health care 
expenses. These types of accounts also are expressly defined by Code 
section 4975(e)(1) as plans that are subject to the Code's prohibited 
transaction rules. Thus, although they generally may hold fewer assets 
and may exist for shorter durations than IRAs, there is no statutory 
reason to treat them differently than other conflicted transactions and 
no basis for suspecting that the conflicts are any less influential 
with respect to advice with respect to these arrangements. Accordingly, 
the Department does not agree with the commenters that the owners of 
these accounts are entitled to less protection than IRA investors. The 
Regulation continues to include advisers to these ``plans,'' and this 
exemption provides relief to them in the same manner it does for 
individual retirement accounts described in section 408(a) of the Code.

Amendment to and Partial Revocation of PTE 75-1

PTE 75-1, Part I(b) and (c)

    The Department is revoking Part I(b) and I(c) of PTE 75-1, and Part 
II(2) of PTE 75-1. Part I(b) of PTE 75-1 provided relief from ERISA 
section 406 and the taxes imposed by Code section 4975(a) and (b), for 
the effecting of securities transactions, including clearance, 
settlement or custodial functions incidental to effecting the 
transactions, by parties in interest or disqualified persons other than 
fiduciaries. Part I(c) of PTE 75-1 provided relief from ERISA section 
406

[[Page 21199]]

and Code section 4975(a) and (b) for the furnishing of advice regarding 
securities or other property to a plan or IRA by a party in interest or 
disqualified person under circumstances which do not make the party in 
interest or disqualified person a fiduciary with respect to the plan or 
IRA.
    PTE 75-1 was granted shortly after ERISA's passage in order to 
provide certainty to the securities industry over the nature and extent 
to which ordinary and customary transactions between broker-dealers and 
plans or IRAs would be subject to the ERISA prohibited transaction 
rules. Paragraphs (b) and (c) in Part I of PTE 75-1, specifically, 
served to provide exemptive relief for certain non-fiduciary services 
provided by broker-dealers in securities transactions. Code section 
4975(d)(2), ERISA section 408(b)(2) and regulations thereunder, have 
clarified the scope of relief for service providers to plans and 
IRAs.\50\ The Department believes that the relief provided in Parts 
I(b) and I(c) of PTE 75-1 duplicates the relief available under the 
statutory exemptions. Therefore, the Department is revoking these 
parts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \50\ See 29 CFR 2550.408b-2, 42 FR 32390 (June 24, 1977) and 
Reasonable Contract or Arrangement under Section 408(b)(2)--Fee 
Disclosure, Final Rule, 77 FR 5632 (Feb. 3, 2012).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

PTE 75-1, Part II

    As noted earlier, the exemption in PTE 75-1, Part II(2), is being 
incorporated into PTE 86-128. Accordingly, the Department is revoking 
PTE 75-1, Part II(2). In connection with the revocation of PTE 75-1, 
Part II(2), the Department is amending Section (e) of the remaining 
exemption in PTE 75-1, Part II, the recordkeeping provisions of the 
exemption, to place the recordkeeping responsibility on the broker-
dealer, reporting dealer, or bank engaging in transactions with the 
plan or IRA, as opposed to the plan or IRA itself.
    A few commenters suggested that the Department should not revoke 
PTE 75-1, Part II(2). They argued that that exemption provides needed 
relief for consideration received in connection with mutual fund share 
transactions.
    As stated above, the Department disagrees. PTE 75-1, Part II(2) was 
an exemption that was broadly interpreted beyond what was intended, and 
that contained minimal safeguards. Providing an exemption for 
fiduciaries to receive compensation under the conditions of PTE 75-1, 
Part II(2) is not protective of retirement investors. Instead, the 
Department has provided relatively limited relief for mutual fund 
transactions in Section I(b) of the amended PTE 86-128 and much broader 
relief in the Best Interest Contract Exemption. The Best Interest 
Contract Exemption, as stated above, imposes more appropriate 
conditions on the receipt of compensation that goes beyond simple 
commissions.

Applicability Date

    The Regulation will become effective June 7, 2016 and these amended 
exemptions are issued on that same date. The Regulation is effective at 
the earliest possible effective date under the Congressional Review 
Act. For the exemptions, the issuance date serves as the date on which 
the amended exemptions are intended to take effect for purposes of the 
Congressional Review Act. This date was selected in order to provide 
certainty to plans, plan fiduciaries, plan participants and 
beneficiaries, IRAs, and IRA owners that the new protections afforded 
by the Regulation are officially part of the law and regulations 
governing their investment advice providers, and to inform financial 
services providers and other affected service providers that the 
Regulation and amended exemptions are final and not subject to further 
amendment or modification without additional public notice and comment. 
The Department expects that this effective date will remove uncertainty 
as an obstacle to regulated firms allocating capital and other 
resources toward transition and longer term compliance adjustments to 
systems and business practices.
    The Department has also determined that, in light of the importance 
of the Regulation's consumer protections and the significance of the 
continuing monetary harm to retirement investors without the rule's 
changes, that an Applicability Date of April 10, 2017, is adequate time 
for plans and their affected financial services and other service 
providers to adjust to the basic change from non-fiduciary to fiduciary 
status. The amendments to and partial revocations of PTEs 86-128 and 
75-1, Part II, as finalized herein have the same Applicability Date; 
parties may therefore rely on the amended exemptions beginning on the 
Applicability Date. For the avoidance of doubt, no revocation will be 
applicable prior to the Applicability Date.

Paperwork Reduction Act Statement

    In accordance with the requirements of the Paperwork Reduction Act 
of 1995 (PRA) (44 U.S.C. 3506(c)(2)), the Amendment to and Partial 
Revocation of Prohibited Transaction Exemption (PTE) 86-128 for 
Securities Transactions Involving Employee Benefit Plans and Broker-
Dealers; and the Amendment to and Partial Revocation of PTE 75-1, 
Exemptions From Prohibitions Respecting Certain Classes of Transactions 
Involving Employee Benefits Plans and Certain Broker-Dealers, Reporting 
Dealers and Banks published as part of the Department's proposal to 
amend its 1975 rule that defines when a person who provides investment 
advice to an employee benefit plan or IRA becomes a fiduciary, 
solicited comments on the information collections included therein. The 
Department also submitted an information collection request (ICR) to 
OMB in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 3507(d), contemporaneously with the 
publication of the proposed regulation, for OMB's review. The 
Department received two comments from one commenter that specifically 
addressed the paperwork burden analysis of the information collections. 
Additionally, many comments were submitted, described elsewhere in the 
preamble to the accompanying final rule, which contained information 
relevant to the costs and administrative burdens attendant to the 
proposals. The Department took into account such public comments in 
connection with making changes to the prohibited transaction exemption, 
analyzing the economic impact of the proposals, and developing the 
revised paperwork burden analysis summarized below.
    In connection with publication of this final amendment to and 
partial revocation of PTE 86-128 and this final amendment to and 
partial revocation of PTE 75-1, the Department is submitting an ICR to 
OMB requesting approval of a revision to OMB Control Number 1210-0059. 
The Department will notify the public when OMB approves the revised 
ICR.
    A copy of the ICR may be obtained by contacting the PRA addressee 
shown below or at http://www.RegInfo.gov. PRA ADDRESSEE: G. Christopher 
Cosby, Office of Policy and Research, U.S. Department of Labor, 
Employee Benefits Security Administration, 200 Constitution Avenue NW., 
Room N-5718, Washington, DC 20210. Telephone: (202) 693-8824; Fax: 
(202) 219-4745. These are not toll-free numbers.
    As discussed in detail below, as amended, PTE 86-128 will require 
financial firms to make certain disclosures to plan fiduciaries and 
owners of managed IRAs in order to receive relief from ERISA's and the 
Code's prohibited transaction rules for the receipt of commissions and 
to engage in transactions involving mutual

[[Page 21200]]

fund shares.\51\ Financial firms relying on either PTE 86-128 or PTE 
75-1, as amended, will be required to maintain records necessary to 
demonstrate that the conditions of these exemptions have been met. 
These requirements are information collection requests (ICRs) subject 
to the Paperwork Reduction Act.
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    \51\ As discussed below, the amendment requires investment 
managers to meet the terms of the exemption before engaging in 
covered transactions with respect to IRAs, and revokes relief for 
investment advice fiduciaries with respect to IRAs.
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    The Department has made the following assumptions in order to 
establish a reasonable estimate of the paperwork burden associated with 
these ICRs:
     51.8 percent of disclosures to retirement investors with 
respect to ERISA plans \52\ and 44.1 percent of disclosures to 
retirement investors with respect to IRAs and non-ERISA plans \53\ will 
be distributed electronically via means already used by respondents in 
the normal course of business and the costs arising from electronic 
distribution will be negligible, while the remaining disclosures will 
be distributed on paper and mailed at a cost of $0.05 per page for 
materials and $0.49 for first class postage; \54\
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    \52\ According to data from the National Telecommunications and 
Information Agency (NTIA), 33.4 percent of individuals age 25 and 
over have access to the Internet at work. According to a Greenwald & 
Associates survey, 84 percent of plan participants find it 
acceptable to make electronic delivery the default option, which is 
used as the proxy for the number of participants who will not opt 
out that are automatically enrolled (for a total of 28.1 percent 
receiving electronic disclosure at work). Additionally, the NTIA 
reports that 38.9 percent of individuals age 25 and over have access 
to the Internet outside of work. According to a Pew Research Center 
survey, 61 percent of Internet users use online banking, which is 
used as the proxy for the number of Internet users who will opt in 
for electronic disclosure (for a total of 23.7 percent receiving 
electronic disclosure outside of work). Combining the 28.1 percent 
who receive electronic disclosure at work with the 23.7 percent who 
receive electronic disclosure outside of work produces a total of 
51.8 percent who will receive electronic disclosure overall.
    \53\ According to data from the NTIA, 72.4 percent of 
individuals age 25 and older have access to the Internet. According 
to a Pew Research Center survey, 61 percent of Internet users use 
online banking, which is used as the proxy for the number of 
Internet users who will opt in for electronic disclosure. Combining 
these data produces an estimate of 44.1 percent of individuals who 
will receive electronic disclosures.
    \54\ The Department received a comment stating that no cost of 
postage had been considered in the proposal. In fact, postage had 
been considered. Detail has been added for improved transparency.
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     Financial institutions will use existing in-house 
resources to prepare the legal authorizations and disclosures, and 
maintain the recordkeeping systems necessary to meet the requirements 
of the exemption;
     A combination of personnel will perform the tasks 
associated with the ICRs at an hourly wage rate of $167.32 for a 
financial manager, $55.21 for clerical personnel, and $133.61 for a 
legal professional; \55\ and
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    \55\ For a description of the Department's methodology for 
calculating wage rates, see http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/labor-cost-inputs-used-in-ebsa-opr-ria-and-pra-burden-calculations-march-2016.pdf. The Department's methodology for calculating the overhead 
cost input of its wage rates was adjusted from the proposed 
amendment to this PTE to the final amendment to this PTE. In the 
proposal, the Department based its overhead cost estimates on 
longstanding internal EBSA calculations for the cost of overhead. In 
response to a public comment stating that the overhead cost 
estimates were too low and without any supporting evidence, the 
Department incorporated published U.S. Census Bureau survey data on 
overhead costs into its wage rate estimates.
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     Approximately 2,800 financial institutions \56\ will take 
advantage of this exemption and they will use this exemption in 
conjunction with transactions involving 23.7 percent of their client 
plans and managed IRAs.\57\
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    \56\ One commenter questioned the basis for the Department's 
assumption regarding the number of Financial Institutions likely to 
use the exemption. According to the ``2015 Investment Management 
Compliance Testing Survey,'' Investment Adviser Association, cited 
in the regulatory impact analysis for the accompanying rule, 63 
percent of Registered Investment Advisers service ERISA-covered 
plans and IRAs. The Department is using this to form a proxy for the 
share of broker-dealers that service ERISA-covered plans and IRAs. 
The Department conservatively assumes that all of the 42 large 
broker-dealers, 63 percent of the 233 medium broker-dealers (147), 
and 63 percent of the 3,682 small broker-dealers (2,320) work with 
ERISA-covered plans and IRAs. Therefore, of the 3,997 broker-dealers 
registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission, 2,536 
broker-dealers service ERISA-covered plans and managed IRAs. The 
Department anticipates that the exemption will be used primarily, 
but not exclusively, by broker-dealers. Further, the Department 
assumes that all broker-dealers servicing the retirement market will 
use the exemption. The Department believes that some Registered 
Investment Advisers will use the exemption, but all of those RIAs 
will be dually registered and accounted for in the broker-dealer 
counts. The Department has rounded up to 2,800 to account for any 
other financial institutions that may use the exemption. Further, 
the Department assumes that approximately 1,800 of the financial 
institutions using the exemption focus their business primarily on 
ERISA-covered plans, while 1,000 of the financial institutions using 
the exemption focus their business primarily on managed IRAs and 
non-ERISA plans.
    \57\ This is a weighted average of the Department's estimates of 
the share of DB plans and DC plans with broker-dealer relationships. 
The Department does not have a reliable estimate of the number of 
managed IRAs, and non-ERISA plans with relationships with financial 
institutions seeking exemptive relief, but believes it to be less 
than 10,000, which would not materially impact the weighted average.
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Disclosures and Consent Forms

    In order to receive commissions in conjunction with the purchase of 
mutual fund shares and other securities, sections III(b) and III(d) of 
PTE 86-128 as amended require financial institutions to obtain advance 
written authorization from a plan fiduciary independent of the 
financial institutions (the authorizing fiduciary), or managed IRA 
owner, and furnish the authorizing fiduciary or managed IRA owner with 
information necessary to determine whether an authorization should be 
made, including a copy of the exemption, a form for termination, a 
description of the financial institution's brokerage placement 
practices, and any other reasonably available information regarding the 
matter that the authorizing fiduciary or managed IRA owner requests.
    Section III(c) requires financial institutions to obtain annual 
written reauthorization or provide the authorizing fiduciary or managed 
IRA owner with an annual termination form explaining that the 
authorization is terminable at will, without penalty to the plan or 
IRA, and that failure to return the form will result in continued 
authorization for the financial institution to engage in covered 
transactions on behalf of the plan or IRA. Furthermore, Section III(e) 
requires the financial institution to provide the authorizing fiduciary 
with either (a) a confirmation slip for each individual securities 
transaction within 10 days of the transaction containing the 
information described in Rule 10b-10(a)(1-7) under the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, 17 CFR 240.10b-10 or (b) a quarterly report 
containing certain financial information including the total of all 
transaction-related charges incurred by the plan. The Department 
assumes that financial institutions will meet this requirement for 40 
percent of plans and IRAs through the provision of a confirmation slip, 
which already is provided to their clients in the normal course of 
business, while financial institutions will meet this requirement for 
60 percent of plans and IRAs through provision of the quarterly report.
    Finally, Section III(f) requires the financial institution to 
provide the authorizing fiduciary or managed IRA owner with an annual 
summary of the confirmation slips or quarterly reports. The summary 
must contain the following information: The total of all securities 
transaction-related charges incurred by the plan or IRA during the 
period in connection with the covered securities transactions; the 
amount of the securities transaction-related charges retained by the 
authorized person and the amount of these charges paid to other persons 
for execution or other services; a description of the financial 
institution's brokerage placement practices if such practices have 
materially changed during the period covered by the summary; and a

[[Page 21201]]

portfolio turnover ratio calculated in a manner reasonably designed to 
provide the authorizing fiduciary the information needed to assist in 
discharging its duty of prudence. Section III(i) states that a 
financial institution that is a discretionary plan trustee who 
qualifies to use the exemption must provide the authorizing fiduciary 
or managed IRA owner with an annual report showing separately the 
commissions paid to affiliated brokers and non-affiliated brokers, on 
both a total dollar basis and a cents-per-share basis.

Legal Costs

    According to the 2013 Form 5500, approximately 681,000 plans exist 
in the United States that could enter into relationships with financial 
institutions. The Department lacks reliable data on the number of 
managed IRA and non-ERISA plans with relationships with broker-dealers, 
but estimates that they number less than 10,000. Of these plans and 
managed IRAs, the Department assumes that 6.5 percent are new plans, 
managed IRAs and non-ERISA plans, or plans, managed IRAs or non-ERISA 
plans entering into relationships with new financial institutions \58\ 
and, as stated previously, 23.7 percent of these plans, managed IRAs 
and non-ERISA plans will engage in transactions covered under this 
class exemption. The Department estimates that reviewing documents and 
granting written authorization to the financial institutions will 
require five hours of legal time for each of the approximately 11,000 
plans, managed IRAs and non-ERISA plans entering into new relationships 
with financial institutions each year.\59\ During the first year that 
these amendments take effect, it will also take five hours of legal 
time each of the approximately 1,000 financial institutions to draft an 
authorization notice to send to managed IRAs and non-ERISA plans that 
are existing clients. Finally, the Department estimates that it will 
take one hour of legal time for each of the approximately 2,800 
financial institutions to produce the annual termination form. This 
legal work results in a total of approximately 59,000 hours at an 
equivalent cost of $7.9 million during the first year and 56,000 hours 
at an equivalent cost of $7.5 million during subsequent years.
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    \58\ This estimate is from the 2011-2013 Form 5500 data sets. 
The Department is using new ERISA plans as a proxy for new non-ERISA 
plans and IRAs.
    \59\ This estimate has been increased from one hour of legal 
time per plan in the proposal in response to a public comment. The 
proposal did not take into account any burden for reviewing the pre-
authorization disclosures.
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Production and Distribution of Required Disclosures

    The Department estimates that approximately 161,000 plans and 2,000 
managed IRAs and non-ERISA plans have relationships with financial 
institutions and are likely to engage in transactions covered under 
this exemption. Of these 161,000 plans and 2,000 managed IRAs and non-
ERISA plans, approximately 11,000 plans, managed IRAs, and non-ERISA 
plans, are new clients to the financial institutions each year.
    The Department estimates that 11,000 plans, managed IRAs and non-
ERISA plans will send financial institutions a two page authorization 
letter each year. Prior to obtaining authorization, financial 
institutions will send the same 11,000 plans, managed IRAs and non-
ERISA plans a seven page pre-authorization disclosure.\60\ During the 
first year, financial institutions will send 2,000 authorization 
notices to existing managed IRA clients and non-ERISA plan clients. 
Paper copies of the authorization letter, pre-authorization disclosure, 
and authorization notice will be mailed for 48.2 percent of the plans 
and 55.9 percent of managed IRAs and non-ERISA plans, and distributed 
electronically for the remaining 51.8 percent and 44.1 percent 
respectively. The Department estimates that electronic distribution 
will result in a de minimis cost, while paper distribution will cost 
approximately $9,000 during the first year and $7,000 during subsequent 
years. Paper distribution of the letter, disclosure, and notice will 
also require two minutes of clerical preparation time per letter, 
disclosure, or notice resulting in a total of 400 hours at an 
equivalent cost of $23,000 during the first year and 300 hours at an 
equivalent cost of approximately $19,000 during subsequent years.\61\
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    \60\ One commenter questioned the availability of the required 
materials necessary to create the pre-authorization disclosure. 
Because PTE 86-128 has been in existence for decades, systems are 
already in place to compile the materials into a disclosure. 
Further, many of the components of the disclosure also fulfill other 
regulatory requirements. Therefore, the Department believes that the 
pre-authorization disclosure can be compiled electronically at de 
minimis cost. The incremental costs to financial institutions of 
printing and distributing this disclosure to plans comprise the only 
additional burden associated with the pre-authorization disclosure.
    \61\ One commenter questioned the basis for this estimate. The 
Department worked with clerical staff to determine that most notices 
and disclosures can be printed and prepared for mailing in less than 
one minute per disclosure. Therefore, an estimate of two minutes per 
disclosure is a conservative estimate.
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    The Department estimates that all of the 161,000 plans and 2,000 
managed IRAs and non-ERISA plans will receive a two-page annual 
termination form from financial institutions; 51.8 percent will be 
distributed electronically to plans and 44.1 percent will be 
distributed electronically to managed IRAs and non-ERISA plans, while 
48.2 percent and 55.9 percent, respectively, will be mailed. The 
Department estimates that electronic distribution will result in a de 
minimis cost, while the paper distribution will cost $47,000. Paper 
distribution will also require two minutes of clerical preparation time 
per form resulting in a total of 3,000 hours at an equivalent cost of 
$146,000.
    The Department estimates that 60 percent of plans, managed IRAs and 
non-ERISA plans (approximately 97,000 plans and 1,000 managed IRAs and 
non-ERISA plans) will receive quarterly two-page transaction reports 
from financial institutions four times per year; 51.8 percent will be 
distributed electronically to plans and 44.1 percent will be 
distributed electronically to managed IRAs and non-ERISA plans, while 
48.2 percent and 55.9 percent, respectively, will be mailed. The 
Department estimates that electronic distribution will result in a de 
minimis cost, while paper distribution will cost $112,000. Paper 
distribution will also require two minutes of clerical preparation time 
per statement resulting in a total of 6,000 hours at an equivalent cost 
of $349,000.
    The Department estimates that all of the 161,000 plans and 2,000 
managed IRAs and non-ERISA plans will receive a five-page annual 
statement with a two-page summary of commissions paid from financial 
institutions; 51.8 percent will be distributed electronically to plans 
and 44.1 percent will be distributed electronically to managed IRAs and 
non-ERISA plans, while 48.2 percent and 55.9 percent, respectively, 
will be mailed. The Department assumes that these disclosures will be 
distributed with the annual termination form, resulting in no further 
clerical hour burden or postage cost. Electronic distribution will 
result in a de minimis cost, while the paper distribution will cost 
$28,000 in materials costs.
    The Department received one comment suggesting that the burden 
analysis in the proposal did not account for any costs to compile data 
necessary to produce the quarterly transaction reports, annual 
statements, and report of commissions paid. In fact, this burden was 
taken into account in the proposal and has been updated here. The 
Department estimates that it will cost financial institutions $3.30 per 
plan,

[[Page 21202]]

managed IRA, or non-ERISA plan, for each of the 161,000 plans and 2,000 
managed IRAs and non-ERISA plans, to track and compile all the 
transactions data necessary to populate the quarterly transaction 
reports, the annual statements, and the report of commissions paid. 
This results in an IT tracking cost of $540,000.\62\
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    \62\ This estimate is based on feedback received from the 
industry in 2008 stating that service providers incur costs of about 
$3 per plan to compile statement and transaction data. This estimate 
has been inflated using the CPI to current dollars.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Recordkeeping Requirement

    Section VI of PTE 86-128, as amended, and condition (e) of PTE 75-
1, Part II, as amended, will require financial institutions to maintain 
or cause to be maintained for six years and disclosed upon request the 
records necessary for the Department, Internal Revenue Service, plan 
fiduciary, contributing employer or employee organization whose members 
are covered by the plan, participants and beneficiaries and managed IRA 
owners to determine whether the conditions of this exemption have been 
met.
    The Department assumes that each financial institution will 
maintain these records in their normal course of business. Therefore, 
the Department has estimated that the additional time needed to 
maintain records consistent with the exemption will only require about 
one-half hour, on average, annually for a financial manager to organize 
and collate the documents or else draft a notice explaining that the 
information is exempt from disclosure, and an additional 15 minutes of 
clerical time to make the documents available for inspection during 
normal business hours or prepare the paper notice explaining that the 
information is exempt from disclosure. Thus, the Department estimates 
that a total of 45 minutes of professional time (30 minutes of 
financial manager time and 15 minutes of clerical time) per financial 
institution per year will be required for a total hour burden of 2,100 
hours at an equivalent cost of $273,000.
    In connection with the recordkeeping and disclosure requirement 
discussed above, Section VI(b) of PTE 86-128 and Section (f) of PTE 75-
1, Part II, provide that parties relying on the exemption do not have 
to disclose trade secrets or other confidential information to members 
of the public (i.e., plan fiduciaries, contributing employers or 
employee organizations whose members are covered by the plan, 
participants and beneficiaries and managed IRA owners), but that in the 
event a party refuses to disclose information on this basis, it must 
provide a written notice to the requester advising of the reasons for 
the refusal and advising that the Department may request such 
information. The Department's experience indicates that this provision 
is not commonly invoked, and therefore, the written notice is rarely, 
if ever, generated. Therefore, the Department believes the cost burden 
associated with this clause is de minimis. No other cost burden exists 
with respect to recordkeeping.

Overall Summary

    Overall, the Department estimates that in order to meet the 
conditions of this amended class exemption, over 13,000 financial 
institutions and plans will produce 910,000 disclosures and notices 
during the first year and 906,000 disclosures and notices during 
subsequent years. These disclosures and notices will result in 
approximately 71,000 burden hours during the first year and 67,000 
burden hours during subsequent years, at an equivalent cost of $8.7 
million and $8.3 million respectively. This exemption will also result 
in a total annual cost burden of almost $736,000 during the first year 
and $734,000 during subsequent years.
    These paperwork burden estimates are summarized as follows:
    Type of Review: Revision of a Currently Approved Information 
Collection.
    Agency: Employee Benefits Security Administration, Department of 
Labor.
    Titles: (1) Amendment to and Partial Revocation of Prohibited 
Transaction Exemption (PTE) 86-128 for Securities Transactions 
Involving Employee Benefit Plans and Broker-Dealers; Amendment to and 
Partial Revocation of PTE 75-1, and (2) Final Investment Advice 
Regulation.
    OMB Control Number: 1210-0059.
    Affected Public: Businesses or other for-profits; not for profit 
institutions.
    Estimated Number of Respondents: 13,445.
    Estimated Number of Annual Responses: 910,063 during the first 
year, 905,632 during subsequent years.
    Frequency of Response: Initially, Annually, When engaging in 
exempted transaction.
    Estimated Total Annual Burden Hours: 70,516 hours during the first 
year, 67,434 hours during subsequent years.
    Estimated Total Annual Burden Cost: $735,959 during the first year, 
$734,055 during subsequent years.

General Information

    The attention of interested persons is directed to the following:
    (1) The fact that a transaction is the subject of an exemption 
under ERISA section 408(a) and Code section 4975(c)(2) does not relieve 
a fiduciary or other party in interest or disqualified person with 
respect to a plan from certain other provisions of ERISA and the Code, 
including any prohibited transaction provisions to which the exemption 
does not apply and the general fiduciary responsibility provisions of 
ERISA section 404 which require, among other things, that a fiduciary 
discharge his or her duties respecting a plan solely in the interests 
of the participants and beneficiaries of the plan. Additionally, the 
fact that a transaction is the subject of an exemption does not affect 
the requirement of Code section 401(a) that the plan must operate for 
the exclusive benefit of the employees of the employer maintaining the 
plan and their beneficiaries;
    (2) In accordance with ERISA section 408(a) and Code section 
4975(c)(2), and based on the entire record, the Department finds that 
the amendments are administratively feasible, in the interests of plans 
and their participants and beneficiaries and IRA owners, and protective 
of the rights of plan participants and beneficiaries and IRA owners;
    (3) These amendments are applicable to a particular transaction 
only if the transaction satisfies the conditions specified in the 
amended exemptions; and
    (4) These amended exemptions will be supplemental to, and not in 
derogation of, any other provisions of ERISA and the Code, including 
statutory or administrative exemptions and transitional rules. 
Furthermore, the fact that a transaction is subject to an 
administrative or statutory exemption is not dispositive of whether the 
transaction is in fact a prohibited transaction.

Amendment to PTE 86-128

    Under section 408(a) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
of 1974, as amended (ERISA) and section 4975(c)(2) of the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1986, as amended (the Code), and in accordance with the 
procedures set forth in 29 CFR part 2570, subpart B (76 FR 66637, 66644 
(October 27, 2011)), the Department amends and restated PTE 86-128 as 
set forth below:

Section I. Covered Transactions

    (a) Securities Transactions Exemptions. If each of the conditions 
of Sections II and III of this exemption is either satisfied or not 
applicable under Section V, the restrictions of ERISA

[[Page 21203]]

section 406(b) and the taxes imposed by Code section 4975(a) and (b) by 
reason of Code section 4975(c)(1)(E) or (F) shall not apply to--(1) A 
plan fiduciary's using its authority to cause a plan to pay a 
Commission directly to that person or a Related Entity as agent for the 
plan in a securities transaction, but only to the extent that the 
securities transactions are not excessive, under the circumstances, in 
either amount or frequency; and (2) A plan fiduciary's acting as the 
agent in an agency cross transaction for both the plan and one or more 
other parties to the transaction and the receipt by such person of a 
Commission from one or more other parties to the transaction.
    (b) Mutual Fund Transactions Exemption. If each condition of 
Sections II and IV is either satisfied or not applicable under Section 
V, the restrictions of ERISA sections 406(a)(1)(A), 406(a)(1)(D) and 
406(b) and the taxes imposed by Code section 4975(a) and (b), by reason 
of Code section 4975(c)(1)(A), (D), (E) and (F), shall not apply to a 
plan fiduciary's using its authority to cause the plan to purchase 
shares of an open end investment company registered under the 
Investment Company Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80a-1 et seq.) (Mutual Fund) 
from such fiduciary, and to the receipt of a Commission by such person 
in connection with such transaction, but only to the extent that such 
transactions are not excessive, under the circumstances, in either 
amount or frequency; provided that, the fiduciary (1) is a broker-
dealer registered under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 
78a et seq.) acting in its capacity as a broker-dealer, and (2) is not 
a principal underwriter for, or affiliated with, such Mutual Fund, 
within the meaning of sections 2(a)(29) and 2(a)(3) of the Investment 
Company Act of 1940.
    (c) Scope of these Exemptions. (1) The exemption set forth in 
Section I(a) does not apply to a transaction if (A) the plan is an 
Individual Retirement Account and (B) the fiduciary engaging in the 
transaction is a fiduciary by reason of the provision of investment 
advice for a fee, described in Code section 4975(e)(3)(B) and the 
applicable regulations.
    (2) The exemption set forth in Section I(b) does not apply to 
transactions involving IRAs.

Section II. Impartial Conduct Standards

    If the fiduciary engaging in the covered transaction is a fiduciary 
within the meaning of ERISA section 3(21)(A)(i) or (ii), or Code 
section 4975(e)(3)(A) or (B), with respect to the assets involved in 
the transaction, the following conditions must be satisfied with 
respect to such transaction to the extent they are applicable to the 
fiduciary's actions:
    (a) When exercising fiduciary authority described in ERISA section 
3(21)(A)(i) or (ii), or Code section 4975(e)(3)(A) or (B), with respect 
to the assets involved in the transaction, the fiduciary acts in the 
Best Interest of the plan at the time of the transaction.
    (b) All compensation received by the person and any Related Entity 
in connection with the transaction is not in excess of reasonable 
compensation within the meaning of ERISA section 408(b)(2) and Code 
section 4975(d)(2).
    (c) The fiduciary's statements about the transaction, fees and 
compensation, Material Conflicts of Interest, and any other matters 
relevant to a plan's investment decisions, are not materially 
misleading at the time they are made. For this purpose, a fiduciary's 
failure to disclose a Material Conflict of Interest relevant to the 
services the fiduciary is providing or other actions it is taking in 
relation to a plan's investment decisions is deemed to be a misleading 
statement.

Section III. Conditions Applicable to Transactions Described in Section 
I(a)

    Except to the extent otherwise provided in Section V of this 
exemption, Section I(a) of this exemption applies only if the following 
conditions are satisfied:
    (a) The person engaging in the covered transaction is not a trustee 
(other than a nondiscretionary trustee), an administrator of the plan, 
or an employer any of whose employees are covered by the plan. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, this condition does not apply to a 
trustee that satisfies Section III(h) and (i).
    (b)(1) The covered transaction is performed under a written 
authorization executed in advance by a fiduciary of each plan whose 
assets are involved in the transaction or, in the case of an IRA, the 
IRA owner. The plan fiduciary is independent of the person engaging in 
the covered transaction. The authorization is terminable at will by the 
plan, without penalty to the plan, upon receipt by the authorized 
person of written notice of termination.
    (2) Notwithstanding subsection (1), with respect to IRA owners or 
non-ERISA plans that are existing customers as of the Applicability 
Date, a person relying on this exemption may satisfy this Section 
III(b) and Section III(d) if, no later than the Applicability Date, the 
person provides the disclosures required by Section III(d) and a form 
expressly providing an election to terminate the services arrangement, 
with instructions on the use of the form, to the IRA owner or plan 
fiduciary. The instructions for such form must include the following 
information:
    (A) The arrangement is terminable at will by the IRA or non-ERISA 
plan, without penalty to the IRA or non-ERISA plan, when the authorized 
person receives (via first class mail, personal delivery, or email) 
from the IRA owner or plan fiduciary, a written notice of the intent of 
the IRA or non-ERISA plan to terminate the arrangement; and
    (B) Failure to return the form or some other written notification 
of the IRA's or non-ERISA plan's intent to terminate the arrangement 
within thirty (30) days from the date the termination form is sent to 
the IRA owner or non-ERISA plan fiduciary will result in the continued 
authorization of the authorized person to engage in the covered 
transactions on behalf of the IRA or non-ERISA plan.
    (c) The authorized person obtains annual reauthorization to engage 
in transactions pursuant to the exemption in the manner set forth in 
Section III(b). Alternatively, the authorized person may supply a form 
expressly providing an election to terminate the authorization 
described in Section III(b) with instructions on the use of the form to 
the authorizing fiduciary or IRA owner no less than annually. The 
instructions for such form must include the following information:
    (1) The authorization is terminable at will by the plan, without 
penalty to the plan, when the authorized person receives (via first 
class mail, personal delivery, or email) from the authorizing fiduciary 
or other plan official having authority to terminate the authorization, 
or in the case of an IRA, the IRA owner, a written notice of the intent 
of the plan to terminate authorization; and
    (2) Failure to return the form or some other written notification 
of the plan's intent to terminate the authorization within thirty (30) 
days from the date the termination form is sent to the authorizing 
fiduciary or IRA owner will result in the continued authorization of 
the authorized person to engage in the covered transactions on behalf 
of the plan.
    (d) Within three months before an initial authorization is made 
pursuant to Section III(b), the authorizing fiduciary or, in the case 
of an IRA, the IRA owner is furnished with a copy of this exemption, 
the form for termination of authorization described in Section III(c), 
a description of the person's brokerage placement practices, and any 
other reasonably available information

[[Page 21204]]

regarding the matter that the authorizing fiduciary or IRA owner 
requests.
    (e) The person engaging in a covered transaction furnishes the 
authorizing fiduciary or IRA owner with either:
    (1) A confirmation slip for each securities transaction underlying 
a covered transaction within ten business days of the securities 
transaction containing the information described in Rule 10b-10(a)(1-7) 
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; or
    (2) at least once every three months and not later than 45 days 
following the period to which it relates, a report disclosing:
    (A) A compilation of the information that would be provided to the 
plan pursuant to Section III(e)(1) during the three-month period 
covered by the report;
    (B) the total of all securities transaction-related charges 
incurred by the plan during such period in connection with such covered 
transactions; and
    (C) the amount of the securities transaction-related charges 
retained by such person, and the amount of such charges paid to other 
persons for execution or other services. For purposes of this paragraph 
(e), the words ``incurred by the plan'' shall be construed to mean 
``incurred by the pooled fund'' when such person engages in covered 
transactions on behalf of a pooled fund in which the plan participates.
    (f) The authorizing fiduciary or IRA owner is furnished with a 
summary of the information required under Section III(e)(1) at least 
once per year. The summary must be furnished within 45 days after the 
end of the period to which it relates, and must contain the following:
    (1) The total of all securities transaction-related charges 
incurred by the plan during the period in connection with covered 
securities transactions.
    (2) The amount of the securities transaction-related charges 
retained by the authorized person and the amount of these charges paid 
to other persons for execution or other services.
    (3) A description of the brokerage placement practices of the 
person that is engaging in the covered transaction, if such practices 
have materially changed during the period covered by the summary.
    (4)(A) A portfolio turnover ratio, calculated in a manner which is 
reasonably designed to provide the authorizing fiduciary with the 
information needed to assist in making a prudent determination 
regarding the amount of turnover in the portfolio. The requirements of 
this paragraph (f)(4)(A) will be met if the ``annualized portfolio 
turnover ratio,'' calculated in the manner described in paragraph 
(f)(4)(B), is contained in the summary.
    (B) The ``annualized portfolio turnover ratio'' shall be calculated 
as a percentage of the plan assets consisting of securities or cash 
over which the authorized person had discretionary investment authority 
(the portfolio) at any time or times (management period(s)) during the 
period covered by the report. First, the ``portfolio turnover ratio'' 
(not annualized) is obtained by dividing (i) the lesser of the 
aggregate dollar amounts of purchases or sales of portfolio securities 
during the management period(s) by (ii) the monthly average of the 
market value of the portfolio securities during all management 
period(s). Such monthly average is calculated by totaling the market 
values of the portfolio securities as of the beginning and end of each 
management period and as of the end of each month that ends within such 
period(s), and dividing the sum by the number of valuation dates so 
used. For purposes of this calculation, all debt securities whose 
maturities at the time of acquisition were one year or less are 
excluded from both the numerator and the denominator. The ``annualized 
portfolio turnover ratio'' is then derived by multiplying the 
``portfolio turnover ratio'' by an annualizing factor. The annualizing 
factor is obtained by dividing (iii) the number twelve by (iv) the 
aggregate duration of the management period(s) expressed in months (and 
fractions thereof). Examples of the use of this formula are provided in 
Section VIII.
    (C) The information described in this paragraph (f)(4) is not 
required to be furnished in any case where the authorized person has 
not exercised discretionary authority over trading in the plan's 
account during the period covered by the report.
    For purposes of this paragraph (f), the words ``incurred by the 
plan'' shall be construed to mean ``incurred by the pooled fund'' when 
such person engages in covered transactions on behalf of a pooled fund 
in which the plan participates.
    (g) If an agency cross transaction to which Section V(a) does not 
apply is involved, the following conditions must also be satisfied:
    (1) The information required under Section III(d) or Section 
V(c)(1)(B) of this exemption includes a statement to the effect that 
with respect to agency cross transactions, the person effecting or 
executing the transactions will have a potentially conflicting division 
of loyalties and responsibilities regarding the parties to the 
transactions;
    (2) The summary required under Section III(f) of this exemption 
includes a statement identifying the total number of agency cross 
transactions during the period covered by the summary and the total 
amount of all commissions or other remuneration received or to be 
received from all sources by the person engaging in the transactions in 
connection with the transactions during the period;
    (3) The person effecting or executing the agency cross transaction 
has the discretionary authority to act on behalf of, and/or provide 
investment advice to, either (A) one or more sellers or (B) one or more 
buyers with respect to the transaction, but not both.
    (4) The agency cross transaction is a purchase or sale, for no 
consideration other than cash payment against prompt delivery of a 
security for which market quotations are readily available; and
    (5) The agency cross transaction is executed or effected at a price 
that is at or between the independent bid and independent ask prices 
for the security prevailing at the time of the transaction.
    (h) Except pursuant to Section V(b), a trustee (other than a non-
discretionary trustee) may engage in a covered transaction only with a 
plan that has total net assets with a value of at least $50 million and 
in the case of a pooled fund, the $50 million requirement will be met 
if 50 percent or more of the units of beneficial interest in such 
pooled fund are held by plans having total net assets with a value of 
at least $50 million.
    For purposes of the net asset tests described above, where a group 
of plans is maintained by a single employer or controlled group of 
employers, as defined in ERISA section 407(d)(7), the $50 million net 
asset requirement may be met by aggregating the assets of such plans, 
if the assets are pooled for investment purposes in a single master 
trust.
    (i) The trustee described in Section III(h) engaging in a covered 
transaction furnishes, at least annually, to the authorizing fiduciary 
of each plan the following:
    (1) The aggregate brokerage commissions, expressed in dollars, paid 
by the plan to brokerage firms affiliated with the trustee;
    (2) the aggregate brokerage commissions, expressed in dollars, paid 
by the plan to brokerage firms unaffiliated with the trustee;
    (3) the average brokerage commissions, expressed as cents per 
share, paid by the plan to brokerage firms affiliated with the trustee; 
and

[[Page 21205]]

    (4) the average brokerage commissions, expressed as cents per 
share, paid by the plan (to brokerage firms unaffiliated with the 
trustee.
    For purposes of this paragraph (i), the words ``paid by the plan'' 
shall be construed to mean ``paid by the pooled fund'' when the trustee 
engages in covered transactions on behalf of a pooled fund in which the 
plan participates.
    (j) In the case of securities transactions involving shares of 
Mutual Funds, other than exchange traded funds, at the time of the 
transaction, the shares are purchased or sold at net asset value (NAV) 
plus a commission, in accordance with applicable securities laws and 
regulations.

 IV. Conditions Applicable to Transactions Described in Section I(b)

    Section I(b) of this exemption applies only if the following 
conditions are satisfied:
    (a) The fiduciary engaging in the covered transaction customarily 
purchases and sells securities for its own account in the ordinary 
course of its business as a broker-dealer.
    (b) At the time the transaction is entered into, the terms are at 
least as favorable to the plan as the terms generally available in an 
arm's length transaction with an unrelated party.
    (c) Except to the extent otherwise provided in Section V, the 
requirements of Section III(a) through III(f), III(h) and III(i) (if 
applicable), and III(j) are satisfied with respect to the transaction.

Section V. Exceptions From Conditions

    (a) Certain agency cross transactions. Section III of this 
exemption does not apply in the case of an agency cross transaction, 
provided that the person effecting or executing the transaction:
    (1) Does not render investment advice to any plan for a fee within 
the meaning of ERISA section 3(21)(A)(ii) with respect to the 
transaction;
    (2) is not otherwise a fiduciary who has investment discretion with 
respect to any plan assets involved in the transaction, see 29 CFR 
2510.3-21(d); and
    (3) does not have the authority to engage, retain or discharge any 
person who is or is proposed to be a fiduciary regarding any such plan 
assets.
    (b) Recapture of profits. Sections III(a) and III(i) do not apply 
in any case where the person who is engaging in a covered transaction 
returns or credits to the plan all profits earned by that person and 
any Related Entity in connection with the securities transactions 
associated with the covered transaction.
    (c) Special rules for pooled funds. In the case of a person 
engaging in a covered transaction on behalf of an account or fund for 
the collective investment of the assets of more than one plan (a pooled 
fund):
    (1) Sections III(b), (c) and (d) of this exemption do not apply 
if--
    (A) the arrangement under which the covered transaction is 
performed is subject to the prior and continuing authorization, in the 
manner described in this paragraph (c)(1), of a plan fiduciary with 
respect to each plan whose assets are invested in the pooled fund who 
is independent of the person. The requirement that the authorizing 
fiduciary be independent of the person shall not apply in the case of a 
plan covering only employees of the person, if the requirements of 
Section V(c)(2)(A) and (B) are met.
    (B) The authorizing fiduciary is furnished with any reasonably 
available information that the person engaging or proposing to engage 
in the covered transaction reasonably believes to be necessary to 
determine whether the authorization should be given or continued, not 
less than 30 days prior to implementation of the arrangement or 
material change thereto, including (but not limited to) a description 
of the person's brokerage placement practices, and, where requested any 
other reasonably available information regarding the matter upon the 
reasonable request of the authorizing fiduciary at any time.
    (C) In the event an authorizing fiduciary submits a notice in 
writing to the person engaging in or proposing to engage in the covered 
transaction objecting to the implementation of, material change in, or 
continuation of, the arrangement, the plan on whose behalf the 
objection was tendered is given the opportunity to terminate its 
investment in the pooled fund, without penalty to the plan, within such 
time as may be necessary to effect the withdrawal in an orderly manner 
that is equitable to all withdrawing plans and to the nonwithdrawing 
plans. In the case of a plan that elects to withdraw under this 
subparagraph (c)(1)(C), the withdrawal shall be effected prior to the 
implementation of, or material change in, the arrangement; but an 
existing arrangement need not be discontinued by reason of a plan 
electing to withdraw.
    (D) In the case of a plan whose assets are proposed to be invested 
in the pooled fund subsequent to the implementation of the arrangement 
and that has not authorized the arrangement in the manner described in 
Section V(c)(1)(B) and (C), the plan's investment in the pooled fund is 
subject to the prior written authorization of an authorizing fiduciary 
who satisfies the requirements of subparagraph (c)(1)(A).
    (2) Section III(a) of this exemption, to the extent that it 
prohibits the person from being the employer of employees covered by a 
plan investing in a pool managed by the person, does not apply if--
    (A) The person is an ``investment manager'' as defined in section 
3(38) of ERISA, and
    (B) Either (i) the person returns or credits to the pooled fund all 
profits earned by the person and any Related Entity in connection with 
all covered transactions engaged in by the fund, or (ii) the pooled 
fund satisfies the requirements of paragraph V(c)(3).
    (3) A pooled fund satisfies the requirements of this paragraph for 
a fiscal year of the fund if--
    (A) On the first day of such fiscal year, and immediately following 
each acquisition of an interest in the pooled fund during the fiscal 
year by any plan covering employees of the person, the aggregate fair 
market value of the interests in such fund of all plans covering 
employees of the person does not exceed twenty percent of the fair 
market value of the total assets of the fund; and
    (B) The aggregate brokerage commissions received by the person and 
any Related Entity, in connection with covered transactions engaged in 
by the person on behalf of all pooled funds in which a plan covering 
employees of the person participates, do not exceed five percent of the 
total brokerage commissions received by the person and any Related 
Entity from all sources in such fiscal year.

Section VI. Recordkeeping Requirements

    (a) The plan fiduciary engaging in a covered transaction maintains 
or causes to be maintained for a period of six years, in a manner that 
is reasonably accessible for examination, the records necessary to 
enable the persons described in Section VI(b) to determine whether the 
conditions of this exemption have been met, except that:
    (1) If such records are lost or destroyed, due to circumstances 
beyond the control of the such plan fiduciary, then no prohibited 
transaction will be considered to have occurred solely on the basis of 
the unavailability of those records; and
    (2) No party in interest, other than such plan fiduciary who is 
responsible for complying with this paragraph (a), will be subject to 
the civil penalty that may be assessed under ERISA section

[[Page 21206]]

502(i) or the taxes imposed by Code section 4975(a) and (b), if 
applicable, if the records are not maintained or are not available for 
examination as required by paragraph (b) below; and
    (b)(1) Except as provided below in subparagraph (2), or as 
precluded by 12 U.S.C. 484, and notwithstanding any provisions of ERISA 
section 504(a)(2) and (b), the records referred to in the above 
paragraph are reasonably available at their customary location for 
examination during normal business hours by--
    (A) Any duly authorized employee or representative of the 
Department or the Internal Revenue Service;
    (B) Any fiduciary of the plan or any duly authorized employee or 
representative of such fiduciary;
    (C) Any contributing employer and any employee organization whose 
members are covered by the plan, or any authorized employee or 
representative of these entities; or
    (D) Any participant or beneficiary of the plan or the authorized 
representative of such participant or beneficiary.
    (2) None of the persons described in subparagraph (1)(B)-(D) above 
are authorized to examine privileged trade secrets or privileged 
commercial or financial information of such fiduciary or are authorized 
to examine records regarding a plan or IRA other than the plan or IRA 
with which they are the fiduciary, contributing employer, employee 
organization, participant, beneficiary or IRA owner.
    (3) Should such plan fiduciary refuse to disclose information on 
the basis that such information is exempt from disclosure, such plan 
fiduciary must, by the close of the thirtieth (30th) day following the 
request, provide a written notice advising the requestor of the reasons 
for the refusal and that the Department may request such information.
    (4) Failure to maintain the required records necessary to determine 
whether the conditions of this exemption have been met will result in 
the loss of the exemption only for the transaction or transactions for 
which records are missing or have not been maintained. It does not 
affect the relief for other transactions.

Section VII. Definitions

    The following definitions apply to this exemption:
    (a) The term ``person'' includes the person and affiliates of the 
person.
    (b) An ``affiliate'' of a person includes the following:
    (1) Any person directly or indirectly, through one or more 
intermediaries, controlling, controlled by, or under common control 
with, the person;
    (2) Any officer, director, partner, employee, or relative (as 
defined in ERISA section 3(15)), of the person; and
    (3) Any corporation or partnership of which the person is an 
officer, director or in which such person is a partner.
    A person is not an affiliate of another person solely because one 
of them has investment discretion over the other's assets. The term 
``control'' means the power to exercise a controlling influence over 
the management or policies of a person other than an individual.
    (c) An ``agency cross transaction'' is a securities transaction in 
which the same person acts as agent for both any seller and any buyer 
for the purchase or sale of a security.
    (d) The term ``covered transaction'' means an action described in 
Section I of this exemption.
    (e) The term ``effecting or executing a securities transaction'' 
means the execution of a securities transaction as agent for another 
person and/or the performance of clearance, settlement, custodial or 
other functions ancillary thereto.
    (f) A plan fiduciary is ``independent'' of a person if it (1) is 
not the person, (2) does not receive or is not projected to receive 
within the current federal income tax year, compensation or other 
consideration for his or her own account from the person in excess of 
2% of the fiduciary's annual revenues based upon its prior income tax 
year, and (3) does not have a relationship to or an interest in the 
person that might affect the exercise of the person's best judgment in 
connection with transactions described in this exemption. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, if the plan is an individual retirement 
account not subject to title I of ERISA, and is beneficially owned by 
an employee, officer, director or partner of the person engaging in 
covered transactions with the IRA pursuant to this exemption, such 
beneficial owner is deemed ``independent'' for purposes of this 
definition.
    (g) The term ``profit'' includes all charges relating to effecting 
or executing securities transactions, less reasonable and necessary 
expenses including reasonable indirect expenses (such as overhead 
costs) properly allocated to the performance of these transactions 
under generally accepted accounting principles.
    (h) The term ``securities transaction'' means the purchase or sale 
of securities.
    (i) The term ``nondiscretionary trustee'' of a plan means a trustee 
or custodian whose powers and duties with respect to any assets of the 
plan are limited to (1) the provision of nondiscretionary trust 
services to the plan, and (2) duties imposed on the trustee by any 
provision or provisions of ERISA or the Code. The term 
``nondiscretionary trust services'' means custodial services and 
services ancillary to custodial services, none of which services are 
discretionary. For purposes of this exemption, a person does not fail 
to be a nondiscretionary trustee solely by reason of having been 
delegated, by the sponsor of a master or prototype plan, the power to 
amend such plan.
    (j) The term ``plan'' means an employee benefit plan described in 
ERISA section 3(3) and any plan described in Code section 4975(e)(1) 
(including an Individual Retirement Account as defined in VII(k)).
    (k) The terms ``Individual Retirement Account'' or ``IRA'' mean any 
account or annuity described in Code section 4975(e)(1)(B) through (F), 
including, for example, an individual retirement account described in 
section 408(a) of the Code and a health savings account described in 
section 223(d) of the Code.
    (l) The term ``Related Entity'' means an entity, other than an 
affiliate, in which a person has an interest which may affect the 
person's exercise of its best judgment as a fiduciary.
    (m) A fiduciary acts in the ``Best Interest'' of the plan when the 
fiduciary acts with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the 
circumstances then prevailing that a prudent person acting in a like 
capacity and familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of an 
enterprise of a like character and with like aims, based on the 
investment objectives, risk tolerance, financial circumstances, and 
needs of the plan, without regard to the financial or other interests 
of the fiduciary, its affiliate, a Related Entity or other party.
    (n) The term ``Commission'' means a brokerage commission or sales 
load paid for the service of effecting or executing the transaction, 
but not a 12b-1 fee, revenue sharing payment, marketing fee, 
administrative fee, sub-TA fee or sub-accounting fee.
    (o) A ``Material Conflict of Interest'' exists when a person has a 
financial interest that a reasonable person would conclude could affect 
the exercise of its best judgment as a fiduciary in rendering advice to 
a plan.

Section VIII. Examples Illustrating the Use of the Annualized Portfolio 
Turnover Ratio Described in Section III(f)(4)(B)

    (a) M, an investment manager affiliated with a broker dealer that M 
uses to effect securities transactions for the accounts that it 
manages, exercises

[[Page 21207]]

investment discretion over the account of plan P for the period January 
1, 2014, though June 30, 2014, after which the relationship between M 
and P ceases. The market values of P's account with A at the relevant 
times (excluding debt securities having a maturity of one year or less 
at the time of acquisition) are:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                           Market value
                          Date                             ($ millions)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
January 1, 2014.........................................            10.4
January 31, 2014........................................            10.2
February 28, 2014.......................................             9.9
March 31, 2014..........................................            10.0
April 30, 2014..........................................            10.6
May 31, 2014............................................            11.5
June 30, 2014...........................................            12.0
Sum of market value.....................................            74.6
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Aggregate purchases during the 6-month period were $850,000; 
aggregate sales were $1,000,000, excluding in each case debt securities 
having a maturity of one year or less at the time of acquisition.
    For purposes of Section III(f)(4) of this exemption, M computes the 
annualized portfolio turnover as follows:

A = $850,000 (lesser of purchases or sales)
B = $10,657,143 ($74.6 million divided by 7, i.e., number of 
valuation dates)
Annualizing factor = C/D = 12/6 = 2
Annualized portfolio turnover ratio = 2 x (850,000/10,657,143) = 
0.160 = 16.0 percent

    (b) Same facts as (a), except that M manages the portfolio through 
July 15, 2014, and, in addition, resumes management of the portfolio on 
November 10, 2014, through the end of the year. The additional relevant 
valuation dates and portfolio values are:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                           Market value
                          Dates                            ($ millions)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
July 15, 2014...........................................            12.2
November 10, 2014.......................................             9.4
November 30, 2014.......................................             9.6
December 31, 2014.......................................             9.8
Sum of market values....................................            41.0
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    During the periods July 1, 2014, through July 15, 2014, and 
November 10, 2014, through December 31, 2014, there were an additional 
$650,000 of purchases and $400,000 of sales. Thus, total purchases were 
$1,500,000 (i.e., $850,000 + $650,000) and total sales were $1,400,000 
(i.e., $1,000,000 + $400,000) for the management periods.

M now computes the annualized portfolio turnover as follows:
A = $1,400,000 (lesser of aggregate purchases or sales)
B = $10,509,091 ($10,509,091 ($115.6 million divided by 11)
Annualizing factor = C/D = 12/(6.5 + 1.67) = 1.47
Annualized portfolio turnover ratio = 1.47 x (1,400,000/10,509,091) 
= 0.196 = 19.6 percent.

Restatement of PTE 75-1, Part II

    The Department is proposing to revoke Parts I(b), I(c) and II(2) of 
PTE 75-1. In connection with the proposed revocation of Part II(2), the 
Department is republishing Part II of PTE 75-1. Part II of PTE 75-1 
shall read as follows:
    The restrictions of section 406(a) of the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act of 1974 (the Act) and the taxes imposed by section 
4975(a) and (b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (the Code), by 
reason of section 4975(c)(1)(A) through (D) of the Code, shall not 
apply to any purchase or sale of a security between an employee benefit 
plan and a broker-dealer registered under the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78a et seq.), a reporting dealer who makes primary 
markets in securities of the United States Government or of any agency 
of the United States Government (Government securities) and reports 
daily to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York its positions with 
respect to Government securities and borrowings thereon, or a bank 
supervised by the United States or a State if the following conditions 
are met:
    (a) In the case of such broker-dealer, it customarily purchases and 
sells securities for its own account in the ordinary course of its 
business as a broker-dealer.
    (b) In the case of such reporting dealer or bank, it customarily 
purchases and sells Government securities for its own account in the 
ordinary course of its business and such purchase or sale between the 
plan and such reporting dealer or bank is a purchase or sale of 
Government securities.
    (c) Such transaction is at least as favorable to the plan as an 
arm's length transaction with an unrelated party would be, and it was 
not, at the time of such transaction, a prohibited transaction within 
the meaning of section 503(b) of the Code.
    (d) Neither the broker-dealer, reporting dealer, bank, nor any 
affiliate thereof has or exercises any discretionary authority or 
control (except as a directed trustee) with respect to the investment 
of the plan assets involved in the transaction, or renders investment 
advice (within the meaning of 29 CFR 2510.3-21(c)) with respect to 
those assets.
    (e) The broker-dealer, reporting dealer, or bank engaging in the 
covered transaction maintains or causes to be maintained for a period 
of six years from the date of such transaction such records as are 
necessary to enable the persons described in paragraph (f) of this 
exemption to determine whether the conditions of this exemption have 
been met, except that:
    (1) No party in interest other than the broker-dealer, reporting 
dealer, or bank engaging in the covered transaction, shall be subject 
to the civil penalty, which may be assessed under section 502(i) of the 
Act, or to the taxes imposed by section 4975(a) and (b) of the Code, if 
such records are not maintained, or are not available for examination 
as required by paragraph (f) below; and
    (2) A prohibited transaction will not be deemed to have occurred 
if, due to circumstances beyond the control of the broker-dealer, 
reporting dealer, or bank, such records are lost or destroyed prior to 
the end of such six year period.
    (f)(1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in subsections 
(a)(2) and (b) of section 504 of the Act, the records referred to in 
paragraph (e) are reasonably available for examination during normal 
business hours by:
    (A) Any duly authorized employee or representative of the 
Department or the Internal Revenue Service;
    (B) Any fiduciary of the plan or any duly authorized employee or 
representative of such fiduciary;
    (C) Any contributing employer and any employee organization whose 
members are covered by the plan, or any authorized employee or 
representative of these entities; or
    (D) Any participant or beneficiary of the plan, or IRA owner, or 
the duly authorized representative of such participant or beneficiary; 
and
    (2) None of the persons described in subparagraph (1)(B)-(D) above 
shall be authorized to examine trade secrets or commercial or financial 
information of the broker-dealer, reporting dealer, or bank which is 
privileged or confidential, or records regarding a plan or IRA other 
than the plan or IRA with respect to which they are the fiduciary, 
contributing employer, employee organization, participant, beneficiary, 
or IRA owner.
    (3) Should such broker-dealer, reporting dealer, or bank refuse to 
disclose information on the basis that such information is exempt from 
disclosure, the broker-dealer, reporting dealer, or bank shall, by the 
close of the thirtieth (30th) day following the request, provide a 
written notice advising that person of the reasons for the refusal and 
that the Department may request such information.
    (4) Failure to maintain the required records necessary to determine 
whether the conditions of this exemption have been met will result in 
the loss of the

[[Page 21208]]

exemption only for the transaction or transactions for which records 
are missing or have not been maintained. It does not affect the relief 
for other transactions.
    For purposes of this exemption, the terms ``broker-dealer,'' 
``reporting dealer'' and ``bank'' shall include such persons and any 
affiliates thereof, and the term ``affiliate'' shall be defined in the 
same manner as that term is defined in 29 CFR 2510.3-21(e) and 26 CFR 
54.4975-9(e).

    Signed at Washington, DC, this 1st day of April, 2016.
Phyllis C. Borzi,
Assistant Secretary, Employee Benefits Security Administration, 
Department of Labor.
[FR Doc. 2016-07929 Filed 4-6-16; 11:15 am]
BILLING CODE 4510-29-P